National Register of Historic Places Multiple Property Documentation Form

X New Submission

A. Name of Multiple Property Listing

Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio MPS

B. Associated Historic Contexts

Confederate Gen. John Hunt Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, July 2-July 26, 1863

Monuments Commemorating Places and Events Associated with Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio

C. Form Prepared by

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D. Certification

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this documentation form meets the National Register documentation standards and sets forth requirements for the listing of related properties consistent with the National Register criteria. This submission meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR 60 and the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation.

I hereby certify that this multiple property documentation form has been approved by the National Register as a basis for evaluating related properties for listing in the National Register.

Signature of the Keeper

July 19, 2016
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Provide the following information on continuation sheets. Cite the letter and title before each section of the narrative. Assign page numbers according to the instructions for continuation sheets in National Register Bulletin How to Complete the Multiple Property Documentation Form (formerly 16B). Fill in page numbers for each section in the space below.

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Paperwork Reduction Act Statement: This information is being collected for applications to the National Register of Historic Places to nominate properties for listing or determine eligibility for listing, to list properties, and to amend existing listings. Response to this request is required to obtain a benefit in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended (16 U.S.C.460 et seq.).

Estimated Burden Statement: Public reporting burden for this form is estimated to average 18 hours per response including time for reviewing instructions, gathering and maintaining data, and completing and reviewing the form. Direct comments regarding this burden estimate or any aspect of this form to the Chief, Administrative Services Division, National Park Service, PO Box 37127, Washington, DC 20013-7127; and the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reductions Project (1024-0018), Washington, DC 20503.
Section E Context:

Confederate Gen. John Hunt Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, July 2-July 26, 1863

On July 2, 1863, Confederate General John Hunt Morgan’s cavalry crossed the Cumberland River, beginning a raid through Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio that ended on July 26, 1863, with Morgan’s surrender near West Point, Ohio.

The route of the raid either passed through, or caused damage to or loss of property in, twelve counties in Kentucky: Adair, Bullitt, Cumberland, Green, Hardin, Jefferson, Meade, Metcalfe, Monroe, Nelson, Taylor and Washington; ten counties in Indiana: Clark, Dearborn, Floyd, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson, Jennings, Ripley, Scott and Washington; and twenty-nine counties in Ohio: Adams, Athens, Belmont, Brown, Butler, Carroll, Clermont, Clinton, Columbiana, Fairfield, Gallia, Guernsey, Hamilton, Harrison, Highland, Hocking, Jackson, Jefferson, Meigs, Morgan, Muskingum, Noble, Perry, Pike, Ross, Scioto, Vinton, Warren and Washington (Maps 1-4).

Two periods of significance have been defined for Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio: (1) the dates of the raid, July 2-July 26, 1863, and (2) the period of post-war commemoration, 1874-1963. This context addresses the first period of significance. The second is addressed in Monuments Commemorating Places and Events Associated with Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio.

Four property types have been defined for properties falling into the first period of significance: engagement sites, surrender sites, transportation-related sites and buildings. To qualify for listing, resources must be directly associated with the campaign recorded in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion as Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio (Morgan’s Raid) and must retain integrity. ¹ One property type has been defined for the second period: monuments. To qualify for listing, monuments must be generally over fifty years old, must possess significance based on their own value as a evidence of the later generation's assessment of the significance of Morgan's Raid and retain sufficient integrity to convey the historic character of the path of the raid. Refer to Section F of this document for specific property type registration requirements.

Significance of Morgan’s Raid
On July 29, 1863, three days after Gen. John Hunt Morgan was captured in Columbiana County, Ohio, Irene Gray of Cincinnati wrote her sister, Julia, about her experiences during Morgan’s

raid in Ohio. She summed up her feelings in one sentence: “I think we will never get done talking about it.”

Confederate Gen. John Hunt Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio has national significance as an important event within the context of the American Civil War. The raid, a campaign recognized by the landmark *Civil War Sites Advisory Commission* (CWSAC), stretched from the Cumberland River near the Kentucky-Tennessee border, through Kentucky, across southern Indiana, and through southern and eastern Ohio, ending in Columbiana County, Ohio, approximately forty miles west of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.

The governors of Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia and Pennsylvania called out militia to pursue Morgan. At the time of his capture, some 32,000 militiamen were in pursuit. Over the course of the twenty-four-day raid, more than 100,000 militiamen were called up and organized. In addition, parts of the 23rd Corps and the Second Kanawha Division—some 20,000 Union soldiers—participated in the campaign to stop Morgan, and the navy deployed seven gunboats to help keep him from re-crossing the Ohio River.

The geographic scope of the raid, the number of U.S. volunteers and local militia involved, the deployment of U.S. naval vessels, the effect of the raid on the ebb and flow of operations in the Western Theater, and the cost of the raid in terms of reparations, affirm its national significance.

The congressionally mandated Civil War Sites Advisory Commission identified fifty-seven significant raids, stating: “In general, they [raids] left little or no signature on the ground.” The list the Commission developed was to aid in the study of raids and to help scholars recognize and interpret these military events.

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The CWSAC noted:

Raids, especially those conducted by cavalry, were a special phenomena of the American Civil War. They demonstrated a versatility and mobility seldom seen before. Raids yielded intelligence, screened troops movements, disrupted enemy operations, and destroyed supplies and munitions.6

Many of the raids identified as significant by the CWSAC had tangible goals and a limited scope of operation, as the name given the raids indicate. Fourteen targeted specific railroads. The scope of operations of twenty-eight raids was limited to one state; fifteen covered more than one state, including Morgan’s 1863 raid into Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio.

Of the fourteen raids in addition to Morgan’s that covered more than one state, five were limited to a given theater of operations or had very specific goals and were to some degree associated with the Atlanta Campaign. Union General Samuel P. Carter’s December-January 1863 Raid into East Tennessee and Southwestern Virginia was a raid against railroads, bridges and Confederate supply depots. This raid, while it did cross three state lines, was very limited in scope. Confederate Brigadier General James R. Chalmers’ October 1863 Raid into West Tennessee and North Mississippi was strictly a railroad raid, its focus the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston railroads. Confederate Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s March-April 1864 Raid into West Tennessee brought fresh horses and recruits into Forrest’s command and tied up Union troops that could have been sent against Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s forces near Atlanta. Confederate Major General Joseph Wheeler’s August-September 1864 Raid to North Georgia and East Tennessee was designed to cut Union General William T. Sherman’s supply lines and to draw him away from Atlanta. Confederate Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s September-October 1864 Raid into North Alabama and Middle Tennessee targeted the Nashville and Decatur and the Nashville and Chattanooga railroads. One railroad was cut, the other was not and Sherman’s supply lines remained intact.7

Three, also limited to a given theater of operations or that had very specific goals, do not match the scope of Morgan’s Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio Raid. Union Colonel Abel Streight’s Raid from Tuscumbia, Alabama to Rome, Georgia was actually a one-state raid as Streight’s men never made it to Rome, except as prisoners. The St. Albans Raid was a very small scale affair;

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twenty-one Confederate cavalrmen commanded by Colonel Bennett Young participated in what were three bank robberies and a failed attempt to burn the small Vermont town for which the raid was named. This event does not rank with the larger cavalry raids of the Civil War. Confederate Captain Thomas Hines’ Raid into Indiana in June 1863 was a scouting expedition for Morgan’s raid. This event was also a small scale raid that accomplished very little, except to gather information for Morgan.\(^8\)

Only six raids approach the scope of Morgan’s Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio Raid. These are, in alphabetical order, Grierson’s April-May 1863 Raid from La Grange, Tennessee to Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Jenkins’ August-September 1862 Expedition in West Virginia and Ohio; Shelby’s September-October 1863 Raid in Arkansas and Missouri; Stoneman’s March-April 1865 Raid from East Tennessee into Southwestern Virginia and Western North Carolina; Stuart’s October 1862 Raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania; and Wilson’s March-April 1865 Raid from Chickasaw, Alabama to Selma, Alabama to Macon, Georgia.

Perhaps the most successful of the six was Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson’s raid, the objectives of which were to destroy Confederate installations, supplies, stores and communications. The raid tied up the thousands of Confederate soldiers who were trying to stop or capture Grierson and his 1,700 men. The raiders destroyed sixty miles of railroad track and telegraph line and tons of quartermaster and commissary supplies and the diversion of the Confederate troops allowed Major General Ulysses S. Grant to make an unopposed landing on the east bank of the Mississippi River. Grierson rode 600 miles and lost only twenty-four men in the process. The raid helped demonstrate the vulnerability of the southern interior and earned Grierson a general’s star.\(^9\)

Confederate Brigadier General Albert G. Jenkins’ August-September 1862, expedition in West Virginia and Ohio was very focused. Except for a brief foray into Ohio, the raid was confined to present-day West Virginia. When 5,000 Union troops were pulled out of the Kanawha Valley, Major General William W. Loring ordered Jenkins to attack Union installations in that area. Jenkins’ circuitous route took his column from southern West Virginia north to Huttonsville and then west to Ravenswood on the Ohio River where he forded the river into Meigs County, Ohio.


After crossing the river he went west and captured Racine, where he crossed the Ohio back into West Virginia. The raid, though fairly long, was localized. It resulted in the destruction of quartermaster and commissary supplies and eventually made possible the Confederate capture of Charleston, West Virginia.\(^\text{10}\)

Confederate Colonel Joseph O. Shelby’s September-October 1863, raid in Arkansas and Missouri began in Arkadelphia, Arkansas. On September 22, 1863, he crossed the Arkansas River at Ozark, reaching reached Missouri ten days later. Shelby captured numerous Union soldiers and supplies before being badly defeated at Marshall, Missouri. After his defeat he destroyed the supplies he had captured and retreated back into Arkansas. Regardless, Shelby’s men had ridden 1,500 miles and he was promoted to brigadier general. Though dramatic, the raid had no lasting effect on the war in Missouri or Arkansas.\(^\text{11}\)

Union Major General George Stoneman’s March-April 1865, raid from East Tennessee into Southwestern Virginia and Western North Carolina may have been one of the most destructive Union raids of the Civil War. Six thousand Union cavalry left Tennessee and rode through Virginia, North Carolina, and into South Carolina, destroying railroad bridges, supplies and government property, and capturing Confederate soldiers. The month-long raid stretched as far east as Greensboro, North Carolina, as far north as Lynchburg, Virginia, and into South Carolina, where a bridge across the Catawba River was burned. The raid coincided with the end of the war in the Eastern Theater—as it was taking place Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House.\(^\text{12}\)

One of the most famous raids of the Civil War was Confederate Brigadier General J.E.B. Stuart’s October 1862, raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. This was the second time that Stuart had ridden around Union Major General George B. McClellan’s army. Stuart crossed the Potomac River west of Williamsport and rode northeast to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, where he captured horses and burned Union supplies and railroad rolling stock. He then continued east and turned south through Pennsylvania, crossed into Maryland near Emmitsburg, and crossed back


into Virginia near Leesburg. The raid gathered horses and intelligence regarding the location of Union forces and generally embarrassed the Union high command.  

On March 22, 1865, Union Brigadier General James H. Wilson set out with 13,000 cavalrymen to destroy Alabama’s industrial centers. All that stood between Wilson and his goal was Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest and less than 7,000 Confederate troopers. Forrest’s command was scattered and he never brought them together. He was defeated at Montevallo, Ebenezer Church, and finally at Selma. Wilson’s Raid destroyed four major industrial complexes; he captured 6,000 Confederate soldiers and the former Confederate capital, Montgomery, Alabama.

J.E.B. Stuart’s and Albert Jenkins’ raids, while extending into Union states, did not have the scope or the reach of Morgan’s raid. Stuart, while riding around the Army of the Potomac, basically made a one hundred mile arc around Hagerstown, Maryland. The raid extended to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, but two-thirds of it took place in Maryland—a Union border state where the people, for the most part, were not hostile to the Confederates. Jenkins’ Raid was approximately 600 miles long and all but about 20 miles was in what is today West Virginia. The fate of the western Virginia counties that became West Virginia were still up in the air and the removal of thousands of Union troops allowed Jenkins’ pretty much free reign along the route of the raid.

Both Stoneman’s and Wilson’s raids were very late in the war and both demonstrate the Union army’s overwhelming manpower and the Confederacy’s broken will. It can be argued that by the time these raids took place the outcome of the war was no longer in doubt. Conversely, one could make the argument that the soldiers in the field in March and April 1865, did not know that South had lost the war. However, by the spring of 1865, Confederate soldiers had deserted the army in large numbers. By April 1865, the Confederate army had 359,000 soldiers on its muster rolls yet only 120,000 were present for duty. Fully two-thirds of the Confederate army

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was absent. The high desertion rate indicates that a significant percentage of Confederate soldiers no longer felt that the Confederacy was worth fighting for.\(^{15}\)

As Stoneman ran roughshod over Virginia and North Carolina only a handful of Confederate soldiers could be brought to bear against the Union cavalry. In western North Carolina, a brigade of Confederate troops refused to engage Stoneman after they had heard rumors of a truce between Union Major General William T. Sherman and General Joseph E. Johnston. In Alabama, Confederate Lieut. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest could not pull together enough troops to slow Wilson’s cavalry. As a result, the industrial heartland of the Confederacy was destroyed and Forrest surrendered less than a month after his defeat at Selma. Both Wilson’s and Stoneman’s raids were highly effective and the distances covered were comparable to that covered by Morgan. However, those raids were undertaken at a different time in the war and had very focused military objectives.\(^{16}\)

Of the six raids, Shelby’s Arkansas and Missouri Raid was most comparable with Morgan’s in terms of distance covered but Shelby’s raid lacked military focus. As one historian wrote: “Nobody . . . appears to have weighed with any care either the purpose or the utility of such a raid; in no sense was it a calculated military maneuver.”\(^{17}\) Shelby’s men left Arkadelphia, crossed western Arkansas, and rode into Missouri reaching Marshall, approximately seventy miles east of Kansas City, where he was defeated in battle and forced to retreat back to Arkansas. On November 3, 1863, his column, with 600 new recruits arrived in Washington, Arkansas, then the Confederate capital of the state. During the forty-day raid Shelby tore up railroad track, captured and paroled Union soldiers, fought several battles, captured supplies and artillery, and lost 125 of his men. He was promoted, though the raid accomplished little except add a few hundred men to the ranks. The Union army retained control of Missouri and northern Arkansas. Morgan and Shelby both carried their raids through Union states that were also their home states. While in Kentucky and Missouri, respectively, both Morgan and Shelby were aided to some degree by friends, family and sympathizers. But unlike Shelby, Morgan carried his raid across the Ohio River where he had no hope of assistance and faced a deeply hostile population.\(^{18}\)

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Grierson’s Raid through Mississippi, which was concluded less than a month before Morgan received permission for his proposed raid into Kentucky, has the most in common with Morgan’s Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio Raid. It is true that the raid, which began in LaGrange, Tennessee, and ended in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, covered less ground, but Grierson’s small column tied up thousands of Confederate cavalry and infantry. The raid drew the attention of Confederates in the region to such a degree that Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was able to land a large force on the east bank of the Mississippi River unopposed, allowing him to begin his siege and eventual capture of Vicksburg. Grierson looted plantation larders, burned Confederate supplies, tore up railroad track, and pulled down telegraph wires. Like Morgan, he took thousands of horses and mules. Unlike Morgan, Grierson’s raid was a resounding success. Over the course of the sixteen-day, 600 mile raid, Grierson lost three men killed and seven wounded; he left behind five men too sick to move and nine men were reported missing. Though several hundred of Morgan’s men did manage to escape, Morgan’s 2,500-man cavalry division was wrecked and he and most of his men were captured.19

Morgan’s Raid differs from all of the other raids in that Morgan had a specific goal—to terrorize the local populace in the North in order to force Union commanders to draw troops out of the region to pursue him. This action was against Morgan’s direct orders. He unilaterally decided that the best course of action to bring about a strategic advantage for the Confederacy was for him to take his cavalry into Union territory.20

Morgan did not leave any papers or other documentation concerning his actions and never wrote anything justifying them. The closest to contemporary documentation available is the 1867 A History of Morgan’s Cavalry written by Basil Duke, Morgan’s brother-in-law and second-in-command. In the book, Duke recounts a conversation he had with Morgan:

A raid into Indiana and Ohio, on the contrary he [Morgan] contended, would draw all of the troops in Kentucky after him, and keep them [Union troops] employed for weeks. Although there might be sound military reasons why Judah and Burnside should not follow him . . . the scare and clamor in the States he proposed to invade, would be so great that the military leaders and the administration would be compelled to furnish the troops that would be called for.21

Duke’s narrative outlines Morgan’s reasoning in disobeying a direct order, for when Morgan took his cavalry across the Ohio River he did it against orders. In Kentucky, Morgan never

19 Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin Grierson and His Family, pp. 77-99.
21 Ibid.
carried out his orders at all. The raid through Kentucky appears to have been a ruse designed to confuse the Union command. Morgan tore through Kentucky, sending detachments of his main column off in various directions to disguise his movements. He burned a few bridges and pulled down telegraph wires but did very little in the way of destroying Union supplies.

This was Morgan’s third raid into Kentucky, and when it began there was no reason not to believe that Morgan had once again come into Kentucky to wreck the railroad and lead befuddled Union forces on a merry chase. Morgan fought the first major engagement of the raid on July 4, 1863—the day that Vicksburg, Mississippi, surrendered to Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, and the day after Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee was defeated at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Needless to say, these events overshadowed another Morgan raid into Kentucky, which received little in the way of newspaper coverage outside of Kentucky in its early stages.

On July 1, 1863, the *Louisville Journal* reported that Major General Henry Judah’s brigade had arrived in Scottsville, Kentucky, for the purpose of “meeting and annihilating one Morgan . . .”22 As Morgan’s cavalry rode through Kentucky between July 4 and July 8, the *Louisville Journal* reported the fighting at Tebbs Bend and Lebanon and reports of Confederates being everywhere. No one seemed to know where Morgan was or what he was doing.23

When Morgan crossed into Indiana in the second week of July, the nation began to take notice, and by the time he was captured newspapers throughout the nation were following the events of Morgan’s raid. A basic search of *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers* on the Library of Congress web site using the terms Morgan, raid and Morgan’s Raid turned up 100 issues in thirty-six newspapers from the District of Columbia and states including Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Articles even appeared in *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser* in Hawaii, which at the time was an independent country. This broad coverage clearly demonstrates interest in the raid far outside of the area in which it occurred.

After Morgan crossed the Ohio River it was clear this was not just another Kentucky raid. On the day that Morgan’s men entered Indiana reports were confusing. An Indianapolis paper reported that Morgan was at Brandenburg, Kentucky, had captured steamboats, and that part of his force was in Indiana. The next day the *Daily State Sentinel* declared: “Indiana Invaded!”24 By July 13,

The raid had been underway for nearly two weeks when the national press began to take notice. Confederate soldiers had for the second time in 1863 come north and brought the war to the home front. Beginning with the July 13 issue and running through the July 29 issue, the New York Tribune ran at least one story every day related to Morgan. On July 24, four of the six columns on the front page were devoted to the Battle of Buffington Island. In fact, the August 6 and 13 issues of The Pacific Commercial Advertiser of Honolulu included information on the raid. The August 13 issue ran: “Morgan’s Raid Cut Short” as a headline.

The extensive and prolonged coverage of the raid by newspapers in major cities indicates that Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio was an event of national importance.

The cost of the raid was enormous. Commissions established in Indiana and Ohio to reimburse citizens for damage caused by the Confederates processed 2,201 and 4,375 claims, respectively. Nearly one million dollars was paid out to claimants—$413,599.48 in Indiana and $580,837.00 in Ohio. The Ohio figure includes damage done by Union forces and militia, as well as pay for militia. Damage done by Morgan to the property of the citizens of Kentucky in July 1863 has never been calculated.

None of the Confederates involved in the raid submitted after-action reports. However, as noted above, Duke’s A History of Morgan’s Cavalry, published four years after the raid, describes Morgan’s plan and what the Confederates hoped to accomplish. Morgan told Duke he intended to disobey direct orders and cross the Ohio River, taking the war “. . . deep into the country of the enemy.” Before they left Tennessee, Morgan ordered Duke to send scouts into Indiana and Ohio to determine the best fords for crossing the Ohio. Duke stated: “. . . he intended – long

27 “Gen. Morgan in Indiana,” Daily Dispatch (Richmond, Virginia), July 14, 1863.
before he crossed the Ohio – to make no effort to recross it, except at some of these fords, unless he found it more expedient, when he reached that region, to join General Lee, if the latter should still be in Pennsylvania.” Morgan hoped, according to Duke, to tie up the 23rd Corps, which was mostly in Kentucky, as well as delay Major General Ambrose Burnside, who planned an assault on east Tennessee.\textsuperscript{30}

During July 1863 Raid, Morgan tied up most of the Union 23rd Corps, including all of the cavalry and the Kanawha Division of the District of West Virginia. He disrupted the Department of the Ohio, forcing Burnside to declare martial law in Cincinnati, Louisville and Covington. The U.S. Navy closed a portion of the Ohio River to civilian traffic and used at least seven gunboats in the chase to capture Morgan.\textsuperscript{31}

The states of Indiana and Ohio called up thousands of local militia to repel the Confederate invasion. Seventy-two hours after Morgan crossed the Ohio River, 30,000 members of the Indiana Legion were organized and armed. Ohio organized 32,000 militiamen to pursue Morgan. At the time of his capture, some 100,000 Buckeyes had been organized and armed as part of the emergency.\textsuperscript{32}

There is no doubt that Morgan’s raid delayed Burnside’s advance into east Tennessee, and was probably a factor in Major General William S. Rosecrans’ delayed pursuit of Confederate Major General Braxton Bragg’s army, which had retreated from Tullahoma to Chattanooga. Morgan’s raid cost the Confederacy an experienced cavalry division. While Morgan failed to escape, to some extent he may have accomplished his goal. Again according to Duke, Morgan believed that even if he lost his command by crossing the Ohio River, it was his best opportunity to aid Bragg and the Confederate cause.\textsuperscript{33}

**Background**

In the summer of 1862, the Confederacy took the offensive in all theaters of operations. A Confederate army invaded Maryland, a second marched into Kentucky, and two others attacked Corinth, Mississippi. All of these campaigns failed and the Confederates retreated. By early summer 1863, the Confederacy was on the defensive everywhere except the Eastern Theater.

\textsuperscript{32} Scarborough, “The Impact of the John Morgan Raid in Indiana and Ohio,” p. 223.
\textsuperscript{33} Duke, *History of Morgan’s Cavalry*, p. 410.
Following his victory at Chancellorsville, Virginia, Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee conceived a plan to invade the North that was approved by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Lee planned to take the war to the Union homeland, hoping for either a negotiated peace or recognition of the Confederacy by one or more of the European powers. Lee also hoped that defeating the Union army in Pennsylvania would result in a retreat and might force the Union government to abandon Washington. In response, Union field armies would be moved to protect the government, thereby relieving pressure on the Confederate armies in the Western Theater. On June 2, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee’s army of some 89,000 men left Fredericksburg, Virginia, and marched north.34

In the Western Theater, the Confederate army in Vicksburg, Mississippi, the Confederate bastion on the Mississippi River, was facing a crisis. The Union army under Gen. Ulysses S. Grant continued its siege. No supplies had reached Vicksburg in weeks and the Confederates were in dire need of food. In south-central Tennessee, the Confederate Army of Tennessee commanded by Gen. Braxton Bragg braced for an attack by Union Gen. William Starke Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland. Bragg’s 46,000 Confederates would face Rosecrans’ force of 60,000.35

On June 3, 1863, the Union 9th Army Corps, which had been in Kentucky under the command of Gen. Ambrose Burnside, arrived in Vicksburg. The 9th Corps had been scheduled for double duty—part of the corps would participate in an invasion of east Tennessee and the rest would aid Rosecrans’ anticipated assault on Bragg. Its departure left the Department of the Ohio, which included Kentucky, with a much depleted force. The east Tennessee campaign long-desired by the Lincoln administration was once more delayed. Plans to move 8,000 of Burnside’s men into Tennessee were scrapped, forcing Rosecrans to go it alone.36

By mid-June, the Confederate Army of Tennessee had been weakened by poor decisions on Bragg’s part. At perhaps the least opportune moment, he sent Colonel Philip D. Roddy’s detachment of 1,600 cavalry to northwest Alabama. He also agreed to Gen. John Hunt Morgan’s proposed raid into Kentucky. To make matters worse, Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, arguably

Bragg’s best cavalry commander, had been wounded on June 13, 1863. As a result, Bragg’s cavalry was short-handed and in disarray.37

Morgan received orders authorizing a raid into Kentucky with 2,000 men on June 14, 1863. He exceeded the orders and took 2,500 men. Morgan’s orders were specific: “He [Morgan] will, if practicable, destroy depots of supplies in the State of Kentucky, after which he will return to his present position.”38 Morgan’s position was back in Tennessee with the Army of Tennessee; Bragg specifically told him not to cross the Ohio River. From the outset, Morgan planned to disobey Bragg. His biographer, brother-in-law and second-in-command Colonel Basil Duke, wrote: “. . . he intended, notwithstanding his orders, to cross the Ohio.”39

For the better part of two weeks, Morgan’s command operated in north-central Tennessee hoping to intercept Union Colonel William P. Sanders’ detachment of 1,500 cavalry, which was raiding Confederate-controlled east Tennessee. Sanders having eluded him, Morgan asked for permission to attack the federal garrison at Carthage, Tennessee, on the north side of the Cumberland. Bragg agreed, and Morgan’s cavalry crossed the Cumberland at Rome, a few miles downriver from Carthage. Before Morgan could attack, he received orders to proceed to Monticello, Kentucky, where Sanders was thought to be. Morgan’s cavalry re-crossed the Cumberland and moved northeast. Rain and impassible roads forced a delay at Livingston, Tennessee. When Morgan arrived in Albany, Kentucky, on June 23, he learned that Sanders had left Monticello. Morgan turned northwest, toward Burkesville, Kentucky.40

When Morgan crossed into Kentucky on June 23, 1863, Rosecrans opened operations against Bragg, initiating the Tullahoma campaign. In a rather amazing campaign, Rosecrans used maneuvers, feints and calculated pitched battles to force Bragg out of middle Tennessee and into Chattanooga, in what Abraham Lincoln called “. . . the most splendid piece of strategy I know of.”41

July 1-2, 1863: The Raid Begins

Morgan’s command crossed the Cumberland River near Burkesville on July 1st and 2nd, 1863, with his entire cavalry division: ten regiments totaling approximately 2,500 men, a train of supply wagons, and four pieces of artillery—two 10-pounder Parrott cannon and two 12-pounder howitzers (Map 5). Morgan’s command crossed the Cumberland at numerous points in Monroe and Cumberland counties. Colonel Adam Johnson’s Second Brigade crossed the river at McMillan’s Ferry at Turkey Neck Bend in Monroe County, and Cloyd’s Ferry at Salt Lick Bend in Cumberland County. The only boats available when Johnson’s men crossed were canoes and other small craft too small for horses, which were forced to swim across. The men followed, some in boats and some swimming with their horses.

Col. Basil Duke’s First Brigade crossed the Cumberland at Albany Landing, Scott’s Ferry, Burkesville, and Neely’s Ferry. It was at Burkesville that Duke found boats sturdy enough to carry artillery and loaded wagons. The boats Duke described as “two crazy little flats” were sufficient to get everything across. The lack of Union resistance in Burkesville and everywhere else allowed the Confederates to complete the river crossing when they were most vulnerable, with almost no opposition.

Brig. Gen. Henry M. Judah, the Union commander in that region of Kentucky, had three brigades of soldiers under his command; one at Glasgow, Kentucky, the second at Columbia, Kentucky, and the third at Carthage, Tennessee. When Judah got word that Morgan was moving he shifted two infantry divisions south to Tompkinsville, Marrowbone, and Ray’s Cross Roads, Kentucky, to cover roads leading north from the Cumberland River. The shift moved his troops closer to the Cumberland but for reasons he never explained, Judah left the road from Burkesville to Columbia, Kentucky, uncovered. Morgan took advantage of Judah’s gaff and his force rode north to Columbia, which was only lightly defended.

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42 Ramage, Rebel Raider, pp. 162-163.
45 Gorin, “Morgan Is Coming!,” pp. 120-123.
On the afternoon of July 2, Morgan moved out of Burkesville along the Marrowbone-Glasgow road with the 6th Kentucky, the 9th Tennessee, and two pieces of artillery, to determine the Federals’ strength. Morgan drew a portion of the column up about one mile east of Marrowbone. He hid them from view near Norris Branch and waited for the Union soldiers to approach.46

Morgan did not have to wait long. A Union cavalry column trotted out of camp at Marrowbone, heading east. As they reached Norris Branch, Morgan sprang his trap. The hidden Confederates fired a volley of small arms and artillery fire that startled and stopped the blue column. The Union forces retreated back toward Marrowbone followed by Morgan’s men, who soon found themselves facing a regiment of Union infantry formed in line of battle. This time, the Confederates stopped short as the Union infantry fired a volley. The two sides skirmished for about an hour. Some accounts suggest that Morgan’s soldiers rode into the Union camp. In the end, Morgan’s outnumbered column retreated. The skirmish accomplished little of military significance except that Morgan’s chief scout, Capt. Tom Quirk, was wounded and had to be taken back to Tennessee.47

The action at Norris Branch was the first of over twenty engagements that would be fought in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio. The last was fought just east of Mechanicstown in Carroll County, Ohio, the day before Morgan surrendered a few miles away, near West Point in Columbiana County, Ohio.

Had the Union army been more aggressive, it could have crushed Morgan’s raid on the banks of the Cumberland. The Confederates had been discovered prior to crossing the river at Turkey Neck Bend by troops under the command of Brigadier General Edward H. Hobson. Hobson briefed his commanding officer, Brig. Gen. Henry M. Judah, on the Confederate presence, suggesting a night attack. He also suggested sending a brigade of Union troops to Burkesville. Judah rejected both of Hobson’s suggestions.48

Judah seemed to be more inclined to block the roads rather than find Morgan and engage him in battle. Judah’s shifting of his numerically superior command did block all of the roads but one; unfortunately for the Union cause he left a road open that allowed Morgan to get north of Judah’s infantry. Judah had hoped that Brig. Gen. Samuel Carter, who was at Jamestown, could

48 Gorin, “Morgan Is Coming!,” p. 121.
cover the Burkesville-Columbia road, though it is not clear if the two officers communicated regarding the matter.  

In spite of Judah’s muddling there was still a chance to at least hurt Morgan. After the fight at Norris Branch, Hobson regrouped at Marrowbone and sent a large force east toward Burkesville in hopes of catching Morgan’s force strung out on the road. Lieut. Col. James H. Holloway led a small detachment of cavalry followed by Colonel Benjamin H. Bristow with the 3rd and 8th Kentucky cavalry regiments. The cavalry was accompanied by the 12th Kentucky and the 91st Indiana infantries and a section of Indiana artillery. The column had not gone far when they were recalled.  

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Holloway of the 8th Kentucky Cavalry confided in his diary, “When General H.M. Judah, commander of this part of KY, arrived at Marrow Bone from Tompkinsville and learning what General Hobson and General Shakelford had done, immediately, countermanned [sic] orders and ordered all movements stopped til [sic] he could personally inspect such.”

**July 3, 1863: Engagement at Columbia, Kentucky**

Morgan had gotten past the Union line in southern Kentucky. While Judah inspected, and no doubt Hobson and Shakelford fumed, Morgan’s cavalry moved north. The Confederates spent the night of July 2, 1863, on the road to Columbia ten miles from the Cumberland River. The next day, July 3, 1863, as the Confederates continued their march north to Columbia they encountered a hill too steep for the horses pulling artillery to climb. The accounts do not say where they got them, but the Confederate artillerymen obtained several yoke of oxen and used them to drag the cannon up the hill.

After the long pull up the hill, Morgan’s columns closed up, regrouped, and rested briefly about eight miles outside of Columbia, the Adair County seat. All of the shifting of Union soldiers had left the town very lightly defended. There were about 150 Union soldiers in Columbia—

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detachments of the 1st Kentucky and 2nd Ohio cavalries and the 45th Ohio Mounted Infantry. The Union soldiers had no artillery.  

A brief shower did not slow the Confederate advance sent ahead to scout Columbia. About one and one-half miles from town Morgan’s advance found the Union videttes. The outmanned Union soldiers fired into the advancing Confederates and retreated toward town. Captain Jesse Carter of Co. J, 1st Kentucky Cavalry, the commander of the detachment, joined the videttes as they fled into town. In the ensuing chase he received a mortal wound. Command fell to Captain J.B. Fishback, also of the 1st Kentucky, who brought men up from town and positioned them along the brow of a hill between the Burkesville and Creelsboro roads.

Union soldiers positioned themselves on either side of the Burkesville road, along fences on the right and at M&F High School on the left. The Union defenders drove off the initial Confederate attack and skirmishing continued until Duke’s brigade made its way onto the field. Duke dismounted his brigade and they attacked with a yell, pushing the Federals off the hill into town. For a while the Union defenders continued the fight, firing from houses and buildings in town, but the overwhelming numbers of Confederates were simply too much. By late afternoon Columbia was in Confederate hands. One Confederate officer reported that his men broke into a store in Columbia and looted it. Casualties were reported as two Confederates killed and two wounded; the Union side lost four killed and six to eight wounded.

Late in the afternoon of July 3, 1863, Morgan’s command filed out of Columbia, moving north. Morgan divided his men, sending them along several roads, both to avoid crowding on the Columbia Pike and to disguise his numbers from federal authorities. The Confederates stopped for the night at the villages of Coburg and Cane Valley, where they foraged for food for themselves and their mounts. Knowing that the Confederates were headed their way, the people hid their horses, money, and other valuables. Morgan made his headquarters at the John F. Bridgewater House in Cane Valley. There he took his dinner and breakfast the next morning. Between meals, Morgan ordered Captain Tom Franks, his new chief of scouts, north toward

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Campbellsville to assess the strength of the Union forces at Green River bridge. Morgan did not believe that the federal force in Taylor County posed much of a threat to his command.56

**July 4, 1863: The Battle of Tebbs Bend, Taylor County, Kentucky**

Tebbs Bend is one of three bends in the Green River south of Campbellsville, Kentucky. The Columbia Turnpike led north toward Campbellsville through the open end of the bend and continued through the Narrows, an area where the land fell into deep ravines on both sides of the road. From the Narrows the Turnpike climbed up to a plateau, made a hairpin turn, and proceeded down a steep hill to cross the river at a covered bridge.

The Union army had built a stockade on the bluff above the river and had been guarding the bridge since 1862. Both the bridge and the stockade were burned by Morgan on New Year’s Day 1863, near the end of his Christmas Raid, but had since been rebuilt, though the bridge was damaged by a flood on June 28, 1863.57

Union Colonel Orlando Moore commanded the 250 or so men of the 25th Michigan charged with guarding the Green River bridge. Moore began his defensive preparations in late June, increasing patrols in Tebbs Bend and the surrounding area. He posted guards at the two fords at the extreme end of Tebbs Bend and west of the main Union defensive position. The fords led directly to the Columbia Turnpike and Moore knew that Confederate cavalry could use them to get behind the federal defenses.58

Col. Moore abandoned the stockade after determining that it could not be defended with the force at his disposal. He chose instead to build a fortified position in the Narrows where he wrote, the land “. . . drops precipitously on the north side of the ridge 150 feet into the river.” The terrain gave the defenders a decided advantage. Confederate Col. Basil Duke, Morgan’s brother-in-law and right-hand man, later described it as “one of the strongest natural positions I ever saw.”59

57 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,” pp. 27, 86-88, 160; and Ramage, Rebel Raider, p. 163.
58 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,” pp. 158-159; and Lieut. Michael A. Hogan, Map of Tebbs’s Bend, July 4, 1863, National Archives, Washington, DC.
Moore had no artillery and he knew Morgan had several pieces. Morgan’s tactic had always been to bring his forces to a fortified Union position, fire a few rounds with his artillery, and demand surrender. The tactic generally worked; outnumbered Union garrisons with no artillery often had little recourse but to surrender. Moore designed his defenses to render the Confederate artillery useless.

Moore’s defense had two lines. He built a forward position, a simple rifle trench, about 100 yards in front of the main line. This position could be seen from the Columbia Turnpike and would appear to be the main line, which was not visible from the turnpike. The rifle trench was designed to allow the defenders to fall back to the main line if necessary. At the same time, it afforded the enemy who might take it no protection because it was open in the rear (Map 6).

The Michigan troops felled trees to clear a field of fire between the main line and the rifle trench. At the main line, they set logs on end and put dirt in front of them, forming a breastwork. An abatis—smaller felled trees with sharpened branches pointing toward the enemy’s line of approach—was placed in front of the main line. Work continued into the night adding the finishing touches to the defenses, which included placing sharpened spikes in two zigzag rows in front of the abatis. The breastwork was not finished until the morning of July 4.

By placing the rifle trench in front of his main line, Moore gave Morgan a target, but one that was well-sited and protected by thick woods and steep banks on three sides. Moore also placed his best marksmen in the forward position; once the Confederate artillery unlimbered it would be under constant and accurate rifle fire.60

Gen. John Hunt Morgan commanded a large, well-trained, experienced force and expected little trouble from Moore’s smaller force of untried troops. The report of his scout, Capt. Franks, led Morgan to believe that Col. Orlando Moore would put up little resistance. It was the first time Franks had led a reconnaissance mission; his report to Morgan was in error. Col. Moore meant to stand his ground and fight.61

Morgan expected an easy victory. At about 6:30 on the morning of July 4, the Confederates deployed their artillery and began shelling the forward Union position. After several shots, Morgan sent a demand for surrender. It was Independence Day and Col. Moore answered Morgan’s demand: “Present my compliments to General Morgan, and say to him that, this being

the fourth day of July, I cannot entertain his proposition.” Moore had no artillery and only about 170 men on the field. Morgan’s infantry and artillery totaled 800 to 1,000, not including the two regiments held in reserve. Moore was outnumbered four or five to one. The Confederate officer who delivered Morgan’s demand for surrender pointed out the Confederate advantage and Moore answered, “I have a duty to perform to my country, and the presence of this day supports me in my decision; therefore I cannot reconsider my reply to General Morgan.”

His demand for surrender rejected, Morgan ordered the artillerists to resume their bombardment. In response, Moore ordered his sharpshooters to open fire on the Confederate gunners. The effect of their small arms fire was so great that it forced Morgan to withdraw his artillery. Morgan had two choices: to cut his losses and withdraw or to attack the Union position. Had John Hunt Morgan been another man he might have taken the prudent course of action and withdrawn without attacking the formidable position. He did not; Morgan ordered his division forward.

The position of the Union forces left Morgan no choice but to carry the works by a frontal assault. The Confederates advanced under heavy Union fire, suffering heavy casualties. Morgan’s men drew back, regrouped, and moved forward again. The Union troops in the rifle pit eventually fell back. As they did so, the Union soldiers in the main works directed intense fire on the advancing Confederates.

After his force took the rifle trench, Morgan and his staff crept forward to see Moore’s defenses. It was clear that the Union position was extremely strong. An assault on the Union works required a charge over an open field; then the men had to fight through the abatis and cross a ditch filled with water before they could hit the Union defenders. The terrain afforded little cover; the advancing Confederates would be exposed to direct fire. Col. Adam R. Johnson had advised Morgan not to fight at Tebbs Bend earlier that day. He now advised Morgan against a frontal assault. Once again, Morgan declined to take his advice—he ordered an attack.

The dismounted Confederate cavalry advanced on the double-quick (a fast walk or trot). Moore ordered his men to hold their fire until they had taken careful aim. As the first wave of

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64 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,“ pp. 184-186.

Confederates neared the Union position they became mired in the abates and Morgan sent more men forward in support. Moore’s regiment, though untested, was very well drilled. His men efficiently fired, reloaded, and fired again. The Confederates soon realized, some too late, that kneeling to fire or standing to reload their weapons made them attractive targets. Some lay on the ground to reload before running forward again.  

A small number of Confederates made it to within several feet of the Union position. According to Moore, “The conflict was fierce and bloody. At times the enemy occupied one side of the fallen timber, while my men held the other, in almost a hand-to-hand fight.” The Confederates were never able to use their superior numbers effectively against the entrenched Federals. One cavalryman later reported that he had not so much as seen a Union soldier, only the ends of their rifles protruding from the fortification.

Time and again the Confederates fell back, regrouped, and charged again. Col. Tucker was ordered to set the Union fortifications on fire but could not ignite the green wood. In spite of the heavy losses, Morgan wasn’t finished. He ordered Colonel David Waller Chenault to carry out a flanking maneuver, getting his regiment into a position where enfilading fire could be poured into the Union fortifications. To do so, Chenault had to lead his men into the ravine, along the river bank, and up the steep slope to the Union fortification. Chenault in the lead, his men charged the abatis, forcing the Federals back. Hoping to create the illusions that reinforcements were arriving, Moore blew his bugle, calling up a company that had been held in reserve and signaling part of the detachment guarding the bridge to come forward. The reserve troops arrived and the federal troops rallied, pouring pistol shot into the Confederate line. Col. Chenault was hit, falling dead at the feet of his second in command, Major James B. McCreary. Seeing their leader fall, the shocked Confederates pulled back momentarily. McCreary assumed command, designating Captain Alex Tribble his second in command. Moments later, Tribble lay dead. Seeing that something was wrong, Major Thomas Y. Brent raced across the field. He, too, was killed.

As the Confederates faltered, Moore signaled his force to advance. He quickly reconsidered, however, and decided that it was best to remain behind his fortifications. Victory was his, in any case. Morgan, meanwhile, was being told that the Federals could not be dislodged. It was a little

66 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,” pp. 187-188.
67 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,” pp. 184-186; and O.R., Series I, Volume XXIII, p. 646.
before ten o’clock when Col. Cluke, hearing no further fire from the battlefield, advanced his force. As he neared the Green River Bridge, Cluke expected to intercept Union troops retreating in the face of Morgan’s victory. Instead, Union sharpshooters opened fire, unseating two or three of his cavalry. Realizing that his assumption of Confederate victory was in error, Cluke withdrew under fire and rejoined the Confederate forces bypassing the position.69

At 10:30 a.m. Morgan sent a flag of truce forward that read: “I have sent under Flag of Truce Dr. J.F. Keiser, the Rev. Mr. Moore, Chaplain of the 5th Ky. Regiment, other attendants to recover the bodies of our dead and wounded who are left on the field.” It was signed D. Keller, Surgeon, 1st Brigade, Ky. Cavalry, C.S.A., 10 ½ o’clock.70

The Rev. Moore’s men laid the bodies of the dead along the road. Four Kentuckians, including Col. Chenault, were taken home for burial. The rest were left to be buried by others. It was not until Col. Moore was sure that the Confederates had withdrawn and that rumors of further Confederate attacks were proved false that he was willing to send out a burial detail.71

The Battle of Tebbs Bend lasted just four hours from the first artillery shot to Morgan’s final flag of truce, but it was a very costly battle for John Hunt Morgan. He lost twenty-seven men, twenty of whom were experienced officers, including Col. David Waller Chenault and Maj. Thomas Y. Brent. Fourteen men were wounded, and thirty-two captured. Col. Moore’s losses were much lighter: six men killed, twenty-four wounded and one captured.72

July 5, 1863: The Battle of Lebanon, Kentucky
After Morgan called off the attack, the Confederate column moved out, bypassing the Union defenders and crossing the Green River at the fords used by Col. Cluke. They marched through Campbellsville without stopping, pushing on toward Lebanon. Morgan’s advance met and drove in the Union pickets stationed outside of Lebanon and the column bivouacked for the night. Morgan is said to have spent the night in the home of David Shuck a few miles south of Lebanon, some of his men finding refuge in the adjacent orchard.73

69 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,” p. 198.
70 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,” pp. 196-200.
71 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,” pp.199-200.
On the night of July 4, 1863, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hanson, 20th Kentucky (US), commander of the Union garrison at Lebanon, received a telegram ordering him to hold Lebanon until reinforcements arrived. Hanson, like almost everyone else in Kentucky, overestimated the size of Morgan’s column but he was determined not to surrender without a fight even though he had less than 400 men, no cavalry, and one piece of artillery with which to face over 2,000 Confederate cavalry with artillery.74

The next morning, July 5, the engagement began around 6:30 a.m. with Morgan’s men pushing Hanson’s scouts back toward town. Morgan had put his men in an arc covering the St. Mary’s and Bradfordsville roads, the western and southern approaches to town. He had small detachments of men covering all of the approaches to the city, cutting off Hanson’s line of retreat and the routes for reinforcements. Around 7:00 a.m. Morgan brought up his artillery, fired a few rounds into town, and then sent in a demand for surrender. Hanson refused and the battle heated up.75

Hanson had prepared breastworks south of town consisting of earthworks, fences, overturned wagons, and anything else that might slow down an assault. Morgan’s men advanced up the roads from Campbellsville and St. Mary’s and along the railroad, which ran between the roads. Most of Hanson’s men were deployed to cover these approaches to town. He had also placed a fifty-man detachment on Bradfordsville Road north of his main line. The Union men held their line for about two hours before being forced back into town.76

The Confederates pushed all of Hanson’s vastly outnumbered forces into town. Most took refuge in the brick Louisville and Nashville Railroad depot; the rest occupied two buildings on Main Street one block north. At noon, Morgan sent in a second flag of truce. Hanson, seeing that the Confederates were using the cease fire to move men and artillery closer to town, opened fire without meeting the flag bearer.

Three regiments attacked the depot. Some of the Confederates pushed up the railroad tracks and the roads leading to the depot, others took positions in buildings surrounding the depot, which was on low ground between Main and Water streets. The fire from both sides was continuous.

76 Gorin, “Morgan is Coming!,” p. 225.
The Confederate artillery was unable to inflict much damage on the depot even though it was hit numerous times. Finally, about 1:30 in the afternoon, Hanson surrendered.\textsuperscript{77}

One Confederate account says that the 5th Kentucky charged the depot from the west, overwhelmed the defenders, and accepted their surrender. A second states that the 2nd Kentucky attacked the depot and poured volley after volley through the windows, forcing the surrender.\textsuperscript{78} Hanson only states: “I reluctantly surrendered to save my gallant command from the further destruction of the town, a considerable portion of which was then in flames, including the depot building.”\textsuperscript{79}

Thirty Confederates were killed including Morgan’s brother, Thomas Morgan. An unknown number were wounded. The 20th Kentucky lost three killed and sixteen wounded. Morgan burned twenty buildings in town including the county clerk’s office and a number of private residences. Hanson had burned the railroad round house, which contained Union commissary stores, before the battle. After Hanson’s surrender, Morgan’s men broke into stores and looted them. Hanson’s defense of Lebanon cost Morgan another day. In two days of fighting in Kentucky, Morgan had lost over 100 killed and wounded, not a very auspicious beginning for his campaign.\textsuperscript{80}

The Confederates crowded the Union prisoners into the depot, detaining them there while Morgan’s men ransacked merchants’ stores and the Union supplies in town. At about 3:00 p.m. the prisoners were marched at the double-quick toward Springfield by their mounted captors. It was very hot and the Union men were exhausted after fighting the battle. On the nine-mile march from Lebanon to Springfield, two prisoners died and a third was injured. A rain shower that drenched the prisoners en route probably prevented more deaths. Upon reaching Springfield, the Confederates marched the prisoners to the courthouse and paroled them.\textsuperscript{81}

The Confederate column left Springfield and headed toward Bardstown, Morgan sending Company H, 2nd Kentucky, east to Harrodsburg to “occupy the attention of Burnside’s cavalry.”

\textsuperscript{77} Jeffrey G. Mauck, \textit{A Proud Heritage: Lebanon and Marion County, Kentucky, in the Civil War}, Marion County Economic Development Office, Lebanon, Kentucky, 1997, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{78} Sydney K. Smith, \textit{Life, Army Record and Public Services of D. Howard Smith}, The Bradley & Gilbert Company, Louisville, Kentucky, 1890, p. 63; and Duke, \textit{A History of Morgan’s Cavalry}, p. 425.
Morgan’s men arrived in Bardstown in the early morning hours of July 6, 1863, and surrounded a stable held by twenty-five men of the 4th U.S. Cavalry under the command of Lieutenant Thomas W. Sullivan.  

July 6, 1863: Engagement at Bardstown, Kentucky
Union cavalry in Kentucky gathered at Lebanon the day after the battle. Brig. Gen. Henry Hobson was given command of the 23rd Corps’ cavalry with orders to catch Morgan or cut him off. Hobson was already a day behind Morgan and did not know where the Confederate general was headed. It would be 5:00 p.m. before the Union cavalry got organized and left Lebanon. By then, Morgan had almost reached the Ohio River.

As the day broke in Bardstown, Lieut. Sullivan found himself and his small command trapped by most of Morgan’s column. Sullivan had fashioned defenses with manure and wood and put out pickets. Now he waited for the Confederates to act. The two sides exchanged fire, inflicting a few casualties on each other but the Confederates could not force the Federals into the open. The livery stable where Sullivan’s little band had taken refuge offered good cover and they held out for hours. Finally, Morgan had had enough. He sent in a demand for surrender, which Sullivan declined. Morgan had brought up his artillery and was preparing to shell the stable when Sullivan reconsidered.

The captured Union soldiers were stripped of their guns and horses, paroled, and left in Bardstown. Morgan pulled out of town about 10:00 a.m., marching west. The Confederates reached the main Louisville and Nashville Railroad line where it bridged the Rolling Fork River about twenty-five miles south of Louisville. They burned the bridge and continued north to Bardstown Junction, where a spur of the Louisville and Nashville branched off to Bardstown. Morgan captured a telegraph office where George A. “Lightning” Ellsworth, Morgan’s wizard of the telegraph, sent several deceptive messages that helped spread confusion among the Union command.

While listening to the telegraph traffic, Ellsworth discovered that a train was on the way to Bardstown Junction. The Confederates burned a trestle just south of the junction, forcing the engineer to brake hard. When the train stopped, Confederate soldiers poured on board taking

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85 Ramage, Rebel Raider, p. 166.
watches, boots, money, the mail, and anything else of value. After the train robbery Morgan’s men pushed west again, this time riding all night.86

July 7, 1863: Capture of the *John T. McCombs* and the *Alice Dean*
Morgan ordered a small force to Brandenburg to capture boats for his planned crossing of the Ohio River. He also sent two companies under the command of Captain William J. Davis toward Louisville. Davis’s men were to gather boats, cross the Ohio at Twelve Mile Island north of Louisville and create havoc in Indiana. A second column in Indiana would confuse and divide the home guard while Morgan’s main column marched north from Brandenburg.87

Davis’s detachment did not fare well. Of his 120 men, only forty-nine made it to Indiana. Most were captured by the U.S.S. *Moose* as they tried to cross from the island to Indiana. What remained of Davis’s force was captured at Pekin, Indiana, on July 12, 1863.88

The men sent to Brandenburg, Captain Sam Taylor and Captain Clay Merriwether, were more successful. Taylor and Merriwether captured the steamer *John T. McCombs* as it put into Brandenburg to take on passengers and freight. They took the vessel into the river, sent up a distress signal, and captured the *Alice Dean* as she came along side to render assistance. When Morgan and the rest of the column arrived the next day, transportation was waiting for them.89

Morgan’s column spent the night of July 7, 1863, in Garnettsville, Kentucky, located off of the Old State Road, just west of the Louisville and Nashville Turnpike, the main north-south route into Louisville. The Union pursuers had no idea of the whereabouts of Morgan’s command. Brig. Gen. Henry M. Judah had moved his column to Elizabethtown and then to Leitchfield, Kentucky, in anticipation of Morgan crossing the Green River. Judah’s move was curious. Leitchfield was off the beaten path and away from the main Union supply routes and depots. It was also about forty miles southwest of Morgan’s position and nowhere near the Ohio River. Gen. Edward H. Hobson stopped at Rock Haven, Kentucky, upriver from Brandenburg and north of Morgan’s position, trying to secure a gunboat. Both Judah and Hobson failed to reach the Confederates before they crossed the river into Indiana.90

86 Ibid.
July 8, 1863: Morgan Crosses the Ohio River into Indiana

When Morgan and his officers arrived they made their headquarters at the Robert Buckner House, which is located on a hill above the city with a clear view of the Indiana shore. Some of Morgan’s men found a large store of whiskey in Brandenburg, which they shared with their comrades.91

Something as monumental as 2,000 enemy troops camped just across the river did not go unnoticed in Indiana. Lieutenant Colonel William J. Irwin of the Indiana Legion in Mauckport, just down river from Brandenburg, got word that Morgan was trying to cross the river. Forewarned, Irwin was able to gather over 100 men and a 6-pounder cannon with which to contest the Confederate crossing. By 7:00 a.m. on July 8, the Indiana Legion, now under the command of Colonel John Timberlake of the Harrison County Legion, had placed his men and the cannon across the river from Brandenburg. A fog shrouded Brandenburg, forcing the Indiana Legion to hold their fire. The fog lifted about 8:30 a.m., and the Hoosiers opened fire. The first shot went through the McCombs, chasing all of the Confederates onboard out of the boat. The next shots were fired at the fleeing men. Timberlake then trained the gun on the cavalry milling around on the dock. The artillery fire drove the Confederate soldiers away from the wharf and into town.92

During the Hoosier bombardment Morgan’s artillery arrived and began to return fire. The Confederates placed two cannon in Robert Buckner’s pasture on a hill above town and the other two on the Meade County Courthouse lawn. All four were aimed at the Indiana shore. The Confederate guns were larger and their fire more accurate than that of the overmatched militia. Two men tending the cannon on the Indiana shore were soon killed. The deadly fire forced the Indiana gunners to move their cannon back one-half mile. The retreat allowed the Confederates to get two regiments aboard a steamer and across the river. The determined Hoosiers fired the cannon at the steamer, but as soon as it landed the Confederates overwhelmed the militia and captured the cannon. The rest of the force retreated.93

93 Indiana Legion, Operations of the Indiana Legion and Minute Men, 1863-4, Documents presented to the General Assembly, with the governor’s message, January 6, 1865, W.R. Holloway, State Printer, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1865, pp. 27-28, 31-32.
As the Indiana Legion was retreating toward Corydon, the U.S.S. *Springfield* steamed into view. The tinclad gunboat began firing at the Confederates on both shores of the river. Morgan’s artillery answered, and an artillery duel began that lasted several hours. The *Springfield* could not damage the gunners on shore and the shore batteries were unable to harm the boat. Eventually, the gunboat steamed upriver to Louisville, leaving the commandeered steamers undamaged.94

Morgan spent the rest of the day crossing the river. It was dark before the rest of the first brigade got across and the second brigade began crossing. The crossing was completed about midnight; Morgan burned the *Alice Dean* but let the *McCombs* go. The Confederates moved away from the river, spending the night about six miles south of Corydon. Their arrival in Indiana had terrified the local populace. The men found abandoned houses left just as they were when the inhabitants fled, often with doors open and tables set. Basil Duke observed, “The Chickens were strolling before the door with a confidence that was touching, but misplaced.”95 Many a Confederate cavalryman fed on Hoosier hens that night.

**July 8-9, 1863: Indiana’s Governor Calls for Citizens to Aid the Fight**

As soon as Morgan had crossed the Ohio River, Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton telegraphed Brigadier General Jeremiah Boyle in Louisville requesting that he send government troops (Union volunteers) to drive the Confederates from Indiana. All of the Union soldiers that had been in Indiana had been removed by Boyle for duty in Kentucky. The next day Boyle replied:

> Morgan is near Corydon, and will move either upon New Albany or the interior of the state. He has no less than 4,000 men and six pieces of artillery. General Hobson in pursuit of him is at Brandenburg, and has sent for transports to cross his forces. Your cities and towns will be sacked and pillaged if you do not bring out your state forces.96

It was clear that no one had been expecting an invasion and the state government was ill-prepared. After receiving Boyle’s reply on July 9 Governor Morton issued a call for citizens to aid the fight. Morton ordered that all able-bodied white, male citizens arms themselves, form companies, elect officers, and drill as quickly as possible. Despite the odds, thousands of Indiana men answered the governor’s call to arms.


To make matters worse, the general populace was in a full-scale panic.\(^7\) One Indiana paper reported:

Two things had taken possession of the public mind, and no amount of contradiction could shake their belief in them. One was that the train from Cincinnati had been captured and the other, no matter where we were, was that there was a bridge burned between us and Indianapolis.\(^8\)

After the Indiana militia unsuccessfully resisted the Confederate crossing at Brandenburg, many people in southern Indiana abandoned their houses and fled. The initial engagement had demonstrated that the Indiana Legion was no match for Morgan. They continued to put up a fight, however, skirmishing with Morgan from the Ohio to Corydon before many were captured.

**July 9, 1863: The Battle of Corydon, Indiana**

On July 9, 1863, Morgan again encountered the Indiana Legion, facing them in a fortified position near Corydon, Indiana. The militiamen, under the command of Colonel Lewis Jordan, built a barricade hoping to slow Morgan long enough for help to arrive from New Albany (Map 7).

Jordan’s pickets in front of the main line skirmished with Morgan’s advance troops, the Confederates pushing toward Corydon and the militia falling back. By mid-morning the militia had been driven back to the defensive line Jordan had completed on a rise just south of Corydon. The barricade stretched about one-half mile across the three roads leading north from the river.\(^9\)

Col. Jordan had 400 to 450 militia and armed citizens at the Union line. Col. John Timberlake, who had served in the 81st Indiana, helped Jordon direct the defense of the barricade. Morgan’s advance under Colonel Richard Morgan, Gen. John Hunt Morgan’s brother, reached Jordan’s position about 11:30 a.m. Col. Morgan tested the Union left, which was defended by the “Spencer Guards” under the command of Captain George Lahue. The militia fired a volley, killing at least one Confederate and wounding several. In the exchange one of the militia was killed. Col. Morgan pressed the attack a second time and was again driven off.\(^10\)

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\(^8\) Scarborough, “The Impact of the John Morgan Raid in Indiana and Ohio,” p. 110.

\(^9\) Indiana Legion, *Operations of the Indiana Legion and Minute Men*, p. 32.

As Col. Morgan was regrouping, the rest of Gen. Morgan’s column came onto the field. The Confederate artillery unlimbered and at least one and perhaps both of Morgan’s brigades were deployed in line of battle across the front and along both flanks of the militia barricade. Just before his soldiers attacked, Morgan’s artillery opened fire. The Indiana farmers fought well for a while, but outnumbered and without artillery, they never stood a chance. They stood their ground for about thirty minutes, and then Col. Jordan ordered a retreat.101

The retreat turned into a rout as the beaten militia scrambled for what they hoped was the safety of the city. The mounted militia made good their escape as the remainder headed for Corydon. Morgan moved his artillery to a hill above town and fired another few rounds and that settled the matter. Col. Jordan, who was in the old state capitol, hoisted the white flag and surrendered his militia. Morgan lost forty-one men in the assault, thirty wounded and eleven killed; eight Hoosiers were killed and six wounded. Morgan gathered up the 345 captured Hoosiers and escorted them to the courthouse lawn where they were paroled.102

Morgan made his headquarters at Kintner’s Hotel and his men made themselves at home, plundering the town’s shops. The local mills were spared the torch only after paying $1,000 each to Morgan. The Confederates rounded up 400 horses, trading them for their old mounts. Having obtained new hats, clothing, and other goods, Morgan left Corydon on the Salem road that afternoon, leaving eleven of his seriously wounded men in the Presbyterian Church. Morgan’s tired troopers rode north, stopping that night at Palmyra, just south of Salem.103

July 10, 1863: Morgan Loots Salem, Indiana

Hobson’s Union cavalry arrived in Brandenburg in time to watch the Alice Dean burn. Again, Morgan had eluded his pursuers and was now safely on the Indiana shore. Hobson sent the John T. McCombs to Louisville to fetch transports so that he could get his men and horses across the river. Gen. Judah, then in Leitchfield, learning to his surprise that Morgan had crossed the Ohio, marched his men to Elizabethtown and put them on trains for Louisville. That same day Lieutenant-Commander LeRoy Fitch issued General Order 5, closing the Ohio River to civilian traffic unless escorted by gunboats.104

103 Terrill, _Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Indiana, Volume I_, p. 183; Indiana Legion, _Operations of the Indiana Legion and Minute Men_, p. 33; and Burke, “Civil War Journal,” p. 188.
Hobson and his men received a warm welcome when they arrived in Corydon the morning of July 10. Hobson was only one day behind Morgan, but the Union cavalry was still not sure where the Confederates were headed. Morgan was headed for Salem. After spending the night in and around Palmyra, Morgan’s men mounted up and moved north. The advance of Morgan’s column reached the Washington County seat about 9:00 a.m. The ranking officer of the advance, a captain, rode into town carrying a flag of truce. He approached a delegation of citizens and asked if they planned to defend the town. The men told him no. After hearing their answer, the Confederate captain told the men that Morgan’s soldiers would respect private property, taking only what they needed. The Confederates took possession of the town and took only what they needed—which happened to be clothing, most of the food and all of the horses in town.105

The local militia retreated to Salem where they determined to put up no resistance. Those who were mounted fled, and were quickly captured by the raiders. There were a few shots fired; one militiaman was killed and one of Morgan’s soldiers wounded. The exact number of men captured is not known, though one source puts the number at 400. The captured militia were rounded up and taken to the courthouse where they were paroled. Morgan placed guards on stores and streets but the guards proved very ineffective—the town was pillaged by his troopers anyway.106 Duke reported, “This disposition for wholesale plunder exceeded anything that any of us had ever seen before.”107

Morgan collected $2,000 in exchange for not burning the two local flouring mills. While in town, his men gathered new mounts and fed themselves and their horses. The railroad depot was burned, along with three box cars and a passenger car. Before burning the depot, the Confederates seized a heavy wooden box they suspected of holding gold or other currency. They took it back to Morgan’s headquarters at Persise House on the square where they broke it open. The box was filled not with gold, but very heavy hand tools. The empty box survives to this day, now in a museum in Salem. Detachments of Morgan’s cavalry burned the railroad bridges east and west of town and the bridge over the Blue River, and cut telegraph wires.108

Morgan found much-needed ammunition at Salem. The powder and shot meant for the militia was placed in a wagon, also procured in Salem, which joined Morgan’s supply train. At 2:00 p.m. the column pushed toward Vienna. Morgan sent a company north on the main road to Indianapolis, only to be turned back by two companies of militia.109

Morgan’s column pushed through Canton and New Philadelphia, gathering about 500 horses as they passed through Washington County. The horses they left behind were later confiscated by the army and sold at Salem. After reaching Vienna about 6:00 p.m., Morgan burned the depot and a bridge. He also captured the telegraph operator before he could raise the alarm. At Vienna, “Lightning” Ellsworth learned that the militia had been ordered to fell trees to block roads. At this point, however, Morgan was moving too fast for the strategy to be effective. After a brief rest in Vienna, the Confederates pushed on to Lexington, at that time the Scott County seat. The Confederates raided the town, but not to the degree of some other towns. A confectionary store was looted as was a general store, where cheese, crackers, and other foodstuffs were taken.

At Lexington, via the telegraph, Morgan got his first real intelligence on the Union troops pursuing him. He confirmed that Hobson was closing in and that other troops and militia were being shuttled via the river and railroad to try to cut off his advance.110

The state of Indiana was on high alert. The military, including the militia, were given unlimited access to trains and the use of the telegraph. Hobson was still behind. He was making up ground but his progress was hampered by a lack of fresh mounts—Morgan was still taking every available horse. Hobson arrived in Salem on the morning of July 11, less than twenty-four hours after Morgan had departed.111

**July 11, 1863: Vernon, Indiana**

Upon leaving Lexington, Morgan turned his column north, following the railroad to Vernon. The column stopped in Paris briefly, to rest and fill their canteens.112

Hobson arrived in Vienna just a few hours after Morgan had left. To slow the Union pursuit, Morgan sent a column south toward Madison, while his main force continued on to Deputy, Paris and Vernon. A large number of Indiana Legion had arrived at North Vernon by train and marched to Vernon where they were determined to make a stand. The Legion, approximately 1,200 militia from Dearborn and Ohio counties and a battery of two 6-pounder cannon, held the high ground.113 Morgan sent a demand for surrender to which Colonel H.T. Williams, replied, “I was abundantly able to hold the place, and if Gen. Morgan got it he must take it by hard fighting.”114 The demand for surrender was a ruse to buy time. Morgan knew he did not have time to fight a battle at Vernon. While the militia emptied the town of women and children, Morgan’s men turned south.115

July 12, 1863: Dupont, Indiana
The Confederates arrived in Dupont about midnight. The town was on the Madison and Indianapolis Railroad and Morgan took this opportunity to wreck it. He sent detachments to burn the trestles over Big Creek about one mile south of Dupont and the trestle over Graham’s Fork. The Confederates in town cut telegraph wires, burned a water tower, the Dupont depot and twelve railroad cars, and took 2,000 hams from a local meat-packing house. Leaving the ruined remains of Dupont behind, Morgan’s cavalry turned east.116

Morgan’s column rode through Millersburg and New Marion before arriving in Versailles, where they captured and paroled 300 militia. Morgan took $5,000 from the courthouse, and discovered and captured a large herd of horses intended for sale to the Union army. As the Confederates moved east from Versailles they destroyed two bridges. They captured the telegraph operator as they passed through Osgood, taking the opportunity to spread false information by wire. They pressed on, following the railroad to Pierceville and Milan, burning bridges as they went. Morgan’s command spent the night near Sunman.117

114 Indiana Legion, Operations of the Indiana Legion and Minute Men, p. 56.
July 13, 1863: Into Ohio

Morgan’s advance skirmished with Indiana Legion about 2,500 strong in Sunman. The Confederates avoided a major engagement and at 5:00 a.m. left their last bivouac in Indiana and began the march for Ohio. Morgan’s column passed through the towns of Harmon’s, Van Weddon’s and Weisburg, burning bridges and wrecking track as they went. The column wove its way through Hubbell’s Corner and the German settlement of New Alsace, where the raiders consumed all of the beer that the two breweries had produced and Morgan slept for a few hours in a lodging room at the Gephart Saloon. After leaving New Alsace, the raiders rode through Dover and Logan.\textsuperscript{118}

They continued through Dearborn County, with the Union cavalry closing in. A soldier in the 2nd Ohio Cavalry reported that girls sang “Down with the Traitor” as he passed through German towns in Morgan’s wake and others recalled that people fed the Union soldiers as they passed through. The Union militia marched for Lawrenceburg, on the Ohio River, thinking that Morgan might be headed in that direction but Morgan’s goal was the Whitewater River and Ohio. Morgan arrived at Harrison Hill on July 13. The Confederates crossed the Whitewater River and filed into Harrison, Ohio, in the early afternoon (Map 8). Once again, they took what they needed or wanted from the local stores. With Hobson close behind, Morgan didn’t tarry in Harrison. He gathered what intelligence he could, burned the Whitewater bridge, and rode for Hamilton, Ohio. Hobson arrived in Harrison in time to see steam rising from the Whitewater River from the collapsed bridge. With Morgan approaching Cincinnati, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside declared martial law; all business was suspended and a call went out for men to defend the city.\textsuperscript{119}

Duke states that Morgan had a very specific plan once he left Indiana and makes it quite clear that crossing into Ohio had always been part of the plan, and that it was important for the plan’s success to circumvent Cincinnati:

If we could get past Cincinnati safely, the danger of the expedition, he [Morgan] thought, would be more than half over. Here he expected to be confronted by the concentrated forces of Judah and Burnside, and he anticipated great difficulty in eluding or cutting his way through them. Once safely through this peril, his escape would be certain, unless the river remained so high that the transports

could carry troops to intercept him at the upper crossings. The cavalry following in his rear could not overtake him as long as he kept in motion, and the infantry could not be transported so rapidly by rail to the eastern part of the State that it could be concentrated in sufficient strength to stop him. His object, therefore, entertaining these views and believing that the great effort to capture him would be made as he crossed the Hamilton and Dayton railroad, was to deceive the enemy as to the exact point where he would cross this road, and denude that point as much as possible of troops. He sent detachments in various directions, seeking, however, to create the impression that he was marching to Hamilton.120

July 13-14, 1863: Around Cincinnati
Ellsworth again commandeered the telegraph in Harrison, and sent deceptive messages stating variously that Morgan was headed to Hamilton or that he was attacking Cincinnati. In fact, Morgan hoped to avoid a fight in or near Cincinnati and felt he could slip by unnoticed if he created enough confusion to throw the city into turmoil.

Before leaving Harrison, the Confederates cut the telegraph lines. As they headed into the county, Morgan divided his column, sending part of the force to Miamitown while the main column pushed on to New Baltimore. Morgan arrived in New Baltimore about 5:00 p.m., crossed the Little Miami River, burned the bridge and pushed on to New Burlington where he again split his column. From New Burlington, one of his columns headed north to Springfield and the other to Glendale. In Glendale Morgan crossed the Hamilton and Dayton Railroad, captured the telegraph, again sending misleading messages, and tore up as much track as he could.121

The column that split off toward Miamitown was a feint to draw Union troops away from the main column. This group of 500 men followed Harrison Road into Miamitown, where they were forced to rebuild the planking on the bridge across the Great Miami River and they fought a skirmish with Ohio militia just beyond the city. They merged with Morgan’s main column at Bevis.122

120 Duke, A History of Morgan’s Cavalry, p. 440.
121 Horwitz, The Longest Raid, pp. 117-118; and Lora Schmidt Cahill, Morgan’s Raid in Ohio, “Harrison to Miamisville,” unpublished manuscript in possession of the author, pp. 2-5. The manuscript is divided into sections, each numbered individually.
122 Lora Schmidt Cahill, Morgan’s Raid in Ohio, “Appendix A. Miamitown Feint Towards Cincinnati,” unpublished manuscript in possession of the author, p. 1. The manuscript is divided into sections, each numbered individually.
Camp Dennison, on the eastern edge of Cincinnati, was a recruiting and training camp for the Union army. In July 1863, the camp of less than 600 convalescents and militia was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel George W. Neff. In the early morning hours of July 14, Neff received word that Morgan was less than five miles away. He quickly sent 100 militiamen with axes to obstruct the road. The militia had just finished blocking in the road as Morgan’s advance appeared. They retreated back into Camp Dennison as Morgan unlimbered his artillery and fired on the camp.123

The blockade forced Morgan to swing west and cross the Little Miami River at Dugan’s Crossing, just west of Miamiville. Morgan then sent a detachment toward Camp Dennison with the intention of burning the railroad bridge across the Little Miami. Lieut. Col. Neff ordered two companies of militia and a battery of artillery forward to protect the bridge. Again, Neff’s timing was impeccable. His men arrived on the south bank of the river just as Morgan’s cavalry arrived on the north. The militia and the artillery succeeded in driving away the Confederates.124

Duke called the fight near Camp Dennison a picket skirmish. The Union soldiers lost one man killed and four captured. The Ohio militia captured five of Morgan’s men. In the ride around Cincinnati, Morgan lost several men captured and killed. In addition to his losses near Camp Dennison, two Confederates were killed and three wounded in a fight with Ohio militia on the Miamitown road, and four men were captured by the Zouave Guards near Bevis Station. Union forces also captured twelve men and the baggage wagon they were accompanying. The column that split off to Springfield reunited with Morgan near Branch Hill.125

The Union cavalry pursued but never caught Morgan as they followed him around Cincinnati. Col. James H. Holloway of the 8th Kentucky Cavalry wrote in his diary:

Left Harrison 5 a.m., march to New Haven. Thence to Big Miami River where as usual we found the bridge burned. Forded the stream, thence marched to within nine miles of Cincinnati – thence marching around Cincinnati passing through Springdale and Glendale and within one mile of Camp Dennison. Crossed the Little Miami River, passed through Miamiville and at 11:00 p.m. camped for the night.126

126 Holloway, Diary of James H. Holloway, p. 50.
Even before Morgan crossed the state line, Governor David Tod of Ohio called up the militia from the state’s thirty-two southern counties. By July 14, over 3,000 men had assembled at Camp Chase in Columbus. A day later, 6,000 men had assembled at Camp Dennison and an equal number at Chillicothe. In addition to the Union troops now in hot pursuit, Morgan would have to deal with thousands of armed militia. By this time Morgan’s force, about 2,500 when he crossed the Cumberland River into Kentucky, numbered about 2,000 troopers.\(^{127}\)

**July 14-15, 1863: Clermont, Brown and Adams Counties, Ohio**

Reunited Morgan’s columns arrived in Williamsburg at 4:00 p.m. on July 14. His exhausted troopers had been in the saddle almost continuously since they left Sunman, Indiana, thirty-five hours and ninety miles earlier. He allowed his men to make camp that night, making his headquarters at John Kain’s Tavern in Williamsburg. The Confederates looted stores and obtained food from the local populace before continuing their march the next day.\(^{128}\)

During much of the time the Confederates were in Ohio, Morgan’s command was split into three columns. Morgan led the center, Col. Adam Johnson the north, and Morgan’s brother, Col. Richard Morgan, the south column. This strategy disguised their numbers and gave them access to more horses, giving them a steady supply of fresh mounts while denying them to their pursuers.\(^{129}\)

Morgan left Williamsburg on July 15. As the Confederates pulled out of Williamsburg, the vanguard of Hobson’s cavalry arrived. The citizens of Williamsburg found even more food to feed the hungry Union troops, providing pie, cakes, bacon and gallons of coffee to the boys in blue.\(^{130}\)

The column under the command of Col. Richard Morgan crossed into Brown County, passing through Georgetown and moving south toward the Ohio River. Just outside of Ripley, Col. Morgan drove in the militia pickets. His scouts had reported gunboats on the river and a larger number of militia in town. The column turned north and quickly moved away from the river. The


column passed through Decatur and out of Brown County, passing through Eckmansville. They burned a bridge over Cherry Fork, moved through North Liberty (present-day Cherry Fork), and continued northeast through Youngsville, Dunkinsville, Dunbarton and on to Locust Grove, where they reunited with the main column and bivouacked for the night.¹³¹

Morgan’s main column passed through Mount Orab and Sardinia, arriving in Winchester about 8:00 a.m. At Winchester they looted three stores and Morgan inspected the mail. The column continued on to Harshasville, where the men looted another store. They passed through Jacksonville where some sources say Morgan spent the night. Most of Morgan’s men bivouacked in or around Locust Grove.¹³²

By July 14, their exhausted mounts and the shortage of fresh horses was causing Hobson’s Union cavalry continuous delays. Replacing spent mounts was extremely difficult with Morgan leading the chase. In hopes of slowing Morgan, Hobson ordered Colonel August Kautz and the 2nd and 7th Ohio cavalries to push ahead, catch and engage Morgan. Hobson gave Kautz the best mounts and ordered him to travel light—each man carrying only a blanket, a poncho, 100 rounds of ammunition, a set of horseshoes with nails, and three days rations for himself and his mount. If Kautz could force Morgan in a pitched battle, Hobson reasoned, he could catch up and bring the rest of his column, including the artillery, into action.¹³³

**July 16, 1863: Adams, Pike and Jackson Counties**

The Confederate raiders left Locust Grove on the morning of July 16. A detachment went south into Scioto County, toward Rarden. The rest moved east toward Jackson, on to Polar Grove, and then followed the road along Chenoweth’s Fork to Arkoe. The Confederates stopped briefly to feed their horses at a mill near present-day Elm Grove before continuing east and burning the 125-foot-long covered bridge over Sunfish Creek.¹³⁴

Before reaching Jasper, Morgan divided his column. One section rode east into Jasper; the other approached Jasper from the south. By this time, the militia had been alerted to the Confederates’

approach and were felling trees to impede their progress. At Jasper, the militia took position behind a barricade of felled trees and made a stand against Morgan. The Pike County militia under the command of Andrew Kilgore had chosen a good defensive position, placing the barricade where the road curved north. There was a steep ridge on the north side of the road, which dropped off into Long Fork Creek on the south side of the road. The Confederates could not get to Jasper without going through the barricade.\textsuperscript{135}

Kilgore had about forty men, armed with whatever guns they had brought with them and determined to make a stand. Morgan’s advance discovered the barricade about 1:00 p.m. Morgan dismounted several companies of Col. Adam Johnson’s brigade, who moved on the militia in line of battle and fired a volley. The militia returned fire. The Confederates fired a second volley and the militia surrendered. The Confederates marched the militia into Jasper and paroled them. One man, Joseph McDougal, was shot and killed by the Confederates after he refused to give them directions to the Scioto River ford.\textsuperscript{136}

Before leaving, the Confederates ransacked Jasper. Andrew Kilgore could only watch as his store was robbed along with two others in the small canal town. The raiders burned several buildings, a mill, two canal boats and the bridge over the canal.\textsuperscript{137} Upon entering the town one Confederate soldier remarked, “At first I thought the whole town was on fire.”\textsuperscript{138} The damage was done quickly and the Confederates were on their way.

Kautz’s Union cavalry pursued Morgan through Jacksonville and Locust Grove, reaching Jasper not long after the Confederates had left. Kautz was delayed for several hours while a temporary bridge was constructed to replace the bridge over the canal burned by Morgan’s men. Morgan was headed to Piketon, and still the Union cavalry lagged behind.\textsuperscript{139}

Upon reaching Piketon, Morgan instructed Ellsworth to send out false telegraphic messages saying that he planned to attack Chillicothe. The ruse worked; all of the militia in Jackson and Pike counties marched for Chillicothe, allowing Morgan to proceed unmolested to Jackson.

\textsuperscript{135} Beekman, \textit{Call of Conscience}, pp. 33-34.
\textsuperscript{136} Cahill, \textit{Morgan’s Raid in Ohio}, “Locust Grove to Jackson,” p. 2; and Beekman, \textit{Call of Conscience}, pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Burke, “Civil War Journal,” p. 203.
\textsuperscript{139} Charles Durling, “The Civil War Diary of Charles W. Durling,” typescript copy transcribed from the original by Mary Jean Clouse (1972) VFM 2295, Charles W. Durling Papers, 1862-1863, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio, p. 79.
Morgan burned the bridge across the Scioto River at Piketon and sent a detachment to Waverly, where they burned another bridge across the Scioto.\footnote{Cahill, Morgan’s Raid in Ohio, “Locust Grove to Jackson,” p. 3.}

Morgan, fearing that the Union cavalry was getting close, ordered a night ride. The raiders rode through Zahn’s Corners and Givens, and about 7:00 p.m. passed through Beaver and into Jackson County. About 9:30 p.m. Morgan’s advance guard rode into Jackson, taking the city by surprise and capturing a number of militia and soldiers in Jackson. The captured men were taken to the fairgrounds and paroled.\footnote{Cahill, Morgan’s Raid in Ohio, “Locust Grove to Jackson,” pp. 3-4; and Robert Edgar Ervin, Jackson County: Its History and Its People, Sheridan Books, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2006, pp. 58-60.}

The Confederates gathered up all the guns they could find and destroyed them, looted stores, and destroyed the printing press and type of The Standard. Apparently, the Republican paper had printed a disparaging article that Morgan read, which led to its destruction. The Confederates gathered all of the horses they could find and at about 10:00 a.m. left Jackson, riding east. Kautz’s cavalry, about twelve hours behind Morgan, arrived in Jackson just after dark, where the joyous town fed them lavishly.\footnote{Ervin, Jackson County: Its History and Its People, pp. 59-60.}

\textbf{July 17, 1863: Engagement at Berlin Cross Roads}

Colonel Benjamin Runkle arrived at Hamden in Vinton County, about 2:00 a.m. with between 2,000 and 2,500 militiamen. He marched his force down the Scioto and Hocking Railroad to Berlin Cross Roads and drew his militia up on Berlin Heights north of town. They fired on the Confederate advance as it entered Berlin Cross Roads, badly wounding one raider. Morgan dismounted at least part of Duke’s brigade and unlimbered his artillery.\footnote{Burke, “Civil War Journal,” p. 205; and Ervin, Jackson County: Its History and Its People, p. 62.}

At least a portion of Runkle’s men had been thrown out as skirmishers and were in Berlin Cross Roads. The Confederates drove the skirmishers out of town and back to their main line and Morgan opened fire with his artillery. The Confederate artillery rattled the militia and apparently Col. Runkle, who reported that the Confederates attacked with double his numbers, which was not possible.\footnote{O.R., Series I, Volume XXIII, Part I, p. 767.}

The first sergeant of Co. E, 1st Pickaway County militia regiment described Runkle’s deployment:
The brigade was now, about 10 o’clock, A.M., drawn up in line of battle; the “Bloody 1st” on the left, in a cornfield; the 2nd Regiment, Col. Mason, composed of several companies from Pickaway County, some from Ross, and a company of sharpshooters from Zanesville, were posted on the right; and a regiment from Fayette . . . were held in reserve.\textsuperscript{145}

One Confederate reported, “Three or four shells was thrown at them and they left.”\textsuperscript{146} In his very brief report of the engagement Runkle wrote: “After the militia heard the shells and my men had been driven out of the town, it was as much as I could do to hold my position, and impossible to take the offensive.”\textsuperscript{147} Runkle retreated back to Hamden and the Confederate advanced out the Wilkesville and Pomeroy roads. The engagement cost Morgan four men killed and at least one wounded. It also cost the Confederates about three hours they could not afford. Runkle reported no losses.\textsuperscript{148}

The militia beleaguered Morgan constantly. While Morgan’s force was far superior to any the militia could bring against him, the constant harassment took its toll. Duke wrote in his \textit{History of Morgan’s Cavalry}:

\begin{quote}
Small fights with the militia were of daily occurrence. They hung around the column, wounding two or three men every day and sometime killing one. We captured hundreds of them daily, but could only turn them loose again after destroying their guns.\textsuperscript{149}
\end{quote}

Sheer fatigue and the militia’s unending campaign of bedevilment were wearing on the raiders. They rode to Wilkesville and stopped before dark. The men welcomed the rest, but as one Confederate wrote:

\begin{quote}
I was glad that we were going to have a good nights rest, but something told me that we ought to ride all night, which would take us to the Ohio River and once across we would be safe. Several of the boys remarked that we ought to keep moving although they were in need of rest.\textsuperscript{150}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[148] Ervin, \textit{Jackson County: Its History and Its People}, p. 63.
\item[149] Duke, \textit{A History of Morgan’s Cavalry}, p. 445.
\end{footnotes}
July 18, 1863: Meigs County
On July 18, Col. Kautz wired Hobson that Morgan was repulsed near Pomeroy. Morgan’s cavalry had run into Meigs County militia under the command of captains R.B. Wilson and John Schreiner just outside of Middlesport. The force of 120 was dispersed on both sides of the road, which led up a gentle slope to a hill where they placed their cannon. A steep-banked creek and thick woods covered the militia’s flanks. It was a naturally strong position called Bradbury Hill.151

As Col. Adam Johnson’s column approached, the Ohioans fired their cannon and a volley of small arms. Johnson’s men pulled back and then crept forward. The fight at Bradbury Hill went on for about an hour before Morgan arrived and ordered Johnson to disengage and to push on. Morgan took the high road around Pomeroy and rode toward Chester. Along a five-mile stretch of the narrow road that wound through a ravine, which has been called the gauntlet, the Confederates were plagued by militia and barricades. Morgan struggled through the gauntlet, losing men.152

There might have been another skirmish at or near Bradbury Hill, but it is more likely that Union infantry were with the militia. Colonel Rutherford Hayes reported that his detachment, the 23rd Ohio and 13th Virginia (US), landed at Pomeroy and engaged Morgan. Some sources mention that there were Union troops with the militia along the gauntlet route north of town. It seems clear that Hayes’ men fought Morgan in Meigs County and sustained casualties. The use of steamboats, which had brought the Union troops to Meigs County, enabled the army to get men into position at Pomeroy, where they hoped capture the Confederates, or at least turn them away from the river.153

Morgan arrived in Chester, about twenty-five miles west of Portland, in the early afternoon of July 18. Over the preceding few days, Morgan’s men had been skirmishing constantly with militia and occasionally with Union soldiers. Hobson and Brigadier General James M. Shackelford were closing in on Morgan when he inexplicably chose to dally in Chester. At the former Meigs County seat, Morgan lounged on the front porch of a store happily discussing the

situation with his brigade commanders. He was convinced they would cross the Ohio River and be on Southern soil the next day. Morgan demonstrated no sense of urgency. He refused to leave Chester without a guide, even though it took some time to find one. Meanwhile, the Union command was utilizing nineteenth-century technology to its fullest to find and trap Morgan.  

The Union soldiers chasing Morgan had not caught him, but they knew where he was, and by the night of July 18, where he was headed. Union commander Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside used the telegraph to update his troops in the field on the constantly changing situation. He employed steamboats and gunboats to block fords and shuttle troops, and used the railroad to move soldiers and artillery and to leap frog militia to where they were most needed.

On July 18, Shackelford and Hobson’s cavalry rested briefly, stopping only to feed man and beast. Both detachments rode through the night hoping to catch Morgan before he crossed the river. Fortunately for the Union cause, Burnside wired Captain William R. Putnam at Marietta, ordering him to send men to protect the ford at Portland. Putnam sent 200 militia and fifty mounted militia with two pieces of artillery under Captain D.L. Wood. Wood, a regular army officer who was in Ohio recruiting, arrived in Portland on July 17 and began building an earthwork. Major W.J. Bloomfield, a militia officer, commanded the fifty mounted men. About half of Bloomfield’s men were sent out scouting toward Pomeroy and Chester; the rest helped build the earthworks. The soldiers constructed a redoubt with flanking infantry trenches on a hill in front of the ford. Here, Wood mounted his guns facing west, covering the road to the ford.

Col. Basil Duke’s brigade came down the Chester road leading Morgan’s column into Portland. Light was fading fast as the tired Confederates approached the Buffington Ford. Capt. Wood sent eighty men in a long skirmish line in front of the works and spread the rest out along the earthworks to give the illusion of a larger force. The ruse worked; Morgan delayed an attack until the next morning. About 2:00 a.m., Brigadier General Eliakim Scammon, whose men had been moved by steamboat from Pomeroy to Ravenswood, ordered Wood to pull out of Portland. No doubt relieved, the militia crossed the river on a small steamer.

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155 O.R., Series I, Volume XXIII, Part I, pp. 660, and 778-780 for telegrams and communications directing boats and Union troops to stop Morgan from crossing the river; and Neibling, The Bloody First, p. 4.
July 19, 1863: The Battle of Buffington Island
Morgan ordered Duke to have his men in position to attack the Union fortification at first light. Duke placed the 5th and 6th Kentucky in line approximately 400 yards from where he judged the redoubt to be and placed artillery on the hill opposite the ford to support the assault. How the men got the artillery onto the ridge in the pitch dark when they could not see the Union defensive position is not explained. How Capt. Wood got his men across the river without raising an alarm is also a mystery.158

Lieutenant Commander LeRoy Fitch commanded the gunboats chasing Morgan. En route to Buffington Ford, Fitch had been diligent. He dispersed his seven-boat flotilla to block Morgan’s path, placing Reindeer at Goose Island crossing, while Naumkeag covered Eight Mile Island. He left two boats, Victory and Springfield, near Pomeroy guarding Wolf Shoals and Belleville crossing, respectively. With the boats in place, Fitch steamed to Buffington Island with his flagship Moose, the steamer Imperial and an auxiliary vessel, Allegheny Belle. During the night, a fog drifted from the river over the Portland bottom. At about 2:00 a.m. Fitch decided to anchor the boats for the night. They floated in the river just off the southern end of Buffington Island. Morgan did not know the navy was so close. He had counted on low water to keep the gunboats at bay. Rain upriver caused a rise in the water level, aiding the navy and wrecking the hopes of the Confederates.159

That night, Morgan posted pickets on the Chester road west of the bottom, but posted none along the Pomeroy road. Morgan took the Middleswart house as his headquarters and, after deciding to call off the assault, retired for the night. Johnson’s brigade was bivouacked in the fields around and west of the Middleswart house. Duke’s men were south of Johnson’s and just north of the redoubt, east of the present-day state memorial. At first light, Duke attacked the redoubt with the 5th and 6th Kentucky, only to find that it had been abandoned and the artillery dismounted and rolled into a ravine. As a precaution, Duke ordered Colonel D. Howard Smith, who had commanded the aborted assault, to take the 5th and 6th Kentucky several hundred yards up the Pomeroy road.160

158 Duke, A History of Morgan’s Cavalry, p. 448; and Bennett, “Morgan’s Luck Runs Out,” pp. 19-20. In violation of Union navy orders, the steamboat Starlight was on the Ohio River with a load of flour. It went aground near Buffington Ford. Capt. Wood and his men helped free the boat and secured it. It was this boat that they used to cross the river.
159 O.R.N., Series I, Volume 25, p. 243; and Ramage, Rebel Raider, p. 177.
The Battle of Buffington Island was essentially two separate engagements that became one general engagement after the two Union columns united in the Portland bottom. Union Gen. Henry Judah’s column approached the Portland bottom from the south along the Pomeroy road. Gen. Henry Hobson’s column, led by Col. August Kautz, came down the Chester road from the west.

After marching all night, Judah’s column arrived on the outskirts of Portland about 5:30 a.m. The general stated in his after-action report: “Here, halting my force and placing my artillery in a commanding position, I determined to make a reconnaissance in person.” Judah took a small detachment, “... a small advance guard, my escort, and one piece of Henshaw’s battery, a section of which, under Captain Henshaw, I had ordered to join my force. I advanced slowly and cautiously along a road leading toward the river....” This small force included Major Daniel McCook, the elder of the “Fighting McCook Family” of Carrollton, Ohio. In the early morning hours the bottom was thick with fog. As Judah’s small detachment moved north toward Portland, Col. D. Howard Smith’s two Confederate regiments headed south along the road and in the fields to the right of the Pomeroy road. As the fog began to clear, Judah and Smith’s columns came into contact. All of the accounts indicate that both sides were surprised, and for a moment both stopped and gaped at each other. The Confederates, in line of battle, reacted first. They opened fire and charged the Union men strung out in column along the road.

The Confederate attack took place just north of the Williamson house, in a narrow neck of land between Dry Run Creek and the river. The Confederates’ opening shots killed some of the horses pulling the cannon and wounded Maj. McCook and others. The charge panicked the remaining horses, causing the caisson to turn over and block the road. Judah managed to negotiate the cannon barricade, but many of those with him were not so fortunate; twelve men were wounded, two mortally, and two others killed outright. Between twenty and fifty men were captured. Judah and most of the survivors withdrew to the main line (Map 9).

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164 Michael G. Pratt, The Battle of Buffington Island: The End of Morgan’s Trail, Center for Historic and Military Archaeology, Tiffin, Ohio, 2000, p. 38; and J.E. McGowan, “Morgan’s Indiana and Ohio Raid” in Annals of the War: Written by Leading Participants North and South, reprint edition, The Blue & Grey Press, Edison, New Jersey, 1996, pp. 759-760. The number of prisoners taken varies with the source. Duke says between forty and fifty; Judah puts the number between twenty and thirty. McGowan says only forty-five men were with the detail. All of those captured were liberated before the end of the day.
Duke rushed forward and took command of the situation on the Pomeroy road. He ordered Col. Smith to pull his two regiments back, near the position they occupied prior to the assault on the redoubt. Duke then rode to the Middleswart house to confer with his commander. Morgan ordered Duke to hold his ground and bring up additional men as needed. Before Duke could return to his men Col. August Kautz’s column pushed Col. Adam Johnson’s pickets in, opening the second part of the battle.165

Judah returned to his main force, got his men in line, and opened fire with his artillery. The fog lifted. Duke’s two cannon on the ridge fired upon the main body of Union soldiers. Judah deployed the 5th Indiana Cavalry and placed the 11th Kentucky Cavalry (US) in line to the right of the Hoosiers. The 14th Illinois Cavalry fell in behind as reserve. As Judah’s line began to press Duke’s, a fifty-man detachment of the 5th Indiana led by Lieut. John O’Neal dashed across the bottom and up the ridge, capturing Duke’s Parrott rifles. The guns on the ridge were not supported by Confederate troops and the crews fled, leaving O’Neal his prizes (Map 10).166

The loss of the guns was a major blow to Morgan’s defense. Without artillery support the Confederates could not hope to counter Judah’s artillery or fight off the gunboats. Morgan knew the river would be too shallow for ironclads and believed he could fight off the lighter tinclads with his rifled artillery. The capture of the Parrotts removed that option.

The fighting on the Pomeroy road awakened Lieut. Commander Fitch aboard the Moose. Fitch ordered all of his vessels under way, the Moose in the lead as the three boats churned down the chute toward the head of Buffington Island. The Allegheny Belle, with the one gun on her bow protected by cotton bales, was behind the Moose; the Imperial brought up the rear. Before he reached the head of the island Fitch picked up a passenger, Capt. John J. Grafton, a Union officer. Grafton had fled the initial altercation with Col. D. Howard Smith’s Confederates and found his way to the river bank, where he hailed the passing boats. Grafton explained the situation in the Portland bottom to Fitch. As the two men were speaking, the fog cleared and Fitch caught sight of Morgan’s soldiers ahead on the shore with two cannon. Fitch fired his two 24-pounder bow guns and the Confederates abandoned the artillery.167

Fitch moved his flotilla past the head of the island, beyond Duke’s line. He elevated the Moose’s guns and opened fire in the direction of Johnson’s line on the northern end of the battlefield. Fitch also sent boats ashore to capture the guns abandoned by Morgan’s troops, as well as wagons, buggies and small arms.\textsuperscript{168}

While Fitch was clearing the river bank of Confederates, Judah continued pressing the attack on Duke. Duke, knowing he needed his artillery to stabilize the situation, ordered part of the 6th Kentucky under Lieut. Colonel J. Warren Grigsby to retake the lost guns. Grigsby’s mounted charge was cut down by the dismounted Union soldiers who now held the ridge. Duke’s counterattack failed. In the bottom, Judah’s brigade kept pressure on Duke, pushing him back to the area just south of the present-day state park. All the while, Union artillery less than one-half mile from Duke’s position fired case shot at the thin Confederate line. As Duke was pushed back, he sent several couriers asking Morgan to send the 2nd Kentucky to his aid.\textsuperscript{169}

A Confederate private in Johnson’s brigade described the initial assault on the northern end of the battlefield by the Union gunboat:

\begin{quote}
We heard the boats puffing very plain and hurried to our horses. Buffington Island lay just below us. In five minutes more a shell burst some distance below us. The next one burst nearer on a bee line with us. We knew at once that the Yanks were shelling us.\textsuperscript{170}
\end{quote}

About the time that Judah regrouped and attacked Duke, Col. August Kautz arrived on the field. Kautz, with the 2nd and 7th Ohio cavalries and two pieces of artillery, had been riding all night from Chester. He arrived early in the morning and pushed Col. Adam Johnson’s pickets off the ridge. He then deployed and began to attack the Confederates in the bottom. Johnson’s force initially outnumbered Kautz’s and held him in check. The pressure on Duke forced him farther north, where his line and Johnson’s were linked— forming a right angle. The arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Grover Wormer on the Chester road with the 8th and 9th Michigan cavalries,


\textsuperscript{169} Bennett, “Morgan’s Luck Runs Out,” p. 49; McGowan, “Morgan’s Indiana and Ohio Raid,” p. 761; and Duke, A History of Morgan’s Cavalry, p. 450. Duke claims to have had about 500 men in the two regiments on July 19, 1863. Case shot is a form of 19th-century anti-personnel ammunition—a spherical projectile timed to explode over the target, raining lethal iron fragments on the soldiers below.

and Gen. Henry Hobson with Col. William P. Sanders’ Michigan brigade, which included more artillery, was too much for Johnson.\textsuperscript{171}

The advancing Union cavalry pushed north from the Pomeroy road and east from the Chester road, compressing the Confederate resistance in an arc stretching from just west of what was then Rise Road to just north of the Chester road. Both Judah and Hobson brought more and more regiments into line, lengthening their lines and forcing the Confederates to thin theirs to protect their flanks, which proved impossible. Hobson used Kautz’s column and his artillery to hold Johnson and took the offensive with the Michigan brigade.\textsuperscript{172}

When Fitch’s gunboats cleared the chute, Morgan’s wagon train, which had been lined up preparing to cross the river, fled in confusion. The teamsters that got out into the bottom faced artillery fire from the river, the heights on the west, and from the south. No doubt the men were panicked and confused, as were many of the Confederates not actively engaged with the enemy. The scene, Duke wrote, was one of “indescribable confusion.” Johnson’s and Duke’s defenders were now forced into that confusion. The only way out was the Portland road, near the north end of Portland bottom.\textsuperscript{173}

Lieut. Col. Grover Wormer described the scene from the area near the Chester road as his men broke Adam Johnson’s line:
\begin{quote}
. . . the enemy, already slowly retiring, took to flight in great disorder, strewing the ground over which they fled with the plunder which they had accumulated all along their line of march.\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}

The 11th Kentucky (US) turned Duke’s left flank and was poring into the maelstrom in the bottom. Morgan managed to get the regiments with him out of the bottom. After conferring, Duke and Johnson also ran for the north. The battle lasted less than an hour. Morgan’s cavalry division, once one of the Confederacy’s best, was destroyed.\textsuperscript{175}

As the Confederates retreated, the Union line united. The east-west line swept the floodplain and pushed the remnants of Morgan’s cavalry into the bottleneck at the north end of the bottom. Men

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{171} O.R., Series I, Volume XXIII, Part I, pp. 660, 666; and Bennett, “Morgan’s Luck Runs Out,” p. 49.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{172} O.R., Series I, Volume XXIII, Part I, p. 662; and Nekoranec, “The Hunt for J.H. Morgan,” p. 82.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{174} O.R., Series I, Volume XXIII, Part I, p. 666.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{175} Duke, \textit{A History of Morgan’s Cavalry}, p. 452; and Nekoranec, “The Hunt for J.H. Morgan,” p. 87.}
\end{footnotes}
and material were desperately trying to get up the Portland road and out of the bottom. Morgan sent couriers to Duke and Johnson urging them to hold on long enough for what was left of his division to escape. In the center of the line, Duke and the remnants of his command fought a desperate holding action.  

Once in the Portland bottom there were four ways out. The Pomeroy road to the south, the Chester road in the middle, the ford across the Ohio River at Buffington Island, and the Portland road in the north end of bottom. The Union navy held the river and Judah and Hobson’s troops had pushed the Confederates away from the Pomeroy and Chester roads. The only avenue of escape was up the Portland road. The present-day route of SR 124 did not exist—the extreme north end of the bottom was blocked by a steep ridge.

In the end, the Michigan cavalry finished the Confederates trapped in the bottom. The 9th Michigan led the charge, followed by the 8th Michigan. Those of Morgan’s survivors who tried to get through the gaps in the 9th Michigan’s line ran into the trailing 8th Michigan. Some Confederates took cover behind overturned wagons and others tried to flee up the Portland road; very few escaped (Map 11). The Michigan brigades swept down Lauck’s Run valley, taking hundreds of prisoners. Lieut. Col. Grover S. Wormer, 8th Michigan Cavalry, reported capturing 573 prisoners, among them Col. Basil Duke, Morgan’s brother-in-law, and Col. Richard Morgan, Morgan’s brother.

The historical accounts of the battle are confusing and contradictory. Basil Duke insists that the Confederates had only five rounds of ammunition per man, yet they fought for at least an hour and possibly two. Morgan only had four cannon. Duke says two Parrots were on the ridge across the valley from the ford. These were captured early in the battle by Union cavalry. Yet, Fitch says he captured two guns near the ford, one of which he says was a Parrott. Duke also states that a cannon and caisson fell into a ravine as the Confederates were retreating. The captured Confederates did not write after-action reports. Duke’s original narrative, written in 1867, is the most complete Confederate account. The details are intriguing, but they do not alter the outcome. Morgan was soundly defeated at Buffington Island.

The Battle of Buffington Island ended Morgan’s Raid. Morgan lost some 700 captured, fifty-seven killed, and nearly 200 wounded.

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We were brought in with 50 others to the river where prisoners were brought in squads of from 10 to 300 all day. In the evening Col. Smith and Col. Duke with 200 more were brought in.179

Following the disaster at Buffington Island, what was left of Morgan’s command began a desperate race to cross the Ohio River. Col. Richard Morgan managed to get to the Chester road and back to Bashin, west of Portland. There, he encountered a portion of Gen. Shakelford’s command near Bashin Church. Col. Morgan drew up in line of battle and fought the Union cavalry for about an hour before surrendering. Gen. Morgan rode north along the Ohio River to Reedsville, where about 300 raiders under Col. Adam Johnson managed to cross the river. John Hunt Morgan was with the group, but returned to the western shore when the Moose appeared. Morgan’s weary column passed through Tupper Plains, leaving some wounded there. The Confederates rested a few hours on a hill above the town before moving on. Shakelford’s Union cavalry arrived in Tupper Plains, perhaps while Morgan was still on the hill above town, and remained there that night.180

**July 20-21, 1863: Morgan turns West and North**

Morgan turned west from Tupper Plains, heading back across Meigs County. Gen. Shakelford’s column proceeded to Cheshire in Gallia County, where they captured a portion of the 10th Kentucky Cavalry near there trying to cross the Ohio. Morgan and what remained of his main column continued west, going back into Jackson County and spending the night at Lincoln, also known as Iron Valley Furnace, in the northeast corner of the county.181

Morgan’s cavalry spent the next day in Vinton County, riding through Oreton and Vinton Station. They bypassed McArthur and rode north to Creola, where Sara Karns baked bread and

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biscuits for the Confederates. In return, the soldiers looted the town shops before leaving in the early morning hours of July 22.\textsuperscript{182}

**July 22, 1863: From Nelsonville, Athens County, to Perry County**
Morgan rode north, the raiders passing through New Plymouth and into Athens County. They rode into Starr, where Morgan went through the mail at the post office. The column continued east to Coonville, then turned north, arriving on the outskirts of Nelsonville in mid-morning on July 22.\textsuperscript{183}

The raiders crossed the bridges across the Hocking River and Hocking Canal and rode into Nelsonville, which in 1863 had a population of about 800. The local militia was in Athens, where they had expected Morgan to strike. The mayor of Nelsonville surrendered the city and Morgan’s men began collecting provisions and horses. A Union soldier home on leave was made to assist the Confederates, taking merchandise from the shelves and handing it to those looting the stores. At least four stores were looted, though post-war accounts note that the Confederates paid for some of what they took.\textsuperscript{184}

Morgan’s men spent about two hours in Nelsonville. They were efficient in their efforts; they quickly gathered up what they needed and moved on. At this point, few men were still wearing complete Confederate uniforms. According to an eyewitness account, Morgan’s soldiers in Nelsonville appeared “dirty ragged, and their dress was all different, and of every possible description.”\textsuperscript{185} Indiana accounts mention Confederate soldiers taking clothing, so there is little doubt that their appearance was less than uniform by this time.\textsuperscript{186}

Morgan left Nelsonville around 2:00 p.m. with at least thirty-six of his men mounted on horses acquired during their brief stop. As they left town, they burned the Hocking River bridge and between ten and twenty canal boats; it is unclear if they burned the canal bridge. Col. Frank Wolford’s command rode into town four hours later. The distance between Morgan and his pursuers was closing.

\textsuperscript{182} Cahill, *Morgan's Raid in Ohio*, “Buffington to Nelsonville,” p. 3; and Ogan, *History of Vinton County, Ohio*, p. 220. Ogan has his dates mixed up and the sequence of Morgan’s route through the county confused.

\textsuperscript{183} Cahill, *Morgan's Raid in Ohio*, “Buffington to Nelsonville,” p. 4.


\textsuperscript{185} Soper, *Historic Athens County*, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{186} *History of Hocking Valley, Ohio*, p. 175.
Shortly after leaving Nelsonville, the raiders entered Hocking County, passing through Long Hollow and Murray City before riding into Perry County. The citizens of the county seat, New Lexington, were convinced that Morgan would sack their town. As there were few men to defend the town it was decided that a delegation would meet Morgan on the road and surrender. They waited for hours but Morgan never came. He bypassed New Lexington and passed through Buckingham, Drakes, Millerstown and Chapel Hill.187

Morgan’s men looted stores in Chapel Hill and Millerstown. They gathered horses as they went, taking mounts along the road from women, country doctors and farm wagons. Morgan continued through the hills of Perry County, crossing Island Run near Porterville, where the Confederates camped for the night, Morgan sleeping in the Deacon Wright house. Meanwhile, the Union cavalry continued to gain on the fleeing Confederates. Hobson’s cavalry rode through Perry County that same day.188

July 23, 1863: Engagement at Eagleport, Morgan County

During the evening the raiders were in Perry County they captured several of a party of mounted militiamen from Zanesville. The men who eluded the Confederates got word to the authorities in McConnelsville that Morgan was probably headed for Eagleport, where he could cross the Muskingum River. There was a company of militia with two brass cannon on a steamer seventeen miles downriver from Eagleport, but the commander, Colonel Hill, refused to bring his company upriver, leaving the town virtually undefended.189

Morgan arrived at Eagleport about 8:00 a.m. and drew up his column at Devol’s Store about 200 yards below the ford. To defend the crossing, a number of citizens armed with whatever weapons were available took up defensive positions on a high embankment about seventy-five yards southeast of the ford. As Morgan’s dismounted troopers approached the ford, the townspeople opened fire. Morgan’s men returned fire but neither side suffered any casualties.190

Morgan used a captured a ferry boat to land his men on the east shore of the Muskingum. After a number of Confederate cavalry had crossed, their comrades on the west shore ceased firing. The

190 Robertson, *History of Morgan County, Ohio*, p. 230.
squad on the east shore charged the Ohio civilians, ending the engagement. After the defenders had been routed, Morgan continued ferrying his men across the river. The Confederates remained in Eagleport less than two hours. Morgan had hoped to follow the river to Gaysport (present-day Blue Rock) and then head east but his plans were foiled when the steamer *Dime* came downriver from Zanesville with the 86th Ohio Mounted Infantry onboard. At about the same time, the boat bearing Col. Hill and the militia steamed upriver. Morgan had no choice but to change plans. The raiders and the troops on the steamers exchanged a few shots and Morgan withdrew to the east.  

Following the brief engagement, Morgan cut across country. His column rode across Bloom and Bristol townships in Morgan County and crossed into Muskingum County where he crossed through Meigs Township. As Morgan’s cavalry rode through the interior of Morgan County, Gen. James M. Shakelford’s column of 1,000 cavalry rode into Eagleport.

Morgan entered Guernsey County and the town of Cumberland about 3:00 p.m. The Confederates spent several hours in Cumberland, looting stores, gathering horses and eating. They left five hours later with 100 new horses and a local man they impressed to guide them.

Four days after Morgan was captured, the *Cambridge Times* of Guernsey County described the raiders:

> John Morgan, with the remnant of a band composed of the most villainous cut-throats and scoundrels, the sweepings and accumulations of two years of murdering and plundering among helpless people, amounting to probably, six hundred found his way into the county. . . .

Morgan’s column rode through the night. At Point Pleasant (present-day Pleasant City) they released the guide seized at Cumberland and took another. The raiders continued to Hartford (present-day Buffalo) and a bridge across Seneca Creek just outside of town. Upon arriving, Morgan discovered that the local militia had removed the floorboards from the bridge, forcing his men to swim their horses across the creek. In an effort to slow his pursuers, Morgan ordered

the bridge’s superstructure burned, but the fire was put out before it caused much damage. Morgan rode through Senecaville, reaching Campbell’s Station very early on the morning of July 24.  

**July 24, 1863: Engagement at Old Washington**

At Campbell’s Station Morgan attempted to use the telegraph to his advantage, but was foiled by a provost marshal who replied to the phony telegraph message, wiring that he had plenty of troops guarding the bridge between Mill Wood and Barnesville. The Confederates rode out of Campbell’s Station, leaving a path of destruction and several burning freight cars in their wake. They then burned the bridge across Leatherwood Creek and continued north, arriving in Washington (present-day Old Washington) about 7:00 a.m.  

Washington, on the Old National Road, had a number of hotels and taverns and Morgan made full use of them. He rested and took dinner with his staff at the American House while his men ate in town. Morgan spent several hours at Washington, a delay that cost the Confederates—as the raiders were enjoying the town’s hospitality, Shackelford’s column arrived. The Union general unlimbered his artillery on the cemetery hill south of town and opened fire.  

The artillery opened the Battle of Washington, a series of small engagements that pushed Morgan further north. The advance of Shackelford’s brigade arrived and pushed in Morgan’s pickets, which were guarding the road into Washington from the south. The flank attack on the Confederate pickets and the artillery fired drove Morgan from Washington. The Confederates drew up in line of battle in a dense wood about a mile north.  

Shackelford dismounted his troopers, deployed in line of battle, and began his assault. Morgan’s stand was a ruse. He knew he was outnumbered and outgunned and that engaging Shackelford would lead to the destruction of his command. As the dismounted Union cavalry pressed forward, Morgan’s men mounted and fled toward Winchester (present-day Winterset), ending the Battle of Washington. Morgan lost three killed and several wounded. Four of his men were captured, but Morgan again eluded his pursuers. 

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About an hour north of Washington, Shackelford caught Morgan at the Salt Fork bridge. Morgan delayed, parleying with Shackelford over terms of surrender. While the two generals talked, Morgan’s men continued moving north, putting space between them and the Union troops. In a lull in the discussion, Morgan and his guard slipped away and rejoined his men. The Confederates passed through Antrim and Londonderry before entering Harrison County at Smyrna.

After riding through Smyrna, Morgan burned the bridges across Stillwater Creek and Boggs Fork, smoke from the burning bridges alerting the citizens to the raiders’ presence. The wrecked bridges slowed the Union pursuit, giving the Confederates a brief respite. Morgan rested at the Mills Hotel in Moorefield while his men scoured the countryside for supplies and horses. Some took the opportunity to rest at the Nottingham Presbyterian Church about a mile east of Moorefield. The Confederates pushed on after an hour or so, but were turned back by local militia deployed in a strong position on the road into Cadiz. Morgan fell back to a maple grove on Short Creek and halted for the night. Shackelford spent the night in New Athens, where his men were welcomed and fed by the residents of the abolitionist community.

July 25, 1863: Jefferson County

By July 25, the woods in Jefferson County were crawling with militia. Morgan spent the day trying to avoid them and Union cavalry. He followed a snaking route that took him across the county from east to west and from Adena in the south to Monroeville in the north. The Confederates followed the road along Long Run to Short Creek and then followed Short Creek to present-day Dillonville. The raiders captured a squad of militia between Dillonville and Smithfield, disarmed them and marched them to Smithfield, where the local populace, thinking they were Union cavalry, fed the Confederates.

The Confederate raiders rode northwest from Smithfield to New Alexandria, where they arrived about noon. Morgan was now just four miles from the Ohio River, but was again stymied by the diligence of the local commander. The initial call for militia by Ohio Governor Tod did not include Jefferson County; no one thought Morgan would get that far. On the afternoon of July 24, the bell on the Steubenville courthouse rang out, calling the local militia to gather. The men were soon joined by three regiments of Pennsylvania militia under the command of General

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W.T.H. Brooks. The Pennsylvania regiments were posted at the principal fords south of Steubenville—Warrenton, Brush Run, Brilliant and Mingo—forcing Morgan to continue moving north.203

Before leaving New Alexandria, Morgan burned the railroad bridge and tore up the telegraph wires. The Confederates rode up Dry Fork Creek, Morgan and his officers taking a quick supper at the homes of Mr. Hannah and Mr. Stone before the raiders rode back to the west, toward Wintersville. A company of Steubenville militia under the command of Colonel Collier was also headed to Wintersville. Collier sent a scouting party of eleven men under Captain F. Prentiss to find Morgan. Prentiss’ men charged Morgan’s advance just outside of Wintersville. The militia attacked on horseback and opened fire, killing one raider. The militia lost one man and a woman in a nearby house was wounded in the crossfire. The militia scattered and Morgan rode on.204

General Burnside had been moving troops by train and was now determined to get cavalry ahead of Morgan to head him off. Burnside ordered Major George W. Rue with 400 men and a section of artillery to take trains to Bellaire, Ohio, where it was thought Morgan might cross. He did not. Rue then took the train to Steubenville and up to Shanghai (present-day Empire) where the cavalry detrained and rode to Wintersville.205

Rue arrived just after the Confederates fought a brief engagement with the 9th Michigan Cavalry. Morgan had brushed aside the militia and continued to the west, toward Richmond. At Two Ridge Presbyterian Church between Wintersville and Richmond, the 9th Michigan caught Morgan’s rear guard. The Michigan cavalry fired, wounding one man. As Morgan’s troops rushed toward Richmond, Col. Collier’s Steubenville militia deployed and fired on the Michigan cavalry thinking they were Morgan. The militia killed one trooper. The confusion caused by the friendly fire allowed Morgan to escape.206

Morgan reached Richmond about 7:00 p.m., where he learned that militia had been sent to cover the crossings at Shanghai and Yellow Creek above Steubenville. Morgan had no choice but to keep moving. The Confederate column rode to East Springfield where they gathered more

203 Doyle, 20th Century History of Steubenville and Jefferson County, Ohio, p. 190.
horses. They turned north and rode to Nebo (present-day Bergholz), making camp on the farm of Herdman Taylor. That day, Morgan’s men had ridden from Georgetown in Harrison County to Nebo just south of the Carroll County line. It had been a long day for the raiders.207

Shackelford and Maj. Rue’s cavalry were less than three miles behind Morgan when they, too, stopped for the night. Shackelford conferred with Rue and Rue, who was operating independently, agreed to fight under Shackelford’s command. They were determined to capture Morgan the next day. Shackelford probably had over 1,000 mounted troops at his disposal—the 1st Kentucky, 14th Illinois and 9th Michigan cavalry, the 11th Michigan Battery, 86th Ohio Mounted Infantry, the 2nd Tennessee Mounted Infantry, and Major Rue’s 375 men of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry with three pieces of artillery, as well as Ohio militia.208

July 26, 1863: Battle of Salineville and Morgan’s Capture
July 26 started off badly for Morgan and did not improve. He was planning to have an early breakfast when a soldier rushed in with the news that Union cavalry was pressing the Confederate pickets. Morgan left the Taylor home in a hurry about 3:00 a.m., urging his column toward Monroeville. They burned the bridge across Yellow Creek and pushed north.209

Morgan had planned to go though Salineville, but Shackelford’s mounted force and a regiment of Pennsylvania militia held the road into town. About a mile and half from Salineville, Michigan cavalry hit the back of Morgan’s column as he attempted to bypass the town. Morgan ordered part of Col. Roy Cluke’s command to make a desperate stand near the east boundary of Carroll County. As the rest of Morgan’s column fled through the woods, Cluke deployed in a cornfield and fired on Major W.B. Way’s Michigan cavalry. The fight was uneven and short. Morgan’s rear guard numbered less than fifty and was short on ammunition. The Michigan cavalry wounded several Confederates and took forty prisoners.210

Morgan rode down a deep ravine and over a hill, his column emerging from the wood on the Mechanicsville road near West Grove Cemetery. Maj. Way caught up with Morgan at the cemetery and perhaps the fiercest fighting of the last week of the raid ensued. The Confederate

207 Doyle, 20th Century History of Steubenville and Jefferson County, Ohio, p. 191.
209 Doyle, 20th Century History of Steubenville and Jefferson County, Ohio, p. 192.
rear guard was again sacrificed. This time Morgan lost one killed. Two men later died of wounds received, and Maj. Way captured 240 raiders. Morgan lost nearly half of what remained of his effective force at West Grove Cemetery. The wounded were taken to the Moore and McIntosh farms. After the fight at the cemetery, Morgan’s command galloped north, racing along roads and through fields.\textsuperscript{211}

The final engagement of the raid—and what was the final engagement of the Battle of Salineville—took place in Fox Township in Carroll County. Captain Ralph Sheldon’s Company C, 2nd Kentucky Cavalry, charged a portion of the 7th Michigan, which was in line along a rail fence. Sheldon’s mounted troopers charged; some broke through the fence, others were wounded. At least one Michigan cavalryman was killed. As Sheldon was distracting the Michigan soldiers, Cluke deployed the rest of his brigade in a mounted line, as if preparing to attack the column of Union cavalry coming up from the south. Anticipating an attack, the Union troopers dismounted. Cluke quickly turned his column and galloped east. This action, which ended the Battle of Salineville, was the northernmost Civil War engagement in Ohio.\textsuperscript{212}

The engagements of the morning of July 26 dashed any hope that Morgan might have had of fighting his way to the Ohio River, if by that time any hope remained. Morgan had lost nearly half of his column. Union soldiers and militia were being shuttled by railroad up and down the Ohio River to cover the fords. Morgan was hopelessly outnumbered and desperately short on ammunition.

In the early afternoon, Morgan sought out a militia commander and found a Captain Burbick. Morgan, attempting to make the best deal possible for his command, told the captain that he would leave Ohio and cause no more harm if Burbick would lead him into Pennsylvania. When Major George Rue’s 9th Kentucky Cavalry appeared, Morgan quickly surrendered to Burbick, who agreed to parole Morgan’s command and allow the men to keep their horses and the officers their side arms. The Union officers refused to honor Morgan’s surrender to the Ohio militia. About 2:00 p.m., near West Point, Ohio, approximately forty miles west of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, General Morgan surrendered his command to General Shackelford, giving up 336 men and 400 horses. The raid was over.\textsuperscript{213}

Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio is historically significant. Morgan may not have accomplished his goals, but the raid had a pronounced effect on the war in the Western Theater. Morgan failed to join forces with Gen. Robert E. Lee, who was defeated at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on July 3, 1863. Morgan’s Raid caused all operations involving the Union 23rd Corps to be delayed, including the planned invasion of east Tennessee by Burnside, as most of the Corps was chasing Morgan. Morgan did succeed in bringing the war to the North, but instead of creating the kind of terror and misgivings he had hoped for the raid galvanized the population against the raiders and created a tide of patriotic spirit in Indiana and Ohio. Morgan lost a full division of cavalry that the Confederacy could ill afford to lose.215

Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio also boosted morale among the people of the Confederacy. After the disasters at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Helena, Arkansas, the people of the Confederacy followed the exploits of Morgan as he blazed across the north. Even though he was captured the exploits of his command brought a brief glimmer of hope to a dispirited Confederacy.

Section E Context:

Monuments Commemorating Places and Events Associated with Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio

On July 2, 1863, Confederate Gen. John Hunt Morgan’s cavalry crossed the Cumberland River, beginning a raid through Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio that ended on July 26, 1863, with Morgan’s surrender near West Point, Ohio.

The route of the raid either passed through, or caused damage to or loss of property in, twelve counties in Kentucky: Adair, Bullitt, Cumberland, Green, Hardin, Jefferson, Meade, Metcalfe, Monroe, Nelson, Taylor and Washington; ten counties in Indiana: Clark, Dearborn, Floyd, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson, Jennings, Ripley, Scott and Washington; and twenty-nine counties

214 Ramage, Rebel Raider, pp. 183-189, 238, 245-258.

Two periods of significance have been defined for Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio: (1) the dates of the raid, July 2-July 26, 1863, and (2) the period of post-war commemoration, 1872-1963. This context addresses the second period of significance. The first second is addressed in Confederate Gen. John Hunt Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, July 2-July 26, 1863.

Four property types have been defined for properties falling into the first period of significance: engagement sites, surrender sites, transportation-related sites and buildings. To qualify for listing, resources must be directly associated with the campaign recorded in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion as Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio (Morgan’s Raid) and must retain integrity.

One property type has been defined for the second period: monuments. To qualify for listing, monuments must be generally over fifty years old, must possess significance based on their own value as evidence of the later generation's assessment of the importance of Morgan's Raid and retain sufficient integrity to convey the historic character of the path of the raid. Refer to Section F of this document for specific property type registration requirements.

Following a survey undertaken in 2003, the Cincinnati History Library and Archives defined five types of Civil War monuments: eagles, soldiers, obelisks, markers and structures. With one exception, the monuments discussed in this context fall into the marker category, defined as: “plaques attached to boulders, slabs of granite or interior walls of buildings.” The Tebbs Bend monument, an obelisk, is the lone exception.

Significance
As a part of its 1993 landmark study the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission produced Technical Volume I: Appendices. In this volume Appendix J: “Other Important Civil War (Non-Battlefield) Sites: A Representative Sample,” lists sixteen types of non-battlefield sites, one of which is “Raids.” The Commission stated: “In many instances though, raids are difficult to relate to a specific site or sites. In general, they left little or no signature on the ground.” Many of the monuments erected to commemorate Morgan’s Raid were placed so that an interested person
could follow the route of the raid. The markers are literally a signature on the ground. Veterans of the Civil War placed the first markers and monuments. Their sons and daughters continued the effort to mark the route of the raid. Now, the great-grandchildren of those Civil War veterans have undertaken the task of interpreting Morgan’s raid for future generations. Clearly, the raid continues to resonate with those in the states Morgan crossed.

The route of the raid across the three states, especially in Indiana and Ohio, is significant. What road or roads did the Confederates take, where did they stop, which houses or stores did they raid, whose horses did they steal? Over the last 150 years historians have painstakingly sought to document the route and the places impacted by the watershed event in the lives of the people who lived along the route of the raid.

While the nation followed the raiders in the columns of newspapers that July, the raid as it unfolded was local and personal to the communities through which it passed. Every family that Morgan or his men visited in July 1863 has a Morgan story. The stories are rarely terrifying—they are often tell of defending hearth and home or the kindness of strangers—and together they form the collective memory of Morgan’s Raid.

Almost every monument or marker that has been erected to commemorate this raid has been placed to mark the exact spot of something associated with the raid. The 1872 monument at Tebbs Bend marks the Confederate mass grave. The 1913 monuments in Jefferson County, Ohio, mark the route of the raid through that county. Many of the monuments erected in Indiana in the 1920s and 30s also mark the route of the raid through a given county.

Many battlefields have granite or marble monuments placed where significant events occurred—the death of a general, the place where a regiment stood, or the place where the battle was won. The monuments erected to commemorate Morgan’s Raid are not unlike those monuments at Vicksburg, Shiloh or some other grand battlefield. It is almost as if the people of the region understood that the raid “… left little or no signature on the ground.” By erecting these modest monuments the people in the three states have created a cultural landscape that helps define the raid.

The monuments erected to commemorate Morgan’s Raid demonstrate its significance to the people of the region in which it occurred. The first known monument was erected in 1872; the latest in 2007. The commemoration and interpretation of Morgan’s Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio Raid demonstrates that the raid was and is part of the collective memory of the people of the region to this day.
Monuments are physical reminders of the past. The forty-one monuments examined as part of the field work associated with this project were erected to mark the events associated with Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio and to honor those who fought and died in the raid. They commemorate an event that still has meaning for the people who live in the region through which the Confederate soldiers passed 150 years ago. Historian Kathryn Allamong Jacob described the significance of Civil War monuments, which continue to be erected to this day:

Mundane as they may appear, ubiquitous as they may be, public monuments constitute serious cultural authority. They are important precisely because, by their mere presence and their obvious expense, they impose a memory of an event or an individual on the public landscape that orders our lives.\(^{219}\)

Marking Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio is an ongoing process. All three states have erected and continue to erect historical markers along the raid route. In 2000-2001, the three states launched a new initiative to interpret Morgan’s Raid. Kentucky and Indiana completed trails in 2001 and the trail in Ohio was completed in the summer of 2013, the sesquicentennial of Morgan’s Raid. The route of the raid was painstakingly researched. The marked and interpreted trails follow as closely as possible the exact route that the Confederates followed in 1863, which often takes travelers well off the beaten path.

In 2011, Conner Prairie Interactive History Park in Noblesville, Indiana, opened its *1863 Civil War Journey: Raid on Indiana*. The interactive, multi-media experience tells visitors the story of Morgan’s Raid on Dupont, Indiana. The exhibit features a recreation of a portion of Dupont, first-person interpretation, and a multi-media presentation that brings the Confederates into town. It is one of only four major interactive exhibits at History Park. The ongoing recognition of the raid clearly demonstrates its significance to the people of Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio.

**Background**

The route of Confederate General John Hunt Morgan’s 1863 Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio passed through three Union states. However, post-war memorialization in the three states was quite different. Kentucky, it has been argued, joined the Confederacy after the Civil War, and the vast majority of its monuments and memorials honor the men who fought for the Confederacy. In Indiana and Ohio, almost all of the Civil War monuments are dedicated to those

who helped put down the rebellion and save the Union.220

Civil War monuments were erected early in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio—the first in late 1861 in Munfordville, Kentucky. Private August Bloedner of the 32nd Indiana Infantry, a regiment composed of German immigrants, carved the limestone monument to honor his comrades who died in the Battle of Rowletts Station that December. This monument was moved to Louisville’s Cave Hill Cemetery with the remains of the Union soldiers in 1867.221

The first Civil War monument in Ohio was also erected before the war ended. On October 16, 1863, a modest monument was dedicated in Bristolville, a small community in Bristol Township in northeast Ohio. This memorial honored the sacrifices of the fourteen men from Bristolville who joined the Union army. By August 1863, all fourteen had been killed. The monument was dedicated in an elaborate and very symbolic ceremony.222

The earliest known Civil War monument erected in Indiana was dedicated just after the war, on July 4, 1865, in Princeton, the county seat of Gibson County. The memorial shaft dedicated to the 58th Indiana Infantry was conceived in 1863 and the regiment, then encamped in Tennessee, raised $5,000 for its construction. It was the first monument honoring a regiment to be erected in Indiana.223

Following the Civil War, both sides sought to remember the sacrifices made by soldiers who fought and died in the war by erecting monuments as permanent tributes to them. In the years following the dedication of the earliest monuments, hundreds more monuments commemorating the Civil War were erected in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio.

The Grand Army of the Republic and Women in the North
In Indiana and Ohio, as in other northern states, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) was the most important of the post-war veterans’ organizations. Formed in 1866, the GAR was a

The GAR was also concerned with the remembrance of the war. In 1868, former Union General John A. Logan, commander of the GAR, ordered that all GAR posts take charge of the annual May 30, Memorial Day observance. In 1868, Memorial Day was not a national holiday; celebrations were local and usually led by women. Even after Logan’s directive, women in both the North and South remained the main participants in Memorial Day events. Women usually organized the events and it was mostly women who decorated soldiers’ graves.

The Women’s Relief Corps, an auxiliary of the GAR, was founded in 1883. Memorial Day became a national holiday in 1890 and that same year the Daughters of Union Veterans (DUV) was chartered in Ohio. The organization’s mission was: “To perpetuate the memory, deeds and loyalty of those ancestors who sacrificed so much in the struggle to preserve the Union and establish freedom for everyone . . . .” The DUV worked tirelessly to keep the memory of the men who fought for the Union alive by educating the public, decorating graves on Memorial Day, and raising money to erect monuments. It was instrumental in commemorating the Battle of Buffington Island, funding the creation of a shrine honoring Major Daniel McCook and two of the three monuments on the Buffington Island Battlefield.

The United Confederate Veterans and the Women of the South
The United Confederate Veterans (UCV) was formed in New Orleans in 1889. By 1896, there were over eight hundred UCV camps and the organization’s magazine, Confederate Veteran,
a circulation of over 20,000. The United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) began as an auxiliary organization to the UCV, which admitted only veterans. It adopted the name United Daughters of the Confederacy in 1892.229

As in the former Confederate states, the United Confederate Veterans, Ladies Memorial Associations, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy were the driving forces behind the sixty-two monuments erected in Kentucky. Ladies Memorial Associations held sway through the 1870s, but by the 1890s their mission had been assumed by the UCV and the UDC. The 1880s saw the rise of industrialization and the New South, a South that embraced the Lost Cause, which championed the states rights and constitutional rights theory of the Civil War as defined by Jefferson Davis in his post-war writings. The question of slavery was marginalized and a reverence for the passing of the Old South—portrayed as a culture of tradition, honor, and chivalry—was emphasized. This began the celebration of the Lost Cause, in which memorials were no longer relegated to cemeteries but were placed on courthouse lawns and in other very public places.230

Commemorating Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio
The first monument known to have been erected to commemorate any aspect of John Hunt Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio is on the Old Confederate Burying Ground on the Tebbs Bend battlefield. The obelisk was erected in 1872 at a cost of $500 on land donated by James Madison Griffin, a local farmer. The monument became the focal point for local Confederate veterans’ commemorations that continued until 1911.231

In Kentucky, the memory of General John Hunt Morgan held more significance than the raid itself. Morgan made numerous raids into Kentucky during the course of the Civil War and the local understanding of events often blurs one raid into the next. After Morgan’s death in 1864, he was interred in Abingdon, Virginia. The body was moved from Abingdon to Richmond, Virginia, where a state funeral was held. In 1868, his family moved Morgan’s body from Richmond to Lexington where John Hunt Morgan and his brother Thomas, who was killed in the raid, were buried in the Morgan plot in the Lexington Cemetery.232

In 1906, the United Daughters of the Confederacy in Lexington, Kentucky, began a project to build a monument to General Morgan. Five years later, with an infusion of cash from the Kentucky general assembly, the monument was completed. In 1911, the equestrian statue was placed on the Fayette County courthouse square and unveiled in a lavish ceremony. Ten thousand people crowded the square, the streets and surrounding buildings to witness this momentous event. The memorial was a tribute to the man, not a single event. The Tebbs Bend monument and an obelisk erected in Brandenburg in the 1980s remain the only monuments in Kentucky to commemorate Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio.  

Commemoration of Morgan’s Raid in Ohio began in 1909 with the erection of the Morgan Surrender Monument near West Point. Will L. Thompson of East Liverpool, Ohio, purchased an acre of ground to be used as a memorial park. He also paid for the boulder and metal plaque that marks the place where Morgan surrendered his command to Union forces. Thompson’s monument was unveiled on August 11, 1910, in a ceremony attended by the East Liverpool GAR, the Columbiana County Historical Society, and the local press. As part of the dedication ceremony, Thompson presented the land and memorial to the state of Ohio.

A year later, in 1910, a more modest marker was placed in West Grove Cemetery in Carroll County to mark the graves of two Confederate soldiers killed at the Battle of Salineville. The small stone memorial, approximately one foot wide and two feet tall, was the first permanent monument erected on the Salineville battlefield indicating that an engagement was fought there. The East Liverpool Morning Tribune funded the monument.

The first organized attempt to mark Morgan’s Raid in Ohio took place in 1913, the fiftieth anniversary of the raid, as a part of Steubenville, Ohio’s “Three Wars Commemoration,” a two-day celebration proposed by the Stanton Monument Association to commemorate the Revolutionary War, the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. The Association felt that marking the route of Morgan’s Raid was significant.

It is peculiarly proper that Jefferson County should commemorate this event, not only from a historical point of view, but because it was practically the centre [sic] of operations which brought the affair to its termination.

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While adjacent counties might quibble with the Steubenville paper’s assertion of the role of Jefferson County in the raid, there was no quarrel with the results of the Stanton Monument Association. The three wars were commemorated with appropriate monuments. A plaque remembering the Spanish-American War was made from guns and other relics from the U.S.S. Maine. Monuments erected in Steubenville recognizing Fort Steuben honored the Revolutionary War. Morgan’s Raid through Jefferson County was marked by fourteen monuments placed along the route taken by the Confederate raiders.

An all-day celebration was held to mark the completion of the “Three Wars Commemoration.” The celebration included speeches, martial music, vaudeville performances, fireworks and a sham battle fought by U.S. soldiers camped at the old race track. The governor of Ohio, the Secretary of War, other local and state elected officials and Union and Confederate veterans were on hand for the events, which began at 9:00 a.m. and ended at 10:30 p.m.237

Thirteen of the fourteen monuments erected as part of the “Three Wars Commemoration” to recognize Morgan’s Raid are extant. They are granite, four feet high and twenty inches square, each weighing approximately 1,800 pounds. Each bears a bronze plaque sixteen by twenty-four inches in size providing a brief summary of events at that location.238

Ripley County, Indiana, was the first county in that state to mark Morgan’s Raid. In 1924, the Ripley County Historical Society placed the six stone and bronze markers at Rexville, Versailles, Pierceville, Milan, and at the intersection of SR 101 and CR 900 near what was Ferris School. These monuments, like those in Jefferson County, Ohio, marked the route of the raid, though they provide very little information on the event. All are extant.

Three years later, the Dearborn County Historical Society placed monuments along the raid route through that county. The newspaper accounts list the monument locations: New Alsace, Dover, Logan and Harrison (present-day West Harrison). Large boulders were donated by local citizens, as were the ten-inch by twenty-inch bronze plaques affixed to each boulder. All survive.239

237 “Three Wars Celebration Offers Many and Varied Events,” The Steubenville (Ohio) Herald-Star, July 10, 1913; “Program of Steubenville’s Big Celebration This Week,” The Steubenville (Ohio) Herald-Star, July 17, 1913; and “Personnel,” The Steubenville Herald-Star, July 24, 1913.


The dedication ceremony was a county-wide celebration. Citizens were asked to decorate their homes with flags as were businesses, which were also urged to close for the afternoon. According to newspaper accounts, a copper box containing newspaper stories, reminiscences of the raid written by local people, letters, and information about the creation of the markers was cemented into the foundation of the monument at New Alsace. The monuments were dedicated on July 17, 1927, in a ceremony that included musical performances, poetry readings, and the reading or telling of reminiscences.240

In 1927, a granite and bronze monument was erected in Old Washington in Guernsey County, Ohio, by Auxiliary No. 28 of the Sons of Union Veterans of Cambridge, Ohio. This monument, which features a horse’s head on a bronze medallion centered above the inscription, was created to commemorate the Union victory over Morgan by troops under the command of Gen. James M. Shackelford on July 24, 1863—two days before the raid ended. The monument was placed on the Old National Road at the entrance to the old “centralized school.” The school is gone but the monument remains.241

Jefferson County, Indiana, marked the route of Morgan’s Raid in 1929. Very little is known about this effort except that it was undertaken by the Jefferson County Historical Society in late 1928. Markers were to be placed in Graham, Lancaster and Monroe townships and included the towns of Dupont and Bryantsville. The historical society placed an unknown number of markers along the route; seven are extant: one in and two near Dupont, one at Bryantsville and three (reportedly) on the old Jefferson Proving Grounds in a restricted area containing unexploded ordnance. The Jefferson County markers, unlike Morgan markers erected elsewhere in Indiana, are not stones with bronze plaques, but are three-foot-high inscribed stones resembling headstones.242

By 1930, the effort to mark the route of Morgan’s Raid in Indiana had become organized. The Southern Indiana Historical Society, an umbrella organization of sixteen Indiana counties, voted at a meeting held at Corydon to sponsor marking the route of the raid. Local member historical societies were, however, responsible for erecting the markers. At the meeting a date was set to dedicate two Morgan’s Raid markers in Harrison County. The Society’s goal was that the

240 “Markers to be Placed Along Route of Morgan Raid,” Lawrenceburg (Indiana) Press, June 16, 1927; and “In the Box” and “Program,” The Lawrenceburg Press, July 14, 1927.
241 Wolfe, Stories of Guernsey County, Ohio, p. 307.
remaining twelve member counties would join Ripley, Dearborn, Jefferson, and now Harrison, counties in marking the route of the raid.243

The two Harrison County markers were dedicated on July 8, 1930, the 67th anniversary of the Ohio River crossing by Morgan’s command. The well-attended program, which began at the Ohio River town of Morvin, featured a ceremony in which the bronze plaque was affixed to a boulder with four screws set by the two surviving Harrison County Civil War veterans, a grandson of an officer in the Harrison County militia, and one of Basil Duke’s grandsons respectively.

The attendees then moved on to Mauckport, where they listened to presentations by two speakers. Following the speeches, they drove to the battleground outside of Corydon, where two of the city’s surviving Civil War veterans, Basil Duke’s other grandson, and the grandson of a man killed in the Battle of Corydon, attached a bronze plaque to a second boulder. Following this ceremony, the crowd moved to Harrison County Courthouse in Corydon for the final program. Apparently, plans were made to place more markers in Harrison County but those plans never came to fruition. Neither of the monuments dedicated on July 8, 1930, survive intact. The marker at Morvin could not be located. The plaque placed on the boulder at the battleground in Corydon is now affixed to a concrete slab.244

In the summer and fall of 1930, Washington County, Indiana, moved ahead to mark the route of Morgan’s Raid. By October, the Washington County Historical Society had announced that plans for a local marker were nearing completion. The marker was placed “...near the site of the meeting of the citizens of Salem sent to surrender the town...” was dedicated on December 21, 1930. What became of the marker and where it was located is unclear. The only marker located in Washington County is east of Pekin on Blue Hollow Road, almost nine miles southeast of Salem. The year given in the inscription on the plaque is 1930.245

The markers erected in Indiana in 1930 appear to be the last in the state placed to commemorate Morgan’s Raid until the 1960s, when the Indiana Civil War Centennial Commission marked the route of the raid in Harrison, Jefferson, Jennings, Ripley, Scott and Washington counties with traditional roadside historical markers: cast metal plaques set on a metal post.

244 “Morgan’s Raid Route Marked—Program Held,” Corydon (Indiana) Democrat, July 9, 1930.
245 “Washington County Historical Society,” Salem (Indiana) Democrat, December 3, 1930; and “Morgan Trail Marker to be Dedicated,” Salem (Indiana) Democrat, December 17, 1930.
In 1929, sixty-six years after the Battle of Buffington Island, Mrs. Norma Calkins Peoples, the
granddaughter of Charles and Sarah Price who owned the land in 1863, expressed her desire to
donate a portion of the battlefield to the State of Ohio. The donation was shepherded through the
Ohio General Assembly by Representative Tom W. Jones, who drafted House Bill 273, which in
part stated:

The Ohio state archaeological and historical society is hereby authorized to
receive by gift a site at Portland, Meigs County, Ohio, and to erect thereon an
appropriate monument in honor of the Union soldiers who, in the Battle of
Buffington Island, July 19, 1863, turned back the Morgan raiders in their effort to
escape across the Ohio River.\(^\text{246}\)

House Bill 273, filed in the Office of the Secretary of State on April 26, 1929, included an
appropriation of $3,000 to build an appropriate monument. Four years later, on October 3, 1933,
Buffington Island State Memorial was dedicated. To make access to the new state park easier,
the Ohio Department of Highways improved the road to the site. Philip Keintz built the
centerpiece monument, an obelisk of mortared granite, each face of which bore a bronze plaque.
A flagstaff was erected on the top of the monument. The site was dedicated with great fanfare.
Four Civil War veterans, the governors of Ohio and West Virginia, and 2,000 people gathered to
pay tribute to the men who fought at Buffington Island and to commemorate the memory of the
Civil War.\(^\text{247}\) One speaker noted:

\text{... we must agree that this monument of stone and mortar, mute and inanimate as
it is, is and will continue to be more eloquent than anything said or done here
today, for it is at once a compliment to the valor and courage of the thousands of
our soldiers and a monument to the sacrifice of those who died here on July 19,
1863.}\(^\text{248}\)

The monument, while it mentions the prehistoric mound builders and those who donated the
land, was conceived and constructed as a memorial to the Union soldiers who fought and died at
the Battle of Buffington Island. The plaque on the east face of the monument details the Battle of
Buffington Island; the plaque on the west face is dedicated to Major Daniel McCook of
Carrollton, Ohio.

On July 19, 1863, Major McCook, who was serving on Gen. Henry M. Judah’s staff as

\(^{246}\) H.B. 273, April 25, 1929, copy on file at Ohio Historical Society, Historic Sites and Facilities, Columbus, Ohio.
\(^{247}\) “Red Letter Day in Meigs County History Sees Buffington Island Memorial State Park Dedicated,” \textit{Pomeroy
(Ohio) Tribune-Telegraph}, October 4, 1933.
\(^{248}\) Ibid.
paymaster, was mortally wounded in the opening engagement of the Battle of Buffington Island. The McCook family made great sacrifices for the Union—the elder McCook was killed in battle, as were four of his nine sons.

Four months earlier, on May 21, 1933, another memorial to Major McCook was dedicated just south of the state memorial. Erected by the Ohio Daughters of Union Veterans, the monument was a native stone and bronze marker approximately four feet tall. Approximately 1,000 people attended the dedication ceremony, which featured patriotic music and speeches. Four local Civil War veterans: Robert Griffith, Charles Kraft, J.Q. Adams, and J.B. Warner, were given seats of honor at the ceremony. The monument was unveiled and a wreath of flowers was placed before it. The Pomeroy American Legion drum corps provided the music.249

A year later, the area surrounding the McCook monument was dedicated as the McCook Shrine in a ceremony with music played by the local American Legion band, speeches, and three of the four veterans present at the dedication of the monument the year before. The shrine, which included the larger monument, a smaller stone and bronze monument memorializing the shrine and two stone benches, was landscaped and enclosed by two semi-circular walls. Like the original McCook monument, the small monument memorializing the shrine and the McCook Shrine were paid for and dedicated by the Ten Districts of the Ohio Department of the Daughters of Union Veterans.250

The Daughters of Union Veterans presented the shrine to Prof. A.W. McKay of Middlesport, who accepted the gift for the State of Ohio. The Daughters also presented the state with a new flag to be flown at the nearby Buffington Island State Memorial. In the speeches made by the Daughters, it was made clear that the shrine was created not just to the memory of Daniel McCook but also to the, “. . . Union soldiers [who] gave their sacrifices on the altar of love of country.”251

Two other markers in Guernsey County merit mention. In 1947, Freeman T. Eagleson erected a three-foot-high stone marker in the Old Washington Cemetery as a memorial to three of Morgan’s soldiers killed in the fighting at Old Washington on July 24, 1863. The memorial was

erected with the approval of the village council. It is not clear if the council paid for the monument, but the inscription makes it clear that they approved of the marker.

Also in Old Washington is what the Ohio Historical Society (OHS) calls a “corporate limit marker”—a metal sign that alerts motorists that they are arriving within the limits of a town. These metal signs, which are in the shape of the state of Ohio, feature very brief text with historical information. Unlike the brown OHS historical markers, these signs are meant to be read by motorists as they drive by. The marker at Old Washington, which was erected in the 1950s, reads: “Old Washington – Site of Skirmish with General John H. Morgan’s Confederate Raiders.” The corporate limit marker, the 1927 monument, and the 1947 memorial to the three Confederate soldiers who died in the fighting in Old Washington, demonstrate that the raid was significant to the people of this small east-central Ohio town.252

Two other Ohio monuments deserve mention. The first is a marker in Rokeby Lock in Morgan County that is included in the Ohio Civil War survey. It is a granite marker about three feet high erected by E.D. Shafer. Research conducted by the Ohio Civil War Survey and the author failed to turn up a construction date for this marker.

The second was erected in Carroll County in 1969. As of 2012, this monument is not eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, but will be in seven years. This marker, a bronze plaque on a rectangular stone slab approximately five feet tall, was erected by the Carroll County Historical Society to mark the northern-most engagement fought during the Civil War. The engagement was the third and final fight of the Battle of Salineville, the last fought during Morgan’s Raid. The marker was dedicated on May 25, 1969, in a ceremony that included speeches and an unveiling ceremony. The marker is significant in that it is on the only acre of the battlefield that is preserved.253

**Surveys of Civil War Monuments**

All of the monuments along the route are modest markers that were designed primarily to help tell the story of the raid. Both Kentucky and Ohio have undertaken surveys of their Civil War monuments that provide a basis of comparison. Indiana has not conducted a Civil War monument survey. Glory-June Greiff compiled a list of the larger monuments in Indiana county seats, but her survey did not include the smaller, marker-type monuments.

The survey conducted by The Kentucky Heritage Council in 1997 recorded sixty-two Civil War

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252 Personal communication, Andy Verhoff, Local History Department, Ohio Historical Society, August 20, 2012.
monuments across the state. The small obelisk at the Confederate Cemetery on the Tebbs Bend battlefield was the only monument recorded by the survey that had a direct relationship to Morgan’s July 1863 Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio.254

The survey of Civil War monuments in Ohio undertaken by Cincinnati History Library and Archives (CHLA) in 2003 recorded 269 monuments in eighty-five of Ohio’s eighty-nine counties. The Ohio survey found that twenty-nine monuments were erected by the GAR between 1882 and 1917, though none were GAR monuments within the Morgan’s Raid survey area. The records also show that eight monuments were erected by the Daughters of Union Veterans between 1903 and 1941, two in Meigs County (the CHLA did not record the two McCook monuments). The 1927 Morgan’s Raid monument in Old Washington was erected by Auxiliary No. 28 of the Sons of Union Veterans. This monument was also omitted from the Ohio survey.255

Of the twenty-four monuments located in Ohio as part of the Morgan’s Raid survey, only four are listed in the Civil War Monuments database: the surrender monument in Columbiana County, the 1947 Confederate grave memorial in Old Washington (Guernsey County), the monument at the state memorial in Portland (Meigs County), and the Morgan’s Raid marker in Morgan County near Rokeby Lock. All of the Jefferson County markers are absent, as are the Carroll County markers, one Columbiana County marker, one Guernsey County marker, and two markers in Meigs County.

As far as can be determined, all of the monuments in Ohio were erected as the result of local initiatives. The fourteen markers in Jefferson County represent the only organized attempt to mark the route of the raid. The remaining markers were placed to mark a local event or person, or to recognize the unmarked graves of soldiers who died as the result of the raid. None of the markers are large, and none were very costly.

In contrast, all of the markers in Indiana were erected to mark the route of Morgan’s Raid. What may have begun as a single event in Ripley County had become a regional initiative by 1930, an undertaking that may have been halted by the Depression. It is known that more markers were erected than survive. At least one has disappeared in Harrison County and perhaps one or more are missing in Washington County. Three of the reportedly extant markers in Jefferson County are not accessible because they are located on the former Jefferson Proving Grounds in areas where the army tested munitions.

255 Ibid.
Section F: Associated Property Types

Two periods of significance have been defined for Morgan’s Raid: the dates of the raid, July 2-26, 1863, and the period of post-war commemoration, 1872-1963. Four property types have been defined for resources falling into the first period of significance: engagement sites, surrender sites, transportation-related sites and buildings. One property type has been defined for the second period: monuments.

To be considered for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places, properties associated with the first period of significance must have had a significant and direct association with Morgan’s Raid, be intact examples of one of the identified property types and meet National Register of Historic Places integrity requirements. It is possible that these properties could be listed under Criterion A for their association with Morgan’s campaign.

To qualify for listing, resources associated with the early period of significance must be directly associated with the campaign as recorded in the The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies as Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio which has been presented briefly in Section E of this document or at least one other primary source, which includes published histories written within living memory of Morgan’s Raid. (The Official Records is a 128 volume collection of reports and letters written by military participants of the Civil War.) Another significant source is the Indiana and Ohio Morgan’s Raid Commission reports. The two commissions processed over 6,000 claims. The printed Indiana commission report lists the claimant’s name, county, what was taken, who took it, its monetary value. The Ohio commission report lists the claimant’s name, the county in which they lived and their post office address, what was taken, and its monetary value. There was no raid commission in Kentucky.

Property types associated with the second period of significance (monuments) could be nominated under Criterion A, will also meet Criterion Consideration F, be generally over fifty years old, must possess significance based on their own value, as evidence of the later generation's assessment of the significance of Morgan's Raid and retain sufficient historic integrity to convey the historic character of the path of the raid.

Morgan’s Raid was a military event. Confederate cavalry crossed into Kentucky to damage Union supply lines then crossed the Ohio River, taking the war to the Union heartland. All along the route of the raid Union military pursued Morgan’s Confederate cavalry. As the Confederates rode across the three states they “raided” houses and businesses along the route. In the context of this study “raided” is any visitation by the Confederates of a property from which they took
horses, food, or other goods; forced the inhabitants to feed them; took shelter or spent the night in a building; or confiscated a building and used it for any purpose. A building owned by someone who made a claim to one of the two commissions could be eligible if the claim established that soldiers had been on the property and if the material taken from the building added significantly to the military advantage of those raiding the structure. However, a witness property—a building along the route that Union or Confederate troops simply rode past or from which a single meal, animal, or other minimal property was taken—would not be eligible for listing under this MPDF if the property taken did not significantly affect the military advantage of those taking it.

After the Confederates crossed the Ohio River, it is the interaction between Morgan’s cavalry and the civilian population that creates the greatest number of identified property types along the raid route. It is the interaction between the Confederates and the people of Indiana and Ohio that created the collective memory of the raid that remains part of the cultural heritage in those states. The interaction between the Confederates and the people of Kentucky is different, in that many of the men with Morgan were natives of the state, and many visited friends or relatives along the route. However, that familiarity and those relationships did not stop Morgan’s men from raiding in Kentucky as well. It is well documented that Morgan’s troops looted stores and took property from commercial establishments and individuals in Kentucky.

The route of the raid either passed through, or caused damage to or loss of property in, twelve counties in Kentucky, ten counties in Indiana and twenty-nine counties in Ohio. The numbers in Indiana and Ohio are based on the counties for which claims were submitted to the Morgan’s Raid commissions. See Section G: Geographical Data for the list of counties. Section E of this document establishes the historical significance of the military action. Its brevity did not allow a complete chronicling of every action taken by the Confederates over the course of the raid. Additional research will be necessary to evaluate the eligibility of specific resources nominated under this MPDF. For properties that have been identified as significantly associated with Morgan’s Raid and previously listed in the National Register of Historic Places it may be appropriate to amend the original listing to include an expanded statement of significance to reflect this area of significance.

One property type has been defined for the second period of significance: monuments. Monuments that commemorate the July 1863 raid were placed in all three states. While commemorative properties are typically not eligible for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places, they may be considered under Criterion Consideration F if design, age, tradition or symbolic value has invested the monument with its own historical significance. However,
significance of monuments will not be assessed on the significance of the raid or person being memorialized. Monuments that commemorate the raid are a part of the collective memory of the event and have become part of the raid’s cultural landscape, much like monuments on larger battlefields such as Gettysburg or Vicksburg have become part of the cultural landscape of those sites. For a monument to be evaluated under this MPDF it must have been erected to commemorate the July 1863 raid or some event directly associated with it.

**Property Type: Engagement sites**

An engagement site is any place where armed combat took place as part of a military action. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* lists twenty-four engagements associated with Morgan’s Raid: eight in Kentucky, three in Indiana, and fourteen in Ohio.

**Significance**

Each engagement took a toll on the Confederate cavalry, depleting manpower and ammunition—resources that could not be replaced. The engagements, especially those fought in Indiana and Ohio, aided the Union troops pursuing Morgan by slowing the Confederates’ progress and allowing the pursuers to gain ground.

Morgan’s Raid can be characterized as a running engagement. Individually, the engagements may be small in terms of the number of troops engaged and the casualty figures; collectively they are more significant. The engagement at Marrowbone, Kentucky, on July 2, 1863, cost Morgan his chief scout. Before he left Kentucky he lost two more chief scouts, which must have damaged his reconnaissance capabilities. More Confederates were lost at Columbia, Tebbs Bend, and Lebanon, Kentucky. Morgan had lost approximately ten per cent of his force before he left Corydon, Indiana. Morgan’s presence in Indiana and Ohio galvanized support for the Union cause as citizens turned out to fight the Confederates. The militia, while inefficient, harassed and delayed the Confederates as they rode across Indiana and Ohio. Militia fought Morgan at Brandenburg, Kentucky; Corydon, Salem and Pekin, Indiana, and at almost every engagement in Ohio.229

Taken as a whole, the engagements are significant. Newspaper coverage, especially after Morgan crossed the Ohio River, was national even *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser* of Honolulu carried a story of the raid in both its August 6 and 13, 1863, editions. The actions required to mobilize enough manpower to fight and pursue over 2,000 Confederate cavalry in the Midwest

had a ripple effect on other activities in the Western Theater. The raid closed part of the Ohio River—a major Union supply route—to commercial traffic for over a week, denying needed supplies to Union forces in Mississippi and the Trans-Mississippi. A large navy flotilla pursued Morgan and twice stopped him from crossing the Ohio River in Ohio. Most of the Union 23rd Corps, including all of the cavalry, was tied up pursuing the Confederates across the three states. The raid delayed Gen. Ambrose Burnside’s east Tennessee campaign and it aided Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg’s retreat from Tullahoma to Chattanooga by denying reinforcements to Union Gen. William S. Rosecrans.230

Registration Requirements
Engagement sites will retain sufficient defining natural and manmade features—roads, streams, houses, bridges, river crossings or other terrain features mentioned in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion that were used by the combatants—to understand how each engagement unfolded. Bulletin 40: Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering America’s Historic Battlefields states: “Generally, the most important aspects of integrity for battlefields are location, setting, feeling and association.”231 An engagement site may be listed if some defining features are no longer extant, as long as enough features remain to convey integrity of location, setting, feeling and association. The remaining features should allow the viewer to understand where the action occurred, and how the landscape was employed in the military strategy of the combatants or caused the action to unfold. An engagement site in the Core Area—the area where combat occurred—may be eligible if even a portion of that area retains integrity. However, the remaining portion of the Core Area must retain sufficient defining features to convey integrity of location, setting, feeling and association. An isolated remnant of the Core Area devoid of any defining features surrounded by noncontributing resources would not be eligible. An engagement site that retains intact staging areas, approach routes and retreat routes but whose Core Area is lost is not eligible.

The terms Study and Core Area are used by the National Park Service’s American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) to define the two major parts of a battlefield. The ABPP has developed baseline information on 384 Civil War battlefields in the United States including Corydon, Tebbs Bend, Buffington Island and Salineville, which are part of this MPDF. The Study Area represents the historic extent of the battle as it unfolded across the landscape. It encompasses resources known to relate to or contribute to the battle event: where troops

230 O.R.N., Series I, Volume 25, pp. 244, 246; and Ramage, Rebel Raider, pp. 179-182.
maneuvered, deployed, and fought immediately before, during, and after combat. Historic accounts, terrain analysis, and feature identification help define the Study Area boundary. The Study Area indicates the extent to which historic landscape associated with the battle (areas of combat, command, communications, logistics, medical services, etc.) may be found. The Core Area encompasses the areas where combat occurred. Positions that delivered or received fire fall within the Core Area. The Core Area lies within the Study Area.232

Property Type: Surrender sites
A surrender site is the piece of ground or building where the commander of one force officially gave up his command to the commander of the enemy.

Significance
Surrender sites are significant in that they end bloodshed and turn soldiers into prisoners, diminishing the surrendering side’s effective force. Over the course of Morgan’s Raid, Union troops surrendered in Bardstown and Lebanon, Kentucky, and in Corydon and Salem, Indiana. The Confederates surrendered at near Pekin, Indiana, Portland and Columbiana County, Ohio. Approximately 700 of Morgan’s command surrendered at Portland, Ohio, greatly diminishing his effective force. The most significant is the final surrender site in Columbiana County, Ohio, where Morgan surrendered what remained of his command to Union Gen. James M. Shackelford, ending the raid.233

Registration Requirements
To be eligible for nomination, a surrender site must be documented in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies or at least one other primary source, which includes published histories written within living memory of Morgan’s Raid. The site or building must retain sufficient historic integrity as defined in the National Register of Historic Places requirements for eligibility. If the surrender took place in a building, it must retain essential exterior and interior physical features that enable it to convey its historic integrity as outlined for the property type: Buildings which is described later in this section.

Property Type: Transportation-related features
Transportation-related features include historic road networks, stone walls, railroads, river access points such as boat landings and fords, bridges over important waterways, viaducts, and other

transportation-related cultural resources used or destroyed by Union or Confederate soldiers over the course of Morgan’s Raid.

Significance of transportation-related features
Transportation related features are significant resources associated with Morgan’s Raid. The movement of Union and Confederate forces was affected by the transportation options available, influencing their choices regarding defensive maneuvers, strategy, and lines of advance and retreat.

Roads provided the framework for the route of the raid and the Union pursuit. Railroads moved Union forces and supplies, and the Confederates destroyed track and trestles to delay them. Morgan’s more than 2,000 mounted men, four artillery pieces, and a lengthy supply train of wagons had to be gotten across the Cumberland and Ohio rivers and many smaller watercourses that were not bridged. Boat landings and fords were necessary for crossings and their locations determined to some extent Morgan’s route and that of the Union forces pursuing him. Bridges and viaducts used by the Confederates were routinely destroyed after they had crossed them, costing Union forces valuable time to rebuild or to find other means of crossing natural obstacles.234

Registration Requirements
To be eligible for nomination, a transportation-related feature must be documented in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies or at least one other primary source, which includes published histories written within living memory of Morgan’s Raid. The feature must be documented as associated with a significant event which impacted the raid.

The raid ran across three states and over its course Confederate and Union cavalry used numerous roads. For a road to be eligible it must have more significance than that Confederate cavalry or Union troops used the road during the course of the raid. Bulletin 40: Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering America’s Historic Battlefields states: “Generally, boundaries should not be drawn to include the portion of the route taken to the battlefield where there were no encounters. Although the route may be important in understanding the tactics of the overall campaign, it is not necessary to defining the particular battlefield. Boundaries should not be drawn to include retreat routes where there was no pursuit.”235 If however, a road is a defining feature of the Core Area of a battlefield it may be eligible.

Many of the old ferry landings and fords are now boat launches providing river access for anglers and recreational boaters. The road is extant and the historic name appears on maps. Ferry landings and fords submerged by impoundments are not eligible unless the character defining features are extant. The access road must still be intact to show the relationship of the landing or ford with historic transportation routes.

Eligible rail facilities must be in the same location as in 1863. Over the course of the raid Morgan burned trestles and wrecked railroad track. If the stone abutments of a trestle that Morgan’s men burned remain but the tracks are no longer extant, and if the stonework can be documented as the remains of a trestle burned by Morgan’s men it may be eligible.

Eligible bridges, viaducts and trestles must retain original materials and be supported by original abutments. Wooden parts above the abutments may have been replaced but the new materials must be identical to the original. Bridges, viaducts, and trestles originally constructed totally of wood must retain the look of the original structure.

At least one known bridge survives from the time of the raid, though many abutments from period bridges do survive. The bridge abutments at Tebbs Bend are original and the abutments of at least three bridges or trestles in Indiana are extant. The abutments are tangible connections to the bridges used, and in many cases destroyed, by the Civil War soldiers. The most important aspects of integrity for bridges, viaducts, and trestles abutments would be location, setting, materials and association and they must retain sufficient overall integrity to represent their significance. They must be substantially complete, enough so that their original height and width can be discerned. Some 19th-century stone abutments have been strengthened with or partially encased in poured concrete; to be eligible they must retain the look of the original. If the structure has been completely rebuilt it would not be eligible.

**Property Type: Buildings**

Buildings that represent a significant aspect of or that affected the outcome of the raid; commercial and residential buildings, railroad depots, those buildings from which prisoners were paroled, and buildings seized for a specific purpose—to be used as hospitals, headquarters, defensive positions or surrender sites may be considered as potentially eligible.

**Significance of the buildings**

Buildings are significant as defining features of the campaign and tangible links to the events of the raid. The Confederates and those pursuing them used both public and private buildings for
their needs. Morgan’s Raid holds an important meaning for the descendants of those whose homes or businesses were raided/used by the Confederates. Over 150 years later, stories of the raid are still recounted and form a vital part of the oral and written history of families and communities.

Public buildings such as the old Washington County courthouse in Springfield, Kentucky, where prisoners were paroled, and private houses along the route used as headquarters by Morgan or one of the Union commanders, or used as hospitals following one of the twenty-four engagements that punctuated the raid, or added significantly to or significantly affected the military advantage of those raiding a building, may be eligible for listing under Criterion A for their association with Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio if they retain sufficient integrity as described below.

**Registration Requirements**

To be eligible, buildings will fall into one of the categories defined above and must be documented in *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, the documentation of the Indiana or Ohio Morgan raid commissions, or at least one other primary source, which includes published histories written within living memory of Morgan’s Raid.

Eligible buildings will have integrity of location, setting, feeling and association and must retain enough integrity of design and materials to be listed individually under Criterion A. If the building is in its original location and the surrounding landscape has not been drastically altered it can be listed even if minor changes have been made to the exterior, as long as the building is still recognizable as the structure in use in 1863. Structural elements should be evaluated for integrity: overall shape, roofline, door/window placement (though it need not necessarily have original doors or windows) and construction materials. Nominations of a building must also consider if interior features such as plan, architectural detail, or trim remain, particularly if the significant association with the raid took place in the building.

Eligible buildings must have had a direct role in an engagement—as a headquarters, hospital, or defensive position. If the building is not in the Core Area of an engagement site and was “raided” by either side, the aid derived from the building must have given the raiding party a military advantage. That is, supplies or other material taken from the structure must have helped the raiding party significantly. The taking of one animal or a single meal, or simply taking money or property from it, would not likely make a building eligible. A group of buildings raided in a neighborhood or town, which taken as a whole provided a significant military advantage, could be considered for nomination as a district or a discontiguous district.
Monuments
A monument is a commemorative object erected as a memorial. Examples of monuments commemorating Morgan’s Raid include a monument on the Tebbs Bend battlefield marking the Confederate mass grave; small monuments in Dearborn County, Indiana, marking events of the raid and its route; those erected in Jefferson County, Ohio, in 1913 to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the raid; and that at Corydon Battlefield Park in Harrison County, Indiana, erected in 1930.

Significance of the monuments
The first Civil War monument known to have been erected was placed in a cemetery in Munfordville, Kentucky, in January 1862. By 1880, monuments commemorating the Civil War were being erected across the nation; thousands would be erected through the 1930s. Grand or modest, all were a way for veterans, their wives, sons and daughters, and the public to pay respect to the sacrifices made by individuals, communities and the nation during the Civil War and “... established a long-term framework for fashioning personal and collective identity in the United States.”

The modest monuments erected along the route of Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, were erected by individuals, local organizations and, in a few cases, state governments. They are tangible representations of the memory of Morgan’s Raid in these communities, and by these states, individuals and organizations. These modest stone and bronze monuments mark the route of the raiders or Union troops through a given county commemorate an event, the death of an important individual, or the capture of Confederate Gen. John Hunt Morgan. They demonstrate the significance of this event for the people of the region and provide evidence of a later generation’s assessment of the event.

Unlike monuments erected to commemorate the “Lost Cause,” the “Cause Victorious,” or to memorialize those who died in the Civil War, the monuments associated with Morgan’s Raid mark graves, engagements and, often, the route of the march of the Confederates or line of pursuit by Union cavalry. These modest monuments are part of the cultural landscape of the raid and bear witness to events associated with Morgan’s Raid.

These humble stone and bronze monuments, often a plaque mounted on a boulder, were placed by residents to commemorate a local event or action. These simple monuments were, for the most part, paid for by the people of a given county to mark some action of the Morgan Raid.

236 Brown, The Public Art of Civil War Commemoration, p. 3.
While this citizen action may not be unique to this event, it is uncommon. The monuments speak to the collective memory of the raid and created a cultural landscape that crosses three states.

**Registration Requirements**

While properties primarily commemorative in nature are typically not eligible for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places, Criterion Consideration F allows that they may be considered if design, age, tradition or symbolic value has invested the monument with its own historical significance as a cultural expression of rememberance, separate from the significance of the event or person that it commemorates.

The monuments, while not directly associated with Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio of July 2-July 26, 1863, serve as evidence of a later generation’s assessment of the event. They represent society's response at the date of the monument's creation and will be evaluated for significance based on their own value. As stated in the NPS Bulletin: *How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation*, to be considered for nomination, a commemorative property like a monument must generally be over fifty years old and possess significance based on its own history, not on the value of Morgan’s Raid or of a person directly associated with the raid.

To be nominated under this MPDF, monuments must meet requirements for listing in the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion A and Criterion Consideration F, and have integrity of location, design, setting, materials, feeling and association. Their setting will retain sufficient integrity to reflect the historic setting and character of the route of the raid. Monuments must retain their original appearance and be in their original location.

To be nominated, monuments will be the best representations of organized efforts of later generations to commemorate the contributions of those directly associated with Morgan’s Raid. Headstones marking graves in cemeteries are not eligible. The inscription on the marker must clearly refer to Confederate General John Hunt Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio of July 2-July 26, 1863, although it may use other terminology.
G: Geographical Data

Morgan’s cavalry either passed through, or caused damage to or loss of property in, the counties below. The definition of the geographic area is based on the known route of the raid and the findings of the commissions in Indiana and Ohio that awarded monetary compensation to individuals for damages as a result of the raid.

**Indiana**
Clark, Dearborn, Floyd, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson, Jennings, Ripley, Scott and Washington

**Kentucky**
Adair, Bullitt, Cumberland, Green, Hardin, Jefferson, Meade, Metcalfe, Monroe, Nelson, Taylor and Washington

**Ohio**
Section H: Summary of Identification and Evaluation Methods

The documentation of resources associated with Morgan’s 1863 Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio is based on research and a field survey of the route of the raid conducted between March 1 and August 20, 2012, by Joseph E. Brent and Maria Campbell Brent, Mudpuppy & Waterdog, Inc., Versailles, Kentucky, under a contract to Preservation Kentucky, a 501(c) (3), based in Frankfort, Kentucky. The project was funded by a grant from the National Park Service’s American Battlefield Protection Program (GA-2255-11-014). The survey identified 151 properties judged to be eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places: twenty engagement sites: four in Kentucky, four in Indiana and twelve in Ohio; two surrender sites: none in Kentucky, one each in Indiana234 and Ohio; twenty-four transportation related sites: fourteen in Kentucky, five in Indiana and five in Ohio; and sixty-five buildings fourteen in Kentucky, twenty-one in Indiana and thirty in Ohio; and forty monuments: one in Kentucky, fifteen in Indiana and twenty-four in Ohio.

The survey area encompassed every county through which Morgan’s command marched and all counties in which citizens received monetary compensation from the Indiana and Ohio Morgan’s Raid commissions for damage to their property by the raiders, militia or Union troops.

Joseph Brent drove the route of John Hunt Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio from the fords on the Cumberland River in Monroe and Cumberland counties, Kentucky, to the surrender site in Columbiana County, Ohio. Roads known to be associated with the route of the raid were examined in eleven Kentucky counties: Adair, Bullitt, Cumberland, Green, Hardin, Jefferson, Meade, Metcalfe, Monroe, Nelson, Taylor and Washington; seven Indiana counties: Dearborn, Harrison, Jefferson, Jennings, Ripley, Scott and Washington; and twenty Ohio counties: Adams, Athens, Brown, Carroll, Clermont, Columbiana, Gallia, Guernsey, Hamilton, Harrison, Hocking, Jackson, Jefferson, Meigs, Morgan, Muskingum, Noble, Perry, Pike and Vinton.

Betty Jane Gorin, author and local historian who has studied Morgan’s Raid in south-central Kentucky for decades, assisted in locating the raid route in Adair, Cumberland, Marion, Monroe, Taylor and Washington counties, Kentucky. Mr. Brent used the Morgan Trail in Kentucky map (which he helped develop in the 1990s), the historic record, and his knowledge of the raid in the survey of Jefferson, Hardin, Meade and Nelson counties.

234 This surrender took place in a building, the Old Harrison County Courthouse, which was not counted twice.
In Indiana, Mr. Brent used *The John Hunt Morgan Heritage Trail in Indiana: A tour guide to the Indiana portion of Morgan’s Great Raid July 8-13, 1863* by Laura Cahill as a field guide. This 200-mile tour follows the route of Morgan’s men through Indiana and directs the user to a series of interpretive waysides installed at significant places along the Morgan’s Raid route. Ms. Cahill, with the assistance of many local historians, carefully documented the roads used by the raiders and those pursuing them. This comprehensive guide helped locate many of the buildings, monuments, battlefields, river crossings, and roads associated with the Indiana portion of the raid.

Laura Cahill’s draft of a guide for a Morgan’s Raid trail in Ohio, to be published by the Ohio Historical Society in 2013, was used in that state. Like its Indiana counterpart, it is comprehensive, identifying numerous properties associated with the raid and following roads used by the Confederates or pursuing Union troops. Edd Sharp, president of the Buffington Island Battlefield Foundation, also provided valuable assistance in locating associated properties.

Archival research was undertaken to develop the historic contexts and to further document the route of the raid and associated properties. Local libraries and many historical societies were visited concurrently with the field work in the counties listed above. Collections were searched for historical information relating to the raid and associated monuments. Research was also conducted at the University of Kentucky Young Library, University of Kentucky King Library Special Collections, Kentucky Historical Society, Allen County Public Library in Fort Wayne, Indiana Historical Society, Indiana State Library, Ohio University Library, Ohio State Historic Preservation Office, and the Ohio Historical Society.

Survey and research led to the definition of five property types: engagement sites, surrender sites, transportation-related sites, buildings, and monuments commemorating the raid.

Properties were grouped under two historic contexts that define the periods of significance: (1) *Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, July 2-July 26, 1863*, and (2) *Monuments Commemorating Places and Events Associated with Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, 1874-1963*.

Properties thought to be associated with the raid and considered potentially eligible for listing in the National Register were recorded. Properties were then evaluated based on the level of documentation for their direct association with or commemoration of Morgan’s Raid, and whether they retain sufficient integrity of location, setting, feeling, materials and association.
Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio

Each property recorded was photographed and mapped using ArcGIS Explorer and saved as a KML files. Following fieldwork, a form containing the following information was completed for each property: state and county where located, property subtype, name of property, short description of property, verbal description of location, GIS coordinates, and a photograph. The forms were provided to the appropriate Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio SHPO with copies of the MPDF.
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Map 2: Counties in Kentucky associated with Morgan’s Raid.
Map 3: Counties in Indiana associated with Morgan’s Raid as determined by the Indiana Morgan’s Raid Commission.
Map 4: Counties associated with Morgan’s Raid as determined by the Ohio Morgan’s Raid Commission.
Map 5
Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio
Kentucky: July 2 - July 8, 1863

- Morgan’s main column
- Morgan’s secondary column(s)
- U.S. troops
- Engagement

FRANKFORT: State Capital
- River
- Railroad
- State Line
Map 6: The Battle of Tebbs Bend, July 4, 1863.
Map Based on Cave Valley and Gresham USGS quads.
Scale is 1:24,000
Map 7
Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio
Indiana: July 8 - July 13, 1863

- Morgan’s main column
- Morgan’s secondary column(s)
- U.S. troops and militia
- Engagement
- FRANKFORT State Capital
- River
- Railroad
- State Line
Map 8
Morgan’s Raid in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio
Ohio: July 13 - July 26, 1863

Morgan’s main column
Morgan’s secondary column(s)
U.S. troops and militia
Engagement
Confederates who escaped

State Capital
River
Railroad
State Line
Map 9: The battle begins - July 19, 1863, 5:30 a.m.
Map based on Portland and Ravenswood USGS quads.
Scale is 1:24,000
Map 10: July 19, 1863 - Confederates are pushed back as Morgan retreats from the bottom. Map based on Portland and Ravenswood USGS quads. Scale is 1:24,000.
Map 11: July 19, 1863 - Duke and hundreds of Confederate cavalry are captured. Map based on Portland and Ravenswood USGS quads. Scales is 1:24,000.