NPS Logo

Guilford Courthouse National Military Park

GUILFORD COURTHOUSE NATIONAL MILITARY PARK, established by Act of Congress in 1917, includes the site on which the Battle of Guilford Courthouse was fought on March 15, 1781. This battle marked the beginning of the end of the Revolutionary struggle. It was a British victory, but a victory which left the enemy so weak that it caused them to lose the campaign for the suppression of the rebellion in the Southern colonies, a victory that started the armies of Cornwallis on the road to Yorktown and surrender. Also within the park is the site of the original Guilford County Courthouse and a part of the vanished village of Martinsville, N. C.

From 1917 to 1933 Guilford Courthouse National Military Park was under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of War. In 1933 the park was transferred to the Department of the Interior to be administered by the National Park Service. An attempt has been made by the Service to restore the battlefield to its historic setting. To that end many trees have been planted to give the area a semblance of the open woodland in which the American and British forces fought.

Guilford Courthouse National Military Park, containing approximately 147 acres, is situated in gently rolling country, 6 miles northwest of Greensboro, N. C., on United States Highway No. 220. In the park are a total of 29 monuments and markers, including a fine equestrian statue of Gen. Nathanael Greene. Buried in the area are the remains of six persons prominent in the history of the State of North Carolina. The administration building, in which there is a small museum, is located immediately adjacent to the park entrance, and here a guide is on duty at all times except Saturday afternoons. Adjoining the national military park on the southeast is a park owned by the city of Greensboro, in which are facilities for picnics, swimming, boating, and a limited amount of fishing.

All communications relating to the park should be addressed to the Superintendent, Guilford Courthouse National Military Park, Greensboro, N. C.

Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, Commanding General of the American forces in the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. This engraving was made from a painting by Charles Willson Pealet

The Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War

THE CAMPAIGN of which the Battle of Guilford Courthouse was the culmination began more than 2 years earlier. In 1778, with the war approaching a stalemate in the East, the British authorities adopted a new plan by which operations were to be transferred to the South, an area relatively untouched by the war up to that time. They planned to overrun the States successively from Georgia northward in the belief that little more than a parade of British might would be necessary to restore those States to normal relations with the crown. It was also believed that if the people were made to suffer the discomforts of war, they would soon desire peace.

Accordingly, an expeditionary force sent to Georgia under Sir Archibald Campbell captured Savannah during the last week of 1778, and with the assistance of Gen. Augustine Prevost, who had marched northward from Florida with 2,000 men, completed the conquest of Georgia during the first half of 1779. In April, Prevost entered South Carolina and devastated it, but failing to take Charleston, the key city of the region, he was compelled to return to Georgia. In September, the Americans, with the aid of a French fleet attempted to retake Savannah, but were repulsed with severe losses. In December, Sir Henry Clinton, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in America, set sail from New York with 8,000 men. He landed at Tybee Island at the mouth of the Savannah River, and having obtained reinforcements from Prevost, proceeded against Charleston. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, who commanded Charleston, should have abandoned it, but instead he collected all the troops he could and shut himself up in the city, where he surrendered on May 12, 1780, after a brief siege. Clinton immediately sent out forces which made the British position more secure throughout South Carolina.

Having obtained his objective, Clinton returned to New York, leaving the Earl of Cornwallis in command, with the task of consolidating the gains in the South and continuing the conquest. There followed a period of anarchy and confusion with the British and loyalists plundering, murdering, confiscating, and the patriots retaliating the best they could. Cornwallis exercised a measure of control by means of a series of military posts that he established throughout the country, but he was constantly annoyed and harassed by guerrilla raids led by the partisans Marion, Sumter, Pickens, and Williams. Charleston remained the British base of operations and supply depot, while activity in the interior centered at Camden.

In June, Gen. Horatio Gates was appointed to take command of the patriot troops in the South, and when he arrived at Hillsboro, the capital of North Carolina, he found a force composed of the Maryland Brigade and the Delaware Regiment under the immediate command of De Kalb. Gates determined to attempt the liberation of the South and planned to move in force against Camden where Lord Rawdon was in command of the British garrison. This was, strategically and tactically, a sound conception, but in its execution Gates failed completely. His own fatal errors led to a defeat at Camden, August 16, 1780, one of the most disastrous battles in which an American army has ever been engaged. This defeat terminated all organized opposition to British control in South Carolina and cleared the way for further advances. In September, Cornwallis moved his main body from Camden to Charlotte. Simultaneously, a flank column, under Maj. Patrick Ferguson, was marching from Fort Ninety-Six through the Piedmont carrying the war into the upcountry. This column was expected to join Cornwallis at Charlotte.

Ferguson's advance aroused the back country mountaineers, hitherto not particularly concerned with the war. Separated by time and distance from the more thickly populated East, these settlers had their own problems and their own troubles—notably the Indians. Ferguson's appearance in their own region was, however, of vital concern to them. They forthwith assembled in small bodies, each under its own leader, for the purpose of repelling the invasion. Eventually, about 2,000 of them gathered from the frontiers of the four southernmost States and at once set out in pursuit of the invader who had learned of the gathering and had turned toward Charlotte. Ferguson took position on Kings Mountain to await reinforcements and here was discovered and immediately attacked by about 1,000 backwoodsmen on October 7.

The position chosen by Ferguson for a stand was almost ideally suited to the type of fighting at which his adversaries were most adept. The heavily wooded hillside offered ample cover through which the frontiersmen, trained in such tactics by contests with the Indians, worked their way forward with little opposition. The same cover provided a refuge to which they retired for the interval required to reload their rifles. The base of the mountain was surrounded, and the parties advanced independently on each side. As one group reached the crest it fired a volley and retreated to the woods to reload while one of the other parties occupied the British attention. At the end of approximately an hour Ferguson was dead, about 400 of his men were slain, and more than 700 were captured. On learning the news of this disaster, Cornwallis fell back from Charlotte to Winnsborough to await reinforcements.

A few days after Cornwallis withdrew from North Carolina, the Continental Congress made an important move affecting the war in the South. The fiasco at Camden had caused that body to lose faith in Gates, and Washington was requested to nominate a successor. Nathanael Greene was Washington's choice, and he was accordingly appointed by the Congress to the command of the Southern Department.

The battlefield at Guilford Courthouse as it appeared in 1854, according to a sketch by Benson J. Lossing

Greene reached Charlotte early in December, and here he found the remnant of Gates' force which had been joined by some additional militia. The men were low in morale and poorly equipped. Obviously, the Americans were in no position to give battle, in consequence of which Greene divided his army, sending Gen. Daniel Morgan with about half of the men to the southwest toward Fort Ninety-Six, while he conducted the remainder to a position on the Peedee River near the present site of Cheraw, S. C. Greene's move was undoubtedly dangerous and violated the basic rule of strategy which forbids the division of a force in the face of a superior enemy, but it forced Cornwallis to act, for the Americans were so distributed as to endanger his entire forward line. That line ran from Georgetown through Camden, Winnsborough, and Fort Ninety-Six to Augusta. Morgan threatened Fort Ninety-Six and Augusta, while Greene was in position to advance on either Georgetown or Camden, or even to cut between them and to move directly against the British base at Charleston. Another possibility which Cornwallis faced was a cooperative advance against Winnsborough from two directions.

The British commander's answer to this threat was to divide his own Army. He sent Col. Banastre Tarleton with a strong column to operate against Morgan, while he intended to move into position to intercept the Americans whom he expected Tarleton to drive northward. Unfortunately for his plan, Morgan roundly defeated Tarleton in a battle at Cowpens, and then escaped because Cornwallis had delayed about 48 hours in moving the main British body northward. That battle took place about the middle of January 1781, and in it the British suffered a reverse almost as serious as that of Kings Mountain 3 months earlier.

Morgan began a rapid retreat northward and eastward immediately after Cowpens with Cornwallis in close pursuit. The two Armies were then about 25 miles apart. Twenty-three days later, after the Americans had marched about 125 miles airline distance, they had gained 3 miles. When he began to retreat, Morgan sent news of the battle and of his future plans to Greene. Thereupon, Greene set his force in motion northward under Gen. Isaac Huger, while he, himself, with a small escort, joined Morgan near Beatty's Ford on the Catawba River near the present site of Mooresville, N. C. The Yadkin River was crossed at the Trading Ford, a few miles from Salisbury, where an overnight rise of 2 feet in the stream prevented the passage of the pursuing force. From that point the Americans continued to Guilford Courthouse, where they were joined by the other half of the Army from Cheraw, and whence the retreat was continued toward Virginia.

The Earl of Cornwallis, Major General in command of the British forces in the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. From a portrait by John Singleton Copley

Cornwallis, unable to use the Trading Ford because of the high water, ascended the Yadkin River to the Shallow Ford, several miles west of the Moravian settlement at Salem. By this time Greene's plans were fairly evident. He wished to avoid battle, to draw the British as far as possible from their base, and to be able to retire into Virginia if the necessity should arise. To prevent Greene from escaping and in the hope of forcing an engagement, Cornwallis continued the pursuit which developed into a race for the river fords. The Dan River was deep and could be forded only on its upper reaches, in consequence of which the Englishman interposed his army between Greene and these fords in the expectation that he might compel the Americans to fight. Greene, however, had prepared for just such a contingency and at his direction boats had been built and collected on the south bank of the Dan. In them the Americans safely crossed the river. Cornwallis gave up the chase and marched back to Hillsborough, where he raised the royal standard and issued a proclamation calling upon all loyal subjects to rally to his assistance. The results, however, were so disappointing that within a few days his army was again on the march partly from the necessity of securing food.

Meanwhile, Greene collected reinforcements and rested his army in Virginia. His main object had been to draw Cornwallis away from his base, and, fearing now that he might return to it, Greene recrossed the Dan about the first of March. For about 2 weeks he kept on the move, playing for time and position, and avoiding decisive action until he could be joined by the last of the summoned militia reinforcements. These reinforcements arrived in camp on March 13 and 14, and the whole American force was moved forthwith to Guilford Courthouse where battle stations were taken. Cornwallis was informed of this on the fourteenth, and early on the next morning he marched from his camp on Deep River to the engagement he had so long sought.

The Battle of Guilford Courthouse

ADVANCED guard action took place 3 miles west of the American position, but it resulted in no advantage to either side. The Americans retired, and the British continued to advance along the New Garden Road toward the courthouse.

The Americans were drawn up in three lines, approximately 400 yards apart, facing west. The third line was entirely north of the New Garden Road, following the crest of a low hill, while the other two were across the road to the north and south. The terrain was heavily wooded and hence impracticable for effective cavalry action. The woods likewise reduced the effectiveness of the artillery since the field of fire, particularly for the attacking force, was poor. Approximately a half mile in front of the position there was a small stream from which the ground rose steadily, though rather gradually, to the crest of a hill where the first line was drawn up. Three cultivated fields, one to the north and two to the south of the road, provided an excellent field of fire for parts of that line while the rail fences enclosing them afforded the troops some protection. The second line was entirely in the woods, and the third near the western edge of a good-sized clearing of which the courthouse was the center.

Both flanks of the first two lines and the right of the third were unprotected, but the heavy woods precluded anything other than a direct frontal attack. The left flank of the third line rested on the New Garden Road and was protected by artillery during the later stages of the battle.

The first line consisted of two brigades of North Carolina Militia, almost all of whom were thoroughly untrained and entirely without battle experience. On the left flank were stationed Lee's Legion and Campbell's Riflemen. The former were regulars and the latter a body of frontiersmen from the Virginia and North Carolina mountains who had had appreciable campaign experience, including participation in the Battle of Kings Mountain. The right flank detachment was composed of William Washington's regular cavalry, the remnant of the Delaware regiment of Continentals, and Lynch's Riflemen, comparable in experience and capacity to Campbell's. In the center, on the road, a section of artillery, two 6-pound guns, commanded the stream crossing below.

The second line was made up entirely of Virginia Militia, the majority of whom were as untrained and inexperienced as were the North Carolinians in the front line. The Virginia officers, however, were largely men who had served in the Continental Army, and a number of them had had some battle experience. There were also a few men in the ranks of the Virginians who had had previous military service, so that the second line was somewhat stronger than the first by virtue of this leaven of experience. Finally, General Stephens, in command of one brigade, placed sentinels a few yards in the rear of his line to insure against any break by his men.

The third line was composed of Greene's two small brigades of Continental troops. Of the four regiments one, the First Maryland, was a veteran unit. The Second Maryland and the two Virginia regiments were recently reorganized, had excellent officers, and a good proportion of veterans were in the ranks. The total force, regular and militia, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, numbered about 4,400. Of this total possibly 1,500 to 1,600 of all arms were regulars, but many of these fell into the recruit classification.

William Washington, Colonel of Cavalry in Greene's army, led the only charge in the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. William Washington was a cousin of George Washington

The army of Cornwallis, numerically inferior, was vastly superior in organization, discipline, training, and experience. Engaged in the Battle of Guilford Courthouse were about 2,000 of the very flower of the British forces in America. There were two battalions, a grenadier, and a light infantry company of the Guards; the Twenty-third and Thirty-third Regiments of foot, the former the famous Welch Fusiliers; the Seventy-first Highlanders, the King's Own Borderers; the Regiment of Bose, one of the best of the Hessian units; some agers; Tarleton's Legion Cavalry; and a detachment of the Royal Artillery. All were veterans, thoroughly schooled in the business of war, and commanded by able, experienced officers.

The attacking force advanced toward the east from the scene of the advance guard skirmish along the New Garden Road, crossed the stream at the foot of the hill in front of the American position, and formed for action. Meanwhile, the American artillery had opened fire in an attempt to delay the crossing, and to harass the formation of the line, but with little result. The British artillery replied with an equally useless expenditure of ammunition. The attack formation was a single line with a small reserve. The right wing consisted of the Highlanders and the Regiment of Bose with the First Battalion of Guards in support. In the left wing the Twenty-third and Thirty-third Regiments were in line and the Second Battalion and Grenadiers of the Guards in support. The artillery, confined by the woods to the road, was in the center, to its left the light infantry of the Guards, and the yagers were stationed in the woods. On the road, in column behind the artillery, was the cavalry. These four units composed the small reserve.

The formation being completed, the force moved almost directly east on the position held by the Americans. The fighting on the two flanks, where experienced troops had been stationed by General Greene, was brisk. This flank resistance forced the commander of each of the two British wings to commit his small support to the battle in its earliest stages. General Leslie, on the right, brought up the First Battalion of the Guards to assist in opposing the American left, and thus extended his own line. On the British left Colonel Webster caused his whole line to incline to the left, while his support, the Second Battalion and Grenadiers of the Guards, moved into the center to maintain contact with the right wing and fill the interval caused by the echelon movement. The light infantry and yagers were brought up from the reserve and posted on the extreme left flank. A considerable number of casualties were suffered by the British, especially by the flank units, but the center encountered little resistance, for that part of the American line, in large measure, broke at the first onset.

The American left flank detachment under Lee and Campbell retired before the Regiment of Bose and the First Battalion of the Guards toward the southeast. These units became completely detached from the main course of the engagement, conducting what amounted to a separate conflict of their own. This terminated with the retirement of the Americans at about the same time that the Continentals withdrew from the field. The exact course of the American right flank detachment is unknown. It seems most probable that it briefly took position on the flank of the second line; and, upon the retirement of that body, moved thence to the flank of the third.

(click on image for a PDF version)

The break in the center permitted the attack to proceed east along the road and through the woods about 400 yards, where it struck the second line. The Virginians gave a good account of themselves, inflicting further casualties upon the attackers. The superior discipline, organization, and experience of the British, however, were too much for the militia, who were forced to retire to the rear. The retirement of the second line was a distinctly more orderly procedure than had been that of the first line.

The withdrawal of the second line opened the way for the advance against the third. This last line was entirely north of the road and was opposed by the British left wing. The heavy woods and several gullies of considerable size served to slow up the advance, particularly that of the Welch Fusiliers. The Second Battalion of the Guards made contact with the left units of the American line almost simultaneously with the attack on the American right by the yagers, the light infantry, and the Thirty-third Regiment. A general engagement resulted in which the contest was more nearly equal than any which had preceded it. The Guards were broken by the combined efforts of the Maryland Brigade and a charge by Washington's Cavalry. This charge was the only real cavalry action during the battle. The Guards had been repulsed by the First Maryland which, in its turn, was advancing to engage with the bayonet. Washington led his dragoons through the broken ranks of the Guards and then left that unit to the tender mercies of the Marylanders in a fierce but brief hand-to-hand conflict, ended only by a "whiff of grape-shot" thrown into the struggling mass at the order of Cornwallis. On the extreme left the yagers, the light infantry, and the Thirty-third had been driven back to a position of safety by the steady fire of the Americans. They were not pursued, the defenders in that quarter remaining steadfast in their own position.

By this time the Fusiliers had succeeded in passing the woods and gullies which had impeded their progress, and were in position to attack. The Royal Artillery had occupied a position from which it commanded almost the entire American line with grape and canister, and the Highlanders to the south of the road threatened to turn Greene's left flank. The Guards, extricated from their conflict with the Marylanders by the grape-shot, were hastily reorganized, while the latter returned to their position in the American line. Tarleton had been dispatched with the cavalry to recall the First Battalion of the Guards from the detached contest with the troops of Lee and Campbell and to conduct that unit to the scene of the major engagement. All was ready, therefore, for a final assault in force upon the one remaining line of American troops. That assault was never to be made, for the American commander decided to avoid a final test of strength which might result in the complete destruction of one or the other of the contending Armies.

General Greene was faced with a difficult decision at this juncture. On the one hand a desperate charge by his Continentals, or even a determined stand in their established position, might conceivably have shattered the little English force already weakened by extensive casualties. Either of these courses, however, involved the risk of sacrificing completely, or materially weakening, his two small brigades of regulars, the only thoroughly dependable force in his entire command. On the other hand, a general retirement from the field with those troops remaining to him involved no risk and left him so situated as to be able to renew the contest at his own discretion. His Continentals had not, thus far, suffered many casualties. They were entirely under control and fully capable of immediate or future action. He was fully aware that much further campaigning would be necessary if the South were to be redeemed from British domination. He had dealt a heavy blow to his adversary while suffering little himself. He therefore ordered a general retreat, leaving to his enemy the field of conflict and hence the claim to victory.

Lieut. Col. Henry Lee, known as "Light Horse Harry," commanded the cavalry on the left of the American line at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse

British arms had gained another hard-fought field. Disciplined, organized, regular troops had triumphed again over greatly superior numbers of raw militia. No more than this had been accomplished. A victory had been won, but won at such cost that it could not be exploited. Of the entire British force at the beginning of the battle, nearly 600, or more than one-fourth of the whole, were casualties at its close 2-1/2 hours later. The Americans, on the other hand, suffered only about half as many casualties. A large number of men were missing, principally from among the troops of the first line, but the majority of these found their way back to the Army within a few days.

The Road to Yorktown

THE BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURTHOUSE was the climax of a hard campaign of 2 months in the dead of winter. Cornwallis had destroyed his baggage train in order that he might pursue the Americans more rapidly, and after their victory the British found themselves in an almost desperate situation. Shoes, clothing, ammunition, medicines, food—all the myriad supplies and equipment necessary for successful campaigning were either entirely expended or dangerously low. The men were tired and their morale was none too good. Rest, reorganization, and refitting were essential and for this Cornwallis required time and safety. The English were, therefore, forced to retreat in order that they might establish immediate contact with their base of operations at Charleston.

After the battle, Cornwallis headed southeast. His first destination was Cross Creek near Fayetteville. The settlers in that region, almost all Highland Scots, were largely loyalists, and it was thought that they would provide the retreating army with food and a safe haven for reorganization. It was also thought that water communication with Charleston could be established by way of the Cape Fear River. But the river was not navigable to Cross Creek, nor was food available. Of necessity, then, the march was continued to Wilmington, where the sea route to Charleston was open, and where all needed supplies could be delivered without difficulty.

In the meantime, Greene eagerly grasped the opportunity which the action at Guilford Courthouse and the retreats of his adversary had presented to him. He followed Cornwallis part of the way to Cross Creek, seeking in his turn to bring on a contest which Cornwallis sought to avoid. After a few days of fruitless pursuit Greene suddenly changed direction, led his army into South Carolina, and bent his energies to the redemption of that State. In this purpose he was successful. At the end of the summer he had lost most of his battles, as he had lost at Guilford, but after each battle the British were compelled to evacuate one or more of the posts which they held. Finally, in September, after the Battle of Eutaw Springs, the British were driven from the whole State and continued to hold only the city of Charleston against which Greene was powerless for want of an assisting naval force.

Cornwallis remained at Wilmington for about a month, going thence to Virginia where he united with an army under Benedict Arnold and operated over much of the southern part of the State during the first part of the summer. Early in August he established himself at Yorktown, where he was forced to surrender on October 19.

The importance of the Battle of Guilford Courthouse lies not in the battle itself, not in the numbers involved, the tactics employed, nor in the casualties inflicted upon either side. Rather its importance is in the effects which flowed from it, and in the fact that in winning Cornwallis was the ultimate loser.

Thus Guilford Courthouse is important in the immediate result of rendering North Carolina safe, and in the larger result of freeing Greene's hands for reconquest to the southward. The grand British plan of campaign which would have detached the southern States from the States to the north was broken. Cornwallis was driven into Virginia without making secure his rear. Greene had lost a battle but won a campaign.

The Guilford Battle Ground Company

QUITE apart from its particular page in the story of the American Revolution, Guilford Courthouse National Military Park has an interesting history of its own. The creation of the park was largely due to the vision, the energy, and the devotion of the late Judge David Schenck of Greensboro, N. C., who in the early eighties of the last century was accustomed to make frequent visits to the area for the purpose of studying the battle. On one of these visits, in October 1886, Judge Schenck suddenly decided to purchase the site in order to rescue it from oblivion. It was nearly sundown, but an irresistible urge to carry out this scheme spurred him to immediate action, and the twilight had faded, he had bargained for 30 acres of land.

This plan of the battle, engraved for Lee's Memoirs of the War, is a so-called Tarleton Map, which was published in London in 1787. It is not wholly accurate, and the north point should be rotated 50 degrees to the left for proper orientation

Soon after his initial activity, Judge Schenck succeeded in imparting some of his enthusiasm for the battleground venture to a group of his intimate friends, and together they determined to place the enterprise on a firm base. They incorporated under the name of The Guilford Battle Ground Company and petitioned the State legislature for a charter. An act of incorporation, passed by the legislature and ratified on March 7, 1887, stated that the corporation would exist "for the benevolent purpose of preserving and adorning the grounds on and over which the battle of 'Guilford Court House' was fought" ... and the "erection thereon of monuments, tombstones, or other memorials to commemorate the heroic deeds of the American patriots who participated in this battle for liberty and independence."

From a Philadelphia broadside, outlining Greene's activities in the South. In the Emmett Collection, New York Public Library

In May of the same year, the stockholders enumerated in the charter held their first meeting, organized the company, and elected Judge Schenck to the presidency, a position he continued to hold for many years. The company then set to work vigorously to carry out the purposes for which it had been formed. Stock was sold at $25 a share, and, as money came in from the sale of stock, more land was purchased. It seems to have been an accepted indication of good citizenship in the community to own one or more shares of stock in the company, and, by 1893, one hundred individuals and corporations were listed as stock holders. As it obtained land, the company proceeded to develop the battlefield. Woodlands were cleared and monuments were erected. During the 30 years of the company's existence, between 20 and 30 monuments were erected in the area—some by the company, some by individuals, and others by governmental units, including the United States and the State of North Carolina. The company also erected a small museum and acquired a number of eighteenth and early nineteenth century items for exhibit. A part of this museum collection is now on display at Guilford Courthouse National Military Park.

In addition to its program for the development of the battlefield, the Guilford Battle Ground Company desired to make its property an historic shrine—a repository for the remains of patriotic and distinguished individuals. As a result, the remains of six persons were secured and reinterred on the battlefield. Among these were two of the North Carolina signers of the Declaration of Independence, a North Carolina senator, and a governor of the State.

Under the auspices of the company annual patriotic celebrations were held on the "Battle Ground," a name still used locally to designate the park; and on these occasions, usually July 4, the people of the surrounding country gathered almost en masse. These formal celebrations continued to be held until 1931 when the Battle of Guilford Courthouse was reenacted by units of the National Guard in commemoration of the sesquicentennial anniversary of the battle. The custom of visiting the park on the Fourth of July is still observed by large numbers of the local citizens.

An effort to have its property recognized as of national significance and to have it declared a national preserve was inaugurated by the Battle Ground Company in 1910. Several bills to effect the transfer of the property to the Federal Government were introduced in Congress, but it was not until 1917 that the legislation creating the Guilford Courthouse National Military Park was enacted. Promptly after passage of the act, the Battle Ground Company deeded its lands to the United States, wound up its affairs, and went out of existence.

At the left is a monument to the memory of Mrs. Kerrenhauppuch Turner, who, according to legend, rode alone from Maryland to North Carolina to nurse a son wounded in the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. On the right is a memorial to Capt. James Morehead, of the North Carolina Line, who was killed at the Battle of Stono. Captain Morehead was a grandson of Kerrenhauppuch Turner

Monument to the memory of Maj. Joseph Winston, who commanded a group of North Carolina Militia riflemen in the Battle of Guilford Courthouse

Monument erected by the students of Oak Ridge Military Institute in 1896 to the memory of the "Bugler Boy" Gillies, trumpeter to Light Horse Harry Lee. Gillies was killed by troopers of Tarleton's Legion near the present village of Oak Ridge

The Administration Building and Museum

(click on image for a PDF version)

<<< Previous <<< Contents>>>

Last Updated: 20-Jun-2010