El Malpais In the Land of Frozen Fires: A History of Occupation in El Malpais Country

No one in the army hierarchy seriously entertained thoughts of Navajo capitulation. At the head of the list stood General Carleton. Even before the July 20th deadline, he set into motion a summer campaign to break Navajo resistance. On July 7, the aggressive Colonel Carson left Los Pinos, situated 20 miles south of Albuquerque, with a detachment of 750 soldiers and Indian auxiliaries. Marching rapidly, Carson reached Fort Wingate on July 10. The fort resembled a beehive as soldiers prepared for field service. A mountain of quartermaster supplies foretold Fort Wingate's importance as a supply depot in the ensuing months.

Carson lingered but four days at Fort Wingate before striking out to re-establish a fort in the heart of Navajo country. Carson converted the blackened rubble of former Fort Defiance into headquarters and dubbed the new site, Fort Canby. Unleashing 200 Ute scouts, Carson sent them forward in search of their old nemesis. The Navajos managed to avoid collision with the Utes and the troops but their peach orchards, fields of ripening corn, and their livestock fell to the despoilers. [38]

While Carson's forces perfected a systematic destruction of Navajo land, Fort Wingate's soldiers remained alert. Given the prevailing attitudes of the period, the predominantly Hispanic New Mexico Volunteers and the almost exclusive Anglos comprising the California column, existed in racial harmony while serving together at Fort Wingate. [39] Captain Chacón recalled in his memoirs that relations with the California troops were always cordial. [40] Whatever their ethnic differences, the two cultures found commonality in that they were Volunteers and hence were considered inferior to Regular troops. Moreover, they bonded together in a common cause--a desire to hunt down and kill, if necessary, all Navajos who did not adhere to General Carleton's Bosque Redondo plan. In an effort to harass and wear down the Navajos, scouting and reconnoitering parties flooded the region. On July 30, 1863, Major Edward B. Willis departed Fort Wingate with Company C, 1st California Volunteers, one of two California companies temporarily assigned to the post, and Company F, 1st New Mexico Cavalry. Willis' scout, which carried him into Arizona, flushed no Indians but did serve Carleton by forcing the Indians to move their camps. [41]

In August Capt. Rafael Chacón spearheaded another grueling reconnaissance. The New Mexicans overtook a party of Navajos near the Salt Lakes, south of Zuni Pueblo. Chacon dispersed the Indians, killing two warriors and capturing ten women and children. On August 28 his detachment pummeled another Navajo encampment. In a dawn attack, the New Mexicans scattered the village capturing 60 women and children, 6,000 sheep, and 30 horses. [42]

While Chacon chased Indians across portions of New Mexico and Arizona, the Navajos initiated a surreptitious visit to the malpais. On August 31, Navajos assailed a wagon train five miles from the post. The celerity of the assault succeeded in wounding one man and forcing the soldiers to relinquish their wagons to the jubilant warriors. [43] On September 16 the Indians struck again, this time stampeding Capt. Chacon's horses grazing five miles from the post. Colonel Chavez gave pursuit but halted after an abortive 30 mile chase. [44] The nettlesome assaults on Fort Wingate persisted, serving to infuriate Carleton and drive a wedge of discord between him and Colonel Chavez. Relations deteriorated in a litany of angry messages from Carleton. A proud Chavez, stung by the criticism, searched for relief from the tyrannical Carleton. [45] Probably using influence with his step-father, Governor Henry Connelly, Chavez garnered an assignment away from Fort Wingate and the martinet, Carleton. In December, he headed a battalion of Missouri and New Mexico Volunteers escorting the newly appointed Governor of Arizona Territory to Fort Whipple. [46]

Meanwhile, Forts Canby and Wingate were converted into temporary detention centers before sending prisoners to Fort Sumner. On October 21, a contingent of warriors converged on Fort Wingate for the purpose of demonstrating peaceful overtures. Again, the military response to the peace proposal remained uncompromising--"All must come in and go to the Bosque Redondo, or remain in their own country at war." [47] In November Delgadito's destitute band became the first major Navajo faction to surrender when he and 187 followers traveled to Fort Wingate. Under military escort, Delgadito's group made the long trek to Fort Sumner. [48]

But it remained to Carleton's chief war architect, Col. Carson, to strike a decisive blow against the Navajos. In January 1864, Carson took dead aim at that bastion of Navajo citadels--Canyon de Chelly. The expedition succeeded in destroying valuable Navajos supplies. Stunned by Carson's hammer blows, the Navajos faced two unpleasant alternatives--surrender and become wards of the Army, or retreat farther into the abyss of their vast domain and subsist off nature's meager bounty of pinon nuts and wild potatoes. Danger impaled the latter course. If the army did not find them, then the Utes or Puebloans might. [49] Realizing the futility of resistance, many Navajos yielded to the dictates of the government. The remaining Indians, their will unbent, determined to resist until the bitter end.

On February 1, 1864, 800 half-starved and half-frozen Navajos congregated outside Fort Canby, awaiting transportation to Fort Sumner. The scenario duplicated itself the next day at Fort Wingate, where a ragtag group of 680 Navajos assembled. By March 1, the ranks of homeless Navajos mushroomed to 2,500. The Santa Fe Gazette gleefully revealed, "There are now about 1600 Indians here, and perhaps an equal number on their way to Fort Wingate so that the rate they arrive daily we will in less than three weeks have about five thousand on the reservation." [50]

On March 4, a pitiful band of 2,000 Indians departed Fort Canby on their "long walk" to Bosque Redondo. The young, the aged, and the infirmed rode in wagons, while the healthy trailed beside. Most were ill-clad, many exhibited symptoms of malnutrition. Some succumbed to exhaustion but most died from dysentery attributed to poor preparation of flour. The army issued flour but failed to provide cooking instructions. Many Navajos devoured the flour raw or mixed water with it to form a paste or gruel; still other Indians, poorly clad, succumbed from exposure to a chilling March cold. Their trail was easily identified by the number of corpses that lined the road between Forts Canby, Wingate and Sumner. One hundred and twenty-six perished. [51]

The human suffering only worsened in the succeeding weeks. Captain Francis McCabe of the 1st New Mexico Cavalry Volunteers left Fort Canby on March 20 in charge of another Navajo caravan bound for Fort Sumner. Snowstorms pelted the column making travel miserable. Reaching Fort Wingate, McCabe grimaced when he discerned that headquarters had not forwarded sufficient food or blankets for his pathetic captives.

The unexpected surrender of so many Indians at one time caught General Carleton and Fort Wingate off balance and in an embarrassing situation. Carleton instructed Fort Wingate to "place all troops on half rations." The Indians too were placed on half rations. When another 146 hungry Navajos showed up, rations were again reduced. McCabe finished his trek to Fort Sumner but not without tragedy and human suffering. In his report, McCabe revealed that 110 Indians died en route, another 25 escaped. He noted that many Indians had departed Fort Canby without benefit of warm clothing. Blankets were not issued until the column reached Los Pinos on the Rio Grande. [52] The demise of the proud Navajos caused New Mexicans to rejoice enthusiastically. Governor Connelly proclaimed the first Thursday in April as a day of prayer and thanksgiving. He honored General Carleton and his troops for their successful campaign. Santa Fe church bells rang gloriously in the wake of Navajo misery.

In the spring and summer of 1864, Navajos surrendered in droves. At Fort Wingate, the new post commander Maj. Ethan W. Eaton spent much of his time processing Navajos for shipment to Fort Sumner. Vigilance, however, could not be relaxed. Manuelito's band remained defiant. Eaton maintained patrols, scouring the territory in search of the recalcitrant warrior.

During the summer, the hard-driving Carson continued to lay waste to the Navajo homelands. Returning to Canyon de Chelly, Carson's pyrotechnics razed the ripening orchards and fields of crops, which tightened the strangulation hold on the Navajos. As summer turned to autumn, more Navajos joined their relatives at Bosque Redondo.

In October, Major Eaton reported the surrender of 1,000 Navajos at Fort Wingate, additional evidence of the effectiveness of Carson's sacking of Canyon de Chelly and the Fort Wingate patrols. With the advent of cold weather, Fort Wingate troops settled into a winter routine. Garrison life focused on the mundane chores of escorting military supply wagons to and from Fort Canby, assisting in never-ending construction activities, and superintending to the needs of the Navajos who continued to dribble into the fort. But even the cold brace of winter did not eliminate Fort Wingate troops from campaigning. On January 2, 1865, a detachment under Lt. Jose Sanchez left their creature comforts to punish sheep-stealing Indians. The column found no Indians but did blunder into a raging snowstorm near the Datil Mountains, which obliterated all traces of the marauders. Sanchez returned to the post empty-handed, reporting that his command subsisted for three days on nothing more than boiled wheat. Although they did not encounter Indians, their presence forced the Navajos who were already in a weakened condition to move their camps. [53]

To induce Manuelito's band, which represented the largest remaining contingent of Navajos opposing exodus to Bosque Redondo to surrender, General Carleton sent three Navajos to Fort Wingate for the purpose of establishing communications with the proud warrior. Near Zuni they made contact with Manuelito's camp. Despite persuasion, Manuelito remained unyielding. While he would not go to Bosque Redondo, some of his followers postulated a different viewpoint. The peace emissary returned to Fort Wingate and presented their findings. They reported that about 350 Navajos remained at large. [54]

During the winter, small groups of Navajos continued to migrate to Fort Wingate. Some endeavored to establish their camp about a mile from the post as a sign of friendliness towards the government and thus hoping their actions would sway the army to allow them to settle near the post. When Major Ethan Eaton learned of their presence he informed them they must go to Bosque Redondo--no exceptions, regardless of their peaceful intentions. [55] Rather than risk the uncertainty of eastern New Mexico, the Navajos bolted electing to take their chances on the run. After discovering the Navajos had jumped, an angry Major Eaton instructed Capt. Donaciano Montoya to take 25 men from Companies B and F of the 1st New Mexico Cavalry, who were all dismounted, and track down the runaways. Eaton admonished Montoya, "If they refuse to return and resisted, to bring them in by force--If they fought, to kill all he could. Women and children to be spared as much as possible." Montoya's foot cavalry, languishing on the trail in a snowstorm managed to capture just two women and a child. Soldiers did prevail in killing one warrior who lingered too long in an attempt to rescue the family. [56]