GENERAL C.F. SMITH'S ATTACK ON REBEL RIGHT

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By: Edwin C. Bearrs

FORT DONELSON NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD

ON MICROFILM
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Edwin C. Bearss
Research Historian

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At daybreak on February 15, 1862, when the Confederates launched their powerful onslaught on the Union right, five of the eight brigades, constituting Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant's investing army were operating west of Indian Creek. Detachments drawn from four of these brigades occupied the line of outposts which the Federal officers had established, on the ridges paralleling the commanding ground occupied by the Rebels' rifle pits. The other brigade, Morgan L. Smith's, was held in reserve.

Until the early hours of the 15th, this sector of the Fort Donelson perimeter had been held by Brigadier General Simon B. Buckner's division. In accordance with the plan of operations adopted by the council of war, convened by Brigadier General John B. Floyd on the night of the 14th, it had been determined to use Buckner's troops to bolster Brigadier General Gideon J. Pillow's attack on the Yankees' right. Before Buckner's men could leave the rifle pits which they had held for the past three days, it would be necessary to have troops from another unit relieve them. Colonel John W. Head's 30th Tennessee, which had been holding the Erin Hollow sector, would take Buckner's command's place. Following the departure of Buckner's troops the three-quarters of a mile of rifle
pits, lying to the west of Indian Creek, formerly held by 3,600 soldiers would be occupied by approximately 450 officers and men. The Rebel brass, however, felt justified in taking this calculated risk. Because it was the Rebel generals' considered opinion the Yankees would be so hard-pressed dividing measures to cope with Pillow's assault, they would be unable to capitalize on this situation.¹

When the orders to report to General Buckner reached the 30th Tennessee's command post about 2 a.m., both Colonel Head and Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Murphy were absent. The two colonels, being quite ill, were spending the night at the fort. On perusing the dispatch, the ranking officer present, Major James J. Turner sent a runner to the fort to acquaint Colonel Head with the situation. Pending Head's appearance, the major directed his subordinates to rouse their respective commands. This proved to be quite difficult the major recalled "as many men had scarcely slept for three days and nights, and had lain in the trenches for two days and night in the mud, rain, sleet, and snow, without fire or adequate clothing to protect them from such exposure." Accordingly, considerable time was wasted in forming and mustering the troops. Once the men had fallen in, the regiment moved out. As a result of the icy condition of the road, the march was greatly retarded. Therefore, dawn was approaching before the men of the 30th Tennessee filed into the
trenches. Immediately following the Tennesseans' appearance Buckner's troops, who had been standing by for a considerable time anxiously awaiting their arrival, hit the road.  

Before departing for the Confederates' left, Buckner called for Colonel Head. The colonel, upon receiving Turner's message, had rejoined his command. Buckner informed Head that his regiment was to occupy the rifle pits formerly held by his division, and, "if attacked and overpowered, to fall back into the fort." In an effort to accomplish this difficult assignment, Head divided his command. Major Turner, accompanied by Captains J. L. Carson's, T. C. Martin's, and W. T. Sample's companies, was charged with the defense of the detached rifle pits formerly held by Colonel Roger W. Hansen's 'crack 2d Kentucky. The six other companies belonging to the regiment would hold the trenches previously occupied by the six regiments constituting Colonel John C. Brown's brigade. In deploying his detachment Major Turner placed Carson's and Sample's units in the rifle pits; Martin's was held in reserve. To make matters worse, the three batteries, (Jackson's, Graves', and Porter's), which had employed their 16 guns to assist Buckner's division in holding this sector of the Fort Donelson perimeter, had been withdrawn to support Pillow's attack on the Union right.
At daybreak the Union sharpshooters, with their long-range rifled-muskets, opened fire on Colonel Head's greyclads. Being equipped with "short-range guns" the Tennesseans found it unhealthy to expose themselves. They were forced to "keep well under cover or be picked off." Major Turner recalled, "A more cheerless day we never spent. It was cloudy and cold. For five hours we could hear the clash of arms on the east, and we expected the army to go out, leaving us to hold the fort and surrender."4

The divisions commanded by Brigadier Generals Charles F. Smith and Lewis Wallace spent the night of the 14th on the ridges and in the hollows lying to the west of Indian Creek. Wallace's division, which had been organized during the day, was posted on the right and Smith's on the left. Wallace's main line of resistance rested on the crest of a ridge overlooking the hollow which debouched into Indian Creek, about 250 yards southwest of the Poor house. It was on this ridge that a portion of Brigadier General John A. McClernand's division had camped on the night of the 12th. In Wallace's sector the higher ground was covered with scattered timber, while the slopes of the ridge were heavily wooded. Immediately to the rear of Wallace's position lay the road which served as the line of communications linking the two wings of Grant's investing army. The valley of Indian Creek separated Wallace's right flank unit, Colonel Charles Cruft's brigade, from McClernand's left, which was held by Colonel William H. L. Wallace's troops. Besides being "within good supporting
distance" of Wallace's troops, Cruft's outposts occupied positions "not more than 500 yards from" the Rebels' rifle pits. Wallace's other brigade, commanded by Colonel John M. Thayer, was posted on Cruft's left. Patrols from Thayer's unit were in contact on the left with pickets drawn from General Smith's division. In fact, Wallace, on making a tour of inspection, discovered that his entire line was "within easy cannon-shot" of the Confederate works. Once he had deployed his division, Wallace received his instructions from General Grant. His orders were: to hold his ground and prevent the Rebels from breaking through the investment lines in the Indian Creek sector.5

Upon the advent of darkness, Wallace had his subordinates establish and man a strong line of outposts. The remainder of the troops were permitted to retire from the crest of the ridge. When they reached the hollows behind the ridge the soldiers were allowed to build camp fires. After eating their evening meal Wallace reported his men "laid down as best they could on beds of ice and snow, a strong, cold wind making conditions still more disagreeable." During the night, the quiet was shattered on several different occasions when the Confederate cannoneers dropped a few shells into Wallace's lines. This harassing fire proved to be especially disconcerting to Thayer's troops, a large portion of whom were getting their first taste of combat.6
On Wallace's left General Smith's division continued to occupy the ridge parallel to the one held by the Confederates. The Ridge road served as the boundary between Smith's right and Wallace's left. With the approach of darkness, General Smith directed Colonels John Cook and Jacob G. Lauman, the officers in charge of his two advance brigades, to detail strong detachments to hold their main line of resistance. The remainder of the troops would be recalled. Except for the soldiers assigned to outpost duty, Cook's and Lauman's men were to be permitted to obtain rest and refreshments as circumstances allowed.

Colonel Cook's picket line, on Smith's right, was held by companies drawn from the 50th Illinois, 52d Indiana, and 12th Iowa, supported by the 13th Missouri. These troops, being in proximity to the foe, were denied the use of camp fires. It snowed again on the night of the 14th and the troops, especially those on outpost duty, spent another terrible night exposed to the hostile elements. Colonel Crafts J. Wright the commander of the 13th Missouri reported:

We remained in this position on the ridge opposite the Confederate rifle pits without fires during the storm of rain... sleet, and snow. The clothes of the men were drenched and frozen upon them. I sat upon a log wrapped in my blanket until 3 o'clock, when permission was given to go back half a mile and build fires to dry the men.
It appears, however, that Colonel Wright was mistaken, because Colonel Cook hadn't sanctioned the 13th Missouri's retirement. When advised of Colonel Wright's move Cook was shocked by the regimental commander's apparent flagrant violation of orders. Without bothering to procure his horse, Cook proceeded on foot to the point, where Wright's Missourians were huddled around the newly kindled fires. Hailing the unfortunate Wright, Cook ordered the Missourian to get his troops back to their original position. By the time the regiment returned to the front it was 8 a.m. Fortunately for the bluecoats, the Confederates were busy regrouping their forces preparatory to the attempt to breakout of Fort Donelson. Therefore, no attack was made on Cook's weakened line of outposts during the 13th Missouri's absence.  

Like Colonel Cook, Lauman had called upon his regimental commanders to detail certain companies to hold his brigade's advance position. After these units had occupied his line of outposts, Lauman withdrew the remainder of his troops from the wind swept ridge. Once the lucky individuals of Cook's and Lauman's brigades, who had escaped the disagreeable duty on the picket line, reached the shelter afforded by the hollows overlooking Hickman Creek they quickly kindled camp fires. Gathering around the cheerful flames, the troops heated their coffee, cooked their rations, and dried their clothes. These basic needs taken care of, the
the soldiers threw themselves on the snow covered ground in order to get a few hours' rest.9

General C. F. Smith's third brigade, Lew Wallace's, had left Fort Henry early on the morning of the 14th. By the time Wallace's brigade had reached Mrs. Crisp's log cabin, where Grant maintained his headquarters, Cruft's and Thayer's troops had also reached the Hickman Creek staging area. Accordingly, General Grant drafted an order constituting a new division composed of Cruft's and Thayer's commands. Wallace was placed in charge of the newly organized division. The ranking colonel, Morgan L. Smith, assumed command of Wallace's former brigade following the reorganization.10

Upon being elevated to a brigade command Colonel Morgan L. Smith reported to General C. F. Smith for orders. The general, taking cognizance of the late hour and the limited space available, decided to hold Smith's brigade in reserve for the time being. Therefore, M. L. Smith's troops were permitted to bivouac for the night on either side of the Ridge road, several hundred yards east of Mrs. Crisp's cabin.11

On the 14th Lauman's brigade had been strengthened by the addition of one regiment. The transport, McGall, with the 2d Iowa aboard, had reached the Fort Donelson area at the same time as the convoy carrying Cruft's and Thayer's troops. Arriving at the Hickman Creek
staging area about 11 a.m. the Hawkeyes were assigned to Lauman's brigade. When the 2d Iowa's commander, Colonel James M. Tuttle, reported to Lauman, he was directed to form his regiment on the brigade's extreme left. Scaling the ridge the Iowans took position to the left of the 25th Indiana. Like their comrades-in-arms, the Hawkeyes spent a "cold and disagreeable night, without tents or blankets." 12

Shortly after daybreak on the 15th the full-throated roar of battle, from the northeast caused Wallace to have the "long roll" beaten. As soon as they had mustered their units, the regimental commanders led them to the front. One arriving at the line of outposts the officers quickly formed their men into line of battle. This accomplished they covered their respective fronts with a strong line of skirmishers. Initially Wallace believed McClernand was the attacker. 13

The heavy firing (both artillery and small-arms), however, continued without let up. Finally this served to raise doubts in Wallace's mind as to the correctness of his initial assumption as to who was the aggressor. One hour passed, then the better part of a second, Wallace commenced to wonder -- "would it [the firing] never end." The suspense became exasperating. About 8 a.m. a solitary horseman galloped up to Wallace's command post. The newcomer proved to be Major Mason Brayman, McClernand's assistant adjutant general.
Brayman excitedly informed Wallace that McClernand's division had been attacked and needed assistance badly. Continuing Brayman reported the Confederates, under the cover of darkness, had massed their entire force against McClernand. At the moment, Brayman noted, the situation was critical because not only was the division having to give ground, but its ammunition had commenced to give out.

In conclusion Brayman stated that McClernand had told him, "No one can tell what will be the result if we don't get immediate help."¹⁴

McClernand's message thrust Wallace on the horns of a dilemma. If Wallace chose to be guided by Grant's instructions of the previous afternoon, "to hold...[his] position and prevent the enemy from escaping", his division would have to remain where it was. After explaining his orders to Brayman, Wallace called for one of his staff officers, Lieutenant Addison Ware. The young lieutenant was directed to hasten to Grant's headquarters, acquaint the general with the situation, and request permission for Wallace's division to move to McClernand's assistance. ¹⁵

Pounding up to Grant's headquarters on his sweat-lathered horse, Lieutenant Ware learned the general was absent. One of Grant's aides informed Ware the general had departed several hours before for the fleet anchorage, for the purpose of conferring with Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote. Furthermore, Ware was informed nobody at headquarters felt he had the necessary authority to authorize Wallace
to go to McClernand's assistance. While Ware returned to Wallace's command post, one of Grant's staff officers, Captain William S. Hillyer, headed for the landing. Hillyer's mission was to advise the general of the critical turn of events.16

About daybreak a courier, with a message from Flag Officer Foote, had galloped up to Mrs. Crisp's house. Grant was handed a dispatch informing him the flag officer wished to see him. In his letter, Foote pointed out that his injury (The flag officer had been wounded during the navy's attack on the Water Batteries on the previous afternoon.) prevented him from visiting the general. After directing his adjutant general, Captain John A. Rawlins, to notify each of the division commanders of his absence and "instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders," Grant rode off to confer with Foote. Either Captain Rawlins neglected to carry out Grant's instructions or the staff officers entrusted with their delivery failed to contact all the division commanders. Because Wallace was certainly not appraised of Grant's absence.

During the previous day the road linking Union headquarters with the landing, where the fleet was tied up, had been churned into a sea of mud by the passage of the thousands of reinforcements. The intense cold on the night of the 14th had frozen the ground solid. Consequently, the general found the going difficult as he rode toward the river.
Reaching the landing the general discovered Foote's flagship, the ironclad St. Louis, anchored out in midstream. A small boat was used to ferry the general out to the flagship. Boarding St. Louis, Grant learned from Foote that the ironclads had been badly battered in their attack on the Water Batteries. Foote suggested that Grant should entrench his army, while he returned to Cairo with the two most badly damaged of the ironclads. The other two would be left below Fort Donelson, charged with the mission of protecting the transports. At Cairo, Foote, in addition to supervising the gunboats' repair, would seek to hasten forward the ironclad Benton and the mortar boats. Foote expressed the opinion he could effect the necessary repairs and be back at Fort Donelson inside of ten days. A cursory glance served to convince the general that it was mandatory to place several of the battered ironclads in drydock. Grant parted from the flag officer, believing he would be forced to resort to a siege, if he was to reduce the Confederate stronghold.

Just as Grant stepped ashore, he was greeted by a member of his staff, Captain Hillyer. The general immediately noted that the captain was livid with fear. Hillyer tersely informed Grant, that a powerful Rebel force had sallied from the left flank of the Fort Donelson perimeter, and was in the process of rolling up the Union right. Putting the spurs to his horse the general headed for the point of danger on the gallop.
Having failed to contact General Grant, Lieutenant Ware returned to Wallace's command post. After the lieutenant had informed Wallace that the members of Grant's staff had declined to accept the responsibility for ordering him to reinforce McClerand, Brayman retraced his steps. All this time the roar of the battle seemed to be drawing steadily nearer. This was a clear indication to Wallace that the tide continued to run against the Federals.18

Shortly after Brayman's departure two staff officers thundered up to Wallace's headquarters. The older carried a second dispatch from McClerand. Subsequently Wallace recalled that this officer, "a gray-haired man in uniform" addressed him "with tears in his eyes," as he described the situation on the Union right. After advising Wallace that the Rebels had turned McClerand's right flank, the elderly gentleman exclaimed, "The regiments are being crowded back on the center. We are using ammunition taken from the dead and wounded. The whole army is in danger."19

Wallace's initial impulse had been to send reinforcements when he had been hailed by Major Brayman. But he had hesitated in the face of Grant's injunction, "to hold his position." Now, however, Wallace's first impulse was "seconded by judgment." Wallace knew that if McClerand's division was rolled back on his command, a general panic might ensue. "In the absence of the commanding general," Wallace reasoned, "the responsibility was ... [his]."
Like a good officer Wallace decided to hold his previous orders in abeyance. He determined to march to the sound of the guns. Wallace knew that one regiment would not be enough to cope with the crisis. He would send a brigade. Turning to the grizzled-haired officer, Wallace remarked, "Tell General McClenland that I will send him my first brigade with Colonel Cruft." Pointing to the officer's companion, Wallace continued, "I will retain this gentleman to serve as guide." 20

Having made this important decision Wallace hastened to Cruft's command post. The general, after tersely briefing his subordinate on the critical turn of events, ordered Cruft, "to put ... [his] brigade in rapid motion to the extreme right of our line, for the purpose of re-enforcing General McClenland's division." As the two officers parted, Cruft glanced at his watch -- the time was 8:30 a.m. 21

Immediately following the receipt of his marching orders, the able Cruft sprang into action. Without bothering to recall his skirmishers, Cruft quickly assembled his brigade. Leaving their blankets, knapsacks, and great-coats behind Cruft's troops, guided by McClenland's young staff officer, moved off in column of companies through the woods. Gaining the Pinery road, Cruft's bluecoats turned into a little used country lane. This road ascended the eastern slope of the Indian Creek valley and gave ready access to the Wynn's Ferry road. 22
The departure of Cruft's command left Wallace with only one
brigade -- Thayer's. This brigade continued to hold the ridge
overlooking the hollow which debouched into Indian Creek, about
250 yards southwest of the Poor house. Skirmishers drawn from
Thayer's brigade and those left behind by Cruft occupied the
ravine in front of Wallace's main line of resistance. Some time
after the departure of Cruft's brigade, Wallace was joined by
Grant's adjutant, Captain Rawlins. Wallace succinctly briefed
Rawlins on the contents of McClernand's two messages,
and told of his dispatch of Cruft's brigade to reinforce the
Union right.\textsuperscript{23}

When he was conversing with Rawlins, Wallace sighted a number
of stragglers approaching. These panic-stricken individuals came
dashing up the "half-defined road" which crossed the Indian Creek
valley. Wallace recalled he and Rawlins, "scarcely noticed the
fugitives, so much more were we drawn by the noise behind them.
That grew in volume, being a compound of shouts and yells, mixed
with the rattle of wheels and the rataplan and throbbing rumble
of hoofs in undertone."\textsuperscript{24}

Rawlins in a very agitated frame of mind inquired,"What can
that be?" Wallace replied: "It beats me. But I'll find out."
Spotting an orderly, Wallace shouted, "Ride and see what all that
flurry means." As a suspicion of the truth suddenly struck home,
Wallace bade the aide not to spare his horse. Applying his spurs
to his mount the orderly quickly disappeared from view.\textsuperscript{25}
Rawlins and Wallace sat astride their horses anxiously waiting for the aide to return. Suddenly a wild-eyed, bareheaded officer, mounted on a sweat-streaked horse, came pounding up the road. As the frightened officer thundered passed, he shouted, "We're cut to pieces." Wallace subsequently recalled he "had never seen a case of panic so perfectly defined, and it was curious even impressive." The volatile Rawlins, however, was not disposed to take a philosophical view of the situation. Jerking his revolver from its holster, the captain would have shot "the frantic wretch," had Wallace not caught his hand. Rawlins remonstrated with Wallace. The officers' discussion was quickly terminated, however, when the orderly came galloping up with an ominous look on his face.26

"What is it!" Wallace bellowed. The aide excitedly replied, "The road back there is jammed with wagons, and men afoot and on horseback, all coming toward us. On the plains we would call it a stampedede." Rawlins and Wallace looked at each other and there was no need for any additional questions. McClernand's division was in full retreat. Rawlins immediately inquired, "What are you going to do." Wallace replied, "There's but one thing I can do." "What is that?" asked Rawlins. "Get this brigade [Thayer's] out of the way." Wallace noted, "If those fellows strike my people, they will communicate the panic." In reply Rawlins wanted to know, where Wallace, proposed to send Thayer's troops. Pointing to the west,
Wallace remarked, "To take that way is to retreat, and carry the panic to General Smith; so I'll go right up this road toward the enemy." His question answered, Rawlins prepared to return to headquarters. When he started for the rear, Rawlins held his horse to a walk, in order not to alarm the men whom he passed.  

Even before Rawlins had disappeared from view, Wallace ordered the drummers to beat the "long roll." The regimental commanders quickly formed their respective units. Lieutenant Peter Wood was alerted to have his six gun battery (Battery A, 1st Illinois Light Artillery) accompany Thayer's brigade. By 10 a.m. the officers had assembled their men. Wallace then ordered Thayer to move by the right flank and support McClernand's troops. Accordingly, Thayer barked out the command: "By the right flank, file left." Thayer's brigade moved out in column of companies. The sight of Thayer's resolute troops caused Wallace's spirits to boom. Rising to the occasion the general shouted out the command, "right shoulder shift, double-quick" time march.  

A short time before Wallace decided to commit Thayer, three additional regiments had reinforced the latter officer's command. These units -- the 46th, 57th, and 58th Illinois -- had been transported to the Fort Donelson area on the same convoy as Thayer's and Cruft's brigades. Disembarking at the landing, four miles below the Water Batteries, the Illinoisans had marched to the Hickman Creek
staging area on the 14th. Here the regimental commanders received orders attaching their respective units to Thayer's brigade. On the following morning the three regiments moved to the front, where they reported to Colonel Thayer.29

Wallace paused for a few moments, following Thayer's departure, to try and rally the "sunshine soldiers" from McClernand's division. Unable to accomplish much Wallace, accompanied by his staff, prepared to ride toward the gathering storm. Just as he was preparing to leave the ridge, Wallace remembered Cruft's skirmishers. An aide was detached with instructions to assemble these individuals and hurry to the division's support.30

In addition to Wallace's division, one of General C. F. Smith's three brigades was sent from the Union left to bolster McClernand's hard-pressed division. The brigade commanded by Colonel M. L. Smith was held in reserve by General Smith on the morning of the 15th. When Major Brayman had returned with the information that General Wallace was unable to send help, McClernand called for Captain George P. Edgar. McClernand directed Edgar to hasten to General Smith's headquarters with a request for reinforcements. Smith, like Wallace, in the face of Grant's instructions to hold his position, declined to rush any troops to McClernand's support. It was indeed fortunate for the Union that Wallace finally decided to reinforce McClernand. Otherwise the battle would have probably been lost, while the Federal officers wasted valuable time waiting for Grant to return from his conference with Flag Officer Foote.31
By the time Grant returned to his GHQ, it was past 11 a.m. Following a brief conference with his staff, the general started for the point of danger. On passing Smith’s division, Grant issued orders for the general to send M. L. Smith’s brigade to stiffen the Union right. Quickly falling in Morgan L. Smith’s troops moved off at a rapid pace.

At dawn, Lauman’s and Cook’s troops, who had spent the night camped in the hollows in the rear of Smith’s division’s main line of resistance, returned to the front. The various units occupied approximately the same positions, on the ridge facing the Confederate rifle pits, as they had on the previous afternoon. General Smith’s left flank brigade — Lauman’s — was deployed from left to right: the 2d Iowa, 25th Indiana, 7th and 14th Iowa, and 14th Missouri. Colonel Cook, whose brigade formed the division’s right, placed four of his regiments in line. These units were posted from left to right: the 12th Iowa, 50th Illinois, 13th Missouri, and 52d Indiana.

Cook’s fifth regiment — the 7th Illinois — as on the preceding day, supported Battery D, 1st Missouri Light Artillery.

Under the cover of darkness, Captain Henry Richardson’s cannoneers had shifted two of their Parrott rifles. These guns had been moved into position on the ridge, near where Captain Edward McAllister’s artillerists had emplaced their 2½-pounder howitzers on the 13th. A slight earthwork was thrown up for the guns’ protection.

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At the time the Missourians emplaced their two Parrots the ridge was occupied by Lew Wallace's troops. Accordingly, the 7th Illinois had remained where it was affording infantry protection to Richardson's other section. These two pieces were emplaced about 400 yards southwest of the advanced position. The other battery drawn from the 1st Missouri Light Artillery (K), which was currently operating with Smith's division continued to be held in reserve, near the Ridge road.

Once they had been relieved, the detachments which had manned the line of outposts during the cold and snowy night were allowed to go to the rear for a short period. Rerasing their regimental bivouacs these troops were permitted to eat, dry their clothes, and get a few minutes rest before returning to the front.

Not long after Smith's troops had taken up their battle stations, the sound of heavy firing (both artillery and small-arms) became distinctly audible. The sound of battle came from the right of the investment line. As the morning progressed this terrible roar of conflict steadily drew nearer. Smith's bluecoats listened to this noise "with bated breath and clasped muskets waiting orders which would send them to the help of their comrades." The historian of the 7th Illinois, D. Leib Ambrose vividly recalled the morning's happenings:
It snowed again last night, but this morning the sky is clear; the clouds have disappeared, and the sunlight is seen again on the Cumberland hills. How cheeringly does it fall around the weary soldiers. It is indeed a blessing sent from heaven, for Grant and his army. But hark! we hear the rattle of musketry. It comes from the right wing. Soon we learn that.../Wallace's/, McArthur's, and Oglesby's brigades are engaged. The battle is now raging furiously.38

By 9 a.m. General Smith learned that Wallace had sent Cruft's brigade to reinforce McClernand. Since this left the section of guns, which Richardson's cannoniers had mounted in the advanced emplacement, without any support it worried the general. Simultaneously General Smith had commenced to fret, lest the Rebels launch a sortie against his extreme left flank. The general believed if such a thrust developed, it would originate in the rifle pits adjacent to the Eddyville road. Actually there was no danger, though the general did not know it, of any Confederate counterattack in his sector. At this time only one Confederate regiment -- the 30th Tennessee -- faced Smith's powerful division. To guard against these fancied dangers, however, Smith directed Colonel Cook to support the Missourians' Parrots with one regiment, while he detailed a second to cover Lauman's left. The 13th Missouri drew the assignment of protecting the guns, and the 52d Indiana the task of bolstering Lauman's left flank. The departure of these two organizations left Cook with only two regiments immediately available -- the 50th Illinois and 12th Iowa.39
Meanwhile the gunners of Battery K had finally committed one of their sections. Moving forward the Missourians emplaced two of their Parrott rifles on the nose of the ridge, a short distance to the right of Battery D's advanced section. From this position the cannoneers went into action. Firing across the Indian Creek valley the artillerists hammered away at Pillow's attacking Confederate legions. In spite of the extreme range, one and one-fourth miles, the Union gunners were impressed with the apparent effectiveness of their fire. Upon reaching the ridge the 13th Missouri's infantrymen sustained both sections of artillery.40

Shortly after the men of the 13th Missouri had taken position in support of the four guns, Grant rode up. At this time the general was enroute to the Union right. Observing that the soldiers were wearing their knapsacks and blanket rolls the general, believing the packs would impede the men's movements, directed the troops to throw them on the ground.41

The 14th Missouri, which was composed of picked marksmen, was thrown forward to cover General Smith's main line of resistance. One battalion of the regiment operated in front of Lauman's brigade. The other was posted in Cook's sector. Picked companies drawn from both Lauman's and Cook's brigades were thrown forward to reinforce the 14th Missouri on the skirmish line. Taking position at the bottom of the ravine near the edge of the abatis the Union sharpshooters
blazed away, whenever some unwary Confederate exposed himself beyond the rifle pits' protected confines. Until noon the greyclads endeavored to answer the Yankees' fire. Besides being silhouetted against the skyline, when they sought to reply to the foe's snipers, Colonel Head's Tennesseans were plagued by inferior arms. Therefore, the butternuts finally tired of the one-sided contest and all but ceased firing.\textsuperscript{42}

By the time Grant reached the Wynn's Ferry road, Thayer's brigade had stemmed the Confederate onslaught. Accordingly, there was a lull in the battle. The cannonading had ceased, and everybody was asking, What next? When he rode up, Grant recalled, he found many of McClernand's troops clustered together discussing the situation in a "most excited manner." Many of the officers, appearing to have lost control of the situation, had ceased to provide any leadership. The soldiers had their arms, but no ammunition, while there were "tons of it close at hand."\textsuperscript{43}

When Grant galloped onto the scene McClernand and Wallace were conversing with one another. Wallace remembered that Grant clutched some papers in his hand, which looked like telegrams. Giving the appearance of a man without any worries, Grant "saluted and received the salutations of his subordinates." Proceeding to the business at hand, Grant directed McClernand and Wallace "to retire their commands to the heights out of cannon range, and throw up works." Continuing Grant announced, "Re-enforcements were en route, and it was advisable
to await their coming." The two division commanders then told Grant "of the mishap to the First Division, and that the road to Charlotte was open to the foe."44

But by this time Grant had begun to take cognizance of the remarks made by some of the troops, in regard to the enemy soldiers having moved to the attack "with knapsacks and haversacks filled with rations." The soldiers expressed the opinion "this indicated a determination on ...[the foe's] part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out." Turning to his chief of staff Colonel Joseph D. Webster, Grant remarked, "Some of our men are pretty badly demoralized; but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back; the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." Wallace recalled: "With a sudden grip ...[Grant] crushed the papers in his hand." In this instant all signs of disappointment or hesitation vanished. In his usual quiet way Grant addressed McClernand and Wallace, "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken." With that he wheeled his horse about and galloped off.45

While McClernand and Wallace attacked the Confederate left, General Grant proposed to hurl General Smith's division against the foe's right. Grant now saw through the Rebels' plan of operations. Undoubtedly, he reasoned, the butternuts had hurled
their entire force, except for a few pickets, against McClernand. If Smith was able to assault before the Rebel grass could redeploy their troops, Grant reasoned, the Yankees would encounter little opposition, "except from the intervening abatis." As he headed toward Smith's command post, Grant directed Colonel Webster to ride with him and call out to the men as they passed, "Fill your cartridge-boxes quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape, and he must not be permitted to do so." According to Grant, "This acted like a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command."46

It was a little before 2 p.m. when Grant reached General Smith's command post. At the time the general, accompanied by his staff, rode up, General Smith and his chief of staff, Captain Thomas J. Newsham, were sitting at the base of a large tree on the ridge facing the Confederate rifle pits. Hailing Smith, Grant remarked: "General Smith, all has failed on our right -- You must take Fort Donelson." Smith sprang to his feet and brushing his moustache with his right hand said, "I will do it." While Grant was briefing him on the tactical situation, Smith sent Captain Newsham to alert the brigade and regimental commanders. After Grant had directed Smith to charge the Confederate works to his immediate front with Cook's and Lauman's brigade, he advised his subordinate "that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with."47
Artillery would be used to soften up the Confederates' positions preparatory to Smith's attack. Therefore, Smith issued instructions for Batteries D and K, 1st Missouri Light Artillery to commence to shell the rifle pits about to be assaulted. Battery D's gunners immediately sent several projectiles into the foe's works. When they elicited no reply the Missourians promptly ceased firing. General Grant noticed this. Accordingly, he directed Captain Richardson to send one of his sections to support the Union right. Without a moment's hesitation, Richardson issued marching orders to his left section, whose guns were emplaced furthest from the Rebels' works.\textsuperscript{48}

The cannoneers manning the section of Battery K which had been held in reserve near the Ridge road, quickly wheeled their two Parrots into position. Unlimbering their pieces on the ridge opposite the greyclads' earthworks, the Missourians commenced to blast away, employing both shot and shell.\textsuperscript{49}

Meanwhile General Grant had sent a staff officer to recall the other artillery unit organic to Smith's division -- Battery H, 1st Missouri Light Artillery. This battery had been sent to reinforce McClellan's division on the previous day. When the Confederates had launched their powerful onslaught, the battery had been forced to retire. At the time Grant's aide arrived on the Wynn's Ferry, the battery was not engaged. Following the receipt of Grant's instructions to move
to Smith's support, Captain Frederick Welker quickly mustered his cannoneers and started for the Union left with three of his pieces. 50

Long before the gunners of Batteries H and K had reached his line of departure, Smith had completed his dispositions. The general planned to assault with his left flank brigade -- Lauman's. His right brigade -- Cook's would be used to feign an attack on the foe's rifle pits -- if all went according to schedule, Cook's feint would keep the Confederates pinned in position, while Lauman scored a breakthrough. 51

In accordance with General Smith's instructions, Colonel Cook prepared to strengthen his skirmish line. Strong detachments drawn from the 50th Illinois and 12th Iowa moved down off the ridge. Working their way cautiously forward these men reached the edge of the timber, fronting the abatis. Here the soldiers joined their comrades-in-arms, who had been occupying the skirmish line since morning. Taking position the "men went cheerfully to the work assigned them, and kept up a warm fire on the enemy." Covered by Cook's feint Lauman's brigade surged to the attack on his left.

As soon as Colonel Cook learned that the guns which the 7th Illinois had been supporting had been ordered to the right, he sent a messenger with instructions for Lieutenant Colonel Andrew J. Babcock to move his regiment to the front. Led by Colonel Babcock, and cheered on by Major Richard Rowett, the Illinoisans moved forward on the double. 52
When Captain Newsham alerted him to hold his brigade ready to attack, Lauman quickly formed his command. The 2d Iowa was designated to spearhead the assault. When informed of this, Colonel Tuttle formed his regiment into double line of battle, the left battalion in front and the right in support. Colonel Tuttle would lead the advance battalion, while Lieutenant Colonel James Baker headed the other. The 2d Iowa would be covered on the left by the 52d Indiana and on the right by another Hoosier regiment, the 25th Indiana. Preparatory to taking up the advance Colonel James C. Veatch, of the 25th Indiana, deployed and threw forward, as skirmishers, Company B. The 7th and 14th Iowa (the former unit on the left and the latter on the right) were formed on the 25th Indiana's right. Before the attack jumped off, Lauman redeployed the 14th Missouri. The picked marksmen comprising this crack regiment were formed as skirmishers. They were given the task of protecting the flanks of Lauman's brigade during the assault. Except for the 2d Iowa and 14th Missouri, Lauman's units would move to the attack in column by battalions.53

Just as Colonel Tuttle finished forming his command, General Smith rode up. Hailing Captain Newsham, who had been assisting Tuttle, the general inquired as to the regiment. Newsham replied, "the 2d Iowa." General Smith turned to the Hawkeyes and said, "Second Iowa, you must take the fort -- take the caps off your guns --
fix bayonets and I will support you." Once the general had taken his battle station between the two battalions, the 2d Iowa moved off.\(^5\)

After the decision to withdraw into the Fort Donelson perimeter had been made, General Buckner, in spite of his views to the contrary, prepared to carry out his superiors' mandate. Furthermore, Buckner had been admonished by Generals Floyd and Pillow to get his men back to their original positions as rapidly as possible. The reason, it appeared the Yankees were about to launch a massive assault on Colonel Head's badly outnumbered regiment. Since the bluecoats made no effort to pursue, Buckner was able to disengage his division without any difficulty. Having first secured the two 24-pounder howitzers captured by them, Buckner's troops fell back. They re-entering the perimeter in the Erin Hollow sector. Buckner's retrograde movement was covered by the 2d Kentucky and the 41st Tennessee. Upon reaching the fortifications, Buckner's exhausted troops still had (depending on the sector of the rifle pits held) from one to one and one-half miles to go before they reached their former battle stations. Even so, all of Buckner's units, except the 2d Kentucky and 14th Mississippi, were able to reach their former positions before Smith's attack was driven home. Unfortunately for the Confederates, however, it was against the rifle pits originally held by the Kentuckians, and now occupied by Major Turner's three companies.
that Lauman's bluecoats moved.55

The panting infantrymen of the 3d, 18th, 32d, and 41st Tennessee, having made a forced march, filed into their former positions a few minutes before Smith's onslaught. Porter's and Graves' cannoneers likewise had returned to their original emplacements, where they had unlimbered their guns. Only two of Buckner's units -- the 2d Kentucky and 14th Mississippi -- had not reached the sectors entrusted to their defense, when the Yankees' struck. Since the rifle pits slated to be occupied by the Mississippians were not under attack it made no difference, but where the Kentuckians were concerned, disaster ensued.56

Once General Smith had given the word the rugged infantrymen of the 2d Iowa, deployed in double line of battle, took up the advance. As the troops started forward, several officers glanced at their watches, the time indicated was a little past 2 p.m. With Colonel Tuttle at its head the left battalion commenced to descend the timber covered eastern face of the hollow, which separated Smith's line of departure from the Confederate rifle pits crowning the opposite ridge. The right battalion led by General Smith and Colonel Baker followed about 150 yards in rear of the left wing. Company B, 25th Indiana, deployed as skirmishers, inadvertently took up the advance at the same time. The company of Hoosiers moved on the Hawkeyes' right.57
Four of the five other regiments constituting Lauman's attacking force advanced *en echelon* on the right and left of the 2d Iowa. The 52d Indiana was on Tuttle's left. The 25th Indiana, 7th and 14th Iowa were on his right. Unlike the 2d Iowa, which surged to the assault in line of battle, these four units marched by the left flank. The sharpshooting 14th Missouri, deployed as skirmishers, covered Lauman's flanks. 58

Crossing the small stream at the bottom of the hollow, Tuttle's battalion entered the abatis. Urged on by their hard-fighting colonel, the men of the 2d Iowa commenced to ascend the western slope, at the crest of which were located the Confederate rifle pits. The right wing, with General Smith at its head, followed in Tuttle's battalion's wake. Pushing steadily up the hill the grim Iowans, their fixed bayonets glistening, drove resolutely toward the Confederate earthworks which flanked the Eddyville road. 59

On the Hawkeyes' left and right the supporting regiments likewise crossed the small watercourse and entered the abatis. When their colors reached the bottom of the hollow, two of the four regimental commanders sent their men up the opposite slope in columns of battalions. After crossing the stream, Colonel Veatch halted his lead battalion, pending the arrival of the other. Once his second battalion came up, the colonel formed his unit, the 25th Indiana, into line of battle. The regiment then started
up the hill on the run. The commander of the 14th Iowa, Colonel William T. Shaw, deployed his left battalion into line of battle. His right battalion, however, marched up the hill by the left flank.60 Observing the Union build up on the opposite ridge Major Turner, whose small command (three companies) was charged with the defense of the detached rifle pits ordered his officers "to keep a careful watch." A little after 2 p.m. Captain Carson informed the major "that the Federals were moving on the works in large numbers." Mounting his horse Turner rode to his left. Here there was a commanding knoll from which he could survey the entire area to his front. From this point the major "could see the enemy in two lines, and numbering several thousand, moving rapidly upon us."

Rejoining his small command, Turner ordered his troops into position. He admonished his soldiers "to hold their fire until the enemy were at close range." At this moment Turner was cheered to see the advance elements of Colonel Hanson's crack 2d Kentucky rapidly approaching. Galloping toward the oncoming reinforcements Turner hailed Hanson, who was riding with his regiment's van, and asked for help. Without taking time to reply Hanson bellowed out the command "double-quick time march!" But by the time Hanson's gasping infantrymen reached the point of danger, the Federals had driven their attack home.61
The 2d Iowa's left battalion, Tuttle at its head, surged rapidly forward "in unbroken line," without firing a shot. Not until the Hawkeyes had penetrated to within 20 paces off the rifle pits, held by Turner's Tennesseans, did they encounter any small-arms fire. Captain Newham, who was riding at General Smith's side, recalled when the butternuts did open fire it was with "double barrelled shot guns loaded with buckshot." Several gaps were ripped in Tuttle's initial assault wave by this point-blank fire. It was like trying to stop the tide with a broom, however, as the Iowans letting go with a mighty cheer closed in for the kill. Reaching the rifle pits, the Hawkeyes found that most of Turner's men had taken to their heels. The few Confederates, who remained behind, "were promptly put to the bayonet." Having scored a breakthrough, Tuttle ordered his soldiers to blaze away at the fleeing Tennesseans. The Hawkeyes responded to this command with enthusiasm. Several volleys had been discharged into the fleeing greyclads, before Colonel Baker's panting battalion, headed by General Smith, reached the captured works. Company B, 25th Indiana kept abreast of Tuttle's wing. The Hoosiers gained the foe's rifle pits a little to the right of the Hawkeyes' point of penetration. Even before the Iowans had caught their second wind General Smith, in hopes of exploiting his success, called upon Tuttle to redeploy his regiment and press on.
In accordance with the general's instructions, the colonel quickly reformed the 2d Iowa into line of battle.\textsuperscript{62}

The other units of Lauman's attacking brigade reached the captured rifle pits close on the Iowans' heels. On Tuttle's left the 52d Indiana rapidly came up. Because of the rugged configuration of the terrain over which the regiment had advanced, and the "want of tactical" know how demonstrated by the recently organized regiment's officers the Hoosiers reached the Confederate works in "confusion." Nevertheless, Smith ordered the Indians to support the 2d Iowa's pursuit of the foe.\textsuperscript{63}

The 25th Indiana, after having been deployed into line of battle, had veered to the left when the troops dashed up the steep incline. Accordingly, the regiment, except for Company B, entered the enemy's works at the point where the 2d Iowa had planted its colors. Upon gaining the Rebel rifle pits the regiment was instructed, by General Smith, to support the 2d Iowa's advance.\textsuperscript{64} To the Hoosier's right the 7th and 14th Iowa likewise reached the earthworks. Apparently only one of these regiments, the 7th Iowa, pressed after the retreating Confederates. By the time these two regiments reached the abandoned rifle pits, Porter's Tennessee Battery had commenced to hammer the area with canister and shell. Furthermore, the infantrymen of the 18th Tennessee, from their position atop the commanding knoll several hundred yards southwest of the breakthrough, had
opened fire on the two Iowa regiments. General Smith was afraid that this might foreshadow a Rebel counterattack on the exposed right flank of Lauman's brigade. Therefore, the general directed the commander of the 14th Iowa, Colonel Shaw, to have his organization hold and defend the western portion of the captured rifle pits. The 14th Missouri, deployed as skirmishers, continued to cover the flanks of Lauman's brigade.

As soon as the rifle pits were secured, General Smith called for Captain Newsham. The general ordered the captain to hasten to the rear and bring forward a section of artillery. These guns would be emplaced in the captured works. From this vantage point the field pieces would be used to support the attack on the new line of resistance which the Confederates were frantically endeavoring to establish on the next ridge, 400 yards to the east. Hurrying to the rear, Captain Newsham quickly contacted the officer in charge of Battery K, Captain George H. Stone. The captain on being advised that artillery was needed at the front, issued marching orders to Lieutenant John O'Connell's section. In spite of the difficult terrain O'Connell's gunners succeeded in bringing their two 10-pounder Parrotts forward. Gaining the captured position, the Missourians quickly unlimbered their pieces and opened fire. After the artillerists had placed their Parrott rifles in battery, Colonel Shaw redeployed his regiment, the 14th Iowa. Shaw did this
with a dual objective in mind; to get his troops undercover and
to furnish support to the cannoneers.66

When their volleys failed to check the Tuttle's determined
Iowans, a number of Turner's men abandoned their comrades-in-arms
and commenced to drift to the rear. A large portion of Captains
Carson's and Sample's companies, however, grimly held their
position. These soldiers contested "the ground with a courage",
Major Turner had "never seen surpassed." Overwhelmed by the Hawkeyes
the badly outnumbered Tennesseans, leaving behind their dead and
seriously wounded, rapidly retreated across the deep hollow, lying
to the rear of their rifle pits. Reaching the crest of the opposite
ridge, 400 yards to the east, Major Turner rallied his three companies.
Aided by Colonel Head, who had hastened to the point of danger,
Turner quickly deployed his troops behind the ridge's topographic
crest.67

The Yankee scored their breakthrough before Hanson's hard-
fighting Kentuckians were able to reach the rifle pits. When the
bluecoats continued to press the attack after halting only
momentarily to allow Tuttle to readjust his line, they caught the
Kentuckians before they were able to complete their deployment.
Accordingly, Hanson's regiment was driven back "in confusion"
upon the position held by the 18th Tennessee. Here, however,
Hanson, assisted by General Buckner, was able to rally his Kentuckians.
Indeed, the Kentuckians had been thrown into such disorder that the two officers in order to rally and form them "had to take at least twenty men by the shoulders and pull them into line as a nucleus for formation." 68

Buckner and Hanson had blearily finished rallying the 2d Kentucky when Colonel Head rode up. Head quickly briefed the general on the desperate turn of events in his sector. Preparatory to bending his efforts to organize a new defense line, Buckner sent several of his staff officers to hurry reinforcements (both infantry and artillery) to the scene of the Union penetration. Next, the general, aided by a number of officers, hastily laid out a new main line of resistance. Buckner's new line was located behind the topographic crest of the ridge, and overlooked the spur where the detached works which the foe had just captured were located. The Confederates knew this position would have to be held. If the Unionists were able to emplace batteries on this ridge, they would render the Water Batteries and fort untenable. 69

Colonel Head had observed that the severe morning's fighting had "greatly exhausted" Buckner's command. Therefore, the colonel decided it would be a good idea if he committed a portion of the fort's garrison. A messenger was sent galloping to the fort with instructions for Colonel James E. Bailey to hurry the 49th Tennessee to Buckner's support. Moving out of the fort on the double the 49th Tennessee, 300 strong, quickly covered the 800 yards which
separated it from the point of danger, where Buckner's new defense line was being formed. Colonel Bailey immediately deployed his regiment on the right of Turner's detachment. The 49th Tennessee had reached the front at a critical moment. As the soldiers dashed into position, they saw that the Union skirmishers (probably the 14th Missouri) had already crossed the ravine, and were nearly one-third of the way up the ridge. Bailey's men opened a scathing fire on the advancing bluecoats.70

Besides ordering out the 49th Tennessee, Colonel Head sought to strengthen Major Turner's detachment. Two companies of the 30th Tennessee had been manning the fortifications in the vicinity of the southwest salient angle. Following the return of Buckner's command these two units found themselves temporarily unemployed. Advised of this situation, Head sent them to reinforce Major Turner. With the addition of these two companies Turner found his command increased to a battalion. Four other companies, belonging to the 30th Tennessee, continued to occupy their positions in the rifle pits between the salient angle and Indian Creek.71

Two of the three guns emplaced in the fort also opened fire on the attacking Federals. Finding that no gunboats were in range, Captain Reuben R. Ross temporarily left the Upper Battery. Accompanied by Ordnance Sergeant Stone and several other men attached to his battery, Ross took charge of one of the fort's two 9-pounders. With
this piece the artillerists "played on the enemy's land forces over
the heads" of their comrades, with what effect Ross "could not tell".
Simultaneously the crew manning the 8-inch siege howitzer, commanded
by Lieutenant P. K. Stankiewicz, had opened fire. Apparently the
siege gun was served with good effect, because the guns spotters
reported the shells falling into the target area. 72

The five regiments of Colonel Brown's brigade were charged with
the defense of the sector of the perimeter extending from the 18th
Tennessee's right flank to the knoll overlooking Indian Creek.
Brown's troops had scarcely settled into position, before an excited
staff officer galloped up to the colonel's command post. The aide
informed Brown that Buckner needed both infantry and artillery,
in order to contain the Union breakthrough. Without a moment's
hesitation, Colonel Brown issued orders for the 14th Mississippi,
3d Tennessee, and a section of Graves' Kentucky Battery to hasten
to Buckner's support.73

The rugged Mississippians, who had just occupied their position
in support of Porter's six guns, moved off on the double, closely
followed by the 3d Tennessee. These two regiments dashed up at
a most opportune moment. Because at this time the Federals had
begun to press forward in a determined effort to crush the Rebels'
reorganized main line of resistance. Buckner used these two regiments
to plug a gap in his line, which existed between the 2d Kentucky's
right and Turner's battalion's left. The Mississippians were deployed to the right and the Tennesseans to the left. The section of Graves' battery which Brown had sent in response to Buckner's call also came thundering up at this time. In accordance with Buckner's instructions, the cannoneers unlimbered their two pieces. The guns were mounted in the emplacement which had been previously constructed at the intersection of the new and old defense lines. From this position Graves' artillerists could enfilade the Federals' right flank as they moved against Buckner's newly established line.\textsuperscript{74}

When Generals Floyd and Pillow were advised that the Yankees had secured a lodgement within Buckner's lines, they ordered the 42d Tennessee, Colonel William A. Quarles commanding, to the right wing's support. Quarles' unit, at the time it received its marching orders, was stationed between Erin Hollow and the Wynn's Ferry road. Cold and benumbed as they were, Quarles' Tennesseans moved off on the double-quick through the "mud, sleet, ice and snow."\textsuperscript{75}

Observing Lauman's troops had seized the rifle pits flanking the Eddyville road, Colonel Cook determined to get permission to commit his brigade. Since General Smith had accompanied the attacking force, he was not readily available. Therefore, Cook realized he would have to obtain the necessary sanction from General Grant. A staff officer was sent to contact Grant, and secure the general's
permission for Cook's proposed move. Furthermore, Cook wished to attack and capture the enemy's batteries (Porter's and Graves') which had commenced to rake Lauman's command with canister and shell. While awaiting the return of his messenger, information reached Cook indicating the "Stars and Stripes" had been planted on the portion of the Confederate works occupied by Porter's battery. This favorable news caused Cook to order his men to hold their fire. Once this had been accomplished Cook sought to verify the reported capture of Porter's position. At the same time Cook ordered his skirmishers to rejoin their parent units. Within a few minutes, however, Cook was able to ascertain the "Stars and Stripes" had been raised by the Rebels as ruse, in an effort to decoy the bluecoats into an ambush. \(^7\)

Shortly, thereafter, the staff officer returned with Grant's approval of Cook's proposal to move to Lauman's support. Colonel Cook then ordered his brigade forward. By this time the 7th Illinois had reached the front and taken position on the 50th Illinois' right. In column of battalion, by the left flank, Cook's three attacking regiments (the 12th Iowa on the left, 50th Illinois in the center, and 7th Illinois on the right) swept forward on the double. Surging down off the ridge, which served as their point of departure, Cook's troops crossed the small stream at the bottom. They then began to ascend the abatis covered opposite slope.
Cook's three regiments advanced against the left flank of the detached line of rifle pits previously captured by Lauman's brigade. Therefore, they received no frontal fire. Porter's guns, which were emplaced in the perimeter's southwestern salient angle, were able to enfilade the right flank of the attacking columns. Fortunately for the Yankees the beaten zone was limited, and the greyclad gunners consistently overshot their targets. In his "After Action Report," Colonel Cook observed, "The distance being short, the discharges caused but little damage, overshooting us just enough to tear into shreds the colors of the Seventh Illinois ...." Cook's troops entered the detached earthworks to the right of the sector, where Lauman's brigade had scored its breakthrough. Taking position in the rifle pits, Cook's three regiments prepared to cover Lauman's troops.??

Lauman's brigade, spearheaded by the 2d Iowa, had resumed the advance. Pressing eagerly forward in line of battle, Tuttle's Hawkeyes, their flanks covered by soldiers of the 14th Missouri (deployed as skirmishers), reached the bottom of the ravine. The Iowans and Missourians then began to claw their way up the ridge, on top of which the butternuts had reformed their lines. In the face of a galling fire the grim Iowans slowly worked their way forward. Before Tuttle's troops were able to reach the ridge's topographic crest, the greyclads checked their advance. When his men were unable
to move any further in the face of the constantly impacting resistance, Tuttle ordered them to lay down. Hitting the ground the Iowans returned the Confederates' fire from the prone position.78

On Tuttle's left the 52d Indiana moved cautiously forward. Evidently the regimental officers had been unable to reorganize their unit, which had reached the rifle pits in "confusion." A large number of the Hoosiers refused to resume the advance. Instead of accompanying their comrades-in-arms, these individuals took cover in the earthworks' protective confines. From the rifle pits the Indians commenced to blaze away at the Confederates on the opposite ridge. The range, however, was too great. The recently recruited Hoosiers' volleys fell short. At this time the 2d Iowa was pinned down in front of the Confederates' position. Unfortunately for themselves, the Hawkeyes were within effective range of the Indians' small-arms. Accordingly, the Iowans suffered severely as a result of the "trigger happy" Hoosiers' fire. Colonel Tuttle in his "After Action Report" caustically commented,

In the mean time the enemy were being re-enforced, and one of our regiments poured a disastrous fire upon us in the rear. I am not able to name the regiment which fired upon our rear, but I do know that the greater part of the casualties we received at that point was from that source, for I myself saw some of my men fall who I know were shot from the hill behind us.

Dashing up to the rifle pits, where the Indians had ensconced themselves, General Smith put a stop to this haphazard firing. Before riding over to another section of the front, General Smith directed the Hoosiers to remain where they were.79
A portion of the 52d Indiana, however, supported on the left by a battalion of the 14th Missouri, deployed as skirmishers, had continued the advance in compliance with Smith's instructions. Reaching the bottom of the hollow, these two units commenced to ascend the western slope. Like the 2d Iowa, to their right, the Hoosiers' and Missourians' quickly found their forward progress checked by the hard-fighting Confederates.

The 25th Indiana and 7th Iowa preceded by the other battalion of the 14th Missouri, deployed as skirmishers, supported the 2d Iowa's attack on the right. Descending the steep slope the officers in charge of the two regiments found that their respective battle lines had become "somewhat broken." At the bottom of the ravine, they halted their units, while the men dressed their ranks. Before the advance could be renewed, however, the 2d Iowa had started to retire. In order to cover the Hawkeyes' retreat the 25th Indiana and 7th Iowa grimly held their ground in the bottom of the hollow.60

The Confederate infantry, ably supported by Porter's and a section of Graves' batteries, easily checked the Federals' attempt to exploit their initial success. An examination of the "After Action Reports" reveals that only one Union regiment, the 2d Iowa, made a determined effort to reach Buckner's reorganized main line of resistance. Tuttle's Hawkeyes, however, were stopped short of the Rebel line. After lying down, the Iowans continued to bang away
at the butternuts "for over an hour." Only when he was informed
that his men had exhausted their ammunition, did Tuttle order
them to fall back. Tuttle was able to disengage his unit without
any interference on the grayclads' part. The Iowans fell back in
good order, despite the heavy losses suffered in the attack --
41 killed, and 157 wounded. 81

Before the 2d Iowa's retreat additional Confederate units
reached the point of danger. The 42d Tennessee came up on the
double. Buckner used the regiment to plug a weak spot in his
reorganized front, which existed between the 2d Kentucky's right
and the 3d Tennessee's left. Colonel Head, in order to contain the
Union penetration, decided to order additional troops from his
brigade into action. Accordingly, the colonel sent a messenger to
the fort with a dispatch for Colonel Cyrus A. Sugg. The latter officer,
had been left in charge of the fort's garrison upon Colonel Bailey's
departure. Sugg was directed to have part of his regiment --
the 50th Tennessee -- reinforce Buckner. Leaving Lieutenant Colonel
Harrison C. Lockhart in command at the fort, Sugg, accompanied by
one battalion, moved out on the double. On arriving at the front,
Sugg deployed his battalion on the right of the 49th Tennessee.
The newcomers were used to anchor the right flank of the reorganized
Confederate defense line. 82
Having succeeded in concentrating six regiments (2d Kentucky, 14th Mississippi, 3d, 18th, 42d, and 49th Tennessee) and two battalions (Turner's and Sugg's), supported by artillery, along a line which Colonel Hanson pronounced stronger "than the one lost," the Confederates stopped the Union advance. In fact, the Yankees were unable to hold all the ground gained, in the face of the tremendous fire-power displayed by the Confederates. Grudgingly giving ground the bluecoats retired across the hollow, taking cover in the captured rifle pits. Buckner, however, failed to launch a counterattack. The butternuts were denied the chance of exploiting this Federal set back. The reason for this failure can be attributed to two factors. Buckner had overestimated the strength of the attacking Union force, and the exhausted condition of most of the Confederate troops involved. All of Buckner's infantry and artillery, except the 49th Tennessee and the two battalions (Sugg's and Turner's), had participated in the morning's attack on the Union right. In his "After Action Report," Major Nat F. Cheairs, commanding the 3d Tennessee, noted: "Notwithstanding they [his men] were completely (or nearly so) worn down by incessant fighting and fatigue duty for eight consecutive days, we succeeded in driving back the enemy, although they had fresh and we had exhausted troops."
The Rebel artillery (Porter's battery, a section of Graves' unit, and the two guns in the fort, manned by Ross' and Stankieuriz's detachments) blasted the oncoming Unionists with canister, shot, and shell. Lieutenant John W. Morton, of Porter's battery, dramatically described the Union attack:

Bailey's, Sugg's, and Quarles' regiments very soon reinforced this new line, and one section of Graves' battery, under the personal direction of the heroic Graves took position at the intersection of the new with the old lines, and as usual was most conspicuous for its effective work. Morton's section of Porter's battery, which had been delayed in reaching its former position, was promptly thrown into action to the left of Graves, under a heavy fire. The horses were shot down and the guns run into place by hand. Until dark the desperate conflict raged. Lieutenant [Leverett] Hutchison, of Porter's battery, was severely shot though the neck. Lieut. [W. R.] Culbertson of the same battery, was hit; and the gallant Capt. Thomas K. Porter, who, Hanson said, "always directed his guns at the right time and to the right place," was disabled by a severe and dangerous wound, and was borne from the field. Capt. Porter's marked coolness and dash, and the efficient and intelligent manner in which he handled his guns, elicited the unbounded admiration of all who saw him. While being carried bleeding from the field, he said to me, "Don't let them have the guns Morton." I replied, "No, Captain; not while I have one man left," little mindful that my apprehensions would be so nearly carried out. The cannoniers had been greatly reduced by frost-bites, wounds and deaths, until toward the close of this engagement I had only three men left at one gun. One of these was wounded and left where he fell, we being unable to remove him at the moment. Pat Kine, acting number one, who was always at his post, seeing the dead and wounded lying thick around us, impelled by that generous and gallant nature and impulsive disposition so characteristic of the Irish race, threw himself in front of me saying: "Lieutenant, Lieutenant, get lower down the hill, or they will kill you;" and actually embraced me, as if to make a shield of himself to the enemy's bullets for my protection. I replied: "No, Pat; let us give
them one more round." He promptly seized his ramming staff and while in the act of driving the charge home, was shot through the heart and dropped underneath his gun. Night soon closed the bloody combat.55

Both General Buckner and Colonel Brown in their "After Action Reports" paid tribute to the role of the artillery in checking the Yankees' advance. The general recalled,

During a contest of more than two hours the enemy threatened my left with a heavy column and made repeated attempts to storm my line on the right, but the well-directed fire of Porter's and Graves' artillery and the musketry fire of the infantry repelled the attempts and finally drove them to seek shelter behind the works he had taken and amid the irregularities of the ground.86

Colonel Brown cited the artillery's accomplishments in stronger terms:

Captains Porter and Graves did efficient service in the engagement with their batteries; indeed they excited the admiration of the whole command by an exhibition of coolness and bravery under a heavy fire, from which they had no protection, which could not be excelled. Captain Porter fell dangerously wounded by a Minie ball through his thigh while working one of his guns, his gunners being nearly all of them disabled or killed. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant Morton, a beardless youth, who stepped forward like an old veteran, and nobly did he emulate the example of his brave captain.87

Rebuffed in their attempt to crack Buckner's defense line, the hard-fighting infantrymen of the 2d Iowa and the 14th Missouri retired into the captured rifle pits. From the protection afforded by these earthworks the bluecoats returned the Confederates' fire. Shortly after his Iowans had regained the works, Colonel Tuttle was injured
when a projectile from one of the Confederate cannons struck the log on which he was standing. The impact knocked the colonel to the ground, injuring his back, and spraining his wrist. Colonel Tuttle temporarily out of action, Colonel Baker assumed command of the regiment. The 25th Indiana and 7th Iowa held their position in the bottom of the ravine, until after the 2d Iowa and 14th Missouri had reached the rifle pits. Having successfully covered their comrades-in-arms' retreat the Hawkeyes and Hoosiers, keeping their faces toward the foe, slowly retraced their steps. Reaching the earthworks these two regiments took position on the 2d Iowa's right. On mustering his unit, the 25th Indiana, Colonel Veatch found the attack had cost his command 40 men, all wounded.

After his division had failed to carry the Confederates' reorganized main line of resistance, General Smith ordered his brigade commanders, Lauman and Cook, to hold the captured rifle pits. As soon as Lauman's troops had fallen back into the earthworks they were redeployed from left to right: the 2d Iowa, 25th Indiana, 7th Iowa, 14th Missouri, and 14th Iowa. Colonel Shaw's 14th Iowa continued to support Lieutenant O'Connell's 10-pounder Parrott rifles. The hapless 52d Indiana was pulled out of the line by General Smith. Once Colonel James M. Smith had mustered and reformed his regiment, he rejoined his parent brigade -- Cook's.
When Captain Newsham reached the front with Lieutenant O'Connell's Parrots, General Smith told him "the guns were too light." The general urged the staff officer to procure some heavier ordnance. Returning to the Ridge road, Captain Newsham encountered Battery K, 1st Missouri Light Artillery. At this time the Missouri artillerists were en route from the Union right. The battery was under orders to furnish fire support to Smith's command. Hailing the battery commander, Captain Welker, Newsham directed him to report to General Smith. Following the receipt of these instructions the cannoneers moved their three guns (two 20-pounder and one 10-pounder Parrott rifles) cautiously off the ridge, where Smith's division had formed prior to the attack. Gaining the Eddyville road the gunners drove their teams up the opposite slope. On reaching the rifle pits Captain Welker's cannoneers unlimbered their three pieces on the left of O'Connell's section. Their guns placed in battery, the Missourians began to trade shots with the Confederate field pieces emplaced on the opposite side of the hollow. During the ensuing duel O'Connell's section beat Welker's gunners to the punch, dismounting one of the butternuts' guns.91

Colonel Cook's brigade occupied the section of the captured earthworks on Lauman's right. Shortly before the 2d Iowa was compelled to give way, General Smith had ridden up to Colonel Babcock's
command post. Evidently the general had witnessed the advance of the 7th Illinois. As Historian Ambrose recalled, the general called to Colonel Babcock:

I never saw a regiment make such grand movements under such a fire in all my military life as your's has just made. Colonel, I thank God for your command at this moment. Charge that rebel battery! charge it with your steel and silence its work of death!

Accordingly, Colonel Babcock hastily formed his regiment into line of battle. But before the colonel could lead his men in an attack on Porter's battery, the general glanced toward the west. Observing that the sun was about to drop below the horizon, General Smith turned to Babcock and remarked, "I countermand the order given you to charge that battery. It is now too late; I will leave that work for you to do tomorrow."92

In addition to the 52d Indiana, the 13th Missouri, which had been supporting the four guns emplaced on the ridge southwest of the Poor house, was also directed to report to Colonel Cook. By dusk, the Missourians had rejoined Cook's brigade. The rifle pits occupied by Cook's command were not very extensive. To keep from crowding his men into this limited space, Cook decided to hold a portion of his brigade in reserve. The three regiments already ensconced in the earthworks -- the 7th and 50th Illinois, and 12th Iowa -- would remain where they were, while the 52d Indiana and 13th Missouri spent the night on the timber-strewn western slope of the ridge.93
Before returning to the front after contacting Battery H, Captain Newsham encountered General Grant. The general asked Newsham if "Smith wanted anything." Without having been given the authority by General Smith, the captain replied the general "wanted some of his old regiments." Without a moment's hesitation Grant issued instructions for Captain Rawlins to proceed to the army's right flank. On his arrival in that area Rawlins was to order Colonel John McArthur's brigade to report to General Smith.94

McArthur's brigade had been badly battered during the course of the Confederate attack on the Union right. Accordingly, the brigade had been withdrawn into the upper reaches of Bufford Hollow. Here the troops had halted. The rolls were called and the command supplied with rations and ammunition. By 4 p.m. when Rawlins rode up these tasks had been completed. McArthur was ready to redeploy his brigade. After Rawlins had explained Grant's orders to McArthur, the brigade moved out -- the 12th Illinois in the van. Darkness had fallen and the day's fighting had ceased, by the time McArthur's hard-marching troops reached the hollow south of James Crisp's house. Before proceeding any further McArthur stopped his command. A staff officer was sent to acquaint General Smith with the brigade's arrival. The aide soon returned with the necessary instructions. McArthur was directed to send one of his regiments to the front; the other two would constitute Smith's strategic reserve and camp in the hollow. McArthur assigned the 12th Illinois the
mission of bolstering Smith's main line of resistance. Greatly hindered by the darkness, the Illinoisans scaled the abatis covered slope and gained the captured rifle pits. When the 12th Illinois reported to General Smith, he ordered the unit into position on the 2d Iowa's left. After the Illini had completed their deployment, Welker's cannoneers shifted their three Parrott rifles into the regiment's sector. McArthur's two other regiments -- the 9th and 41st Illinois -- spent the night in the ravine.95

Colonel Wallace's brigade, like McArthur's, had been hurled back by the powerful Rebel onslaught on the Union right. After being reorganized and replenishing their ammunition in Bufford Hollow, Wallace's troops were again deployed into line of battle. Taking position on the right of Thayer's brigade, Wallace's bluecoats had helped to check the Rebels' advance. Once the greyclads had commenced to retire into their earthworks, Wallace received a message from Grant. According to these instructions Wallace was to move his brigade to the left, "so as to be within easy supporting distance of either wing" of the army. Quickly assembling his command Wallace proceeded to implement the general's orders. Crossing the valley of Indian Creek, Wallace's troops took position on the ridge southwest of the Poor house. It was on this ridge that Lew Wallace had formed his division less than 12 hours before.96
The section of guns belonging to Battery D, 1st Missouri Light Artillery which had been ordered to the Wynn's Ferry road sector during the afternoon, was also directed to rejoin General Smith. Without having fired a single projectile the Missourians retraced their steps, camping for the night near the Ridge road. 97

The presence of Wallace's troops served to alarm the Confederates. They were afraid the Yankee brass were going to use these men to launch an attack on the sector of the Fort Donelson perimeter, lying between the southwestern salient angle and Indian Creek. At this time (just before dark) these rifle pits were held by two regiments -- the 32d and 41st Tennessee -- and a battalion of the 30th Tennessee. In their "After Action Reports" both General Buckner and Colonel Edward C. Cook, of the 32d Tennessee, commented on Wallace's concentration. The general pointing out "the enemy threatened" his left, while Cook stated "the enemy appeared in large force in front of us and threatened to attack us, when night came on."98

When the news of the Union breakthrough reached Confederate GHQ, General Floyd issued instructions for Colonel John M. Simonon's brigade to move to Buckner's aid. At the time these instructions reached Colonel Simonon's command post, his unit was in the process of reoccupying the rifle pits adjacent to the Forge road. The troops were ordered to fall in, and the brigade moved off.
on the double. Before Simonton's men were able to reach the point of danger, however, Buckner's troops had contained the Union penetration. Furthermore, Colonel Joseph Drake's command had been unable to check Lew Wallace's advance on the Confederate left. Accordingly, Floyd countermanded his orders to Simonton. The now thoroughly confused troops belonging to Simonton's brigade retraced their steps.99

Once darkness had put a stop to the day's hostilities, General Smith inspected and approved the dispositions made by Cook and Lauman. In accordance with the general's instructions the brigade commanders had covered their respective fronts with a strong line of outposts. Before retiring to his headquarters, on the opposite ridge, the general told Cook and Lauman "to hold the position obtained during the night and immediately prepare for a combined assault the following morning."100

Reaching the bottom of the hollow, west of the captured rifle pits, Smith sighted "a regiment drawn up in line of battle with about 50 men with bandages on their arms and legs." Turning to Captain Newsham the general inquired the regiment's designation. Newsham replied the 9th Illinois. Smith then asked "what those white bandages were on the men for?" The captain answered "they were on men who when they heard that he wanted them had left the field hospital and joined the regiment to do and die for him."
By this time Smith and his staff had reached the 9th Illinois' right flank. As Newsham recalled, "the grand old hero at once took off his cap and rode down the front of the regiment bareheaded. The officers and men stood silent until he had passed, and then a cheer from their full hearts broke forth that told him how they appreciated the mark of respect he had paid them."101

Reaching their field headquarters, Smith and his staff discovered their tents had been converted, during their absence, into hospitals. To provide a measure of comfort the officers kindled a large camp fire at "the foot of a white oak tree." After the Union officers had discussed the day's activities and the desperate work anticipated in the morning, they lay down in the snow, and slept as best they could.102

Except for the sporadic exchanges on the picket line the Union troops, occupying the captured rifle pits, spent a quiet night. The soldiers were compelled to remain underarms, but at the same time they were permitted to build camp fires. These warming fires enabled "them to rest more comfortably."

Toward the close of the day's action on the Confederates' right, Generals Floyd and Pillow visited Buckner's command post. After inspecting and giving their approval to Buckner's dispositions, the two generals returned to their headquarters. Once darkness had put a stop to active hostilities, Buckner called upon his regimental commanders for large working parties. These fatigue details were given the task of throwing up earthworks along Buckner's new defense
line. The soldiers not assigned to work on the fortification, stood to their arms, in case the Yankees attempted a night attack. 104
NOTES


2 Ibid., 377; Fort Henry and Fort Donelson Campaigns - February, 1862 (Fort Leavenworth, 1923), 673-674. (Cited hereafter as Source Book.)


4 Ibid.

5 O.R., Series I, Vol. VII, 236-237. The following units comprised Cruft's brigade: 31st and 44th Indiana, 17th and 24th Kentucky. Thayer's brigade was composed of: the 1st Nebraska, 58th, 68th and 76th Ohio. Thayer's and Cruft's brigades had reached the Fort Donelson area, by boat, on the night of February 13. The troops were disembarked the next morning at the landing, four miles below Fort Donelson. After a hard circuitous march the bluecoats reached the upper reaches of Hickman Creek. Before moving into position at the front Cruft's and Thayer's brigades were organized into a division commanded by General Wallace.

6 Ibid., 237.

7 Ibid., 221; O.R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 8, 10.

9 Ibid., 229; David W. Reed, *Campaigns and Battles of the Twelfth Regiment Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry* (Evanston, 1903), 18-19.

10 Lewis Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, I, 409. M. L. Smith's brigade was composed of the following units: 11th Indiana, 8th Missouri, and Battery A, 1st Illinois Light Artillery.

11 Ibid.


13 Ibid., 237.

14 *Source Book*, 977.


19 Ibid., It is impossible to identify the grey-haired staff officer. Wallace in his autobiography notes that he was a colonel. An examination of the roster of McClernand's staff, however, reveals that Major Brayman was the ranking officer. In his "After Action Report" McClernand fails to identify the officer entrusted with this second message.
Source Book, 977-978.


Source Book, 978-979.

Ibid., 979.


Source Book, 979-980.


O.R., Series I, Vol. VII, 252: Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois, III, 405; IV, 66, 107. The 46th Illinois was mustered into Federal service at Camp Butler, Illinois, on December 26, 1861. The regiment was ordered to Cairo on February 11. From Cairo the newly organized unit was sent up the Cumberland River to the Fort Donelson area, where the regiment arrived on the 14th. Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois, III, 405.

The 57th Illinois was recruited from various portions of the Sucker state, during the autumn of 1861. On December 26, 1861, the regiment was mustered into United States service at Camp
Douglas. The organization, "with about 975 enlisted men, fully officered, armed with old Harper's Ferry muskets altered from flint-locks, and commanded by Colonel [Silas D.] Baldwin, left Camp Douglas over the Illinois Central, under orders for Cairo...."

The regiment reached Cairo on the evening of the 9th, and immediately embarked on the transport Minnehaha. Reaching Fort Henry on the 11th the regiment, without disembarking, returned to Paducah, thence up the Cumberland. Colonel Baldwin's regiment landed on the 14th several miles below the Water Batteries. Ibid., IV, 66.

The 58th Illinois was mustered into Federal service at Camp Douglas on January 25, 1862. On February 11 the regiment, 387 strong, left Chicago, via the Illinois Central Railroad, for Cairo. Arriving at Cairo the next day the regiment reported to Brigadier General E. A. Paine. After being issued their arms and accoutrements the soldiers were embarked aboard a waiting transport. The vessel with the 58th Illinois aboard reached the Fort Donelson area on the night of the 13th. Disembarking the next day the regiment marched to the Hickman Creek staging area. The 58th Illinois was initially assigned to Lauman's brigade, but on the 15th was transferred to Thayer's unit. Ibid., 107.

32 Ibid., 228-229, 231-232.
33 Ibid., 221, 223-224.
34 Ibid., 225.
35 Ibid., 226.
36 Ibid., 221.
37 Reed, *Campaigns and Battles of the 12th Iowa*, 19.
38 *Source Book*, 1008.

Wallace believed, probably correctly, that Grant's decision to seize the initiative was the most important one the general was ever called upon to make. In his article in *Battles and Leaders*, Wallace wrote:

In every great man's career there is a crisis exactly similar to that which now overtook General Grant, and it cannot be better described than as a crucial test of his nature. A mediocre person would have accepted the news as an argument for persistence in his resolution to enter upon a siege. Had General Grant done so, it is very probably his history would have been then and there concluded. His admirers and detractors are alike invited to study him at this precise juncture. It cannot be doubted that he saw with painful distinctness the effect of the disaster to his right wing. Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, I, 422.
Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, I, 252.


The Missouri Democrat's correspondent informed his readers:

General Smith is emphatically, a fighting man, and as may be imagined, the events of the morning had tended to decrease in no measure his pugnacity. When he received his long-desired orders for an assault of the enemy's works, his eyes glistened with a fire which, could it have been seen by his malingers would have left them in no doubt as to his private feeling in regard to the present contest. Source Book, 773.


Ibid.


Source Book, 935, 971.


Ibid., 344-345, 348, 350, 354, 357.


65 Ibid., 231-232; O.R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 9-10. Lew Wallace in his article published in Battles and Leaders wrote of the attack in highly colored terms:

Taking Lauman's brigade, General Smith began the advance. They were under fire instantly. The guns in the fort joined in with the infantry who were at the time in the rifle-pits, the great body of the Confederate right wing being with General Buckner. The defense was greatly favored by the ground, which subjected the assailants to a double fire from the beginning of the abatis. The men have said that "it looked too thick for a rabbit to get through." General Smith, on his horse, took position in the front and center of the line. Occasionally he turned in the saddle to see how the alignment was kept. For the most part, however, he held his face steadily toward the enemy. He was, of course, a conspicuous object for the sharp-shooters in the rifle-pits. The air around him twittered with minie-bullets. Erect as if on review, he rode on timing the gait of his horse with the movement of his colors. A soldier said: "I was nearly scared to death, but I saw the old man's white mustache over his shoulder, and went on."

On to the abatis the regiments moved without hesitation, leaving a trail of dead and wounded behind. There the fire seemed to get trebly hot, and there some of the men halted, whereupon, seeing the hesitation, General Smith put his cap on the point of his sword, held it aloft, and called out, "No flinching now, my lads? -- Here -- this is the way! Come on!" He picked a path through the jagged limbs of the trees holding his cap all the time in sight; and the effect was magical. The men swarmed in after him, and got through in the best order they could -- not all of them, alas! On the
other side of the obstruction they took the semblance of re-formation and charged in after their chief, who found himself then between the two fires. Up the ascent he rode; up they followed. At the last moment the keepers of the rifle-pits clambered out and fled. Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.* I, 423.

All the "After Action Reports" submitted by the participants agree on one point; the left wing of the 2d Iowa, led by Colonel Tuttle spearheaded the Union attack. General Smith, Colonel Baker, and Captain Newsham rode at the head of the 2d Iowa's right battalion, which followed in the wake of Tuttle's wing. Furthermore, the Confederates held their fire until the Iowans had driven to within 20 paces of the rifle pits. While the Federals did not use their firearms until after they had crossed the earthworks.

The source for Wallace's account in *Battles and Leaders* is probably the story submitted by the Missouri *Democrat*'s correspondent dated Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862. The reporter wrote:

The hills at the point are among the most precipitous of those upon which the enemy were posted. Selecting the Second and Seventh Iowa, and the Fifty-second Indiana for the storming party, Gen. Smith deflected the main portion of his division to the right, and having succeeded in engaging the attention of the enemy at this point, himself headed the storming party and advanced upon the works from his extreme left. It was a most magnificent sight. Unappalled by the perfect storm of bullets which rained about him, the General on horseback, and with his hat on the point of his sword, preceded his troops, and inspired them with furore there was no withstanding. *Source Book,* 773-774.


69 Ibid., 333, 378.

70 Ibid., 378, 391-392. Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Robb was mortally wounded at this time. The 49th Tennessee's historian, Folk C. Johnson, recalled:

No braver or better soldier ever died. He went into the battle upon a large white horse, and being himself a very large man, was a fine target for the sharp-shooters. He was shot through the breast by one of these, and when shot put his hand on his breast, and saying he was shot, started to the rear. Several men followed him, and he would have fallen from his horse in fifty yards, but for their assistance. The men managed to get him to his quarters. During the night he was carried to the boats at Dover to be sent to Clarksville with the other wounded. Two boats were at the wharf, one fastened to the bank, and the other on the side of this boat. He was placed on the first boat to be carried through to the second; in crossing from the one boat to the other the boats separated -- the men holding his legs let loose and his body fell into the river, and he would have been drowned had it not been for his faithful old colored servant (Uncle Abram Robb) who, holding his arms, pulled him into the boat. He died at his home February 17, 1862. Source Book, 1371-1372.


72 Ibid., 401.

73 Ibid., 333, 348-349.

74 Ibid., 333, 345, 348-349, 350-351.
77 *Ibid.*, 221, 223; Reed, *Campaigns and Battles of the 12th Iowa*, 19–20. During the advance through the abatis the 12th Iowa suffered 8 or 10 casualties, all wounded.
87 *Ibid.*, 349. Lieutenant Horton reported:

Porter's battery, from its active participation in the four-days' conflict, its advanced and exposed position, lost eight men killed outright and twenty-five wounded, making a total in killed and wounded of thirty-three out of forty-eight officers and men engaged actively at the guns. The remainder of the company were drivers, teamsters, and artificers, and, with the horses, were protected in a ravine some distance from the battery. *Source Book*, 1358.


92 Source Book, 1009.

93 O.R., Series I, Vol. VII, 221-222, 224; Reed, Campaigns and Battles of the 12th Iowa, 20.

94 Source Book, 936.


97 Ibid., 225.

98 Ibid., 333, 357.

99 Ibid., 374.

100 Ibid., 221-222; Source Book, 935.

101 Source Book, 937.

102 Source Book, 935, 937.


104 Ibid., 333, 344, 349, 354.
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Chapter I  - The Confederates Decide to Capitulate
Chapter II - The Federals March In

By

Edwin C. Bearss
Research Historian

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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
FORT DONELSON NATIONAL MILITARY PARK
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Chapter I

The Confederates Decide to Capitulate

Nightfall on February 15 found the Confederate troops back in their rifle pits after their attempt to cut their way through Grant's investing army had been frustrated. Except on the extreme right, where Brigadier General Charles F. Smith's division had seized the detached line of rifle pits guarding the sector where the Eddyville road entered the perimeter, the status quo had been almost restored. Besides being badly exhausted by the day's fighting, the Confederates had left a large number of their comrades either dead or wounded on the snow-covered ridges and in the hollows where the armies had struggled since dawn. Brigadier General John B. Floyd -- self-hypnotized by some strange delusion -- telegraphed his superior, General Albert S. Johnston, announcing that he had won a great victory. ¹

Even after the advent of darkness, it was not too late for the majority of the Confederates to escape from Fort Donelson. At this time, the bluecoats had not reoccupied in strength the area adjacent to the Forge road. Furthermore,
the Charlotte road was still open, though passage over
Smith's Ford was rendered difficult by the backwater from the
Cumberland. Divergent and conflicting opinions among the
Rebel brass, however, served to prevent an evacuation of the
Fort Donelson area during the early part of the night.
Rather than act, Brigadier Generals John B. Floyd and Gideon
J. Pillow talked of ways of extricating the army from its
embarrassing position. In this way, valuable time was wasted.
By midnight, the Confederate ambulance corps had gathered in
all the Rebel wounded, who, along with the sick, and the Union
prisoners, were loaded on steamboats and sent to Clarksville. 2

About 1 a.m., in response to a summons from
General Floyd, all the general officers, the brigade, and the
regimental commanders assembled at the Rice house. As soon
as he was informed that most of the officers were present,
Floyd called the gathering to order. First, Floyd informed
the assembled officers that his scouts, who were operating on
the east side of the Cumberland, had reported that another
Union convoy (composed of 14 transports) had tied up at the
landing four miles below the Water Batteries. At this moment,
Floyd continued, Union troops were being disembarked.
(Floyd's information was correct. A convoy with five
infantry regiments aboard -- the 14th and 15th Illinois, the
23d Indiana, the 56th and 78th Ohio -- reached the Fort
Donelson area on the evening of the 15th.) Since it would be
impossible for the Confederates to hold their ground in the
face of these reinforcements, Floyd directed his officers to
have their men under arms by 4 a.m. At that hour, the
Confederates would evacuate the Fort Donelson perimeter,
marching out by way of the Charlotte road.

An air of urgency was added to the situation when
two messengers entered the room and reported to Brigadier
General Simon B. Buckner. These men had been sent from the
front by Captain Rice E. Graves. The first reported that a
large force of Yankees was being massed on the ridges
opposite Buckner's wing; the second stated that strong Union
contingents had been observed moving from the Confederate
right toward the Wynn's Ferry road. After these evil tidings,
Floyd dismissed the officers. 3

While the brass discussed the situation in the
friendly atmosphere of the Rice house, the remainder of the
army spent an uncomfortable night on the lines. In
accordance with Colonel John C. Brown's instructions, the
units of his brigade "stood to their arms". The only troops
not under arms were those assigned to fatigue parties. These groups were kept busy strengthening and extending the new fortifications, which had been laid out following the loss of the rifle pits covering the Eddyville road.

It was about 2 a. m. when Brown returned from the Rice house. As soon as he reached his command post, Brown issued instructions for his regimental commanders to recall their fatigue parties and for the battery commanders to spike their guns. After this business had been attended to, Brown's soldiers moved out of the rifle pits and marched into Dover. Though it had not been announced, it was the understanding among the officers and men of Brown's brigade that the generals had determined to evacuate the Fort Donelson perimeter. 4

Returning to his headquarters from the meeting, Brigadier General Bushrod R. Johnson prepared to carry out Floyd's orders. By 3 a. m., Johnson had pulled all his soldiers out of the trenches. This time, however, Colonel Adolphus Heiman's brigade did not remain behind, as it had on the previous morning, when Johnson's grayclads marched out. Heiman's soldiers brought up the rear of Johnson's column as it pushed cautiously ahead. As on the previous night, Johnson massed his wing on the Charlotte road, north of the
fortifications. 5

When Colonel John W. Head received orders to move his brigade into Dover, he issued instructions for Captains Bell G. Bidwell's and Thomas W. Beaumont's companies which manned the big guns emplaced in the Lower Battery to rejoin their parent units. After the officers had formed and mustered their organizations, Head's brigade evacuated Fort Donelson and marched to Dover. 6

Following the departure of Johnson and the brigade commanders, Generals Floyd, Buckner, and Pillow remained in Dover. While anxiously waiting for 4 a.m. to arrive, the three generals passed the time in Pillow's headquarters at the Rice house. A senior member of Pillow's staff -- Colonel John C. Burch -- had been in an adjoining room during the briefing. After the brigade and regimental officers had dispersed, Pillow sent for Colonel Burch. When he entered the general's room, Burch was directed by Pillow to assemble the staff. Hastening forth, Burch quickly informed the designated officers that Pillow wished to see them. 7

At the time that Colonel Burch aroused him, Major Gustavus A. Henry, Pillow's adjutant, was asleep in his office which was located in one of the upstairs rooms of the house. Throwing on his clothes, Henry descended the stairs
and entered Pillow's room. Here, Henry was informed of the generals' decision to cut their way out of the Fort Donelson area. Pillow directed Henry "to gather up all the papers and books belonging to ... his department". Whereupon, Henry left the general's room, returned to his quarters, and proceeded to execute the order which he had been given. As soon as he had completed his task, Henry rejoined the generals.

After awakening Henry, Colonel Birch proceeded to the quarters of Majors William H. Haynes and J. Wyatt Jones. Haynes was Pillow's chief of commissary; Jones was in charge of the quartermaster department. Apparently, these two officers were not billeted in the Rice house -- since, by the time they reported to Pillow, a hitch had developed in the Confederate plans for the evacuation of the Fort Donelson perimeter. 9

A little before 2 a. m., a courier rode up to Pillow's headquarters with a dispatch from the commander of one of the units posted in the Forge road sector. Perusing the message, the generals discovered that the troops occupying the trenches in that area were able to hear dogs barking in front of their lines. This led the soldiers to believe the Federals were reinvesting their position. Learning this distressing intelligence, General Floyd
directed Pillow to send scouts to check on this report. 10

Pillow detailed two trusted men to reconnoiter and see if the Federals had re-established their position astride the Forge road. Within a short time, the scouts returned to the Rice house. By the time the two were ushered into Pillow's room, Colonel Burch had rejoined the generals. The scouts stated, "the enemy's camp-fires could be seen at the same places in front of our left that they had occupied Friday". Pillow was not "satisfied with the truth of the report". He determined to investigate further, and sent for Colonel Nathan D. Forrest and Major John E. Rice. Besides owning the building where Pillow had established his quarters, Rice served on the general's staff. 11

Since Rice was already in the house, he reached Pillow's room first. The generals, with Pillow taking the lead, proceeded to question Rice closely on the geography and the character of the roads over which the army would have to pass. While this interview was taking place, two of Pillow's aides -- Lieutenants Charles F. Martin and Hunter Nicholson -- entered the room. 12 Replying to the questions of the generals, Rice gave a "decidedly unfavorable" account of the condition of the Charlotte road. 13
When he was dismissed, Major Rice told the generals that Doctor J. W. Smith was "more familiar" with the Charlotte road than he. Dr. Smith was immediately sent for. Having accompanied Rice to the house, Smith was eagerly awaiting his summons. When he entered the room, Smith recalled that General Floyd placed before him:

... a map of the battle-ground of Fort Donelson, which had been drawn by General Buckner. Finding that I understood the map and was familiar with the ground, roads, and creeks, General Floyd requested me to go out on the [Charlotte] road and investigate and examine the ford of Lick Creek. He requested me specially to ascertain the depth of the water in said ford, whether or not it was possible to cross it on horseback, and to report as soon as practicable to him ....

When Colonel Forrest reached Pillow's quarters, the generals were discussing the information obtained from Major Rice and Doctor Smith. Hailing Forrest, Pillow told the cavalryman that information had been received indicating that the Yankees had reoccupied the ground from which they had been driven on the morning of the 15th. The hard-hitting Forrest expressed disbelief. He pointed out that when he had left that portion of the field, earlier in the evening, there had been no signs of Union activity. Pillow countered
with the scouts' reports. Reinforced by Forrest's positive opinion, which coincided with his own, Pillow ordered the cavalry leader to have a patrol visit the Forge road sector. Its mission would be to verify or disprove the reported Federal occupation of that area. Simultaneously, Forrest would have "two reliable men" ascertain if Smith's Ford, where the Charlotte Road crossed Lick Creek, were passable. Furthermore, these two scouts were to see if the Federals had established a roadblock on the Charlotte road. 16

Being a man of action and not words, Forrest stalked out into the night. Arousing two of his most trusted men, the colonel gave them the task of reconnoitering the Charlotte Road. Dr. Smith accompanied the scouts. No Union patrols were encountered and the scouts reached Smith's Ford without any difficulty. Crossing the stream, the Southerners found that the water just touched their saddle-skirts. Having successfully completed its mission, the scouting party retraced its steps. 17

In the meantime, Forrest had sent two other trusted scouts -- Adam R. Johnson and S. H. Martin -- to check on the purported Yankee activity in the Forge road sector. After being gone about an hour, Johnson and Martin returned. They informed Forrest that the only Federals they had observed
near the Forge road were "the wounded, and possibly some few stragglers searching for the killed and wounded". The fires seen and reported by the other scouting parties, Johnson and Martin stated, were the smoldering campfires abandoned by the bluecoats on the morning of the 15th. In an effort to keep warm, the wounded had rekindled these fires. 18

Immediately following the departure of Forrest's scouts, the officers in charge of the commissary and quartermaster departments reported. Major Jones arrived first, closely followed by Major Haynes. Lieutenant Nicholson had been called into an adjoining room, where he remained for a few minutes. When he returned, the lieutenant recalled:

... Major Jones ... was just entering the room. General Pillow at once approached him, and taking him a little off one side, explained to him that it had been determined to evacuate the place, and that he must prepare to burn the quartermaster's stores in his hands. Major Jones inquired at what time. General Pillow replied, "About daybreak; about 5:30 o'clock." Major Jones left very soon, and I did not see him in the room afterwards ....

When he reached Pillow's quarters, Major Haynes was immediately accosted by the general. As in the case of Major Jones, Pillow took Haynes aside. After informing the major
of the decision to have the army cut its way through the
nenemy's lines, Pillow ordered him "to destroy all the
commissary stores" and then escape across the river. Before
taking leave of the general, Haynes inquired when the orders
were to be executed. Glancing at his watch, Pillow replied,
"At 5:30 o'clock." 20

Following the departure of Jones and Haynes, a very
excited scout was shown into the room. He announced that he
had just returned from the Forge road sector. He reported,
"the woods were perfectly alive with troops, and that their
camp-fires were burning in every direction". Pillow was
still skeptical of any intelligence indicating that the
bluescoats had reoccupied their former position astride the
Forge road. He accordingly sent another scout to report on
the situation. 21

Shortly thereafter, the party sent to check on the
Charlotte road returned. The scouts reported the "overflowed
valley of Lick Creek" was not practicable for infantry; that
the soft mud was about half-leg deep, and that the water at
the ford was about saddle-skirt deep to the horses, and that
there was a good deal of drift in the way". When questioned
by Pillow, Dr. Smith corroborated the cavalrymen's statements.
Previously, the generals had been advised by their medical
authorities that a number of the troops were suffering from frostbite. Consequently, this matter was given some weight, when the generals determined their course of action. In view of the cold weather and the depth of the water, the Rebel brass decided that the infantry would be unable to use the ford. 22

Having abandoned the plan to utilize the Charlotte road to evacuate the Fort Donelson area, the generals endeavored to find another way out of their predicament. General Floyd inquired, "Well, gentlemen, what is best now to be done?" When neither Pillow nor Buckner promptly answered, Floyd repeated his question, addressing the former by name.

Pillow remarked, "that it was difficult to determine what was best to be done, but ... [his name] was in favor of cutting our way out."

Floyd then asked Buckner what he thought ought to be done. 23

Buckner, taking the floor, stated that he:

... regarded the position of the army as desperate, and that an attempt to extricate it by another battle, in the suffering and exhausted condition of the troops, was almost hopeless. The troops had been worn down with watching, with labor, with fighting. Many of them were
frosted by the intensity of the cold; all of them were suffering and exhausted by their incessant labors. There had been no regular issue of rations for a number of days and scarcely any means of cooking. Their ammunition was nearly exhausted. We were completely invested by a force fully four times the strength of our own. In their exhausted condition they could not have made a march. An attempt to make a sortie would have been resisted by a superior force of fresh troops, and that attempt would have been the signal for the fall of the water batteries and the presence of the enemy's gunboats sweeping with the fire at close range the positions of our troops, who would thus have been assailed on their front, rear, and right flank at the same instant. The result would have been a virtual massacre of the troops, more disheartening in its effect than a surrender. 24

Continuing, General Buckner expressed the opinion that it would cost Floyd three-quarters of his command if he sought to cut his way through the enemy's lines. Buckner stated, "he did not think any general had the right to make such a sacrifice of human life". 25

Even if the Confederates were able to steal a march on the Yankees and slip out of the Fort Donelson perimeter, Buckner believed, they would be followed and cut to pieces.

Forrest assured Buckner that his cavalry would be able to cover the army's retreat. General Floyd, however, sided with Buckner. The commanding general stated that their
force was so demoralized as to cause him to agree with General Buckner as to their probable loss in attempting to cut their way out.

Forrest did not view the tactical situation in the same light as Floyd and Buckner did. The cavalryman confidently announced he "would agree to cut ... his way through the enemy's lines at any point the general might designate, and ... could keep back their cavalry, which General Buckner thought would greatly harass our infantry in retreat."

Either Floyd or Buckner replied, "they (the enemy) would bring their artillery to bear on us".

At this remark, the thoroughly disgusted cavalryman left the room. 25

With the proposal for the Confederate army to cut its way out disposed of, Pillow offered another suggestion. He stated:

... we could hold our position another day and fight the enemy from our trenches; that by night our steamboats that had taken off the prisoners and our ... wounded men would return; that during the next night we could set our troops on the right bank of the river, and that we could make our escape by Clarksville, and thus save the army. 27

General Buckner expressed strong opposition to
Pillow's plan to hold the Fort Donelson perimeter for another 24 hours. The West Pointer observed that his right was already turned, and a portion of the entrenchments was in the Yankees' possession. From the vantage point gained, Buckner believed, the foe would be able to launch a massive attack on his reorganized defense line and capture the Water Batteries. Buckner said that he was confident the Federals "will attack my lines by light, and I cannot hold them for half an hour."

General Pillow, who was sitting next to Buckner and immediately fronting the fireplace, interrupted, "Why can't you?" He then added, "I think you can hold your position; I think you can, sir."

Buckner hotly retorted, "I know my position; I can only bring to bear against the enemy about 4,000 men, while he can oppose me with any given number." 23

To reinforce his statement concerning the condition of his command, Buckner observed:

You, gentlemen, know that yesterday morning I considered the Second Kentucky (Hanson's) Regiment as good a regiment as there was in the service; yet such was their condition yesterday afternoon that, when I learned the enemy was in their trenches (which were to our extreme right and detached from the others), before I could rally and form them I had to take at least twenty men by the shoulders and pull them into line as a nucleus for formation. 29
Continuing, Buckner remarked that he understood the principal reason for the defense of Fort Donelson was to cover the retreat of General Albert S. Johnston's army from Bowling Green to Nashville. If Johnston had not yet reached Nashville, Buckner observed, the Confederates should attempt to hold Donelson, "even at the risk of the destruction of our entire force, as the delay even of a few hours might gain the safety of General Johnston's force". 30

Floyd interrupted to announce, "that General Johnston's army had already reached Nashville".

Buckner again pointed out "it would be wrong to subject the army to virtual massacre when no good could result from the sacrifice". He then expressed the opinion "that the general officers owed it to their men, when further resistance was unavailing, to obtain the best terms of capitulation possible ... 31"

General Floyd agreed with Buckner on this point.

Regarding General Buckner's statement as a rejection of his plan to hold the Fort Donelson area for another 24 hours, Pillow stated, "Gentlemen, if we cannot cut our way out nor fight on there is no alternative left us but capitulation, and I am determined that I will never surrender the command nor will I ever surrender myself a prisoner. I
will die first." 32

Floyd chimed in, "Nor will I; I cannot and will not surrender, but I must confess personal reasons control me."

General Buckner replied, "But such considerations should not control a general's actions". 33

Floyd acknowledged that personal considerations influenced his decision, "but nevertheless such was his determination". 34

General Pillow spoke up, informing the officers that "he thought there were no two persons in the Confederacy whom the Yankees would prefer to capture than himself and General Floyd". Pillow then asked Floyd's opinion as to the propriety of his accompanying him.

To this inquiry, Floyd replied, "that it was a question for every man to decide for himself".

Next, Pillow addressed the same question to Buckner. The Kentuckian remarked he "could only reply as General Floyd had done, that it was a question for each officer to decide for himself, and that in ... [his] own case ... [he] regarded it as ... [his] duty to remain with ... [his] men and share their fate, whatever it might be." 35

While this discussion was taking place, Colonel Forrest re-entered the room. The fiery colonel inquired "if
they were going to surrender the command". Buckner announced that they were.

"This was more than the cavalryman could stomach. He remarked that he had not come to the fort for the purpose of surrendering his command, and he would not do so if his men would follow him through the investing lines. Forrest stated he "intended to go out if ... [his] saved but one man". \[36\]

Overhearing the conversation between Buckner and the colonel, Floyd announced "he would take his chances with Forrest".

Addressing Buckner, Floyd asked him "if he would make the surrender". \[37\]

Buckner replied in the affirmative, " remarking that a capitulation would be as bitter to ... [his] as it could be to any one, but ... [his] regarded it as a necessity of our position, and ... [his] could not reconcile it with ... [his] sense of duty to separate ... [his] fortunes from those of ... [his] command". \[38\]

Floyd then said, "General Buckner, I place you in command; will you permit me to draw out my brigade?"

"Yes, provided you do so before the enemy act upon my communication", Buckner remarked.
Floyd, facing Pillow, stated, "General Pillow, I turn over my command."

Pillow exclaimed, "I pass it."

General Buckner said, "I assume it; bring on a bugler, pen, ink, and paper." The general then sat down at the table and began to draft a message, addressed to General Grant. 39

As Buckner sat down at the table, Forrest turned to General Pillow and asked what he should do. Pillow replied, "Out your way out." The cavalryman wheeled about and strode out of the room, preparatory to making arrangements for his brigade's escape. 40

Immediately following Forrest's departure, Pillow asked, "Gentlemen, is there anything wrong with my leaving?"

Floyd replied, "Every man must judge for himself of that."

Pillow answered, "Then I shall leave this place."

At that, General Pillow left the room. 41

Encountering Pillow in the passage, Colonel Burch (The colonel had also left the room.) asked the general, "if there was any possibility of a misunderstanding as to his position".

Pillow remarked that he thought not.
Burch, however, believed it would be wise if the general again discussed the situation with Floyd and Buckner. Pillow then re-entered the room. Taking a seat between the two generals, Pillow said, "Gentlemen, in order that we may understand each other, let me state what is my position; I differ with you as to the cost of cutting our way out, but if it were ascertained that it would cost three-fourths of the command, I agree that it would be wrong to sacrifice them for the remaining fourth."

Generals Floyd and Buckner replied, "We understand you, general, and you understand us." Floyd, Pillow, and the latter officer's staff now left the room. As he was walking out, Major Haynes asked Buckner "if Pillow's order to destroy the commissary stores should be carried out".

The general answered, "Major Haynes, I countermand the order." Buckner now returned to his headquarters, which were located in the Dover Hotel.

While the three generals argued, the soldiers had been kept standing in ranks, shivering with the cold. C. W. Tyler of the 50th Tennessee recalled, "The enemy's camp-fires blazed brightly all around us, and looked cheerful enough as we stamped our feet in the snow. We expected orders to cut
our way through them, but instead we were ordered back to the fort ... "45

Most of the units received orders to return to the rifle pits. Colonel Brown's brigade retraced its steps and by daybreak reoccupied the fortifications west of Indian Creek. 46 Not all of the heavy artillerists or the troops of Colonel Head's brigade returned to Fort Donelson as ordered. Among the individuals, who declined to return to the fort, and escaped before the surrender were Colonel Head and Captain Bidwell. 47

In their eagerness to escape from the area, the generals apparently forgot all about General Johnson's command. Johnson first began to suspect that something was afoot when Floyd's Virginia regiments moved off toward the landing. When no orders arrived, Johnson began to grow impatient. Finally, Johnson sent an aide to headquarters with the information that his command was formed and ready to move. The staff officer soon returned with a note from General Buckner. Glancing at the message, Johnson found that Buckner was now in command of the garrison. Furthermore, Buckner directed Johnson to hold his division where it was, pending the receipt of additional instructions. Shortly thereafter, one of Buckner's couriers rode up and told
Johnson that the general was looking for him. Johnson accordingly proceeded to the Dover Hotel. Here, Johnson first learned of the decision to surrender. At this time, General Buckner was absent, having gone to search for Johnson. One of the staff officers therefore directed Johnson to establish contact with the Union outposts and request them not to fire on his troops when they returned to their camps. Johnson then retraced his steps. 48

Within a few minutes of his return, one of Buckner's aides rode up and handed Johnson a message signed by the general. Scanning the dispatch, Johnson received formal notification that the command of the troops holding the Fort Donelson perimeter had devolved upon General Buckner "by the order of General Floyd". Buckner also informed Johnson that he had "sent a flag to General Grant and during the correspondence and until further orders", the Confederates would refrain from making any hostile demonstration. To keep the Federals from firing on his men, Buckner requested Johnson to send a flag of truce party through his lines. This party would inform the Yankees, who were holding the right flank of the investment lines, that Buckner was endeavoring to establish contact with General Grant. In addition, the truce party would make inquiries regarding the
location of Grant's headquarters. 49

After directing Major W. E. Rogers and another officer to get in touch with the Federals, Johnson issued instructions dismissing his brigade commanders. Three of Johnson's brigade (Baldwin's, Drake's, and Simonton's) were quickly put in motion. By dawn, these three units had reoccupied their former positions. 50 Colonel Heiman's brigade, however, did not return to the front. Instead, Heiman's troops milled around in the Dover area. 51

Having determined to save his mounted brigade, if possible, Forrest returned to his encampment. The field and company officers were hurriedly summoned to the colonel's quarters. As soon as the officers had assembled, Forrest tersely explained the tactical situation. He informed his subordinates that he had resolved not to surrender. Furthermore, the colonel declared that "he would lead forth all who desired to accompany him". Next, Forrest inquired as to the number who wished to hazard the attempt. The reply was unanimous. After directing the officers to arouse their men, Forrest dismissed them. Since Lieutenant Colonel George Gantt of the 9th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion was not present at the meeting, Forrest sent Major David C. Kelley to acquaint him with the situation. 52
Within a few moments, the cavalry encampment was alive with activity. After the men had packed their gear, they were formed and mustered. By 4 a. m., the officers of the 3d Tennessee reported that their troopers were ready to march. Forrest, however, was troubled when he failed to hear anything from Colonel Gantt. Major Kelley was again sent to see what had happened to Gantt's battalion. When the major returned with the information that he had been unable to locate Gantt, Forrest passed the word for the cavalrymen to move out. Riding out of the ravine where the camp was located, the head of the column turned into the Charlotte road.

Besides his own regiment, the 3d Tennessee, Forrest was accompanied by Captain S. B. Williams' company of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry. Colonel Gantt's battalion and the two other companies of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry which were attached to Forrest's brigade refused to try to escape. All told, about 500 cavalrymen followed Forrest as he headed eastward away from Dover. Approximately 200 stragglers from other commands trailed along behind the grim horsemen. 53

A lieutenant and three men had been sent ahead to see if the way were clear. Before the head of the column had proceeded very far, these scouts returned with evil tidings.
They told Forrest that a strong Union force had blocked the road. Forrest determined to see if the men were telling the truth. He therefore called for volunteers. When no one responded, he turned over the command to Major Kelley. Next, Forrest told Kelley that he would personally reconnoiter the line of march. If he were killed, Forrest continued, Kelley "would do the best he could, but must, in the meanwhile, advance along the road upon which they had set out." After being joined by his brother, Lieutenant Jeffrey Forrest, the colonel headed up the road.

Reaching the area where his patrol had reported that they had seen the bluecoats, the Forrest brothers reined in their horses. They were unable to see or hear anything which might indicate the presence of a Union roadblock.

Advancing cautiously, the two Confederate officers watched as "the supposed Federal battle array was speedily resolved into a line of fencing, formidably staked with short rails into somewhat the resemblance of a line of infantry in the dim light and gray atmosphere of that early hour". Subsequently, Colonel Forrest expressed the opinion that this fence had also been mistaken by the scouts, whose report had carried so much weight in producing the decision to surrender. 54

After having made this discovery, Colonel Forrest
and his brother wheeled their horses to the right and rode up onto Dudley's Hill. Reaching the scene of the previous morning's combat, the two Confederate officers came upon a number of camp fires. Clustered around the fires were a number of wounded Union soldiers. In answer to the officers' inquiries, the bluecoats stated that the only men they had seen during the night were scouts. Convinced that the Charlotte road was still open, Forrest and his brother rejoined the column. In view of what he had learned, the colonel felt it was his duty to relay this information to General Buckner. But, upon reflecting on the situation, the colonel decided it was too late; he knew that steps had already been taken to surrender the army. 55

Shortly thereafter, Forrest's vanguard reached Smith's Ford. At this point, Lick Creek, enlarged by the backwater from the Cumberland, was about 100 yards across. A thin sheet of ice covered the creek near the bank. The stream looked like a formidable barrier. Forrest again called for a volunteer to test the depth of the ford. As no one came forward, the colonel rode his horse into the icy stream. Crossing the creek, Forrest found that the water was "about saddle-skirt deep". The rest of the command quickly followed the route pioneered by the colonel. As soon as the
last of his troopers had reached the right bank of Lick Creek, Forrest ordered the march resumed. Leaving the Charlotte road, the column filed into the road leading to the Cumberland Iron Works. Major Kelley with one company was detached and left to guard the junction. Kelley was to engage the Union cavalry in case it sought to follow Forrest. At daybreak, Kelley's combat patrol rejoined Forrest, since no Yankees had appeared. 56

With scouts and flankers thrown out, Forrest's command moved at a deliberate pace as it withdrew. To keep from freezing, the troopers were forced to dismount and walk at frequent intervals. Nightfall on the 16th found Forrest's column camped 20 miles from the scene of the disaster. Not a single armed Yankee had been seen during the course of the retreat. On the 17th, the march was resumed. At 10 a.m. on the following day, Forrest's troopers reached Nashville. 57

It had been Floyd's original intention to accompany Forrest on his dash through the Union lines. 58 But, when Buckner had given him permission to withdraw his command, Floyd changed his mind. He determined to use his own troops to cut his way through the investing lines. The general sent members of his staff to tell Colonels John McCausland and Gabriel C. Wharton, and Major William N. Brown, of the
decision to capitulate. Besides telling these officers that Floyd would not surrender, the aides informed them of the general's determination to fight his way out of the Fort Donelson trap. Earlier (in accordance with General Johnson's instructions), McCausland, Wharton, and Brown had pulled their troops out of the rifle pits. Moving to the Charlotte road, the officers started to deploy their troops on the ground where Pillow had marshaled his attacking column 24 hours before. 59

While his troops were taking position astride the Charlotte road, Floyd learned that two steamboats were scheduled to reach Dover before daylight. This information caused Floyd to change his plans. He determined that, in view of the reportedly all but impassable condition of the ford, he would use the boats to ferry as many troops as possible across the river. Having made this decision, Floyd sent an officer to acquaint McCausland, Wharton, and Brown with the change in plans. These officers were directed to march their troops "to the steamboat-landing, to embark on one of the two boats momentarily expected". 60

At the landing, Major Brown, not having a clear picture of what was expected of his command (the 20th Mississippi), obtained an interview with General Floyd. The
general told the major "that we would embark according to the rank of [the] commanding officers". In that case, McCausland's and Wharton's brigades would precede Brown's regiment when they went aboard the transports. Floyd also ordered Brown to put "a strong guard around the steamboat landing, to prohibit stragglers from going aboard". Upon the receipt of these instructions, Brown stationed his Mississippians in a semicircle, around the wharf. 61

It was almost daybreak before the two anxiously awaited steamboats tied up at Dover. The transport General Anderson, the larger of the two, had "on board about 400 raw troops". Floyd immediately commandeered the boats and ordered the bewildered recruits ashore. Hardly were the vessels emptied before McCausland's Virginians clambered aboard. The boats then crossed the river, and the troops were disembarked on the opposite side. After all the soldiers had gone ashore, the transports recrossed the Cumberland, preparatory to picking up another load. As soon as the boats touched the bank, Wharton's troops thronged aboard.

Meanwhile, the news of the impending surrender had spread like wildfire through the Confederate camps. Major Brown recalled that many of the soldiers flocked "to the river, almost panic-stricken and frantic, to make good their
escape by getting aboard one of the boats. 62

Captain John H. Guy of the Goochland Light

Artillery described the hurried evacuation:

We arose from our quiet place of repose (in the Wynn's Ferry road sector) and packed our knapsacks. Upon looking around we failed to see any of our troops. The works had been abandoned. The condition of affairs was not comprehended by us (the personnel of the Goochland Artillery). We, however, proceeded to the wharf (which was nearly two miles distant. The strange situation of our troops was discussed. Upon our arrival at the wharf we found assembled a large number of our soldiers, many of whom were much excited. I then saw a steamer of considerable dimensions landing some of our troops (McCausland's) on (the right bank). I was ignorant of the cause of the peculiar proceedings going on at the time. I did not understand them; but very soon I fully comprehended the true condition of affairs and gravity of the situation, especially when I saw various kinds of provisions and munitions of war being thrown into the river, and I determined not to be captured, if there was any possible means of escape. The steamer General Anderson was just returning for another load of soldiers, and my only hope of escape was on the steamer. I anxiously awaited its return, but, instead of coming near me, as I expected, it stopped about 100 yards above where I was standing. Several thousand soldiers had now congregated at the wharf, and the possibility of my escape seemed very improbable. To force my way through this immense body of men was impossible. This was a predicament,
indeed, delay was dangerous. I at once resolved, if possible, to get on board of that steamer. The only chance was for me to wade the surging Cumberland river for some distance. Whether justifiable or not, I had a horrid conception of a prison pen. I proceeded to make my way in the direction of the steamer, keeping as near as possible to the bank of the river, though up to my waist in mud and water, and coming in contact with melting snow and ice most of the time. After no little perseverance I succeeded in accomplishing my object, though before reaching the steamer I was nearly over my shoulders in the water, very cold, and much exhausted. On board of the steamer there happened to be a barrel of whiskey, which had been bayoneted by soldiers. I needed a stimulant, and at once procured some in a tin cup and drank it, then took a position by the engine and warmed and dried myself as thoroughly as possible.

The members of my battery also came off on this steamer, one of whom, Private Perkins, was pulled out of the water into the steamer by a colored man.

The commotion among our soldiers at this time was very great, many of them were frantic with excitement, and attempted to get on board of the steamer, though failed to accomplish their object. 63

This chaotic scene caused Major Brown to worry lest the boats depart without his command. At this time, there were about 200 officers and men milling around in the space between his regiment and General Anderson. Finally, Brown
decided to send his adjutant to inform Floyd that the Mississippians were ready to embark. Boarding the transport, the adjutant spotted Floyd standing on the deck of the steamer with drawn saber, shouting, "Come on my brave Virginia boys." Unable to get a satisfactory answer from the general, the adjutant rejoined Brown. Simultaneously, Brown received a report that Floyd and his aides were struggling to keep the stragglers from boarding General Anderson.

From his vantage point on the shore, it seemed to Major Brown that there was room enough on the boat for his soldiers. If Floyd wanted the stragglers cleared out of the way, Brown knew his Mississippians "could have cleared the bank in a moment's time". Before this excitement had abated, General Buckner sent for Major Brown. The general informed the major "that unless the steamboat left the landing immediately he would have a bomb-shell thrown into it". One of Buckner's staff carried a similar message to General Floyd. In justification of this extreme course of action, Buckner pointed out that "we were in danger of being shelled by the gunboats of the enemy, as he had surrendered the place, and the gunboats were or might be at the fort". Furthermore, the general stated that both his and the Confederacy's honor
required that, under the terms of the capitulation he had signed with General Grant, everything under his command should be turned over to the Federals. 65

Upon being dismissed, Brown rejoined his regiment, intent on making one final effort to get his troops aboard the transport. The major, however, was too late. When Buckner's aide told Floyd that the transport would have to leave, near panic ensued. The stragglers, who were milling around on the shore, made a wild rush for the boat. Seeing this, the captain informed Floyd that the boat would be swamped unless he shoved off immediately. Just as the sun started to rise over the horizon, General Anderson pulled away from the wharf. As they watched the two transports start upstream, the Mississippians bitterly observed that not over 50 men were visible on General Anderson's desk. The regiment then "stacked arms in perfect order, without the least intimidation, but full of regret". 66

In the wake of the decision to capitulate, General Pillow aroused Lieutenant Colonel Jeramy F. Gilmer. After telling the chief engineer of the surrender, Pillow invited Gilmer to join his staff, since it had not been included in the surrender. The colonel readily acceded to the general's proposal. 67
Shortly after the arrival of the transports, Major Rice hailed Pillow. He informed the general that he had procured a small flatboat (four feet wide by 12 feet long) from the opposite side of the river. Rice then ferried the general and his staff across the Cumberland. The officers waited on the right bank of the river until the transports shuttled McCausland's brigade across. Along with the troops came the horses belonging to Pillow and his staff. Securing their mounts, the officers started for Clarksville.

McCausland's infantry, however, was forced to hike to the same destination over ice- and snow-covered roads.  

Pillow reached Clarksville during the late afternoon. Here, Pillow rejoined General Floyd aboard General Anderson. The two transports, with Wharton's brigade and the stragglers from a number of other units aboard, had tied up at Clarksville several hours earlier. Taking the troops with them, the two generals proceeded to Nashville, where they arrived at 7 a.m. on the 17th. As the two steamboats approached the landing, the officers and men beheld a disgusting spectacle. General Floyd reported:

The rabble on the wharf were in possession of boats loaded with Government bacon, and were pitching it from these boats to the shore, and
carrying what did not fall into the water by hand and carts away to various places in the city. The persons engaged in this reprehensible conduct avowed that the meat had been given them by the city council.
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Notes on Chapter I

The Confederates Decide to Capitulate

1 Fort Henry and Fort Donelson Campaigns, February, 1862
(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1923), 1016. (Cited hereafter as
Source Book).

2 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol.
VII, 287, 293. (Cited hereafter as O. R.)

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 349, 354.

5 Ibid., 362, 369-370.

6 Ibid., 378, 396.

7 Ibid., 287, 293.

8 Ibid., 296.

9 Ibid., 297, 299.

10 Ibid., 287.

11 Ibid., 287, 293.

12 Ibid., 299.

13 Ibid., 293.

14 Ibid., 299.


17 *Ibid.*, 295; Wyeth, *General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 56-57. The ford where the Charlotte road crossed Lick Creek was located on Dr. Smith's farm. Having been born and reared on the farm, the doctor was thoroughly familiar with the area.

18 *Source Book*, 1344. Adam R. Johnson became a brigadier general in the Confederate army; Martin was advanced to the rank of lieutenant colonel.


31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 288.
33 Ibid., 300.
34 Ibid., 288, 300
35 Ibid., 334.
36 Ibid., 295.
37 Ibid., 294.
38 Ibid., 334-335.
39 Ibid., 288, 294, 297-298, 300.
40 Ibid., 295.
41 Ibid., 300.
42 Ibid., 294.
43 Ibid., 300.
44 Ibid., 298.
45 Source Book, 1372-1373.
47 Ibid., 378, 396. The surgeon of the 30th Tennessee had informed Head that if he were taken prisoner in his condition (The colonel was suffering from exposure which gave indications of turning into pneumonia.), it might cost him his life. Head accordingly called upon and explained the situation to General Buckner. The colonel asked the general's advice "as to the propriety" of his making an escape. Buckner informed the
colonel that it was a matter which he would have to decide for himself. The general pointed out, however, "that he felt it his duty to remain and share the fate of his men". Head, believing that he could be of no further service to his command or his country if he surrendered, fled Dover by boat.

48 Ibid., 362-363.
49 Ibid., 363.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 370.
52 Source Book, 1346-1347.
53 Ibid., 1347; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 295, 386. A number of the artillerists from Porter's battery had unhitched their horses and accompanied Forrest's column in its dash.
54 Source Book, 1347-1348.
55 Ibid., 1348.
57 Source Book, 1349; Wyeth, General Nathan Bedford Forrest.
59 Ibid., 381.
60 Ibid., 274, 381.
61 Ibid., 381.
62 Ibid., 274-275, 302, 381.
63 Source Book, 1353-1354.
66 Ibid., 275, 381-382.
67 Ibid., 264. Colonel Gilmer's quarters were located in one of the upstairs rooms.
68 Ibid., 288, 302-303. Pillow was forced to leave his Negro servant and trunk at Dover. Fortunately for the general, Floyd saw that they were sent to Nashville on one of the boats. Having borrowed the horse he used during the Donelson campaign from Brigadier General Charles Clark, Pillow was greatly relieved when the mount was ferried across the river, Ibid., 305-306.
69 Ibid., 306, 427-428.
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Chapter II

The Federals March In

On the Union left, Smith's troops spent a disagreeable night. The Union officers knew that they had captured a key position with their late afternoon attack. They accordingly warned their troops to be on the lookout for a Confederate counterattack. The soldiers of Colonel Jacob G. Lauman's brigade and the 12th Illinois of Colonel John McArthur's command which were stationed on the extreme left remained under arms throughout the long, cold night.1

Colonel John Cook's brigade, which was posted on Lauman's right, was permitted to get some rest. Cook's troops, however, were aroused at an early hour. After his soldiers had eaten a "scanty breakfast", Cook was called to General Smith's headquarters. Cook was directed by Smith to have two of his regiments relieve Lauman's men in the rifle pits flanking the Eddyville road. Two more of Cook's regiments would be used to support the two in the rifle pits. His fifth regiment would be held in reserve. Since the 7th Illinois had seriously depleted its supply of ammunition (which the ordnance department had been unable to replenish),

1
Cook determined to hold that unit in reserve. About this time, several ordnance wagons reached the front. Before sending his men into the trenches, Cook decided to let them refill their cartridge-boxes. 2

In the meantime, dawn had started to break. Suddenly, the attention of Lauman's dog-tired soldiers was drawn, by the notes from a bugle, to the Rebel rifle pits on the opposite side of the hollow. This sound called the Yankees' attention to a white flag which the Confederates were displaying. After ordering his men not to fire, Lauman sent Lieutenant Colonel James C. Parrott of the 7th Iowa to see what the Rebels wanted. Within a few minutes, Parrott returned and told Lauman that a Confederate officer, Major George B. Cosby, wanted to see him. Lauman hastened to the spot, and received from Cosby a letter from General Buckner addressed to Brigadier General Ulysses B. Grant. Informed that this message contained a proposal for the surrender of Fort Donelson Confederates, Lauman quickly relayed it to General Smith's headquarters. Smith, in turn, carried Buckner's letter to Grant. 3

Walking into Grant's headquarters at Mrs. Crisp's house, Smith handed Buckner's communication to the commanding general. The message drafted by Buckner read:
Sir: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station I propose to the commanding officers of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. 4

Grant immediately replied, acknowledging the receipt of Buckner's letter, and curtly adding, "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." 5

At the time that Grant's answer reached Buckner, only a small proportion of the garrison had returned to the rifle pits. Furthermore, a number of the artilleryists had spiked their guns when they had marched into Dover. The gunners assigned to the Water Batteries had not had time to return to their pieces. The supply of ammunition available to the garrison also was getting short. Worse, Buckner believed that he detected signs that a number of the Confederate units were beginning to fall apart and were becoming badly disorganized. For the better part of the past four days, the garrison "had been almost constantly under fire". To make matters more disagreeable, the weather had turned bitterly cold on the evening of the 12th. Thus, from Thursday night until Sunday morning, Buckner reported, the troops "had suffered intensely
in a heavy snow-storm and from intense cold, almost without shelter, with insufficient food, and almost without sleep. This condition had led, in Buckner’s opinion, to a weakening of the will to fight.

At this time, reports from the front indicated that Smith’s division was massed for an assault on the northwestern sector of the perimeter. To oppose this massive attack, Colonel Brown had less than 1,000 men in position. With the exception of the Charlotte road, every road leading into the Fort Donelson perimeter was blocked by the Federals. After having weighed these conditions, Buckner decided that the only alternative left open to him was to accept Grant’s terms.

Buckner drafted his reply:

The distribution of the forces under my command incident to an unexpected change of commanders and the overwhelming force under your command compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

When Buckner’s message reached his headquarters, Grant had his adjutant, Captain John A. Rawlins, draw up several orders calculated to insure an orderly and speedy disarmament of the Confederates. General C. F. Smith’s division was to occupy the portion of the perimeter west of Indian Creek, including Fort Donelson; Brigadier General John A. McClernand’s division was to garrison the area east of Indian Creek. In selecting their camps,
the two division commanders would be governed by two criteria — security and comfort. Brigadier General Lewis Wallace's division was to return to Fort Henry. Grant wanted the forts on the Tennessee held in force. 9

All the public property falling into the Union hands was to be turned over to Captain Algernon S. Baxter of the quartermaster corps. McClemand and Smith would each detail 100 men from their commands to assist Baxter. Pillaging and the appropriating of public property for private use was strictly forbidden. Grant called upon his officers to see that this order was strictly enforced. 10

The Confederate prisoners were to be disarmed as rapidly as possible and collected in camps near the Dover landing. Unless General Buckner objected, the officers were to remain with their units. Before being transferred to Cairo, each Rebel would be issued two days' rations. Prisoners were to be allowed to retain their clothing, blankets, and any of their private possessions which they carried on their persons. The commissioned officers would be permitted to retain their side arms. 11

As soon as Buckner's communication acceding to Grant's terms had passed through the lines, the Confederate soldiers began to display white flags along the works. The news of the surrender reached the fort and the Water Batteries a few minutes after the
troops had returned to their positions. One of Buckner's aides galloped up and told Colonel James E. Bailey, who had taken charge of the brigade after Colonel Head's departure, to raise the white flag. Curses both long and loud followed the receipt of this order. Since nobody anticipated a surrender, there was no white flag available. Finally, Ordnance Sergeant R. L. Cobb of the 50th Tennessee procured a white sheet, which was run up. 12

Since his brigade had spearheaded the assault on the Confederate rifle pits covering the Eddyville road, Colonel Lauman asked General Smith to let his troops have the honor of entering the works first. Smith agreed to Lauman's request, specifying that the 2d Iowa have the post of honor when the column marched. After receiving Smith's approval to his proposal, Lauman quickly put his command into motion. With drums beating and colors flapping in the breeze, Lauman's brigade proudly moved off. The Eddyville road served as the line of march. Entering the perimeter, the bluecoats saw the Confederates "drawn up in line, with their arms in great heaps". Colonel Lauman thought the greyclads looked "quite woe-begone" as the victors swung rapidly along. When the 2d Iowa reached the fort, they planted their "colors upon the battlements beside the white of the enemy". After all of his men had entered the fort, Lauman permitted them
to camp. Lauman would be in charge of the fort; his brigade would constitute its garrison. 13

General Smith's other two brigades, Cook's and McArthur's, followed Lauman's soldiers as they passed through the works. These two units bivouacked on the ridges and in the hollows west of Indian Creek. Details from Cook's and McArthur's commands were assigned the task of guarding the prisoners and captured public property. 14

While the communications were passing back and forth between the opposing commanders, Union officers on the right were preparing to renew the attack. Lew Wallace had his soldiers under arms at an early hour. Preparatory to assaulting the Rebel rifle pits covering the Wynn's Ferry road, General Wallace sent one of his staff officers, Lieutenant Addison Ware, to see Colonel John M. Thayer. Riding over to Thayer's command post, Ware directed the brigade commander to shift his unit to the right. After the regimental commanders had formed and mustered their men, Thayer ordered the march to begin. Battery A, 1st Illinois Light Artillery accompanied the brigade as it moved eastward. To conceal its march from the Confederates, Thayer's column moved down into Bufford Hollow. Guided by Lieutenant Ware, Thayer turned the head of his column into the Forge road. Ascending
Dudley's Hill, Thayer's soldiers moved into position on the right of Colonel Charles Cruft's brigade. The gunners of Battery A unlimbered their six pieces on the crest of the ridge. 15

While Thayer's troops were deploying on his right, General Wallace had his other two brigade commanders, Colonels Charles Cruft and Morgan L. Smith, form their troops along the Wynn's Ferry road ridge. It was Wallace's intention to launch a massive assault on the left flank of the Fort Donelson perimeter "about breakfast time". Since his troops were being concentrated within range of the Rebel earthworks, Wallace was surprised when the Southerners failed to open fire. It appeared to the general that perhaps the Confederates' will to fight had been sapped. 16

General McClemand also had aroused his troops before daybreak. In accordance with the instructions which he had received from Grant on the previous evening, McClemand alerted his three brigade commanders to be ready to support Smith's and Wallace's attacks. 17

Having completed his dispositions, General Wallace eagerly awaited an order from Grant which would send his men rushing toward the butternuts' entrenchments. The absence of any opposition caused some of Wallace's soldiers to speculate on the possibility that the Southerners had laid down their arms. The
sight of the Confederate flag flying over the fort, faintly visible "in the dawn's early light", served to squelch these rumors. 18

Suddenly, one of Wallace's aids exclaimed, "There -- what's that?"

"Where?", asked another.

"There -- coming over the breastwork", replied the first officer.

Glancing toward the rifle pits, Wallace observed that two Confederates had ridden through a gap in the fortifications. One of them carried a white flag affixed to a pole like a lance. Fearful lest the greyclads utilize the flag of truce to reconnoiter his position, Wallace shouted for Captain Frederick Knefler to find out what the Rebels wanted. Putting the spurs to his horse, Knefler galloped forward and stopped the Southerners before they reached Wallace's picket line. After a few words with them, Knefler turned his horse around. Rejoining Wallace, the staff officer reported:

The bearer of the flag is Major [W. E.] Rogers, of Mississippi. He brings a request from General Buckner that you refrain from further hostilities as he and General Grant have been in correspondence about a surrender, and they have reached an understanding. The major has a dispatch for Grant which he wants permission to deliver in person. 19

Wallace considered this "great news indeed -- news to justify
a display of excitement". The general, however, did not consider Major Rogers' statement entirely satisfactory. He determined to ask the two officers some additional questions. Following a rather stiff introductory ceremony, Wallace inquired of the Confederates, "Do I understand, gentlemen, that the surrender is perfected?"

"I do not know if a formality will be required", the officer who had accompanied Major Rogers replied, "With that exception it is a surrender."

Satisfied with the greyclads' answers, Wallace inquired, "Are you ready to give possession?"

"Yes", the butternuts replied, "The troops are drawn up in their quarters, arms stacked."

Subsequently, Wallace recalled, "At this time I felt a quick thrill, which if the reader pleases, may be set down to a recognition of an opportunity and an irresistible impulse to get there [Into Dover] first." 20

Wallace lost no time. He ordered one of his staff officers, Lieutenant James R. Ross, to escort Major Rogers to General Grant's headquarters. 21 Ross was also directed to tell Grant that Wallace was moving to take possession of the fortifications. Captain Knefler was instructed to:
... ride to the brigade commanders, and tell them to move the whole line forward, and take possession of persons and property. Tell them to see to it personally that their men are kept in close check -- that I want the business done as delicately as possible. Not a word of taunt -- no cheering. 22

The officer who had accompanied Major Rogers looked at Wallace gratefully. Thereupon, Wallace asked him if he knew where General Buckner was quartered. The Confederate replied that he had left the general at the Dover Hotel. After informing the Rebel officer that he and Buckner were personal friends, Wallace suggested a visit to the general's headquarters. Seeing that Major Rogers had not yet departed, the officer borrowed the flag of truce. On doing so, he remarked, "You won't need it." Then, turning to Wallace, he said, "Our people are in a bad humor; but I will be glad to have you go with me." 23

Guided by the Southern officer, Wallace and his staff passed through the Rebel lines. The Union officers rode into town, accompanied by their guide, and drew rein in front of the Dover Hotel. Wallace dismounted and entered the building. Here, he found himself in a shallow hall. The general stopped and asked his guide to be good enough to give his name to General Buckner. Passing through a door at the far end of the hall, the Confederate officer disappeared from view. When he returned to the hall, the
officer told Wallace "to walk in". He did not accompany Wallace. 24

Entering the dining room, the general found Buckner seated at the head of a table. Eight or ten members of Buckner's staff were seated at the sides of the table. Wallace recalled that upon his entry Buckner rose. The Rebel general met him in the center of the room, "grave, dignified, silent; the grip he gave ... [Wallace], however, was an assurance of welcome quite as good as words". 25

Turning to his comrades seated at the table, Buckner, waving his hand, remarked, "General Wallace, it is not necessary to introduce you to these gentlemen; you are acquainted with them all." The officers rose, came forward one by one, and shook the Union general's hand. Wallace recalled that he had met every one of them two years before when he was General Buckner's guest at the encampment of the Kentucky State Guard in Louisville. Two of Buckner's staff -- Major Alexander Casseday and Lieutenant Thomas J. Clay -- had won Wallace's esteem at the time of the Louisville encampment. The latter was the last to come forward. As young Clay extended his hand, he turned his face to one side. Wallace remembered that Clay "cried like a child -- and I could see nothing unmanly in his tears". 26

Next, Buckner wanted to know if Wallace had eaten any
breakfast. When Wallace remarked that he hadn't, the Confederate said, "I'm afraid you are a little late, but we will see." The general called for his Negro servant. When the slave thrust his head through the door, Buckner told him, "Another breakfast here."

In response to Buckner's request, the servant brought in another place setting. Taking a seat, Wallace prepared to partake of his breakfast. His meal consisted of corn bread and coffee. The Confederate officers made no apology for the limited menu, which was the best their kitchen could provide. Nevertheless, Wallace decided in his "own mind that the surrender had not been any too soon." 27

During and after the meal, the conversation became quite animated. The subject discussed was the war and, more particularly, incidents in the Fort Donelson operations. It amused Wallace to observe how steadfastly the Confederates clung to their belief that the Federals had 50,000 men with more arriving hourly. Since this opinion helped soften the pangs of defeat, Wallace chose not to enlighten them. 28

Finally, Wallace said something to Buckner about the "old flag". As the Union general recalled, "it was an expression of wonder that his congress gave it up for a new one." With this, Buckner slammed his hand down on the table with a bang! "The old
flag!", he shouted, "I followed it when most of your thousands out yonder were in swaddling clothes -- in Mexico -- on the frontier -- and I love it yet."

Wallace knew that Buckner's statement was not meant for retort. He, therefore, held his tongue.

Buckner inquired, "What will Grant do with us?" This question caused Wallace to pause for a moment before answering. Having collected his thoughts, the Union officer replied:

I can't say. But I know General Grant, and I know President Lincoln better than General Grant, and I am free to say that it is not in the nature of either of them to treat you, or these gentlemen, or the soldiers you have surrendered, other than as prisoners of war. 29

After Wallace had finished, Buckner remarked, "I thought as much." Continuing, the Confederate officer commented, "The only favor I have to ask is that I may not be separated from my friends here." Buckner then inquired if it were proper for him to bring the matter to Grant's attention. Wallace thought that he should. 30

At the time that General Wallace rode through the Confederate lines, Grant's order regarding the disposition of the troops had not reached the Wynn's Ferry road sector. Wallace accordingly had directed Crugh to march in and take possession
of Dover. As soon as Cruft gave the word, the bands struck up a lively air, and the brigade marched off. Passing through the works, Cruft's soldiers quickly occupied the town. A soldier in the 4th Mississippi, Ben H. Bounds, sadly recalled Cruft's troops tramping over the breastworks "with one band coming down one ridge playing Yankee Doodle and another... down another ridge playing Dixie and we sitting mum with our arms stacked." 31

Wallace's other two brigades (M. L. Smith's and Thayer's) did not get to enter the fallen stronghold. Before they could take up the advance, a staff officer galloped up and told the brigade commanders of Grant's decision to have their units proceed to Fort Henry. McClellan's troops accordingly followed Cruft's into the perimeter. Two brigades (Colonels Richard J. Oglesby's and Leonard F. Ross') entered the Confederate works by way of the Wynn's Ferry and Forge roads; Colonel William H. L. Wallace's used the Pinery road as its line of march. In compliance with Grant's directive, McClellan had his troops establish their camps in the hollows and on the ridges south and east of Dover. 32

When General McClellan's troops took position near the town, a private dashed into the two-story square brick courthouse. Within a few moments, he had completed his task. The stars and stripes were again waving gracefully from the cupola of the
courthouse. In the meantime, the soldiers had started inspecting the town. Dover, they found, contained a number of houses, a few buildings formerly used as stores, a doctor's office, and a dilapidated church. The town, as was to be expected, had suffered considerably during the battle. Nearly every building had been converted into a hospital. Trees had been cut down, fences burned, windows broken, and a number of buildings razed and used for fuel.

In the basement of one of the stores, the bluecoats found a Rebel arsenal. There were piles of rifles, old shotguns, many of them ticketed with the owner's name. In another building was located the Confederate commissary department. Here, were hogsheads of sugar, barrels of rice, boxes of abominable soap, and a few barrels of flour.  

The Union navy also sought to get into the final act of the Fort Donelson drama. At daybreak on the 16th, Commander Henry Walke, having heard rumors that the Rebels were about to surrender, ordered Commander Benjamin M. Dove to take the ironclads Louisville and St. Louis up the river and see if he could induce the foe to surrender to the navy. (Up to this hour, the crew of Carondelet had been unable to complete temporary repairs, and the flagship was, as yet, unable to get under way.)
Casting off with his two ironclads, Dove observed, on approaching the Water Batteries, that two white flags were flying over the upper one. The gunboats stopped, while Dove transferred to a tug. After a flag of truce had been hoisted, the tug proceeded up the Cumberland. The small boat pulled in to the shore immediately below the Water Batteries. Here, the commander was met by a Confederate major, who tendered his sword to the naval officer. Dove declined to receive the sword, believing that it was proper to "consult with General Grant" first. Taking the major on board, the tug again headed upstream. As soon as the vessel tied up at the upper steamboat landing, Dove proceeded to the Dover Hotel, where he was informed by the major that Buckner maintained his GHQ.

Reaching the hotel, the naval officer, accompanied by the major, headed for the dining room. Discovering the door closed, Dove knocked. In response to the acknowledgment, "Come in", Dove entered. As he advanced toward the table, Dove observed that a ranking army officer (General Wallace) was breakfasting with the Rebel brass. After introducing himself to Buckner, Dove addressed several questions to Wallace regarding, as the general subsequently recalled, the terms of the capitulation. Wallace then explained the situation to the naval officer and told him that he was
momentarily expecting General Grant. After some general conversation, Dove retired from the room and reboarded the tug. 35

Following the naval officer’s withdrawal, Wallace told his aide (Lieutenant Ware) that he was highly suspicious of the navy’s designs. The general remarked "that the navy seemed to be abroad very early; they were looking for swords, perhaps. I flattered myself, however, that this time I had been about three-quarters of an hour ahead of him." 36

About three-quarters of an hour after Dove’s exit, General Grant, accompanied by his staff, rode up to the hotel. Despite the brusque tone of his demand for "unconditional surrender", Grant, when he arrived at the hotel, was, to use Buckner’s words, "very kind and civil and polite". In the course of their conversation (which was friendly), Buckner told Grant that if he had been in command of the Confederate forces during the investment, the Federals would not have been allowed to make an unopposed approach on Donelson. Grant replied that if Buckner "had been in command ... [he] should not have tried in the way ... [he] did." 37

Continuing, Grant added facetiously that Pillow need not have been so anxious to escape. "If I had captured him", Grant said, "I would have turned him loose. I would rather have him in command of you fellows than as a prisoner." 38
In the meantime, the crew of Carondelet had effected emergency repairs. The vessel, for the first time since its fearful hammering on the 14th, was able to make way. Casting off, the ironclad started up the river. As the gunboat pulled away from the landing, Walke signalled for the gaily decorated transports to follow. While en route up the river, Carondelet passed Louisville and St. Louis. Hailing the two ironclads, Walke ordered them to accompany him. Shortly thereafter, the convoy drew abreast of the now silent Water Batteries. A little over 36 hours before, the Union gunboats had been pounded unmercifully by these same guns. As the vessels chugged slowly up the swollen river, they "steamed past Fort Donelson, thick with Confederate soldiers, -- past the intrenched camp of log-huts, past a school-house on a hill, above which waved the hospital flag, -- and on to Dover, the gunboats thundering a national salute the while." 39

As soon as the gunboats and transports had arrived off Dover, Commander Dove boarded Carondelet. Reporting to Walke, Dove informed his superior that the Rebels had surrendered, but he had been unable to determine under just what conditions. After religious services, Carondelet started for Cairo, where she arrived the next morning. St. Louis and Louisville would
remain at Dover until ordered elsewhere, or until a fall in the
stage of the river compelled them to return to the Ohio River. ¹⁰

A number of the transports, including Grant's headquarters
boat (the steamer New Uncle Sam), tied up at the lower landing.
One of the first men to go ashore was the noted newspaper
-correspondent, Charles C. Coffin. Clambering up the bank, the
newspaperman rambled about the area. He pronounced the
Confederate prisoners a careworn, haggard, melancholy looking lot.
Upon being questioned, the Rebel soldiers all told the same story --
they had fought well, but had been outnumbered. Furthermore, they
stated that there had been discord and disagreement among the
generals. Floyd and Pillow had escaped; Buckner had been left
holding the bag. The Mississippians and Texans were especially
incensed against Floyd and Pillow for having deserted them.
"Floyd always was a d....d thief and sneak." said one. Others
swore with mighty oaths that "they would shoot Floyd as they would
a dog, if they could get a chance". ¹¹

The uniforms and equipment of the Confederates made a
lasting impression on the Yankees. In his wandering, Coffin came
upon a squad of soldiers hovering around a fire. Some of the
Rebels had wrapped themselves in old patched bed quilts which
they had brought with them when they had been mustered into the
army. Others had covered themselves with white cotton blankets. Still others wore bright boking, evidently furnished by some merchant. One had wrapped himself in a faded piece of threadbare carpet. Their weapons were stacked, their accoutrements thrown aside, cartridge-boxes, belts, and ammunition trampled in the mud. The soldiers' arms were a heterogeneous lot — shotguns (single and double-barreled), hunting rifles, flintlock muskets (some of which had been altered to percussion locks), and English manufactured Enfields.

There were all sorts of uniforms represented, Coffin reported, brown-colored predominating. In addition, the reporter saw men clad in all shades of grey — sheep-, iron-, blue-, and dirty-grey. The correspondent for the New York Times informed his readers that most of the Confederates whom he saw were clad in "citizen's clothes, their only military insignia being black stripes on their pants. Many of the officers had the regular gray uniform, while others wore the army blue, the only difference from the United States style being the great profusion of gold lace." 42

For protection against the chilling wind, the soldiers used a conglomeration of overcoats, blankets, quilts, buffalo robes, and pieces of carpeting of all colors and figures. Each of the Rebels had a pack slung over his shoulder. Coffin recalled, "Judging by
their garments, one would have thought that the last scraping, the odds and ends of humanity and of dry goods, had been brought home together." 43

Coffin also visited the upper landing near the Dover Hotel, where the Confederate stores were piled, and from which Floyd had made his escape. Here, there were sacks of corn, tiers of rice, sides of bacon, barrels of flour, hogsheads of sugar — enough rations to last for several days. At the time of Coffin's visit, the ironclads were lying off the landing, and a portion of McClellan's division was posted on Robinson's and Dudley's hills; the stars and stripes and regimental banners flapping in the breeze, and the bands gaily playing patriotic airs. In the distance, Battery B, 1st Illinois Light Artillery could be heard firing a national salute. 44

Milling around the landing were a large number of Confederates, "evidently the rabble, or the debris of the army", belonging to various regiments. Some of these men were sullen, some indifferent, some gave the appearance of feeling a sense of relief, mingled with an apprehension for the future. Mingling among the Rebels were a number of Union soldiers. Despite their exuberance, the blueclads manifested no disposition to add to the unhappiness of the vanquished. 45
Before the day was over, the Union soldiers began to get out of hand. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in accordance with Grant's orders, many of the men commenced plundering. Both private and public property fell prey to the victorious bluecoats. War correspondent Coffin reported:

Later in the day we saw soldiers luxuriating like children in the hogsheads of sugar. Many a one filled his canteen with New Orleans molasses and his pockets with damp brown sugar. Looking into a store we found a squad of soldiers taking things of no earthly use. One had a looking-glass under his arm, one a paper of files, another several brass candlesticks, one a package of bonnets. 46

In an effort to keep the miscreants from making off with their ill-gotten gains, Grant ordered all the steamboats searched before they would be permitted to leave Dover. Guards were also stationed on the vessels to keep the men from carrying their booty aboard. Grant, however, directed his officers to collect from the Confederates the blankets which McClelland's troops had been forced to abandon on the morning of the 15th, when they had been driven from their camps. Since these blankets were grey with the letters "U. S." in the center, they would be easily identified. 47

By late afternoon, the Union officers had made an inventory of the captured war material, and a rough estimate of the number of prisoners that had fallen into their hands. As soon
as these figures were in his hands, Grant sent a message to Major General Henry W. Halleck. Grant informed his superior:

We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod Johnson; also about 20,000 stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 to 4,000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores. 48

It seems that Grant overstated the number of cannons captured by his troops. There were 13 pieces of heavy ordnance emplaced in the Water Batteries; one 8-inch siege howitzer was mounted in the fort. This indicates that, instead of capturing "17 heavy guns", the Federals took 14. Furthermore, the eight Confederate field artillery batteries at Fort Donelson were equipped with 48 guns. In addition, there were the two 9-pounders mounted in the fort. It appears that Grant had likewise overstated the number of field pieces captured by his forces. Instead of the 48 light guns claimed, the Yankees had actually taken 43.

The cold snap which gripped Middle and West Tennessee continued through the 16th. During the day, General Buckner observed that his men were suffering from the elements. Thousands of the Confederate soldiers were kept standing throughout the day in the mud without food or fires. Whenever the Rebel officers attempted to muster their men, they were arrested by some
of the Union guards. Buckner, therefore, decided to see General Grant and "ask him to make some disposition for the comfort" of the Confederate soldiers. Accompanied by Major Samuel K. Hays, General Buckner left his headquarters at the Dover Hotel. As the two Confederate officers headed for the landing, they passed the camp of the 2d Kentucky. The soldiers greeted the general with loud cheers. Buckner paused for a few minutes to try to comfort his Kentuckians.

Reaching the landing, the general found that the Union soldiers aboard New Uncle Sam had observed his approach. As the general and the staff officer started up the gangplank, the band struck up "Yankee Doodle". Buckner, however, walked resolutely up the plank, giving no indication that he noticed the music. Boarding the vessel, the general inquired for Grant. The officer of the day told Buckner that Grant was in the ladies' cabin holding a staff meeting. Buckner proceeded to the designated cabin. Entering the room, Buckner found Grant and about a dozen of his principal subordinates. Grant received Buckner very cordially and introduced him to the assembled officers. He then asked Buckner to take a seat. At this moment, the band ceased playing. A Union colonel, evidently wishing to embarrass Buckner, inquired in a sarcastic tone, "Gen. Buckner, doesn't that tune remind you
of the glories of the old flag under which you once fought?"

Buckner realized that this question was intended as an insult. When Grant, as Buckner expected, failed to reprove the colonel, the Confederate general decided a fair question demanded a fair reply. Buckner retorted:

A Confederate soldier, for some serious offense, was sentenced to be drummed out of the service, and as is the custom, you know, Colonel, on that occasion the field music struck up "The Rogue's March", when he indignantly turned to them and said: "That is not the tune; play Yankee Doodle, for a half a million rogues march to that every day."

Major Hays was the only one present who laughed at Buckner's jokes. Having answered the colonel, Buckner sat down and proceeded with his business. Buckner informed Grant that the terrible weather was causing much suffering among his troops. Furthermore, Buckner stated, it did not seem to him that there was any need of inflicting further hardship on his troops, because there were plenty of steamboats available. The general felt that if his men were allowed to board these vessels, the suffering would be greatly alleviated.

Grant replied, "I am newly arrived here; my staff is not completely organized, and I find difficulty in doing this."

"Gen. Grant", Buckner answered, "my staff is perfectly
organized, and I place them at your disposal for this purpose."

After hesitating a moment, Grant promised to issue an order directing his troops to obey any order which Buckner might give in respect to the comfort and movements of the Rebel prisoners. 50

Correspondent Coffin witnessed this meeting between Grant and Buckner. He recalled that Buckner sat on one side of the table and Grant on the other. Coffin described the Confederate general as:

... in the prime of life, although his hair had turned iron gray. He was of medium height, having a low forehead and thin cheeks, wore a moustache and meagre whiskers. He had on a light-blue kersey overcoat and a checked neckcloth. He was smoking a cigar, and talking in a low, quiet tone. He evidently felt that he was in a humiliating position, but his deportment was such as to command respect when contrasted with the course of Floyd and Pillow. 51

When Buckner rose to leave, Grant followed him. Outside the cabin, Grant stopped and remarked, "Buckner, you are, I know, separated from your people, and perhaps you need funds; my purse is at your disposal."

After declining Grant's offer, Buckner thanked him. Nevertheless, it was a clear indication that the Union general remembered Buckner kindness to him. 52 (In the summer of 1854,
Grant had resigned from the army. The Union future general reached New York from the West Coast in an almost destitute condition. His financial affairs reached a crisis when his hotel refused him further credit for board and room. In this emergency, Grant appealed to his old friend, Captain Buckner, whom he had known at West Point and in Mexico. Buckner restored Grant's credit at the hotel, had his baggage returned, and tided him over until he was able to collect some money from a creditor. Grant then went home to Missouri. 53

Returning to his quarters, Buckner encountered Captain George Dodge of the Union cavalry with two Confederate colonels. The two Rebel officers had been placed under arrest by a Union officer and were being escorted to Grant's headquarters boat. One of the colonels stated that he had been personally paroled by General Smith. Addressing a letter of protest to Grant, Buckner observed, "There seems to be no concert of action between the different departments of your army in reference to these prisoners." Buckner requested in writing that either the Union sentries be permitted to respect his passes, or that Grant appoint a provost-marshal vested with the necessary authority. 54

In response to Buckner's request, Grant had Rawlins draft a general order dealing with this problem. Hereafter, the Union guards would honor all passes signed by General Buckner. 55
About dusk, Coffin again went ashore. As he rode about
the area, the Confederate officers were mustering their troops
preparatory to embarking them upon the steamers. Standing on
Robinson's Hill, Coffin was able to get a good view of the entire
proceedings. The reporter recalled:

Hogarth never saw such a sight;
Shakespeare, in his conception of Falstaff's
tatterdemalions, could not have imagined the
like, -- not that they were deficient in
intellect, or wanting in courage, for among
them were noble men, brave fellows, who shed
tears when they found they were prisoners of
war, and who swore with round oaths that they
would shoot Floyd as they would a dog, if they
could get a chance, but that for grotesque
appearance they were never equalled, except
by the London bagman and chiffroniers of Paris. 56

Boarding the transports, the enlisted men were quartered
on the lower deck; the officers were given the freedom of the
boat. The saloons, cabins, berths, and staterooms were filled
with the sick and wounded from both armies.

The number of Confederates captured at Fort Donelson has
never been determined with precision. Grant, on the day of the
surrender, reported the number of prisoners bagged by the Federals
as "from 12,000 to 15,000". 58 Colonel Adam Badeau, in his The
Military History of U. S. Grant, states that the number of Rebels
captured was 14,623. 59 According to a report made by Major Thomas
H. Johnston of the 1st Mississippi and found among his papers in Mississippi in 1864, the number "engaged" was 15,246; the number surrendered was 11,738. General Floyd made no estimate of the strength of the Confederate force engaged, nor how many were captured. General Pillow placed the number of the defenders at 13,000. General Buckner, in a report filed after his exchange in August, wrote, "The aggregate of the army, was never greater than 12,000, ... and was reduced to less than 9,000 men after the departure of General Floyd's brigade." An estimate appearing in the Nashville Patriot soon after the surrender placed the number of Confederates engaged at 13,829.

All told, the Confederate army charged with the defense of the Fort Donelson area probably totaled 15,500 effectives. This figure did not take into account the men in hospitals, those assigned to supernumerary details, and the 400 recruits who reached Dover early on the morning of the 16th. When these are added to the garrison, it probably exceeded 18,000. (See Appendix A which accompanies the report titled, "The Fortifications of Fort Donelson.")

Colonel Charles Whittlesey was placed in charge of about 10,000 prisoners. Whittlesey's regiment, the 20th Ohio, escorted an estimated 6,300 of these to prisoner-of-war camps in the north.
Another, but much smaller number of prisoners, was entrusted to the 52d Illinois, Colonel Thomas W. Sweeny commanding. 66

Whittlesey and Sweeny were directed to see that the prisoners were provided with two days', and the guards with four days', rations before the steamboats left Dover. The officers' side-arms would be taken from them and stored. Upon reaching Cairo, Sweeny and Whittlesey, unless otherwise ordered, would see that the pistols and swords were returned to their rightful owners. 67

Evidently, the task of taking care of the thousands of prisoners proved to be a difficult problem. Grant, on the 17th, informed the Union commander at Cairo, Brigadier General George W. Cullum, that he was sending the prisoners down the Cumberland River as rapidly as possible. Grant felt that the last of the Confederates would be en route to Cairo by the next day. The general informed Cullum that he would be "truly glad" to get rid of them. He was of the opinion that they were easier captured than taken care of. Grant expressed the fear that the prisoners would "prove an elephant". In the future, Grant wrote, he thought it would be best if the government adopted a policy of paroling any Confederates captured. In view of his difficulties with the prisoners, Grant observed, he had already begun to pity Cullum "the moment the first cargo started." 68
When Halleck learned that Grant was sending thousands of prisoners to Cairo, he ordered Cullum to send 3,000 to Springfield, Illinois, 3,000 to Indianapolis, Indiana, and the remainder to Chicago. The officers, on giving their paroles in writing, would be transferred to Columbus, Ohio. Secretary of War Edwin H. Stanton, however, did not see the situation in the same light as Halleck did. Through General in Chief George B. McClellan, Stanton issued instructions countermanding Halleck's orders regarding the granting of paroles to the Confederate officers. In addition, Stanton directed that "no arrangements either by equivalents or otherwise will be made for the exchange of the rebel generals Johnson, Buckner, Pillow and Tilghman, nor for that of prisoners who had served in ... [the] Regular Army, without special orders from" Washington. 70

When Governor Richard Yates of Illinois learned that Halleck planned to send 3,000 prisoners to Springfield, he was aghast. Telegraphing Halleck, the governor warned, "We think it unsafe to send prisoners to Springfield, Ill.; there are so many secessionists at that place". 71

Meanwhile, Halleck had received encouraging dispatches from Chicago and Indianapolis. Adjutant General Allen C. Fuller of Illinois informed Halleck that the state had a lease on Camp
Douglas which did not expire until May 1. Fuller was confident that 7,000 prisoners could be quartered there. Assistant Quartermaster James A. Ekin notified "Old Brains" that he was seeing that barracks for 3,000 prisoners of war were prepared at Indianapolis. In view of these developments, Halleck again contacted Cullum on the 19th in regard to the disposition of the prisoners. In accordance with General Yates' fears, Cullum was not to send any of the Confederates to Springfield. Three thousand were to go to Indianapolis and seven thousand to Chicago; the remainder would probably be sent to Columbus, Ohio. Before leaving Cairo, the officers would be separated from the enlisted men. The officers were to be sent to St. Louis under a strong guard.

By the evening of the 18th, 11,000 prisoners had reached Cairo. Before Halleck's first message arrived regarding the disposal of the Confederates, General Cullum had forwarded over 9,000 to St. Louis. Following the receipt of Halleck's telegram, Cullum began to send the prisoners to Camp Douglas. On the night of the 19th, 1,000 Rebels left Cairo by rail for Chicago. A second 500 man contingent started for Chicago the next morning. Since there was a shortage of guards and steamboats, Cullum, despite Halleck's orders to the contrary, was compelled to send
the officers and men off together. He, however, gave instructions for the guards to keep them separated. Cullum was also deeply disturbed to learn that the Confederate officers had their side-arms when they reached Cairo. Apparently, the officers in charge of the prisoners had not followed Grant's instructions. Upon being questioned, the Rebels mistakenly stated that Grant had agreed to let them retain their pistols and swords. Cullum had the officers disarmed and their side-arms shipped to Camp Douglas. 75

The last big shipment of prisoners, about 2,000 strong, left Dover on the morning of the 19th. General Buckner and his staff departed the following day. 76 When these soldiers reached Cairo, General Cullum sent about 2,000 of them to Indianapolis; the rest went to Chicago. Since there was a shortage of passenger cars, many of the Confederates had to make the journey in unheated freight cars. 77

By this time, the transports with the 10,000 prisoners aboard had reached St. Louis. The officers and men now parted company. Pending the receipt of instructions from Washington, the Confederate officers were quartered on a steamboat which was anchored in the middle of the Mississippi River. The enlisted men were transferred to either Camp Douglas or camps in Indiana.
Altogether, about 7,000 of the Fort Donelson Confederates were sent to Camp Douglas, while over 4,210 were quartered at Camp Morton, Indiana. Smaller numbers of enlisted men were held at Alton and Camp Butler, Illinois and Terre Haute and Lafayette, Indiana. The junior Confederate officers were sent to Camp Chase, Ohio. 78 Generals Buckner and Tilghman and the field officers were confined at Fort Warren, Massachusetts. 79

Besides the prisoners sent to northern camps, there were a number of Confederate sick and wounded confined in the military hospitals in the Dover area, who also fell into the Yankees' hands. Colonel Whittlesey estimated that altogether the Federals, counting the patients, had bagged about 13,000 Rebels. 80

In addition to the men who had accompanied Forrest, an undetermined number of soldiers from other units had escaped from Dover. General Floyd reported that the boats which ferried his command across and up the Cumberland River carried about as many stragglers from other organizations. Floyd stated that when he reached Murfreesboro on the 21st, his four Virginia regiments numbered 986 officers and men. 81 General Pillow announced on March 14 that several thousand infantry, by hook or by crook, had escaped from the Fort Donelson area. Many of these men had
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The Other officer who went with General Johnson on the stroll and subsequent escape was Capt. John Hansford Anderson, Company C, 10th Tenn. Inf. Vols.

He later became Johnsons As Aide at Shiloh. Promoted to Lt. Col., 8th Tenn. at Shiloh.
Fought at Murphreesboro as Col. Cmdg of 8th Tenn.
Disch. May 1, 1865, Died 1902

This information gained in interview with grandaughter (Name & Address lost)
Reference: Tenn State Library & Archives
Also see Lindsleys History of Terg Regiment}
already reported to Pillow at Decatur, Alabama; the rest were under orders to rendezvous with their comrades there. 82

Even after the surrender, the Confederates continued to slip through the Union lines. Grant quickly learned of this illicit traffic. On the 17th, he informed General McClernand that "during the night a large number of captured animals have been run off and many prisoners escaped". Since a large proportion of the cavalry was attached to McClernand's division, Grant wanted him to organize a number of roving patrols to prevent any further traffic of this sort. McClernand would also send out a mounted detachment in an effort to apprehend the escapees. Evidently, McClernand's patrols were not very alert, because a very important prisoner soon succeeded in giving the Federals the slip. 83

By the afternoon of the 18th, all of General Johnson's troops had been sent down the river. The general, therefore, concluded that it would be very unlikely that he would be of any further service to his men. Furthermore, Johnson had neither been enrolled nor had he given his parole not to try to escape. About sunset, the general, accompanied by another officer, went for a stroll. Scrolling the hill where Heiman's brigade had formerly been posted, the two officers, seeing no bluecoated sentries, kept on going. Passing beyond the Union encampments, Johnson and his
It was the morning of the 17th before General Wallace could reorganize his command and begin the return march to Fort Henry as directed by Grant. Before the division left Dover, Colonel Cruft's brigade was detached, and Colonel M. L. Smith's brigade was again assigned to Wallace's command. 85

General Floyd placed the number of killed and wounded suffered by the Confederates at Fort Donelson at 1,500. 86 Pillow estimated the Rebel casualties at 2,000. He reported that the Southerners had evacuated 1,134 wounded from Dover before the surrender. In addition, he subsequently learned that about 400 wounded greyclads had fallen into the Yankees' hands upon the surrender and were confined in the hospital at Paducah. 87 At Fort Donelson, the Federal officers reported they had 500 killed, 2,108 wounded, and 224 missing, an aggregate of 2,832 casualties. 88 The Union navy, which had supported the army's attack, had lost 9 killed and 49 wounded.

Grant's dispatch reporting the fall of Fort Donelson reached Halleck's St. Louis headquarters about noon on the 17th. At 1 p. m., the jubilant Halleck wired General in Chief McClellan, "Make [Don C.] Buell, [Ulysses S.] Grant, and [John] Pope major-generals of volunteers and give me command in the West. I ask
this in return for Forts Henry and Donelson." It appears that the ambitious armchair general, Halleck, was trying to capitalize on his able subordinate's success. Furthermore, by including Grant's name with Buell's and Pope's, Halleck apparently was trying to put up a smoke screen, to make the Washington authorities believe that other Union generals had shared in the victory.

Two days later (on the 19th), Halleck stepped up his campaign to discredit Grant's contributions to the great Union victory. "Old Brains" wired Major General David Hunter (the commander of the Department of Kansas) his congratulations.

Halleck informed Hunter:

To you more than to any other man out of this department are we indebted for our success at Fort Donelson. In my strait for troops to re-enforce General Grant I appealed to you. You responded nobly and generously, placing your forces at my disposition. This enabled us to win the victory.

At the same time, Halleck wired Washington:

Brig. Gen. Charles F. Smith, by his coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle was against us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You can't get a better one. Honor him for this victory and the whole cavalry will applaud.
Except for a general order published at St. Louis on the 19th, Halleck took no further notice of Grant's role in the Forts Henry and Donelson operations. In this document, Halleck formally congratulated "Flag Officer [Andrew H.] Foote and General [Ulysses S.] Grant and the brave officers and men under their commands, on the recent brilliant victories on the Tennessee and Cumberland". 92

On the 20th Halleck, seeking to capitalize on the successes scored by his subordinate, wired McClellan in urgent terms, "I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May I assume the command?" 93

Following the receipt in Washington of the news of the fall of Fort Donelson, President Abraham Lincoln nominated Grant a major general of volunteers as of February 16; the Senate immediately confirmed the appointment. Subsequently, Buell, McClernand, Pope, C. F. Smith, and Lew Wallace were also promoted to major general to rank from March 21.

General Halleck, on March 11, was granted his fondest wish: A new command, the Department of the Mississippi, was constituted and Halleck was placed in charge. The new department included the departments formerly commanded by Halleck and Hunter, and the portion of Buell's which lay west of a north-south line drawn
through Knoxville, Tennessee. By their capture of Fort Henry, the Federals had driven a wedge into the Confederate defense line guarding the heartland of the Confederacy. The left flank of this line was anchored on Columbus, Kentucky, and the right on Cumberland Gap. With the loss of Fort Donelson, this line was hopelessly shattered. To make matters worse, the Confederates had lost a powerful field army and an immense amount of war materiel.

The fruits of the great Union victory at Fort Donelson were quickly apparent. As early as February 8, two days after the fall of Fort Henry and in the light of the serious threat to Fort Donelson, General Johnston notified Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin that he was giving up his position at Bowling Green, Kentucky, and retiring on Nashville. When Fort Donelson fell, Nashville was uncovered. Federal gunboats, it was expected, would ascend the Cumberland, compelling the Confederates to give up Nashville, a vital industrial and transportation complex. On February 17 and 18, Johnston evacuated Nashville and moved the main body of Major General William J. Hardee's Central Army of Kentucky to Murfreesboro. The Confederate rear guard left Nashville on the night of the 23d, and the vanguard of General
Buell's Army of the Ohio appeared the next morning on the right bank of the Cumberland, opposite the city.

At the same time, Columbus, the Confederate bastion on the Mississippi River, was rendered untenable. Major General Leonidas Polk (the commander of the First Division, Western Department) was forced to order reluctantly the evacuation of "The Gibraltar of the West", which was carried out on the night of March 2. The Union troops occupied Columbus the next day. Thus, by the capture of Fort Donelson and the destruction of the defending army, the Federals at one fell swoop had forced the Confederates to give up southern Kentucky, and virtually all of Middle and West Tennessee. Falling back, the Confederates began to concentrate their troops for a new stand on Corinth in north Mississippi.

With the fall of Fort Donelson, the entire picture of the "War in the West" was changed almost overnight. Grant had seized the initiative and, despite temporary setbacks, he was never to lose it. The deep wedge driven into the South by the fall of Fort Donelson would eventually split the Confederacy. Just over the horizon lay Shiloh, Corinth, Memphis and, 18 months later, Vicksburg. The South was to pay for the disaster at Dover with three more years of bitter warfare, but the ultimate price was total defeat.
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Notes on Chapter II

The Federals March In

1 Source Book, 914-915.
5 Ibid., 161.
6 Ibid., 335.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 161.
9 Ibid., 625-626.
10 Ibid., 626.
11 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 234, 246; Source Book, 995.

18 Ibid., 239; Source Book, 995; Lewis Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, l28.

19 Source Book, 995-996.

20 Ibid.


22 Source Book, 996-997.

23 Ibid., 997.


25 Source Book, 997.


27 Ibid.

28 Source Book, 998.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 999


33 Charles C. Coffin, *Four Years of Fighting: A Volume of Personal Observations with the Army and Navy — From the First Battle of Bull Run to the Fall of Richmond* (Boston, 1866), 82.


35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.


41 Coffin, *Four Years of Fighting*, 80-82.

42 Ibid., 81, 83; *Source Book*, 783.
43 Coffin, *Four Years of Fighting*, 83.
45 Coffin, *Four Years of Fighting*, 81-82.
51 Coffin, *Four Years of Fighting*, 83.
55 Ibid., 268.
56 Coffin, *Four Years of Fighting*, 82-83.
57 Ibid., 83.
60 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 283.
63 Ibid., 335.
64 Force, From Fort Henry to Corinth, 61.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 271-272.
69 Ibid., 276.
70 Ibid., 275-276.
71 Ibid., 277.
72 Ibid., 277-278.
73 Ibid., 278.
74 Ibid., 281.
75 Ibid., 277, 278, 282. The transports White Cloud, Empress, Gladiator, and D. A. January were used to ferry the first contingent of from 4,000 to 5,000 Rebels to St. Louis.
76 Ibid., 283; Source Book, 1025-1027.
78 Ibid., 291-292, 311, 315, 325.
79 Ibid., 326; Morton, "Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Tells Story of
Fall of Ft. Donelson”, Nashville Banner, Dec. 11, 1909. Camp Butler was at Springfield, Illinois; Camp Morton was at Indianapolis; and Camp Chase was at Columbus, Ohio.

80 Force, From Fort Henry to Corinth, 62.


82 Ibid., 290.


85 Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Indiana, II (Indianapolis, 1865), 84.


87 Ibid., 291.

88 Ibid., 169.

89 Ibid., 628.

90 Ibid., 636.

91 Ibid., 637.

92 Ibid., 638-639.

93 Ibid., 641.