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THE BRITISH DEFENSES OF YORKTOWN, 1781

NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK / VIRGINIA
HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY
THE BRITISH DEFENSES OF YORKTOWN, 1781
COLONIAL NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK
VIRGINIA

by

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HISTORIC PRESERVATION DIVISION
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
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PREFACE

This study on the British defenses at Yorktown has been prepared in accordance with the approved planning directive for the project (Package 180). The desired objective has been to complete a document that will prove useful to the needs of management, preservation, interpretation, and planning. Whether that objective has been attained will be known soon enough. Meanwhile, the experience has been exhilarating, frightening, enjoyable, worrisome, exciting, and behind schedule.

Logically, a specialist in the American Revolution would be the proper person to prepare a study on Lord Cornwallis's sojourn at Yorktown. But, things being the way they are, a non-specialist who had no prior exposure to the Revolutionary period was chosen. This choice should result in some interesting reading. Nevertheless, it has been a fine adventure resulting in great associations, in research at institutions not before visited, and in generous help from many people every time my ignorance blocked progress.

The highlight in accomplishing the research was being associated with Historian Jerome A. Greene, Denver Service Center. Jerry was assigned a research project concerning the Allies at Yorktown. We coordinated our research, acquired a common pool of historic maps, visited some libraries together, and exchanged data from other institutions. His competence, tact, understanding of my obstinateness, and gentle wit raised my spirits when they fell down. His innate friendliness and courtesy paved the way for us on many occasions when meeting the custodians of the resources. This joint undertaking was a rewarding experience that I shall not forget.

Supervisory Historian John F. Luzader, Denver Service Center, not only supplied primary documents from his collection of German material but also took time to translate them. He also patiently answered all my questions concerning the American Revolution, of which he is master. Editor Linda Greene, Historic Preservation, had a particularly difficult task in encouraging me, with grace and good humor, to conform my methodology to the Chicago Manual of Style. Considering my fossilization after eleven years with another style, she deserves sympathy and my thanks. Also, my appreciation goes to Robert H. Todd, Division of Graphics, Denver Service Center, who drew the many maps in this report in a superb manner. The Division of Graphics is responsible for the fine visual appearance of this study.

Working at Colonial National Historical Park was attended by unusual circumstances. Because the visitor center complex was being enlarged and remodeled while I was there, I was required to wear a
hardhat while delving into the history files. Because the building is located within the area defended by the British, the noise of jackhammers gave me an inkling of the cannonading that Cornwallis’s men endured. Regardless, my appreciation for generous help is extended to the three Jameses: Superintendent Sullivan, Chief Historian Hasket, and Park Historian Gott. My thanks also go to Ranger Laura Feller for her translation of a French journal of the siege.

The archeological investigation and historical research on Yorktown presently being undertaken by the Southside Historical Sites Foundation, Williamsburg, are important additions to our knowledge of the siege. Moreover, the ideas and concepts generated by this group of researchers are a stimulus to the study of the fortifications. Thanks go to Director of Research Norman Barka, Edward Ayers, Arthur Barnes, and Edward McManus.

A considerable number of historical societies, libraries, and museums fully extended their services and made all their resources available for the purposes of this study. On several occasions, when machines broke down and so forth, these institutions went to extraordinary lengths to insure that the materials were made available in time. My acknowledgements and thanks are due to the following: Mrs. Gertrude A. Fisher, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston; Edward M. Riley, Mrs. Nancy Merz, and Mrs. Linda Rowe, The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, Virginia; John L. Lochhead, The Mariners Museum, Newport News, Virginia; Miss J. Miller, Casemate Museum, and Mrs. Thomas, TRADOC Library, U.S. Army Continental Command, both at Fort Monroe, Virginia; Edward B. Russell and John M. Dervan, U.S. Army Engineer Museum, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Mrs. Lucy Hrivnak, The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Mrs. Mary A. Thompson, Paul Mellon Collection, Oak Spring, Upperville, Virginia; John S. Aubrey, Newberry Library, Chicago; William S. Dix and Mrs. Agnes B. Sherman, Princeton University Library, New Jersey; Richard Boulind, The John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island; Virginia State Library, Richmond; Mrs. Lois B. McCauley, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore; A. Modelski and Jeffery Clark, Geography and Map Division, The Library of Congress, Alexandria, Virginia; Gary Morgan, Map Division, the National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Map Information Service, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia; and the University of Colorado Library, Boulder, and the Denver Public Library, Colorado.

I am particularly indebted to Mr. Joseph P. Tustin, Tuckerton, New Jersey. Mr. Tustin has in his possession the unpublished diary of Capt. Johann Ewald, Jägers, who had much to say on the British defenses at Yorktown. He has edited this important account and, despite its being on the eve of publication, made generous portions of it available for the benefit of Yorktown.

A special thanks is due also to the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Director Howard N. Peckham, Curators
John Dann (Manuscripts) and Douglas W. Marshall (Maps), Assistant Curator Arlene Kleeb, and the entire staff did everything possible to make our visit there both comfortable and profitable. The riches in the Sir Henry Clinton papers were indispensable for the purposes of this report.

In the text and in the bibliography of this study, note is made of the important research that has already been accomplished by National Park Service people who have been assigned to Colonial NHP over the years. Needless to stress, this body of work was of critical importance to the study. My thanks are due also to the nameless NPS people who have contributed their time and talents toward the creation and management of the history files and of the excellent research library at the park.

Last, but most important of all, my gratitude goes to Lael Cleys, who took my handwritten draft and transformed it into a legible document.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ........................................ iii

I. CORNWALLIS COMES TO YORKTOWN .......... 1

II. YORKTOWN AND GLOUCESTER POINT: EARLY HISTORY .... 7
   A. Yorktown ..................................... 7
   B. Gloucester Point ........................... 10

III. THE BRITISH FORTIFY, AUGUST 1781 .... 11
   A. Cornwallis Sails to Yorktown .............. 11
   B. Patrols ..................................... 13
   C. Lafayette Moves ........................... 15
   D. Fortifying the Posts ....................... 15
   E. French Fleet Arrives ...................... 19

IV. THE BRITISH ARMY AT YORKTOWN .............. 23
   A. Strength .................................... 23
   B. The Units .................................. 27
      1. British, General ......................... 27
      2. 17th Regiment of Foot ................. 28
      3. 23d Regiment of Foot .................. 28
      4. 33d Regiment of Foot .................. 29
      5. 43d Regiment of Foot .................. 29
      6. 71st Regiment of Foot .................. 29
      7. 76th Regiment of Foot .................. 30
      8. 80th Regiment of Foot .................. 30
      9. 1st and 2d Light Infantry Battalions . 31
     10. Royal Artillery .......................... 31
     11. Royal Engineers ......................... 31
     12. German Units, General ................. 32
     13. Anspach Battalions ...................... 32
     14. Fusilier Regiment Erbprinz ............. 32
     15. Musketeer Regiment von Bose ........... 32
     16. Jägers ................................... 33
     17. German Artillery ...................... 33
     18. British Legion, Provincial ............. 33
     19. Queen's Rangers, Provincial .......... 33
     20. Royal Navy ............................. 34

vii
V. A MONTH OF GRACE, SEPTEMBER 1781 .......................... 37

A. Cornwallis's Decisions ........................................ 37
B. Military Activities ........................................... 38
C. The Allies Gather ............................................. 40
D. Fire Ships ..................................................... 42

VI. THE DEFENSES OF YORKTOWN AND GLOUCESTER .................. 45

A. Siege Warfare: Theory and Practice .......................... 45
   1. De Vauban ................................................ 45
   2. John Muller .............................................. 47
   3. A Good Defense .......................................... 48
   4. Construction of Fortifications ........................... 54
      a) Artillery: Penetration and Range ..................... 55
      b) Trace .................................................. 56
      c) Rampart/Parapet ...................................... 56
      d) En barbette and Embrasures ......................... 57
      e) Platforms ............................................. 58
      f) Soddng ............................................... 59
      g) Ditches ............................................... 59
      h) Palisades .............................................. 60
      i) Fraises ............................................... 60
      j) Abatis ............................................... 61
      k) Outworks ............................................. 62
         1) Gabions, Fascines, Sauciussons, and Hurdles .... 63

B. The Defenses of Gloucester Point ............................. 67

C. The Defenses of Yorktown .................................... 70
   1. Fusiliers' Redoubt ...................................... 76
   2. Outposts, Windmill Point, etc. ......................... 78
   3. Main Defenses, Western Yorktown ....................... 78
   4. Main Defenses, Eastern Yorktown ....................... 81
   5. Hornwork ............................................... 83
   6. Water Batteries ........................................ 83
   7. Interior Works ......................................... 84
   8. Magazines .............................................. 84
   9. Hospital(s) ............................................ 85
  10. Cemeteries .............................................. 85
  11. Redoubts 9 and 10 ...................................... 85
  12. Cornwallis's Cave ....................................... 87

VII. AT THE BRITISH LINES, SEPTEMBER 28-OCTOBER 16, 1781 ......... 91

A. September 28-29 ............................................ 91
B. September 30-October 5 ..................................... 93
   1. At Yorktown ........................................... 93
   2. At Gloucester Point .................................... 97
   3. On York River ......................................... 98

viii
C. October 6-10 ................................................. 99
  1. First Parallel ........................................ 99
  2. Enemy Artillery ....................................... 102
D. October 11-16 .............................................. 108
  1. Council of War ........................................ 108
  2. Second Parallel ..................................... 109
  3. Redoubts 9 and 10 Lost .............................. 113
  4. British Sally .......................................... 115
  5. Cornwallis Decides on Retreat ...................... 116

VIII. SURRENDER .................................................. 119
  A. Negotiations .......................................... 119
  B. Surrender, October 19 ................................. 122

IX. THE SPOILS OF WAR .......................................... 129

X. ALLIED OCCUPATION OF YORKTOWN .................. 139
  A. Policing the Battlefield ............................ 139
  B. Clinton Off Chesapeake Bay ......................... 140
  C. The Damages of War ................................ 142
  D. The French Occupy Yorktown ....................... 144
  E. State Troops ........................................... 148

XI. YORKTOWN BETWEEN WARS, 1783-1861 ............... 151

XII. THE SECOND SIEGE, 1862 ................................. 155
  A. The Siege .............................................. 155
  B. Civil War Photographs ............................... 161
  C. Comparison of 1781 and 1862 Works ................ 162
  D. A Recommendation .................................... 165
  E. Hatch's Observations on the Two Lines ............ 166
  F. Jelks's Archeological Study, 1955 .................. 168

APPENDICES
  A. Blacks at Yorktown, 1781 ............................. 171
  B. Glossary of Fortification Terms ................... 175
  C. A Note on Sieges ..................................... 181
  D. Articles of Capitulation ............................ 185
  E. Maps, Sieges of Yorktown, 1781 and 1862 ......... 191

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 203

HISTORICAL BASE MAPS ......................................... 219

  No. 1. Yorktown on Eve of Siege, 1781 ............... 220
  No. 2. The British Fortifications at Yorktown ....... 222

ix
No. 3. Disposition of British Troops, Yorktown .......... 224
No. 4. Profiles of British Works, Yorktown .......... 226
No. 5. British Works and Town Lots ................. 228
No. 6. Surrender of British Army, Yorktown .......... 230
No. 7. French Billeting Map, Yorktown, Nov. 12, 1781 . 232
No. 8. New Post-siege French Line ................. 234
No. 9. British Fortifications, Gloucester Point ....... 236
No. 10. Gloucester Point, August-September-October, 1781 238
No. 11. Civil War, Yorktown .................. 240
No. 12. Civil War, Gloucester Point ............. 242
No. 13. Siege Lines of 1781 and 1862, Yorktown .. 244

SELECTED HISTORIC MAPS: Siege of Yorktown ............. 247

No. 1. Tracing of Map 20: "A Draught of York and its
    Environs" ............................................. 248
No. 2. Portion of Map 29: [Yorktown, Gloucester Point,
    and York River] ................................. 250
No. 3. Portion of Map 30: "A Plan of York Town and
    Gloucester in the Province of Virginia" ......... 252
No. 4. Portion of Map 51: "Plan of York Town in Virginia
    and Adjacent Country" .......................... 254
No. 5. Portion of Map 13: "Carte des Environs de York en
    Virginie" ........................................... 256
No. 6. Portion of Map 48: "Plan D'York en Virginie" ...... 258
No. 7. Another portion of Map 48 .................... 260
No. 8. Map 21: "Environs de Gloucester" ............ 262

ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................ 265

1. Colonial water battery at Yorktown, 1755 .......... 266
2. Watercolor of Yorktown from Gloucester Point, 1781 268
3. Watercolor of Yorktown by Jonathan Trumbull, 1791 .. 270
4. Post-siege French line and Secretary Nelson's residence 272
5. "Cornwallis's Cave," ca. 1796 .................. 274
The defence which the noble Earle made upon this Occasion has not been equal to our expectations.

Anthony Wayne, "Journal"
Wayne Manuscripts
The Historical Society of Pennsylvania
I. CORNWALLIS COMES TO YORKTOWN

When Charles Earl Cornwallis surrendered his army to the Allied forces at Yorktown on October 19, 1781, Great Britain lost the War of American Independence—a truth that became apparent in time. Since then, students of the war have repeatedly questioned why so capable a general with so strong an army found himself in a defensive position without the naval support that was essential to his army's survival.

Lord Cornwallis, a lieutenant general and second in command of the King's forces in North America, had come south with his commander in chief, Sir Henry Clinton, in 1780, when the British captured Charleston, South Carolina. Sir Henry had returned to New York and Cornwallis had marched and countermarched through the Carolinas with little success in rallying Loyalists. Early in 1781 he decided that he could not achieve control over the southern colonies until he had subdued Virginia, thus sealing off the South from Gen. George Washington's forces in the North.¹

---

¹ Charles Cornwallis, the first Marquis and second Earl Cornwallis, was born in 1738 into an aristocratic family. After attending Eton, he received a commission in the 1st, or Grenadier, Guards at the age of seventeen. He attended the military academy at Turin, then considered the best in Europe. During the Seven Years War he fought for a time in Germany against France. When his father died in 1762, Cornwallis returned to England to take his seat in the House of Lords. He became the colonel of the 33d Foot in 1766 and married in 1768. At the outbreak of the American Revolution he was promoted to major general; on January 1, 1776, he became lieutenant general. His wife died in 1779 while Cornwallis was in England. His surrender at Yorktown did not adversely affect his career. In future years he was governor general and commander in chief of both India and Ireland. He died in 1805. His biographers consider him to have been the ideal aristocrat, possessing most of the virtues of that class. Despite his defeat in 1781, he is considered to have had a better grasp of strategy and tactics than most British officers of the day. Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis, The American Adventure (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), is an admiring but solid biography of the man. Hugh F. Rankin, "Charles Lord Cornwallis, Study in Frustration," in George Washington's Opponents, British Generals and Admirals in the American Revolution, ed. George Athan Billias (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1969), pp. 193-232, is more critical of Cornwallis and delves somewhat into "psychohistory."
By the time Cornwallis decided to march to Virginia, relations between him and Clinton had become ambivalent. In 1780 Clinton had asked to be relieved of his command in America. Cornwallis had assumed that he would succeed Clinton as commander in chief and, his critics write, he began to act the role. When the king refused Clinton's request, "Cornwallis immediately seemed to withdraw into a shell of self-pity as a result of his acute embarrassment." Clinton, on his part, now seemed hesitant of executing vigorous leadership over Cornwallis, his heir apparent.2


In mid-June, with the oncoming of summer heat, Cornwallis decided to withdraw to the Chesapeake in order to make new plans for the Virginia campaign and to await any new orders from Clinton. Lafayette cautiously followed at a distance; the fact that they were no longer withdrawing poured fresh enthusiasm into the American troops. The British halted in the vicinity of Williamsburg, the former capital of Virginia. The fertile Williamsburg (or Yorktown) Peninsula, bounded by the York and James rivers, provided ample forage and security for an army at rest. To be sure, the summer "dog days" of high temperatures and humidity made camp life uncomfortable.

By June 26 Cornwallis had received a message from Clinton that cancelled any plans His Lordship may have been contemplating for renewing the campaign: "As soon as you have finished the active operations you may now be engaged in, [you are] to take a defensive station in any healthy situation you choose (be it at Williamsburg or Yorktown)."

Cornwallis decided to reconnoiter the Yorktown area to evaluate its possibilities as a defensive post. On either June 28 or 30, he rode the twelve miles to Yorktown escorted by Lt. Col. John Graves Simcoe, Queen's Rangers, and Johann Ewald, Hessian Field-Jäger Corps, with a Jäger detachment and three companies of rangers. Americans, perhaps

2. Rankin, "Charles Lord Cornwallis," in Billias, George Washington's Opponents, p. 202. Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis, p. 326, states that had Cornwallis remained in North Carolina, he would have received three dispatches from Clinton saying that he did not want to make Virginia a major field of operations.
militia, fired cannon at the British party from Gloucester Point, one-half mile across York River, but without effect. Ewald recorded in his diary that while Yorktown seemed to him a suitable place to fortify, Cornwallis did not seem impressed with its possibilities. The earl, thought Ewald, preferred Williamsburg even though it was not on navigable water. 3 On June 30 Cornwallis wrote Clinton of his views: "Upon viewing York, I was clearly of the opinion, that it far exceeds our power, consistent with your plans, to make safe defensive posts there and at Gloucester, both of which would be necessary for the protection of shipping." 4

Even while Cornwallis was inspecting Yorktown, Clinton was composing a new letter of instructions. Sir Henry had convinced himself that New York was in danger of attack from Washington and that he needed a substantial portion of Cornwallis's force to aid in its defense and to assist in a counterraid on Philadelphia. He ordered the following troops and material to be sent northward as soon as possible:

2 battalions of light infantry
43d Regiment (infantry)
76th or 80th Regiment (infantry)
2 battalions of Anspach troops (infantry)
2 regiments of cavalry and infantry
Detachment of the 17th Dragoons
Artillerists, as could be spared
Several pieces of artillery
4 vessels
24 boats having platforms for cannon
Lt. Alexander Sutherland, Cornwallis's military engineer
Intrenching tools, horses, and wagons 5

3. Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis, pp. 338-39. The Wickwires, citing Simcoe's journal, say this reconnaissance was on June 28. Ewald, in his diary, gave the date of the patrol as June 30. Ewald's diary is used herein with the kind permission of Mr. Joseph P. Tustin, Tuckerton, New Jersey, who has translated and edited it. Although this diary is on the eve of publication, Mr. Tustin made portions of it available because of his interest in the National Park Service's restoration and preservation work at Yorktown. Both Simcoe and Ewald agreed on the presence of American artillery at Gloucester Point.

4. Cornwallis, June 30, 1781, to Clinton, in Earl Cornwallis, An Answer to ... Sir Henry Clinton ... [Regarding] the Conduct of ... Cornwallis in the Year 1781 (London, 1783), p. 123.

Shortly after sending this request, Clinton received Cornwallis's negative report on Yorktown. Agitated, Sir Henry dashed off another missive to his southern general:

And being strongly impressed with the necessity of our holding a Naval Station for large Ships as well as small, & judging that York Town was of Importance for securing such a one, I cannot but be concerned that your Lordship should so suddenly lose sight of it, pass [over] James River, & retire with your Army to the sickly Post of Portsmouth... And this, my Lord, as you are pleased to say, because you were of opinion that it exceeded your Power, consistent with my Plans, to make safe defensive Posts there [Yorktown] & at Gloucester.

Clinton was convinced that if Cornwallis did cross to the south side of James River, Lafayette would promptly seize Yorktown for his own benefit. "I therefore flatter myself," Clinton continued, "that even altho' your Lordship may have quitted York, and detached Troops to me, that you will have a Sufficiency to reoccupy it; or that you will at least hold Old Point Comfort if it is possible to do it without York."6

Three days later he reinforced his argument with another letter saying that he and Admiral Samuel Graves "are both clearly of opinion that it is absolutely necessary we should hold a Station in Chesapeake [sic] for Ships of the Line, as well as Frigates, and the Admiral seems to think, that should the Enemy possess themselves of Old Point Comfort, Elizabeth River could no longer be of any use to us as a Station for the Frigates." Further, "It was moreover my opinion that the Possession of York Town, even tho' we did not possess Gloucester, might give Security to the Works we might have at Old Point Comfort."7

Meanwhile, Cornwallis had proceeded to abandon the peninsula (battle of Green Springs, July 6), cross the James, and take up a post at Portsmouth on the Elizabeth River. There he reluctantly prepared to embark the troops that Clinton had requested. When Clinton's letters concerning the importance of Old Point Comfort arrived, Cornwallis directed Engineer Sutherland to survey the area and to report on its suitability as an army and naval base. On July 26 Cornwallis forwarded the engineer's findings:

6. Clinton to Cornwallis, July 8, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library. Old Point Comfort, at the tip of Yorktown Peninsula, is now the site of Port Monroe.

Your Excellency will see, that a work on Point Comfort, would neither command the entrance, nor secure his Majesty's ships at anchor in Hampton road[s]. This being the case, I shall in obedience to the spirit of your Excellency's orders, take measures . . . to seize and fortify York and Gloucester, [York River] being the only harbour in which we can hope to be able to give effectual protection to line of battle ships.

Because of this turn of events, Cornwallis said that it was now impossible for him to spare any troops: "For York and Gloucester from their Situation command no Country. And a Superiority in the Field will not only be necessary to enable us to draw Forage and other Supplies from the Country, but likewise to carry on our Work without Interruption." No troops sailed for New York.\(^8\)

\(^8\) Cornwallis to Clinton, July 27, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library.
II. YORKTOWN AND GLOUCESTER POINT: EARLY HISTORY

A. Yorktown


Founded soon after the Port Act of 1691, Yorktown quickly grew into a busy seaport and county seat. The York River at that point is deep and well suited for overseas shipping. By 1736 the town was nearing the height of its prosperity. An English traveler that year gave a good pen-picture of the bustling port:

York-Town, Capital of the County of that Name, is situated on a rising Ground . . . tho' but stragglingly built, yet makes no considerable Figure. You perceive a great Air of Opulence amongst the Inhabitants, who have some of them built themselves Houses, equal in Magnificence to many of our superb ones at St. James's; as those of Mr. Lightfoot, Nelson, etc.

* * * * * * * * *

The Count House is the only considerable publick Building, and is no unhandsome Structure. . . . The most considerable Houses are of Brick; some handsome ones of Wood, all built in the modern taste; and the lesser Sort, of Plaister. There are some very pretty Garden Spots in the Town; and the Avenues leading to Williamsburg, Norfolk, etc., are prodigiously agreeable. The Roads are, as I said before, some of the best I ever saw, and infinitely superior to most in England.1

1. [Edward Kimber,] "Observations In Several Voyages and Travels in America in the Year 1736," William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine, 1st ser. 15 (1907): 222.
Even before the Revolution, however, Yorktown's fortunes had begun to decline. Repeated tobacco growing on the surrounding lands was depleting the soil of its fertility. And, unlike the James River, the York was navigable by oceangoing ships only a few miles inland. The produce of the newly-developed interior had to reach the sea by way of the James. Yorktown was gradually becoming a backwater port. Yet its excellent anchorage brought it to the attention of the generals and the admirals at the outbreak of the American Revolution.

Yorktown's first defensive water battery was probably erected soon after the founding of the town. At any rate it was in such poor condition in 1699 as to be temporarily abandoned. With the threat of French attack in 1710-11, Governor Alexander Spotswood ordered the reestablishment and construction of four batteries throughout the colony. One Edward Powers served as overseer at Yorktown, employing Negro slaves in the construction work. Details of the battery are lacking, but a 1721 report stated that it had eleven guns. Ten years later an inspection report said that the battery was in ruinous condition and its gun platforms much decayed: "The Battery erected at York being built upon the Beach & Thereby Subject to inundations by which means it is greatly decayed & proposing to remove the said Battery to a more Convenient Scituation upon the Bank of the river the same is approved and recommended to give the necessary directions therein." Historian Hatch believes that this first battery was located on the flat, or lower town, in front of Lot 16.

The colonial government accepted these recommendations and erected a new battery on the slope of the bluff between upper and lower towns, in front of Lots 34 and 40. This site became known as Fort Hill. In 1734 the council ordered "that twelve Small Guns about three Hundred [pounds sterling] Each be sent for to be placed on the Battery at York Town." The 1736 English traveler quoted earlier arrived at Yorktown by sea and saw "the Battery of Guns before the Town upon the Pitch of the Bluff." On closer examination, he was not impressed: "I should just mention the Battery, that is the Defence of the Town, which at this Time was under the Direction of an awkward Engineer, by Trade a Barber, and is as despicably contriv'd for the Safety of the Place, as it, no doubt, would be conducted in a time of Danger."

In 1755 Governor Robert Dinwiddie reported to London that "there are two small Batteries on York River, [which] are only of Service to protect the Merch't Ships in y't River, and [are] of no Defence ag'st an Enemy y't have Force sufficient to attack them by Land." Two years later he was more specific: "A Fort at the Town of York on York River mounting eleven Guns of 18 and nine pounds, and ten small Guns of a pound and half, of which the large Guns are all honeycomb'd and unfit for Service." He complained that a major problem was the absence of a skilled engineer.
The Revolution created a sense of urgency in the matter of coastal defenses. In October 1776 the new government enacted a bill for fortifications in Virginia:

That the governour . . . may . . . direct such fortifications as they may judge necessary and proper to be erected at the following places, to wit: At Portsmouth . . . at Yorktown; at Hampton; at Corotoman . . . and at Cherrystone's . . . the two former to be strengthened in the most effectual manner on the land side also, and the whole to be provided with proper ordnance and all other necessaries. And the governor . . . is farther empowered to appoint a skilful engineer . . . who shall hold the rank of . . . lieutenant-colonel.

Apparently these new works were begun at Yorktown, at least on the water side at Fort Hill. The York County commissioners soon thereafter issued warrants to pay for materials and labor for "the York Town Battery."

In 1777 another Englishman, Nicholas Cresswell, visited Yorktown. Besides describing the battery, he noted the misbehavior of the artillerists: "Close to the town there are several very good Gentlemen's houses built of brick and some of their gardens laid out with the greatest taste of any I have seen in America, but now almost ruined by the disorderly soldiers, and, what is more extraordinary, their own soldiers, the guardians of the people and the defenders of their rights. Houses burnt down, others pulled to pieces for fuel, most of the Gardens thrown to the street, everything in disorder and confusion and no appearance of trade." Concerning the defenses, he wrote: "Here is a battery consisting of 12 pieces of heavy cannon to command the River and a company of artillery stationed here, but they make a sorry appearance for so respectable a corps, as the Artillery ought to be." Cresswell made no reference to works on the land side of the town.

While British accounts of the defenses of Yorktown in 1781 did not specifically mention Cornwallis's incorporating this earlier battery in his works, maps of the siege show the largest of the British water batteries in the same area. After the siege, correspondence originating with the governor of Virginia stated that the old "fort" and its platforms were still intact.2

B. Gloucester Point

Gloucester Point, originally called Tyndall's (Tindall's) Point and, occasionally, Yorke Fort, had a water battery earlier than Yorktown. A county history states that the colony erected this battery in 1667 "as a fort with 'a wall ten feet high, ten inches thick, eight great guns, a magazine, and a court of guard.'" Gloucester Point, not to be confused with Gloucester Court House twelve miles away, was a mere village in the late colonial period. But its strategic location, directly across from Yorktown at a narrow point in the river, demanded that it too be defended if one were to control the York.

The history of its battery closely paralleled that of Yorktown's. Again, during the French threat of 1710-11, Governor Spotswood called for the reestablishment of a "fort" at Gloucester. The 1721 inspection report stated that fifteen guns (four more than at Yorktown), from six- to eighteen-pounders, were mounted there. This battery too was in a state of disrepair by 1731. Governor Dinwiddie, in 1757, described the artillery on the north side of the river: "A Fort at Gloucester on the same River, mounting 15 Guns of 18, 12 and 6 pounds, but, like the others, unfit for Service."

Earlier this study noted that when Cornwallis visited Yorktown in June 1781, cannon at Gloucester Point fired on his reconnaissance party. Whether these works later played any role in the British fortifications at the point remains unknown.3

III. THE BRITISH FORTIFY, AUGUST 1781

A. Cornwallis Sails to Yorktown

When Cornwallis withdrew to Portsmouth, Lafayette retired and established his field headquarters at Malvern Hill, southeast of Richmond. There the young marquis speculated on what Cornwallis would do next. Both sides in the Revolution freely employed scouts and spies to gather military information. But according to his biographer, Lafayette's intelligence was faulty when Cornwallis set sail from Portsmouth for Yorktown. He did learn that the British had embarked, but he concluded that they were heading up the Chesapeake toward Baltimore. Consequently, he marched north to follow Cornwallis by land—away from Yorktown.1

Lafayette's misinformation possibly came from a letter that one John Wills wrote General Wayne on August 2. Wills had just come from the vicinity of Portsmouth: "I think it my Duty to give you what Intelligence I collected. A fleet with fifty three Sail with Lord Cornwallis Sailed last monday morning; They appear'd to bend their course to sea, but was Inform'd that they intended to Baltimore on the Head of Elk [uppermost reach of Chesapeake Bay, by which Washington's army later came south], and to go to New York by land."

Wills also reported on Cornwallis's second in command: "Brig. Gen'l O'Hara is left at Portsmouth with about Six or Eight Hundred Men, with a Number of Negroes." Lafayette soon learned that the British had come up York River; but not everyone in his command knew where Cornwallis was. An anonymous letter from the American headquarters, written on the same day that the earl landed at Yorktown, said: "It is reported that a Detachment of Earl of Cornwallis's Army under the Command of Brigadier General O'Hara, have landed in Gloucester County . . . near the mouth of York River, in the vicinity of which, on New-Point Comfort [Gloucester Point?] it is asserted they are to erect a strong fortification."2


Cornwallis eventually reported to Clinton on his move to Yorktown: "I embarked the 80th Regiment in Boats, and went myself on board the Richmond, very early in the morning of the 29th [July]. But we were so unfortunate in Winds as to be four days on our Passage. The 80th landed on the night of the 1st [August] at Gloucester; and the Troops, who were in Transports, on the Morning of the 2d at this Place. I have since brought the 71st and Legion hither, and sent the Regiment du Prince Hereditaire to Gloucester."3

Two German enlisted men recorded in their diaries their arrival at Yorktown. On August 1, Pvt. Johann Döhla, disagreeing slightly with His Lordship, wrote: "At noon all the troops were disembarked at Yorktown and immediately camped beyond the town a whole day without tents. Lord Cornwallis was already here with the greatest part of his troops, except one regiment which was still staying back at New Portsmouth as a garrison." Fifer Stephan Popp also recorded in his journal that he landed at Yorktown on August 1. He noted that most of the inhabitants had fled the town.4

In his report to Clinton mentioned earlier, Cornwallis did not specify the units that landed on the York side of the river. Fortunately for the historical record, Captain Ewald of the Jägers did. He listed the two Light Infantry battalions, the 43d and 76th regiments, Simcoe's Queen's Rangers, and the two Anspach battalions.5

Even while Cornwallis was landing his troops, Clinton was still fussing about the importance of Yorktown as a naval station: "pointing partially to the one at York--being led to the Consideration of its utility, by the French having two Winters ago sheltered their Ships under


5. [Capt. Johann Ewald] "Extracts from Volume IV, Diary of the American War, 1776-1784, By Captain Johann Ewald, Hessian Field-Jäger Corps," trans. and ed. Joseph P. Tustin. This diary is in the possession of Mr. Joseph P. Tustin, Tuckerton, N. J., and is quoted from with his kind permission.
Works thrown up there." Despite its importance, however, Clinton did not think it needed a force of 7,000 men to defend it: "General [Benedict] Arnold has since told me, that from the Description given him of it by Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, he judged 2000 Men would be ample for its Defense." Clinton was talking to the wind; Cornwallis would keep all his army with him.6

Not until August 22 did Cornwallis manage to assemble his entire army at Gloucester and Yorktown and demolish his former works at Portsmouth. The departure dates for all the remaining units at Portsmouth are uncertain. However, some references to continuing troop movements may be found. Lafayette wrote to Wayne on August 6 that only a detachment of North Carolina Loyalist troops were still at Portsmouth. British Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton recorded that he and his cavalry force joined Cornwallis on August 7. An American witness, writing on August 9 from Hampton, stated: "Yesterday Morning 750 Foot and Cavalry landed at Newport-News; 600 proceeded [overland] up to York; 150 Horse were left at Newport-News" temporarily. He continued: "But what we have been able to learn, in general, is, that the Enemy are all moving from Portsmouth, it being a sickly place, intending to continue at Gloucester and York as long as they can; but I am certain they will not be able to hold it long." He also observed: "Our Negroes flock fast to them, and ease the soldiery of the Labourer's Work." Finally, Cornwallis reported on August 22: "General O'Hara arrived here this day with the Stores and Troops and a great Number of Refugees have accompanied him from the Counties of Norfolk and Princess Ann."7

B. Patrols

Supplying an army on both sides of York River as well as two thousand or so blacks and refugees occupied the time of a good portion of Cornwallis's troops. Foraging was the order of the day. At the same time, patrols roamed through the countryside to gain intelligence on the activities of Lafayette's army.

As early as August 2 Captain Ewald was sent out on the Gloucester side to gather both forage and intelligence. He and a detachment of cavalry and Jägers marched north to the beautiful (and still extant)


Abingdon Church. There he discovered a herd of five hundred to six hundred cattle that the local inhabitants had vainly rounded up in an effort to save them from the British. Ewald ordered the cavalry to escort the cattle back to Gloucester Point. At the same time he learned through interrogation that the local militia had received orders to muster at the King and Queen County courthouse. Five days later Ewald led a second group of Jägers and cavalry out to escort a foraging party heading toward the Whiting plantation. At Seawell's Ordinary, an inn five miles north of Gloucester Point, he made contact with an enemy patrol. Shots were exchanged, but no decisive action occurred.\(^8\)

Similar activities took place on the Yorktown side of the river. Tarleton recalled that he "made several expeditions to Williamsburg, and by such moves covered all the country for the foraging parties between that place and Hampton. One excursion was pushed farther with success: Lieutenant Colonel [Robert] Abercrombie with the light infantry proceeded to Williamsburg, whilst the legion cavalry advanced and defeated . . . about three hundred militia, at Chiswell's ordinary, on the Newcastle road."\(^9\)

During the early days of the British occupation of Yorktown and Gloucester, foraging parties often traveled considerable distances to gather supplies. Ewald wrote that between August 26 and 29, foragers repeatedly visited the plantations on both sides of the Severn River, northeast of Gloucester Point. Also, British naval vessels foraged the plantations up and down York River. While small skirmishes with local resisters usually occurred, the British were successful enough in gathering food and other produce that a "Magazine of forage" was established at Gloucester. The Yorktown garrison did not have a diarist as prolific as Ewald, but probably no scarcity of food occurred there throughout August.\(^10\)

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10. Ewald, "Diary," n.p. Correspondence in New York between Commissary General Daniel Wier and Sir Henry Clinton, apparently during the siege, discussed the food supply at Yorktown:

"What Quantity i.e. for days and Numbers, was there in the Chesapeake, when the Warwicks Convoy arrived?

"On the 17th June (which was about the time of the Warwick Arrival) there were Ninety days Provisions, for Eight Thousand Men.

"What Quantity was there on the 22nd of last August.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bread and Flour</td>
<td>50 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef and Pork</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pease</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oatmeal</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
C. Lafayette Moves

Once he felt reasonably assured that the British were staying put at Yorktown and fortifying the place, Lafayette dared to move his forces a little closer. Although he established his units of light infantry and militia at different points, he concentrated them generally in the vicinity of West Point, twenty-five miles or so above Yorktown at the head of York River. When he learned that French Admiral Compte de Grasse was sailing with a fleet for the Chesapeake Bay, Lafayette's main concern was that Cornwallis would escape by crossing the James River to its south bank and fleeing toward the Carolinas. Lafayette planned to thwart this possibility by moving toward Williamsburg and there throwing a line across Yorktown Peninsula. He advanced on September 3, well before the first French troops disembarked from the French fleet. At the same time, the Virginia militia, under Brig. Gen. George Weedon, moved a little closer, but only a little, toward Gloucester Point.11

D. Fortifying the Posts

Cornwallis remained oblivious of de Grasse's plans. His men continued to fortify the two posts in a most leisurely manner, being greatly affected by the extremely hot days and nights. Sometime in July Ewald had confided to his diary the effects on men of a Tidewater summer: "For six weeks the heat has been so unbearable that many men have been lost by sunstroke or their reason has been impaired. Everything that one has on his body is soaked as with water from the constant perspiration. The nights are especially terrible, when there is so little air that one can scarcely breathe." Cornwallis was criticized then and has been through the years for the slowness with which his defensive positions took form that summer. While some of the censures were probably well deserved, one might wonder if the critics were ever exposed to a Tidewater dog day with shovels in their hands.12

(Continued)

"NB. In addition to the Above, the Commissary on the 24th August, bought Three hundred barrels of Flour by Order of Lord Cornwallis, which will serve the above Number, Six days longer, and had likewise received his Lordships Orders to purchase all the Rum, that was to be procured.

"Whether any Provisions were Sent by the last Empty Transports, and how much?

"The Transports were victuolated for Seventy days compleat, according to their Tonnage, which in the whole amounted to Ten days, for Ten thousand men."

Wier to Clinton, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library.


When Cornwallis moved to Yorktown possibly the last thought in his mind was that a powerful Allied Army would lay siege to him within two months. Nevertheless, according to the best military customs of the day, he directed the construction of field fortifications at both camps, but with emphasis at first at Gloucester. Ewald wrote that work began on three landward redoubts and a water battery at the point as early as the evening of August 2. By August 11 the Hessian troops were on duty in trenches on the north side of the river. The next day Cornwallis wrote Clinton: "The Works on the Gloucester Side are in some Forwardness, and I hope in a Situation to resist a sudden attack." Despite this optimism, Cornwallis soon had to admit that the construction of earthworks was slow work:

Since our arrival we have bestowed our whole Labour on the Gloucester Side, but I do not think the Works there (after great Fatigue to the Troops) are at present, or will be for some time to come, safe against a Coup de Main with less than one thousand Men. After our Experience of the Labor & Difficulty of constructing Works at this Season of the Year, and the Plan for fortifying this Side [Yorktown] not being entirely settled, I cannot at present say, whether I can spare any Troops.\(^{13}\)

Lafayette, from a distance, attempted to determine why Cornwallis was concentrating his efforts on the Gloucester side. He wondered if His Lordship was preparing a secure base from which to mount expeditions northward, or if Cornwallis was preparing a defense against the French fleet, or both. The real reason for Cornwallis's course of action at this time seems to have been that he and his engineers failed to decide how the Yorktown side should be defended, as he implied in his August 16 message to Clinton.\(^{14}\)

In his letters of this period Cornwallis did not mention the hundreds of black slaves he employed in building the fortifications. The British had promised Negroes their freedom in return for logistical support in the field. No exact count was made of the number of blacks who had come to Yorktown, although the Maryland Journal informed its readers that about three thousand were laboring on the works. A closer


\(^{14}\) Lafayette to Wayne, Aug. 16, 1781, Wayne Manuscripts, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
estimate might have been two thousand. In the weeks ahead disaster would strike these people; their plight would leave a sorry mark on the histories of both armies.15

Three weeks after his arrival, Cornwallis was able to announce that Lieutenant Sutherland had finally devised a plan of defense for Yorktown that was acceptable: "The Engineer has finished his Survey and Examination of this Place, and has proposed his Plan for fortifying it; which appearing judicious, I have approved of, and directed to be executed." Having a plan and executing it were quite different things. Cornwallis complained that the Gloucester defenses would take the whole labor force five or six weeks more to complete. Yorktown would take equally as long: "My Experience there [Gloucester] of the Fatigue and Difficulty of constructing Works in this warm Season, convinces me, that all the Labor that the Troops here will be capable of, without ruining their Health, will be required at least for six Weeks to put the intended Works at this Place in a tolerable State of Defence." Clinton could not understand why Cornwallis had to employ the troops as laborers, "having entertained hopes that you were supplied with a sufficient number of Negroes for that and other drudgeries." Cornwallis had the blacks; but he never gave them credit for their contributions.16

August 23 was inventory day at Yorktown, especially with regard to artillery and entrenching tools. These latter articles became a matter of dispute between Clinton and Cornwallis after the surrender. On the twentieth-third, however, Cornwallis's adjutant general reported that the army had on hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spades and shovels</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickaxes</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felling axes</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand hatchets</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheelbarrows</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same day Lieutenant Sutherland submitted a requisition for additional tools needed for the fortifications, but it was never implemented:

15. Stevens, "The Allies at Yorktown," p. 32. An appendix to this study discusses the blacks at Yorktown.

300 Spades
200 Shovels
 2 Grinding Stones
10 Casks of 7 Inch Spikes
 4 Casks of Deck Nails
12 Whip Saws
24 Augers Sorted
 5 Dozen of Gimblets sorted
10 Dozen of hand saw files
10 Dozen of Whip saw Do
 6 Dozen of Cross Cutt Do
 4 Casks of 20 penny and 12 penny Nails
 3 Dozen of Stock Sacks
 6 Dozen of Padlocks
 2 Double Iron'd Long plains
 2 Ditto of smoothing plains
12 Hand Saws
18 Pair of framing Chisels
 2 Tenant Saws
50 Pound of Chalk
30 Check Lines
 6 Pair of Compass
 6 Iron Squares
A Proportion of Saw setts
A small assortment of [Verniers?] and Gauges
A tun of Barr Iron17

After the war Cornwallis complained that he had had only 500 entrenching tools for the entire works. Clinton defensively replied that Cornwallis's own inventory had shown a total of 992. Captain Ewald blamed Cornwallis and Sutherland for their lack of preparedness: "Half the army was put to work, and now it was found for the first time that tools were lacking, like at Portsmouth under Arnold, which no one had thought about again in all that time."18

Captain George Rochfort, commanding the Royal Artillery at Yorktown, submitted a request on August 23 for additional guns and mortars. To complete the batteries, particularly those facing the river, he required


14 24-pounders, iron, heavy
12 18-pounders " "
2 10-inch mortars, brass
4 8-inch mortars "

He also asked for 600 rounds for each of these weapons. In his letter forwarding this request, Cornwallis noted that on that date he had only one twenty-four-pounder and four eighteen-pounders on hand. 19

The correspondence for August indicated clearly that the pace of fortifying Yorktown and Gloucester was slow indeed. In addition to the muggy weather, there was little threat of a sudden attack to offer a stimulus for completing the works. Lafayette still kept his distance. An unmistakable air of lethargy covered the British camps. Had Cornwallis any worries about attack, he could have reread a letter Clinton had written him back in June: When Admiral de Grasse "hears that Your Lordship has taken Possession of York River before him, I think it most likely he will come to Rhode Island" from the West Indies. 20

E. French Fleet Arrives

Even as the engineer was requesting additional spades, Admiral de Grasse and his formidable fleet were approaching Chesapeake Bay. Exactly when Cornwallis heard of the enemy navy is unknown. The Hessian soldier Popp noted a rumor of its approach in his diary on August 26. The news electrified the British. Popp wrote that from then on "the fortifying went on strongly day and night." 21

De Grasse's warships anchored in the bay on August 30. Captain Ewald at Gloucester noticed smoke on the horizon that morning, indicating a cannonading. About noon several British ships, including the frigate Guadaloupe and the sloop Bonetta, appeared, hightailing it to port. These vessels had departed only the day before enroute to Charleston. Close behind them came three large French ships. These latter dropped anchor at the mouth of York River. Yorktown was blockaded. Ewald felt


great alarm because the British water batteries were not yet armed with cannon. But de Grasse was satisfied with a blockade; his ships would approach no closer throughout the siege.  

With greater confidence than Ewald, Lt. Col. Duncan McPherson, 71st Regiment, dashed off a letter to "Dear Sir" about September 1. He told of the arrival of twenty-five French warships the "day before yesterday"; of the French capturing the Loyalist, a sloop of war; and of the Guadeloupe, the Bonetta, and three or four smaller vessels returning safely to Yorktown. McPherson was undismayed: "Nothing but hard labour goes on here at present in constructing & making Batteries towards the River, & Re-doubts towards the Land. The troops are in perfect health & if our Enemies are polite enough to give us three day's grace [we will be ready]."  

On the last day of August Cornwallis wrote Clinton what he knew for certain: "A French Ship of the Line with two Frigates and Loyalists, which they had taken, lay at the Mouth of the River," and what he had heard: "A Lieutenant of the Charon, who went with an Escort of Dragoons to old point Comfort, reports, that there are between Thirty and Forty Sail within the Capes, mostly Ships of War, and some of them very large." Cornwallis must now have guessed or known that an overjoyed Lafayette was already planning to move his troops to Williamsburg to hinder a British escape. Nevertheless, Cornwallis could have chosen to abandon his posts and to attempt a move through Lafayette's smaller army. He did not. Should they be needed, the British Navy and Sir Henry Clinton would come to his aid.  

Captain Ewald, who held Lord Cornwallis in high esteem but who had only contempt for Engineer Sutherland, was disgusted:

Now, they hastily began to unload all the magazines  
and guns which had been brought from Portsmouth,  
but which--through negligence and laziness--were  

23. Dun McPherson, Yorktown Lines, to "Dear Sir," Aug. 9, 1781, History Files, Colonial NHP, original in George Washington Papers, Library of Congress. The month should have been September. While the letter was dated the ninth, internal evidence indicates that it was written over a period of time. The letter never reached "Dear Sir." It was intercepted and sent to Washington on Sept. 24, 1781. Because McPherson described British troop dispositions in detail, Washington must have been delighted to receive it.  
still on board the ships lying at anchor in the York River between the two towns. Now, if the French had been in better readiness, or perhaps, had had better intelligence, the ships could be shot to pieces. 25

IV. THE BRITISH ARMY AT YORKTOWN

A. Strength

On October 1, three days after the Allies began their investment, Earl Cornwallis signed a troop return for His Majesty's forces in the army in Virginia. This return showed the following units present at both Yorktown and Gloucester Point:

**British**

1st Battalion, Light Infantry  
2d Battalion, Light Infantry  
Brigade of Guards (infantry)  
17th Regiment  "  
23d Regiment  "  
33d Regiment  "  
43d Regiment  "  
2d Battalion, 71st Regiment  "  
76th Regiment  "  
80th Regiment (infantry)  
Royal Artillery  
17th Light Dragoons  
23d Light Company  
82d Light Company  
Guides and Pioneers

**German**

Von Voit Battalion, Anspach Regiment  
Von Seybothen Battalion, Anspach Regiment  
Fusilier Regiment Erbprinz (Prince Hereditary) (Hessian)  
Von Bose Regiment  
Jäger Company  
German Artillery

**Provincial**

Queen's Rangers (infantry and cavalry)  
British Legion (Cavalry)  
North Carolina Volunteers (light company)

A breakdown of the return showed the following strength figures for the officer corps:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British</th>
<th>Staff officers present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned officers present</td>
<td>Staff officers present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 colonels</td>
<td>0 chaplains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 lieutenant colonels</td>
<td>7 adjutants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 majors</td>
<td>10 quartermasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 captains</td>
<td>8 surgeons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 lieutenants</td>
<td>6 mates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 ensigns</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German</th>
<th>Staff officers present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned officers present</td>
<td>Staff officers present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 colonel</td>
<td>2 chaplains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 lieutenant colonels</td>
<td>2 adjutants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 majors</td>
<td>4 quartermasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 captains</td>
<td>4 surgeons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 lieutenants</td>
<td>17 mates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 ensigns</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial</th>
<th>Staff officers present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned officers present</td>
<td>Staff officers present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 colonels</td>
<td>0 chaplains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 lieutenant colonels</td>
<td>3 adjutants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 majors</td>
<td>7 quartermasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 captains</td>
<td>3 surgeons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 lieutenants</td>
<td>1 mate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 ensigns</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grand total of troop officers present</th>
<th>Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned</td>
<td>Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 colonel</td>
<td>2 chaplains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 lieutenant colonels</td>
<td>12 adjutants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 majors</td>
<td>21 quartermasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 captains</td>
<td>15 surgeons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130 lieutenants</td>
<td>24 mates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 ensigns</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 279</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The troop returns for October 1 show one full colonel present for the Anspach Regiment. The returns for October 19 show two colonels for the Anspachs present: von Voit and von Seybothen. Just when the second colonel arrived and under what circumstances remains unknown.
Also to be considered was General Cornwallis's staff. No return for this group of officers has been located; those listed below were compiled by Henry P. Johnston for his Yorktown Campaign:

Second in command: Brig. Gen. Charles O'Hara
Deputy Adjutant General: Maj. John Despard
Commissary: ----- Perkins
Deputy Quartermaster: Maj. Richard England
Deputy Quartermaster Assistants: Captain Campbell, Captain Vallancy, Lieutenant Oldfield, and Ensign St. John.
Majors of Brigade: Edward Brabazon, ----- Manley, J. Baille, and Francis Richardson
Engineers: Lt. Alexander Sutherland, chief; Lieutenant Haldane; and Lieutenant Stratton

In contrast to the Allied Army, the British forces had a severe shortage of officers of the higher grades: one lieutenant general, one brigadier general, one colonel, and only ten lieutenant colonels. Also, the chief engineer held the lowly grade of lieutenant (the chief engineer of the American forces was a brigadier general; that of the French, a colonel). This lack of experienced senior officers must have had a negative effect on overall British leadership; but this is a factor that cannot be measured statistically.

The enlisted strength present and fit for duty on October 1 was less than has sometimes been supposed. The following table simplifies the return by not showing sergeants, drummers, and rank and file separately. The British term "effective" means simply that the bodies were on the rolls:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Unit</th>
<th>Present &amp; Fit for Duty</th>
<th>Absent on Command or Recruiting</th>
<th>Already POWs</th>
<th>Sick</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Total Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn., Lt. Infantry</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn., Lt. Infantry</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade of Guards</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Regiment</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d Regiment</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Regiment</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43d Regiment</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn., 71st Regt.</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>[582]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th Regiment</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th Regiment</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Present &amp;</td>
<td>Absent on</td>
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<td>Sick</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fit for Duty</td>
<td>Command or Recruiting</td>
<td>POWs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Lt. Dragoons</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>23d Lt. Company</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>82d Lt. Company</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guides &amp; Pioneers</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>5,773</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| German |
|-----------------|-------|--------|--------|---------|---------|-------|
| Unit            | Present & | Absent on | Already | Sick   | Wounded | Total |
|                 | Fit for Duty | Command or Recruiting | POWs     |         |         |       |
| Von Voit, Anspach | 432   | 47      | 6       | 74      | 2       | 561   |
| Von Seybothen " | 412   | 51      | 1       | 78      | -       | 542   |
| Erbprinz        | 404   | 19      | 5       | 79      | -       | 507   |
| Von Bose        | 285   | 22      | 24      | 132     | 36      | 499   |
| Artillery       | 55    | -       | -       | -       | -       | 55    |
| Jägers          | 77    | -       | -       | -       | -       | 77    |
| Total           | 1,665 | 139     | 36      | 363     | 38      | 2,241 |

| Provincials |
|-----------------|-------|--------|--------|---------|---------|-------|
| Unit            | Present & | Absent on | Already | Sick   | Wounded | Total |
|                 | Fit for Duty | Command or Recruiting | POWs     |         |         |       |
| Queen's Rangers | 320   | 33      | 21      | 141     | -       | 515   |
| British Legion  | 188   | 93      | 276     | 10      | 6       | 573   |
| N. C. Volunteers | 83    | -       | -       | -       | -       | 83    |
| Total           | 591   | 126     | 297     | 151     | 6       | 1,171 |

| Grand Total     | 5,583 | 871     | 691     | 1,734   | 306     | 9,185 |
| Percent of Total| 60%   | 10%     | 8%      | 19%     | 3%      | 100%  |

Thus, as the Siege of Yorktown began, General Cornwallis had approximately 5,600 enlisted men present and fit for duty. This number would steadily decline as the siege progressed. Casualties, sickness, and desertions would take their toll.²

On September 1 a detachment of reinforcements for the British Army in Virginia had sailed for New York. In the group were 17 officers, 467 enlisted men, 56 women, 50 children, and 5 servants, all belonging to the various regiments at Yorktown. Because the French fleet was already in Chesapeake Bay, it is doubtful if this group ever arrived. On hand was the colonel of the Erbprinz Regiment. There is no record of his arrival in Virginia, leading to the assumption that the ship carrying this detachment probably turned back to New York. 3

B. The Units

1. British, General

Prior to the American Revolution, the British Army contained seventy regiments of foot, i.e., infantry. By the end of the war there were 105 such regiments. These infantry regiments were divided into two groups: the Household Regiments and the regiments of the line. The Household Regiments were the oldest ones in the army and ordinarily served as bodyguards to the king at London and Westminster. The infantry units of the Household Regiments consisted of the 1st, or Grenadier Guards; the 2d, or Coldstream Guards; and the 3d, or Scots Guards. They totaled sixty-four companies. At the outbreak of the Revolution, a Brigade of Guards was formed by selecting fifteen men from each of these companies. General O'Hara commanded this brigade at Yorktown.

Seven regiments of the line served at Yorktown: 17th, 23d, 33d, 43d, 71st, 76th, and 80th. The last three, of course, were formed during the course of the Revolution. The average strength of a British regiment in ordinary times was 475 men, organized into a single battalion of ten companies. Eight of these companies served as regular infantry; the other two were a light infantry company and a company of grenadiers. Light infantrymen differed from their fellows in that they were the best marksmen and had to be of light build. They excelled as skirmishers. The grenadiers were thought of as the elite of the regiment because they were the tallest and strongest of all its soldiers.

Each of the Guards regiments had a civilian band (at least in England), consisting of two oboes, two clarinets, two horns, and two

3. Oliver De Lancey, "Return of Troops Embarked at New York belonging to the Corps in Virginia, New York, 1st September 1781," Sept. 1, 1781, Clinton Papers. Another reinforcement of from five hundred to six hundred had reached Cornwallis before the beginning of the blockade and must have been included in the October 1 troop return. These men had been captured by the Americans at Cowpens, South Carolina, and had been exchanged. Clinton to Lord George Germain, Sept. 7, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library.
bassoons. Whether the Brigade of Guards had a band at Yorktown is uncertain. All the infantry regiments had drummers and fifers—the troop returns listed them both under "drummers." The cavalry employed trumpets and drums for signaling commands.

The uniform of these regiments consisted of the familiar brick red jacket lined with white wool, stock, waistcoat, smallclothes, gaiters above the knees, and a cocked hat. The regiments of the line had yellow facings, while the Household Regiments' facings were blue. Around his waist the soldier wore a belt that supported a bayonet and, sometimes, a short sword. Another belt over his left shoulder supported a "cartouche" box. At Yorktown he also had a knapsack and a haversack. The light infantrymen's red coats were cut short, and the men wore leather caps, red waistcoats, and small cartridge boxes. The distinguishing mark of the grenadiers was their tall bearskin caps with metal plates in front.

The standard infantry weapon at that time was the fourteen- or fifteen-pound, .75-caliber flintlock, called the "Brown Bess." It had a smooth bore and a priming pan. Its effective range was 300 yards, but it was considered accurate only up to 100 yards. The bayonet weighed over a pound and was fourteen inches long. A bullet consisted of one ounce of lead and a strong paper cartridge. In addition to his musket, the light infantryman carried a hatchet. 4

2. 17th Regiment of Foot

This unit, formed in 1688, received its designation as the 17th in 1751. It was also called the Leicestershire Regiment. Its distinguishing facings were grayish-white, and its lace had two blue strips and one yellow. After the American Revolution it served in Nova Scotia. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Johnson commanded this regiment at Yorktown. Today this unit is designated as the 4th Battalion, The Royal Anglican Regiment. 5

3. 23d Regiment of Foot

This unit also had its origins in 1688. In 1727 it was designated the Royal Welch Fusiliers, a name very much in use at Yorktown. In 1751 it received the designation of 23d Foot. The fusiliers' facings were blue and their lace had a red, a blue, and a yellow stripe. Some


uncertainty exists as to who commanded the regiment at Yorktown. Henry Johnston listed Captain Apthorpe, but with a question mark. Apthorpe did command the Fusiliers' Redoubt to the right of the British defenses at the beginning of the siege. He may well have commanded the entire regiment also; the troop returns for October show a captain as the highest ranking officer present. Today the "c" in their name has been changed to "s" and the unit is now designated The Royal Welsh Fusiliers.  

4. 33d Regiment of Foot

Formed in 1702, this regiment was designated the 33d in 1751. Today it is known as the West Riding Regiment (Duke of Wellington's). The uniform facings were red and the lace was "bastion" with a red stripe. Lieutenant Colonel John Yorke commanded the regiment at Yorktown in addition to commanding a brigade consisting of the 17th, 23d, 33d, and 71st regiments.

5. 43d Regiment of Foot

This unit was organized in 1741 and received its numerical designation in 1751. Its facings were white and the lace had a red and black stripe. At Yorktown its commanding officer was apparently Maj. George Hewett. At one time it was known as the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. Today it is designated the 1st Battalion, The Royal Green Jackets.

6. 71st Regiment of Foot

The first of the new regiments formed because of the American Revolution, this regiment was raised at Glasgow, Scotland, in 1775. It was also known as (Simon) Fraser's Highlanders and the Highland Light Infantry. Only the 2d Battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. Duncan McPherson, served at Yorktown. Its uniform facings were white and the lace had a red stripe. These infantrymen, being Scots, had worn


bonnets and kilts; by 1781, however, they wore the breeches of the British infantry. One must assume that they had bagpipes in Virginia. The regiment was disbanded in 1783.9

7. 76th Regiment of Foot

Also known as (Lord) MacDonald's Highlanders, this unit was also raised in Scotland in 1777. A good portion of this regiment was mounted. The facings on its uniforms were deep green in color and the lace had a black stripe. This regiment too had adopted infantry breeches by 1781. Major Francis Needham commanded these Scots at Yorktown. The regiment was disbanded in 1784.10

8. 80th Regiment of Foot

The history of this regiment--at least of the unit at Yorktown--is somewhat confused. According to Curtis (1926), Col. Allan Maclean raised the regiment in Canada in 1779. It also included Scots from New York and North Carolina. Curtis wrote that while the regiment had two battalions, only a detachment of the 2d Battalion served at Yorktown. Its uniform consisted of full highland garb with the facings and regimental tartan of the Black Watch (42d Regiment of Foot). It was disbanded in 1784.

Katcher (1973) states that the regiment, also known as the Royal Edinburgh Volunteers, was raised in Scotland in 1778. Its uniform originally included bonnets and kilts; the facings were yellow, and the lace had a red stripe between two black ones. He agrees that the 80th Foot was disbanded in 1784. All the available evidence indicates that this regiment as described by Katcher was the unit that fought at Yorktown. For example, the troop returns showed it as being one of the largest regiments in the British command, not a mere detachment. British maps of the siege, as well as the troop returns, depicted the main body of the 80th Foot serving in the main lines at Yorktown, and a detachment (about eighty-five men) holding a portion of the defenses at Gloucester.11


9. 1st and 2d Light Infantry Battalions

These two battalions had been created by General Clinton in New York. He referred to them as "the very elite of my army." They had come to Virginia under General Phillips and had been incorporated into Cornwallis's army when he had arrived at Petersburg in May 1781. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abercrombie and Maj. Thomas Armstrong commanded these two units.  

10. Royal Artillery

First raised as The Train of Artillery, this important arm was designated the Royal Artillery Regiment in 1716. Captain George Rochfort commanded the artillery detachment at Yorktown. Assisting him was Capt.-Lt. Edward Fage, who later prepared one of the better British maps of the siege. The troop returns prepared at the time of surrender showed 171 artillerists present. During the siege they were augmented by a large number of naval gunners and a small detachment of German artillerists. The Royal Artillery wore blue coats faced with red.

11. Royal Engineers

The corps of Royal Engineers had its beginning in 1717, when a small group of engineers was employed as part of the military branch of the Ordnance. In 1757 these men were issued commissions. The laborers on engineering works at that time were hired civilians. Then, in 1772, the first company of men was enlisted as uniformed soldiers, at Gibralta. But not until after the Revolution was the engineer corps expanded to six companies of one hundred men each. The chief British engineer at Yorktown was Lt. Alexander Sutherland. Two other lieutenants, Haldane and Stratton, assisted him. Although slaves and soldiers did most of the actual construction of the lines, a detachment of enlisted men probably assisted the engineer officers in laying out angles and traces. Sutherland, while accused by Captain Ewald of procrastinating, planned the defenses of Yorktown as well as the circumstances allowed. The Confederate Army followed his general outlines in 1861.

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12. German Units, General

More than 30,000 German soldiers fought on the side of Great Britain in North America from 1776 to 1783. In return, the British government paid the German princes handsome sums for this manpower. Such an arrangement had long been a custom in European wars. Indeed, Lord Cornwallis himself once almost lost his commission for joining a German unit before his own was authorized to do so during the Seven Years War. The German soldiers for American service were recruited principally in the states of Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Hanau, Brunswick, Anspach-Bayreuth, Waldeck, and Anhalt-Zerbst. The German troops at Yorktown came from Anspach-Bayreuth and Hesse-Cassel.¹⁵

13. Anspach Battalions

These two battalions were commanded by Col. F.A.V. Voit von Salzburg (popularly known as the Von Voit Battalion; from the 1st Regiment Anspach-Bayreuth) and Col. F.J.H.W.C. von Seybothen (Von Seybothen Battalion; from the 2d Regiment Anspach-Bayreuth). The Von Voit Battalion had arrived in New York in 1777. Its blue jacket had red facings and the smallclothes, i.e., knee breeches, were white. The Von Seybothen Battalion had also participated in the war since 1777. Black facings were the distinctive color of its uniforms.¹⁶

14. Fusilier Regiment Erbprinz

This regiment was one of three Hessian units that fought at Yorktown. It had arrived at New York in 1776, and was commanded at Yorktown by Lt. Col. Mathew von Fuchs. Its distinctive uniform featured rose facings on blue coats and white metal caps.

15. Musketeer Regiment von Bose

Another of the Hessian units at Yorktown, the Regiment von Bose had also arrived in America in 1776. At that time it was known as Musketeer Regiment von Türmbach. White facings and red stocks were the distinguishing features of its uniforms. Its commanding officer at Yorktown had the unlikely name of Major O'Reilly.


16. Jägers (hunters)

These men, composing the last Hessian unit at Yorktown, were a group of expert riflemen. They had been recruited in Germany from among gamekeepers and foresters. The company at Yorktown was commanded by Capt. Johann Ewald. These troops often went by the nickname Green Coats because of the dark green color of their jackets, which were trimmed with red and yellow. Although their dress trousers were yellow, Kipping suggests that these marksmen probably wore green trousers in the field. They wore black hats bearing green and red feathers.

17. German Artillery

This unit at Yorktown was a small detachment of Anspach's commanded by Capt. N. F. Hofmann.\(^\text{17}\)

18. British Legion, Provincial

Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton commanded the British Legion, a provincial cavalry unit raised in New York in 1778. Originally the uniform jacket was green with black facings. In 1778 an order came out directing all provincial organizations to wear red jackets. Whether Tarleton's cavalrmen had complied with this order by the time of the Yorktown campaign remains unknown. Tarleton was a forceful leader, and the British Legion had won a reputation for its military worth long before Yorktown.

19. Queen's Rangers, Provincial

The other unit containing cavalry at Yorktown was the Queen's Rangers, which had been raised in Connecticut and in the vicinity of New York by Col. Robert Rogers in 1776. By the Siege of Yorktown many Southern Loyalists had joined the unit. Lieutenant Colonel J. Graves Simcoe commanded the Rangers in 1781. This dashing but competent officer would later become the first governor of Upper Canada (Ontario). Not all the Rangers were mounted; a portion of them served as light infantry. Uniformed in green like Tarleton's Legion, they were considered the most flamboyant of the provincial units. At Yorktown, the Rangers proved to be Cornwallis's best scouts. The ancestor of the Queen's

Rangers was Rogers's Rangers of the 1750s, who ventured as far west as Grand Portage at the head of Lake Superior while escorting fur traders. Its descendant today is the Queen's York Rangers.18

20. Royal Navy

A considerable flotilla of small vessels stood anchored off Yorktown in August 1781. It included both warships and transports. Until it sailed on August 25, the Richmond was the flagship. After that date, the senior naval officer was Capt. Thomas Symonds, master of the Charon. An American intelligence report of September 7 listed the ships possessing armament:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>18- and 12-pounders</th>
<th>12- and 9- &quot;</th>
<th>9- and 6- &quot;</th>
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<tr>
<td>Charon</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>Guadaloupe</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Old Poway</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonetta, sloop of</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>war</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Defiance, brig</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Spitfire, brig</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Rambler, sloop</td>
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<td>Susannah, sloop</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarleton, sloop</td>
<td>10</td>
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When the French fleet arrived in Chesapeake Bay and blockaded York River, the British were stimulated to improve the state of their defenses. One of the actions taken at this time was to transfer most of the naval guns and seamen to shore. The guns were placed principally in the water batteries at both Yorktown and Gloucester. A body of Royal Marines from the ships landed at Yorktown to assist in the defense of that place. Captain Symonds reported these activities to Rear Admiral Graves on September 8:


Most of the cannon & ammunition of the Charon are landed, and great part of the Crew in Tents, and employed in enlarging the Sea Battery, and assisting the Army; the Guadaloupe is moor'd head & stern, opposite a [Yorktown] Creek above York Town to enfilade a Gulley should the Enemy attempt to cross it.

The Foweys Ammunition & Provisions are ashore, and she is hauled close in, and her men assisting at the Batteries. The Bonetta at Gloucester side, Capt. Dundas ashore with his officers and Men, to man the Batteries, assisted by 30 of the Foweys Men.20

20. Symonds to Graves, Sept. 8, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, vol. 2, History Files, Colonial NHP.
V. A MONTH OF GRACE, SEPTEMBER 1781

A. Cornwallis's Decisions

Exactly four weeks elapsed from the arrival of the French fleet to the Allied advance on Yorktown. At the beginning of those twenty-eight days, Cornwallis had a choice of action. He could remain at Yorktown and rely on his fortifications and his superior force to hold off Lafayette until the British Navy arrived, or he could march overland, break through Lafayette's small army, and move on to either Baltimore or the Carolinas. When the French fleet lifted its blockade and left the Chesapeake on September 5 to engage Admiral Hood, Cornwallis had a third choice—to embark his force and sail for South Carolina.

Clinton's biographer summarizes the military situation succinctly: "When the enemy fleet arrived on August 31, [Cornwallis's] road of retreat was wide open. Washington's army was weeks away, de Grasse had not yet landed his troops, and the only enemy force in the area was Lafayette's weak corps." (Lafayette had fewer than 4,000 men: 1,500 Continental regulars, 400 recruits, and 2,000 ill-trained militia.) But, other than holding conferences to discuss the options with his subordinate officers, Cornwallis took no steps to leave the Yorktown Peninsula. Colonel Tarleton argued strongly for an attack on Lafayette. Still, Cornwallis hesitated.

On September 5 Lafayette's command almost doubled when over 3,000 French troops from the West Indies disembarked from de Grasse's ships and came up the James River to Jamestown Island, near Williamsburg. By September 8 Cornwallis had learned that Washington was marching toward Virginia. The debate continued in the British war council. After the French fleet renewed its blockade, Tarleton repeated his arguments for an attack on Lafayette and finally persuaded Cornwallis that this was the preferable course of action. Then, about September 15, a message from Clinton arrived that caused Cornwallis to change his mind: "It would seem that Mr. Washington is moving an Army to the Southward with an appearance of haste. . . . Your Lordship . . . may be assured that if this should be the case, I shall either endeavor to reinforce the Army under Your Command . . . or make every possible diversion in your Lordship's favor." Furthermore, Clinton assured him, another British fleet was underway for the Chesapeake.1

In his memoirs Tarleton still admitted puzzlement as to why Cornwallis did not march against Lafayette or escape by water when the French fleet was at sea:

Earl Cornwallis, when the French and Americans took post at Williamsburg, had near six thousand men fit for duty. The infantry were all good, most of them chosen troops; the detachment of field artillery unequalled; and the cavalry, to the amount of four hundred, in excellent order. Besides this regular force, there were sufficient numbers of marines, seamen, convalescents, and refugees, to have manned the batteries, and maintained the works . . . against any attempt of the French fleet during the absence of the British army [attacking Lafayette].

Historian Willcox criticizes Cornwallis severely for his passivity during these first two weeks in September: "The point is not that he chose wrong, but that he pretended to have no choice. Tarleton's brother supposedly jumped over the earthworks at Yorktown to show how weak they were, and told the Earl that defending them would bring disgrace on the army; in that case, his chief replied, the blame would fall on Clinton and not on them. The anecdote may not be true, but the attitude was there." Willcox concludes: "He had his moment of decision, and decided to let it pass; he then tried to put the onus on Sir Henry for leaving him no discretion." Clinton's part in keeping Cornwallis at Yorktown is not to be overlooked; but Willcox's evaluation has merit. Cornwallis's reactions and inaction during this critical period slightly tarnished an otherwise illustrious career.

B. Military Activities

While Cornwallis and his aides pondered what course to follow, the tempo of fortification construction increased, and patrols and foraging parties continued to scout the area. Captain Ewald noted that as soon as the French fleet appeared, the British laid out a line "in an arc around York. . . . Half of the army was put to work." Lafayette's spies informed him that "the enemy are entrenched at York with great intensity. Everything is landed from their shipping and dispositions made for their destruction." At that same time, a small patrol of Tarleton's cavalry clashed with American militia. According to American sources, the militia captured the entire British patrol.


38
When Lafayette arrived at Williamsburg on September 3, he billeted his troops on the campus of the College of William and Mary. Some of his militia, under Brig. Gen. George Weeden, moved down the north side of York River a little closer to Gloucester Point. Inexperience caused the militia to act timidly, and they tended to keep distance between themselves and the British. Nevertheless rumors spread through the British camps that Lafayette would soon attack.  

British control of the north side of the river was demonstrated during the night of September 3-4. The Queen's Rangers and the Jägers accompanied a foraging party that ransacked the wharves along the north bank of the Severn River. The riflemen took up a position at Abingdon Church to protect the foragers' rear and flank. Ewald recounted that during the night several small enemy parties appeared but no clash occurred.

According to Ewald, Cornwallis moved Colonel Dundas's 80th Regiment from Gloucester to Yorktown on September 4. Colonel Fuchs, Erbprinz Regiment, then took command of the works at Gloucester. This change pleased Ewald, who was unimpressed with Dundas "Since Colonel Dundas had thought of nothing else during the fortification of Gloucester than merely throwing up great heaps of sand." But Ewald was soon to be disappointed. Whatever Dundas was doing over at Yorktown did not take long. He soon resumed command at Gloucester (if he ever relinquished it) and remained there until October 12.

While Simcoe rode north of Gloucester, Tarleton's cavalry made daily patrols toward Williamsburg on the Yorktown side. His troopers made a considerable impression on the Americans. A Pennsylvania officer described a clash: "This morning some of Tarleton's Horse came within our Centrys in pursuit of Capt. Herd with 20 Men the Centrys fir'd, and the Guard having let Capt. Herds party pass Wheel'd again to the right & left & threw a Heavy fire they on this retreated a small distance, but Our having accounts that they were 1500 strong prevented us Attempting to Cross the Mill dam."

Captain Ewald sat down to his diary at Gloucester on September 6. He had already criticized the defenses at length, but on this day he gave full vent to his feelings. He wrote that no one had given thought to gun platforms and that he and Simcoe had had to march out that day to search for lumber on the plantations. He criticized Engineer Sutherland, "the English Vauban," for digging trenches before he had fascines, saucissons,

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palisades, or assault stakes prepared. Furthermore, Sutherland had not followed the rule books on field fortifications: "But what is the reason? The engineer gets a daily allowance of one pound sterling as long as his work lasts; hence, it is to his advantage if it drags on." Sutherland undoubtedly would have made a sharp reply had he known of these remarks.\footnote{8}

Cornwallis also took a hard look at the unfinished works at Yorktown. On September 8 he made an important decision: "As my works were not in a State of Defense, I have taken a Strong Position out of the Town." Despite the additional labor required on this new line of outposts (redoubts, redans, and small batteries) that stretched from the headwaters of Wormley Creek to the head of Yorktown Creek, Cornwallis continued to fortify the town proper: "I am now working hard at the Redoubts of this place." He said that the command was in relatively good health and that he had provisions for six weeks.\footnote{9}

C. The Allies Gather

Also on September 8 the French troops from the fleet joined Lafayette at Williamsburg. Although they had landed at Jamestown several days earlier, problems of food, water, and transportation had delayed the arrival of the French in the old capital. That same day Captain Symonds of the Royal Navy learned that gunfire had been heard off the Capes from September 4 to 6. But, as yet, the meaning of that firing had not been learned.\footnote{10}

That gunfire signaled the naval engagement known as the Battle of the Capes. While a victory for neither side, de Grasse's encounter with Rear Adm. Sir Thomas Graves forced the British fleet to sail northward toward New York. It also allowed a small French fleet under Count Louis de Barras, from Newport, Rhode Island, to slip into Chesapeake Bay on September 9. On board were Brig. Gen. Claude Gabriel de Choisi with 600 French soldiers and the all-important siege artillery from the Newport garrison. Lafayette's spirits must have soared still higher.\footnote{11}

By mid-September Cornwallis faced total isolation at Yorktown. The French fleet had returned and resumed its blockade. General Washington himself had arrived at Williamsburg. On September 16 Cornwallis wrote Clinton with mixed emotions: "If I had no hopes of relief, I would rather

\footnote{8. Ewald, "Diary," n.p.}
\footnote{9. Cornwallis to Clinton, Sept. 8, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library.}
\footnote{10. Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution, p. 300; Symonds to Rear Admiral Graves, Sept. 8, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, vol. 2, History Files, Colonial NHP.}
\footnote{11. Stevens, "The Allies at Yorktown," p. 14.}
risk an action than defend my half-finished works; but as you say [Admiral Digby] is hourly expected [from England], and promise every exertion to assist me, I do not think myself justified in putting the fate of the war on so desperate an attempt." While the commissary still had considerable food for the army, Cornwallis expressed alarm about the shortage of fodder for the cavalry mounts. He feared that the animals would have to be deliberately killed—an event that soon came to pass. He concluded his message with dark pessimism: "This Place is in no state of Defense. If you cannot relieve me very soon, you must be prepared to hear the worst."12

On this same occasion Captain Symonds wrote Admiral Graves that his sailors had become good soldiers: "The Seamen work with the greatest spirits and exertion, in cutting down wood for redoubts, or cooperating in any piece of Service Lord Cornwallis is desirous of having them employed on." Symonds also ordered preparations for the sinking of transports in York River in front of both Yorktown and Gloucester as obstructions to the French should they sail up the river.13

Across the river, Weedon's militia made a patrol to Seawell's Ordinary where they set up an ambush, only five miles from Gloucester Point. In reaction Simcoe and Ewald led a force of 200 Jägers and cavalry toward the inn, with Ewald in the van. They discovered that the militiamen were not yet ready to stand and fight. Ewald described his tactics: "I divided [his] entire body into five groups of ten horsemen and ten jägers, which were arranged in a circle of two thousand paces, so as to attack the ambuscade from all directions. After a small skirmish, the enemy withdrew through the wood to Burwell's mill."14

Shortly after this encounter, Ewald fell ill with "southern land fever." This malady swept through the British Army; the good health of the command in August disappeared. Ewald wrote in his diary that Colonel Simcoe and most of the Jäger officers were ill. Only 20 Jägers and 100 Rangers were still "half-well." The same was true at Yorktown where several regiments had a large number of men ill. The timing of this sickness was not propitious; the Allied siege could not be far away.15


15. Ibid., entry for Sept. 18, 1781.
D. Fire Ships

Early in September Captain Symonds had informed Admiral Graves that he had prepared fire ships to loose against the French blockades should they come up the river: "Capt. [George] Palmer of the Vulcan, lays prepared to act ... and has three Horse vessels [transports] fitted to act on the same service." The three French ships, the Triton, the Reflechi, and the Raillleuse, had resumed their blockade on September 14, after the Battle of the Capes, but made no move to approach closer to Yorktown.

Perhaps out of frustration, Symonds decided to employ the fire ships against the French vessels anyway. Other than the possibility that a successful attack might cause the Allies to delay their advance on Yorktown a day or two, Symonds could gain little tactical advantage in such a maneuver. If the French ships burned, de Grasse could easily replace them from his fleet. But even a slight delay in Allied plans might allow enough time for the British fleet to arrive.

Captain Palmer set September 21 as the date for the operation. A young officer aboard the Charon, Bartholomew James, participated in the event: "Four fireships being ordered to be fitted ... and having offered myself as a volunteer to command one, with Lieutenants Conway, Symonds, and a lieutenant [Campbell] of a privateer," they prepared for action. The ubiquitous Ewald learned of the plan: "Toward evening of the 22d, a good friend of mine, a naval officer, came to me and disclosed that three [four] fireships were to sail during the night with the high tide against the three French ships ... to burn them. Thereupon I boarded a boat with him in order to follow ... Captain Palmer led the fireships. The sight was worth the trouble to see! The ships were set on fire and illuminated the area so brightly that we could easily detect the French ships."\[16\]

Despite the spectacular sight, the scheme went awry. James explained:

We cut our cables at midnight and ran down the river. At two o'clock [morning of 22d] we came within sight of the enemy ... when from some cause, unaccountable as strange, Mr. Campbell of the privateer, set fire to his vessel. ... the enemy ... cut their cables, beat to quarters, and, having fired twenty or thirty shot at us, retreated in a precipitate and confused

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manner. Mr. Conway at this time set fire to his vessel, and soon after Mr. Symonds to his, when, seeing the French launches rowing towards us, and no probability of grappling with the enemy, and running a risk of my retreat being cut off . . . I set fire to my vessel. . . . We ran two ships of the line on shore. . . . We arrived at our tents about six in the morning, with the loss only of one man wounded who was blown up in setting fire to the vessel. 17

A French Army officer on board the Triton described the attack from his position:

The Triton was first in line and was the only ship to suffer. The Vaillant [Railleuse?] and the Reflechi had time to up anchor. A turn in the current and a change in the wind swept the blazing boats past the Triton, however, and the attempt failed. We had been, however, in great danger for, after cutting our cable, we grounded and a swarm of [British] ships with grappling irons succeeded in bringing one of the fire ships alongside. We directed a heavy fire upon this flotilla and finally succeeded in freeing ourselves from the embrace. . . . This affair . . . cost us the loss of seventeen men and damage by fire to our forward deck. 18

No other important engagements occurred prior to the siege itself. An exchange of letters between Virginia's Governor Thomas Nelson and Lord Cornwallis on September 25 and 26 indicated that the Allied advance was at hand. Nelson, who was ordinarily a resident of Yorktown, asked the general to allow civilians to leave the place. Many of the town's citizens had already fled, but some had stubbornly stayed on. Cornwallis replied the following day: "I have not the least objection to any of the Inhabitants at present in this place going out with their families & effects; Nor to those who formerly resided here sending for their wives & Families, who will likewise be permitted to take their effects with them, and any Wagons that you think proper to send to assist them will be received at our Out-post on the Hampton Road."

17. James, Journal, p. 117.

Cornwallis went on to explain that he had detained one citizen, a Dr. Griffin, having been informed that the doctor "had been particularly attentive to our Works with a design to give Intelligence to our enemies." However, deciding that the doctor probably was not a spy, Cornwallis released him. How many citizens took advantage of these last hours to flee remains unknown. The Negro labor force stayed; the Loyalists remained; and so did the women and children associated with the British Army. Even Governor Nelson's uncle, Secretary Thomas Nelson, remained in his elegant home, which Cornwallis was using as his headquarters.19

General Washington issued his orders for the march on Yorktown the following morning. Cornwallis, his soldiers, sailors, marines, and civilians waited. The month of grace had slipped by. The fortifications, still incomplete, might hold out long enough for Clinton and the Royal Navy to rescue the British Army.


44
VI. THE DEFENSES OF YORKTOWN AND GLOUCESTER

A. Siege Warfare: Theory and Practice

Siege warfare had reached the state of an art by the end of the 18th century. The procedures and rules for besieger and besieged alike were set forth in textbooks in most European languages. Military writers had set down in exquisite detail how to build permanent fortifications for border towns, how to throw up temporary works for field operations, even how to surrender when all else failed.

Yorktown was a classic, if not a grand, example of a siege. Both the British and the Allied armies followed the rules: fortifying a small town, establishing outposts, constructing batteries and redoubts, digging parallels, reducing outerworks, countering with sorties, attempting escape, and negotiating terms for a capitulation. Nonetheless, Lord Cornwallis had selected a tactically poor place to defend. Yorktown and the Allied parallels were practically on the same elevation; the town did not command the countryside. The small area (all that was suitable) circumscribed by the British defenses allowed the enemy to concentrate a terrible artillery fire on the besieged. Ravines and draws provided the Allies with secure lines of communication to the front. But the Siege of Yorktown did occur; and out of the rubble grew the strongest republic in the history of the world and, eventually, a different kind of British empire, larger and stronger than before.

1. De Vauban

Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban was considered the greatest military engineer of the 18th century. The significance of the contributions of this French servant of Louis XIV has been brilliantly captured by Professor Henry Guerlac. Guerlac points out that in the 16th and early 17th centuries, the French developed the first really effective siege artillery that easily destroyed the high-walled fortifications of medieval towns. In response, Italian engineers developed a new type of enceinte (the principal wall or rampart). When perfected, this enceinte consisted of "a thick low rampart, with parapet; a broad ditch; and an outer rampart, the glacis, which sloped gently down to the level of the surrounding countryside," the result being a strong fortification with a low profile.

This new "system" of defense spread rapidly through Europe and was further improved upon by military engineers in many countries. Vauban's predecessors in the French school of fortification included Errard de Bar-le-duc, its "titular founder" and author of *Fortification réduite en art* (1594), and Blaise de Pagan, a theorist who influenced Vauban's ideas (*Les fortifications du comte de Pagan* [1645]).

While Vauban published little in his lifetime, his influence was immense then and throughout the 18th century. After his death in 1707, three of his treatises were published under one title: *Traité de l'attaque et de la défense des places suivi d'un traité des mines* (The Hague, 1737). Another volume of his works appeared in Leiden in 1740. This latter, *A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification*, has recently been translated by George A. Rothrock and published by the University of Michigan Press (1968). If his literary output was small, physical evidence of his reforms and ideas in fortifications was scattered profusely along France's borders. Similarly, he furthered the art of besieging improved fortifications—a seeming contradiction that military engineers engaged in of perforce.

Guerlac's summary of Vauban's contributions toward the improvement of siege techniques effectively set the scene for the events at Yorktown:

His innovations in siege craft were designed to regularize the taking of fortresses and above all to cut down the losses of the besieging force. Before his perfection of the system of parallels, which he probably did not invent, attacks on well defended permanent fortifications took place only at a considerable cost to the attackers.

* * * * *

Vauban's system of attack, which was followed with but little variation during the eighteenth century, was a highly formalized and leisurely procedure. The assailants gathered their men and stores at a point beyond the range of the defending fire and adequately concealed by natural or artificial cover. At this point the sappers would begin digging a trench that moved slowly toward the fortress. After this had progressed some distance, a deep trench paralleling the point of future attack was flung out at right angles to the trench of approach. This so-called "first parallel" was filled with men and equipment to constitute a place d'armes. From it, the trench of approach was moved forward again, zigzagging as it approached the fortress. After it had progressed the desired distance, the
second parallel was constructed, and the trench was moved forward once more, until a third and usually final parallel was constructed only a short distance from the foot of the glacis.

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The essential feature of Vauban's system of siegecraft, then, was the use he made of temporary fortifications, trenches and earthworks, in protecting advancing troops.

The British works at Yorktown were hastily-constructed, temporary field fortifications, not the massive permanent fortresses to which Vauban principally addressed himself. Yet the Allied armies in 1781 followed the formalized procedures of siegecraft as if they were attacking Vauban's masterpiece, the fortress at Neuf-Brisach.

Vauban's concepts of defense are more difficult to summarize. Guerlac observes that an important contribution was Vauban's freeing the besieged from reliance on the main enceinte and taking steps toward a defense in depth: "In all previous cases adaption had been through projecting crown works or horn works that were merely spectacular appendages to the primary enceinte; and when these were taken the main line was directly affected." Engineer Sutherland indulged in a hornwork at Yorktown; but the Allied artillery overwhelmed the entire British works before an assault on any of its parts had become a necessity.²

Another French military engineer whose publications were known in Great Britain in the 18th century was Guillaume Le Blond. His A Treatise of Artillery . . . The First Part of Le Blond's Elements of War appeared in English in 1746. He also published Elemens de Fortification, a treatise that like so many of its contemporaries concerned huge permanent works.³

2. John Muller

Britain acquired its first important writer on military fortifications and the use of artillery in sieges in the person of John Muller. His Royal Highness, the Duke of Gloucester, patronized Muller, who also held the post of Professor of Artillery and Fortification at the Royal

2. Ibid., pp. 33, 39-42.

Military Academy at Woolwich. Muller's Treatise on Artillery (London, 1768) was one of the few books on that subject widely available in English on the eve of the American Revolution. Its popularity crossed the Atlantic and a pirated edition appeared in Philadelphia in time to be of service to the Continental Army. Undoubtedly Gen. Henry Knox, who commanded the American artillery brigade at Yorktown, was aware of its content.

Muller wrote two other important works in the 18th century. One of these, A Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification, Regular and Irregular, did not appear in print until 1799, well after the Revolution. The other, The Attack and Defence of Fortified Places, probably was first published after the war. In all his work, Muller drew heavily on the more important continental experts, including Vauban.4

The British, German, and French officers at Yorktown had a thorough background in siege warfare, both through the writings of Muller and many others and through years of experience in earlier European wars. While the Americans had less experience, all the engineers in Washington's army were French and had been thoroughly immersed in the theory and practice of siegecraft.

Before examining the defenses at Yorktown, a brief glance at the textbooks on fortifying places should be taken. While some of the authorities quoted below did not appear until after the Revolution, their comments are valid. The Siege of Yorktown produced no changes in this type of military action. A book on fortifications by Hector Straith in 1852 has as much to offer to our understanding of 1781 as has Muller's 1768 work, despite the Napoleonic wars and their revolutionary results.5

3. A Good Defense

John Muller, in his Attack and Defence, had a multitude of recommendations for the captain of defense. He observed that a good defense depended on the strength of the works, the garrison, the supply of ammunition and provisions, and the governor himself, who must be both brave and clever. A maxim for the commandant was that he "make the enemy pay dearly for every inch of ground they gain." But even in the

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best of situations the besieged had little to hope for: "The strongest places [in Europe], that were attacked since the beginning of the war in 1740 [except two] . . . have not held out above a month."

Discussing a permanent fortification, Muller went into considerable detail concerning the number of men to be assigned to various tasks. Pertinent to Yorktown was his division of the troops into three bodies: one to be on guard, one to lie under arms, and one to rest. The Allies generally followed this system in their attack on Yorktown; but, as the artillery bombardment increased in intensity, none of the British troops found much opportunity to rest. He advised the construction of "detached redoubts, arrows, and such other kind of out-works which oblige the enemy to open their trenches at a great distance." "The covert-way," he said, "should be well palisaded."

Concerning the town itself, Muller recommended the demolition of any houses that might obstruct the defense, "and nothing left either within or without that may favour the besiegers." The street pavement should be taken up and water barrels placed about for fighting fires. Underground bombproofs were necessary as a safe resting place for the troops not on duty. Powder magazines should be constructed with particular care: "They should be covered with seven or eight feet thick of earth, and a layer of fascines, dung, and strong planks laid over them." J. G. Tielke also gave advice on the construction of magazines:

In general, powder magazines are only formed behind batteries of heavy artillery; but in some cases they may be equally necessary in field works. They are usually holes dug in the ground, lined with boards or straw, and covered with planks and earth. Their entrances made in the rear, and in general . . . the barrels are placed upon square pieces of wood or benches.

If . . . it should be necessary to make such magazines bomb-proof; they must be first covered with strong beams . . . afterwards, with two rows of fascines, and lastly, with at least two feet depth of earth. Or, instead of fascines, a covering of straw, of ten or twelve inches in thickness. . . .

Once the enemy invested the place, the commander should send out several nightly patrols "of ten or twelve men [each], commanded by a sergeant, with orders to lay [sic] on their faces, all round the skirt of the glacis, to keep strict silence, and attentively listen to whatever passes."

Muller treated the all-important defensive artillery in detail:
The place of attacks being known, the great pieces of ordnance are mounted on the rampart . . . to fire en barbet, and the small [pieces] on the covert-way and other out-works . . . to assist their aim, fire-balls are thrown from the mortars into the trenches, to discover the workmen and their guards; in the moment of opening the trenches, the greatest fire should be made. . . .

The guns may continue to fire en barbet, till such time as the besiegers have erected their batteries, which is commonly after the second or third night of the trenches being opened. [Once the besiegers began firing, the defenders' guns had to be moved to fire through embrasures.]

* * * * *

Shifting the guns from place to place, whenever they are in danger of being dismounted [by enemy fire], will give the enemy infinite trouble, and cause them to lose much time.

Muller also paid much attention to sallies, which were important undertakings under certain conditions. When carried out with care, sallies were a principal means of lengthening a siege, that is, putting off capitulation—especially if reinforcements were expected. They were proper when the garrison was numerous and the besiegers weak in numbers. They were also justified when the fortification was of poor quality or when there was a shortage of ammunition and provisions. Sallies could be dangerous if the enemy were at too great a distance, "but when their approaches are advanced between the second and third parallels, then is the time . . . they may even sally whilst the second parallel is making." "The intent of great sallies," said Muller, "should be to destroy a considerable part of the enemy's works, and thereby oblige them to repeat their labour to re-establish them; to nail up their guns; to retake some post which had been lost; and, lastly, to obstruct and retard the enemy's works as much as possible." The best time to make a sally was about two o'clock in the morning, when the enemy troops were tired and sleepy. If it were raining, conditions were better still. Muller turned to Vauban to describe the order of sally:

1. A detachment of 90, 30 across and 3 deep, armed with breast plates, sword, pistol, and an iron fork with a hook (called a partizan).

2. A fourth rank of 30 grenadiers.

3. A detachment of 180, 30 across and 6 deep.
4. Two hundred workmen.

This party should be supported by a detachment of three or four hundred that should not go farther than the head of the enemy trench. Muller recommended that the troops fix a white paper or a handkerchief in their hats so that they could recognize one another in the dark.6

Hector Straith also dealt with the defense of villages:

The first thing to be done is to clear the approaches to the town, by leveling houses, hedges, shrubberies, and whatever may not be of advantage to the defence. . . . Trees and shrubs ought to be cut two feet from the ground, that it might serve to impede the advance of the enemy. . . . The next object is to form or complete the enclosure round the town. For this purpose, advantage is taken of buildings, walls, and fences. . . . All streets leading directly out of the town must be barricaded.

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That the communications in the interior may be free, all hedges and enclosures, which may in any way impede . . . must be levelled.

* * * * * * *

Good abattis . . . [must] cover the salients and parts in advance.7

While Straith agreed with the authorities that independent redoubts on the advanced ground were preferred over hornworks, he gave advice on the construction of the latter: Hornworks should be "thrown out beyond the glacis" and "their long branches or wings are . . . directed so as to be flanked by the fire of some of the main works." The purposes of a hornwork included covering a gate, strengthening a weak salient in the general outline of the fortress, or occupying a plateau in advance of the place that could not otherwise be included in the fortification. He warned that the wings should not exceed in length the range of musketry--


about 240 to 260 yards. If the hornwork stood on a plain or on the same general level with the main works, then its front should be small. The British hornwork at Yorktown generally followed Straith's prescription.8

Tielke did not overlook the defense of a town either. He noted that traverses (thick walls solid enough to stop a cannonball) "should be formed cross the streets, and particularly near the barricaded gates . . . . These traverses may either be made with earth or wooden chests." Tielke also urged the establishment of a strong post within the town "as the last place of refuge, from whence the troops must make the most obstinate resistance in their power: because they will have no other means of securing to themselves an honourable capitulation."9

Tielke's observation on "an honourable capitulation" was not an idle one. The rules of siege warfare set forth specific conditions that must be present if a garrison was to be granted a surrender with honor. Muller wrote at length on this subject and, in view of the actual surrender ceremony at Yorktown, his discussion is pertinent, if lengthy:

When a Governor . . . sees himself reduced to the last extremity . . . he orders to beat the Chamade; for which one or more drummers are to beat their drums on the rampart next to the attack, to give notice to the besiegers, that the Governor has some proposals to make; there are likewise put up one or more white colours upon the rampart . . . and one of them remains either on the breach or rampart, during the time of negotiation. The same is done for demanding a suspension of arms, to bury the dead, and carry off the wounded, after a violent attack.

The chamade being beat, the fire ceases on both sides, and the Governor sends some officers . . . to the commander in chief of the besiegers, who deliver to him the conditions . . . . But as a security . . . the besiegers send an equal number into the town. When the Governor's proposals are not satisfactory to the General . . . he prescribes the conditions on which the town is to surrender . . . . During the suspension of arms, no work should be done on either side . . . .

Muller then listed the most common conditions for an honorable capitulation:

8. Ibid., 1:215-18; Muller, Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification, p. 101.

9. Tielke, Field Engineer, 2:130, 134.
1. The garrison shall march out through the breach with their arms, baggage, horses, drums beating, matches lighted at both ends, colours flying, a certain number of cannons and mortars, with their appurtenances, spare carriages, ammunition for a certain number of charges, to be conducted in safety to the town agreed upon.

2. One of the gates shall be delivered up to the besiegers, either the same evening, or at a certain hour next day, and the garrison shall march out in a day or two after.

3. The besiegers shall furnish a certain number of covered wagons that are not to be searched, besides others to carry the wounded and sick.

4. That the sick and wounded, which cannot be carried off shall have free liberty to go away when [they are able. In the meantime they shall be fed and lodged.]

5. There shall be no indemnification required from the besieged, for horses taken from the inhabitants, or for houses burned or destroyed during the siege.

6. The Governor, the officers under him, and those belonging to the garrison, the garrison, and, in general, every one in the king's service, shall freely go out of the place, without reprisals.

7. The inhabitants shall exercise their religion without any molestation.

8. The inhabitants shall be maintained in all their rights, privileges.

9. It shall be at their choice to go where they please with their effects.

10. All the powder and ammunition shall be delivered to the besiegers, and the loaded mines shown.

11. All the prisoners made on both sides shall be released.
A garrison should have provision and ammunition, at least for three days, to be entitled to a composition; without which they are to be made prisoners of war.

When the besiegers will agree to no other composition than that the garrison shall be made prisoners of war, it is generally endeavoured to make the conditions as little onerous as possible.

1. That the Governor, and the principal officers, shall keep their swords, pistols, baggage, etc.

2. That the subalterns, under the captains, shall keep their swords with the baggage.

3. That the common men shall not be rifled, or dispersed from their regiments.

4. That the garrison shall be conducted to a certain place... where they are to remain prisoners of war.

5. That the principal officers shall have leave for two or three days.

6. When the garrison quits the place, it shall not be permitted to decoy the soldiers to desert from their regiments.

The capitulation being settled, an officer of artillery from the besiegers... with an officer of artillery from the garrison... take an inventory of all the artillery and ammunition... a commissary of provision also [does the same].

... the besiegers army is put under arms, and ranged into two files, between which the garrison passes. The time of marching being come, the General, and the principal officers, head the two files, to see the garrison defile before them.¹⁰

4. Construction of Fortifications

The construction of fortifications (offensive and defensive) had evolved into a complex science by the time of the Siege of Yorktown. The manuals of siegecraft contained page after page of definitions,

¹⁰ Muller, Attack and Defence, pp. 177-81.
measurements, charts, plans, and diagrams. To synthesize all these works would produce a multivolume study in itself. But to understand the task facing Lieutenant Sutherland in Virginia, at least a glance at the practical aspects of erecting fortifications must be taken.

Tousard classified fortifications as either regular or irregular, permanent or temporary. Regular fortifications, meaning ones built in a regular figure or polygon shape with equal-sized sides, bastions, and angles, were rare. The British fortifications at Yorktown were for the most part irregular, that is, their parts were not uniform, equidistant, or equal. The works at Yorktown were considered to be temporary.11

a) Artillery: Penetration and Range

In designing a fortification, the engineer had to consider the power of penetration into earthworks of various caliber weapons. Straith prepared a table to this effect, giving the required thickness of the parapet necessary for protection. (The thickness given was for the superior slope of the parapet.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Penetration in feet at a mean range</th>
<th>Proper thickness of parapet in feet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musket ball</td>
<td>1½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-pounder</td>
<td>3 ½-4½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-pounder</td>
<td>6½-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-pounder</td>
<td>8½-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18- and 24-pounder</td>
<td>11½-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another table important to the engineer's plans was the effective maximum range of weapons. Straith said that the effective range of ordinary muskets was from 180 to 200 yards. For artillery:

Field Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Artillery</th>
<th>At pointblank</th>
<th>At 4º elevation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-pounder</td>
<td>200 yards</td>
<td>1,200 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9- or 12-pounder gun</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-pounder [sic] howitzer</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-pounder howitzer</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Heavy Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At pointblank</th>
<th>At 4° elevation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-pounder gun</td>
<td>360 yards</td>
<td>1,600 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-pounder gun</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-pounder gun</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-inch howitzer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,000 at 12° elevation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-inch howitzer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,400 at 12° elevation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small brass mortars (Coehorn or Royal)</td>
<td>600 yards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-inch iron mortars</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-inch mortars</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-inch mortars</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,900&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Trace

Having considered the features of the place to be fortified and the surrounding terrain, the engineer laid out the trace, or ground plan, of the works: "The best trace of a fortification consists in such a disposition of its parts as that the body of the place and its exterior works shall mutually flank and communicate with each other; in order that the fronts attacked may oblige the besieger to straighten his approaches and render the establishment of his ricochet batteries very difficult." Straith described exactly how to lay out the trace: "When a work is traced on the ground, strong pickets are driven at all the angles, and the lines joining them distinctly scored with a pickaxe or spade; two profiles [sticks nailed together to form a cross section of the parapet] should be set up on each line to show the workmen the form of the parapet." Before beginning to dig, the engineer had to prepare any necessary drains. (Drains were especially required for redoubts, since these were almost completely enclosed by earthworks.)

c) Rampart/Parapet

In permanent masonry fortifications, the rampart was the broad, stone-faced, earth-filled wall that surrounded the place; the parapet was the slighter earthwork that surmounted the rampart. Men and guns stood on the rampart behind the parapet. In temporary works, such as

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at Yorktown, this distinction was often lost, the entire earthen wall being referred to simply as the parapet. Vauban considered the optimum height of the inside of a parapet to be 6 feet. If it exceeded 4 1/2 feet, a banquette, or step, had to be constructed for the infantry to stand on while firing over the parapet. (This presupposed that the average infantryman stood 5 feet 8 inches tall.) If the banquette was at least 4 1/2 feet wide, the infantry could stand on it two deep. To withstand twenty-four-pounders, such as the Allies had at Yorktown, the parapet would have to be at least 18 feet thick.14

d) En barbette and Embrasures

Earlier in this study it was stated that the defenders should fire their artillery en barbette until such time as the besiegers opened their artillery. This meant simply that the guns should point over the parapet. The purpose behind this was to deny the enemy knowledge of where the gun embrasures had been placed. The fronts of the embrasures were "masked," that is, covered or camouflaged, up to the time they had to be employed. For protection, the guns were moved from en barbette to embrasures once the enemy artillery opened fire. These openings were cut so that they sloped toward the enemy and within three feet of the horizon. On the exteriors the embrasures were from seven to nine feet wide. They narrowed toward the interior of the parapet so that the openings were as small as possible to offer protection to the gunners. The merlon was that part of the parapet between two embrasures. Depending on the size of the cannon and their crews, the distance between two embrasures, center to center, could vary from twelve to eighteen feet.

Muller's dimensions for the exteriors of the embrasures were unusually large: "For the parapet or breast-work is 18 or 20 feet thick, and 7.5 or 8 feet high; each gun takes up 18 feet [of] parapet . . .; the embrasures are 3 feet from the ground, 2 feet wide within, and 15 or 16 without, so that the merlons . . . are 16 feet long on the inside, and 4.5 feet without."

Straith stated that the embrasures for howitzers should be a little wider than for "long-gun batteries." The reason for this was that the explosions of the short-barreled howitzers soon ruined the embrasures, particularly those made with fascines and earth. Also, Straith wrote, "howitzers being fired with a little elevation . . . the soles [bottoms] of the embrasures may . . . be made with a counterslope, that is, sloping inwards; which adds something to the general stability of the mass.

14. Lewis Lochée, Elements of Field Fortifications (London, 1783), pp. 9-10. Lochée was master of the Royal Military Academy at Little Chelsea, England; Tousard thought the parapet should be 6-7 1/2 feet high. American Artillerist's Companion, 1:445; See also Tielke, Field Engineer, 2:2.
Howitzer and ricochet batteries may sometimes be made without embrasures to cover the gunners better, the guns at 15 feet apart, and retired from the parapet so as to fire over it."

Concerning mortar batteries, Straith explained:

Mortar batteries have no embrasures: if exposed to a heavy fire, their superior slope may be flat on top, or even have a counter slope. Mortars are usually placed 15 or 18 feet apart, and when fired at 45°... they are removed... 7'6" from the eaulement: as the angle of elevation is decreased, the pieces are proportionately removed to a greater distance from the eaulement.

If cannon were to be placed in redoubts and fired en barbette, a terreplein, or earthen platform, would have to be built for each piece. Tousard recommended that each of these terrepleins be twelve feet long and from twenty to twenty-four feet in width. The ramp leading to the terreplein should have a slope of one to six or nine.15

e) Platforms

Plank platforms were required for most guns, howitzers, and mortars. Tielke described the construction of these:

When the place on which each cannon is to stand, has been carefully levelled; you must let three or four beams or sleepers into the earth... fix them... either with or without a foundation of pickets, according to the nature of the soil... and then add a covering of boards. These boards may be fastened either with nails or wooden pegs.

The length and breadth of the platforms will of course depend upon the size of the cannon: for regimental field-pieces [up to twelve-pounders] they are usually about sixteen feet in length by six or eight in breadth; and for 12, 18, or 24 pounders, about twenty-four feet by ten.

If the cannon are to be occasionally fired in an oblique direction, the platforms must be broader behind than in front. In general a difference of four or six feet is fully sufficient.

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15. Tousard, American Artillerist's Companion, 1:37, 507; Lochée, Elements of Field Fortifications, p. 14; Muller, Artillery, p. 166; Straith, Treatise on Fortification and Artillery, 1:126-27.
Straith was more explicit:

For guns, the platforms are laid with a slight rise to the rear (about half an inch to a foot); and as the platforms are usually 15 feet long, there is a rise of \(7\frac{1}{2}\) inches. . . . Materials required . . .

5 Sleepers, each 15 feet long; 5" square
20 Planks, each 10\(\frac{1}{2}\) feet long: 9" broad & 2" thick
2 Ribbands, each 15 feet long and 4" square
10 Rack-sticks and lashings, or iron bolts.

He observed that the sleepers should be well embedded in cuts or trenches and firmly pinned to the earth. For field fortifications he recommended rectangular platforms, fifteen by ten feet, which could be laid more easily in the dark than the splayed (wider at the back than at the front) platforms found in permanent fortifications. Experts could lay a platform in one hour and dismantle it in a few minutes.

To construct a mortar platform, Straith said, one needed seven sleepers--five laid longitudinally and two traversely underneath the five. Each sleeper should measure 7 feet 6 inches long and 6 inches square. Over these one placed eight planks, each 6 feet 6 inches long, 11\(\frac{1}{2}\) inches broad, and 4 inches thick. As for the gun platforms, two ribbands and ten rack-stakes and lashings were required to tie it all together.¹⁶

f) Sodding

Most authorities agreed that if the earthworks were to be sodded, the sods should be thick, wet, and short, laid like bricks (header and stretcher), with the green side down. Each sod should be staked with 8-inch pickets, the stakes being nearly perpendicular to the slope. Tousard said that the sods should measure 16" x 6\(\frac{1}{2}\)" x 4\(\frac{1}{2}\)"; Lochée gave the measurements as 18" x 12" x 3". A laborer could cut 1,000 sods a day and could sod about 360 square feet of the slope in the same amount of time.¹⁷

g) Ditches

A ditch lay before every parapet. While it added to the enemy's difficulties in making an assault, its primary purpose was to supply the earth for building the parapet. In discussing field fortifications, Lochée said a ditch should never be less than six feet deep. A berm, or

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¹⁶. Tielke, Field Engineer, 1:303-4; Straith, Treatise on Fortification and Artillery, 1:131-33.

a ledge between the parapet and the ditch, was often left in place; it helped to prevent the earth of the parapet from sliding into the ditch. Engineers often found it advisable to dig personnel trenches to the rear of the parapets. These could both offer protection and serve as communication trenches. They were generally three feet deep and sloped to the rear. A single step made them easy to enter.18

h) Palisades

Palisades of logs or planks had their place in many fortifications. While the authorities differed on the dimensions, most considered eight or nine inches a proper thickness. The recommended length of the pickets varied from eight to eleven feet, three or four feet of which were sunk into the ground. Both the top and the bottom were pointed. Some writers said that the logs should be slightly separated so as to allow the muzzle of a musket to pass between them; others preferred the logs close together with loopholes cut along the palisade. A horizontal rail, two feet from the top, fastened the logs together. The planks could be planted either vertically or obliquely; the latter method was preferred because the planks could not be cut so easily at the bottom or torn up so readily with ropes.

Palisades were often planted in ditches to offer still another obstacle to attackers. Tielke warned that such palisades "ought never to be a foot higher than the counterscarp, lest they should be shot away by the enemy's artillery. They must be three inches distant from each other, and strengthened by rafters nailed about a foot and a half below their tops."19

i) Fraises

Fraises, rows of pointed stakes, could be planted along the parapets where the earthwork met the berm. While some engineers preferred having these incline slightly toward the ditch (to prevent hand grenades from lodging on them), others placed them horizontally or inclining upwards. These stakes were about nine feet long, four feet of which were buried. To strengthen the fraise, the stakes were often nailed to two sleepers buried beneath the parapet. Tousard had much to say about fraises:

Horizontal fraises are less affected by cannon, [they] raise the ricochet, and are certainly the best. When inclining towards the enemy . . .

18. Lochée, Elements of Field Fortifications, p. 14; Straith, Treatise on Fortification and Artillery, 1:86.

19. Lochée, Elements of Field Fortifications, p. 21; Tielke, Field Engineer, 1:221-22; Straith, Treatise on Fortification and Artillery, 1:97-98.
[grenades] roll down into the ditch . . . but . . . they may sometimes present a cover to the enemy; when raised toward the work this inconvenience is somewhat lessened. Sometimes they are placed . . . forty-five degrees with the horizon; but the most simple method is to fix them perpendicularly to the talus [i.e. slope]. . . .

In no case should they be higher than the plunging of the parapet [so as not to interfere with defending musket fire], and always in such a manner as not to be seen by the enemy, or exposed to the direct fire of his cannon. 20

j) Abatis

Military engineers did not entirely agree on the value of an abatis. Tielke wrote that "no greater abuses are committed than by the unnecessary formation of abattis." He allowed that they were sometimes useful, if trees were available, to defend outposts or to make ravines impassable. Straith, on the other hand, said: "Well disposed abattis make formidable obstacles, and have always been highly esteemed and much used in ancient and modern warfare." The most detailed description of an abatis comes from Tousard:

Sometimes they are made on the covert-way, on the glacis, before redoubts or entrenchments, across roads and avenues, to barricade them, etc. They should be stripped of their leaves and small branches to be less liable to take fire, and, if you have any leisure, the ends of the small branches should be sharpened and hardened with fire.

The trunks are turned towards the works . . . fasten them together with cords, rods, etc. . . . The ground on which the abatis is made ought to be lowered, in order to secure it from the enemy's fire. If it is exposed to his fire, place it nine or ten toises [55-60 feet] from the men whom it is intended to defend, and take care to flank it so as to prevent the enemy from gaining a shelter behind.

20. Lochée, Elements of Field Fortifications, p. 23; Tousard, American Artillerist's Companion, 1:505; Straith, Treatise on Fortification and Artillery, 1:97, had no use for fraises. He noted that in the Peninsular War (after Yorktown) the attackers placed ladders against them, climbed on them, and used them for footing before rushing over the parapet.
Lochéé suggested sinking the trunks three or four feet into the earth and fastening down the main branches with stakes. He added: "Trees of middle size, and especially fruit trees [which are harder to set on fire], are deemed most proper."21

k) Outworks

In addition to the main work, with its curtains, bastions, redoubts, and batteries, a fortified place, especially in a temporary situation like Yorktown, had various types of outworks that guarded the approaches. Among the more common of these were redans, redoubts, and star forts.

A redan, also called a flèche or arrow, was the simplest of all works. It consisted of two sides, called faces, in the shape of a V. The salient angle measured from 60 to 120 degrees. The opening, in the rear, was called the gorge. Small redans had faces up to 30 yards in length and parapets that were 3 feet wide at the top and 4½ feet high on the interior. Large redans had faces up to 100 yards long and parapets up to 12 feet thick. A ditch in front supplied the earth for the parapet. Redans served many purposes including security for advanced guards and camp guards and covering for a bridgehead.22

Redoubts, or works enclosed on all sides except for a narrow passageway, were polygons of three or more sides (squares were the most common). If the faces exceeded four in number, the work was sometimes referred to as a compound redoubt. Lochée observed that the interior perimeter of a redoubt should not be less than 50 yards and that seldom did it exceed 150 yards. Cannon were often added to the defense of a redoubt; thus the passageway had to be wide enough to admit gun carriages. Once the guns were inside, an earthen (sometimes log) traverse was erected inside the entrance.23

A redoubt in the shape of a star was called a star fort. Opinions differed as to the merits of this type of work. Tousard wrote: "The best star redoubts are those which have the greatest number of angles and sides; they are however, most usually constructed with four, five, six and eight points or angles." Lochée noted that a star fort had a greater extent than a redoubt, "and being formed of salient and re-entrning [sic]

21. Tielke, Field Engineer, 2:47; Straith, Treatise on Fortification and Artillery, 1:99; Tousard, American Artillerist's Companion, 1:506; Lochée, Elements of Field Fortifications, p. 29.

22. Lochée, Elements of Field Fortifications, p. 32.

23. Ibid., pp. 36-50; Tousard, American Artillerist's Companion, 1:481.
angles, are deemed of much greater defence." However, Lochée added, a
star fort was difficult to construct and it had less space inside than
a simple redoubt. He noted the popularity of this style of work during
the American Revolution:

In the infancy of the contest in America, the
rebels generally adopted the star fort, which, as
it could not be an object of preference founded on
the knowledge of its advantages and defects, we must
ascribe to the influence of the French, who are gen-
erally supposed to be the inventors of that work,
and with whom it still remains a favorite.

Tielke was even less impressed: "Star-forts are at present [ca. 1780s]
not much in use, because it has been found by experience that they are
weak, especially those of a square or pentagonal form, and that their
interior space is too small." According to Lochée, the parapet of a
star fort should be at least six feet high and from nine to eighteen feet
thick. The exterior ditch should not be less than six feet deep. 24

1) Gabions, Fascines, Saucissons, and Hurdles

Parapets in temporary fortifications were essentially earth. Al-
though it was rammed and packed where possible, and occasionally sodded
if time was available, earth was an unstable element. Parapets could
be washed away in rainstorms as well as torn up by artillery fire.
Engineers could provide a small measure of stability on the exterior of
a parapet by allowing it to slope. But in order to retain maximum thick-
ness of the wall the degree of slope (or talus) could not be excessive.
It is estimated that at Yorktown the angle of the scarp at the French
works was a rather steep sixty to seventy degrees. 25

The interior slope of the parapet demanded a different treatment.
Infantrymen had to (and wanted to) stand close to the parapet when fir-
ing over it. Guns had to roll up close to the parapet in order to point
their muzzles through the embrasures. In order to construct this almost
perpendicular wall in a temporary fortification (it could be brick or
stone in a permanent work), soldiers had invented a number of wooden forms
that could easily and quickly be manufactured from material at hand.
These included gabions, fascines, saucissons, and hurdles.

24. Tousard, American Artillerist's Companion, 1:488; Lochée,
Elements of Field Fortifications, pp. 55-61; Tielke, Field Engineer,
2:19.

25. Edward Ayers et al., Archaeology/Restoration/Reconstruction of
the Yorktown Battlefield, Colonial National Historical Park, Virginia:
Preliminary Thoughts and Recommendations (Williamsburg: Southside
Gabions have been described as baskets without bottoms. In theory, at least, they were perfectly round. Tielke discussed the construction of gabions in detail:

Small gabions are made with the least trouble, and one man can carry, place, and fill them with ease. They are usually three feet high by two in breadth: but the pickets... ought to be an inch and a half or two inches thick, and four feet long, that they may be driven one foot deep into the ground.

Large gabions are six feet high by three in diameter, and require two men to carry them... .

A small gabion will require seven or eight pickets, and a large one from nine to eleven. You must weave a few twigs round the upper ends of the pickets to prevent their flying open... then, beginning at the bottom, keep working upwards till you come near that part, and let the whole be driven down with a mallet before you finish the top.

The Allied Army at Yorktown issued the following instructions for the manufacture of gabions by the troops: "The gabions are to be three feet high, including the end of the pickets, which are to enter the ground. They are to have two-feet-and-a-half diameter, and to be formed of nine pickets each, of two-and-a-half inches circumference, interlaced with branchery stripped of leaves, to be equally closed at the top and bottom, in order that they may not be longer at one end than the other."26

When beginning construction of a parapet, a row of gabions were placed along what would become the base of its interior slope, their protruding pickets pushed firmly into the soil. Workmen filled them with earth from the trench or ditch they were digging. Additional earth would then be rammed against them on the exterior to form the remaining breadth of the parapet.

Fascines and Saucissons were simply bundles of tree branches or brushwood firmly tied. The only difference between them was their length. Fascines were from eight to twelve feet long; saucissons averaged eighteen feet. Both were used primarily for revetting the interior slopes of the parapets, particularly at the batteries, including gun embrasures, and in the trenches of a besieger's parallels. Fascines were also employed in building a banquette—the infantry's firing platform—and in forming the tops of powder magazines, their resiliency being greater than that of solid plank. Tielke described the construction techniques:

As much wood as is thought necessary for a fascine is laid upon the trestles, well squeezed together with a twich, and bound with birch, hazel, or other pliant twigs from foot to foot. Three men are usually employed at each trestle, with two to cut and prepare the materials.

The twigs which are used in binding fascines should be laid over a fire till the sap is dried up, and afterwards twisted till they become perfectly pliant.

Saucissons are composed of the thinnest and most pliant twigs; they are generally eighteen feet long by ten or twelve inches in diameter: and used either for the revetement of embrasures, or to form the corners of a parapet.

Battery-fascines or half saucissons are from eight to twelve feet long, and from ten to twelve inches thick; they are only intended for the revetement of the parapet and for the banquette.
Tracing or trench fascines are used in sieges;—they are generally from four to six feet long, and eight or nine inches thick.

Covering fascines are made use of to form the tops of magazines and saps. They ought . . . to be composed of the strongest branches with the addition of a few hop poles, that they may be able to bear a considerable weight.

An American orderly book at Yorktown contained the following regulation: "The fascines to be six feet long and six inches through, to be made of branchery, the twigs of which are to be crossed; to be bound with withes at each end, and the middle to each fascine, three pickets of three feet long and two or three inches in diameter [to add strength to the core]." And: "The saucissons to be fifteen or sixteen feet long, each, and twelve inches diameter, and well bound with withes." 27

Hurdles, or rectangular mats of woven twigs, were also prepared by the Allies at Yorktown. They too were used in revetting batteries and other earthworks. The instructions for making these stated: "The huddles [sic] shall be six feet long and three feet wide, and shall be made of nine pickets each, of two inches and a half to three inches circumference; equal distance from each other, and interwoven with stronger branchery than that employed for the gabions." 28

An American private described the process of making these siege materials, having some slight difficulty with the French terms:

We made fascines and gabions, the former, bundles of brush, and the latter are made in this manner, viz—after setting sticks in the ground in a circle, about two feet or more in diameter, they are interwoven with small brush in form of a basket; they are then laid by for use, which is in entrenching. Three or more rows of them are sent [set?] down together (breaking joints), the trench is then dug behind and the dirt thrown into them, which, when full, together with the trench, forms a complete breastwork. The word is pronounced gabeens. The fascines (pronounced fa-scheens), are, as I said, bundles of brush bound snugly together, cut off straight at each end; they are of different

27. Tousard, American Artillerist's Companion, 1:21; Tielke, Field Engineer, 1:207-11; Orderly Book, pp. 25, 32.

lengths, from five to twelve feet. Their use is in building batteries and other temporary works. 29

Lord Cornwallis and his officers had ample precedents, guides, textbooks, and experience to assist them in preparing the defenses of Yorktown and Gloucester. However, the British were somewhat handicapped by lack of time, hot weather, sickness, and by being located at a place that was difficult to defend under the best of circumstances. While the Hessian captain, Johann Ewald, disapproved of Lieutenant Sutherland’s fortifications and referred scathingly to the works at Gloucester as “great heaps of sand,” the British labored diligently on their works once the French fleet entered Chesapeake Bay. As late as September 16 Cornwallis referred to his defenses as only “half-finished”; still, he believed they would serve their purpose and allow time for Clinton to come to his aid. Now the testing time had come. The armies of Washington and Rochambeau were marching toward Yorktown. The British and the Hessians waited.

B. The Defenses of Gloucester Point

In early August Cornwallis had concentrated on erecting fortifications at Gloucester rather than at Yorktown. This activity, which Ewald scorned, puzzled the Americans for a time. At one point Lafayette had thought Cornwallis was preparing Gloucester Point as a base of operations for a drive to the north. As the weeks passed it became clear to both the British and the Allies that Yorktown would be the place of decision. The retention of Gloucester was essential to the British for four reasons: to maintain control of the York River at this narrow point, to provide a base for foraging through the rich countryside, to prevent the Allies from establishing a strong point that could threaten Yorktown and British shipping, and to ensure a route of retreat should Yorktown have to be evacuated.

Once the Allies invested Yorktown at the end of September, Colonel Tarleton could no longer employ his cavalry effectively in the restricted ground on the south side of the river. On September 30 Cornwallis directed Tarleton’s Legion to move to Gloucester Point, which was not yet blockaded. At the same time, the Erbprinz Regiment crossed to Yorktown where infantry troops were in demand. Later, on October 12, Colonal Dundas gave up his 80th Regiment to hard-pressed Yorktown. From then until the surrender, Tarleton commanded the point. During the siege the following units served in the Gloucester lines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approx. Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Queen’s Rangers, Colonel Simcoe, Redoubt No. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jägers Company, Captain Ewald, Redoubt No. 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tarleton's Legion, Colonel Tarleton, Redoubt No. 2 200
Detachment, 80th Infantry, Redoubt No. 3 85
Light Company, 23d Regiment 50
Light Company, 82d Regiment 40
Company of North Carolina Volunteers 90

Approx. Total 775

As a secondary position, Gloucester Point did not receive much attention in the primary accounts of the defenses. The greater part of the data on its fortifications comes from maps prepared in 1781 by both British and Allied cartographers. But a few brief descriptions have survived. Tarleton, in his later account, noted the beginning of the defenses:

Earl Cornwallis gave directions to Lieutenant Sutherland, of the engineers, to trace out a chain of redoubts to cover Gloucester. [Tarleton said that about a dozen houses made up the village.] A marshy creek extends along part of the right flank: The ground is clear and level for a mile in front: At that distance stands a wood: The space which it occupies is narrowed by the river on the left, and a creek on the right: Beyond the gorge the country is open and cultivated.30

Private Döhla recorded in his diary that he went on duty in the trenches at Gloucester on August 11: "This island is provided with earthworks round about it." A week later, James McHenry, an aide to Lafayette, was in Gloucester County. He wrote to his friend the governor of Maryland: "Lord Cornwallis neither pushes his works with rapidity on the water or land side . . . he appears to despise armour and to confide in his own natural strength. Would you not, after all this, be surprised to hear good news from this quarter?"31 Mad Anthony Wayne thought that Cornwallis would sacrifice Gloucester Point once the siege began: "They also occupy Gloucester on the opposite side the river where they have one or two little works to preserve a communication with the Country, but they will certainly evacuate that side as soon as the investiture is complete."32


In contrast to the full-fledged siege at Yorktown, the Allies on the Gloucester side of the York, under the command of Brig. Gen. C. G. de Choisi, merely blockaded the British position. By October 3, de Choisi had encamped his forces in the vicinity of Seawell's Ordinary. That same day his cavalry, under the Duke de Lauzun, clashed with Tarleton. The British thereafter withdrew into their defensive positions at Gloucester Point and the Allies advanced to a position about 1¼ miles to the north. While de Choisi undoubtedly threw up some hasty field fortifications, no known descriptions of these are extant. The British, of course, abandoned the few outer redans and strong points along the peninsula, but continued to man the outposts immediately in front of their main line.

The Allies made only one minor attack on Gloucester Point. As a feint during the French and American assaults on Redoubts 9 and 10 at Yorktown, de Choisi received orders to create a distraction on the north side of the river. Lauzun wrote that de Choisi, eager for action, "determined to make a real attack and carry the entrencheds sword in hand. He accordingly distributed axes to the American militia, with which to cut down the palisades. At the first fire half of them threw down their axes and guns to run the faster."33 The legend on French map No. 35 (Appendix 5) also mentioned the use of palisades at Gloucester: "Enemy redoubts, raised, palisaded, and joined together by a range of large wooden stakes planted in earth, all covered by a good abatis of trees, in front of which were several small redans." Of the few explicit comments concerning the British defenses at Gloucester Point, these are the only ones that mention the palisade. Two British maps, those of Hills (No. 30) and Fage (No. 24), indicate the palisade (a row of dots) connecting the redoubts and batteries. Most other maps either suggest an earthen parapet or are unclear. While it is possible that the defense line consisted of a combination of earthworks and palisades in a manner similar to part of the main fortifications at Yorktown, it is more likely that the main line was simply a log palisade anchored in the ground.

The batteries and redoubts were earthworks. On the extreme right of the main line stood a redoubt (herein identified as No. 4) manned by Hessian Jägers. No cannon were mounted here. To the left of this redoubt was a battery (No. 1) mounting four six-pounders. Redoubt 3, defended by a detachment of the 80th Regiment, displayed a single six-pounder. Across the main road, to the west, stood Redoubt 2, which had no fewer than three six-pounders. Tarleton's Legion, now dismounted, occupied this post. The Queen's Rangers manned Redoubt 1, which had a large twenty-four-pounder gun. Battery 2, also with four six-pounders, stood on the extreme left of the line and adjacent to York River.

On the waterside, a large water battery faced York River (Battery 3). Although most secondary accounts stated that ten eighteen-pounders and one twelve-pounder were mounted here, a prime British map (Hayman, No. 29) listed its armament as consisting of six eighteen-pounders and two twelve-

pounders. A small redoubt stood to the west of this battery overlooking the swamplike ground at the tip of the point. Between the water battery and Redoubt 4 a small redan faced York River.

Outside the main line an abatis stretched from west to east, both ends strengthened by palisades that ran out into the river. Farther to the north and northeast, about two-thirds of a mile beyond the main line, a chain of redans served as outposts.

These modest works served their purpose. Gloucester Point did not contribute to Cornwallis's downfall at Yorktown. Toward the end of the siege, when Cornwallis attempted to evacuate Yorktown, Gloucester was ready to receive his troops. While de Choisi effectively blockaded the British there, he did not possess sufficient strength to lay siege or to make an all-out assault. Ewald's "heaps of sand" sufficed. But the main event occurred across the river at Yorktown.

C. The Defenses of Yorktown

On August 22 Cornwallis had approved Sutherland's plan for the defense of Yorktown. At that time the general had estimated that the work would take six weeks to complete. When Washington's forces marched from Williamsburg a little more than five weeks later, Yorktown's defenses were still not finished. Nevertheless, the principal works had taken shape sufficiently to cause the Allies to plan a full-fledged siege--one that would last three weeks.

The terrain itself determined the trace of the fortifications. Lower Town, or "York Under the Hill," consisted of a straggle of warehouses, shops, and residences along the narrow waterfront. The town proper and its "suburb," the Gwyn Road Development, sat on the edge of a plateau about fifty feet above the beach. Four streets followed ravines to join the upper and lower towns. Main Street ran roughly east and west through the center of the town. The west end of this street was a road to Williamsburg. The road from Hampton joined the east end of Main. Yorktown Creek had its headwaters to the south of the town. The creek ran to the west and northwest through deepening ravines with marshy bottoms to join York River above the town. Wormley Creek carved a similar arc running east to join the river below the town. Thus Yorktown was almost an island; the "isthmus" between the heads of the two creeks measured only 1,500 feet of high land. Besides surrounding the town itself, these creeks encompassed a large, fairly level plain to the south and east of the village. Here the Allies would construct their first and second parallels, flanked by Yorktown Creek and York River, during the siege.

Before describing the fortifications, a look at their construction as reported in contemporary accounts might be taken. On August 17 a British orderly book recorded: "The 43d 71st & 76th Regiments are to send to the QM Master of the Light Infantry for a proportion of axes as soon as possible for the purpose of cleaning their front." This order possibly referred to the east front in the vicinity of Redoubts 6 and 7, where,
according to troop disposition maps, these three regiments served during the defense. The axes appeared again in the orderly book on September 3: "The Corps who have had Axis [sic] delivered to them are to cut stockades of the following dimensions--Small trees not more than one foot Diameter, to be cut 14 feet long, those which are thicker 21 feet--Each party will collect what they cut in the most convenient place for the Waggons to carry them away."34

Colonel Tarleton described the weeks before the siege: "The ground was surveyed . . . as soon as the redoubts on the other side of the river [Gloucester] were found . . . tenable . . . and the works proposed by the engineers: After some consideration, the plan was approved . . . and the troops, after levelling some houses, proceeded to construct the fortifications. Working parties were ordered from all the corps, except the legion [Tarleton's cavalry], who remained at the advance post with some mounted infantry."35

Naval Lieutenant James recorded in his journal the assistance the ships' crews extended to the army. August 23: "Detachments of seamen employed with the army in throwing up works." August 28: "The army on the works, the seamen pulling down the houses in the front of York-Town." September 2: "The seamen was removed on shore into tents, and began to throw up works towards the sea, working constantly at them night and day." September 4: "Mounted all the Charon's eighteen-pounders to the sea, and sent all the seamen to pull down the front of the town, and cut trees for stockading it round." September 14: "The navy and army employed, without a moment's loss of time, on the works, and the ground in front of the town levelled and cleared of houses, and all other things which might favour the attack of the enemy."36

Private Döhla of the Anspachs also kept a diary of the siege. August 31: "All the munitions and provisions were unloaded from the ships . . . the lower tiers of guns from the warships and frigates were brought into the earthworks." September 4: "Early I went on fatigue and in the evening felled trees. In front of our lines and encampment all the roads were barricaded with tangled trees over which the enemy could not march so easily." September 14: "I went on fatigue work in the woods which are near us. All the trees in front of our line have been cut down; and all the roads guarded and fortified with a strong abatis." September 16: "This afternoon I went where they were cutting trees, carried and also helped load the same on wagons. Palisades are made of these strong trees, which are placed in the entrenchments of our line around our whole camp."

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September 19: "Many houses were torn down in the little city of Yorktown because they were a hinderance outside of our lines."37

General Edward Hand, Washington's adjutant general, described in mid-September what he had learned of the British defenses: "Cornwallis employs his army night and day in fortifying York and Gloucester. He has drawn up his ships to the shore, moored them head and stern, landed their guns, and cut up their sails for tents, and has given orders to bury or sink them on the first attack." General Anthony Wayne observed at the same time: "From Lord Cornwallis's character it m[a]y yet be possible to temp him to a field day . . . otherwise you may depend upon it that the siege will be very tedious--for the enemy have improved in fortifying and procuring a supply of provisions etc etc."38

Hessian soldier Popp confirmed the furious pace of activities during the latter part of September. Writing on the fourteenth: "Today we . . . cut down the timber before our line, in order to hinder the approach of the enemy. All trees and roads were blocked and strengthened with strong log barricades." And, on the nineteenth: "Many houses of the city were broken down and taken away, because a strong line was being made there which was strengthened with strong palisades and deep trenches. Many powder magazines were also placed and readied."39

On September 28 the Allied armies approached Cornwallis's outposts along Wormley and York creeks and on the "isthmus" between the two.40 The next day Cornwallis wrote to Clinton that because relief was on its way, "I shall retire this night within the works." On the morning of September 30 Washington learned that the British had withdrawn from all the outposts except the Fusiliers' Redoubt on their right flank and Redoubts 9 and 10 on their left. Both the Allies and the British summarized the state of Yorktown's defenses as Washington completed his investment.

The Chavalier d'Ancteville, an engineer in Rochambeau's army, wrote that on October 1

M. de Vioménil attacked the advanced abatis and the redoubt on our left [Fusiliers' Redoubt]. He com-


40. The British outposts in this area are not discussed in this report. Historian Jerome A. Greene is concurrently preparing a study on the Allied siege lines that will include these positions that were integrated into the American and French works.
pelled the enemy to draw back into these works, from which he did not again issue forth. All this place is composed of rough works, twenty feet in thickness, parapets or fraised moats, eight feet deep, and enveloped or covered by well-built abatis. Lord Cornwallis had had these constructed immediately after the arrival of the army of M. de Grasse.

It appears that he first built the detached works, which he then connected when he saw that he would have time to do this. He next had work started on the interior works, then on a second enclosure to his left. The right being covered by a ravine... he had built there only detached works and batteries, connected by a line of trees laid upright, set deep in the ground and terraced behind.41

Tarleton explained the British works at length:

The right rested on a swamp [Yorktown Creek] which covered the right of the town. A large redoubt [Fusiliers'] was constructed beyond it, close to the river road from Williamsburg, and completed with fraizing and abatis. The Charon, Guadaloupe, and other armed vessels, were moored opposite to the swamp; and the town batteries commanded all the roads and causeways which approached it. On the right, at the head of the morass, two redoubts [Nos. 1 and 2] were placed, one on each side of the main Williamsburg road... .

The works erected for the protection of Yorktown consisted, on the right, of redoubts and batteries with a line of stockade in the rear, which supported a high parapet of earth. The redoubts were furnished with fraizing and abbatis... .

The morass extended along the center [south], which was defended by a line of stockade, and by batteries [Nos. 8 and 9] that looked upon all the avenues to the swamp: On the left of the center, was a horn work, with a ditch, a row of fraise, and an abbatis: Some embrasures for cannon were at present open in

41. Warrington Dawson, "The Chevalier D'Ancteville and His Journal of 'The Chesapeake Campaign," Légion d'Honneur 2 (October 1931): 83-96. D'Ancteville was probably correct in his assumptions. A French map, No. 34, prepared before the siege (possibly in late August or early September) shows the British works as then consisting of unconnected redoubts and batteries but following generally the shape of the final product.
this work. The left was fortified by redoubts [Nos. 6, 7, and 8], communications of earth, and batteries [Nos. 4, 5, and 6], which were all furnished with fraizing, but without stockade or abattis. Two redoubts [Nos. 9 and 10] were advanced before the left, which were small, and not as well finished as those in front of the right. The ground in front of the left was in some parts on a level with the works, in others cut by ravines, and altogether very convenient for the besiegers [as avenues of approach]. The space within the works was exceedingly narrow, not large enough for retrenchments and, except under the cliff, exposed to enfilade. 

[ca. October 1] It was soon evident, the principal attack would be directed against the left. . . . Large parties of infantry were employed on the magazines in the town, and at the outward redoubts on the left.42

Captain Samuel Graham of the British Army wrote that when the troops completed the works at Gloucester, the bulk of them crossed to Yorktown and began fortifying it:

On the right [west] of the town there is a considerable ravine, and on the angle of the opposite bank was constructed a pretty strong redoubt [Fusiliers'] with an abatis as a defence on the right flank. The town was then surrounded by a ditch and thick parapet, having a horn work in the centre, in both of which [horns] were batteries lined with fascines. The parapet ran to the river on the left bank, having two advanced redoubts constructed on that flank, one on the brink of the bank over the river [No. 10], the other advanced, and in line with the town's parapet and base of the hornwork. The parapet was formed of trees cut in the woods and placed inside; outside it was formed of fascines; and the earth from the ditch, which was sandy and gravelly, was thrown into the space between; it had also a fraize made of fence rails kept in line and projecting by the earth thrown into the opening of the parapet, giving it an appearance of strength which it little merited.43

42. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, pp. 381-87.

Baron von Clossen, an aide to Rochambeau, was impressed with the Fusiliers' Redoubt. He called it "a great star redoubt, fraised and fortified with a double row of abattis, connected by frequent counterforts," or buttresses. He said that all the British works had fraises and abatis: "In some places there was a second line of trees, placed end to end and joined, and filled in from behind with earth-works." He mentioned the communication trench within the eastern part of the main works and said that Redoubt 10 was 768 feet from the main line. Redoubt 9 was "a more considerable one with a moat, fraises, and abattis. These two works were not connected with each other at all, nor with the main stronghold."

After the British abandoned their outposts, a French officer made a careful inspection of them, probably to determine what the Allies might expect of the main British works. He was not overly impressed with these hastily-built posts: "They are not solid; the parapets are not thick, and are made of sandy soil which obliges them to be propped up lest they fall down; but the abatis are excellent, having no other fault but being made of pine . . . easy to set on fire."

Several observers commented that the British defenses on their right (west) were superior to those on the left. Colonel Count de Deux-Ponts was one who made a statement to this effect--after he had reconnoitered much of the line: "I have made to-day my reconnaissance of the enemy's right, and I consider that it is the best of all the parts of his line of defence."

These several descriptions give a general picture of the British defenses. They contradict one another in some details, such as the locations of abatis. Some statements raise more questions than they answer. Nevertheless, a synthesis of this evidence, of the historical maps of the siege, of the military manuals of the day, and of the results of limited archeology provides a reasonable understanding of the British fortifications of Yorktown.


46. Ibid., p. 137.
1. Fusiliers' Redoubt

Located on the edge of the bluff overlooking the York River, this star redoubt marked the outermost limits of the British right flank. It was located about two fifths of a mile beyond the main defense line. The redoubt guarded the town from approaches on the Williamsburg river road, which ran along a narrow tongue of high land at this point between a branch of Yorktown Creek and York River. It received its name from its first garrison, about 150 men from the 23d (Welch Fusiliers) Regiment and marines from the ships. At some point early in the siege, this garrison was replaced by rotating detachments of 100 men each; but Fusiliers' Redoubt remained its name.

Although some military engineers did not favor star forts, as noted earlier, the Fusiliers' Redoubt was stoutly constructed and firmly withstood successive French attacks throughout the siege. Due to its proximity to the cliff, this earthwork's outline was not a symmetrical star. Indeed, it is doubtful if an earthen parapet existed at all on the river side. Most of the contemporary maps show a parapet completely surrounding the work. But three British maps indicate otherwise: The Hills map, No. 30, and the Page map, No. 24, show no fortifications at all on the water side, the wings of the enclosure simply ending at the cliff; the Hayman map, No. 29, confuses the issue by showing a narrow dark line, seemingly indicating some kind of earthwork, and a partial row of dots, ordinarily used at that time to indicate a wood palisade. But in other areas where wooden palisades are known to have stood, Hayman did not employ dots as the symbol, using instead a series of short parallel lines.

The redoubt was surrounded on the land sides by a ditch, from which earth was taken to construct the parapet. A fraise of wooded stakes, undoubtedly set into a berm for support, also surrounded the work. A double abatis, the only one known to have been built at Yorktown, encircled the work on the land sides. This was an exceptionally well-made obstruction that defied several French attempts to storm the redoubt—although the enemy managed to set fire to it on one occasion. The fire did not extensively damage the abatis, which was made of apple and peach trees rather than the softer pine. Military engineers highly recommended fruit trees as being the best construction material for such a work. The two circles of fallen trees were anchored to each other by buttresses or crossarms of felled trees firmly picketed to the ground.47

During the construction of this redoubt, four British warships anchored offshore to protect the working party. Even as the enemy approached Yorktown, some of these vessels remained off the mouth of Yorktown Creek, guarding it in case the Fusiliers' Redoubt fell.48


One of the contemporary maps (No. 35) states in its legend that this redoubt was "palisaded." Inasmuch as it was a common practice to erect a palisade in the bottoms of ditches, the probability exists that this superior fort's ditch was so outfitted. Some artillery pieces were mounted in the redoubt. Captain Ewald of the Jägers said that they consisted of two twelve-pounders and three coehorn mortars.49

In 1935, CCC Company 1351, "the Colored Veterans," undertook a re-construction of the Fusiliers' Redoubt, all surface remains of the original work having long since disappeared. Although a complete archeological investigation did not precede the work, cross-sectional trenches were dug and a general outline of the redoubt was staked out. These trenches revealed that approximately forty percent of the original site had been lost because of cliff erosion. Workmen redug the exterior ditch and used the earth to rebuild the parapet: "By trampling and rolling the parapet it was raised to a height of 7 1/4 feet with a width at the top of 8 feet. Both the outer and inner slopes were made at an angle of 1 to 1 (one foot in to each foot in height)." The foreman reported that the top of the parapet "was given a slight slope toward the ditch," and the whole sodded. No attempt was made to employ gabions or fascines or to revet the interior slope.

After completing the parapet, the workmen constructed a firing step (banquette) on the inside by cutting away the parapet. This step measured three feet high and three feet wide: "The excess of dirt obtained by squaring up the slope was used to make a gradual ramp up to the steps." Concrete fraises, made to resemble pointed logs, were installed; these were anchored in a concrete curbing within the berm. No trace of an original entrance or gorge having been found, a point on the side nearest Yorktown was selected for an entry. (At least one historical map shows an entrance-way at this approximate location.) After weighing the merits of an earthen or log traverse to protect the entrance, the foreman decided on the log. Again, concrete "logs" were used. Also, a bridge made of concrete resembling wood was installed over the ditch. The laborers also built a single earthen gun terreplein (without platform) and a ramp leading to it on the west side of the interior.

After the redoubt was completed, the workmen dug the interior to a depth of three feet looking for artifacts. They found musket balls, a buckle, pottery sherds, and three skeletons that they reburied in concrete caskets. A drainage pipe was laid from the interior to the ditch, and a seawall was constructed to prevent further erosion of the cliff.50

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49. Tustin to Haskett, June 3, 1970.

50. A. E. Booth, "Detailed Report of Completed [Fusiliers'] Redoubt, CCC Co. 1351, Yorktown, Va.," typescript, ca. 1935, Colonial NHP library. Booth was the project superintendent.
2. Outposts, Windmill Point, etc.

On the bluffs west of the town and east of Yorktown Creek, the British erected an undetermined number of small redans within which they probably mounted a few fieldpieces. The various maps are in disagreement as to their number and locations. Generally, the British maps show very few works in this area, while the Allied maps show several. The historical base map in this report records all those shown on all the maps.

At Windmill Point itself, on a bench slightly below the mill, a battery of two or three fieldpieces pointed westward toward the Fusiliers' Redoubt. The redans, which may have numbered up to five, extended southward from Windmill Point along the bluffs overlooking Yorktown Creek. Pickets stationed at these points could have given the alarm had the Allies approached this area from the west.

These small works consisted of V-shaped parapets formed of earth from outside ditches. Depending on the terrain and the soil, gabions and fascines may have revetted the interior slopes. All trees on the forward slopes of the bluffs that might help impede an enemy advance were cut down, their tops pointing toward the foe. Likewise, all easy avenues of access were barricaded with abatis. Some of these redans were reinforced with fieldpieces. Thor Borresen, an astute student of the siege, referred to "the small redan batteries placed along the ravines...guns of minor dimensions." He also mentioned that one of these redans had three guns mounted. Borresen may have been referring here to the redan in front of Battery 3, for which some historical maps suggest guns (see particularly La Combe, No. 48). He also claimed that the British "erected a row of palisades at the bottom of the York Creek ravine, extending for some distance south of the road, then following the creek to the river's edge." He did not cite a source concerning this palisade. If it did exist, a gate or opening would have been necessary on the Williamsburg road. Constant traffic between the town and the Fusiliers' Redoubt--messengers, reliefs, supplies--must have been the rule of the day.51

3. Main Defenses, Western Yorktown

Lieutenant Sutherland devised different types of construction for the main defenses of eastern and western Yorktown. The eastern portion, more susceptible to a major enemy attack, was composed of relatively large earthworks, with parapets joining the redoubts and batteries in one continuous band. In the western portion the redoubts and batteries stood

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before a palisaded earthwork. Borresen gave two reasons why this latter mode was chosen for the west: sandy soil, and broken topography (ravines, marshes, and bluffs) that prevented the enemy from drawing up into a solid formation before attacking.52

Two redoubts and a battery stood outside the wall on the west side of town. They were numbered Redoubts 1 and 2 and Battery 10. Tarleton wrote that these redoubts "were furnished with fraizing and abattis." Because of the sandy soil in this area, a liberal use of fascines and other revetment probably was necessary. Redoubt 1 stood before the Erbprinz Regiment and likely was manned by detachments from that unit. The 17th Regiment manned the parapets behind Redoubt 2. Both works were probably manned by rotating detachments of about 100 each. Together they commanded the main road from Williamsburg and a spur of that road that led into the western corner of Yorktown.

Battery 10 stood between the two redoubts. The Fusiliers' Redoubt was about 865 yards distant, within range of reasonably accurate artillery fire. Thus, this battery could lend support to the outpost when it came under attack. The primary sources concerning disposition of artillery agreed that this battery consisted of four cannon. Hayman, Map 29, did not state their size. A French map, No. 42, listed all four guns as being twelve-pounders, but Bauman, Map 4, showed them as being one eighteen-pounder and three nine-pounders.

The possibility exists that Lt. Bartholomew James of the Royal Navy commanded this battery. In his account of the siege he stated that he was in charge of a battery in front of the 17th Regiment. Actually this battery stood in front of the 23d Regiment, the 17th being immediately to the left. He stated that his battery consisted of three eighteen-pounders and four six-pounders.53

Fascines were probably employed both in the construction of the battery's parapet and in the revetting of the embrasures. The probability exists too that the battery was fraised and had an abatis in front, although its appearance was not described in writing. Borresen was of the opinion that all the British batteries were cavalier, or raised, in style. This kind of construction often called for a ditch both in front and to the rear of the battery.54

Behind these works stood the main line of stockade and earthen parapet that covered the west end of the town and stretched along the south side

52. Ibid., p. 10.
53. James, Journal, p. 117.
as far east as today's Nelson Street. For the greater part of its length this wall was not fronted with a ditch. An excellent profile of this section appears on French Map 38. According to it, the log stockade stood eight feet above the ground. Behind it was an earthen parapet, four feet high, fourteen feet broad at its base, and eleven feet wide at its top. Had this section been attacked by enemy infantry, the defenders would have had a log breast-height of only four feet. Nine feet behind the parapet was a personnel trench, four feet deep and sixteen feet wide. Its excavation was the source of earth for the parapet.

Borresen's description of this work gives additional detail: "This parapet was made by placing logs vertically in the ground close together ... similar to the slope of an ordinary parapet, which is usually about 3 feet horizontal to 6 feet 3 inches in height of palisade. The earth behind the palisades was 4 feet 4 inches high, with a width across the top of 9 or 10 feet." This width, Borresen wrote, prevented one attacker from engaging a defender with a bayonet while a comrade climbed over the palisade.

Colonel Tarleton's description of this part of the line agreed with the maps and with Borresen's conclusions: "The works . . . consisted, on the right, of redoubts and batteries, with a line of stockade in the rear, which supported a high parapet of earth. . . . The morass extended along the center [south], which was defended by a line of stockade, and by batteries [Nos. 8 and 9] that looked upon all the avenues to the swamp."

This main western parapet had five openings or gates along its extent. The northernmost of these was in the vicinity of Redoubt No. 1. The main road from Williamsburg was detoured to pass through a second gate in the parapet just south of Battery 10. The third gate was behind Redoubt 2. The fourth entry, behind Redoubt 3, led into Church Street on the south portion of the line. The fifth gate ran between Nelson and Smith streets, behind Redoubt 4. It is not known what defensive measures were taken for these openings. If any works existed they may have been earthen or palisaded traverses, or possibly wooden gates. On the other hand, they may have had no particular protection, nearly all of them being covered by redoubts in front.

A simple log palisade joined the north end of this work with the river, crossing Lower Town at its western extremity. This palisade would have been an obstacle to any enemy patrols making their way down the beach.

55. Ibid., p. 10, states that it reached Smith Street, but Hayman, Map 29, indicates clearly that it stopped close to Nelson Street.


57. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, p. 384.
In front of the southern portion of this main line stood an extensive outwork consisting of two redoubts, Nos. 3 and 4; two batteries, Nos. 8 and 9; and their connecting parapets. Based on the evidence shown on the various maps, this network was built in a manner similar to the main defenses of eastern Yorktown: earthworks with a ditch in front, fraises on the berms, and possibly a palisade in the bottom of the ditch.

The two Anspach Battalions held this part of the main defenses, with the Brigade of Guards located between them and the Erbprinz Regiment on the right. Redoubt 3 had a double-V front and was somewhat larger than Redoubt 4. No mention was made of any artillery in these two. According to French Map 42, Battery 8 had four twelve-pounders and Battery 9 possessed six nine-pounders. Hayman, Map 29, reversed these numbers for the two batteries and did not give their sizes. Bauman, Map 4, listed one eighteen-pounder and four nine-pounders in Battery 9, and two eighteen-pounders and two twelve-pounders in Battery 8.

These four works looked down on Yorktown Creek and protected the town from any advances across the creek and up the several roads leading into Yorktown.

4. Main Defenses, Eastern Yorktown

Because of the open plain to the east and south of Yorktown, on which an enemy could mass and which was most suitable for constructing siege parallels, Lieutenant Sutherland designed larger defensive works here than on the west. These were solid earthworks erected according to the formula of the time. In front was an 8-foot-deep ditch having a scarp and counterscarp slope of about sixty degrees. The bottom of the ditch was about 7 feet wide; the top width measured about 16 feet. On the scarp side was a 5½-foot berm, which supported a fraise angling upward about forty-five degrees. (Note: In the earlier discussions of fraises it was mentioned that some engineers preferred a fraise that angled downward to prevent hand grenades from lodging on them and to make them less suitable for an assaulting force to stand on.)

The base of the parapet measured 29 feet and it was still 19 feet thick at the banquette. The breast-height wall measured 5½ feet—the recommended height at that time. Borresen wrote of this portion of the works: "The line of parapets erected from Smith Street to York River, on the left, was of cavalier construction; it had a ditch in front and one to the rear. This was done in order to gain height; and this type was usually constructed where mass assaults could be made."58

This section of the defenses contained four redoubts (Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8), four batteries (Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7), the impressive-looking hornwork, and a number of artillery pieces scattered along the parapet (including the hornwork, which some cartographers considered a full-fledged battery).

Battery 4, at the extreme left of the line and overlooking the river, was designed partly as a water battery, in case the French fleet should approach, and partly as a land battery, especially to support Redoubt 10 to the east. French Map 42 showed this battery as having seven nine-pounders. Hayman, Map 29, agreed as to the number of pieces. Bauman, Map 4, listed it as having two six-pounders and one 5½-inch howitzer.

Battery 5, located between Redoubts 7 and 8, could offer support to both the outlying redoubts, Nos. 9 and 10. For it Hayman showed six guns, which Map 42 said were twelve-pounders. Bauman listed its armament as being five nine-pounders.

Battery 6 stood immediately to the right of Redoubt 6. Its line of fire was aimed toward the French sections of the First and Second Parallels. The French map showed its armament as consisting of four "21-" (24?) pounders. Bauman said it had two twelve-pounders and two eight-inch howitzers.

Battery 7, located approximately on Bacon Street, faced Yorktown Creek, as did its neighbors Batteries 8 and 9. Hayman and French Map 42 agreed that it had ten cannon, the French saying they were eight-pounders. Bauman, always differing, listed the guns as being two eighteen-pounders and two twelve-pounders.

Redoubt 5, to the right of the hornwork, had some artillery mounted on it according to La Combe (Map 48). The same was true for Redoubt 6, the largest of the redoubts in the eastern defenses. Redoubt 7 was located directly behind the outpost, Redoubt 9. The left flank of the British defenses was anchored by Redoubt 8, close by Battery 4.

In contrast to the simple palisade at the western end of Lower Town, earthworks extended across the beach at the east end. La Combe, Map 48, showed some artillery pieces here also. Beyond this parapet, a palisade closed off the beach and the mouth of a large ravine. Still farther east an abatis offered additional security. Two gates existed in the eastern portion of the defense line: one was located to the west of Battery 7, and the other stood to the right of Redoubt 7.

Although Sutherland did not employ palisades generally in the eastern half of the defenses, one or two historical maps suggest that part of Redoubt 7 and much of the parapet between Battery 5 and Redoubt 8 were palisaded on the interior. Whether these areas were repaired during
the bombardment, whether the soil was unusually sandy, or whether some other factor made palisades necessary in these places is not known. It is believed that fraisés were to be found along the berms of all the earthworks on the left half of the defenses, and that the entire exterior ditch had a palisade in its bottom as an obstacle to attackers.

5. Hornwork

In the earlier discussion on types of fortifications, it was noted that some military engineers preferred independent redoubts rather than hornworks on advanced ground in front of the main line. Nonetheless, the British at Yorktown constructed an extensive hornwork. It covered a slight ridge on which the road from Hampton entered Yorktown at its south corner. Like the other works, it carefully followed the dictates set down by the manuals. Its right wing measured about 500 feet and the left wing extended out 350 feet—both within the recommended maximum distances for flanking musket fire from the main line. Its interior had earthen traverses and other works for the protection of artillery and personnel. Guns were mounted in both horns and along the left wing. The hornwork was the only part of the eastern portion of the main line to have an abatis surrounding it.

6. Water Batteries

Along the bluffs facing York River, British seamen erected and manned three water batteries as protection against the blockading French fleet. These were numbered Batteries 1, 2, and 3. Battery 1, the largest of the three, encompassed old Fort Hill; the complete work extended from the right flank of the main line, across three town blocks, to Read Street. Some of the historical maps suggest that only the eastern portion of this battery actually had guns mounted. Nevertheless, its armament was impressive. Both Hayman, Map 29, and the French map, No. 42, stated that it had twenty-six iron twelve-pounders. Other sources noted that these cannon came from the warships in York River. Bauman, Map 4, listed five eighteen-pounders, one nine-pounder, and two six-pounders, a total of eight. Battery 2 stood on a bluff beyond the north end of Bacon Street. Hayman and the French map described its armament as being twelve iron twelve-pounders. Bauman showed nine eighteen- and nine-pounders. On the next point to the east, Battery 3 possessed the least armament of these water batteries. Hayman said that it had four iron twelve-pounders; Bauman settled for three eighteen-pounders.

Around the entire perimeter of defense, short traverses extended from the parapets in toward the town. These were simply earthen mounds that separated gun emplacements or bodies of troops. If an enemy shell exploded on one gun, the traverse would prevent the explosion from affecting neighboring positions. It was not uncommon to place a powder magazine under a traverse, the thick earth offering proof against bombs. Whether Sutherland did so at Yorktown is unknown.
7. Interior Works

The British constructed several additional works within the main defenses. The largest of these was a communications trench that ran from Redoubt 8 toward Redoubt 6 and beyond to the ravines that led to Lower Town. The earth removed from this trench formed a parallel parapet for additional protection. Another trench and parapet were located behind Redoubt 5. This work reached from the large ravine behind Cornwallis's headquarters (in Secretary Thomas Nelson's house) southward into the hornwork. Still another earthwork, south of Battery 3, offered protection to the 33d Regiment stationed in this area as a reserve.

8. Magazines

Small service magazines would have been placed at or near all the batteries and other gun emplacements within the British works. None of the historical maps indicate the locations of these magazines. In addition, the ordnance department would have had need for larger, strategically-placed magazines for bulk storage of powder. An obvious location for a bombproof magazine would have been a cave cut into the foot of the bluff in Lower Town. Such a cave did exist, the so-called Cornwallis's Cave (to be discussed later), but there is no evidence that it served as a powder magazine during the siege. There are two suggestions that the magazines were located on the slope of the bluffs or in the ravines that led to Lower Town. Rochambeau, in his account of the siege, mentioned that his artillery fired on the British magazines "on the slope of the hill, by the river." Sutherland's own map of Yorktown, which is not as detailed as one might expect from an engineer, showed two magazines, marked "D." One of these was located behind Battery 2; the other stood either on the bluff to the east of the Great Valley or in the ravine of the Great Valley itself.

Following the siege, the inhabitants of Yorktown filed claims for damages caused by the British troops and by the siege itself. A claim filed for Grace Church stated: "The pews & windows of the Church all broke and destroyed & the Church used; as a magazine the damages valued to . . . £150." While the walls of the church were composed of marl and were sturdy in design, the various door and window openings and the ordinary roof made the structure a dubious place for storing powder. If the British did so, their straits were desperate indeed. Most likely the term "magazine" here meant simply a storeroom.59

9. Hospital(s)

The number of sick and wounded at Yorktown during the siege made up a long list. Hospital facilities would have been essential. From time to time the British transported some of their casualties across the river to Gloucester Point and early in the siege some casualties were hospitalized on board the Charon. But none of the sources disclose what arrangements were made to take care of the ill at Yorktown itself. After the siege, the French troops who occupied the town turned the county courthouse into a hospital. Whether the British previously did the same remains unknown.60

10. Cemeteries

The evidence concerning the British cemeteries at Yorktown is somewhat contradictory. Borresen, without citing a source, stated that the English cemetery was located on the high ground between Windmill Point and Redoubt 1, outside the main line. Dennis, in his orderly book, recorded on September 27, 1781, before the enemy investment, that the burying ground was on "the hill by the Chimneys in front of No. 4." Unfortunately, he did not specify whether this was Redoubt 4 or Battery 4, or exactly what numbering system he was following. Later, on October 1, Dennis recorded the following: "The Burial Ground for the Right Wing is within the Stockade close to the water side, the same on Ye Left Wing." It seems probable that these two areas, at either end of Lower Town, did become the burial grounds during the siege. Recently archeologists have discovered skeletons, washed out by waves, on the beach at the approximate location where the British left flank reached the river.61

11. Redoubts 9 and 1062

About 1,000 feet east of the main defense line, the British manned two outpost redoubts, Nos. 9 and 10. Number 10 (later called Rock Redoubt by the Americans) was located on the bluff overlooking York River; No. 9 stood almost 1,000 feet south of it. Both were surrounded with ditches, fraises, and abatis. Apparently, too, palisades stood in the ditches. No earthworks connected them to each other or to the main lines. An American officer, the only person to state that a narrow ditch joined these redoubts to the main British line, described them:


62. These two outpost redoubts are being discussed in Jerome A. Greene's concurrent study on the Allied fortifications and siege lines. They are mentioned herein because past studies of them shed light on the general appearance of the British works.
"These forts or redoubts were well secured by a ditch and picket, sufficiently high parapet, and within were divisions made by rows of casks ranged upon end and filled with earth and sand."63 A French source stated that Redoubt 10, the smaller of the two, had three gun embrasures for firing on enemy ships in York River. This otherwise unmentioned feature quite possibly did exist; it would have justified the location of the redoubt at the edge of the cliff.64

On October 14, 1781, American and French troops assaulted and carried these two redoubts, promptly incorporating them into the Allied Second Parallel. At the time of the attack, Maj. James Campbell, 71st Regiment, and 45 men defended Redoubt 10; 120 British and Hessian troops under Lt. Col. Duncan McPherson, 71st Regiment, occupied Redoubt 9. For the attack on No. 9, French troops carried fascines for filling the ditch and ladders for scaling the parapet. They found the abatis around the redoubt stoutly constructed: "We lost not a moment in reaching the abatis, which being strong and well-preserved, at about twenty-five paces from the redoubt, cost us many men, and stopped us for some minutes, but was cleared away . . . we threw ourselves into the ditch at once, and each sought to break through the fraises, and to mount the parapet."65

The Americans found only a single dismounted cannon in Redoubt 10, but the French obtained ownership of two bronze guns in Redoubt 9, which Washington later presented to them in recognition of their valor.66

Thor Borresen, in studying the appearance of Redoubt 9, made the following observations: "The gun banquets . . . were constructed according to the instructions in William [John?] Muller, and the embrasures

63. [Ebenezer Denny,] Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny (Philadelphia, 1859), p. 42; This use of casks was confirmed by Deux-Ponts, Campaigns in America, p. 146; Palisades in the ditches were noted by Rochambeau's chief of staff: [M. de Ménonville], "Journal of the Siege of York," Magazine of American History 7 (1881): 287, "the . . . pioneers . . . were obliged to cut . . . some of the palisades in order to open the frieze of the redoubt."


66. "Diary of French Naval Operations," pp. 196-97; Borresen said these were howitzers (see fn. 67).
according to Lochee." While Washington reported the British force in this redoubt to be 120, Borresen estimated that the structure could hold 200 men:

The total perimeter of Redoubt No. 9 is 103 yards; deducting five yards for each of the [two] howitzers will leave us 93 yards to be manned by the infantry. At 2 men to each yard, there would be room for 186 men. To this number must be added the crew for each of the howitzers, which consisted, usually, of 6 men each . . . a total of 198 that could be comfortably located within the redoubt.67

After the Allies captured the redoubts, they converted them for their own purposes. The major changes involved closing the British openings and cutting new entrances on the Allied reverse sides. These redoubts have been reconstructed by the National Park Service to their general appearance after they came into Allied hands. (Part of the No. 10 site was lost because of cliff erosion.)

12. Cornwallis's Cave

Soon after the American Revolution, a legend took form that Lord Cornwallis had sought safety from Allied shot and shell by taking refuge in a cave. From time to time students of the Siege of 1781 cast doubts on this story, but to no avail. The legend persists today and it is not threatened with extinction in the foreseeable future. But even legends grow from seeds and in this instance the germination of the story may be traced: the British did construct personnel bombproofs, and a "mysterious" cave does exist at Yorktown.

The origins of this cave, located at Lower Town in the foot of the marl bluff east of the Great Valley, appear to have been anything but mysterious. Yorktown's historian, Charles E. Hatch, Jr., concludes that the cave was originally a natural cavity in the marl wall. During the colonial period, when Lower Town was a bustling seaport, persons enlarged the cave to make it a good, safe storage place. When the British came to town the cave was a fact.

Lord Cornwallis first established his headquarters in Secretary Thomas Nelson's handsome house. This prominent structure quickly became a favorite target for Allied gunners and soon the British staff found it untenable. Neither Cornwallis nor his officers made any reference to their new accommodations in their accounts of the siege. Not until the Allies entered the town did any mention appear as to how the headquarters managed to function during the ceaseless bombardment. An American colonel,

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St. George Tucker, wrote in his journal of the siege that "Lord Cornwallis had built a kind of Grotto at the foot of the Secretary's Garden where he lives underground." Secretary Nelson's residence stood near the head of a large ravine that later became known as Tobacco Road. Considering Tucker's remarks, a logical conclusion to be drawn is that the general established himself in a dugout bombproof within the ravine and near its head. ("Cornwallis's Cave" is two ravines farther to the west and the Secretary's garden would hardly have extended that far.)

Daniel Trabue had been in the American Army, but at Yorktown he was a sutler selling liquor to the troops. After the British capitulation, Trabue managed to get a tour of the town: "The British had a number of holes and Pits Dug all over the Fort, some large and some small with timber at the top edge; when the soldiers would see a shell coming near them they could jump in one of the pits..." And again: "They had some large holes under ground where Lord Cornwallis and some of the nobles staid. They called them bomb-proof, but with all their caution a vast number of them were killed."

Trabue's phrase "some large holes" probably accurately reflects the actual appearance of these shelters. Cornwallis held many councils of war during the siege. The bombproofs would have been large enough to contain his captains, staff officers, aides, clerks, messengers, and possibly even some sleeping accommodations. Veterans of the Korean War of modern times will readily visualize the number of bunkers required for the staff of a brigade—a unit approximately the size of Cornwallis's army. While a modern military staff is much more complex than that of Cornwallis's time, a comparison is still valid, especially if one attempts to visualize the small cave at Yorktown serving as the British headquarters.

Still another suggestion of personnel bombproofs being employed is from a French diarist writing after the siege: "The ground between their defense lines and the town is full of ravines, ditches, large holes, and other emplacements quite favorable to sheltering themselves from the effect of the mortar shells. Some casemates had been erected which fulfilled this object rather well."


Some writers over the years have been aghast at the idea of Lord Cornwallis seeking any kind of shelter from bursting bombs. The editor of Putnam's Magazine in 1854 wrote that the concept of Cornwallis's seeking refuge in a cave "is improbable, as no military man of reputation could behave in this way." But dead generals cannot lead troops and exhausted leaders are not effective. Even the earl must have needed a few hours of rest occasionally throughout the siege. It is not improbable that Cornwallis, his officers, and the army itself had bombproofs in which to retire.71

The earliest reference linking Cornwallis's name to this particular cave seems to be Benjamin Latrobe's account of his visit to Yorktown about 1796. He himself did not believe that the general lived in it, but the legend was already established:

I was at York with my friend Mr. Bushrod Washington. We went to see the cave commonly called Lord Cornwallis's cave. It is an apartment dug into the friable shell rock of the cliff, consisting of a room sixteen feet square and an adjoining chamber of ten feet square. Lord Cornwallis never inhabited it.

Another visitor about that time, Isaac Weld, agreed that Cornwallis did not use the cave himself and suggested that it had another occupant: "A cave is shown here in the banks, described by the people as having been the place of head-quarters during the siege, after the cannonade of the enemy became warm; but in reality it was formed and hung with green baise for a lady, either the wife or acquaintance of an officer."72 Several British officers had their wives with them at Yorktown. While it is not documented, others may well have had mistresses. Then too, there were Loyalist refugees in the train. Weld's concept of ladies taking refuge in the cave is more plausible than the Cornwallis's Cave legend.

Although the Cornwallis legend remained healthy throughout the 19th century, it did not escape challenges. In 1845 a book appeared on the market that echoed Colonel Tucker's observations in 1781:

Cornwallis's head-quarters were originally in a splendid brick house, belonging to Secretary Nelson . . . the ruins of which are now visible


in the large and continuous redoubt constructed by the British at the E. end of the town [probably the postsiege French works]. . . . Fifty or sixty yards from this dwelling, on the hill side at the lower end of the redoubt [in the Tobacco Road ravine?], he had a cave excavated in the earth. It was hung with green baize, and used solely for holding councils of war. There is a cave in the solid mass of stone marl which forms the river bank, improperly called Cornwallis's cave. This was used for a sutlery; it is now a piggery.73

During the Civil War the cave became a powder magazine: "A timber and earth embankment was erected to protect its entrance and a passage-like structure connected it to the [nearby water] battery. This explains the rather large square holes now in the exterior face of the cliff. They were to take the heavy timbers that supported the protective entrance structure. One of the famed Mathew Brady photographs made in 1862 shows two Union soldiers on guard at the entrance to the cave complex."74

There is no firm historical evidence that indicates the function of this cave during the siege. But this study concludes that it did not serve as Cornwallis's shelter. After evaluating all the foregoing data, the writer concludes that the British general had a large bombproof, or several bombproofs, in the side(s) of the Tobacco Road ravine. There he held his councils of war and there he rested. Perhaps historical archeology will one day finally resolve the questions.


VII. AT THE BRITISH LINES, SEPTEMBER 28-OCTOBER 16, 1781

In the days before the Allied armies marched from Williamsburg on September 28, Cornwallis maintained cavalry patrols and infantry pickets in the countryside between that place and Yorktown and at Gloucester Point. At Yorktown he moved his troops outside the main defenses and established a line running east and west from the head ravines of Wormley Creek, across the "isthmus," and on to Pigeon Quarter, just south of the headwaters of Yorktown Creek. In addition to the several infantry regiments encamped in depth, Cornwallis placed some light pieces of field artillery, ranging from three- to twelve-pounders, along this line. Toward the right flank, on either side of Goosley Road (another route to Williamsburg), he had two outpost redoubts constructed at Pigeon Quarter. Farther to the northwest a third redoubt overlooked the south bank of Yorktown Creek. An earthwork battery was thrown up on the east side of the road to Hampton, and farther south Tarleton's cavalry established its camp from which it made its patrols.1

A. September 28-29

At noon on September 28 the advanced elements of the French forces approached Yorktown on the Williamsburg road. A British working party was in this area and beyond it Light Infantry pickets guarded the laborers from surprise. This picket was the first to give word of the Allied advance. Rochambeau moved a few pieces of field artillery forward, and after a few shots the pickets retired. Colonel Abercrombie ordered all his Light Infantry pickets to pull in toward his main force. At this same time the French felt out the strength of the Fusiliers' Redoubt on the British right flank. At 4:00 P.M. Tarleton's own sentinels, farther to the British left, informed him that Allied forces were approaching the left flank of his cavalry--near the junction of the Hampton and Warwick roads. Tarleton recorded his action: "The cavalry were immediately mounted, and formed into three squadrons in front of the British center. In this situation they watched for an opportunity of striking at any

1. Pigeon Quarter, Pigeon Hill, and Penny's Hill: These names applied to the general area on the Goosley Road just west of its junction with the Hampton Road. "Quarter" referred to acreage of plantations. Pigeon and Penny probably referred to past owners of the farms. This temporary British line is treated lightly herein. Historian Jerome A. Greene is concurrently preparing a study that discusses this area in depth.
detachment who might pass the Hampton road: But the enemy were cautious, and cannonaded the legion dragoons across the morass, who retired to Moore's house, within the outward position."  

General Washington recorded his version of these light actions in his diary: "About Noon the head of each column arrived at its ground and some of the enemy's Picquets were driven in on the [Allied] left by a Corps of French Troops [from the Deux-Ponts Regiment], advanced for the purpose, which afforded an opportunity of reconnoitering them on their [British] Right, The enemy's Horse on the [Allied] right were also obliged to retire from the ground they had Encamped on, and from whence they were employed in reconnoitering the [Allied] right column."  

Colonel Tucker of the American forces claimed that it was American field artillery that drove off Tarleton's corps:

The continental's having march'd to Secretary Nelson's quarter [farm] on the Mulberry Island road, discovered Tarleton's Legion posted at their ordinary Quarters about a mile below York at the forks of the Hampton & Warwick roads (at one Hudson Allens I think). At the appearance of our Troops Tarleton paraded his horse & came down within three hundred yards of a meadow which lay between his & our reconnoitering party--4 field pieces were brot. down to the Brow of the Hill to drive him off, & cover some pioneers who were sent to repair Mumford's Bridge where the Army were to cross--the second shot produced the desired Effect.  

Because of the broken Mumford bridge, the American troops did not reach their designated positions on September 28. The following morning, the bridge having been repaired, they continued their advance northeastward to the south side of Wormley Creek. The Allies now considered their investiture of Yorktown complete. According to Tarleton, little action occurred during this movement: "A few cannon shot were fired from the British work on the Hampton road, and some [enemy] riflemen skirmished with the pickets of the Anspach battalions on the left." Tucker confirmed this light action: "This morning ... the Enemy fired a few shot from their advanced Redoubts. ... About nine or ten the Riflemen & Yagers exchanged a few shot across Moores Mill pond [on Wormley  

2. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, p. 383; Scheer and Rankin, Rebels and Redcoats, p. 552, quoting Capt. Samuel Graham, 76th Regiment of Foot.  


Creek] at the Dam of which the British had a redoubt." The Allies spent
the remainder of the day throwing up small redans for the security of
their forces and reconnoitering the British positions. Lieutenant
Crèvecœur wrote: "We spent the 29th reconnoitering the English works.
We had 3 men killed and 3 wounded." On this day, too, the Erbprinz
Regiment crossed the river from Gloucester to Yorktown.5

On the evening of the twenty-ninth, a British vessel slipped through
the French blockade and reached Yorktown. It had left New York only five
days earlier. On board was a dispatch from General Clinton informing
Cornwallis that the British fleet, with 5,000 troops, expected to leave
New York for the relief of Yorktown on October 5. Cornwallis made a
hasty, perhaps too hasty, decision to abandon his outposts: "I have this
evening received your letter of the 24th, which has given me the greatest
satisfaction. I shall retire this night within the works, and have no
doubt, if relief arrives in any reasonable time, York and Gloucester will
be both in possession of his Majesty's troops."6

After his surrender, Cornwallis again referred to this decision to
abandon the outer line. This time he added a second reason for his
action: "Upon observing that the enemy were taking measures which could
not fail of turning my left flank in a short time . . . ." Here he was
referring to the American advance toward the dam on Wormley Creek. If
the Americans succeeded in forcing a crossing at the dam, Cornwallis
feared that they would move north toward York River and then swing to the
west and attack his outer line from the rear—while the French Army ap-
plied pressure on the front. Although Cornwallis did not write this until
three weeks after the event, it is possible that it was a factor in his
mind on the twenty-ninth.7

B. September 30-October 5

1. At Yorktown

When the Allies discovered, on the morning of September 30, that the
British had abandoned their outworks, they reacted with varying degrees
of puzzlement and pleasure. The Chevalier d'Ancteville wrote: "Whether
the enemy feared to occupy such a great front . . . or that they had need
to perfect and join together their inner works, which seems likely, they
abandoned the redoubts of the center and the batteries of the left."8

5. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, pp. 383-84; Tucker, "Journal," pp. 6-7; Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:57.

6. Cornwallis to Clinton, Sept. 29, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L.
Clements Library.


Washington wrote that some of his staff thought that Cornwallis planned to evacuate Yorktown and cross to Gloucester. Washington himself considered this highly improbable. Nonetheless, he advised General Weedon on the Gloucester side to watch the British "on every point." Colonel Deux-Ponts said: "The places evacuated allowed us to see . . . all the land which surrounds the town. . . . It is clear that the approaches are as easy as possible." Colonel Tarleton, whose cavalry would cross to Gloucester this day, was disgusted with the abandonment of the outer line. Years later he would insist that giving it up without an inch-by-inch fight was a serious mistake on Cornwallis's part. 9

Rochambeau's aide, Count de Fersen, did not blame Cornwallis, "for he had express orders from General Clinton to shut himself up in the body of the place"; still, Fersen considered the withdrawal "a fault" on Cornwallis's part. General Edward Hand, American Army, wrote of the advantages gained by the Allies: "A movement which will save us much time and trouble, as it at once gives us ground which is so advantageous as that the Enemy possesses, and greatly shortens our approaches." General Wayne held a low opinion of the British withdrawal: "This was not only unmilitary but an Indication of Confused precipitation." 10

The French occupied the abandoned British works on the morning of September 30 and promptly began converting them to their own use. The American troops took over the battery site east of the Hampton road and converted it to a redoubt. British artillery harassed the enemy with "well-sustained" fire but did not succeed in interrupting their labor. A French engineer described the work:

The battery of the Hampton road was closed at the gorge, and an intermediate redoubt was begun between that and the one on Pigeon Hill, near the beginning of one of the gaps of the great ravine on the right of the enemy [Yorktown Creek]. The work . . . was finished in the night of the 3rd to 4th. This line of new batteries next those


abandoned by the enemy, formed a countervallation, the two extremities of which rested on the ravines.11

Also on September 30, French troops attacked the Fusiliers' Redoubt on the British right flank. According to Allied sources this was only a light action that succeeded in driving in the British pickets. The British, on the other hand, considered the French attack to have been rashly conducted without any preparatory artillery fire, as if the French had expected to take this redoubt as easily as they had occupied those in Pigeon Quarter. Artillery fire drove back the French and inflicted great casualties on them--or so the British thought. Hessian soldier Popp recorded that 440 French had been killed in fifteen minutes! A British intelligence agent said that the French left 189 dead on the field. In fact--French casualties were light. Virginia's Governor Nelson, who commanded the American militia, wrote that the French lost two men and six wounded that day. HMS Guadaloupe, anchored near the mouth of Yorktown Creek, added its fire to the land batteries in fending off this attack.12

Patrolling and picket duty were daily (and nightly) occurrences on both sides throughout the siege. On the night of the thirtieth, for example, Lt. John Bell Tilden of the Second Pennsylvania Line patrolled so close to the British positions that he "heard a confused noise of tearing down buildings, for to make fortifications." Tilden was correct. For the next week, until the Allies succeeded in dragging their heavy artillery across the peninsula to Yorktown, the British worked diligently to improve their works. On October 1 an American patrol carelessly got so close to the British lines that mounted troops succeeded in fatally wounding and capturing the patrol's leader, Col. Alexander Scammell of the New Hampshire Regiment. Hessian private Döhla described the hazards of picket duty: "At night [Oct. 5] I went on duty at a detached picket. . . . It was dangerous . . . one had either to sit or lie the two hours one stood post. . . . Throughout the night the location of the post is altered in order that the enemy might observe less."13

11. "Diary of a French Officer, 1781," Magazine of American History 4 (1880): 450; Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:57; Captain Ewald wrote that the British "burned" these redoubts before evacuating them. There would have been little material to burn, and such an action would have had no effect on their utility. Ewald, "Diary," entry for Sept. 30, 1781.


October 1 was marked by brisk artillery fire from the British guns. However, even the British observed that this fire had little effect on the enemy: "The enemy constantly throwing up works, and all our batteries cannonading their working parties, which in great measure impeded their operations, though they were, from their great numbers, carried on with astonishing briskness." A Pennsylvania captain spent the day counting the rate of fire: "A warm fire continued all this day, about 40 Guns to the hour, on an average & 10 by night to the hour 2 men only kill'd one of them in ye works." 14

General Washington wrote Admiral de Grasse on October 1 futilely begging the admiral to send some ships up the York River above Yorktown. He pointed out that Cornwallis had control of the upper river and might attempt to flee by moving up the river to West Point, then marching overland. Washington also noted that his communications with the Allied force on the Gloucester side of the river was now a roundabout land route of ninety miles. With French naval control of the upper river, the distance would be greatly shortened. De Grasse would not risk passing his ships through the Yorktown-Gloucester narrows. 15

British artillery increased the volume of its fire greatly on October 2. Nearly every diarist commented on its intensity that day. Captain John Pryor, Virginia, describes the atmosphere:

We are making our approaches, tho' under an infernal Hot Cannonaid--upwards of 2000 Balls have been fir'd at us to day. . . .

In a day or two our first parallel will be form'd, by which time, I hope our heavy Cannon will be ready to play on them--as yet we have not return'd a single shot.

* * * * *

About 10 kill'd and wounded make the whole of our loss as yet. The Enemy have pull'd down almost every Wooden House in Town & I suppose we shall knock down every Brick one.


One particular round either that day or the next hit an American patrol, killing or wounding the four or five men in it. The Americans were certain that a deserter had informed the British of the patrol's location.\textsuperscript{16}

2. At Gloucester Point

The signs of battle were becoming clear on the Gloucester side of the river by October 1. For two months the British had been foraging through the countryside. Simcoe's cavalry and the German riflemen had had full control of the area. Nearly always keeping out of reach, Gen. George Weedon commanded the Virginia militia, an ill-trained group that had no wish to take on the British. In September the Duke de Lauzun and his French cavalry had joined Weedon, but no forceful action resulted. Lauzun wrote later that he had found Weedon, his superior officer, fifteen miles away from the British and "frightened to death." Lauzun complained to Rochambeau, with the result that General de Choisi took command of all the Allied forces before Gloucester on October 1.

Choisi was a man of action. Lauzun described him in mixed terms, saying that he was "an excellent and worthy man, absurdly violent in temper, constantly in a rage, quarrelling with everybody, and without common sense. He began by ridding himself of General Wiedon [sic] and the entire militia, telling them they were all cowards, and in five minutes they were almost as much afraid of him as of the English, which is certainly a great deal to say." Choisi organized his forces, including the militia, and marched to Gloucester Court House, about twenty miles north of Gloucester Point. His patrols soon made contact with the British outposts, "whereupon a continual crackling noise arose."\textsuperscript{17}

October 3 witnessed the only sharp firefight that was to occur during the siege on the Gloucester side of the river. Choisi, with Lauzun's Legion in the advance, marched south from Seawell's Ordinary and clashed with Tarleton's Legion a little more than a mile from the inn. A British foraging party had gone out that morning, guarded by both infantry and cavalry. The wagons, loaded with Indian corn, were returning to Gloucester Point when the cavalry, then forming the rear guard, spotted some horsemen. It quickly became evident that Lauzun's cavalry was in pursuit. A part of Tarleton's men, a detachment of Simcoe's dragoons, and infantrymen of the 17th Foot faced about in a woods to stand off the enemy.

\textsuperscript{16} Pryor to Col. W. Davies, Oct. 12, 1781, in William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts, 11 vols. (Richmond, 1875-1893), 2:518; Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:57; Davis, "Journal," p. 303. More conservative estimates of the number of British shot and shell that day were 300-500.

\textsuperscript{17} Rochambeau, "Relation," p. 4; Stevens, "The Allies at Yorktown," p. 52, quoting Lauzun; Ewald, "Diary," entry for Oct. 1, 1781.
Tarleton, with a small force, rode forward to reconnoiter the enemy's strength. A horse was wounded and it plunged, striking Tarleton's mount and throwing the colonel to the ground. Seeing their leader lying closer to the enemy than to themselves, the remaining British cavalry "set out in full speed... and arrived in such disorder, that its charge was unable to make impression upon the Duke of Lauzun's hussars, who at this period were formed upon the plain."

Tarleton, though wounded himself, acquired another mount and ordered a retreat. He placed a group of infantry in a thicket; their fire was sufficient to discourage the French from advancing further. Two or three countercharges were then made by both sides, but all were ineffectual. The British withdrew to Gloucester Point. On the following day Choisi's command advanced to within about two miles of the British lines and "proceeded to cut off all communication between the country and Gloucester." Tarleton reported one officer killed and eleven enlisted men killed or wounded during the fray. Lauzun claimed that the British had fifty casualties. Rochambeau stated that Choisi had three men killed and eleven wounded. Washington added two officers wounded to the French total.

The incident was neither a clear-cut victory nor a smashing defeat for either side. But it was to be the only serious fighting on the north side of York River. From then to the end of the siege Lauzun held the British within their forts. News of the encounter spread quickly throughout all the Allied camps. When the soldiers learned that Tarleton had been knocked off his horse, they considered this to be just as important as an overwhelming victory. Allied morale lifted to a new height.18

3. On York River

Both the British and the enemy made note of Capt. Thomas Symonds's small naval force on York River on October 5. Symonds himself said that he had posted guard boats below Yorktown whose mission was to give the alert if the blockading French ships should move upriver. He also said that he had again prepared three fire ships should the enemy fleet approach. A captured British boat captain informed Washington's headquarters:

Ten or twelve large merchant ships have been sunk before York, and piles have been driven in front of these vessels, to prevent our ships from approaching the Town sufficiently to debark Troops... 

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The Charon and Guadeloupe are moored before York, in such a manner as to defend the Town rather than the passage of the River—Twelve large barks in form of half galleys containing some 110 men each, have been collected.

He said also that Cornwallis did not have enough boats in his possession to cross his troops to Gloucester in one night should the general decide to evacuate Yorktown.

The two frigates Charon and Guadaloupe had been annoying the enemy since they had come on line, particularly the French in front of the Fusiliers’ Redoubt. On October 4, this French unit began preparations for the construction of a battery that could fire on the frigates as well as at Yorktown.19

C. October 6-10

1. First Parallel

By October 6 the Allies were ready to begin construction of their First Parallel. The soldiers had prepared the materials for the parapets, redoubts, and batteries. The engineers had completed their survey of the ground and had determined the trace of the parallel. After a week of strenuous effort the heavy siege guns had been dragged from the landing on James River, and the generals had issued orders setting forth instructions in infinite detail for the work at hand.

On the British right, about 500 yards beyond the Fusiliers' Redoubt, the Touraine Regiment prepared to construct a battery and a short parallel running southward from York River, across the river road, to a steep ravine carved by a tributary of Yorktown Creek. A French engineer said that this parallel had a double duty: "to disturb the advanced redoubt of the right wing of the besieged and to keep away the War Ships which might have taken them [the French] from the rear. . . ." The creek itself was ignored; the maze of ravines and marshes prohibited the Allies from making a major attack across it. The main segment of the parallel would stretch from the head of Yorktown Creek in a broad arc, across the open ground south and east of Yorktown, to York River below the town. Here about 2,000 yards of trenching were required, the French troops being assigned to its western portion and the Americans to the eastern. Following the military manuals carefully, the engineers fixed a line for the

parallel approximately 600 yards from the British works. Because of the
two outposts, Redoubts 9 and 10, the right end of the parallel lay about
900 yards distant from the main British works.

Although Cornwallis knew that the enemy would sooner or later con-
struct a first parallel, he remained unaware on the night of October 6-7
that 1,500 men were entrenching one third of a mile away. The night was
perfect for the Allies. A gentle rain fell and the cloud-filled sky
covered the earth with utter darkness. Further helping the main Allied
effort to the south and east was the British discovery that the Touraine
Regiment was digging west of the Fusiliers' Redoubt.

A French deserter came into Yorktown bearing the intelligence that the
Touraines were moving forward with entrenching tools. Immediately British
artillery opened up on this sector. Thus, by concentrating their attention
on this small segment of the enemy lines and by creating noise with their
own guns, the British remained ignorant of the enemy's main effort. Lieu-
tenant Verger of the Deux-Ponts Regiment described the Touraines' adven-
ture:

On our left, a trench had been opened at the head
of the river, defended by a battalion of the
Touraine Regiment and its grenadiers and chasseurs,
whose battery was manned to clear that part of the
river of enemy ships. The enemy discovered this
approach very early and paid it a good deal of at-
tention, though they did not know about our grand
approach and did not fire on it, contenting them-

selves, as in previous nights, with firing on their
abandoned redoubts . . . behind our [new] works.20

When dawn arrived on October 7, Lord Cornwallis saw an uninterrupted
enemy parapet stretching across the Yorktown plain. This earthwork was
already sufficiently high to allow the enemy to work in safety behind it
as they perfected it. General Washington wrote proudly in his diary:

Before Morning the Trenches were in such for-
wardness as to cover the Men from the enemy's fire.
The work was executed with so much secrecy and dis-
patch that the enemy were, I believe, totally ignorant

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20. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:139;
Johnston, Yorktown Campaign, p. 131, states that the Touraines made a
"false" attack on the Fusiliers' Redoubt to distract British attention
deliberately; Butler, "Journal," p. 108, and General Washington recorded
that a deserter betrayed the Touraines; La Combe, "Journal," p. 3, said
that the strength and reputation of the British garrison induced the
Allies to locate the First Parallel "at the usual distance"; See also

100
of our labor till the light of the Morning discovered it to them. Our loss on this occasion was extremely inconsiderable, not more than one Officer (french) and about 20 Men killed and wounded; the Officer and 15 of which were on our left . . . [and were] betrayed by a deserter . . . that went in and gave notice.21

Contrary to the enemy's expectations, Cornwallis did not direct an intensive bombardment of the new parallel on October 7. The scarce documentation of Cornwallis's decision does not disclose his reasons for this inactivity. It is possible that he decided to hoard his ammunition for later, thus hoping to hold out longer, until the relief from New York could arrive. An Anspach diarist did not know the reason why: "The cannonade from our lines was not as heavy today as yesterday. The [enemy] erected redoubts and communication trenches before our lines." Nor did Colonel Butler from Pennsylvania: "The enemy seem embarrassed, confused, and indeterminate; their fire seems feeble to what might be expected, their works, too, are not formed on any regular plan, but thrown up in a hurry occasionally, and although we have not as yet fired one shot from a piece of artillery, they are as cautious as if the heaviest fire was kept up."22

The British still had a breathing spell before the Allies could complete their batteries and mount their siege artillery. (It would prove to be less than seventy-two hours.) Lieutenant James, Royal Navy, said that they used this time in "throwing up traverses to defend the works." Private Döhla described his duties on October 7: "Early this morning I was in the trenches and this evening with the reserve, which was . . . 100 men . . . with 1 captain and 1 lieutenant. The former was posted with 60 men on the rampart of our line, in order--if an alarm should sound--to be all ready . . . the latter went with 40 men into our attached redoubt [No. 3 or No. 4?] with a view to supporting our advanced pickets in case of enemy attack."23

The Allies too had pickets in front of the parallel that day. Döhla wrote: "The rifle men, or American Jäger, crawl around so close that the balls from the long rifles they carry fly over our lines, but do no harm." Captain Thaddeus Weed, 2d Connecticut Line, led a patrol toward the British works. He ran into a British picket that, he said, was 200 strong and had two fieldpieces. Weed came home in such a hurry that he almost dove into a French position rather than his own. But the British did not pursue him.


22. "Wertgetreue Abschrift eines Tagebuchs," Oct. 7, 1781; Butler, "Journal," p. 108; Johnston, Yorktown Campaign, pp. 135-36. "The truth was," wrote Johnston, "Cornwallis, little dreaming that he should be compelled to stand a siege, was unprepared for it."

Had they done so, Ensign Mathew Gregory wrote: "Our orders were . . . to give them our fire, then charge [with] Bayonets and meet them." 24

Colonel Tucker, Virginia, made some observations at this time on the British artillery that are of passing interest: "The Enemy have for some days had recourse to an Expedient for interrupting our men at work without wasting their Ammunition, by flashing a small Quantity of powder near the muzzles of their Cannons, which is frequently mistaken for the fusing at the Touch-hole." This flash would, of course, cause the Allied troops to stop their work and take cover. Tucker also said that during the night of October 6-7, the British fired a rocket. This was the only mention of rockets being used at Yorktown. However, after the siege the Allies reported capturing thirty-six signal rockets from the British. 25

A British soldier deserted during the night of October 7-8 and informed the enemy of the location of the pickets on the left flank. Later in the night the enemy attacked "and drove them into the woods; sometime after which a few of them [enemy] came to the ditch of the hornwork and persuaded the officers they were deserters, who having got on the works to show them the way in, was fired at and two of the officers of the 43rd killed." 26

2. Enemy Artillery

British artillery kept up a heavy fire during the night of October 8-9, but as usual the cannonade inflicted only slight casualties among the Allies. The latter, meanwhile, hastened to complete their batteries. On Tuesday, October 9, the American and French artillerists were ready to begin the bombardment of Yorktown. Eleven days had passed since they had left Williamsburg. The British defenses were now as complete as they would ever be. Cornwallis could only hope that Clinton was near at hand. 27


26. James, Journal, pp. 120-21; "Wertgetreue Abschrift eines Tagebuchs," Oct. 8, 1781. James said the attack on the picket was at midnight, whereas the German account referred to attacks at 5:00 A.M. In the postsiege casualty lists no officers of the 45d Regiment were shown as killed.

27. Apparently the British still believed that the Allies did not have much or any heavy artillery--despite the obvious presence of batteries. French Lieutenant Verger wrote on October 9: "We learned from the deserters' report that the English army was convinced that we had no heavy artillery and that, having beaten M. de Grasse, Clinton was 'coming to their rescue." Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:140.
On the morning of October 9, Maj. James McHenry wrote to Governor Lee of Maryland: "Some batteries will be in readiness to play upon the enemy's works this afternoon. It was originally intended to wait until eighty pieces of cannon and mortars could be brought to operate," but the plan was changed and fire was to open with about twenty guns. At three o'clock in the afternoon the French battery on York River in front of the Fusiliers' Redoubt opened fire on the British works and on the frigates Guadaloupe and Charon. Both ships promptly moved downriver, the Guadaloupe anchoring off Gloucester Point and the Charon in front of Yorktown. Two hours later an American battery on the British left flank began firing. An officer in the Pennsylvania Line wrote: "This day, this happy day, we return'd their fire. American & French flags twisted on our batteries." 28

Washington was pleased with the results of the long hard days of preparation. He wrote the President of the Congress that the French battery above Yorktown had opened with six eighteen- and twenty-four-pounders and six mortars and howitzers, and the American battery below the town had six eighteen- and twenty-four-pounders, two mortars, and two howitzers—a total of twenty-two weapons: "We were informed that our shells did considerable execution in the Town, and we could perceive that our shot, which were directed against the enemy's embrasures, injured them much." Already the weaknesses of the British defenses were beginning to reveal themselves. 29

The enemy shot and shell exacted an immediate toll in Yorktown. A British officer described how one of the first balls struck "a wooden

28. The various accounts give a wide range of times for the beginning of the Allied bombardment. They also disagree on who fired first, the Americans or the French—although the plan seems to have been that both would begin at the same time. Butler, "Journal," p. 108, stated that General Washington fired the first gun—an American one. No one else mentioned this. Washington himself reported that the French battery on the Allies' extreme left opened at 3:00 P.M. and the American battery on the extreme right began firing at 5:00 P.M. Washington, Diaries, 2:264; and Washington to Congress, Oct. 12, 1781, in Writings, 23:212-13. These times are supported by two recipients of the fire: Döhla, "Journal," p. 40; and Popp, A Hessian Soldier, p. 23. General Knox, commander of the American artillery, wrote eleven days later that "our batteries" opened at 2:00 P.M. Noah Brooks, Henry Knox, A Soldier of the Revolution (New York, 1900), p. 160. American Private Martin admitted that the French finished their battery first, but they were not allowed to fire until the Americans were ready. Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, p. 253. Freeman, George Washington, 5:362, wrote that Washington gave the French the honor of firing first because they had excelled in their preparations.

house where the officers of the 76th Regiment were at dinner, badly wounded [a lieutenant] . . . also slightly the quarter-master and adjutant, and killed the Commissary-General Perkins who was at the table." Lieutenant James of the Royal Navy observed that the cannonade continued on into the night with great vigor. "The slaughter was great," he said, "and that among the killed on this day was the commissary general, who with some other officers was killed at dinner." 30

On the morning of October 10 the Allies opened four additional batteries, increasing the number of cannon, mortars, and howitzers to between forty-five and fifty. 31 Throughout the day and night shot and shell poured into the British position. The Allied gunners concentrated their efforts on the hornwork and the eastern earthworks, including Redoubts 9 and 10. But no part of Yorktown was safe. So effective were the enemy artilleryists that the British were forced to pull back their guns: "The fire now became so excessively heavy, that the enemy withdrew their Cannon from their embrasures, placed them behind the Merlins, and scarcely fired a shot during the whole day." Crèvecoeur wrote that his battery "maintained a barrage that never let up for an instant. I quickly put out of action the enemy batteries on which mine was trained." 32

Count de Fersen noted that the cannonballs were not always efficient, burying themselves in the sandy earthworks without doing great damage. On the other hand, "we learned from deserters that our bombs did great execution, and that the number of killed and wounded increased considerably." He too noticed the slackening of British fire: "The besieged fired but little; they had only small pieces, their largest being 18; they had only mortars of 6 to 8 inches; ours were 12 inches. During the day they fired numerous bombs and royal grenades [small mortars], and at night they established flying [mobile] batteries. During the day they ordinarily withdrew their cannon, and placed them behind the parapet [i.e., withdrew them from the embrasures and placed them behind the merlons]." Colonel Tucker's observations on October 10 concurred: "The Enemy last night shut up the Embrasures of their Battery [No. 4?] opposite to ours on the right, & their next Battery [No. 5?] is entirely silent the Cannon being drawn in from

30. Graham, Memoir, p. 60; James, Journal, p. 121; Ewald, "Diary," entry for Oct. 10: "By the first cannon shot of the besiegers, Commissary Bargers [Perkins] was killed at table, and Lieutenant [Charles] Robertson of the 76th Regiment lost his left leg. The lady of the good commissary general sat between the two at table during this misadventure."

31. It is not possible to count accurately the number of Allied guns mounted at this time. Washington himself recorded two different sets of figures. It is probable that guns were still being added after the batteries opened. Washington, Diaries, 2:264; and Writings, 23:212.

32. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:59.
the Embrasures." Again that day: "Many of the Embrasures of the Enemies are wholly rendered incapable of [offensive?] operations--there are but two Cannon now to be seen in their Embrasures."33

Deux-Ponts wrote that on the tenth several flatboats filled with British troops, apparently from the Gloucester garrison, moved up York River to make an attempt on Choisi's flank. Choisi, however, was alert and drove off the boats with fire from his field guns. No one else seems to have referred to this incident. A correspondent for northern papers wrote that at the beginning of the Allied bombardment, the women and children at Yorktown were sent to Gloucester for protection. Considerable small-boat traffic between the two British posts was maintained on the river. Captain Ewald visited Yorktown on October 10 "to call upon Lord Cornwallis" and to take a look at the Allied positions. Still, this water traffic was a dangerous business; enemy shells fell on the waterfront and on the vessels as well as on the earthworks.34

The French battery above the Fusiliers' Redoubt installed a hot shot furnace on October 10. That evening the French began firing hot shot on the Charon, still anchored before Yorktown. The frigate caught fire and, with several hospitalized sick and wounded aboard, burned to the waterline. The fire spread to a transport moored nearby and it too was destroyed. Lieutenant James of the Royal Navy described the Charon's destruction:

The enemy having opened some fresh batteries on this day, and also commenced an additional fire on the Charon with red-hot shot, she was set on fire at half-past six o'clock in three different places, and in a few minutes in flames from the hold to the masts. . . . She broke adrift from her moorings and drove on board a transport to which she also set fire, and they both grounded on the Gloucester side, where they burned to the water's edge.35


It was noted earlier in this report that Lord Cornwallis had established his headquarters in Secretary Thomas Nelson's fine brick residence behind the hornwork. The old Secretary remained in his home even though his nephew, Governor Thomas Nelson, commanded the Virginia militia on the Allied side. French artilleryists pounded at the house on the tenth, hitting it repeatedly. Finally Secretary Nelson decided to leave his home and, under a flag of truce, crossed over to the Allied lines.36

Several persons behind the British works recorded the personal hell they experienced from the Allied bombardment on October 10 and 11. Private Döhla wrote: "Early this morning [tenth] we had to change our camp and pitch our tents in the earthworks.... One could... not avoid the horribly many cannon balls either inside or outside the city. Most of the inhabitants... fled... eastward to the bank of the York River and dug in among the sand cliffs [where many were killed or wounded]." Popp used much the same wording: "Early in the morning we had to pitch our tents in the trenches of the line, because of the heavy cannonading by the enemy. They threw bombs of from 100 to 200 pounds. Their howitzers and cannon balls were all 18, 24, and 48 pounds." He estimated that the enemy fired 3,600 rounds that day alone:

The Hessian regiment from Bosche [von Bose], which stood in the second line, a little behind us, had a bad position, because of the bombs and shells. Therefore they had many dead and wounded. The light infantry which stood in the horn works had the most dangerous spot and lost the most men. All the marines and sailors from the ships were divided up in the trenches and batteries where they had to help with the work.37

The most graphic account of the horror in Yorktown came from the pen of the Navy's Lieutenant James:

10th. On this evening, the enemy, having mounted some more of their artillery, totally silenced No. 5 battery, commanded by the first lieutenant of the Charon, who with his men was obliged to quit it, the shot and shell having dismounted his guns and tore up his platforms. At ten o'clock

36. Johnston, Yorktown Campaign, p. 139. In the section on "Cornwallis's Cave" presented earlier in this report, the writer has concluded that Cornwallis relocated his headquarters in earth- and plank-covered bombproofs in the nearby ravine at this same time.

a general [infantry?] attack was made from the centre to the left, under cover of their cannon, and the enemy again repulsed. The Hessians gave way twice in front of my works on this night, and the cannonade continued with a degree of warmth seldom equalled and not to be described. The remainder of the night passed in a dreadful slaughter, and we occasionally employed in throwing up the works the enemy knocked down. Several parts of the garrison was in flames on this night, and the whole discovered [sic] a view awful and tremendous.

11th. I now want words to express the dreadful situation of the garrison. . . . Upwards of a thousand shells were thrown into the works this night, and every spot became alike dangerous.

* * * * *

Yet . . . no murmuring was heard, no wish to give up the town while the most distant hope was in view of being relieved.

* * * *

The few people in the garrison who were idle spectators . . . of the siege were now living in holes under the cliffs, and dispersed along the shore by the river side, where however they were not unacquainted with its fatal consequences, hundreds having been killed in that situation.

Still another British officer wrote: "On the 10th scarcely a gun could be fired from our works, fascines, stockade platforms, and earth, with guns and gun-carriages, being all pounded together in a mass."38

General Knox maintained good records on the amounts of ammunition the American batteries expended. These records were compiled every twenty-four hours. During the first day of action, October 9-10, the lone American battery (which Knox called the Grand Battery) fired a total of 326 shot and shell. In the next twenty-four-hour period, October 10-11, this figure increased to 660. The French fired considerably more rounds, but a daily breakdown of their record is not available.39

38. James, Journal, pp. 121-23; Graham, Memoir, p. 60.

39. Returns of Ammunition Expended, Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. This source also has a statement of shot and shell fired during the siege: American shot - 3,312; French shot - 6,378; American shell - 2,378; French shell - 3,669; Grand total - 15,737 rounds.
D. October 11-16

1. Council of War

The French opened two more batteries on the First Parallel on October 11. These added nine twenty-four-pounders to the Allies' power. Washington that day renewed his plea to Admiral de Grasse to send some French frigates up the river beyond Yorktown. Now that the Charon had been destroyed, the only British warship of any size left was the smaller Guadaloupe. Just that morning, French hot shot had set fire to two more British transports. Washington again spelled out the advantages of having the French ships so located: "The securing of General De Choisy's right Flank against the enterprises of the Enemy by a sudden descent, to which it is at present exposed. The being able to give the enemy a jealously on the water side relative to his own posts by keeping a demonstration of transport boats constantly near the detached ships, at the same time that we prevent his procrastinating his Surrender by crossing to Gloucester." But de Grasse refused to change his mind.40

Washington did not know it, but at that same time Cornwallis held a council of war at which the idea of crossing to Gloucester was discussed. The day before, at the height of the enemy bombardment, Maj. Charles Cochrane had successfully slipped by the French fleet and brought messages from Clinton in New York, including the bad news that relief would not be arriving as soon as had been hoped for. Great discouragement settled upon the British headquarters. A council was called. Some officers urged the general to abandon Yorktown, "where every gun was discounted as soon as shewn; and where a long defence, against superior numbers and superior artillery, was utterly hopeless." Someone else suggested that they move to Gloucester Point, break through Choisi's line, march westward 100 miles, then decide whether to proceed north or south. Apparently Cornwallis gave some consideration to the idea, if only briefly. Tarleton wrote, with some bitterness: "The retreat was, however, postponed, and other events present themselves to immediate attention."41


41. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, pp. 390-96; Cornwallis to Clinton, Oct. 11, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library; "Wertgetreue Abschrift eines Tagebuchs," Oct. 10, 1781. Cornwallis seems to have decided to keep this discouraging news from the troops. The Anspach diary, at least, had it all wrong: "Maj. Gordon [sic] is arrived by express from New York and brought news that the English fleet is on the Chesapeake Bay"; Ewald, "Diary," entry for Oct. 12, said that Clinton's (continued)
2. Second Parallel

One of the "other events" that occurred on October 11 was the Allies' opening of the Second Parallel, just 300 yards from the British lines. According to Washington, it was constructed with as much secrecy as had been the case for the First Parallel. Work proceeded on this new line with amazing rapidity and with few casualties. Allied artillery roared constantly throughout the daylight hours of the eleventh and on into the night. The next day, however, the Allies slackened their fire temporarily, fearful of hitting their own men working on the new parallel and its batteries.42

Washington was immensely pleased with the new works. He was sure, however, that Cornwallis would soon order a sortie against them; that was what the manuals recommended: "We last night advanced our second parallel within 300 yards of the enemy's Works with little or no annoyance from them. Only one Man was killed and three or four wounded. I shall think it strange indeed if Lord Cornwallis makes no vigorous exertions in the course of this night, or very soon after."43

41. (continued) dispatches told of the arrival of Admiral Digby in New York and of Clinton's having gone on board with 5,000 men; In the Clinton Papers is an undated document, "Signals agreed upon with Major Cochrane." Apparently Cochrane brought this document with him from New York where he and Clinton's staff had prepared this list of signals for Cornwallis to employ when the British fleet eventually arrived in Chesapeake Bay:

"If Lord Cornwallis is still at York River?
"One great Smoke & One Gun at one minute intervals.
"If we are to land on the Gloucester side?
"Two smokes & Two Guns close fired at Two minutes Interval.
"If we are to land at Newport News James River?
"Three Smokes & Three Guns close fired at Six minutes Interval.
"If we are to land at James Town?
"Four Smokes & Four Guns close fired at Eight minutes Interval.
"N. B. The Above Signals are all to be made at York River.
"Any person to be taken off from the Capes Charles or Henry to be trusted if He can sew a Halfpenny with a Strong mark upon it and either of the four letters A, B, C, D, wrote upon it."
"If a smoke or Fire appears on Cape Henry & a Boat is sent for the Person who makes [it], if He produces Two Halfpence it denotes that Lord Cornwallis has left York Town."

42. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:141; Washington, Diaries, 2:265.

Cornwallis was not just then prepared to make a counterattack. On October 11 he wrote to Clinton: "We have lost about Seventy Men [so far in the siege], and many of our Works are considerably damaged. With such Works on disadvantageous Ground against so powerful an attack we cannot hope to make a long Resistance." "P.S. Since the above was written we have lost Thirty Men." The next evening he added still another postscript: "Last night the enemy made their second parallel at the distance of three hundred yards. We continue to lose men very fast."

While the Allies' work parties dug the trenches of the Second Parallel during the night of the eleventh, patrols went out in advance of them to keep the British pickets off balance. The Anspach diary recorded a French patrol's probe of the Fusiliers' Redoubt, "but they were again chased back by our cannonade." Other patrols attacked the British Light Infantry pickets in front of the hornwork. The British, too, made an occasional patrol that night despite the hardships of the day. Deux-Ponts's working party on the new parallel became aware of one of these: "At ten o'clock we heard a score of musket-shots; everybody thought it was the beginning of an attack, but it was only an English patrol. There were several small volleys of this kind during the night, and it is to this all the outside attempts of the enemy are confined."

At the same time the Allies were constructing the parallel, the British worked under cover of darkness at repairing their gun positions. Despite the torrent of incoming fire, they succeeded to a certain degree. Crèvecœur wrote: "It was not until night that they began to fire in earnest, but their shots were not too well aimed; nevertheless, they managed to kill several men in the [old] trench." Elias Boudinot, a member of the Congress at Philadelphia who was undoubtedly kept well informed by friends at Yorktown, wrote that on the night of the eleventh, "the Enemies fire renewed with severity all night."

A visitor to the Allied lines, Dr. Honyman from Hanover County, Virginia, gave his impressions of the siege and Cornwallis's future:

This night & Friday [Oct. 11, 12] as long as I staid, they fired pretty smartly on our new work, & threw a good many shells in the night; but our fire was vastly superior, & sometimes extremely violent. We had

44. Cornwallis to Clinton, Oct. 11, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library. The second postscript is found in Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, pp. 437-38.


but few men killed before Thursday night, but that night & Friday we had a good many killed & wounded. The Enemy have but very few cannon, & those of a small size... Their fire has been very lan-
guid hitherto, & their works are but slight to stand a siege, being little better than field works. So that, it is generally thought, at the rate we push the siege, the place must fall in 7 or 8 days.47

Cornwallis fully realized the critical position in which the new Allied parallel placed him. It was imperative that he coax his artillery-
men into a fresh effort to harass the enemy as much as possible. He knew that when the Allies opened their batteries on the new line, his forces could not hold out for long. His goal now was to delay that moment for as long as possible: "I did every thing in my power to interrupt this Work; by opening new Embrazures for Guns, & keeping up a constant fire with all the Howitzers & small Mortars that we could man."48

The Allies began construction of their batteries on the Second Par-
allel on October 12 without any serious interruptions from the British. General Washington could hardly believe the absence of an enemy counter-
attack: "Lord Cornwallis's conduct has hitherto been passive beyond con-
ception; he either has not the means of defence, or he intends to reserve himself untill we approach very near him. A few days must determine whether he will or will not give us much trouble."49

The British succeeded in increasing their mortar fire somewhat on October 12. But the Allies were already well protected in the new parallel, and their artillery, still firing from the First Parallel, kept the British cannons on the eastern part of the defenses silent. In an effort to renew firing from the hornwork and the batteries on his left, Corn-
wallis ordered the naval personnel to take over the gun positions. Lieu-
tenant James described the horror on the hornwork that terrible October day:

At eight o'clock this morning the enemy sank one of the fireships from an additional battery,


which kept up a heavy and constant cannonade all the day at the shipping, most of which was sunk for the defence of the town against an attack from the sea. At nine o'clock the chief officers of the artillery waited on the commodore [Symonds?] from Lord Cornwallis with directions that the lieutenants of the navy, with their men, should move on from the right into the hornwork on the left, the transports' men having quitied their quarters and left it exposed to a very heavy fire from the batteries of the enemy, who was hourly expected to storm the works.

I immediately offered myself as a volunteer to work this battery, and set off accordingly with a midshipman and thirty-six seamen, to be relieved in eight hours by the first lieutenant. In fifty-two minutes after my arrival . . . the enemy silenced the three left guns by closing the embrasures, shortly after which they dismounted a twelve-pounder, knocked off the muzzles of two eighteens, and for the last hour and half left me with one eighteen-pounder with a part of its muzzle also shot away, with which I kept up a fire till it was also rendered useless. At six o'clock in the evening, the first lieutenant having been sent to relieve me, a shell burst between us and gave me a contusion in my face and right leg. . . . [During the eight hours, James had] nine men killed, twenty-seven wounded, eight of which died . . . and most of the wounded had lost an arm or leg, and some both.50

Major Cochrane, who had run the gauntlet of the French fleet two days earlier, was killed on October 12. He and Lord Cornwallis went up to the parapet where Cochrane aimed a cannon at the enemy. He then peered over the parapet to see the effect of the shot. An enemy cannonball, narrowly missing Cornwallis, took off Cochrane's head.51

Also on the twelfth, Colonel Dundas and most of the 80th Regiment moved from Gloucester to Yorktown, leaving behind a detachment to man one of the redoubts at the Point. The 80th moved into a critical position to the left of the hornwork, at Redoubt 6.52

51. Lowell, Hessians, p. 279.
52. Graham, Memoir, p. 61; Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, p. 396.
On October 13 the British further increased the rate of their mortar fire and, during the night, even their cannon fire. Crèvecoeur wrote that "the enemy seemed to have been saving up their ammunition for the second parallel. It was of very small caliber and very effective, being fired at short range. That night we had 6 men killed and 28 wounded." Washington, too, noted this increase but said that work on the new parallel was not affected by it.53

In contrast, the Allies eased up their cannonading a little that day. This letup apparently occurred while moving the artillery pieces from the first to the Second Parallel and mounting them in their new positions. While the British undoubtedly enjoyed this slight respite, they also observed with dread that the new enemy batteries were swiftly nearing completion. James wrote: "It was now we began to despair of any relief."54

The next day James despairingly recorded that the supply of ammunition was running low and that large breaches had been made in the batteries and redoubts. In the forenoon Allied artillery sank another fireship and two more transports. The number of deserters from the British forces increased this day. They informed the Allies of the "vast number" of killed and wounded in Yorktown. One deserter told the Americans: "The Infantry refuse doing duty, that Cornwallis promises them that they will be relieved from N. York & give each a pipe of wine."55

3. Redoubts 9 and 10 Lost

During the daylight hours on the fourteenth, Allied artillery concentrated its fire on Redoubts 9 and 10, attempting to soften them up for an assault. These redoubts prohibited the Allies from completing the Second Parallel to York River; their capture was essential to the overall strategy of the siege. The Allied command also decided to make another attempt at capturing the stubborn Fusiliers' Redoubt above the town. On the preceding night a French patrol had set fire to the abatis around the redoubt, but only a part of it burned--due to its having been built of fruit trees rather than pine. Now, on the fourteenth, the attack on the Fusiliers began at 7:00 P.M. Once again the redoubt successfully fended off the French, who quickly gave up the attempt, having

53. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:59; Washington, Diaries, 2:266.


113
suffered sixteen casualties. As they had before, some French accounts said that this action was but a feint. However, French siege maps show that plans had been made to extend the French works eastward toward Yorktown, thereby creating a miniature Second Parallel. One must conclude that the attack was real, if frustrated.

Two hours later the American Light Infantry under Lafayette and a French detachment under Baron de Vioménil attacked Redoubts 9 and 10. Although the abatis around No. 9 held up the French for some minutes, both assaults succeeded and within a short time the soldiers were digging the trenches that would complete the Second Parallel. The smaller Redoubt 10 had been defended by forty-five British and German troops. Of these the Americans took three officers and seventeen men prisoner. Although this redoubt was said to have three embrasures for a water battery, the Americans found only a dismounted cannon and a barrel of hand grenades. A mixed force of about 150 British and German troops, supported by two brass guns, had defended Redoubt 9. Here the French killed eighteen and took three officers and thirty-nine men prisoner. Both redoubts were promptly incorporated into the Allied line. 56

Cornwallis realized that the loss of these outposts meant disaster for his cause. No longer did he hope that Clinton would arrive before he was forced to capitulate:

Last Evening the Enemy carried my two advanced Redoubts on the left by Storm, and during the Night have included them in the Second Parallel which they are at present busy in perfecting. My Situation now becomes very Critical. We dare not show a Gun to their Old Batteries [First Parallel], & I expect their New Ones [Second Parallel] will be Open tomorrow Morning. Experience has shown that our fresh

56. This action was recorded by almost everyone who kept a journal at Yorktown. Some of the more detailed accounts include: Washington, Diaries, 2:266-67; McHenry, Sidelight on History, p. 71; Popp, A Hessian Soldier, p. 24; la Fayette to Washington, Oct. 16, 1781, pp. 46-47, and Vioménil to Rochambeau, Oct. 15, 1781, pp. 47-48, in Stevens, "The Allies at Yorktown"; Account of Capt. Stephen Olney, a participant, in Mrs. Williams, Biography of Revolutionary Heroes: Containing the Life of Brigadier Gen. William Barton and also, of Captain Stephen Olney (Providence, 1839), pp. 275-81; Alexander Hamilton to la Fayette, Oct. 15, 1781, History Files, Colonial NHP; Deux-Ponts, Campaigns in America, pp. 145-46; Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:59-60, 141-43; Ménonville, "Journal," pp. 286-87; The number of British prisoners is found in Washington's diaries. Other accounts have slightly different figures.
Earthen Works do not resist their powerful Artillery, so that we shall soon be exposed to an Assault in ruined Works, in a bad Situation, & with Weakened Numbers.

The Safety of the place is therefore so precarious that I cannot recommend that the fleet & Army should run great risk in endeavouring to Save us.57

4. British Sally

Earlier, this study put forth Muller's views concerning sallies. It will be recalled that, when well executed, sallies could lengthen a siege. They were justified when the fortification was of poor quality or when there was a shortage of ammunition and provisions. Muller also said that the sortie could be made when the enemy was erecting his second parallel. All these conditions were present when Cornwallis planned a sally to occur before daybreak on October 16.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abercrombie, Light Infantry, took command of the detachment of 350 men. He divided this corps into two parties: one consisting of grenadiers from the Guards and Capt. John Murray's grenadier company from the 80th Regiment, both under Lieutenant Colonel Lake; the other drawn from the Light Infantry, under Maj. Thomas Armstrong. Between 4:00 A.M. and 5:00 A.M. the detachment left the British lines in the vicinity of the hornwork and silently made its way toward a point in the Second Parallel where a French battery and an adjacent American battery were still under construction, both having a portion of their guns already mounted. Behind these batteries stood a French redoubt. The redoubt and the trench in this area were guarded by the Soissonois Regiment. In advance of the parallel, the Agenois Regiment had a picket that particular morning. Lieutenant Verger described the approach of the British: "They fell upon a picket of the Agenois Regiment whom they massacred, took the captain prisoner, and entered the trench where the Soissonnais put up only a halfhearted resistance, abandoning the place of arms and the redoubt to the advancing enemy."58

The column then entered the French battery. Lieutenant Crèvecoeur wrote that the battery was undefended at the time, the crew having gone

57. Cornwallis to Clinton, Oct. 15, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library. 58. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, p. 398; Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:143; Fersen, "Letters," p. 437, said that the French were extremely tired and were surprised while asleep.
to the rear to bring up more cannon. The British, using their bayonets, spiked the four guns that were present. Next they entered a covered way that led from the First Parallel, halted, then discovered the American battery, commanded by a Captain Savage. The British entered this battery and spiked its three eighteen-pounders. Savage had three men wounded, one killed, and one taken prisoner. Meanwhile the alarm spread through the French positions: the Soissoins Regiment rallied under Colonel de Noailles, and the British began a rapid withdrawal. According to Crèvecoeur, the British spikers were killed, while the French suffered eleven killed and thirty-seven wounded. He was not impressed by the British performance, saying that in his opinion nearly all were drunk. 59

Regardless of the state of its sobriety, the British detachment returned safely to Yorktown, having suffered about ten killed and three taken prisoner. The Allies examined their guns and discovered that the bayonet points could easily be removed. Captain Ewald explained that the British spikers had carried "wheel" nails instead of the proper steel spikes. These nails proved to be too large, and the spikers resorted to using their bayonets, breaking their points off in the vents. Washington's assessment of the sortie was concise and accurate: "It proved to very little Purpose on their Side; and was attended with little Loss on either Part." 60

5. Cornwallis Decides on Retreat

By late afternoon on the sixteenth, the Allied batteries on the Second Parallel were prepared to fire. The French, particularly, now displayed their expertise in ricochet fire, which compounded destruction and dread behind the British lines. Tarleton wrote: "A few hours cannonade from the new batteries upon York town, where the fraizings were already destroyed, the guns dismounted, many breaches effected, and the shells nearly expended." As the fury of the bombardment increased,

59. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:60; Butler, "Journal," p. 110; "Return of Stores expended on the 15th & 16th Oct.," Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. Other accounts stated British dead were ten or fewer and did not specify that they were the spikers.

Cornwallis ordered the transfer of the sick and wounded to Gloucester Point. Presumably, most of these were ferried safely across the river.61

Tarleton and other officers had long thought that Cornwallis should abandon Yorktown, cross to Gloucester Point, and march overland to New York or the Carolinas. Now, on the evening of October 16, the general decided to do just that. Yorktown was no longer defendable: "At this time . . . there was no part of the whole front . . . in which we could shew a single gun, & our Shells were nearly expended." He ordered the preparation of sixteen large boats at Gloucester to carry the troops, and estimated that three trips across the river would be sufficient to convey the fit and ready. At the same time Tarleton, at Gloucester, was directed to prepare some field artillery "to accompany the British troops . . . to attack de Choisy before daybreak, and afterwards retreat through the country." The sick and wounded and much of the stores would have to be left behind. The first contingent, consisting of "the Light Infantry, greatest part of the Guards, & part of the 23d Regiment embarked & most of them landed at Gloucester" before midnight. At the same time 300 Bayreuth soldiers occupied the hornwork that the Light Infantry had held until now.

The boats returned to Yorktown. The second division was in the act of embarking when a sudden squall hit the waterfront, scattering boats. Calm did not return until 2:00 A.M., too late to complete the undertaking before dawn. Cornwallis cancelled the withdrawal and ordered the return of the first division, but daybreak came before this operation was completed. Allied artillery made the return trip extremely hazardous. Tarleton said it all: "Thus expired the last hope of the British army."62

While the Light Infantry and the other units were still straggling back into the lines, the full weight of the Allied artillery played on the battered British works. An American surgeon watched with awe: "The whole of our works are now mounted with cannon and mortars, not less than one hundred pieces [others said seventy] of heavy ordnance have been in continual operation during the last twenty-four hours. The whole peninsula trembles . . . we have leveled some of their works


in ruins and silenced their guns; they have almost ceased firing." An Anspach diary recorded simply: "The cannonade from the enemy this morning is completely astounding." 63

The Light Infantry returned to its old position in the hornwork, where the Anspachs had been holding on. Private Popp, who had been there all night, wrote that "General Lord Cornwallis himself came into our camp and went at once into the horn and observed the enemy coming so close." Cornwallis's time of decision was at hand. Three days later he wrote of his crisis:

Our works in the meantime were going to ruin, and not having been able to strengthen them by Abbatis, nor in any other manner than by a slight Fraizing, which the enemy's Artillery were demolishing wherever they fired, My opinion entirely coincided with that of the Engineer, & principal officers of the Army, that they were in many parts very assailable in the forenoon, & that by the continuance of the same fire for a few hours longer, they would be in such a state as to render it desperate with our numbers to attempt to maintain them. We at that time could not fire a single Gun, only one eight Inch & little more than one hundred Cohorn [sic] Shells remained. . . .

In anguish, he concluded: "A successful defence however in our situation was perhaps impossible, for the place could only be reckoned an entrenched Camp, subject in most places to enfilade, & the ground in general so disadvantageous, that nothing but the necessity of fortifying it as a post to protect the Navy could have induced any person to erect Works upon it." 64

Less than three months had passed since Cornwallis had come to Yorktown. Since those relaxed hot days of early August, Destiny had come to Yorktown also. De Grasse and his ships had arrived in Chesapeake Bay. Washington and Rochambeau had made their famous march overland. Cornwallis's bitter words "I never saw this post in a very favourable light" were spoken too late. The batteries, redoubts, parapets, and redans had been to no avail. The fraises, palisades, fascines, and abatis lay in ruins. The British defenses were destroyed.


64. Cornwallis to Clinton, Oct. 20, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library.
VIII. SURRENDER

A. Negotiations

At ten o'clock in the morning on October 17 a British drummer stood on the parapet and "beat a parley" under the protection of a white flag. Enemy artillery ceased momentarily and a messenger went forth with Cornwallis's proposals for a twenty-four hour cessation of hostilities and the appointment of two officers from each side to meet at the nearby Moore House to settle the terms for the surrender of Yorktown and Gloucester.¹

Washington decided that he would not suspend action until Cornwallis put forth his proposals for surrender in writing. Allied artillery fire promptly reopened and it would continue until mid-afternoon. This resumption of fire caught the British by surprise. Lieutenant Verger wrote that Washington ordered a salvo of artillery "that killed many of the enemy who were on the parapets and had not expected this."²

Meanwhile, Washington's staff prepared a reply to Cornwallis's message. Washington, fully aware that he commanded the situation, requested Cornwallis to put his proposals for surrender in writing before any meeting of commissioners: "I wish previously to the Meeting of Commissioners, that your Lordship's proposals in writing, may be sent to the American Lines: For which Purpose, a Suspension of Hostilities during two Hours from the Delivery of this Letter will be granted."³

This response was dispatched about 2:00 P.M., at which time a silence fell over the battlefield. At half past four, Cornwallis sent a reply that while he could not draft his proposals within the time given


². Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:143. There is no question concerning the resumption of firing, but the editors of Verger's account state that his observation is misleading. The few British/German sources that discuss this moment merely state that hostilities resumed.

The Basis of my proposals will be, that the Garrisons of York and Gloucester shall be Prisoners of War with the customary Honours. . . that the British shall be sent to Britain & the Germans to Germany, under engagement not to serve against France, America, or their Allies until released, or regularly exchanged, that all Arms & public Stores shall be delivered up to you. . . .

Although the paroling of prisoners of war in an honorable capitulation was traditionally acceptable, Washington decided that he would not grant this condition to Cornwallis. Still, he considered the general tenor of Cornwallis's letter to be such "that there would be no great difficulty in fixing the terms. Accordingly hostilities were suspended for the Night and I proposed my own Terms to which if he agreed Commissioners were to meet to digest them into form." So confident was he of the British surrender that Washington dispatched a letter to Admiral de Grasse inviting him to be present at the surrender ceremony.

But death did not leave the British positions with the silencing of the guns. About 7:00 P.M. some drunken soldiers accidentally set a spark to a powder magazine. Thirteen men were killed in the explosion. Some Allied officers believed that Cornwallis deliberately had the magazine blown up.

Washington's counterproposals reached Cornwallis on the morning of the eighteenth. Washington considered inadmissible the British condition of sending the king's army home. Instead, they would be retained as prisoners of war in America. The officers and men could retain their personal effects, and the officers their sidearms; otherwise all stores, weapons, ships, and so forth would have to be surrendered. Remembering General Clinton's refusal to let the Americans surrender with full honors at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1780, Washington decreed that "the same Honors will be granted to the Surrendering Army as were granted to the Garrison of Charles Town." Cornwallis was given two hours to decide whether to accept or reject these proposals. If he accepted them, the commissioners could meet to work out the articles of capitulation. If he rejected them, hostilities would resume.


While the generals pondered their fate, the troops celebrated a day without shot and shell. Scottish bagpipers stood on the British parapets at dawn and serenaded the Allies. Not to be outdone, the band of the Deux-Ponts Regiment answered back. That evening at retreat a British band played "Welcome Brother Debtor," which could be heard by the Allies and which "was by no means disagreeable" to them. Colonel Tucker described the mood of the day:

The British parapets were crowded with officers looking at those who were at the top of our works . . . . On the beach of York hundreds of busy people might be seen moving to and fro. At a small distance from the shore were seen ships sunk down to the water's edge--farther out in the channel, the masts, yards and even the top gallant masts of some might be seen without any vestige of hulls. On the opposite side of the river the remainder of the shipping drawn off as to a place of security. Even here the Guadaloupe, sunk to the water's edge, showed how vain the hope.8

Cornwallis now attempted to make three modifications of the terms: special honors for the garrison at Gloucester Point, which Choisi was by no means threatening to overwhelm; permission to retain a vessel, the Bonetta, with which to send private property to New York; and immunity for the Loyalists who had taken refuge at Yorktown. Washington eventually recognized the first two of these (Articles III and VIII) but not the last (Article X).

The British commissioners were Lt. Col. Thomas Dundas, 80th Foot, and Maj. Alexander Ross, an aide-de-camp to Cornwallis. The Viscount de Noailles, of the Soissonois Regiment and brother-in-law to Lafayette, and Lt. Col. John Laurens, an aide-de-camp to Washington, became the Allied commissioners. The four met in the Moore House, behind the First Parallel, and spent the day and far into the night attempting to reach agreement on the articles. At midnight, the men having failed to reach a full understanding, the truce was extended to 9:00 A.M., October 19. Washington sent a draft of the articles as he understood them to Cornwallis, saying that he expected it to be signed by 11:00 A.M. and the British garrison to march out at 2:00 P.M.9

Lord Cornwallis and Captain Symonds signed the articles of capitulation and had the document delivered to General Washington by the

appointed time. Due to illness, Admiral de Grasse was not able to accept Washington's invitation to be present; instead he sent Count de Barras to sign for him. Washington, Rochambeau, and de Barras, waiting in former British Redoubt 10 on the right of the Second Parallel, affixed their signatures. The siege was over.10

B. Surrender, October 19

About noon the British troops ceased duty in the trenches and marched to their camps behind the works. At the same time two Allied detachments of 100 men each marched towards the British earthworks "with drums beating and colors flying." The American detachment, under the command of Lt. Col. Alexander Hamilton, occupied the left flank of the British line, probably Redoubt 7 and Redoubt 8. Major Ebenezer Denny carried the American flag. The Union Jack was struck, but before Denny could plant his flag, General von Steuben took it from him and planted it himself. The detachment of French grenadiers occupied an adjoining redoubt, possibly No. 6 or No. 7.11

10. The sentence "Done in the Trenches before York" preceded the signatures of the three Allied officers. Freeman, George Washington, S:385, suspected that this meant the former British Redoubt No. 10, but could find no historical documentation for this. My colleague, Historian Jerome A. Greene, National Park Service, researching in the Pierpont Morgan Library, located a letter from American Commissioner John Laurens, dated Oct. 19, 1781, without an addressee, but probably to a British commissioner, that lends considerable strength to Freeman's suspicion: "The Generals of the Allied Army will be at the Redoubt on the right of our second parallel at 9 o'clock this morning - when they expect to receive Lt. Cornwallis's definitive answer and sign the Capitulation."

11. Denny, Military Journal, p. 44; Popp, A Hessian Soldier, p. 25; James, Journal, p. 126; Richard Butler to General Irvine, Oct. 22, 1781, Papers of Brig. Gen. William Irvine, Pennsylvania Historical Society; Denny and Butler said that Hamilton commanded the American detachment. Johnston, Yorktown Campaign, p. 155, said that it was Col. Richard Butler, and that Colonel Laval, Bourbonnois Regiment, commanded the French detachment. This symbolic act of occupation was set forth in Article III, Articles of Capitulation. These troops were charged with preventing contact between the prisoners of war and the Allied troops and citizens. See Washington, Diaries, 2:269.

In Colonial days the Union Jack flew from a flagstaff located at Fort Hill. A 1755 sketch of Yorktown from the river depicted this scene. During the siege the British flew their flag at the same site, as was shown in a watercolor by Colonel Simcoe. It seems likely that the American flag was raised on this same staff on October 19. Bayreuth Private (continued)
Sometime before 2:00 P.M. Lord Cornwallis issued orders to his command. With poignant phrases, the general thanked his men:

Lord Cornwallis cannot express enough the gratitude due the Officers and Soldiers of this Army for their good [performance] on every occasion while he had the honor to command them, but especially for their extraordinary courage [and] resolution in their defense of these posts. He sincerely laments [that] your exertions were not sufficient to withstand the numerous artillery which you have had to stand against. The blood of the noblest men will not have been in vain.

Lord Cornwallis has done all that was in his power to obtain for the Army the condition to go to Europe. This alone could not be ratified. He has taken pains to procure the best treatment for the troops so long as they are in captivity and will repeatedly strive that they will be firmly provided with necessities until they again obtain their freedom, the tents and [?] stores shall not be ruined.

At 3:00 in the afternoon the entire army with martial music will march out in front of the trenches on the left flank which will be occupied by French and American troops from enemy communication trenches, and will form to the right of the French and left of the American Army parading in the finest and grandest order. We will march through both Armies and where finally we will march in line and at a quarter to 5 lay down our arms, going then through both armies with muskets at the trail back to the town in our camp.12

11. (continued) Döhla's diary, as translated in 1941, had the following entry for October 20, 1781: "The Americans hoisted a large flag here at York-town on the water battery, which had 13 stripes." However, Historian John F. Luzader, NPS, has examined the original diary in Germany and was not able to find this entry. Possibly Döhla added it to a later version of his account. Lieutenant James, RN, wrote on October 19, 1781: "The British flag was struck, and the American one displayed on our works." No one described the actual appearance of the American flag, but it probably had stripes. Colonel Simcoe's watercolor shows a flag with stripes over the American sector of the First Parallel. See Illustration 2; Döhla, "Journal," p. 68; James, *Journal*, p. 126.

General Washington had specified that the British forces would march out of Yorktown precisely at 2:00 P.M. to surrender their arms. Unforeseen delays held up the dramatic exit until after three o'clock. It is not possible to determine by which gate the British left their lines. Because the Allies occupied British redoubts on the eastern portion of the works, it might have been considered appropriate for the British to leave by the gates between Redoubts 6 and 7. Another possibility is that they left by the gate just west of Battery 7. Not only was this gate more centrally located, but just outside lay a spur (west of the hornwork) to the Hampton Road, down which they would march. Ezra Stiles, in a quite crude map (No. 58), suggests that the departure was about the middle of the British works.

Lord Cornwallis, like Admiral de Grasse, pleaded ill that day. General O'Hara led the British forces out. According to a French lieutenant, the Guards were first in the column, followed by the regular infantry regiments in numerical order. The cavalry units of Gloucester Point came next. (However, these units had their own surrender ceremony on the north side of the river.) The German troops followed the British, the Hessians first and the Anspachs in the rear.14

Despite the punishment these troops had taken the past three weeks, they made a fine appearance as they marched forth. The British stores had had a supply of new uniforms, which had been issued to the troops for this occasion. However, their colors were furled, as Washington had demanded. And their band(s) were not allowed to play the music of the victors--another rebuke by Washington in retaliation for Charleston.

12. (continued) Historian John F. Luzader, Historic Preservation Division, Denver Service Center. This document is quoted in full for, as far as the writer can determine, it has not heretofore appeared in histories of the Siege of Yorktown. Having been translated twice, its phraseology is probably different from the original. But Cornwallis's sentiments have survived.

13. Crèvecoeur wrote that the British marched out at 2:00 P.M. Knox said "about" two o'clock. Fontaine wrote 3:00 P.M. Kling said between three o'clock and four o'clock. Radler said 4:00 P.M. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:61; Stevens, "The Allies at Yorktown," p. 50; Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 2:567; [Jacob Ernst Kling,] "Letter from 2d Lt. Jacob Ernst Kling to unknown correspondent, Nov. 4, 1781," trans. John F. Luzader, 1975, Hessischer Staatsarchiv, Marburg/Lahn, Germany; [Johann Radler,] "Letter from Soldier [Pvt.] Johann Radler to his mother in Mainbernheim, Dec. 1781," trans. John F. Luzader, 1975, Historischer Verein Mittelfranken, Germany.

14. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:147.
A lively debate has developed in the years since Yorktown about the music, if any, played by the British that day. According to Article III, the garrison was to march out with "Colors cased & Drums beating a British or German March." If taken literally, this stipulation must have been difficult to enforce; few persons would have been able to determine what was being played by drums only. The possibility exists that the term "drums" meant both the fifes and drums that were found in infantry units of that period. In support of this theory, it is noted that the several British troop returns at Yorktown list only drummers with no separate entry for any fifers (or trumpeters for the cavalry).

Eyewitnesses to the surrender recorded conflicting testimonies concerning British bands and the music they may have played. A civilian visitor at Yorktown, Aedames Burke, wrote on the evening of the nineteenth that the British "marched thro' both Armies in a Slow pace, and to the Sound of Musik, not Military Marches, but of certain Airs, wh[ich] had in them so peculiar a strain of melancholy." Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee, also a visitor, said simply that the drums beat a British march. Lieutenant Verger, General Washington, and General Hand all agreed with Lee. Hessian Lieutenant Kling had it both ways: "We marched to military music to where the enemy armies paraded in line. We marched with drums beating and colors cased." Anspach Lieutenant Radler also was ambiguous. He said that Cornwallis's army marched out "with military music" and that the Allied regiments "made handsome music, especially the hautboys of the French." Then, later in his letter, he wrote: "We marched in platoons through the enemy lines, while our drummers beat the march."15

As early as 1828 Alexander Garden wrote in Anecdotes of the American Revolution that the British played one of their country's old drinking songs, "The World Turned Upside Down." Whether or not they did, the appropriateness of the title, if nothing more, has kept this story alive. As recently as 1973 American Heritage gave this idea considerable space. Like "Cornwallis's Cave," it is destined for a long life.16


The collective evidence indicates that the British Army had at least fifes and drums playing as it exited from Yorktown, and at least drums beating as it passed between the Allied lines. Whether or not the musicians played "The World Turned Upside Down" will never be known with certainty. What is amazing is that no witness mentioned a single bagpipe playing. Three of the regiments were Scottish! That instrument must definitely have been prohibited.17

Along both sides of the Hampton Road the Allied Army stood proudly in ranks to witness the march of the British to "Surrender Field." The French forces paraded on the west side of the road, the Americans on the east. Both faced inward toward the road to form a gauntlet of eyes. At the Second Parallel Washington and Rochambeau, with their staffs, sat on their horses at the heads of their respective lines; that is, at the north end, nearest the British lines.18

The two armies made an impressive array. Lieutenant Kling wrote:

We marched in platoons through the enemy armies, while our drummers beat the march. The French stood by our marching out on our right side and paraded splendidly. They were mostly young men and looked good. Their general was mounted in front on a charger which was splendid with silver harness and looked handsome.

On the left stood, first the American regular troops, after them the Virginia militia, who


17. After the capitulation the British surrendered eighty-one drums, ten fife cases, one trumpet, eighteen bugles, and five French horns. This list may not have included the cavalry trumpets at Gloucester Point. See Magazine of American History, 7:451-53.

18. While such eminent historians as Freeman (George Washington, 5:386, 386n) wrote that the French were on the east side of the road and the Americans on the west, there seems little doubt that the order was the reverse. Stiles's map, No. 58, is quite clear on this. Also, Lieutenant Kling wrote: "The French stood by our marching out on our right side [i.e. west]." "On the left [east] stood, first the American regular troops, after them [farther south] the Virginia militia." Kling, "Letter," Nov. 4, 1781. W. Fontaine, an eyewitness, said that the French and American lines were twenty yards apart. See Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 2:567.
were not a match for the former as day from night. We saw all these soldiers with surprise and were astonished over this multitude of people who besieged us.19

Harry Lee, caught up in the emotions of the event, described the scene:

The road through which they marched was lined with spectators, French and American. On one side the commander-in-chief, surrounded by his suite and the American staff, took his station; on the other side, opposite to him, was the Count de Rochambeau, in like manner attended. The captive army approached, moving slowly in column with grace and precision. Universal silence was observed amid the vast concourse, and the utmost decency prevailed: exhibiting in demeanor an awful sense of the vicissitudes of human life, mingled with commiseration for the unhappy.20

When O'Hara came up to where Washington and Rochambeau waited, he turned to Rochambeau to pay Cornwallis's respects and to receive any further orders. When he discovered that he was not addressing Washington, O'Hara turned, crossed the road, and apologized to the commander-in-chief. Washington, noticing that O'Hara was embarrassed by his error, gently advised him that Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln would lead him to the place of surrender. (Stiles's map showed Lincoln preceding the British column down the road.)21

Approximately 1½ miles south of the hornwork, the British marched onto "a level place" surrounded by a circle of French cavalry. Here Cornwallis's soldiers laid down their arms and handed over their furled colors in the final gesture of surrender. Lieutenant Kling described the conclusion of the act: "As soon as we laid down our muskets and

21. Popular accounts of this moment insist that O'Hara offered his sword to Rochambeau, who declined to accept it. Rochambeau himself wrote this—many years after the event. It is to be noted that the British officers were allowed to keep their swords by the terms of the capitulation. The writer is of the same opinion as Freeman (George Washington, 5:388-89, 389n) that the point has yet to be proven.
weapons, we returned again with our knapsacks and equipment back to our lines and quartered in our tents."

The Articles of Capitulation called for a similar ceremony at Gloucester Point, with a few modifications requested by Lord Cornwallis. Because that garrison had not been forced to surrender by any actions of Choisi, the cavalry was allowed to march out with swords drawn and with trumpets sounding a British or German march, but with colors cased. An American and a French detachment occupied two works of the British line at 1:00 P.M.; the British garrison was directed to march out of the place at three o'clock.

Washington was concerned that the undisciplined Virginia militia would confiscate the captured weapons and stores. He dispatched letters to both the Duke de Choisi and General Weedon cautioning them to appoint dependable officers to avoid this. Choisi replied that he would "conform in all points to your orders." He said that Tarleton had just paid him a visit and was desirous of obtaining a copy of the Articles before surrendering. Choisi added that he would like to see a copy himself.

No description of the actual surrender at Gloucester has been located; all attention was riveted on the main ceremony at Surrender Field at Yorktown. The ubiquitous Harry Lee reported that Tarleton was afraid for his personal safety if he fell into the hands of the American militia and asked Choisi to arrange for his protection at the time of surrender. Lee wished that Choisi had made public the reasons for this request, but he did not.

By late afternoon the British troops were back in their respective camps; French and American patrols insured security; and General O'Hara prepared to dine with General Washington (Cornwallis declined because of his illness). The Siege of Yorktown was over. Its participants did not yet realize that the last battle of the American Revolution had been fought. For the moment, the Allies busied themselves in counting up the spoils of war.


IX. THE SPOILS OF WAR

A few days after the surrender, Washington wrote his comrade in arms, Gen. Nathaniel Greene, informing him that the British had turned over their stores, arms, artillery, military chest, and so forth, to the American Army, and their ships, naval guns, tackle, etc., to the French fleet. He acknowledged that accurate counts had not yet been made, but he estimated that the prisoners of war amounted to 7,000 soldiers and 800-900 naval personnel (sailors and marines). So far, 7,320 muskets, 74 brass cannon, and 140 iron cannon had been acquired from the British.1

Washington forwarded the official returns of captured personnel and matériel on October 26, one week after the capitulation. The British Army, including the German units, amounted to 7,247 officers and men.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lieutenant general</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier general</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mate</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummers &amp;</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trumpeters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank &amp; File</td>
<td>6,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town major</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissary of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prisoners</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Dept. cont.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mate</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purveyor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steward</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardmaster</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissary Dept.:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy commissary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy commissary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of forage</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant commiss-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissary, military stores</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Dept.:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon and field inspector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conductor</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Washington to Greene, Oct. 24, 1781, Greene Papers, William L. Clements Library. This is a photostat of the original in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York.
Conductor of horse 5
Artificer 16
Wagon master 1
Wagoneer 25

Provost Marshal and assistants 5

Followers of the Army 80

Total 7,247, of which the Allies had already captured 84 during the siege.

In addition, Washington's adjutant general, Edward Hand, estimated that the number killed in Cornwallis's army during the siege amounted to "at least" 309; wounded numbered 120; and there were 44 deserters. Hand's figures for the number of sailors and marines captured came to 840.2

Major John Despard, deputy adjutant general of the British forces, prepared a detailed return of the killed, wounded, and missing in Cornwallis's army from September 28 to October 19, 1781. His figures differ considerably from those compiled by General Hand, and probably are more accurate:

2. Deputy Commissary of Prisoners Thomas Drive, "General Return of Officers and Privates surrendered Prisoners of War the 19th October, 1781," in letter, Washington [to President of Congress], Oct. 27, 1781, Magazine of American History 7 (December 1781): 451-53; Edward Hand, AG, "State of the Enemy's Loss during the Siege of York," based on the following British sources: Adjutant General's Report, Hospital Books, Commissary's Return, Adjutant General's Register, in History Files, Colonial NHP; The figure of 840 for captured naval personnel appears to be accurate. While some accounts give a much higher figure, it is possible they include the crews of privately-owned vessels. Cornwallis, in his Answer to Sir Henry Clinton, between pp. 136 and 137, included a table of the rank and file (i.e., privates) present at York and Gloucester on October 18. While his columns do not add up correctly, it is of interest that he gave totals of 4,017 present and fit for duty and 1,933 sick and wounded, for a grand total of 5,950.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiments or Corps</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d Regiment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43d Regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st Regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th Regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th Regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Battalions Anspach</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Hereditaire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment von Bose</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lt. Infantry Lieut.  
Campbell 74th Company  
Lyster 63d d
Dunn d  
Lightbourne 37th d
Killed  
Wounded since dead.  
Wounded since dead.  
Wounded.

23d Lieutenants  
Mair  
Guyon  
Killed.  
Killed.

33rd Lieut.  
Kerr  
Curzon  
Killed.  
Wounded.

71st  
Fraser  
Killed.

76th Lieut.  
Robertson  
Wounded.

Captain Rall [von Bose]  
Ensign Spangenberg [von Bose]  
Commissary Perkins  
Killed.  
Wounded.  
Killed.  

On October 18, the day of negotiations, Adjutant General Despard prepared the "State of the [British] Army in Virginia," giving the number of present and fit for duty and present but sick for the various units. According to his count the Yorktown garrison then had 3,689 enlisted men fit for duty and 1,875 sick (total, 5,564). At Gloucester there were 852 still in good health and 214 ill (total, 1,066). These figures gave a grand total of only 6,630 enlisted men.4

On the day of surrender Despard completed another return, showing the number of prisoners of war from Cornwallis's army. From the units (but not including the general staff) there were 312 commissioned officers, and 7,458 enlisted men, for a grand total of 7,848—the highest of all the


4. "State of the Army in Virginia, 18th October 1781," Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library. This return was not signed by Despard, but he forwarded it in a letter to Adjutant General de Lancey in New York.
figures given. One possible explanation for this figure is that it contained all the personnel lost as prisoners of war in combat actions before Yorktown as well as at the siege. It will be recalled that in the troop returns for October 1, at the very beginning of the siege, 691 enlisted men were already shown as being prisoners of war. If this theory is correct and this number subtracted, the balance being surrendered on October 19 would have been 7,157 (plus the general staff), which is close to Washington's figure of 7,247.5

Washington's official report on the ordnance captured included the following:

**Brass cannon, mounted on traveling carriages**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>amusette (carried a 1/2-pound lead ball)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3-pounders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4-pounder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>6-pounders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9-pounder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12-pounders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brass cannon, mounted on garrison carriages**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4-pounders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9-pounders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brass howitzers, mounted on traveling carriages**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5-1/2-inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8-inch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brass howitzers, not mounted**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>8-inch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brass mortars, mounted**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4-2/5-inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>5-1/2-inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>16-inch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Brass mortars, not mounted

1  4-2/5-inch
3  13-inch

Total, brass:  75

Iron cannon, mounted on garrison or ship carriages

2  1-pounders
3  3-pounders
8  4-pounders
30  6-pounders
42  9-pounders
18  12-pounders
27  18-pounders

Iron cannon, mounted on traveling carriages

1  18-pounder
1  24-pounder

Iron carronade, mounted on ship carriages  (A gun without trunnions, used on board ships to throw heavy shot at close quarters and on shore as a howitzer)

4  7-pounders
27  18-pounders

Iron swivel guns

6

Total, iron:  169

Total heavy weapons:  244

While the number of artillery pieces was large, it is to be remembered that the British had to divide them between Yorktown and Gloucester, and between land batteries and water batteries. Furthermore, less than fifty cannon were eighteen-pounders or larger. The British were outgunned at Yorktown, especially in the larger caliber weapons.

Although Cornwallis and others reported a severe shortage of ammunition toward the end of the siege, Gen. Henry Knox listed larger amounts of shot and shell, musket balls, and powder than the British said, or
thought, they had. The list is too long to reproduce here with profit. A few examples will suffice: Round shot, loose: 1,635 for 12-pounders and 2,927 for 18-pounders. Shells, fixed: 213 4-2/5-inch and 150 8-inch. Musket cartridges, fixed with ball: 266,274. Powder: 83 barrels and 89 half-barrels. Miscellaneous weapons of minor interest included: 602 hand grenades, 31 carbines, 11 brass blunderbusses, 1,925 sabers, 32 halberds, and 210 pikes.\(^6\)

Cornwallis's forces surrendered twenty-four regimental standards, eighteen of them German and six British. The British ones consisted of two from the 43d Regiment, two from the 76th Regiment, and two from the 80th Regiment. The Queen's Rangers succeeded in smuggling out their standards. Today, only four of the German (Anspach-Bayreuth) colors may be located: two at West Point, one at the Smithsonian Institution, and one at Colonial National Historical Park. The British standards may have burned at Washington, D.C., in 1814. Also given up were four Union Jacks, thirty-two German camp colors, and forty-one British camp colors.\(^7\)

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7. *Magazine of American History*, 7:451-53; Rice and Brown, *American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army*, 1:61, quote Crèvecoeur as saying that the Congress presented the "22" captured flags to the Court of France; "Notes," *Magazine of American History* 7 (July 1881): 61, quotes the *Connecticut Gazette*, Nov. 23, 1781, describing the arrival of the captured colors at Philadelphia:

British Standards Captured at Yorktown. Philadelphia, Nov. 7. On Saturday afternoon last [Nov. 3], between the hours of three and four, arrived 24 regimental standards, taken with the British and German forces under Lord Cornwallis. They were received by the volunteer cavalry of this city at Schuylkill and conducted into town, displayed in a long procession, preceded by the American and French colours at a proper distance. They were paraded through the principal streets of the city, amidst the joyful acclamations of surrounding multitudes, to the state-house; the hostile standards were then laid at the feet of Congress and his Excellency the Ambassador of France.
Food supplies at the time of capitulation were still plentiful. Among other items, the inventories included: 73,280 pounds of flour, 59,600 pounds of bread, 20,190 pounds of beef, 75,750 pounds of pork, 2,500 pounds of coffee, 3,000 pounds of sugar, and 1,250 gallons of liquor. This volume more than met the old tradition of having a three-day supply of food on hand in order to surrender honorably. The British military chest proved a disappointment to the victors. It contained only a little more than £2,000 sterling.8

The day after the surrender, Captain Symonds wrote to Admiral Graves at New York describing the fate of the British vessels in York River:

On the 10th instance the Charon was set on fire by red hot Shot and entirely consumed, the Guadalupe was Scuttled, and Sunk the 17th to prevent her from sharing the same fate, or falling into the Enemys possession and the Powey was hauld into Shool Water and boreed.

It being agreed . . . that the Bonetta should proceed to New York, to carry Earl Cornwallis's dispatches . . . Captain Dundas proceeds with his Officers and Thirty Men with a Flag of Truce for that purpose.

The Number of Sick and wounded Seamen in the Naval Tents, amounts to eighty five, which cannot be removed for some time . . . during the siege Ten Seamen were killed and Thirty two wounded. Enclosed I have the honor to send you . . . the state of the Transports and Victuallers.

A list of transports and victualers published in The Graves Papers appears to be the one Symonds is referring to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transports</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bellona, taken</td>
<td>Providence, sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipwright, burnt</td>
<td>Favourite &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew, taken</td>
<td>Emerald &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston, sunk</td>
<td>Selina &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Mulgrave</td>
<td>Sally &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony</td>
<td>Horsington &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transports cont.

Robert, sunk
Race Horse "
Neptune "
Oldborough "
Present Succession "
Two Brothers "
Success Increase, sunk
Concord "
Lord Howe "
Fidelity "
Mackrell [sic] "

Victualers (all sunk)

Diana
Mercury
Ocean
Providence Increase
Betsey
Nancy
Rover
Harlequin
Elizabeth

Other inventories taken at that time differed slightly with Symonds's account, but they included some additional details. The official American inventory included the fireship Vulcan; four vessels that belonged to the British Army rather than to the navy: Defiance, Rambler, Formidable, and Spitfire; from twelve to fifteen galleys; "a great number" of bateaux; "many small craft"; six privately-owned vessels: Cochran, North Britain, Susannah, Arno Matthias (a Dutch prize), Ennedert (a Dutch prize), and a captured twenty-gun French privateer. Private Döhla noted that those guns the British had not already brought on shore were "sunk in the river before the capitulation."9

9. French Ensr Chadwick, ed., The Graves Papers and Other Documents Relating to the Naval Operations of the Yorktown Campaign, July to October, 1781, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, vol. 7 (New York, 1916), pp. 149-52; "Return of Vessels Taken or Destroyed in York River Virginia 19 Octobr 1781," Papers of General Edward Hand, vol. 2, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Döhla, "Journal," pp. 62-63; Charles Thompson, "A List of the Vessels taken or destroyed at York in Virginia, Magazine of American History, 7:451-53; Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:61, quotesCrèvecoeur as saying that some of the sunken vessels could be easily raised. Later he added the notation that the Guadaloupe had been taken to France and was in the harbor of Brest; See (continued)
9. (continued) also Homer L. Ferguson, Salvaging Revolutionary
Relics from the York River, Museum Publication No. 7 (Newport News:
The Mariners' Museum, 1939), for lists of artifacts and ships' names.

Bibliographical Note: General Washington's report forwarding
the returns of captured personnel and matériel may also be found in
Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, pp. 462-73. Still
another accounting, a manuscript in German, "Verlust an Gefangenen zu
York," is to be found in the Staatsarchiv Bamberg, West Germany. This
five-page document also includes troop and artillery returns for the
Allied Army. A translation of a portion of this document was provided
by Historian James D. Mote, National Park Service. Its contents in-
dicate that it closely agrees with the various statistics given above.
Another compilation of returns may be found in Freeman, George Washington,
Campaign, pp. 164-65, has Deputy Commissary of Prisoners Thomas Durie's
"General Return of Officers and Privates Surrendered." This differs
slightly from and is less complete than the version in Magazine of Ameri-
can History, 7:451-53.
X. ALLIED OCCUPATION OF YORKTOWN

A. Policing the Battlefield

Washington hoped to send the prisoners of war to the interior on the day following the surrender. But his commissary of prisoners was unable to complete his accounting of them until Sunday, October 21. Meanwhile the British and German soldiers relaxed in their camps. To avoid any incidents between the American militia and the prisoners, French troops guarded the British works and patrolled the ruined town. Private Döhla described this day:

In general the French conducted themselves very well toward us, but the Americans... none were permitted in the city or in our lines, for the French grenadiers had strongly surrounded all our works and also Yorktown and allowed no one inside, because they feared the American militia... might also steal from us and plunder us.¹

The American militiamen got their chance to be overlords the following day when they escorted the captured army away from Yorktown to the Piedmont.

French warships sailed up York River on October 20 to assume control over the British naval force. The British seamen and marines remained at Yorktown until transportation became available to carry them to Europe. Lieutenant James wrote that during this confinement most of the naval personnel became seriously ill, including himself, and some died.²

When the British troops marched away, the American Continentals took over Yorktown and now the French found themselves excluded for the time being. Crévecoeur was quite unhappy over this development: "The magazines at York were filled with every kind of stores. Most of the French officers were in great need of basic necessities. Entrance to the town was forbidden to the French for four or five days, at the end of which time the

¹ Washington, Diaries, 2:270; Döhla, "Journal," p. 59. The British and German troops distrusted the militia greatly. Private Radler wrote: "The French soldiers and the American regulars were fine looking troops, but the militia were dirty, unruly, and easily bribed—bad soldiers and greedy men." Radler, "Letter," December 1781.

Americans granted us freedom to enter . . . but by then they had plundered everything and there was nothing left." Crèvecoeur perhaps was unaware that Washington and Rochambeau had agreed that all British Army stores and weapons were to go to the American forces.3

For the next two weeks the Allied troops kept busy collecting and inventorying matériel and placing their own artillery as well as captured weapons aboard transports. Some units were employed in the unpleasant task of burying the corpses of hundreds of horses that the British had killed because of lack of fodder. The British had disposed of these by dumping them into the York River; but tides had washed them back on shore where they lay rotting.

Still other troops were engaged in leveling and destroying the entire Allied works and the former British outworks on Pigeon Hill---batteries, redoubts, and parapets. As far as the Allies were concerned, a future British attack on Yorktown was a real possibility. If the parallels were left standing, a British land force could use them to lay siege to the town just as the Allies had done. The orderly books and diaries for this period were replete with references to this drudgery. Even as the soldiers leaned on their shovels, General Clinton was sailing toward the Chesapeake with a British Army.

B. Clinton Off Chesapeake Bay

The British fleet, under Rear Admiral Graves, had finally left New York on October 19, the day that Cornwallis had surrendered. Washington learned of this movement on the twenty-fourth: "Received advice . . . of the British Fleet in the Harbour of New York consisting of 26 Sail of the line, some 50s and 44s [guns?]. Many frigates, fire ships and Transports amounting in the whole to 99 sail had passed the Narrows for the [Sandy] hook, and were as he supposed, upon the point of Sailing for the Chesapeake." Washington promptly notified de Grasse of this "advice."

That same day the British fleet arrived off Cape Charles. There a stunned Clinton learned that he was too late: "We had the Mortification to hear that Lord Cornwallis had proposed Terms of Capitulation . . . on the 17th. This Intelligence was brought us by the Pilot of the Charon . . . who came off from the Shore and said they had made their escape from York on the 18th, and had not heard any firing since the day before." The British fleet hovered off the Chesapeake for several days, then set sail for New York. "We do not of course seek an action," said Clinton, "having lost the only object that could justify it."4

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3. Rice and Brown, American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1:64.


140
Meanwhile Cornwallis and his staff, still at Yorktown, prepared and signed their parole papers. One of these documents that has survived was signed by Maj. Alexander Ross, aide-de-camp to Cornwallis:

I, Alexander Ross . . .--

Do acknowledge myself a Prisoner of War to the United States of America, & having permission from His Excellency General Washington, agreeable to Capitulation to proceed to New York & Charlestown, or either, & to Europe.--

Do pledge my Faith and Word of Honor, that I will not do or say anything injurious to the said United States or Armies thereof, or their Allies, until duly exchanged, I do further promise that Whenever required, by the Commander in Chief of the Army, or the Commissary of Prisoners for the same, I will repair to such Place or Places as they or either of them may require.5

Except for an epidemic of "bloody flux" (dysentery) that swept through the command, these were pleasant enough days for the officers at Yorktown. Every senior American and French officer sought the honor of having Cornwallis's attendance at a dinner party. So filled was his social calendar that the defeated general could not attend all the functions: "Lord Cornwallis presents his Compliments to General Wayne and is sorry he cannot have the pleasure of waiting upon him to-morrow, being engaged to dine with Count de Saint Maime [Soissons] Regiment."6

Douglas Southall Freeman described the conclusion of all these activities: "The greater part of the stores now were on shipboard; most of the American troops, in transports of every type, had started up the Bay on the 3rd of November; Cornwallis was ready to leave on the next tide. Washington said au revoir in a round of visits on the 4th and the following day . . . he left his quarters on Jones's Run about 10 o'clock and rode to Williamsburg with his staff."7 Yorktown settled down to a new experience--a winter of occupation by the troops of France.


C. The Damages of War

When the Allies entered Yorktown they were shocked at the damage their artillery had done to the once handsome town. Von Closen wrote: "I will never forget how frightful and disturbing was the appearance of the city of York from the fortifications on the crest to the strand below. One could not take three steps without running into some great holes made by bombs, some splinters, some balls, some half covered trenches, with scattered white or negro arms or legs, some bits of uniforms. Most of the houses [were] riddled by cannon fire, and [there were] almost no window-panes in the houses."8

Sutler Trabue was moved to say: "It was truly a Dreadfully shocking sight to see the damage our bomb-shells had done." A Virginia physician observed: "The town of York is much damaged by this siege; some fine houses irreparably ruined, & the Enemy pulled down several that were in their way." Lieutenant Verger was more graphic: "The din and disorder caused by our bombs in the town defy description. Hardly a house remains that is not destroyed, either wholly or in part, by shells or bombs. One could not go ten steps without meeting the wounded or dying, destitute negroes abandoned to their fate, and corpse after corpse on every hand."9

Chaplain Robin wrote: "I have been through the unfortunate little town of York since the siege, and saw many elegant houses shot through and through in a thousand places, and ready to crumble to pieces; rich household furniture crushed under their ruins . . . carcasses of men and horses . . . Books piled in heaps." Lieutenant Crèvecoeur recorded in his diary that Yorktown was rather small and ugly: "We destroyed it almost entirely during the siege. There was only one pretty house, and that was not spared by the bombs and shells and is now beyond repair. It belonged to Governor Nelson [actually to his uncle Secretary Nelson]." A visitor to Yorktown a year later said: "The inhabitants have not yet recovered from the disturbances of war, and many houses are still in ruins or half repaired. The spars of the ships sunk in the river to block the passage are yet to be seen."10


Despite this ample evidence of destruction at Yorktown--destruction caused both by the British in their construction of defenses and by the Allies in their artillery bombardment--the number of claims for damages submitted by the citizens of the town is small.

A map of the town showing the lots and the approximate location of the British lines is included in this report. The assumption may be made that the British took down all structures in the immediate vicinity of the works and all buildings outside the works (mainly on the west and south sides) that would have interfered with the field of fire.

In 1781 Lots 1 through 6 belonged to Capt. Thomas Lilly. These six lots lay outside the main works; Redoubt No. 1 stood approximately on Lot 5. Following the siege, Lilly claimed reparations for the following: a new dwelling house, forty by twenty-two, brick chimneys and cellar; a twenty-two-by-eighteen kitchen with brick chimney; a stable for six horses, with a chair house; and a dwelling house, twenty-four by sixteen, with a shed and two fireplaces. Berthier's billeting plan of Yorktown (Map No. 5), prepared immediately after the siege, showed no structures standing in this area.

Battery No. 10 stood in the vicinity of Lots 7 and 8. No citizen made a claim for damages in this area; also, Berthier indicated no structures here. If any damages occurred in Lots 10 through 14, through which the main British line ran, no claims were submitted. Similarly, no claims arose over the area of the large water battery, No. 1, between Read and Buckner streets (Lots 10, 16, 22, 28, 34, and 40). Grace Church on Lot 35, which the British occupied, suffered £150 damage, mostly from broken pews and windows. Likewise, the courthouse, Lot 24, experienced excessive damage.

The 1781 title for Lots 51 and 55 on the south side of the town has not been located. These had once been occupied by William Rogers's pottery, an important industry in colonial Yorktown. But the adjacent Lot 54 received considerable damage from "throwing up intrenchments & Breastworks." The claim for damage included: a stable, thirty-two by sixteen, with two sheds, each ten feet; a twenty-four-by-twenty kitchen; a twenty-four-by-sixteen storehouse; a smoke house; a dairy; a larder eight feet square; a garden; and the windows of a dwelling, broken by shot and shell. Recent archeological work in this general area indicates a military work, probably a battery. The Berthier map showed a large structure, probably the dwelling referred to above (today's Ballard House).

Lots 58 and 62, across Nelson Street from Lot 54, also suffered considerable damage: a two-story dwelling house, a kitchen and washhouse, a shop, a stable, a smokehouse, a dairy, etc. Lot 59, through which the main defenses passed, had damage done to a two-story residence, a stable, and a smokehouse. However, no damage claim was submitted for
its neighbor, Lot 63. Lot 70, close to Battery No. 7, also suffered damages: "I Lott Ground on Hill about 1/3 of it very much Cut there being a Battery erected on it."\(^{11}\)

Charles E. Hatch, Jr., in his *Yorktown's Main Street* study, has noted that the Berthier billeting map shows relatively few structures at the southeast end of the town. While pointing out that Berthier crowded his scale here and could have been more careful, Hatch has noted that this portion of the town suffered the most from Allied artillery and that perhaps few usable buildings were left. Also of interest is the fact that Berthier omitted the southern portion of the town and the Gwyn Read Development, thus suggesting that no buildings worthy of consideration for billeting remained in that area.\(^{12}\)

D. The French Occupy Yorktown

Before dispersing the armies, an Allied council decided that Rochambeau's troops would take up winter quarters in Virginia. Lieutenant Crèvecœur described the disposition of the French troops: "All the outer works around York were razed. After completing this task, the French army took up winter quarters on 15-18 November. The headquarters [Rochambeau] was at Williamsburg, and the other quarters were at York, Gloucester, Hampton, and West Point [Virginia], to which I was sent."\(^{13}\)

Approximately 1,000 French soldiers were assigned to quarters in Yorktown. The garrison consisted of the Soissonois Regiment and the grenadiers and chasseurs of the Saintonge Regiment.\(^{14}\) Before the departure of the Allied generals, it was decided that the French troops would reduce the size of the British lines about the town. Von Clossen's journal penned a picture of the changes:

11. Riley, "Preliminary Report," pp. 6-99, considers this to be a reference to Lot 70, while Hatch, *Yorktown's Main Street*, p. 102, associates it with Lot 83; Several staff reports in Colonial NHP history files indicate that the southern portion of the British main line crossed through Lots 27, 33, 39, 45, 50, 51, and 55. This report concluded that it crossed Lots NN, OO, DD, CC, 51, 55, and 59, i.e., one range of lots farther south. See also Hatch, *Yorktown's Main Street*, pp. 107-15.


14. Hatch, *Yorktown's Main Street*, p. 120.
Now that all our works around York were filled in, and the exterior fortifications (that Cornwallis had had built) were razed, we worked in great haste to finish the new walls around York, which M. de Rochambeau very much decreased in circumference. We set up two batteries of 18 pieces on the farther ravine, below the city, and one battery of 12 pieces of 18 [-pounders] at Gloucester, protected by a closed redoubt. These 48 pieces of different calibers are the Americans'. They transported to the North all the other pieces captured from Cornwallis except for those that he had collected in Virginia.15

A chaplain in the French Army confirmed these changes: "The plan of fortifications for the defense of York and Gloucester, has been entirely changed; they are drawing them into a narrower compass than before, have destroyed the English works, and are busy at constructing new ones."16

Later events at Yorktown would disclose that the French did not tear down all the British works as the chaplain claimed. Most of the western portion of the main lines was retained, and repaired where necessary. All of the eastern portion from and including the hornwork was excluded from the defenses and, presumably, obliterated or at least made unsatisfactory for any future enemy activity. Two French maps, No. 37 and No. 40, showed the new French parapet on the eastern side of the town. It began at Redoubt 5 and zigzagged northward along the west side of the great ravine later known as Tobacco Road. About halfway along its extent a large redoubt projected toward the ravine. The new line ended at the former British water battery, No. 2. Latrobe sketched this new earthwork from the rear of Secretary Nelson's house about 1796. The drawing shows a steep parapet, a ditch, and the new redoubt. Based on von Closen's descriptions of the new water batteries that were installed, one concludes that the French did not mount any guns in the old batteries on the landward side of the town. But they probably kept up the maintenance of these old batteries and redoubts in case of future need.

The citizens of Yorktown quickly discovered that the presence of the French troops was quite as irksome as the British occupation had been. William Reynolds, a once-prosperous merchant who had returned to the town shortly after the surrender, was outraged at the foreigners' conduct. In his first letters after returning to his home, while all the Allied Army was still present, he described the ruined community, still blaming the British for the state of affairs:


Ever since Decemr [1780] I have been in a continual state of confusion obliged to be moving about and at length was so unfortunate as to have my family prisoners with them [the British] six weeks.... hope I shall shortly get settled again at York, most of the houses wch the Enemy left standing have suffer'd much from the Bombardment.

And again:

The British pull'd down many of the Houses in York & those they left have been much injured by the Bombardment, yours & mine have not suffer'd so much as many others.17

Almost as soon as the French settled down at Yorktown, an angry Reynolds dashed off a letter to Governor Thomas Nelson, then at Richmond:

The French troops march'd in 13th inst: and have taken possession of part of some, and the whole of most of the houses in this Town. Some of the inhabitants are turn'd out and others with their familys confin'd to a room, a situation little better than a prison. Mr. Michell could not obtain part of your house [the substantial Nelson House presently undergoing restoration by the National Park Service] on your order. Mr. Powell let his family have two rooms at his house, but the Count Viomini [Major General Vioménil], who commands at this place turn'd them out of one. The inhabitants in this Neck are plunder'd.... our friends seem disposed to make the situation of the people more miserable than the British left them.18

Governor Benjamin Harrison, who had replaced Nelson, wrote directly to the Baron de Vioménil telling him about the complaints he was receiving and saying that he knew the baron would set everything right. He also appointed Dudley Diggles, another prominent Yorktown resident, to confer with Vioménil to settle the difficulties. Together, these two men managed

17. Reynolds to William Murdoch, Oct. 26, 1781, and to James Eyma, Oct. 27, 1781, William Reynolds Letterbooks, Colonial NHP. Reynolds was the grandson of William Rogers, a prosperous merchant and pottery manufacturer in colonial Yorktown. Reynolds himself was also a merchant, but his fortunes declined with those of Yorktown after the Revolution.

to work out the more critical problems. Nevertheless, military occupation of a town is always an unpleasant experience for the populace. Doubtless a sense of relief came over the citizens in June 1782 when word came that the French were to depart.19

The State officials at Richmond were not overjoyed with the departure of the French. Great Britain had not yet signed a peace treaty. Yorktown was still a port that required defenses. Moreover, Secretary at War Benjamin Lincoln, who had served at Yorktown, had ordered that all the fortifications at Yorktown be destroyed before the French left.

When Governor Harrison learned of Lincoln's plan, he dashed off a letter to the French commander at Yorktown, then Lieutenant Colonel de la Valette, Saintonge Regiment. Harrison said that the former British works and the new French parapets were of no use to Virginia. But, he informed the colonel, the old water battery and its gun platforms that had been built before the British came to Yorktown must be preserved, "and you have my thanks for offering to deliver them up when you mean to evacuate them." La Valette was agreeable to this request and so informed the governor. Harrison then wrote General Washington that he had ordered Colonel Charles Dabney with 200 State troops to take possession of the battery and that he planned to enclose the works with a strong palisade.20

Harrison then wrote a letter of instructions to Dabney:

You'll please to march the Infantry of your Legion to York Town immediately and take possession of it as soon as the French quit it. *** You'll please . . . [to level] such of the out works as are to be destroy'd which I suppose will be the whole of those round the Town, we shall not have men to man them and their standing will only invite the Enemy to take possession of them. . . . It will be advised to have the fort enclosed with a strong palisade to secure you against a sudden attack. . . .

When the Town fell into the Hands of the English there were some fine cannon in it belonging to the State; if they are still there I think you should claim them. . . . There will now be no occasion to increase the size of the Barracks, tho' it will be necessary to rebuild them as they were.21

20. Ibid., pp. 282, 286, 287.
21. Ibid., p. 288. The location of the former barracks is unknown.
E. State Troops

Relations between soldier and citizen did not improve any with the replacement of the French by the State troops. When the State failed to rebuild a barrack for the soldiers, they were billeted in the town as had been the French. The citizens, of course, complained. But Governor Harrison did not sympathize with them: "The conduct of the Inhabitants of York surprises me much, & leaves me at a loss for their meaning, I know of no people but themselves that would not rejoice at being protected."22

In 1783 the soldiers became more "licentious" when word spread that peace with Great Britain was in the offing: "No vigilence or exertions of the officers could keep them within bounds. very few nights passed without Robbery or gross insult being committed by them. Some of the Men still in pay have already shown that they will not obey Command. what hope can the inhabitants of York have, that the little remains of their property will be safe from the spoils of a set of abandoned Men who observe no law but their brutish Will?" The writer proposed that the State troops be discharged.23

Neither the French nor the State troops had undertaken to level the former British earthworks west of Tobacco Road ravine ("kept up & much enlarged for the defence of the French Army"). However, in the fall of 1782 Maj. Alexander Dick ordered the State troops to remove the wooden palisades erected by the British. The townspeople hated the earthworks, but they thought they had more right to the wood in the palisades than the soldiers. One of the more prominent citizens, a Mr. Gibbons, decided to institute a suit against Major Dick. Governor Harrison was again irritated: "I have no doubt but that all the Stockades in and round the Town belong to the Country in as much as they were the property of the Enemy raised at their expence and for their defence and were wrested from them by force." Next thing, said the governor, the inhabitants would want the water battery's gun platforms. Nonetheless, he instructed Dick not to argue with civilians. Presumably, Dick left the stockades alone.24

22. Ibid., p. 401.


By the summer of 1783 the governor had decided to petition the Continental Congress for an appropriation of £750 to hire blacks to level the earthworks at Yorktown. David Jameson, recently lieutenant governor of Virginia, supported this request, saying that the town was too impoverished by the siege to pay for the work itself. The fortifications forced the citizens to "bear at their very doors Mounds of earth which prevented a free circulation of the Air, and Ditches of stagnant putred water." Congress did not pass the bill; Yorktown remained a fortified place.25

XI. YORKTOWN BETWEEN WARS, 1783-1861

During the eighty years between the two great sieges of Yorktown, 1781 and 1861, the town never fully recovered. This lack of progress was due only in part to the Revolution. Other factors that played a role included the exhaustion of the soil from repeated tobacco growing in the surrounding country, and the fact that the York River was not navigable into the Piedmont country, which was now being developed rapidly. During these years many visitors came to Yorktown to see where the American Revolution had ended. Their accounts give brief glimpses of the fate of the British works.

About 1796 Benjamin Henry Latrobe, the famed architect, visited the site and sketched the newer French line on the east side of the town and the so-called Cornwallis's Cave. Apparently Latrobe selected the French earthwork rather than the more historically significant British parapets because it was in a better state of preservation: "The [British] works were badly constructed and well attacked. Those represented in the drawing were thrown up by the French after the town was taken, by way of keeping their army in exercise. They are now gone much to decay but still betray the design of a skillful engineer."1

Around the time Latrobe did his sketches, Isaac Weld, making a grand tour of eastern North America, stopped at Yorktown to see the sights. He was quite unimpressed with Gloucester Point, saying it had only ten or twelve houses and the remains of one or two redoubts "thrown up during the war." Yorktown, however, was worthy of a full description:

The town of York consists of about seventy houses, an episcopal church, and a gaol. It is not now more than one third of the size it was before the war.

*   *   *   *   *

A few of the redoubts, which were erected by each army, are still remaining, but the principal fortifications are almost quite obliterated; the plough has passed over some of them, and groves of pine trees sprung up about others, though, during the siege, every tree near the town was destroyed. The first and second parallels can just be traced, when pointed out by a person acquainted with them in a more perfect state.

In the town the houses bear evident marks of the siege; and the inhabitants will not, on any account, suffer the holes perforated by the cannon balls to be repaired on the outside. There is one house in particular, which stands in the skirt of the town, that is in a most shattered condition. It was the habitation of a Mr. Nelson, a secretary under the regal government, and was made the headquarters of Lord Cornwallis when he first came to the town. * * * There are trenches thrown up round it, and on every side are deep hollows made by the bombs that fell near it.²

In 1824 Lafayette returned to the scene of his successful exploits at Yorktown. He received a hero's welcome that was described in the newspapers at great length. Unfortunately for history, the correspondents wrote but sketchily of the earthworks. A reporter for the Norfolk and Portsmouth Herald did mention the British earthworks, saying that in some parts they were still "nearly perfect." Another account told of Lafayette "sitting on one of the old British embankments" east of the town to watch a fireworks display. Possibly this was a reference to the former works between the hornwork and Battery 4, or even to the former Redoubt 10. If so, it is an indication that the French did not completely level everything in this area when they reduced the circumference of the line in 1781. In this same account there was a reference to what probably was the postsiege French line, stating that the parapet was "considerably sunk from the trend of cattle and the washing of the rains, and the ditch rapidly filling up."³

An 1843 description of both Gloucester Point and Yorktown briefly mentioned the old earthworks at both places. Gloucester was portrayed as "a small decayed village, containing only a few dwellings." Remains of the 1781 redoubts still existed. Yorktown, too, was depicted as a declining community: "There are now only about 40 dwellings, many of which are dilapidated and fast going to decay. The Swan tavern, in this town, is said to be the oldest in Virginia." The ruins of Secretary Nelson's house could still be seen within "the large and continuous redoubt constructed by the British at the E. end of the town." This, of course, may have been a reference to the postsiege French works.⁴

When Lossing came to town in 1848 he too inspected the earthwork remnants: "The mounds vary in height, from six to twelve and fifteen feet, and being covered by a hard sward, may remain so half a century

³. Hatch, Yorktown's Main Street, pp. 136-37.
⁴. Howe, Historical Collections of Virginia, pp. 281, 520, 530.
longer. The places of redoubts, the lines of the parallels [Allied parallels or British parapets?], and other things connected with the siege, are yet visible." The Civil War was only thirteen years away and, in view of Lossing's opinion on the durability of the British works, it is not surprising that the Confederate forces were able to follow generally the same trace laid down by Lieutenant Sutherland in 1781.5

Another visitor a year later gained impressions similar to those of the earlier sightseers: "There were the British earthworks still complete in form and profile, a little abraded by time and weed-grown. Here we picked up bullets and bones as from a recent battlefield and saw things as they were in 1781, nearly seventy years ago. In the village were the ruins of Gov. [Secretary] Nelson's house and other houses still bearing the marks of cannon shot, the perforated walls unrepaired and the brick and mortar rubbish lying where it fell."6

A writer for Putnam's Magazine arrived at Yorktown by boat from Baltimore early in 1854, seventy-three years after the siege. He made a thorough tour of the siege area and attempted to locate the various specific features. In general, he said, "the American breastworks are nearly obliterated; but the more permanent entrenchments of the British are still comparatively perfect." He looked for the British outerworks that had been abandoned by Cornwallis on September 29, 1781, but thought they lay to the west of the town rather than toward the south. Toward the west he found earthworks (that the British did not abandon) "still in good preservation." "We next looked," he continued, "for the two redoubts stormed by the allied forces on the 15th October. The first, or most eastern of these, (that stormed by the Americans,) [Redoubt 10] being near the river, has nearly been washed away; that taken by the French portion of the allied army [Redoubt 9], may still be traced."

We then entered the main works, situated on the eastern edge of the town [the postsiege French modification]; these are still in excellent keeping, and must have been truly formidable. . . . What first attracted our attention was their brevity; but this was probably considered an excusable military fault, if it was one, as all military commanders prefer compact works, with as few assailable points as possible.

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But there they were, with banks too broad to be perforated by a cannon-shot, and too steep to be

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easily scaled by an assailant. In a conspicuous angle of these works may be seen the foundation and ruins of the ... mansion of ... Governor [Secretary] Nelson. ... The house is of bricks and the marks of several balls are still to be seen.

Next he walked out onto the plain to the south and east of Yorktown. There he found two poplar trees said to mark the precise spot where General O'Hara had come up to Washington and Rochambeau on October 19, 1781. The reporter's matter-of-fact statement that O'Hara surrendered his sword indicates that this story was commonly accepted as fact by 1854, whether or not it actually occurred.7

A. The Siege

The Civil War approached its first anniversary with Federal troops retaining control of Fort Monroe at Old Point Comfort on the tip of the Yorktown Peninsula. Confederate leaders were acutely aware that Union forces could land at this point and advance up the peninsula toward Richmond. Confederate troops had taken up a position at Yorktown as early as the spring of 1861. A soldier stationed there indicated that traces of the old British works still existed. Writing in May, he noted: "Col. Hill commenced fortifying the lower line of Yorktown by retouching the old British works. Now such things would be considered as no defense at all, but then with our limited force, they were the best we could do." He also mentioned the remains of old works at the lower end of Yorktown, possibly referring to the postsiege French lines.1

But a "retouching" of whatever remained of the eighty-year-old British works was wholly inadequate to the Confederates' needs. By autumn, Maj. Gen. J. Bankhead Magruder had begun the construction of the massive earthworks that the weapons of the era demanded—at Gloucester Point, at Yorktown, and on a line across the peninsula from York River to James River, principally along Warwick River.

A Federal spy visited Yorktown and Gloucester on and following October 26, 1861. Later he reported to Allen Pinkerton, "Chief of the Secret Service Division," that Magruder had 27 regiments of infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and 4 field batteries of four to six guns apiece. He said that Yorktown had an earthwork on top of a hill in front of the landing that contained six or eight thirty-two- and sixty-four-pounders—probably old Fort Hill.

Colonel (Samuel H.) Crump commanded at Gloucester. He had two regiments of infantry, two companies of cavalry, and a field battery. Apparently the spy had a better look at Gloucester's fortifications than at Yorktown's; at least his report was more detailed for the former:

On the beach at Gloucester Point was a heavy earthwork, with twelve mounted guns [this water battery appears to have been closer to York River than Cornwallis's], ranging from 32 to 64-pounders. That the entrenchments surrounding all the guns and forces (with the exception of one regiment of infantry) ... commence about one-fourth of a mile above the aforesaid earthwork on the point and run, in a somewhat

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circular form, until they again strike the York River about half a mile below the said earthwork. That these entrenchments are composed of split pine logs, set up endwise inside, with an earth bank outside about 12 feet at the base, the earth being taken from the outside front, thus making a ditch of some 5 or 6 feet in depth and the same in width at the top. That at about the center of this breastwork is a 64-pounder mounted on a high carriage, which traverses on a circle calculated for a sweep of the whole land side of the entrenchments, which is a clear field of about 700 acres, bounded by timber on the north and York River on the south.

This description implied that Gloucester Point had not changed much in appearance since 1781 and that the Confederates fortified the point much in the same manner as had the British. The spy's report continued:

That between October 26 and November 11, 1861, the rebels commenced a heavy earthwork on an elevation 50 yards back from the water . . . 200 yards lower down the river than the earthwork at the point. . . . The said earthwork had an intrenchment in front partly finished, 8 to 10 feet wide at the top, 5 to 6 feet in depth, the front of the embankment perpendicular, and the back of ordinary slope. [Crump informed the spy that this work would contain four thirty-two pounders and two sixty-four pounders when completed.]²

Pinkerton's next report came from William H. Ringgold, "an intelligent colored man," who had left Gloucester Point on November 6, 1861. Ringgold's report confirmed much of the earlier spy's account:

That at Gloucester Point proper . . . is a battery of nine 32-pounder columbiads, pointing up, down, and across the river; that on the bluff encircling Gloucester Point is a continuous embankment about 1-1/2 miles in length from the river above to the river below; that this embankment was used as a sentinel-walk and that on the inside thereof was a single gun, commanding the country road coming from the north.

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On Yorktown:

That around Yorktown on the land side is a continuous embankment, about 3 miles in length, and mounted with heavy columbiads... that within the embankment or breastworks are minor entrenchments. That at Yorktown there was a battery, consisting of five heavy columbiads, mounted on the heights of the town, directly opposite the Gloucester batteries.... That what has been called Cornwallis Cave was used as a magazine for ammunition; that the principal magazine was then (November 5) on the bluff, about 75 yards back of Cornwallis Cave, in an embankment on the upper side of the old road [Great Valley] leading up into town; that under the bluff just below Cornwallis Cave, concealed from upward-bound vessels behind a point on the river, is a battery of four or five shot guns of large caliber....

Magruder's efforts received a setback in December 1861 when he received orders prohibiting him from employing Negro slaves at the works. He explained to the Confederate adjutant general in January 1862 that the work at Gloucester Point was not yet half-finished nor were Yorktown's defenses completed. While he still had about 200 blacks employed at both posts, he needed three times that number.

On February 1, the Confederate general again discussed the state of his defenses: "When I took command there were no works on the James River below Jamestown, no fortifications at Williamsburg, Yorktown, or Gloucester Point, with the exception of one gun at Yorktown and perhaps two at Gloucester Point." He still did not have in place the number of pieces of ordnance that the engineers had recommended, and he urged his superiors not to lose time in finishing the works. Warfare had changed considerably since Cornwallis's day; this was well illustrated by Magruder's request for sixty-four-pounders with which to overcome ironclad warships on York River.

He pointed out his need for galleries to be cut into the sides of the ravines leading from the upper town to the waterfront, and said that he had already ordered their construction. There is no known direct evidence that Cornwallis had had similar bombproofs constructed in these


ravines, except his own headquarters bombproof in the great ravine behind Secretary Nelson's house. (By the time of the Civil War a street [Tobacco Road] had been constructed throughout the length of this ravine.)

While Magruder was pushing construction of his lines, Union General George B. McClellan was preparing his Army of the Potomac for embarkation at Alexandria, Virginia. On March 17, 1862, Union forces began boarding the vessels that would take them to Old Point Comfort to begin the invasion that the Confederates had worried about. Famous for his ever-present streak of caution, McClellan was not ready to advance up the peninsula until early April. By then Magruder was prepared to give up his outer line, seven miles below Yorktown, and to stand on the Yorktown-Warwick River line.

On April 5 McClellan's army at last stood before the Confederate line on the Peninsula. But the Union general decided to lay siege to Yorktown rather than attack it. Later he complained that the Union Navy concentrated its energies against the ironclad Merrimac rather than sending a naval force up the York to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. He also grumbled that his intelligence was vague and untrustworthy.

April slipped away before the Union artillery was prepared to open fire—although a sidewheeler, Sebago, shelled Gloucester and Yorktown lightly on one or two occasions during the month. Then, on May 1, McClellan learned that the Confederates in Yorktown were receiving artillery stores by boat. He ordered Battery 1 to open fire on the wharf and the town. However, Yorktown was to be saved from the destruction it had suffered in 1781. On the night of May 3-4 the Confederates spiked their

5. Magruder to Cooper, Feb. 1, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol 9: 38-40. In connection with the ravine called Great Valley, a few of the 1781 maps showed an unnamed British unit stationed in it; but there was no indication of fortifications. A confederate soldier, not always reliable in his reminiscences, described Magruder's galleries: "While on the subject of Magazines, One was built in the ravine up which a path led to the upper works (that ravine must be what is designated on the map as the 'Great Valley'): It was built with bricks dug up from old destroyed buildings of the town. It had a Arched roof, and stood on the left, or lower side of the ravine path and was covered with 6 or 8 feet of earth. We learned that it had been blown up just about daylight after we left." See Corporal J. W. Minnich, "Reminiscences relating to the 'Siege of Yorktown, April-May 1862,'" typescript, 1928, Colonial NHP. (The original document was dated Morgan City, La., Mar. 6, 1928.)
heavy guns and withdrew toward Williamsburg—two days before all the Union batteries would have been fully prepared to open a devastating bombardment.6

Had McClellan's intelligence been better, he might have learned that the defenses of Yorktown were still incomplete even while his men were erecting their own batteries. As late as April 26, Confederate Major General D. H. Hill reported that his men were exhausted from strenuous efforts to complete the works:

I referred to the present exhaustion of the troops in Yorktown. Ten days ago there was not a traverse constructed against enfilade and reverse fire; there was not a magazine properly covered, and there was scarcely a heavy gun on the land side that could be brought to bear on certain points. All this work has been done by the troops here.7

Brigadier General John G. Barnard, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac, directed his officers to survey the captured works at both Yorktown and Gloucester as soon as they were occupied. Lieutenant Cyrus B. Comstock, Engineers, examined the works at Gloucester on May 5. He reported that they were two in number,

namely, a water battery on the extreme point, with its terre-plein only a foot or two above high tide, and a large field work on the bluff above. The water battery is U-shaped and has its rear closed. The guns and carriages were evidently navy ones; the parapet about 20 feet thick, and interior crest about 7½ feet high, revetted, and covered with turf embrasures, also revetted with sods. * * * There are embrasures for twelve guns.

The field work on the bluff . . . is a bastioned work of strong but variable profile, the parapet varying from 15 to 20 feet in thickness, 7


to 10 feet in height, and a ditch from 7 to 15 with the inequalities of the level of the ground. Several of the magazines serve as traverses. [This work was not quite finished; Comstock's plan showed a bombproof still unfinished in the interior.] The revetment . . . was of sods. . . . Guns and carriages were navy--these three were en barbette. There were no embrasures. The strength of the work is nearly the same as that of the work inclosing Yorktown. 8

Lieutenant Henry L. Abbot prepared a plan of the Yorktown works (see maps), but his written report, if any, has not been located. General Bernard wrote that Abbot's drawing of the outline was accurate:

The three bastioned fronts looking toward our approaches appear to have been earliest built, and have about 15 feet thickness of parapet and 8 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch, the width varying much, but never being less at top of scarp than 15 feet--I think generally much more.

The works extending around the town from the western salient of fronts just mentioned appeared to have been finished during the past winter and spring. They have formidable profiles, 18 feet thickness of parapet and generally 10 feet depth of ditch. The water batteries had generally 18 feet parapet; the guns in barbette. They were (as well as all the works mentioned) carefully constructed, with well-made sod revetments.

There were numerous traverses between the guns, and ample magazines. . . . The first two guns of the work on the heights bear upon the water as well as the land, and were of heavy caliber.

Barnard also made the important observation that "the general outline is almost the same as that of the British works in the Revolution; the trace is somewhat different. The profile is everywhere respectable."

All told, Barnard reported, the Confederates had arrangements for ninety-four guns in the Yorktown fortifications, of which McClellan's troops captured fifty-three in good order and three that had burst. Of the remaining gun positions, seven had embrasures for navy guns and the

other thirty-one were barbette for field guns (up to twenty-four pounders). The captured weapons ranged from six-pounders to sixty-four-pounders and eight-inch Columbiads.9

As the Peninsular Campaign ground to a close and Union troops pulled back to the North, Yorktown's active role in the Civil War ended. On August 31, 1862, a board of Union officers reported on the state of its defenses. At Yorktown forty-two garrison guns—apparently all captured from the Confederates—were then mounted; Gloucester Point possessed none. The two posts also shared three field batteries of four guns apiece. However, most of the garrison guns were out of alignment "from the settling of the earth and the warping of the platforms." Although the earthworks were relatively new, they were already showing signs of decay:

The extent of the covering line, independent of the shore line, is about 1 mile. The interior revetment is good. The exterior ditch and exterior face of the work is in many places so much washed away and defaced as to form but little impediment to an assaulting column. The whole ditch and the ramparts, exterior and interior, and a considerable portion of the enclosure of the works is overgrown with noxious weeds and the earth is saturated with human faeces and decaying animal matter.

The board noted that after the town's capture two divisions had been assigned the task of leveling the Union's siege lines, just as the Allies had done to their own parallels in 1781. However, these two units had been called away before starting this work. The board estimated that it would take 2,000 men thirty days to destroy the approaches and restore the slopes and ditches. But Yorktown's days as a battlefield were finally over.10

B. Civil War Photographs

In 1912 Francis Trevelyan Miller published The Photographic History of the Civil War in ten volumes. Volume 1 of this work contains a twenty-page photographic essay on the 1862 Siege of Yorktown. While these illustrations are not reproduced in this report, some of them add considerably to knowledge of the Confederate fortifications at Yorktown.

9. Barnard, report, May 6, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 2, pt. 1: 322-27, and McClellan, report, Aug. 4, 1863, p. 16. The statement has often been made that the Confederate works were much more massive than the British works. It is true that because of larger ordnance the Confederate batteries and gun positions had to be larger and had different shapes. Nonetheless the differences in thickness and height between the two works were relatively minor.

On page 263 is a photo labeled "The Costliest Rampart Ever Built." The photograph shows from the rear a gun in place in the Confederate main line. The caption reads: "Confederate Breastworks to the South and Southeast of Yorktown, reenforced with Cotton [bales]. This device was used once before, in the War of 1812, by the defenders of New Orleans. Before the end of the Civil War, cotton was worth $1.00 a pound in gold. It is safe to say that no fortification was ever built of material so expensive. These cotton bales were used to protect the gunners serving the 8-inch Columbiad at the parapet. The gun in the center, though of archaic pattern, was deemed worth wrecking by the Confederates when they evacuated the position to fall back upon Richmond."

Also on page 263 is the tantalizing photograph of a ditch that the caption says was dug by Cornwallis. Unfortunately, there is no way of determining where in Yorktown this picture was taken: "Fortifications of Two Wars. Earthworks of the Revolution Used in the Civil War. The ditch, dug by Cornwallis in 1781, was deepened by Magruder in 1862. The higher earthworks to the left are also of Revolutionary origin [a most doubtful conclusion]. The sandbag ramparts were added by the Confederates as further protection for guns and gunners, and as coverings to the magazines, one of which shows at the left of the picture."

On page 265 are six photographs showing various gun emplacements at or near Yorktown. A striking feature in all these illustrations is the extensive use the Confederates made of sandbags in revetting the gun positions. The last illustration on this page shows a water battery at Yorktown (Battery Magruder). The caption says that four of the five eight-inch Columbiads in this battery may be seen. The only water battery having five guns was the Lowertown battery, which had three eight-inch Columbiads, one sixty-four-pounder, and one forty-two pounder carronade.

Finally, a view on page 271 of the gate in the Confederate lines where the road from Williamsburg entered the town to become Main Street gives a good conception of the height and thickness of the 1862 works. It is to be remembered that the Confederate earthworks here on the western edge of Yorktown were the last built and were more substantial than those on the east and south.11

C. Comparison of 1781 and 1862 Works

Several important documents concerning the relationship between the 1861-62 Confederate fortifications and the 1781 British line have been prepared in recent years. These include:

(1) U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, map: "Colonial National Monument, Yorktown Battlefield, Virginia," 1931, surveyed in cooperation with the National Park Service, the Conservation and Development Commission of Virginia, and the United States Yorktown Sesquicentennial Commission. The remains of the Confederate line, as of 1931, are shown on this map in regular contour lines at five-foot intervals. The British works are overlaid on the map with the notation: "The [1781] fortifications and troop positions are tentatively outlined through the courtesy of the Conservation and Development Commission of Virginia." The compilers of this map did not, of course, have the advantage of subsequent (and ongoing) archeology at Yorktown.

(2) Thor Borresen, "Orientation Report on the Yorktown Battlefield Area, Containing the Fortifications, Encampment Areas, Headquarter Sites, and Artillery Parks, Constructed by the British, French, and American Armies In the Year 1781," 119 pages, plus maps and plans. Borresen was a member of the park staff at Colonial in the 1930s and was undoubtedly the best-informed expert on the siege and on the theory of siegecraft and field fortifications of the late 18th century.

(3) Charles E. Hatch, Jr., Historic Resource Study, Yorktown's Main Street (From Secretary Nelson's to the Windmill) and Military Entrenchments Close In and Around the Town of York, 1974, 245 pages, including illustrations and maps. Hatch was the park historian at Colonial NHP for many years; his knowledge of Tidewater Virginia is extensive and he is acknowledged as one of the top authorities in that field.

(4) Edward B. Jelks, "Archeological Study of British and Confederate Earthworks on the Southeast Side of Yorktown, Preliminary Report," 1955, 6 pages. This is a regrettably short report but, until the present, it reflected all the archeology that had been done on the main British lines. (Today Southside Historical Sites, Inc., is carrying out additional excavations in certain areas within and near the British-Confederate lines, and eventually knowledge of these fortifications will be greatly increased.)

All these authorities are in agreement with General Barnard's 1862 assessment that the Confederates followed the same general outline as that developed by Lieutenant Sutherland in 1781, but that the Confederate trace is somewhat different from the British. Although the first Confederate troops, in the spring of 1861, may have attempted to "retouch" the old British works, they must have become aware early that these few remains would not suffice no matter how much patching they received. All the authorities also agree that the works Magruder threw up in late 1861-early 1862 either covered or destroyed the old British trace, including the destruction of any remaining British works where the two traces did not fully coincide.
Of the more notable differences between the two traces, one is the general area at the southwest corner of the town. Here the British had a combination palisade/earthwork main line with redoubts (Nos. 1 and 2) and batteries (Nos. 9 and 10) located outside. The Confederates incorporated their redoubts and batteries into their main line, which here took the shape of an extremely large redoubt covering nearly all the ground that the British had once occupied. This general area is today extensively developed and undoubtedly great damage has been done to any remains from both sieges.

A second major difference occurred toward the south ends of Nelson (Pearl) and Smith streets along the southwestern parts of the lines. Here the British main line had bent inwards, i.e. toward the town; but the Confederate line remained more or less "straight" and lay outside the British parapet, or farther to the southwest. This general area has also undergone development over the years, but archeologists have recently uncovered evidence of a Revolutionary battery south of the Ballard House and east of the Potter's Kiln, in Lots 54 and 55. (This discovery is in disagreement with all the 1781 maps of the siege, none of which show a fixed battery in this location. It might reflect the fact that the British moved some of their artillery pieces about constantly.) Borreson wrote of a still-existing earthwork in this same vicinity: "The writer is of the opinion that no part of the present parapet is the original English work, but that the entire parapet is Confederate."

A third area in which there was considerable change in the traces occurred between the British hornwork and British Redoubt 7. According to the 1931 USGS map, the hornwork was entirely enveloped by the Confederate ramparts. Then, continuing eastward, the Confederate line lay outside (south of) the British as far as British Redoubt 6. At that point the Confederate parapet passed to the inside of the British until it reached a point just north of British Redoubt 7. This area has been little disturbed by modern intrusions and may offer a significant potential for further archeological investigation should such activity be desirable.

Another area where there may be a difference of traces is that on the beach below British Battery 4. Here Cornwallis had both an earthwork and a wooden palisade. Approximately three guns were mounted behind the earthwork to counter any enemy movement up the beach. The Confederates constructed a large water battery of five heavy guns and extensive earthworks in this same general area. Visible remains of either the British or the Confederate works do not exist today. No major development has occurred in this area; it is presently used as a picnic site and a bathing beach. It, too, may possess significant potential for archeological investigation.
Under the best of conditions it would be difficult for a layman to evaluate fairly the projections of the British works as shown on the 1931 USGS map. When one considers that the maps drawn in 1781 exhibit a wide variety of scales and competence on the part of the cartographers (French, British, and American), it becomes almost impossible to make judgements. Thus the layman must accept the 1931 map as the best available for making comparisons between the defense lines for the two sieges.

However, there is a possibility that the British hornwork extended farther to the south than indicated on the 1931 map, and that the Confederate works in this area did not completely envelope it. Borresen apparently thought that this was the case: "The question of whether or not the Confederates constructed their works on top of the old English works still remains to be answered definitely.... the writer is of the opinion that with the exception of a few incidents they did. The few exceptions include... the shortening of the hornwork." And again: "If any part of [the British line] is considered for reconstruction and restoration it should be confined to the hornwork and the area lying east of it." The writer has attempted to make measurements from known points on certain 1781 maps and on Abbot's 1862 map. The result has been (with admittedly great inaccuracy) an indication that the original hornwork possibly extended 100 feet farther to the south than the later Confederate work. The recommendation necessarily follows that this problem be explored by professional cartographers. If it should be determined that the hornwork did extend beyond the Confederate parapet, an archeological investigation might be in order.

D. A Recommendation

With the above in mind one turns to the oft-debated question of whether the surviving Confederate works should be preserved in full or whether they should be removed in part or in whole in order to reconstruct the British line of 1781. There is no question but that the Revolutionary siege, which brought the fighting to a close and gained America its independence, possesses greater historical significance than the Siege of 1862, which had no major influence on the course of the Civil War. At the same time, the remains of the Confederate works are genuine historic structures, dating from a momentous period of American history. Allowing for unknown amounts of restoration and maintenance over the years, they remain essentially what they are purported to be. The fact that their general outline is the same as that in 1781 is a case of good fortune for the interpretive needs of the area. (This is not a suggestion that their origins be misrepresented.)

A reconstruction of the British works in place of the Confederate would be a reconstruction created at the expense of genuine material. The recommendation is made here that the Confederate works not be sacrificed for reconstruction of the British lines; further, that where the two lines do not conflict or where the Confederate work has disappeared, thorough archeological investigations precede any decisions on the feasibility of reconstructing the British works.
E. Hatch's Observations on the Two Lines

In his study of Yorktown's Main Street, Charles E. Hatch, Jr., made some astute observations on the overlapping of the two lines. For the reader's convenience, extracts of these observations, with minor comments, are herewith quoted:

On the northwest side of town, both lines followed on the inner side of Buckner Street, and the 1862 line seems not to have crossed the street into the area where British Redoubt No. 1 was located. The Civil War line, however, turned the corner of the bluff [to the east] and ran downstream without the break at the corner that the earlier line seemingly had. Town Lots 10-12 and 16 surely were involved, as were Lots 13-15 and possibly [7-] 9 inland from Main Street.

... the Confederates erected a sizeable position that embraced all of the site of British Redoubt No. 2 and the indented corner of the British line in this locality. It also probably encompassed the site of the British battery between [Redoubt] No. 2 and Main Street [Battery 10], and possibly even the battery site to the south of [Redoubt] No. 2 [Battery 9]. Most of this would have been beyond the original town limits [but in the Gwyn Read Development], although Lots 15 and 21, and even 20, may have been involved.

The two lines appear to have been on like courses in that section between lines extended from Ballard Street and Nelson Street [Hatch, not having access to the 1781 Knox map of Yorktown, did not think that Yorktown's streets extended through the Gwyn Read area]. Here the heavy Civil War works obliterated, or obscured, the sites or lines of the older British Redoubts Nos. 3 and 4 and the batteries associated with them [8 and 9]. All would have been in the area of the Gwyn Read development.

In the section between ... Nelson Street and the south corner of the original town survey, the Civil War line curved inland [sic] toward Main Street, but not to the same pronounced degree as did the old British line. In this area there was likely involvement with Lots 55, 59, 63, 67, and 71 (and 75), as well as with more of the Gwyn Read development area. About at the edge of the town there was a fortified
break [a gate with traverse] in the line that would allow needed egress and ingress from and to the town area. Just beyond this [to the north] there was an inner trench that seemingly followed the direction of the shortened line built by the French in 1781. It probably was this French line itself.

From this point around the head of "Tobacco Road" ravine and on to the river, the Confederate and British lines seemed to be generally on the same line, even though the earlier line had been leveled after the siege of 1781. In 1862 the projection of the line out along the old York-Hampton Road was a stubby one, without the pronounced elongation of the old British Hornwork. There was also a pointed projection of the line about where the long west face of the Hornwork had been.

Curving east of this area, the Civil War line was flattened out with two battery projections, the second one probably on the site of British Redoubt No. 6 and its adjacent battery [No. 6].

On or over the site of British Redoubt No. 7, the Confederates advanced a massive pointed projection of their line for more artillery placements. The line then curved to the cliffs above the river.

At the cliff edge and facing riverward, the Confederates installed another battery, which from all indications, violated the sites of British Redoubt No. 8 and its adjacent water battery [No. 4].

All of the high bluff sites in Yorktown which overlook the York were brought into use for more Confederate artillery.

a. The section running from the Church area upstream, toward and across where Ballard Street eventually opened to the water [again, the Knox map shows Ballard open to the waterfront in 1781], was used for a large redoubt-battery complex which probably involved Lots 16, 22, 28, 34, and 40 [the traditional Fort Hill site and British Battery 1].

b. The cliff edge from Read Street around to the Great Valley became the site of another elongated position for four 32-pounder cannons. Here Lots 84 and 85 became involved [this bluff was not used by the British].

167
c. The bluff between the Great Valley and that down which the Comte de Grasse now runs likewise became a battery position above a hot shot battery on the waterfront below. Lots 76 and 77 [and 78? ] would have been partly used in this construction.

d. Between the Comte de Grasse Street ravine and that down which "Tobacco Road" runs just beyond the town limits, was still another fortified battery position [on the site of British Battery 2]. This area, on and behind the present Yorktown Monument, surely involved Lots 80 and 82 and the high ground between them, as well as the cliff edge.12

F. Jelks's Archeological Study, 1955

In 1955 Archeologist Edward B. Jelks made four cross sections in the existing Confederate lines to determine their relationship to any underground evidence of the original British works. One of these cross sections was made where the Colonial Parkway now crosses the Confederate line as the road approaches the visitor center parking lot (approximately on the west side of the former British hornwork). Jelks reported:

In addition to a clear profile of the Confederate embankment and moat, Test A revealed a trench or moat lying beneath the Confederate main line, attributed to the British defenses of 1781. The British trench runs west-northwest from Test A, passes under a Confederate gun platform, and (if it does not turn or end in the unexcavated area to the northwest) angles under the existing Confederate work. A few feet southeast of Test A the British trench makes a right angle turn and runs in a southwesterly direction for about thirty feet until it is intercepted by the Confederate moat. Artifacts from the bottom of the British trench have been dated as eighteenth century by Mr. Hudson.

Jelks concluded that the British parapet in this area had been leveled by the Confederates and that "the right angle turn in the British trench represents a corner of that [British] hornwork."

Jelks's next examination was made at the cut already in the Confederate lines where the tour road leaves the visitor center area and heads eastward toward British Redoubts 9 and 10. He cleaned and studied both faces of the cut but could find "no data that has yet been definitely associated with the Revolutionary period."

12. Hatch, Yorktown's Main Street, pp. 144-46.
A third cross section was cut through the main Confederate line where State Highway 238 now crosses it, east of Bacon Street and south of the Victory Monument. Jelks discovered here that "the profiles . . . revealed part of a trench or moat, running more or less parallel to the existing Confederate line. The eastern edge of this moat, still intact, lies under the western slope of the Confederate embankment, and the fill in the moat consists of laminated sand topped by a distinct zone of humus, over which lies fill material of the Confederate fort."

Jelks's last trench was the most revealing of all:

About 100 feet from the edge of the bluff overlooking York River, in the vicinity of British Redoubt No. 8 . . . a ten-foot [wide] trench . . . was cut through the Confederate line and extended southeastward to the edge of a deep ravine. The British main line followed the north bank of this same ravine away from the river.

A deep moat . . . between the Confederate line and the ravine, was followed in both directions. It made a right angle corner a few feet from the ravine, one leg running therefrom in a northerly direction, the other running westerly. Further examination revealed that the north leg of the moat passes beneath the existing Confederate line and that the Confederate moat dissects both legs. (The west leg was not followed under the Confederate line. . . .)

* * * * *

It is the moat dug by the British around their Redoubt No. 8. Further corroboration . . . is provided by numerous artifacts (including two rare budge barrels) . . . [their metal bands] bearing the British ordnance marks (†). . . .

Jelks concluded: "In the areas tested it can be stated with certainty that the Confederate main line followed closely the main British line of 1781. Redoubts, hornworks, gun emplacements, and similar complex defenses of the two periods, however, do not coincide exactly."

13. Jelks, "Archaeological Study," pp. 1-6; A historical note: At the end of 1781, General Knox wrote to Secretary at War Lincoln complaining that the commissary general of military stores had kept all the captured copper hoops from the powder kegs, "which according to the customs of War invariably appertain to the officer commanding the artillery of the conquerors" (himself). Knox was not being greedy; he was practically bankrupt at the time. Knox to Lincoln, Dec. 31, 1781, Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; A budge barrel has only one head. A piece of leather is nailed on the other end, which is drawn together with a string, like a purse. It was used for carrying powder from the magazine to the battery.
Appendix A

Blacks at Yorktown, 1781

While marching through Virginia in 1781, Lord Cornwallis encouraged able-bodied slaves to leave their owners and attach themselves to his army. Promised their freedom when Great Britain crushed the rebels, the blacks readily accepted the offer. Cornwallis was not altogether altruistic in his motives; he wanted laborers by the hundreds for employment on the fortifications, first at Portsmouth, later at Yorktown and Gloucester Point. An American spy reported that when General O'Hara left Portsmouth for Yorktown early in August, he took with him a "Number of Negroes." A correspondent from Hampton, Virginia, wrote a week later: "Our Negroes flock fast to them, and ease the soldierly of the Labourer's Work."\(^1\)

A part of these blacks were organized under the title of "Negro Pioneers"; others were assigned to the various regiments of the British Army. The Pioneers were assigned the task of erecting fortifications, while blacks attached to the regiments apparently performed a variety of menial tasks. Once work was well underway at Gloucester Point, which had priority in construction, an order was issued to the regimental commanders to collect all supernumerary Negroes in their units and send them to Yorktown. Still the demand for workers grew and, on August 25, the regimental commanders were directed to deliver up all blacks temporarily to the commanding officers of the Pioneers. Later that same day another order was issued directing "the Negroes with the Regts & Negro Pioneers to parade at six o'clock this Evening to be delivered over to the Commanding officer of the Black Pioneers." No other reference to the Black Pioneers has been located, but unquestionably it too consisted of pick-and-shovel men.\(^2\)

Writing to Clinton in August, Cornwallis complained that the weather was so hot he could not work his troops hard and thus could not finish the works for at least six more weeks. Clinton was surprised that Cornwallis was employing troop labor at all: "I am concerned to find your Lordship under the necessity of employing so many troops in working on the Fortifications, having entertained hopes that you were supplied with a sufficient number of Negroes for that and other Drudgeries." However, Cornwallis probably would have hesitated at employing many more blacks were they available. Already he was becoming concerned about the rapid

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consumption of food supplies—the first hint of the coming tragedy that would befall these men between two worlds: "Our consumption of provi-
sions is considerably increased by a number of refugees lately come to us,
and by negroes that are employed in different branches of the public
service." On September 3 the commissary received instructions to stop
issuing flour to the blacks and to feed them peas instead.3

The blacks were not recorded on the British troop returns and only
estimates can be made of their numbers. Colonel Timothy Pickering of
Massachusetts thought that Cornwallis had "perhaps, two thousand negroes,
with whose labor, chiefly, he has raised his works." This figure was
probably within reason. Pickering had learned, too, that the Negro la-
borers' circumstances at Yorktown had deteriorated greatly: "By hard
fare and severities these wretches have suffered exceedingly; many have
perished, and many are coming off [the British lines]. Those that are
become unfit for labor, the enemy doubtless wish to get rid of. Their
toils have saved his regular troops fresh for the siege."4

Once the Allied investiture of Yorktown was completed, Cornwallis
could no longer forage through the countryside for supplies. It was now
essential that he conserve his food and ammunition stores as much as pos-
sible to allow enough time for Clinton to arrive with the promised rein-
forcement. Furthermore, now that the fortifications were well advanced,
the need for laborers became less critical than before. Early in October
the British general took two drastic steps to reduce the demands on his
commissary: He ordered the killing of 400 horses; and he directed the
expulsion from the British lines of all blacks who were ill or who were
now excess to the needs of the garrison.

The effect on the Negroes was immediate and terrible. These men
who had fled from their owners for the promise of freedom were now forced
to leave their protectors. In a desperate effort to remain free, bands
of blacks attempted to hide in the woods about Yorktown, wandering in the
no man's land between the armies, starvation, falling ill, and dying by the
scores. Soldiers on both sides were shocked at the sight of these desper-
ate men. A Virginia doctor wrote that the British "have turned several
hundred Negroes out of the town in a most deplorable condition, perishing
with famine & disease." An American private said: "During the siege, we
saw in the woods herds of Negroes which Lord Cornwallis... had turned
adrift.... They might be seen scattered about in every direction, dead
and dying." Captain Ewald of the Jägers was outraged:

3. Cornwallis, Answer to Sir Henry Clinton, pp. 187-88; Clinton to
Cornwallis, Aug. 30, 1781, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library;

4. Octavius Pickering, The Life of Timothy Pickering, vol. 1 (Boston,
1867), pp. 300-301.
I would just as soon forget to record a cruel happening. On the same day of the enemy assault [Sept. 28?], we drove back to the enemy all our black friends, whom we had taken along to despoil the countryside. We had used them to good advantage and set them free, and now, with fear and trembling, they had to face the reward of their cruel masters. Last night I had to make a sneak patrol, during which I came across a great number of these unfortunates. In their hunger, these unhappy people would have devoured what I had; and since they lay between two fires, they had to be driven on by force. This harsh act had to be carried out, however, because of the scarcity of provisions; but we should have thought about their deliverance at this time.5

Washington learned that some of his officers were busily engaged in acquiring some of these victims as personal property. On October 9 he issued a sternly-worded order forbidding this practice and warned that if any officer was found doing this, "he may depend upon being called to the severest account for it."6

Despite Ewald's cry that all Negroes had been expelled from Yorktown, many hundreds were still in the British lines when Cornwallis surrendered. These men had suffered almost as much as had those who had been expelled. Lieutenant Verger described the appearance of the town when the French occupied it: "One could not go ten steps without meeting the wounded or dying, destitute negroes abandoned to their fate, and corpse after corpse on every hand." An American sutler wrote: "The negroes looked condemned, for the British had promised them their freedom, but instead of freedom they made them haul wagons, by hand, with timber to build their works, and made them work very hard with spades." He added that the Allies put these blacks to work filling in shell holes. Meanwhile, Washington ordered that the blacks be collected and accounted for. As Lieutenant Sanderson from Connecticut put it: "Collecting Nigars till 5 o'clock, then was Rel'd."7

Before he left Yorktown, General Washington attempted to settle the disposition of all the surviving blacks. Those who could prove that they


were free men were set at liberty. Slaves were sent to redoubts set aside for them at both Yorktown and Gloucester where they were kept under guard. Owners who showed up at Yorktown could claim their property. The remaining blacks were to be sent to nearby plantations and employed there while advertisements concerning them were placed in appropriate newspapers. Again Washington warned his officers, and the British as well, not to harbor any of these men.8

The number of these blacks that perished during the siege will never be known. As early as October 11, Col. St George Tucker wrote: "An immense number of Negroes have died, in the most miserable manner in York." Brisout de Barnville was more specific: "About 1,000 negroes or negresses of all ages, perished from want." This chapter in the story of the Siege of Yorktown was a tragic episode that reflected favorably on no one, especially not on Lord Cornwallis. He made promises that he could not keep. He stirred men to hope, then ignored their hopelessness. Since then, history has made much of the small number of casualties at Yorktown; but history has failed to count the black corpses. The contribution of these Negroes to the construction of the British defenses that have been discussed in these pages cannot be measured. One may but guess that it was indeed considerable.

Eighty years later Confederate General J. B. Magruder again employed blacks in the construction of Yorktown's Civil War defenses. Until December 1861 he had 1,000 Negro laborers at work on the lines. At that time he received orders to discharge the greater part of these men. From then on he had to rely on white soldiers and only a small number of blacks, whom he managed to retain, to finish the works. But these Negro laborers did not suffer the pain of purgatory as had those in 1781, nor did the signs of their labor disappear. The remains of the Confederate works at Yorktown today are their historical monument.10

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Appendix B
Glossary of Fortification Terms

The following glossary is based primarily on Thomas Wilhelm, A Military Dictionary and Gazetteer (Philadelphia, 1881):

ABATIS. A means of defense formed by cutting off the smaller branches of trees felled in the direction from which the enemy may be expected. The ends of the larger branches are sharpened and the butts of the limbs or trees fastened by crochet picket, or by imbedding in the earth, so that they cannot be easily removed. The hard wood of fruit trees was preferred over such soft woods as pine. Under ideal conditions an abatis should not be exposed to direct artillery fire, nor should it interfere with musket fire from the defenders' parapet. At Yorktown the Fusiliers Redoubt had a double abatis of great strength. Other works defended by abatis included the hornwork and outpost redoubts 9 and 10.

ARROW. See redan.

BANQUETTE. A step of earth within the parapet, sufficiently high to enable the defenders, when standing upon it, to fire over the crest of the parapet with ease.

BASTION. A work consisting of two faces and two flanks, all the angles being salient. Two bastions are connected by means of a curtain. Bastions contain marksmen, artillery, platform, and guards, sheltered by the parapets. While bastions are usually associated with permanent works, some of the redoubts at Yorktown, particularly British Redoubt 7, resembled bastions perfectly.

BATTERY. Consists of two or more pieces of artillery in the field. It implies the emplacement of ordnance either defensively or offensively. The ordnance constitutes the battery; men serve it, horses drag it, and epaulements may shelter it. In this report, for convenience, the sheltering earthworks are also considered part of the battery.

Types of batteries:

BARBETTE BATTERY (EN BARBETTE). Battery without embrasures, in which the guns are raised to fire over the parapet.

CAVALIER (RAISED BATTERY). A battery where the terreplein, or platform of earth on which the guns stand, is above the ordinary level of the ground.
CROSS BATTERIES. Two batteries that play athwart each other upon the same object, forming there an angle; what one battery shakes, the other beats down.

ENFILADE BATTERY. One that sweeps the whole length of a line, or the face or flank of any work.

MASKED (COVERED) BATTERY. When the cannon is covered by a breastwork or bank, or when the embrasure is camouflaged so as to conceal the weapon until it is ready to open fire. The covering is commonly made of brush, faggots, and earth.

RICOCHET BATTERY. Invented by Vauban. It is a method of discharging a cannon with a small charge of powder and with just enough elevation to fire over the parapet. When properly managed, the shot rolls along the rampart or interior of the enemy works, dismounting cannon and destroying troops.

REVERSE BATTERY. One that plays upon the rear of the defending troops and works.

SUNKEN BATTERY. A battery where the bottom of the embrasures is on a level with the ground and the platforms are sunk below it.

BERM. A narrow bench between the parapet and the ditch to prevent the earth of the parapet from sliding into the ditch.

BOMBPROOF. A military structure thick and strong enough to stop a bomb (shell) from penetrating.

CANNON. A weapon for firing projectiles, consisting of a heavy metal tube mounted on a carriage. The term includes guns, howitzers, and mortars.

CHAMADE. A signal made for parley by the beat of a drum.

COUNTERSCARP. The vertical or nearly vertical side of the ditch nearest to the besiegers and opposite the scarp.

COVERED (COUVERT) WAY. In permanent fortifications it was the broad path outside the ditch between the counterscarp and the glacis. Usually about thirty feet wide and sunk so far below the crest of the glacis that soldiers standing upon it cannot be seen by the besiegers. It is broad enough to allow troops to form on it, either to act defensively or to make sorties. At Yorktown it often as not meant simply the trench behind the parapet.
CROWNWORK. A work consisting of two or more fronts of fortification, joining by two long branches to the ditch of another work, a river, a village, etc. Generally used to defend a bridge or a suburb. It may also be regarded as an elaborate form of hornwork. There were no crownworks at Yorktown.

CURTAIN. That part of the rampart or wall between two bastions or two gates. The British parapets at Yorktown may be regarded as field curtains.

DITCH. An excavation made around the works, from which the earth required for the construction of the rampart or parapet is acquired. A ditch inside the works is called a trench.

EMBRASURE. An opening in the parapet through which a gun is pointed. The bottom of an embrasure is called the sole. The widening of an embrasure is called the splay. The sides are called cheeks.

ENCEINTE. The whole area of a fortified place, or the principal wall or rampart encircling the place.

EPAULEMENT. The flank of a battery parapet. Sometimes the whole of a small or secondary earthwork, including the battery and its flanks, is called an epaulement.

FASCINE. A long cylindrical faggot of brushwood used to revet the interior of batteries, embrasures, etc. More thoroughly described earlier in study.

FLECHE. A fieldwork having faces and small flanks hastily run up to shelter a small number of men and forming an outwork to some more powerful fortification. See redan.

FRAISE. A row of palisades planted horizontally or with an upward or downward angle at the edge of a ditch, on the berm, or on the steep exterior of a parapet. Generally seven to eight feet long and about five inches thick.

GABION. A cylindrical, bottomless "basket" made of twigs. Filled with earth, they allow the besiegers to carry on the approaches under cover. Batteries were often made of gabions; they served for revetments in constructing parapets of loose earth. See text.

GLACIS. A slope of open earth that inclines from the main works toward the country. Its object is to bring assailants, as they approach, into a conspicuous line of fire from the parapet, and also to mask the general works.
GORGE. The entrance into any work, or the space between the inner extremities of two faces. At Yorktown it also was applied to the high ground between the heads of Yorktown and Wormley creeks.

GUN. Many meanings. In this report it is generally used in reference to the heavy, unchambered cannon that fired shot, and as distinguished from howitzers and mortars.

HORNWORK. A kind of work in advance of a fortification, related to a crownwork but consisting of only one curtain and two half-bastions. The British had a hornwork extending out over the Hampton Road at Yorktown.

HOWITZER. A short, light cannon, having a chamber intended to throw large projectiles with comparatively small charges. Came in 8-inch and 10-inch sizes. Normally made of brass.

HURDLE. Mats of twigs interwoven close together and sustained by long stakes. Made in the figure of a parallelogram, 5 or 6 feet long and 3-3/4 feet wide. Used for revetting and other purposes. Hurdles were constructed in the same manner as gabions, except that the pickets were placed in a straight line instead of a circle.

INVEST. To seize all the avenues leading to a town or fortress. To invest a place is to take preparatory measures for a blockade or close siege.

LINES OF CIRCUMVALLATION. The defensive works by which a besieging army covers its rear and flanks against a relieving force. The Allies did not have to bother much with these at Yorktown.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION. All the practicable routes and roads connecting the different parts of an army in the theater of war.

MAGAZINE. A bombproof storehouse for powder. British also used this word when referring to a storehouse for provisions.

MERLON. That part of the parapet between two embrasures.

MORTAR. Short cannon for throwing shells, usually fired at angles from 45° to 60° elevation, called "vertical fire," as distinct from the fire of long cannon (guns) usually made at low angles.

PALISADE. A wall of vertical logs, about six to eight inches in diameter, with sharpened tops. The palisades should be from nine to ten feet long so that, when finished, the ends shall be at least seven feet above the ground. They should not be so close together as to allow an enemy to approach unseen.
PARALLEL. The besiegers' trenches before the enemy works, roughly parallel to its defenses, for the purpose of giving cover to the besiegers from the guns of the place. In the late 18th century usually three parallels were required: 1) At 600 yards, 2) At 300 yards, 3) Very close to the enemy works. The British surrendered before the third parallel was necessary at Yorktown.

PARAPET. Breastworks, made of earth at Yorktown. The earth to form it was taken from the ditch, either in front of it or at its rear. The interior slope of a parapet, against which the soldier leans when firing, has a slope of three on one and is usually revetted. The superior slope is usually one on six. The exterior slope is one on one, or the natural slope of the earth. If made steeper, it will be beaten down by shot and shell. If less steep, it will offer less of an obstacle to assault. The dimensions of the ditch are regulated by the amount of earth necessary for the parapet; but generally a ditch should not be less than six feet deep and not less than twelve feet wide. The thickness of a parapet should be one half greater than the penetration of the projectiles it is designed to resist.

RAMPART. Broad embankments or masses of earth that surround fortified places. The parapet is placed on the exterior edge of the rampart. At Yorktown the terms rampart and parapet are interchangeable for the British fortifications because they were only hastily-developed temporary works.

REDAN. The simplest form of field fortifications. It consists of two parapets forming a V, apex toward the front. It is a work of little strength since it has no flanking fire to protect its faces, and an enemy could enter through its undefended gorge. But a row of redans along the front of an army adds to its strength, the troops behind protecting the gorge and the redans flanking each other. The British erected a number of redans at both Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

REDOUBT. A small fort of varying shape. The British built both detached redoubts and redoubts in their main lines. A redoubt has a parapet, ditch, scarp, counterscarp, etc., as in a regular fortification.

SALIENT ANGLE. The projecting angle formed by the two faces of a bastion. It is the opposite of a reentering angle, or one whose vertex points inward.

SALLY (SORTIE). A sudden offensive movement by the garrison of a fortified place, directed against the troops or works of the besiegers.

SAP. A narrow ditch or trench by which approach is made from the foremost parallel toward the besieged place. The sap is usually made by four sappers, the leading man rolling a large gabion before him, excavating and filling smaller gabions and erecting them on one or both sides to form a parapet. When enemy fire is slack so that many gabions may be placed and filled at the same time, it is called a flying sap. If parapets must be formed on both sides, it is called a double sap.
SAUCISSONS. A fascine of more than the usual length. Discussed in text.

SCARP (ESCARP). The surface of the ditch next to the rampart.

SIEGE. Wilhelm's excellent essay on siege is reproduced in its entirety in the following appendix.

SUPERIOR SLOPE. The upper surface or top of a parapet.

TALUS. The degree of slope, or the slope itself.

TERREPLEIN. The terreplein of the rampart in permanent fortifications is the broad surface that remains after constructing the parapet and banquette. In field fortification it is the plane or level country around a work.

TRACE (TRACING). Lines that show the figure of the works and indicate the direction in which the defensive masses are laid out in order to obtain a proper defense.

TRAVERSE. Mounds of earth, higher than a man and eighteen feet thick, placed at frequent intervals on a rampart to stop short enfilading shot. See plan of the Confederate works at Yorktown for a large number of traverses.
Appendix C
A Note on Sieges

Captain Thomas Wilhelm, in his Military Dictionary and Gazetteer (1881), pages 530-32, compiled a short essay on the history of siege warfare. While this definition may not suffice for the needs of a professional military historian, it puts forth the tenets of the conduct of a siege in a concise and clear manner and provides a good background for the general reader. It is herein reproduced in full:

Siege (Fr. *siege*, a seat, "a sitting down"). Is the sitting of an army before a hostile town or fortress with the intention of capturing it. With certain elements, the success of a siege is beyond doubt; the result being merely a question of time. These elements are: First, the force of the besiegers shall be sufficient to overcome the besieged in actual combat, man to man. If this be not the case, the besieged, by a sortie, might destroy the opposing works and drive away the besiegers. The second element is, that the place must be thoroughly invested, so that no provisions, reinforcements, or other aliment of war can enter. The third element is, that the besiegers be undisturbed from without. For this is essential that there shall not be a hostile army in the neighborhood; or if there be, that the operations of the besiegers be protected by a covering army able to cope with the enemy's force in the field. The ancients executed gigantic works to produce these effects. To complete the investment they built a high and strong wall around the whole fortress; and to render themselves secure from without they built a similar wall, facing outwards, beyond their own position. The first was circumvallation, the second contravallation. It was thus that Caesar fortified himself while besieging Alexia, and maintained 60,000 men within his ring. In modern warfare it is considered preferable to establish strong posts here and there round the place, and merely sentinels and videttes between. Let us now assume that a fortress of great strength has to be reduced, and that the

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1. Attention is also directed to a longer article that compares the events at Yorktown with the general conduct of a siege in the 18th century: John W. Wright, "Notes on the Siege of Yorktown in 1781 with Special Reference to the Conduct of a Siege in the Eighteenth Century," William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine 12 (October, 1932): 229-49.
force of the enemy in the vicinity has been either subdued or held in check by a covering army. By rapid movements the place is at once invested on all sides. This step constitutes merely a blockade; and if time be of little importance, it is a sufficient operation, for hunger must sooner or later cause the fortress to surrender; but if more energetic measures are required, the actual siege must be prosecuted. Advantage is taken of any hidden ground to establish the park of artillery and the engineer's park; or, if there be none, these parks have to be placed out of range. The besieging force is now encamped just beyond the reach of the guns of the fortress; and their object is to get over the intervening ground and into the works without being torn to pieces by the concentrated fire of the numerous pieces which the defenders can bring to bear on every part. With this view, the place is approached by a series of zigzag trenches so pointed that they cannot be enfiladed by any guns in the fortress. In order to accommodate the forces necessary to protect the workers, the trenches at certain intervals are cut laterally for a great length, partly encircling the place, and affording safe room for a large force with ample battering material. These are called parallels, and they are generally three in number. The distance of the first parallel will increase as small-arms become more deadly; but with smooth-bore muskets it has been usual to break ground at 600 yards from the covered way of the fortress, while in the case of Sebastopol, ground was broken at 2000 yards. The engineers having, by reconnaissances, decided the locality of the parallel, and taken advantage of any inequalities of surface, a strong body of men is sent to the spot soon after nightfall. The attention of the garrison is distracted by false alarms in other directions. Half the men are armed cap-a-pie, and lie down before the proposed parallel; while the other half, bearing each a pick and shovel, and two empty gabions, prepare for work. Each man deposits the gabions where the parapet of the trench should be. He then digs down behind them, filling the gabions with the earth dug out, and after they are filled, throwing it over them, to widen and heighten the parapet. Before daylight the working party is expected to have formed sufficient cover to conceal themselves and the troops protecting them. During the day, they--being concealed from the garrison--widen and complete their parallel, making it of dimensions sufficient to allow of wagons and bodies of troops with guns passing along. During the same night other parties will have been at work at zigzags of approach from the depots out of range to the first
parallel, which zigzags will be probably not less than 1000 yards in length. As a rule, the defenders will not expend ammunition on the first parallel, for its extent (often several miles) will render the probability of doing material damage extremely small. For this reason also, the dimensions of the parapet and its solidity are of far less importance in the first parallel than in the more advanced works of attack. The first parallel being completed, the engineers select points near its extremities, at which they erect breastworks to cover bodies of cavalry, who are kept at hand to resist sorties from the garrison. The length of the parallel is usually made sufficient to embrace all the works of two bastions at least. Sites are then chosen for batteries, which are built up of fascines, gabions, sand-bags, and earth. They are placed at points in the parallel formed by the prolongation of the several faces of the bastions, ravelins, and other works of the fortress, which faces the batteries are severally intended to enfilade by a ricochet fire. Other batteries will be formed for a vertical fire of mortars. By these means it is hoped that the traverses on the hostile ramparts will be destroyed, the guns dismounted, and the defenders dispersed, before the final approaches bring the assailants to the covered way. The sappers will now commence their advance towards the points, or salient angles, of the two bastions to be attacked. If, however, the trench were cut straight towards the fortress, its guns could easily destroy the workmen, and enfilade the approach. To prevent this, it is cut into short zigzags, the direction always being a point a few yards beyond the outmost flanking-works of the garrison. The side of each trench nearest the fortress is protected by gabions and sand-bags, as in the case of the parallel. At intervals short spurs of trench, incipient parallels, are cut, to contain infantry, to act as guards to the sappers. The second parallel is about 300 yards from the enemy's works, and has to be more strongly formed than the first. It often terminates in a redoubt to hold some light artillery, and a strong force of infantry, who could assail any sortie in flank; or it may run into the first parallel, giving easier access for troops than through the zigzags. The second parallel is revetted with sand-bags, in which loop-holes are left for musketry. After passing the second parallel, the angles of the zigzags become more acute, to prevent enfilading. At about 150 yards, certain demi-parallels are cut, and armed with howitzer-batteries to clear the covered way, while riflemen also act from it. The third parallel is at the foot of the glacis. Thence the place, after being
sufficiently battered, is taken by a storming party, who make their way over the glacis; or the covered way is topped by the double sap, which is a safer plan for the army generally, though much more deadly to the sappers. When the crest of the covered way has thus been reached, batteries of heavy artillery will be there established, for the purpose of breaching the walls of the ravelin and bastion; while at the same time miners will first seek to destroy the defenders' countermines (which would otherwise be likely to send these batteries into the air), and then will excavate a tunnel to the ditch at the foot of the counterscarp. If the breach becomes practicable, a storming party will emerge from this tunnel or gallery, and seek to carry the opposite work by hard fighting. If inner works still subsist, which would tear assailants to pieces, the double sap may be continued across the ditch, if a dry ditch, right up the breach, that counter-batteries may be formed. If the ditch be wet, means must be adopted for a causeway or a bridge. By these means, however obstinate may be the defense, if the besieging force be sufficiently strong, and aid do not arrive from without, the ultimate success of the attack becomes certain. Vauban raised attack to a superiority above defense, first by the introduction of ricochet fire, which sweeps a whole line; and secondly by originating parallels.* Before his time, the whole attack was conducted by zigzag approaches, in which the troops actually in front could be but few, and were therefore unable to withstand strong sorties of the garrison, who, in consequence, frequently broke out and destroyed the works of the besiegers, rendering a siege an operation of the most uncertain character.

*Earlier in this study it was observed that Vauban probably did not originate the concept of parallels but he did indeed perfect the use of them.
Appendix D

Articles of Capitulation

(From a manuscript copy forwarded by Lord Cornwallis to General Clinton, October 20, 1781, in Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library.)

Articles of Capitulation settled between His Excellency General Washington Commander in Chief of the combined Forces of America & France, His Excellency the Count de Rochambeau Lieutenant General of the Armies of the King of France, Great Cross of the Royal & Military Order of St. Louis, commanding the auxiliary Troops of His most Christian Majesty in America, & his Excellency the Count de Grasse Lieutenant General of the Naval Armies of His most Christian Majesty, Commander of the Order of St. Louis, Commanding in Chief the Naval Army of France in the Chesapeake, on the one part. And The Right Honorable Earl Cornwallis Lieutenant General of His Britannick Majesty's Forces, Commanding the Garrisons of York & Gloucester and Thomas Symonds Esq. Commanding His Britannick Majesty's Naval Forces in York River in Virginia on the other part.

Article 1.

The Garrisons of York & Gloucester including the Officers & Seamen of His Britannick Majesty's Ships as well as other Mariners to surrender themselves Prisoners of War to the Combined Forces of America & France, The Land Troops to remain Prisoners to the United States, The Navy to the Naval Army of His most Christian Majesty.

Article 2nd

The Artillery, Arms, Accoutrements military Chest & publick Stores of every denomination shall be delivered unimpaired to the Heads of Departments appointed to receive them.

Article 1.

Granted.

Article 2nd

Granted.

185
Article 3d

At twelve O'Clock this Day the two Redoubts on the left Flank of York to be delivered the one to a Detachment of American Infantry, the other to a Detachment of French Grenadiers. The Garrison of York will march out to a place to be appointed in front of the Posts at 2 O'Clock precisely with Shoul-dered Arms, Colors cased & Drums beating a British or German March. They are then to ground their Arms and return to their Encampment where they will remain until they are dispatched to the places of their Destination. Two Works on the Gloucester Side will be delivered at one O'Clock to detach-ments of French & American Troops appointed to possess them. The Garrison will march out at 3 O'Clock in the Afternoon, the Cavalry with their Swords drawn Trumpets sounding & the Infantry in the manner prescribed for the Gar-rison of York. They are likewise to return to their Encampment until they can be finally marched off.

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Article 4th

Officers are to retain their Side Arms. Both Officers & Soldiers to keep their private Property of every kind, & no part of their Baggage or Papers to be at any Time subject to search or Inspection. The Baggage & Papers of Officers & Soldiers taken during the Siege to be likewise pre-served for them. It is understood that any Property obviously belonging to the inhabitants of these States, in the possession of the Garrison, shall be subject to be reclaimed.

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Granted.
Article 5th

The Soldiers to be kept in Virginia, Maryland or Pennsylvania, & as much by Regiments as possible & supplied with the same Rations of Provisions as are allowed to Soldiers in the Service of America, a Field Officer from each Nation, to wit, British Anspach & Hessian, and other Officers on parole in the proportion of one to fifty Men, to be allowed to reside near their respective Regiments, to visit them frequently & to be Witnesses of their Treatment, & that these Officers may receive & deliver Clothing & other Necessaries, for which Passports are to be granted when applied for.

Article 6th

The General, Staff & other Officers, not employed as mentioned in the above Article, & who chuse it, to be permitted to go on Parole to Europe, to New York, or to any other American Maritime Posts, at present in the Possession of the British Forces, at their own Option, & proper Vessels to be granted by the Count de Grasse to carry them under Flags of Truce to New York within 10 days from this date if possible, and they to reside in a district to be agreed upon hereafter until they embark. The Officers of the Civil departments of the Army & Navy to be included in this Article, Passports to go by Land to be granted to those to whom Vessels cannot be furnished.

Article 5th

Granted.

Article 6th

Granted.
Article 7th

Officers to be allowed to keep Soldiers as Servants according to the common practice of the Service. Servants not Soldiers are not to be considered as Prisoners & are to be allowed to attend their Masters.

Article 8th

The Bonetta Sloop of War to be equipped & navigated by its present Captain & Crew, & left entirely at the disposal of Lord Cornwallis from the hour that the Capitulation is signed to receive an Aid de Camp to carry dispatches to Sir Henry Clinton, & such Soldiers as he may think proper to send to New York to be permitted to sail without Examination when his dispatches are ready. His Lordship engaging on his part, that the Ship shall be delivered to the Order of the Count de Grasse if she escapes the dangers of the Seas. That she shall not carry off any public Stores, any part of the Crew that may be deficient on her Return & the Soldiers' Passengers to be accounted for on her Delivery.

Article 9th

The Traders are to preserve their property & to be allowed three Months to dispose of or remove them & those Traders are not to be considered as Prisoners of War.

The Traders will be allowed to dispose of their Effects, the Allied Army having the Right of Preemption. The Traders to be considered as Prisoners of War on parole.
Article 10th

Natives or Inhabitants of different Parts of this Country at present in York or Gloucester are not to be punished on Account of having joined the British Army.

Article 10th

This Article cannot be assented to being altogether of Civil Resort

Article 11th

Proper Hospitals to be furnished for the Sick & wounded, they are to be attended by their own Surgeons on Parole and they are to be furnished with Medicines & Stores from the American Hospitals.

Article 11th

The Hospital Stores now in York & Gloucester shall be delivered for the use of the British Sick and Wounded. Passports will be granted for procuring them further Supplies from New York as occasion may require. And proper Hospitals will be furnished for the Reception of the Sick and wounded of the two Garrisons.

Article 12th

Waggons to be furnished to carry the Baggage of the Officers attending the Soldiers and to Surgeons when travelling on Account of the Sick, attending the Hospitals at publick Expence.

Article 12th

They will be furnished if possible.

Article 13th

The Shipping and Boats in the two Harbours with all their Stores, Guns, Tackling & Apparel shall be delivered up in their present State to an Officer of the Navy appointed to take Possession of them, previously unloading the private Property, part of which had been on board for Security during the Siege.

Article 13th

Granted.
Article 14th

No Article of the Capitulation to be infringed on pretext of Reprisal, and if there be any doubtful Expressions in it, they are to be interpreted according to the common meaning and Acceptations of the Words.

Done in the Trenches before York October 19th 1781

(Signed)

G. Washington
Le Cte de Rochambeau
Le Cte de Barras en mon nom et celui du Cte de Grasse.

Cornwallis
ThS Symonds
Appendix E
Maps, Sieges of Yorktown, 1781 and 1862

In the course of doing research on the Sieges of Yorktown, my associate, Historian Jerome A. Greene, NPS, and I examined hundreds of primary and secondary maps in a dozen or more repositories and corresponded with another dozen historical societies and libraries. From these sources we gathered approximately 100 reproductions of the more pertinent maps pertaining to the events on Yorktown Peninsula and Gloucester Point in 1781 and 1862.

In planning our attack on this mass of data we began by consulting three basic documents, all indispensable in such an undertaking: (1) Thomas M. Pitkin, "A Bibliography of the Virginia Campaign and Siege of Yorktown, 1781, Being a part of the Master Bibliography of Colonial National Historical Park, Yorktown, Virginia, as of September, 1941," mimeograph, 162 pages. At the time he compiled this bibliography, Pitkin was the associate historical technician at Colonial National Historical Park. In Section 12, "Maps," pages 100-122, he listed 101 maps of the 1781 Siege. For each of these documents he gave the cartographer, title, scale, size, location of the original, and a brief description. Pitkin arranged the maps alphabetically by cartographer or, when that was unknown, by title; (2) Coolie Verner, Maps of the Yorktown Campaign... A Preliminary Checklist of Printed and Manuscript Maps Prior to 1800, Map Collectors' Series, no. 18 (London, 1965). Verner organizes his maps topically, e.g., "The Investment" and "The Siege," these sections being arranged generally in a chronological order. Each section begins with a brief history of the particular event. This is followed by a list of the maps, which are first arranged by nationality of the cartographer (British, French, American) and then subdivided into printed and manuscript documents. Verner discusses each map in detail, not only describing its contents and appearance but noting its history when that is of interest; (3) P. Lee Phillips, A List of Maps of America in the Library of Congress, Preceded by A List of Works Relating to Cartography (Washington, 1901), pages 1132-35. This last item, due to the passage of time since its publication, does not fully reflect today's holdings in the Map Division of the Library of Congress.

The following list of maps represents those that were of value in the preparation of this particular report; it is not a complete listing of all the maps pertaining to the two sieges. It is divided into three groups: (1) Those prepared during and soon after the Siege of 1781, (2) Those pertaining to the Siege of 1862, and (3) Relatively recent maps pertaining to either or both sieges. They are arranged alphabetically by either the cartographer or the title.
Siege of 1781


D'Aboville commanded the French artillery at Yorktown. This is an excellent map of Yorktown and Gloucester Point. Of particular value is an inset showing two profiles of the main British works; these have the appearance of having been prepared with care and are reproduced elsewhere in this study.


A general map of the Atlantic Coast, Delaware Bay, and Chesapeake Bay.


An attractive map that gives more detail of the countryside than it does of Yorktown or Gloucester Point. It is one of very few maps to show Choisi's troops in their blockade position at Gloucester Point.


A decorative cartouche shows many of the implements of siege warfare, including gabions and fascines. Within this cartouche is the statement: "This Plan was taken between the 22nd & 28th of October 1781." Generally considered to be the best American map of the siege. Bauman, German by birth, was in the American Artillery Corps.


The map in this study is a copy of the original made by the writer. Names and lot numbers have been added by the writer. Berthier was noted for the high quality of his maps, but this is a quite simple work prepared as an aid in billeting French troops in Yorktown. Later in life, Berthier became Napoleon's chief of staff.


The William L. Clements Library recently acquired this extremely good map of the siege. Bouan is said to have been an engineer.


An excellent map showing the countryside in detail from Jamestown to Yorktown. There is an inset watercolor sketch of Yorktown from Gloucester Point. A number of structures in both Lower Town and Upper Town are depicted, as well as vessels, some of which are burning.


Little detail given concerning Yorktown. A depiction of the naval engagement off the Capes in September 1781 receives emphasis.


This competent map of the siege is associated with a journal that is also in the Paul Mellon Collection: Henri Crublier d'Opterre, "Journal du Siège d'York en Virginie, Dec. 30, 1781."


Because of mechanical difficulties, a photostat of this map could not be made. However, several amateur photographs captured most of the data on this carefully drawn map.


The original of this map is in France. This copy of a copy is considerably faded.


Quite similar to No. 14 above. One is probably a copy of the other.


Similar to Nos. 14 and 15 above but a little more "finished."


This map is not dated, but it is known that Caziarc was interested in the Siege of Yorktown around 1880, one hundred years after the event.


Desandrouins was Rochambeau's chief engineer. This elegant map of the Williamsburg area shows Archer's Hope, Trebell's Landing, College Landing, Capitol Landing, and French and American camps.


Verner says that Erskine drew this route of march and that the writing on it is in the hands of both Erskine and DeWitt. It is generally called the DeWitt map. Written on it is: "No 124, U. From Allen's Ordinary through Williamsburg to York." It is the last sheet of a series showing the route of march of the Allied Army from New York to Yorktown.

This map, in the Henry Knox Papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society, has not been paid the attention it deserves. The cartographer is unknown, but he evidently had a sound knowledge of the layout of Yorktown. The map does not show any fortifications and leaves the impression that it represents Yorktown as it appeared just before the siege. Written upside down on the map, possibly in Knox's handwriting, is the startling message: "You will deliver the town immediately." The reproduction in this study is an exact copy by the writer.


The most detailed map available of Gloucester Point. It covers the area from York River to Abingdon Church.


Two sheets presenting the details of the naval engagement off the Capes on September 7-8, 1781.

23. [William Faden, publisher.] "A Plan of the Entrance of Chesapeake Bay, with James and York Rivers; wherein are shown the Respective Positions (in the beginning of October) 10° of the British Army... 20° of the American and French Forces... 30° and of the French Fleet... By an officer." British. Print. Nov. 26, 1781. Library of Congress.

A stylized map from Jamestown to Cape Henry. Very little detail of the siege lines. Apparently prepared in a rush as soon as news reached London that Cornwallis had surrendered.


This excellent map has an overlay that shows the British outer positions on September 28-29. The map itself shows the Allies' First and Second parallels.


A crude sketch of the Yorktown area.

A sketch map of Gloucester Peninsula showing roads and place-names. The original is in the Lafayette-Le Clerc MSS, Colonial Williamsburg.


Gouyion was French but was an engineer in the American Army. Washington forwarded this map to the President of the Congress on October 29, 1781.


This map, showing the division of the Yorktown waterfront into lots, is from Charles E. Hatch, Jr., Historic Resource Study, "York Under the Hill," Yorktown's Waterfront (1973). p. 289.


Another good British map. It is dated July 12, 1782, and marked "Copy."


An excellent map for many things, including the disposition of British troops within the works.


Shows the roads and principal dwellings between Williamsburg and Yorktown. The notes describe the countryside in some detail. Pitkin believed this to be a reconnaissance map made before the Allied advance from Williamsburg.


Almost, but not quite, identical to No. 31 above.


A reconnaissance map made before the siege. The trace of the British works indicates they were far from complete at the time.


The legend on this map contains information on the fortifications at Gloucester Point that is not duplicated elsewhere.


Includes the peninsula between Jamestown and Yorktown. The original of this map is in France and the copy in the Library of Congress is not of good quality. Consequently, a small inset sketch of Yorktown from the Gloucester shore cannot be duplicated in this study.


This important map is generally similar to but more detailed than the d'Aboville map, No. 1. It too has an inset showing profiles of the British works. It also shows the trace of the postsiege French fortifications, which Map No. 1 does not.


Possibly copied from No. 37. The profiles of the British works in the inset appear to be less carefully drawn.


Shows the new, postsiege French line of fortification.


An unusual feature is the depiction of several British camps in Lower Town and one in the Tobacco Road ravine. The legend details the armament of the different batteries—French, American, and British.


An unusual feature of this map is that by means of an overlay the lines of fire from the First and Second parallels are shown separately. The folder containing this map at the Library of Congress has "Berthier Brothers" written on it in pencil.


Quite similar to Map No. 2 but done by a different hand. The writing in the margin is by Sir Henry Clinton.


Somewhat similar to Hills's map, No. 30.

Contains much the same data as is on the overlay of Map No. 24—but decidedly a different map.


An excellent map of the battlefield, including the British works. Lieutenant Colonel Querenet was second in command of Rochambeau's engineers.


Similar to No. 48 but includes Allied camps.


Renault presented this map to Lafayette.


Place-names from Norfolk County to Gloucester County.


Two crude sketches of the Yorktown area.


That reproduced in this study was copied by the writer from a machine copy of the original. This is the only map showing the surrender ceremony--who stood where, etc.


Considering that Sutherland was Cornwallis's chief engineer, this is a disappointing map.

60. [Alexander Sutherland.] [The British Works at Yorktown and Gloucester.]

An unlabeled sketch showing the various works. Pitkin tentatively identified the author as Sutherland. Verner identifies it as a map Sutherland gave to General Clinton. Better draftsmanship than No. 59.


A general map of the James and York rivers and Chesapeake Bay.


British lines in outline only.


Even less detail of the British works than No. 63.


Has a small profile of the British earthworks.


A crude sketch done in crayon. Some place-names and mileages.


Siege of 1862


A tracing of Abbot's map is used in this study. The symbols indicating guns have been omitted.


Again, a tracing of Comstock's map is used herein.

Recent Maps


A superb drawing of Redoubt No. 9, giving all details, including four profiles.

Landers compiled this map. Donald E. Windham drew it.


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HISTORICAL BASE MAPS
MAP NO. 1.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 1.

Yorktown on Eve of Siege, 1781

This map of Yorktown and the surrounding country is a composite made from nearly all the existing historical maps concerning the siege. Of particular value was Map 20, "A Draught of York and its Environs," from the Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

Compiled by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd
Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 2.

The British Fortifications at Yorktown

The British fortifications as depicted here represent a composite of all the historical maps. No two of these maps agree in all details. For example, the number of outpost redans along the bluffs of Yorktown Creek differs greatly from map to map. This plan shows them all.

In compiling this map particular attention was paid to British historic maps: Faden, No. 23; Fage, No. 24; Hayman, No. 29; Hills, No. 30; and Sutherland, No. 60. Although Sutherland was the British chief engineer, his map is the least impressive of the lot.

A vexing problem was the appearance of the north (river) side of the Fusiliers' Redoubt. The vast majority of historic maps show it as an earthen parapet, similar to the rest of the redoubt. But three British maps show otherwise: Hills, No. 30, indicates no fortifications on this side, the enclosed redoubt simply ending at the cliff. Fage, No. 24, shows a similar situation. But Hayman, No. 29, has a depiction that is difficult to interpret. A narrow dark line would seem to indicate an earthwork, but one smaller than elsewhere in the British works. Outside this line is a partial row of dots, often used to indicate a wooden palisade. But in other locations where palisades are known to have stood, Hayman uses a series of short lines instead of dots. This north side of the redoubt is shown here as an earthen parapet, but with a question mark.

Documentary sources state that the church was used as a magazine. Two other approximate magazine locations are shown with an X; these are from the Sutherland map, No. 60.

A number of guns are shown along the line in addition to the batteries, e.g., in the hornwork. These too are taken from the many different maps of the siege.

Hills, No. 30, is the only map of the siege to show an entrance to the Fusiliers' Redoubt.

Compiled by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd
MAP NO. 3.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 3.

Disposition of British Troops, Yorktown

The disposition of the British and German units is compiled from four maps: Fage, No. 24; Hayman, No. 29; Hills, No. 30; and British, No. 46 (this last is similar to Hills). These maps are largely in agreement with one another. One exception is the Fage map, No. 24, that reverses the locations of the Prince Hereditary and 76th regiments.

Brigadier General O'Hara commanded the British right (west). Lieutenant Colonel Abercrombie commanded the left (east). Cornwallis established his headquarters in Secretary Nelson's house, later taking occasional shelter in a bombproof.

The Fusiliers' Redoubt was first manned by a detachment from the 23d Regiment (Fusiliers) and marines from the ships. Shortly after the siege began, these troops were replaced by rotating detachments of 100 men each (undoubtedly including Fusiliers).

The detachments at other outposts were not named on the source maps. They probably came from the regiments stationed behind them.

Compiled by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd
MAP NO. 4.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 4.

Profiles of British Works, Yorktown

After the capture of Yorktown, French officers studied the British works with care. Four French maps, Nos. 1, 37, 38, and 66, have insets showing profiles of these works. The profiles from three of them are reproduced here.

The two profiles on both Maps 1 and 37 are the best of the four. They distinguish between the palisade- and-earth construction of the western portion and the more massive earthworks of the eastern portion of the line. They are almost identical, suggesting that one served as a guide to the other. Also, they have the appearance of having been prepared with care. The presence of scales implies that measurements were taken.

The writer of this report has added approximate measurements to the two profiles from Map 37.

The single profile from Map 66 is not as useful as it might have been. The only available copy of this map is of such poor reproduction quality that it is impossible to read what appear to be actual measurements on the profile. (There is no scale.)

Map 38 also has two profiles and a scale. But the profiles appear to have been carelessly drawn, as compared to the others, and are not reproduced here.

Compiled by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd

226
PROFILE OF MAIN BRITISH WORKS WESTERN SIDE OF YORKTOWN

PROFILE OF MAIN BRITISH WORKS SOUTH AND EAST SIDES OF YORKTOWN (EARTHWORKS WITH FRAISE AND ABATIS)

BRITISH FORTIFICATIONS FROM FRENCH MAP No. 37

MEASUREMENTS MADE BY CONVERTING FRENCH SCALE (PIEDS) TO FEET

HISTORICAL BASE MAP
BRITISH DEFENSES OF YORKTOWN
(Profiles Of British Works, Yorktown)

COLONIAL NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK
VIRGINIA
MAP NO. 5.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 5.

British Works and Town Lots

This attempt to overlay a trace of the British works on a map of Yorktown showing its lots (numbers) and the lots in the Gwyn Read Development (letters) differs a little from previous studies.

The principal difference is the depiction of the main line running through Lots NN, OO, DD, CC, 51, and 55 on the southern (inland) side of the town. Earlier studies have indicated that this main line ran through Lots 27, 33, 39, 45, 50, and 54.

This conclusion was reached after studying all the historic maps, including the presiege map of Yorktown from the Henry Knox Papers, Map 20. Historical archeology may eventually settle the matter.

The compiler of this map is not quite so certain about depicting a back street running from between Lots 15 and QQ on the west to between Lots 74 and 75 on the east. While Map 20 clearly indicates such a lane, it may have been located farther south: from Lots QQ and Z on the west to Lots 75 and H on the east.

Shading suggests areas in which all structures would have been destroyed either in construction of the works or in the creation of lines of fire.

Compiled by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd
MAP NO. 6.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 6.

Surrender of British Army, Yorktown

Copy of sketch map by Ezra Stiles titled "Surrender." The original of this map is at the Yale University library. Stiles, then president of Yale University, talked to eyewitnesses of the British surrender ceremony. He was the only contemporary figure known to have drawn such a map. When compared with the best written descriptions of the event, this sketch map agrees in detail as to the locations of the American and French forces, the route of march, etc.

According to one contemporary source, Washington and Rochambeau stood at the head of their respective forces at or near the Allied Second Parallel.

Courtesy, Yale University Library
Traced by Robert H. Todd
SURRENDCERY OCT. 19, 1781
FROM EZRA STILES, "SURRENDCERY."

HISTORICAL BASE MAP
BRITISH DEFENSES OF YORKTOWN
( Surrender Of British Army, Yorktown )
COLONIAL NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK
VIRGINIA
MAP NO. 7.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 7.

French Billeting Map, Yorktown, Nov. 12, 1781

Shortly after the British surrender, French troops prepared to occupy Yorktown during the winter of 1781-82. Alexandre Berthier prepared a map of the town that showed the surviving structures suitable for billeting the troops: "Plan d'york town pour Servier a l'Establisement du d' hyver du Regiment de Soissonnois et les Grenadiers et Chasseurs de St. Onge le 12ibre 1781."

This tracing of the Berthier map has missing streets added by dashes, some lot numbers supplied, a few former British works labeled, and some place-names added.

That Berthier chose not to show the southern (top of page) portion of the town is an indication that few serviceable buildings remained standing in that area.

Courtesy, Princeton University Library
Data added by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd
MAP NO. 8.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 8.

New Postsiege French Line

When they occupied Yorktown in November 1781, the French troops shortened the circumference of the former British works by erecting a new parapet and redoubt on the west side of what was later "Tobacco Road" ravine, just below (east of) the town.

Details are lacking as to how thoroughly the French leveled the former British works to the south and east of this ravine.

This drawing is based on historic Maps 37 and 40, both of French origin.

Compiled by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd
MAP NO. 9.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 9.

British Fortifications, Gloucester Point

A composite map of the fortifications and troop disposition at the British post on Gloucester Point based on all the pertinent historic maps.

The historic maps for Gloucester Point contain fewer contradictions than do those showing Yorktown. A considerable number of the historic maps indicate an earthen parapet joining together the several redoubts and batteries. Yet the more pertinent maps and the written evidence show, seemingly beyond doubt, that a stout palisade joined these strong points.

Compiled by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd
MAP NO. 10.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 10.

Gloucester Point, August-September-October, 1781

A. Abingdon Church. The stout brick church with its surrounding stone wall was an ideal defensive post. During August and September, British patrols covering foraging parties often set up a position here. In October the French further fortified the church in case Cornwallis decided to cross York River to escape northward. The Allies also used it as a hospital.

B. Seawell's Ordinary. A French source stated that American General Weedon made this tavern his headquarters. A Hessian source said that French General Choisi had his headquarters here. The ordinary still serves the needs of travelers, having been moved back from its original site due to widening of the highway, State 17.

C. Farm House. The same French source mentioned in B wrote that Choisi had his headquarters here.

The American-French camp, just south of Seawell's Ordinary, was composed of American militia, with its field artillery, and French marines from de Grasse's fleet. Lauzun's camp consisted of his Legion (cavalry) and some infantry.

The number of guns shown in the British batteries and redoubts is from Hayman, Map 29.

Compiled by Erwin Thompson
Drawn by Robert H. Todd
MAP NO. 11.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 11.

**Civil War, Yorktown**

A TRACING OF RECONNAISSANCE
OF THE SUCCESSION WORKS AT YORKTOWN
BY LIEUT. ABBOT TOP. ENG. MAY 4, 1862

HISTORICAL BASE MAP
BRITISH DEFENSES OF YORKTOWN
(Civil War, Yorktown)
COLONIAL NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK
VIRGINIA
MAP NO. 12.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 12.

Civil War, Gloucester Point

A TRACING OF RECONNAISSANCE
OF THE SECESSION WORKS AT GLOUCESTER POINT
BY LIEUT. COMSTOCK, ENGRS. MAY 4, 1862

( LANDWARD PARAPET NOT SHOWN )

PARAPET 15 FT. THICK
PARAPET 20 FT. THICK
BOMBPRESS
BEGIN

NEW WHARF
OLD WHARF
PARAPET COVERING
APPROACHES TO WATER BATTERY
PARAPET 20 FT. THICK

YORK RIVER

HISTORICAL BASE MAP
BRITISH DEFENSES OF YORKTOWN
( Civil War, Gloucester Point )

COLONIAL NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK
VIRGINIA

333  28.005
JUN 75  DSC
SHEET 12 OF 13
MAP NO. 13.

Historical Base Map, British Defenses of Yorktown, Sheet 13.

Siege Lines of 1781 and 1862, Yorktown


This report is not in full agreement with the locations shown for the British lines: e.g., the extent to which the British line bends "inward" in the vicinity of Smith Street; also, it is possible the British hornwork extended farther to the south than shown here.
SELECTED HISTORIC MAPS

Siege of Yorktown
MAP NO. 1.


The anonymous cartographer of this remarkable map had an expert knowledge of the appearance of Yorktown. It represents the town before the British fortified it. It is possible that Knox had this map prepared when he was first planning his artillery operations, even before the siege began.

Wholly inexplicable is the written comment: "You will deliver the town immediately." On the original map this seems to be in Knox's handwriting.

Courtesy, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston
MAP NO. 2.

A portion of Map 29: John Hayman, Lieut., 17th Infantry. [Yorktown, Gloucester Point, and York River.] This reproduction is from a manuscript map in the British Museum that is dated June 12, 1782, and marked "copy."

Courtesy, Library of Congress
MAP NO. 3.


Courtesy, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
A PLAN of
YORKTOWN AND GLOUCESTER,
in the Province of VIRGINIA.

Showing
the Works constructed for the Defence of those Ports
by the BRITISH ARMY,
under the Command of L'Gen' Earl Cornwalles;

Together with
the Attacks and Operations of the American and French Forces,
Commanded by
Gen'l Washington and Count Rochambeau,
to whom the said Ports were Surrendered
on the 19th October 1781,
from an actual Survey in the Reduction of
the 2nd His late Lord's Ship Emma.

LONDON Printed by Wm. Faden, Mapmaker to the King, Long Acre. (Front)
MAP NO. 4.


Courtesy, Library of Congress
MAP NO. 5.

Portion of manuscript Map 13: "Carte des Environs de York en Virginie avec les attaques et la position des Armées Françoise et Americaine devant cette place en 1781."

Courtesy, William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
MAP NO. 6.


Courtesy, Library of Congress
MAP NO. 7.

Another portion of Map 48. Shows the British fortifications at Gloucester Point.

Courtesy, Library of Congress
MAP NO. 8.

Map 21: "Environ de Gloucester." This French manuscript is the best of the few maps showing more of the north side of York River than of the point itself.

Courtesy, Princeton University Library
ILLUSTRATIONS
Illustration 1.

Colonial water battery at Yorktown, 1755. Beneath the Union Jack, the Fort Hill water battery may be seen. Cornwallis incorporated this ancient battery into his defenses in 1781.

Illustration 2.

Watercolor of Yorktown from Gloucester Point, 1781, in Lt. Col. John Graves Simcoe Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation. The two black structures on the far left represent British Redoubts 9 and 10. To the right of the broad ravine, behind the ship's mast, is the eastern end of the British main line (Battery No. 4). Battery No. 1 stretches along the cliff below the British flag on the far right of the picture.

Courtesy, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation
Illustration 3.

A watercolor of Yorktown by Jonathan Trumbull, April 23, 1791. In the left panel are remains of what is probably the postsiege French line in front of Secretary Thomas Nelson's house. The work in the right panel might represent British Redoubt 10. On the reverse of the sketch is the following description: "York Town . . . as seen from the point at which the British Army enter'd between the two lines of the Allied troops of America & France, at the Surrender in 81.--distance from the advanc'd work, 270 yds."

Courtesy, Fordham University
Illustration 4.

The postsiege French line and Secretary Nelson's battered residence as sketched by Benjamin Henry Latrobe, ca. 1796.

Courtesy, Virginia State Library
Illustration 5.

"Cornwallis's Cave," as sketched by Latrobe, ca. 1796.

Courtesy, Virginia State Library
As the Nation's principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has basic responsibilities to protect and conserve our land and water, energy and minerals, fish and wildlife, parks and recreation areas, and to ensure the wise use of all these resources. The Department also has major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in island territories under U.S. administration.