6

Resource Management in the 1970s

Resource management on Cumberland Island is complicated by two realities. First, natural and cultural resources are interspersed throughout the island. Counting the private Greyfield estate, six discrete complexes of historic buildings lie from one end of the island to the other. Isolated structures and archaeological sites are also numerous and even more widely dispersed (map 6.1). Each falls within one of the delicate island ecosystems that together define the seashore.

A second factor in resource management is the presence of retained estates and the specific rights that accompany each. These too are scattered throughout the island. Particularly significant are the rights to drive roads and the beach held by approximately 300 individuals. These factors together force the Park Service to face legal contradictions, immense pressure from special-interest groups, and a chronic budget shortfall in managing the island's resources.

Natural Resource Management

The National Park Service spent much of the 1970s on Cumberland establishing baseline data and management programs for the seashore's natural resources. Even before Congress established the new unit, agency-sponsored studies of the flora and fauna were under way.[1] When lawmakers passed the seashore legislation, in-depth research began on the geology, soils, hydrology, flora, and fauna of the island. The resulting reports identified natural and human-induced processes and provided data for planning and, in some cases, corrective measures. A University of Georgia team led by Hilburn O. Hillestad conducted the benchmark among these studies. Research began in 1973 with the specific objectives to "inventory and describe



Map 6.1. National Register historical and archaeological districts on Cumberland Island

the natural resources within the boundaries of the Cumberland Island National Seashore and to generally describe their functions and relationships." The scientists released their report in 1975 with chapters on geology, soils, water resources, vegetation, and fauna, as well as an opening summary of historical occupation and a concluding one on management issues. The latter pointed out many of the problems that would become critical in the ensuing twenty-five years.[2]

The first area of concern for Cumberland's new managers was the land itself. Coastal landforms are notoriously unstable because of long-shore currents and variations in sand supply, sea level, wind, storms, and a host of other interrelated physical processes. Beginning in 1963, Park Service policy ordered the agency's field personnel to foster and protect natural geological and ecological processes. Although precedents existed, this was a change in emphasis from earlier policies. It came as a result of a recommendation by an Advisory Board on Wildlife Management. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall formed the advisory board with chairman A. Starker Leopold and four other nationally recognized biologists to study overgrazing by elk in Yellowstone National Park.

In March 1963 the scientists issued their report, "Wildlife Management in the National Parks," more commonly known as the "Leopold Report." Board members went well beyond the task prescribed by Udall and offered a new, science-based philosophy for management of natural resources. They urged the Park Service to return parks to "vignettes of primitive America." This could be done with careful, ongoing research and management aimed at restoring natural processes regardless of what the public might aesthetically desire. Udall accepted the report and ordered all national parks to manage accordingly.[3]

In following this management philosophy, therefore, the Park Service should allow coastal processes to take place unless they are caused by human action. When Park Service researchers studied the geology of Cumberland Island, they found two problems. First, the edges of the island were eroding or accreting in different places. The erosion threatened both historic and recreational resources. Second, the system of ocean-side dunes on the island was actively migrating westward into the maritime forest and freshwater lakes. Each of these issues would become much worse during the national seashore's first three decades.

Most of the attention to coastal erosion focused initially on the Atlantic side of the island (map 6.2). To stabilize the entrance to St. Marys River,



Map 6.2. Shoreline changes on Cumberland Island since 1857. (Adapted from William H. McLemore et al., 1981, *Geology as Applied to Land-Use Management on Cumberland Island, Georgia,* prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior by the Georgia Geological Survey, contract no. CX5000-8-1563, reprinted in 1988 by the Cooperative Park Studies Unit, University of Georgia)

Congress had approved construction of jetties seaward from the south end of Cumberland Island and the north end of Amelia Island in the late nineteenth century. Despite immediate and extensive erosion of the Florida island, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers finished the jetties in 1905. It then began dredging the St. Marys River channel. In 1927 the corps lengthened the Cumberland jetty to more than two miles. It reinforced the jetty with concrete to prevent sand from passing southward into the channel. As a result, more than 500 acres of new land built up against the jetty on the southern Atlantic side of Cumberland Island. Partly in response to the altered ocean current, erosion has affected the northeastern and western sides, especially near Raccoon Keys on the southwestern portion of the island.[4]

In 1978 the Park Service established a monitoring program with twenty-eight stations spread the length of the island's Atlantic shore. After some initial data gathering, seashore personnel reduced the monitoring stations to twelve. As the years of monitoring accumulated, researchers were able to show seasonal changes in the beach profile, but they had insufficient data to reach a conclusion about long-term change.[5]

The Park Service's relative complacency about the Cumberland Sound side of the island was suddenly and unexpectedly shaken during the summer of 1974. Nearly twenty years earlier the U.S. Army had developed the Kings Bay Army Terminal across the sound. Army engineers also dredged a ship channel along the Intracoastal Waterway to a depth of thirty-four feet. Thereafter, the base had been used only as an occasional training facility. In 1973 Representative Bo Ginn threatened to have Congress take the facility away if the army did not increase its use. A year later the U.S. Army Command applied to the Corps of Engineers to dredge a turning basin for ships in Kings Bay and reestablish the thirty-four-foot depth of the channel.[6]

Although these plans were unsettling, the Park Service had little it could say to influence this activity and not much reason to do so. However, another part of the army's plan was intensely disturbing. During the original channel dredging from 1955 to 1957, the army had dumped spoils beside the channel, creating Drum Point Island, and on the southern end of Cumberland itself on lands taken with court order from the Carnegies. Now the army proposed to use those two sites again for additional spoils. The Park Service responded quickly, vigorously opposing the dredge spoil plan. Regional Director David Thompson pointed out that Congress intended to protect the area in the seashore's boundaries when it established the new unit. Park officials picked apart the army's initial environmental assessment

and sought help from the secretary of the interior and Georgia's congressional delegation.[7]

In reality, the army may never have intended to use Cumberland Island for dredge spoils. Its true purpose was to use the seashore's land as a pawn to get its way elsewhere. In July 1974 Park Service official Anthony Rinck accompanied members of the Corps of Engineers and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources to inspect the projected sites for spoils deposition. The most important one was near Kings Bay itself and would have no significant effect on the seashore. Subsequently he reported that the army's representative told him that "the Cumberland Island spoils area will be used only if the environmentalists refuse to let the Corps of Engineers free dump on the west side of the channel."[8]

In August 1975 the Camden County Board of Commissioners added its opposition to the deposit of spoils within the seashore boundaries. In the meantime, the army drafted an environmental impact statement that received even more criticism from environmentalists, the Park Service, locals, and many others. Finally, Stephen Osvald of the corps called the Park Service in November to tell it that a certain amount of dredging was immediately necessary. To avoid delays, he stated the spoils would be deposited on an upland area within the Kings Bay Terminal and on a spoil island near the Kings Bay Wharf. In June 1976 the army's final environmental impact statement declared that as a result of "considerable opposition," it would not use Cumberland Island or Drum Point Island. However, it noted that this decision applied only on this "one-time basis."[9]

The Park Service did not have long to celebrate its victory over this military intrusion. On January 27, 1978, the U.S. Navy announced that it would take over the Kings Bay base and develop it for a fleet of nuclear submarines. Much more development on land and a substantial deepening of the channel would be necessary. Cumberland Island personnel and environmentalists worried that the deeper channel might increase erosion and that petroleum and chemical waste might enter the delicate marine ecosystem.[10]

As they awaited details on the navy's plan for Kings Bay and the Cumberland Sound channel, another threat arose. The S. C. Loveland Company of Philadelphia applied to the Corps of Engineers to install a mooring buoy a few hundred yards from the Dungeness Dock. What the company planned to moor to the buoy was unclear, but Park Service officials suspected it was barges and feared that they might contain chemicals or petroleum products. They adamantly opposed this idea on the basis that it would

endanger ferry operations, place a visual blight at one of the principal debarkation points for visitors, and potentially ruin ecological resources in the event of a spill of dangerous chemicals. Ultimately, the vehement opposition from the Park Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service successfully stopped this intrusion. However, in the face of national defense needs, they were powerless to stop the submarine project.[11]

In addition to the many threats to Cumberland's coastal fringe, the state of its sand dunes also worried park officials. Dune vegetation was conspicuously missing from much of the island, and its absence allowed the dunes to bury portions of the maritime forest and inland lakes. The Hillestad team suggested that livestock introduced in the early 1900s was responsible for this denudation and consequent dune instability. The team's report noted that when livestock had been removed during the Civil War, it gave the island dunes a chance to revegetate. Although hurricanes had caused some damage, most recently in 1964, cattle and feral horses were named as the primary culprits. By consuming the vegetation and trampling the dunes, they threatened the entire ecosystem of the island.[12]

Pigs, Horses, and Cows

In the 1971 master plan for the proposed Cumberland Island National Seashore, Park Service personnel were blunt about feral animals on the island: "The feral hogs must be eliminated from the island. They are too destructive to the island's vegetation and to the turtle eggs. . . . Although cattle can be useful in keeping forest areas free from undergrowth and for improving wild turkey habitat, they are not natural and should also be eliminated." Interestingly, they neglected to mention the horses, which, because of their size, are the most destructive to the dunes. Four years later the Hillestad report agreed that pigs should be eliminated but also noted that cattle and horses could be useful for vegetation control in certain open and historic areas. However, the ecologists advised that they be greatly reduced in number and absolutely restricted from dunes and beaches.[13]

Hence, despite centuries of human use and livestock grazing, the Park Service insisted on removing these animals from all areas slated for management as natural ecological zones. In taking this position, the agency based its decision on policies developed from the inception of the agency, including the 1916 act to establish the National Park Service, Horace Albright's forestry and predator policy statements of 1931, the revolutionary

Fauna of the National Parks issued a year later, Director Newton B. Drury's arguments against emergency grazing in parks during World War II, the Leopold Report, and more than a decade of increasingly science-based resource management.[14]

In seeking to eliminate or reduce cattle, pigs, and horses, the agency's attention quickly focused on the island's only full-time resident and agriculturist, Lucy Ferguson. Cumberland's matriarch seemed to welcome that attention. She informed seashore officials that she had received permission from the other heirs to graze her cattle over the entire island. She expected the Park Service, as new owner of most of the land, to respect that commitment. Furthermore, she claimed all the feral pigs on the island were her property too. She vehemently opposed their removal, she said, because they kept down the population of poisonous snakes. She did not claim all the horses but only those on her land along with her pet burro that now ran with one of the horse herds.[15]

Of course the National Park Service rejected Ferguson's claims and asked her to fence her cattle on her own land. Superintendent Bert Roberts claimed the pigs were wild, had been periodically killed or trapped by former owners, and would be eliminated to the degree possible. Furthermore, he accused her of bringing more horses to the island and turning them loose after the national seashore's establishment.

This issue became quite inflamed in part because of the personalities of Bert Roberts and Lucy Ferguson. She had come to despise the National Park Service and lost no opportunity to say so to anyone who would listen. Government plans to develop the island for recreation, allow thousands of visitors, and restrict her use of the entire island infuriated her. Some of her family tried to assuage her and smooth over relations with the Park Service while others stridently supported her. Grandson Oliver Ferguson told the *Miami Herald,* "It hurts me to see the park rangers running around."[16]

Bert Roberts had succeeded unpopular Sam Weems as superintendent in November 1974. He promptly became even less popular with the island residents. Regional Director Thompson assigned the twenty-eight-year Park Service veteran to move Cumberland from a "project" status to an "operations" one—that is, to open the seashore to visitors. Thompson clearly expected a man who had previously been superintendent of Assateague Island and Cape Hatteras National Seashores to facilitate the island unit's opening. Roberts was a no-nonsense administrator who went by the book in his management activities.[17]

As the Park Service prepared for Cumberland Island's June 1975 opening, Roberts confronted Lucy Ferguson about the feral and domestic animals. After preliminary discussions, Roberts wrote an official letter stating the government's policy, which the island matriarch ignored. After a couple of weeks, Thornton Morris responded and noted that removal of the animals to Ferguson's land and completion of fencing around that land would be terribly expensive. He offered to meet Roberts to discuss the issue. Subsequently, Roberts offered Park Service help in removing cattle on its barge or rounding up and penning cattle and hogs on the island. Morris responded that Mrs. Ferguson no longer claimed ownership of any hogs not on her own land.[18]

When the Park Service opened Cumberland on schedule in June, cattle still roamed the island. A particularly large herd frequented the Dungeness estate. Thornton Morris, in a later interview, claimed that Lucy Ferguson knew she would have to remove her animals but that she defied Roberts in order to get him to offer help. Roberts evidently did not recognize the ploy. He wrote a lengthy and stern five-page letter to her on December 5, complaining that she had made no effort to control her cattle and that in fact their number on seashore land had increased. Furthermore, although Morris had stated that she did not claim pigs all over the island, some of her employees were seen feeding them, and another mentioned that he would trap her pigs on government land. Finally, Roberts accused her nominal employee and confidant J. B. Peeples of claiming part-ownership of the cattle and swine, threatening violence to federal officers and vandalism on federal land, and pledging to trespass whenever he wished. Robert's angry letter sparked an appeal by Ferguson to higher officials. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Nathaniel Reed sent Frank Masland, who promptly negotiated a ninety-day extension of the January 1, 1976, deadline set by the superintendent some months earlier. With that, Ferguson's employees began removing some animals.[19]

Bert Roberts relinquished the superintendency on December 31, 1975, although he stayed on to help the new superintendent, Paul McCrary, for a few weeks. He fired an aggrieved letter to the regional director on January 2, 1976, and welcomed removal of some of Ferguson's animals. However, he stated that family members expressed to him their fear that "Mrs. Ferguson is irrational where her thoughts about the National Park Service are concerned." He claimed that he decided on his very firm deadline after Thornton Morris, her son-in-law Putnam McDowell, a son, a daughter, several

grandchildren, her personal secretary, and other Carnegies recommended he do so. He suggested that Assistant Secretary Reed and Masland "should be reminded of this."[20] Soon thereafter Lucy Ferguson's employees, with Park Service help, removed all the cattle to her land in segment 2N.

Pigs, however, were another matter. When she relinquished claim to the swine on government land, she handed the Park Service a nearly hopeless task that it still has not solved. Under benign circumstances a sow can give birth to nearly sixty young in one year. This level of reproduction means that a limited island ecosystem like Cumberland can see a nearly extirpated population of swine overtake the resources in a matter of a few years.

The only two options are complete elimination, a goal virtually impossible without dogs, or a never-ending program of hunting and trapping. The Park Service had sporadically hunted and trapped the pigs before 1976. That year it started an ambitious trapping program that removed 970 pigs from the island in two years. The *Florida Times-Union* reported that the Park Service then sold them to hunting reserves or butcher shops on the mainland and gave the proceeds to Lucy Ferguson. Despite this, the island matriarch told the reporters she was bitter about their removal and expected rattlesnakes to multiply "beyond reckoning." Park rangers estimated that another 500 hogs still roamed the island. Later that year a Park Service review of the trapping program estimated that it might require the removal of 250 pigs per year to hold the island population at about 600.[21]

Oddly enough, park officials paid little attention to the horses on the island despite their destructiveness. Undoubtedly their popularity with residents, visitors, and to some extent with park personnel preserved them from the harsh solutions visited on cattle and pigs. Nevertheless, they were exotic, and Park Service policy was clear. In its 1979 wilderness recommendation, the Park Service proposed to round up horses in the wilderness area and remove them. A representative herd could be maintained at the south end of the island. A 1978 study by ecologist D. L. Stoneburner supported this decision. He informed park ranger Zack Kirkland that the horses were having a deleterious impact on the island's freshwater lakes. Not only were they destabilizing dunes, but their "grazing and trafficking" along the lakeshores caused erosion (fig. 6.1). He suggested that studies of the horse population and their ecological impact should begin immediately. Five months later Superintendent McCrary sought aid from the Southeast Region for such research, citing concerns about inadequate horse management expressed in the recently released draft general man-

Fig. 6.1. Dune encroachment on the maritime oak forest near Sea Camp

agement plan. Nevertheless, several years passed before serious research on horses began.[22]

Native Animals: The Good, the Bad, and the Missing

The historic faunal assemblage of Cumberland Island was a rich one. Hillestad and his coauthors reported that the literature showed 26 terrestrial mammal, 7 marine mammal, 34 reptile, 18 amphibian, and 323 bird species lived or routinely visited the area encompassed by the seashore within the previous century. However, a number of species had disappeared while new arrivals competed for niches with those that remained. Six of the island's mammals were gone. One of them, the endemic Cumberland Island pocket gopher, had been extinct only since 1970. The other missing native mammals were the opossum, gray fox, eastern harvest mouse, bobcat, and black bear. A brief and unpublicized effort to reintroduce the bobcat in 1972–73 apparently failed.

On the other hand, the island had too many raccoon and white-tailed

deer. The former preyed upon the nests of endangered sea turtles while the deer population, estimated in the thousands, had created a browse line in the forest over the entire island. One recent invader was the armadillo. No one was quite certain how it got there. Despite the armadillo's categorization as an exotic and the destruction of vegetation and archaeological sites it caused by digging for insects, the Hillestad team recommended no action to remove or control the armadillo population.[23]

In 1975 the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments recommended that the Park Service find an eastern island on which to introduce and protect the endangered red wolf. Director Gary Everhardt responded that only Cumberland Island had the necessary size and resources to be a possibility. He suggested that a red wolf recovery team visit the island and further investigate the resources. Apparently, this went no further, for the red wolf never arrived on Cumberland.[24]

Several other animals required special protection. Manatees occasionally visited Cumberland's south end during the summer, a factor that had to be considered carefully in planning ferry and other boat traffic to the island. Least terns nested on the northern and southern ends of Cumberland Island in the interdune areas and on the ocean beach above the high-tide line. In August 1975 Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Reed ordered the Park Service to take extraordinary steps to protect tern nesting colonies in all national park units. At Cumberland Island park officials stopped all use of motor vehicles in the dunes and interdune areas but could not stop it below the mean high-tide line where the state had jurisdiction.[25]

Beach driving also affected another endangered species on Cumberland Island, the loggerhead sea turtle. This species drew the earliest and most aggressive research and protection activity on the island from the Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife, and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources. The agencies were assisted by island resident Carol Ruckdeschel. She began a Park Service–supported study of the loggerhead in 1973 that lasted more than three years. With only occasional state or federal monetary support, she has continued her turtle and other biological research to the present time.[26]

In late November 1976 Superintendent McCrary replied to a request for information on sea turtle management from T. Destry Jarvis of the National Parks and Conservation Association. Using data from Ruckdeschel, as well as Jim Richardson of the University of Georgia, McCrary reported that between 50 and 100 turtles came ashore on the northern half of the island dur-

ing the nesting season and that an equal number nested on Little Cumberland Island. He then reported on the dangers and management issues that affected the turtle population. These included turtles drowned by shrimp nets, nest predation by feral hogs, destruction of the protective foredunes by hogs, cattle, and horses, and motor vehicle use on the state portion of the beach. Deliberate human disturbance of nests was rare.[27]

The National Park Service initially saw little problem with the beach driving. In April 1979 Director William Whalen, land acquisition specialist George Sandberg, other agency officials, and John Bryant of the National Parks and Conservation Association met in Washington, D.C., to discuss the subject. Bryant reported that vehicular use of the beach was not a significant issue because the island residents conceded that Director George Hartzog had rejected it during land acquisition by the National Park Foundation. Only Mary Bullard had a right to drive there, he added. The Park Service leadership confidently awaited the imminent transfer of jurisdiction from Georgia at which time they would terminate nearly all beach driving. Like so many other issues, however, this would prove to be far more complicated than initially expected. Neither a halt in beach driving nor cession of the state's jurisdiction has come at this time.[28]

Protecting Archaeological and Historical Resources

National Park Service officials initially deemed the cultural resources of the new seashore as secondary in importance. In the 1971 master plan for the proposed unit, the agency seemed to relegate it to third in its list of responsibilities, noting that "although Cumberland Island is first thought of for its ecological significance and recreational potential, its archaeological and historical values are also considerable." After a disputatious inspection of the island's historic structures, Park Service architectural historian John Garner claimed that the legislative history of the seashore emphasized protection of cultural resources. Chief historian Robert Utley responded, "There appears to be no more compelling mandate for historic preservation at Cumberland Island than at any other natural or recreational area of the system."[29]

However, intense pressure from island residents and state historic preservationists would not suffer the island's historic and archaeological resources to be relegated to second place. In addition, a history of legislation and policy documents assured that the National Park Service would have to

devote very large portions of its attention and money to these resources. When established in 1916, the agency inherited a variety of historic and archaeological monuments created by presidential proclamation under the Antiquities Act of 1906. Later, efforts by Director Horace Albright and his staff to add historical units in the eastern United States led to the Historic Sites Act of 1935. The relatively recent National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 demanded strict attention to these resources by the Park Service and all other federal agencies.[30]

In the act Congress created a National Register of Historic Places and ordered that the federal government grant funds to states so that they might identify historic resources, list them on the register, and preserve them. Legislators also created the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to be chaired by the director of the National Park Service. This body must approve nominations to the register and actions taken with structures on the register. A majority of the members are from outside the federal government, usually experts from state and local governments.

In 1971 President Richard Nixon followed up with Executive Order 11593 entitled "Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment."[31] This order required the federal government to assume a leadership role in historic preservation, to inventory eligible cultural resources on federal lands, and to initiate procedures to list them on the National Register.

Executive Order 11593 together with the National Historic Preservation Act created a body of restrictions and policies that shaped the historic preservation process. First, both the law and the executive order mandate that a nomination to the register from federal properties be cleared with the appropriate state historic preservation office. Second, an agency may dismantle a historic structure but only after qualified experts carefully record information and photograph it. After demolition, representative examples of style and materials are to be preserved. Finally, historic structures should be repaired or reconstructed only with appropriate historic materials.

The process of seeking state approval of actions pertaining to cultural resources came to be known as "section 106" after the clause in the National Historic Preservation Act where it appeared. The National Park Service evaluates properties for the National Register on the basis of significance in one or more of four areas. These are: (1) association with major events, (2) association with significant people in American history, (3) because they embody distinctive architectural or artistic values, or (4) because they may yield important information about history or prehistory.[32]

In order to enforce this new policy in the national park system, Director George Hartzog ordered in 1968 and again in 1972 that no structure fifty years or more old should be torn down without his permission. Furthermore, any park staff receiving permission should then follow a strict set of procedures. Nevertheless, in August 1974 Superintendent Sam Weems razed the dilapidated Plum Orchard laundry building without permission. Denver Service Center historian Edwin Bearss complained to Regional Director Thompson that Weems also planned to replace the Plum Orchard mansion's roof with one made of nonhistoric materials and to repair the nearby dock as he saw fit. Thompson balled out Weems and ordered him to take absolutely no action of any kind on any island structure without Thompson's written approval. A few weeks later Weems was replaced as superintendent.[33]

As the National Park Service moved to comply with the requirements for historic and archaeological preservation, it faced four tasks. First it had to conduct comprehensive surveys like the one Hillestad and his team were compiling for the natural resources. Second, the agency needed to evaluate each historic structure and decide which to preserve, which to reconstruct, and which to let disintegrate. Third, it had to actually maintain the buildings and convert some for use by the agency. Finally, it had to nominate appropriate archaeological and historic resources to the National Register.

Park Service specialists initiated two studies that would become the foundation of its cultural resource activities. John Ehrenhard of the agency's Southeast Archaeological Center led a team that surveyed the prehistoric and some of the historic resources of Cumberland Island. It investigated thirty-one areas with prehistoric resources and eleven specific historical sites as well as numerous roads, ditches, and canals. Ehrenhard issued his report in 1976. He proposed that seventeen prehistoric sites and two prehistoric "zones" were of sufficient importance and integrity to warrant National Register status. All of these were on the western edge of the island. Although a separate historic structures report would evaluate the more recent features, Ehrenhard recommended that seven specific historic sites be listed as well. These included the Tabby House, the Miller-Shaw cemetery, the ruins of the Deptford tabby house near Plum Orchard, the Stafford and Rayfield slave cabins, and the Half Moon Bluff cemetery. He also warned that dune encroachment and erosion were threatening some of the sites.[34]

Coincident with the archaeological research was the compilation of a his-

toric resource study by Denver Service Center historian Louis Torres. The resulting 1977 report consisted of two parts. The first portion detailed the history of the island, placing the various historical resources in narrative context. The second portion was a "historic structure report" for the Dungeness area. In this section Torres elaborated on the origin, characteristics, and current status of each structure at the old estate. His research was comprehensive, but he ran into trouble detailing the Carnegie era. He was unable to review most of the paper records of the estate because the heirs refused to make them available to him. Torres did profusely thank Nancy Rockefeller in the preface for her information and photographs. However, his attempts to interview Lucy Ferguson were rebuffed, presumably due to her growing distaste for the National Park Service and its actions on the island.[35]

During compilation of these two overviews, other more specific studies were underway. In 1977 the Denver Service Center issued three lengthy reports by architectural historian David A. Henderson. They covered the most architecturally significant standing structures on the island: the Plum Orchard mansion and the Tabby House and Recreation House at Dungeness. Meanwhile, John Ehrenhard and island resident Mary Bullard carried out an important archaeological investigation of the site of the Stafford slave cabins, simply referred to as "The Stafford Chimneys." They found the site to be of considerable significance, in some measure due to its preservation on an island generally inaccessible to the public.[36]

Mary Bullard proved to be a valuable ally in historical and archaeological research of Cumberland Island. Not only did she assist in a number of investigations, but she later published her own research in a variety of venues. Some of the important ones were a monograph on the Settlement, a Park Service report on Peter Bernardey, and a book on Robert Stafford and the plantation era.[37]

The Park Service also conducted a number of inspections of the historical resources, often including experts from the state historical preservation office and other interested agencies. Their reports, along with the more detailed historic structure studies, were necessary not only to evaluate the worthiness of each building for listing on the National Register but to decide whether various buildings were worthy of preservation at all. To the Park Service's dismay, its decisions at both the register and survival levels led to immediate and prolonged controversy.

In November 1975 Park Service officials conducted a four-day "field review" of Cumberland's historic structures. Participating were senior offi-

cials from the Southeast Region and Cumberland Island National Seashore, several planners and historical architects, and historians Lenard Brown and Louis Torres. They focused on the Plum Orchard and Dungeness complexes and concluded that each area would be severely impaired if it was not preserved as a total building complex. Unfortunately at each site they found many outbuildings too far deteriorated to save.

At Dungeness, for example, they determined that the Recreation House, the woodworking shop, the poultry manager's house and its associated coops, a silo, the ice house, and the dairy barn had deteriorated too far to salvage (see map 2.1). The Recreation House was a particular disappointment because of its architectural significance. They decided to record the architectural data on each damaged building and either raze them or allow them to disintegrate on their own.

At Plum Orchard they found most of the support structures in "an advanced state of decay." Many of the Plum Orchard outbuildings were located on reserved estates where the Park Service had recently learned that it had no right to intrude and repair them. The field team concluded that "only several of the dozen or so structures will likely survive the term of the life estate (ending in 2013)." In its summary report the team suggested that the two complexes be interpreted overall as "ruins."[38]

Even those buildings to be preserved presented serious problems. Architectural historian John Garner wrote about the Dungeness complex: "If the unpreservable buildings are removed, the remaining ensemble will not portray the complex as it existed at any historic point in time. Retention of the support structures HS.67 [YCC kitchen], 68 [dairy manager's house], 69 [YCC dorm], 70 [washhouse], 72 [kitchen], and 75 [black servants' quarters] poses a serious management problem in that adaptive use, security, and ongoing maintenance are precluded by existing conditions of funding, staffing and isolation."[39] Here Garner predicted the problems that would continuously plague historic preservation on Cumberland Island.

The final part of the field review report listed the most significant salvageable structures in order of priority. Plum Orchard mansion ranked first. It needed restoration of the porch roof, balustrades, gutters, and rainwater disposal system (fig. 6.2). Next came the Tabby House, which needed work on the roof and exterior woodwork as well as treatment for insect infestation. Third was the Dungeness mansion ruins, which needed to be stabilized. The remaining structures on the list were the Dungeness carriage house, dock, and a storage building. Two months later, in January 1976, Robert Ut-

Fig. 6.2. The hot and humid climate of coastal Georgia took its toll on all the historic structures on Cumberland Island. This damage at Plum Orchard is an example of the costly repairs necessary to maintain the dozens of National Register structures on the island.

ley and Hank Judd from Washington surveyed the Plum Orchard and Dungeness complexes and concurred with the field team's recommendations.[40]

Almost immediately the Park Service list received criticism, much of it from the state historic preservation office. During a meeting a few days after the field review, state archaeologist Lewis Larsen demanded to know why so many buildings were in a terrible state of disrepair. He focused particularly on Plum Orchard mansion and the Dungeness Recreation House, and he blamed the Park Service for letting them decay. He brushed off Park Service replies that these buildings had not been maintained for years before federal acquisition.

Larsen then insisted that the historic resources were the primary value of the island, that other programs should be curtailed in favor of more funds for historic restoration, and that the Park Service should not have opened the seashore to visitors the previous summer when the money spent on transporting them could have been used for historic resources. He insisted that all structures should be preserved and that the entire island should be nominated to the National Register to prevent damage to its archaeological sites by the National Park Service.[41]

The Park Service team reacted to this tirade with relative equanimity. Its members explained their budgetary problems and asked Larsen to prioritize the structures he would save under those circumstances. The state man refused. They explained that Congressman Bo Ginn had pushed them to open the seashore to visitors but that the legislator was unlikely to push Congress for more historic preservation funds. Finally, they agreed to carefully coordinate all their plans with the state office.[42]

Much of the conflict over preservation of historic structures throughout the history of the seashore has focused on the two buildings Larsen identified. During an earlier inspection by Park Service personnel, an argument arose over the Plum Orchard mansion and over historic interpretation of the seashore in general. Superintendent Bert Roberts claimed that the important eras were the prehistoric and Spanish mission periods. He suggested that anything after 1800 rated little attention. Southeast Region chief of planning Frederick Ley Jr. added that "visiting specialists in and out of the Service, scientists, interpreters, etc.," held the same opinion. Furthermore, he called the Plum Orchard mansion a "white elephant" that the agency would regret accepting. Bill Everhart, one of the participants in the early 1950s surveys of the island, and others agreed. Southeast Region historian Lenard Brown disagreed with both the pejorative description of Plum Orchard and the relegation of post-1800 history to insignificance. Subsequently, Ley suggested that more research was necessary but that the matter of which history to emphasize was "not an issue for us to wade into, as the legislative history defines the historic elements."[43]

Despite the division between Park Service personnel about Plum Orchard, the agency sought to maintain and find a use for it. During 1976 contract specialists tented the entire structure and fumigated it to prevent further termite damage. Also, a park maintenance crew did minor work on the porch in 1976 and 1977. However, a series of investigations indicated that these actions were of little help in fully restoring the building. John Garner informed the Southeast Region director in November 1975 that various levels of improvement would range from $52,800 for minimal repairs to the porch and eaves to $1,193,280 for full restoration. Later David Henderson's detailed historic structure report recommended $399,000 as absolutely necessary to make the building usable. Unfortunately, because of budget constraints and attention to other historic structures, the mansion did not receive such serious attention until 1983.[44]

The search for a use for Plum Orchard mansion began even before Con-

gress established the seashore. At the behest of the Johnston donors, the National Park Foundation proposed that it be used as a conference center. At the same time, the Park Service investigated using the house as a training center for historic preservationists. Seashore planners thought that the trainees' learning activities might offset part of the high cost of maintenance. Using the maintenance funds donated by the Johnstons, the foundation contracted with QRC Research Corporation to study the options. In August 1974 QRC researchers reported disquieting results. First, they demonstrated that it would be financially infeasible to use the mansion as an education center. Likewise, they discarded ideas of Plum Orchard as a museum or a "country inn." Then they reported that a conference center would be competitive only if the Park Service invested $1 million in repairs to the big house and $550,000 in building from twenty-two to twenty-seven additional bedrooms nearby. The QRC group added that the center supplemented by a full-size country inn next door would be even better.[45]

These options did not please the National Park Service. The costs were staggering—far more than it could wring from agency special funds for historic preservation. The idea of building a small hotel adjacent to the mansion was simply unacceptable. Nevertheless, it did not reject this or any other option outright. Instead, park officials and others continued to study and discuss the mansion's future for the rest of the decade. In the meantime, the $50,000 donated by the Johnstons for maintenance of the mansion ran out by early summer 1975.[46]

While many people were frustrated by apparent Park Service inactivity at Plum Orchard, the fate of the Dungeness Recreation House caused the most furious recriminations. Years later Nancy Rockefeller Copp expressed the Carnegie heirs' continuing anger at the fate of this unusual building: "It was so unique. . . . There was nothing like it. . . . And it was in perfect shape. All it needed was a new roof. And instead of that, they [the Park Service] took the $300,000 and stabilized the [Dungeness mansion] ruins. It was just a bad judgement."[47]

Copp's recollection of the structure's condition varied considerably from that of the Park Service's analysis. Architectural historian Henderson's 1977 report and photographs documented a building with severe roof damage from wind and storms and serious termite damage elsewhere. Exposure to sun and water had buckled the floor in many areas. Vandals had destroyed some of the columns in the portico and broken most windows. Nails, exposed by the buckling of wood shingles and siding, had rusted through, as had the metal eaves. Several trees had damaged walls and roof sections. Por-

tions of the complex had collapsed or sagged noticeably. Henderson estimated that the deterioration probably began in 1925 when Carnegie heirs closed both this building and the Dungeness mansion.[48]

Henderson offered ten alternatives for the management of the Recreation House, ranging from construction of a steel railing for visitor safety as they watched the building degenerate all the way to massive reconstruction and use for interpretation and employee quarters. He suggested his sixth alternative as his preferred one. In this option the Park Service would restore the exterior of the building, stabilize it, and allow the interior to continue to decay. This would allow interpretation of its form and function for visitors touring the Dungeness estate grounds. Henderson estimated the cost of this work at $256,000.[49]

From the time of their arrival on the island, however, most Park Service officials regarded the structure as unsalvageable. In answer to criticism from the state historic preservation office, private preservation interests, and the public, the Park Service invited a group of observers to inspect the Recreation House as well as other sites on the island. The visiting party included David Sherman, the Georgia state historic preservation officer, his staff, the Georgia state archaeologist, and two congressional aides. After viewing the decaying structure, Sherman asked a number of questions about the Park Service plans for it and expressed satisfaction with their decision. With apparent agreement from the state office, the Park Service rejected Henderson's recommendations and allowed the once-wondrous building to continue its rapid decay. A large portion of the center collapsed in 1982, which accelerated the wind and water damage to the rest of the building (fig. 6.3). Even after the state office gave up its opposition, the Camden County Historical Commission and island residents continued to chastise the Park Service bitterly.[50]

The Plum Orchard mansion and the Recreation House elicited most of the public attention, but the Park Service had many other cultural resources to manage. Various surveys had identified 110 aboveground structures, many of which could and would be preserved. For this work Cumberland Island spent approximately $750,000 from its operating budget and $400,000 from line-item appropriations between 1976 and 1979. In addition, the regional office added almost $800,000 from its cyclic preservation program, close to one-third of the entire budget for more than 3,000 structures in fifty-three parks. Nearly all these funds were spent on restoration of Dungeness outbuildings and stabilization of the Dungeness mansion ruins.[51]

Fig. 6.3. During the 1980s and 1990s the magnificent Recreation House collapsed due to weather and termite damage.

The Park Service also spent a significant portion of the seashore's cultural resources budget on archaeological work. Here too the seashore's staff ran into trouble with state and some Park Service officials as well as some island residents. Ironically, the earliest archaeological reconnaissance of the new national seashore took place on the proposed mainland headquarters site on Brunswick Pulp and Paper Company land. Although this superficial survey found no discernible sites on the access road to Interstate 95, archaeologist Richard Faust did find materials from the Deptford period where the Park Service planned to build a large complex of administrative buildings, employee housing, and visitor campgrounds.[52]

On the island preliminary surveys turned up an immediate problem. The retained estate granted to Coleman Johnston was initially expected to be a 40-acre parcel in segment 5S at the southern end of the island. However, Johnston chose to relocate his estate to Table Point as his retained-right contract allowed. Unfortunately, the area proposed for his new estate included two important archaeological sites that contained both burial and

house mounds. Archaeologist Donald Crusoe noted that the smaller of the sites appeared to be from the historic period and might have been the location of one of the Spanish missions. He suggested that the Park Service ask Johnston to move his retained estate southward and eastward by some 700 feet. However, Johnston refused to relocate. Eventually, archaeologists from the Southeast Archaeological Center conducted an extensive survey and recovery of artifacts while Johnston delayed his construction plans. The Carnegie heir also stipulated in the retained-estate exchange agreement that he would not destroy any cultural resources.[53]

A more serious problem arose on the retained estates of T. M. C. Johnston and Lucy Foster. Johnston had leased his estate at Plum Orchard to a Charles Hauser for the remainder of his reserved-estate right of forty years. The new lessee then began a series of modifications to two historic residences on the property. Letters to T. M. C. Johnston and visits by park officials to Hauser failed to stop the renovations. Cumberland rangers also reported that one of the life tenants on the Foster estate had threatened to remove the ruins of slave quarters at the Stafford Chimneys. Southeast Region director Thompson sought advice from the agency's regional solicitor on how to proceed.[54]

The answer was a shock to Cumberland Island officials. Solicitor Donald M. Spillman reported that the Park Service has the right to inspect property in retained estates but "only when there is belief that the remainder estate is endangered." Even worse, the agency could not legally stop alteration or demolition of historic resources, could not enter a site to conduct archaeological investigations, stabilize buildings, or salvage historical fixtures, and could not forbid any new construction. The only option left was to seek an injunction to stop any adverse action. In the case of the Stafford Chimneys, the Fosters never acted upon the threat. Hauser completed his alterations to the two buildings on his rental lot. Ironically, the Park Service could, with the owner's permission, enter a property and spend federal money to maintain a historical structure.[55]

The National Register

The Park Service faced one more cultural resource issue, the nomination of historical and archaeological sites to the National Register of Historic Places. Here too the agency experienced controversy. By the summer of 1975, the seashore had opened to visitors and was approaching its third an-

niversary. Agency historians had repeatedly inspected the island's cultural resources. Yet the Park Service had no nominations ready for the National Register when Director Everhardt asked for a list. Part of the reason was that agency officials still awaited the results of the major archaeological and historical overviews by Ehrenhard and Torres. However, more than research delays and the complexity of the nomination procedure lay behind their apparent inaction.[56]

During various meetings between Park Service and state historic preservation officials, a dispute arose over the amount of land and resources to nominate. The Park Service proposed several discrete and finite districts, each containing a number of buildings, prehistoric sites, or both. Among them were Dungeness, Plum Orchard, Stafford, and High Point–Half Moon Bluff. Agency officials planned to nominate other, more dispersed archaeological sites later (see map 6.1).[57]

Georgia historic preservation officers, on the other hand, wanted the entire island nominated as a multiple-resource district. This disagreement was a serious one that served as the catalyst for state archaeologist Lewis Larsen's diatribe against the Park Service during their November 1975 meeting. Larsen and other state officials regarded the Park Service's refusal to nominate the entire island as evidence that federal officers would carry out activities harmful to cultural resources on unlisted but potentially significant archaeological sites. Later his distrust spread to the historic preservation community, Cumberland Island residents, and some members of the general public.[58]

During the March 1976 inspection with Southeast Region and seashore personnel, state historic preservation officer David Sherman described the island as a "closed system of cultural development, a space-time continuum." Park Service resource managers argued that the island could not represent an entire system because so many structures and prehistoric sites had been damaged or allowed to deteriorate before the federal government took over. At the time, Park Service representatives believed they had convinced Sherman. For the rest of 1976 they submitted plans for renovation of various structures without any problems and continued to study new sites for potential nomination to the register.[59] However, state officials did not drop their plan to nominate the entire island. They continued to criticize the Park Service's cultural resources program vigorously.

In response, Park Service regional officials urged Denver Service Center specialists to hurry their review of nine potential districts. The acting re-

gional director wrote in February 1977, "We seek, quite frankly, to place the burden of proof on the State Historic Preservation Officer to show why the entire island qualified rather than putting the National Park Service in the position of arguing against nomination of all of Cumberland." Later that year the Park Service declared four districts—Dungeness, Stafford, Plum Orchard, and the Main Road—eligible for immediate nomination. This step initiated the Executive Order 11593 requirement that federal agencies should manage properties declared as eligible as if they were already on the register.[60]

In the meantime, David Sherman and Lewis Larson prepared a letter explaining why the entire island should be nominated as one district. Directed at both the Park Service and the keeper of the National Register, it spelled out their idea of the island as a space-time continuum:

> Cumberland Island is a barrier island encompassing several ecosystems isolated from the mainland. In the absence of data to the contrary, we may assume that aboriginal populations operated on Cumberland Island as autonomous or nearly autonomous units. Any synchronic or diachronic research proposals concerning the anthropology or history of Cumberland Island would, of necessity, require that attention be directed to all site areas of the island as opposed to the district and site boundaries proposed by the National Park Service. The emphasis on preservation of the larger or less disturbed sites of the island to the exclusion of the small or damaged sites of the same temporal position, can only lead to biased interpretations of economic and social subsystems on the island.[61]

This was enough for the acting keeper of the National Register, Charles A. Herrington. He readily agreed with the Park Service historians that the four districts they had nominated were eligible. However, he endorsed the state's rationale of nominating the entire island. In addition, he agreed with criticism that the state preservationists leveled at the Ehrenhard report. They had strenuously criticized it because it did not explain in detail why some archaeological sites were excluded from the list of places to be nominated to the register or what would happen to them in the future.[62]

As the Park Service pondered this response, work continued on both renovation of structures and preparation of individual district nominations. Questions about the value of some historic resources arose. In his letter Herrington referred to the Stafford Chimneys as "one of the most important black history sites in the country." This level of significance was

considerably higher than Torres had posited and called into question Park Service plans to grant retained estates in the Settlement to Carol Ruckdeschel and Grover Henderson. Now it was uncertain how or whether to proceed. However, Sarah Bridges, also of the National Register office, stated that the Settlement was a twentieth-century site and that a few retained rights there probably would not damage the resources.[63]

In 1978 the National Register issue came to a head. First, in its response to the 1977 draft general management plan and wilderness study for Cumberland Island, the Georgia Department of Natural Resources rejected the idea of one islandwide historic district as "neither practical nor feasible." Suddenly it was not simply a state versus federal conflict but a disagreement between state officials. Then, in early March regional historian Lenard Brown accused the state preservation office of refusing to process section 106 requests for structural rehabilitation work until the Park Service surveyed the entire island for archaeological resources and settled the matter of nominating all of it or a group of discrete districts.[64]

After a flurry of unsuccessful correspondence between federal and state officials, the Park Service fell back on an agreement it had with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. That policy provided that if a state office does not respond to a request for approval of a section 106 within forty-five days, the federal officers may assume that state officials have no comment. Using this approach, seashore officials resumed rehabilitation and development.[65]

The National Park Service never reconsidered its nomination of a series of separate districts and sites. In April 1978 the agency released a draft "historical resource management plan." The authors again proposed historic districts at Dungeness and Plum Orchard, identifying which buildings in each area could be preserved and which could not. Oddly, they suggested preservation of the exterior of the Recreation House. Unfortunately, senior Park Service officials rejected the plan because of its inadequate attention to archaeological resources. Nevertheless, with one exception the agency continued in every plan revision to offer the same prescriptions for separate and individual districts and selective preservation of buildings. The aberrant suggestion of saving anything other than the foundation of the Recreation House was never repeated.[66]

National Park Service intransigence continued to generate negative public relations. In February 1980 the Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation invited the Park Service to explain its preservation efforts on Cum-

berland Island. In attendance were representatives of the Georgia preservation office, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and the Camden County Historical Commission. John Garner of the regional office made the presentation. He later wrote to the regional director that these groups apparently had collaborated to present a document that strongly criticized Park Service cultural resource management. However, Garner's presentation seemed to mollify them, and the meeting ended with promises to communicate and cooperate.[67]

The National Register nomination process proved to be a time-consuming one, even without all these problems. Because of the conflict over aspects of the plans for Dungeness and Plum Orchard, the only district to be listed on the register during the seashore's first decade was High Point–Half Moon Bluff. Denver Service Center historian Edwin Bearss initially prepared data for the nomination in October 1974. Over the next several years, Park Service officials had to determine ownership of several private tracts in the Half Moon Bluff area and acquire them as well as settle the issue of retained rights in the Settlement. In addition, they had to negotiate with the Candlers in order to inspect and list the private High Point estate.[68]

In January 1978 the agency submitted its proposal to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and the Georgia state historic preservation officer. Elizabeth Lyon, the acting officer, promptly refused to certify it because of her disagreement with the Park Service's nomination of separate districts. National Park Service historians elected to ignore the state office and pushed ahead anyway. The High Point–Half Moon Bluff district was added to the register in December of that year (fig. 6.4).[69]

Yet even successful establishment on the National Register did not end conflict over Cumberland's historic resources. Six months after the acceptance of the High Point–Half Moon Bluff district, Carol Ruckdeschel notified the regional office that the nomination contained numerous mistakes. After listing them one by one, she stated that only "three modified structures out of 20 to 30 original ones" were left of the nineteenth-century north end hotel complex. She added that the Candlers had eleven new buildings that "further erase the atmosphere of the hotel period." She also challenged the common interpretation of the Settlement as the home of freed slaves.[70]

Some Park Service officials reacted negatively to her evaluation. They believed that she had ulterior motives of trying to limit the size of the historic district and blunt plans to bring visitors to it. A briefing statement for Di-

Fig. 6.4. The First African Baptist Church in the Settlement in the 1980s

rector Whalen blandly suggested that she professed to be concerned about this intrusion in a planned wilderness area, but that her position, if adopted, would "coincidentally" assure her of more privacy. Nevertheless the agency adopted most of her corrections and submitted a second nomination in 1979. Final approval of the amended documentation came in January 1980, more than five years after Bearss's original report.[71]

By the end of 1979, National Park Service historic preservation on Cumberland Island and the criticism it drew had crystallized. The agency had formulated a set of policies to nominate sites for the National Register, to prioritize renovation and adaptation of salvageable buildings, and to identify and protect archaeological sites. Various offices of the Park Service had spent slightly over $2 million on repairs and stabilization. One district had been listed on the National Register, effectively ending the state's argument for an islandwide historic district. Nominations for four others were in various stages of preparation. Seashore personnel or contractors had worked on more than sixty-four structures and adapted eleven buildings for use by seashore personnel.[72]

However, a fundamental distrust of the agency had settled in among many members of the local public, the island residents, and some historic

preservation experts in other agencies. This distrust fed on itself until nearly every step taken by the Park Service was questioned. Public relations became one of the most important jobs for cultural resource managers. During the next twenty years, much of the criticism of the National Park Service and a lot of its public relations work would focus on the Plum Orchard mansion.

Evaluating the Seashore's First Seven Years

Late in 1979 a Park Service official wrote a nine-page summary of the history of the national seashore from 1972 through 1979. After dispensing with the Carnegie period and the issues surrounding the unit's establishment, the author summarized the accomplishments of the Park Service. The agency had preserved and stabilized historic structures but learned it had little power to stop destruction on retained estates. It had opened the seashore to visitors and experimented with various transportation options. It had conducted critical natural resource research and started some monitoring programs. Planning began with a 1973 environmental statement for the preestablishment master plan and continued with public hearings in 1975, 1976, and 1977 and release of a general management plan and wilderness recommendation in August 1977. Land acquisition continued, and programs for historic preservation, natural resource protection, and interpretation were well under way. The author concluded: "In the seven years since Cumberland Island was established considerable progress has been made. An outstanding seashore area has been preserved and made available to the public. . . . The work is not complete, but it has been well begun."[73]

However, this terse summary put a positive spin on what had been a conflict-plagued period. A bitter argument with state historic preservation interests over the island's cultural resources continued. Early general management and wilderness plans had met bristling rejection from environmentalists and many island residents. Some natural resource actions, such as the attempted elimination of pigs, also drew unexpectedly negative responses.

A year later the Park Service released a "final" environmental impact statement for the general management plan and wilderness recommendation. It bore little resemblance to the 1971 master plan or to the agency's understanding of appropriate development for a recreation area. At the same time a Park Service effort to close a road in the future wilderness failed

miserably under intense political pressure. The National Park Service had learned that it faced enormous competition to shape the future of both the physical and the legislative island that is Cumberland.

Historic preservationists wanted the entire island declared a single historic district constrained by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Environmentalists wanted the entire island designated wilderness constrained by the Wilderness Act of 1964. Retained-rights holders insisted that their contracts with the National Park Foundation and the Park Service allowed them to live in semi-isolation as they always had, driving the island's roads and beach, modifying structures to suit their needs, and comanaging the national seashore. The conflicts inherent in these legally binding policies focused stressful attention on a badly underfunded public agency. By 1980 nearly all the pernicious issues of the seashore's first three decades had surfaced. In the following twenty years, a few would be solved, but many others were just beginning.