**1. NAME OF PROPERTY**

Historic Name: Rosebud Battlefield/Where the Girl Saved Her Brother

Other Name/Site Number: Crook’s Fight on the Rosebud; Battle of Rosebud Creek; Battle of the Rosebud

**2. LOCATION**

Street & Number: Montana State Highway 314, 12 miles south of Kirby, Montana

City/Town: Kirby

State: Montana

County: Big Horn

Code: 003

Zip Code: 59025

**3. CLASSIFICATION**

<table>
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Number of Resources within Property

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Number of Contributing Resources Previously Listed in the National Register: 2

Name of Related Multiple Property Listing:
4. STATE/FEDERAL AGENCY CERTIFICATION

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this ____ nomination ____ request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60. In my opinion, the property ____ meets ____ does not meet the National Register Criteria.

_________________________          __________________________ 
Signature of Certifying Official                  Date

_________________________          __________________________ 
State or Federal Agency and Bureau

In my opinion, the property ____ meets ____ does not meet the National Register criteria.

_________________________          __________________________ 
Signature of Commenting or Other Official                  Date

_________________________          __________________________ 
State or Federal Agency and Bureau

5. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this property is:

___ Entered in the National Register
___ Determined eligible for the National Register
___ Determined not eligible for the National Register
___ Removed from the National Register
___ Other (explain): ________________________________________________________________

_________________________          __________________________ 
Signature of Keeper                  Date of Action
6. FUNCTION OR USE

<table>
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<th>DEFENSE</th>
<th>Sub:</th>
<th>Battle site</th>
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<td>LANDSCAPE</td>
<td>Sub:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current:</td>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>Sub:</td>
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7. DESCRIPTION

ARCHITECTURAL CLASSIFICATION: N/A

MATERIALS: N/A

Foundation:
Walls:
Roof:
Other:
Describe Present and Historic Physical Appearance.

Rosebud Battlefield is situated on the spectacular headwaters of Rosebud Creek and approximately twenty miles east of the town of Lodge Grass in southeastern Montana, and fifteen miles north of the Wyoming state line. The dry, rolling prairie at the battlefield is punctuated by low hills, ridges, drainages, arroyos, and ravines. The majority of the battle site is now within Rosebud Battlefield State Park which has been managed to preserve the site in its native state resulting in over three thousand acres of native flora and fauna. Modern intrusions are limited to a handful of buildings and structures. The state park is primarily surrounded by private ranch land in addition to the Crow Indian Reservation to the west, and some state ground north of the boundary. The site exhibits a high level of integrity of location, setting, materials, feeling, and association.

The heart of the Rosebud Battlefield exhibits an amphitheater-like valley in which the meandering Rosebud Creek sluggishly winds its way from west to east. To the south of the creek a towering mesa rises from the valley floor to 4700 feet above sea level. Around the crest of the mesa stand ponderosa pine and juniper trees nestled among rock outcrops which stand as monuments around the perimeter. Slopes, which give rise to the mesa, are studded with sage and native vegetation blending with the pine and juniper at the crest. The vast table stretches a mile wide and up to a half-mile long in places. Dropping off the south slope, ridges and arroyos spearheaded by rock outcrops punctuated by ponderosa pine and juniper, give way to sage and native grasses on the lower pediments. This entire leviathan formation is pristine and reveals some evidence of the battle that occurred here. Captain Frederick Van Vliet was ordered to take this hill and secure the summit until further orders. As Van Vliet broke the crest he discovered a large plain on top of the ridge. The view to the east of Van Vliet’s position, as he gained the summit, revealed Sioux and Cheyenne reaching the summit as well. Van Vliet and his men formed a skirmish line and foiled any attempt by the Sioux and Cheyenne to hold the ridge.

Flanking Rosebud Creek on both sides from west to east are fences. The fence lines are of barbed wire with access gates spaced intermittently. Between these fence lines lay a pristine riparian system with plains cottonwood, box elder, wild roses, and cattails. The emerald green of the creek bottom is punctuated with a beaver dam that creates a small pond surrounded with willows and cattails. To the east end of the creek within the border of Rosebud Battlefield State Park, stands the Slim Kobold ranch buildings including the house, four-car garage, bunkhouse, and two chicken houses. The original portion of the house pre-dates 1925 and is constructed of logs, with a later construction date for the kitchen and bedroom. All the Kobold buildings are situated along the banks of Rosebud Creek and surrounded by cedar trees at an elevation of 4300 feet above sea level. From these buildings, a gravel road runs due north for a quarter mile to the state park’s only interpretive kiosk. A vault-type public restroom is situated just to the north. This facility is immediately to the west of the park’s only public entrance which is situated in the southeast boundary line of the park. The main road through the battlefield enters the park at this location and runs adjacent to the creek north of the fence line. This gravel road supports a spur road that starts at the battlefield entrance, turns north and completes its journey back into the main road, west of where the spur began to form a “D” configuration.

Perpendicular to the main road, a deep ravine travels north flanking the east boundary fence. Running north to where the ravine intersects the north main ridge, the two unite to form a natural gap in the main ridge. The east bank of the ravine, near the gap, displays the natural centerpiece of the battlefield, a sandstone cliff with a twenty-five foot vertical wall running north and south for 175 feet, commanding the attention of all who encounter it in this natural gap in the ridge. This area is known as the Gap. Here the Cheyenne woman, Buffalo Calf Road Woman, saved her brother, Chief Comes In Sight, after his horse had been shot from under him. The Gap was also the route through which some of the approximately 1500 to 2000 Sioux and Cheyenne
warriors streamed to the scene of the initial attack on the U.S. military force. The sandstone formation described above is the site of the Slim Kobold Buffalo Jump. Archaeological evidence suggests that this buffalo jump is at least 4000 years old. Paleo petroglyphs are displayed on this sandstone wall as well as a potential new discovery, yet to be authenticated, being “CROOK 1876” etched on the cliff as well.

The complete east bank of this ravine from beginning to end consists of a high ridge flanked by grassy pediments and ponderosa pine-studded crests. Large rocks and rock ledges intermingle with the pine trees. Captain Anson Mills’s first charge was into this rocky and pine studded ridge where he drove the Sioux and Cheyenne back beyond the Gap. Mills had been halted in the area across Rosebud Creek adjacent to where the Kobold buildings now stand. His initial charge headed in a northerly direction toward this ridge.

To the west of the ravine lies a bench land that rises 75 feet above the valley floor. This area dominates the north side of the main road to the west boundary of the state park. Punching another deep ravine on the extreme western border of this bench lay the drainage of an intermittent stream known locally as Kollmar Creek. The stream flows in a northwest to southeast direction and nudes Rosebud Creek in the western portion of the battlefield. The area where Kollmar Creek empties into the Rosebud is the site of Brigadier General George Crook’s camp where he was engaged in a card game of whist with fellow officers. It was at this time the Sioux and Cheyenne were beginning their attack from the Gap.

Protruding up from the southwest bank of Kollmar ravine is a long narrow ridge that begins at the head of Kollmar Creek a mile and a half above the Rosebud and stretches the entire length of the creek ending beside the main road. Lieutenant Colonel William B. Royall’s first position was located at the head of Kollmar Creek on this ridge. Southeast along Royall’s ridge a half-mile, is Royall’s second position. These first two positions lay west of the state park boundary. Royall’s third position is farther southeast on the same ridge. The third position of Royall is the site of the wounding of Captain Guy V. Henry. To the west sit Foster’s Ridge and Andrew’s Point.

Small arroyos spur off into the northeast bank of Kollmar gouging the bench land’s west flank. One such arroyo is known as “Led Horse Ravine” and was the site of the most aggressive hand-to-hand fighting on this battlefield. The upper Kollmar watershed broadens out into a basin with occasional rock formations rising from its valley floor. Many of these rock formations are accompanied with battle stories of valor and bravery. A Cheyenne warrior named “Limpy” had his horse shot from under him in Kollmar Valley. A birth deformity of one leg shorter than the other, made it difficult for him to mount up behind Young Two Moon for an escape. Limpy climbed up on a nearby rock and jumped onto the back of Young Two Moon’s horse, escaping the certain death from a cavalry bullet.

The center of the bench land between the two ravines continues northward and graduates into numerous small ridges and hills creating a tangled array of coulees, and draws before a sharp upturn into the climax of the main ridge reaching 4700 feet above sea level. Crook’s Hill, as it is known today, is the site of Crook’s base camp during the battle. From this ridge, a splendid view of the battlefield can be seen. This view gave Crook the ideal spot from which to command his troops. To the south and just below Crook’s Hill is Burt and Burrowes’ Ridge. Capts. Thomas B. Burrowes and Andrew S. Burt’s infantry were stationed in reserve on this ridge awaiting battle orders from Crook, which came later in the battle with the infantry coming to the aid of Royall’s retreat from Led Horse Ravine.

This ridge runs from northwest to southeast continuously, save the gap mentioned earlier to the east. The plateau crowning the ridge approximates a hundred yards wide at most places and is over a mile long. The western section of the ridge fans out to a quarter mile wide, and hosts a large conical hill in the center of the
main ridge approaching 4780 feet. The Conical Hill became the Sioux and Cheyenne’s main staging area before their many offensive attacks upon Royall to the south and Crook to the east. At the midpoint between Crook’s position and Conical Hill, lays a sandstone outcrop on the northern crest of the main ridge. This is known as Packer’s Rocks. Crook ordered some of his mule packers to position themselves behind these rocks and shoot to the west toward Conical Hill. This action prevented the Sioux and Cheyenne from approaching Crook from the right flank. Across the main ridge to the south of Packer’s Rocks, is Packer’s Ridge where the remaining mule packers were stationed to discourage attack by the Sioux and Cheyenne from Conical Hill.

West of the conical hill, the land levels back out to 4720 feet with a grassy pediment graduating westward and finally intersecting with the ridge west of Kollmar Creek. This formation creates the head of Kollmar Creek as a large bowl-like valley.

The northern end of the battlefield drops off precipitously from the main ridge producing a grassy pediment. Ultimately, the ground transforms into ridges and arroyos forming drainages emptying into a reservoir near the northern boundary of the battlefield.

The Rosebud Battlefield remains one of the finest examples of a pristine Great Sioux War battlefield, much of which contains native flora and fauna. The state park, a onetime ranch, is transforming back to a wild and native state granting a unique viewshed much as it was 127 years ago when U.S. troops, Shoshone, and Crow scouts under Gen. Crook, engaged in battle with the Cheyenne and Sioux alongside Crazy Horse. Thanks to the vision of rancher Slim Kobold who championed the creation of a state park, and the continuing efforts of the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, and neighbors, the Rosebud Battlefield remains unspoiled and unparalleled as a Great Sioux War battlefield.

Particular landforms and areas included within the boundary are:  

- Crook’s Camp, where the troops were located when the Lakota and Cheyenne warriors first attacked; 
- the Gap, from where Crazy Horse and Sioux and Cheyenne warriors initially attacked the U.S. military force, and also where Buffalo Calf Road Woman saved her brother (the Northern Cheyenne have named this battle after this action); 
- Crook’s Hill, the site of the commanding officer’s headquarters during the battle, which offered a view of the action; 
- Conical Hill, the Lakota and Cheyenne’s main staging area for their offensive attacks upon Royall and Crook; 
- Packers’ Rocks and Packers’ Ridge, where civilian mule packers were stationed to discourage Sioux and Cheyenne on Conical Hill from attacking Crook’s Hill; 
- the area of Mills’s first charge and the strategically important high ridge that he claimed; 
- Van Vliet’s Hill where Sioux and Cheyenne unsuccessfully fought to hold the important high vantage point; 
- the area that constituted the bloodiest of the battle (where five of the nine soldiers killed in the battle were shot), that is, the area around Royall’s third position, and the route that he took from there to retreat to Crook, which included:

1 The exact location where Mills exited the Rosebud Valley and the exact route that his troops took to return to the battle are still a subject of debate so that area has not been included in the boundaries at this time. It is also not possible at this time to include the locations of Royall’s first and second positions, Andrew’s Point and Foster’s Ridge. Although those sites are important, even without them the NHL successfully conveys the significance of the battle and the boundary includes the most important portions of the battle.

To determine locations of specific events and resources on the battlefield, several sources were used including Neil C. Mangum’s *Battle of the Rosebud: Prelude to the Little Bighorn*; J. W. Vaughn’s *With Crook at the Rosebud* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1956); and consultation with the staff at Rosebud State Park.
• Led Horse Ravine, site of the most aggressive hand-to-hand fighting in this battle;
• the site where Captain Guy Henry was wounded; and
• the rocks where Young Two Moon heroically rescued his fellow Cheyenne warrior Limpy; also
• Burt and Burrowes’ ridge from where the infantry aided Royall’s troops retreating from Led Horse Ravine;
• and the route that Mills took as he exited the heart of the battle for a sortie down the Rosebud, and the area
to which he returned to the action, which turned the momentum of the battle and ultimately led to its end.

Contributing Resources

Site: 1
Battlefield

The following landscape features and locations are considered part of the site and so are not counted separately:
Crook’s Camp
Area of Mills’s First Charge
Where the Girl Saved Her Brother
The Gap
Van Vliet’s Ridge
Crook’s Hill
Conical Hill
Packers’ Rocks
Packers’ Ridge
Royall’s Third Position
Burt’s and Burrowes’ Ridge
Led Horse Ravine
Limpys rescue
Wounding of Guy Henry

Noncontributing Resources

Buildings: 6
Kobold House
Kobold Garage
Kobold Chicken Coops (2)
Kobold Bunkhouse
Public Restroom

The following landscape features are considered to be part of the site or small features, and therefore are not counted separately:
Kollman Homestead Site
Kollman Grave Site
Main Road
Road to Crook’s Hill
Concrete pyramidal markers denoting key sites on battlefield (placed in ca. 1960s)
Buffalo Jump
Interpretive signs at picnic area
8. STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE

Certifying official has considered the significance of this property in relation to other properties:
Nationally: X  Statewide:  Locally:

Applicable National Register Criteria:  A X  B  C  D

Criteria Considerations (Exceptions):  A  B  C  D  E  F  G

NHL Criteria:  1

NHL Theme(s):  I. Peopling Places
  5. Ethnic homelands
  6. Encounters, conflicts, and colonization

IV. Shaping the Political Landscape
  3. Military institutions and activities
  4. Political ideas, cultures, and theories

Areas of Significance:  Ethnic Heritage: Native American
Military

Period(s) of Significance:  1876

Significant Dates:  June 17, 1876

Significant Person(s):  N/A

Cultural Affiliation:  N/A

Architect/Builder:  N/A

Historic Context:  The Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 in Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Nebraska

X. Westward Expansion of the British Colonies and the United States, 1763-1898
C. Military-Aboriginal American Contact and Conflict
  3. Northern Plains
State Significance of Property, and Justify Criteria, Criteria Considerations, and Areas and Periods of Significance Noted Above.

Rosebud Battlefield, Montana, is a primary site in the core area of the Great Sioux War of 1876-77. According to the context statement the “The Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 in Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Nebraska,” in order to be eligible for National Historic Landmark status under Criterion 1, a property must have played a definitive or crucial role in the history of the Great Sioux War and the development of the United States between 1876-1877, as represented by the following: 1) The engagement must represent a turning point in the Great Sioux War; or 2) The engagement must mark the entry or exit of a particularly powerful American Indian tribe associated with the Great Sioux War, including the massive movement of Indians to the agencies toward the end of the war. The Battle of the Rosebud, which occurred on June 17, 1876, as one of the largest battles of the Indian wars meets the first of these criteria as a significant turning point in the Great Sioux War that affected the course of the entire conflict between the U.S. Army forces and the Lakota-Northern Cheyenne coalition in 1876 and 1877. Specifically, the Battle of the Rosebud ruined the army’s strategy of launching a three-pronged attack on the tribes’ village on the Little Bighorn River. Brigadier General George Crook was leading his troops toward the village on the Little Bighorn where he planned to rendezvous with army columns heading toward the village from the Montana and Dakota territories when Northern Cheyenne and Lakota attacked his troops at Rosebud Creek on June 17, 1876. Representing a significant change from the tribes’ usually defensive tactical posture, the attack was launched by warriors from the Little Bighorn village. Following the Battle of the Rosebud, Crook withdrew his troops from the war zone. As a result, Crook’s troops were not in a position to support Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer’s troops during the army disaster at the Battle of the Little Bighorn eight days later on June 25.

The Battle of the Rosebud, with its associative significance to Little Bighorn, thus dominated and confounded army operations in 1876 while temporarily raising the confidence and hope of the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, many of whom did not immediately believe their defeat as inevitable. It carried implications affecting the course of the balance of the Great Sioux War by forecasting prolonged army expeditions that followed until the Indians either passed into Canada, or yielded at the agencies by the autumn of 1877. Because of its importance from a military standpoint, as well as because of its significance in the course adopted by the Northern Cheyenne and Lakota in conceiving and initiating the engagement, and in their subsequent defense of their way of life at Little Bighorn and elsewhere, the Battle of the Rosebud constitutes an event of paramount significance in the Great Sioux War. It thereby represents an association with events of transcendent importance in American Indian-army relations of the late nineteenth century, and as such, contributes to understanding the broad national patterns of United States history.

In addition, from the standpoint of the Northern Cheyenne and Lakota, the Battle of the Rosebud was an exceptionally significant engagement. It offered full expression of the supreme confidence that the warriors harbored in 1876 for prolonging their traditional way of life in their country. By instigating the attack on Crook’s column at Rosebud Creek, they changed their usually defensive tactical posture and aggressively demonstrated their lack of fear of the troops, as well as their disdain for their presence in lands they considered their own. Moreover, the estimated presence of as many as 1500 warriors together with 1300 soldiers and civilians on the field that day, made Rosebud one of the largest battles of the Indian wars, and possibly in number of actual combatants, nearly equal to that of the Little Bighorn. With their defeat of Crook, and their consequent victory at the Little Bighorn, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne effectively ruined army plans for the balance of the summer. Following Little Bighorn, the tribes scattered and forced the army likewise to disperse in conducting its persecution of the tribe during the next fifteen months. Rosebud Creek thus proved to be not only a tactical loss for the army but a strategic one as well.
Rosebud Battlefield was identified as a potential National Historic Landmark in the NPS *The Clash of Cultures Trails Project: Assessing the National Significance of Trails Associated with U.S. Army/American Indian Campaigns in the Trans-Mississippi West* theme study, completed in 2002, and which assessed the national significance of the trails and associated sites of the American Indian wars of the trans-Mississippi West.²

**Background of the Great Sioux War³**

The Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 was the largest and widest-ranging army-American Indian war in the country’s history. The conflict conformed to the “Manifest Destiny” ideals of nineteenth-century America that promoted post-Civil War policies of expansionism and commercialism in the West. With its purpose of clearing native peoples from lands that Euro-Americans coveted, the war exemplified the role of the army as an instrument of national policy against indigenous populations throughout the nineteenth century while constituting the largest federal military operation since the close of the Civil War in 1865. Set against a backdrop of railroad promotion, white settlement, and mining enterprise, as well as Reconstruction politics, it reflected the country’s proclivity for fiscal initiative coupled with simultaneous hard-handed military resolution. In pursuit of its objective, the Great Sioux War saw casualties on either side; however, it brought death, destruction, and profound change to the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne peoples producing familial and societal trauma that resonated long after their removal to reservations. Because of the concurrent seizure of the Black Hills and other Sioux and Northern Cheyenne treaty lands, the war fostered an atmosphere of pervasive distrust among these peoples with land ownership issues that continue to complicate federal government-Indian relations to this day.

As with other army-American Indian conflicts in the trans-Mississippi West, the Great Sioux War of 1876-1877, owed its origins to the expansionist policies of the United States government during the period following the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848 that ended the war with Mexico. It was then that the nation first confronted many of the native peoples who inhabited that region stretching north to south between the modern Canadian and Mexican borders, and east to west from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean. For as the war with Mexico yielded new territorial gains to the United States, it inspired an almost immediate influx of thousands of

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² *The Clash of Cultures Trails Project* (Denver: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Intermountain Support Office, Cultural Resources and National Register Programs, 2002), 82. According to the context study *The Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 in Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Nebraska*, to be eligible for National Historic Landmark status under Criterion 6 a property has to yield or have the potential to yield nationally significant archeological information. In order to meet this criterion, the data or potentially recoverable data must be likely to substantially modify or substantially modify a major historic concept, resolve a substantial historical or anthropological debate, or close a serious gap in the nationally significant themes of the Great Sioux War. At this time, Rosebud Battlefield does not meet that criterion because sufficient archeological investigations have not been conducted to substantiate that claim. It is possible that future investigations at the battlefield will have the potential to yield archeological information that will modify concepts about the arms and ammunition resources of the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne during the early stages of the Great Sioux War. Archeologically derived physical evidence while helping to further delineate troop and Indian positions on the field and refining the boundaries of the combat area, might provide more data about the nature and extent of Indian weaponry and ammunition one week before the Little Bighorn engagement. It could also afford an enhanced opportunity to consider material culture aspects of the Indians at this major juncture of the Great Sioux War when the tribesmen were likely flush with armament resources as well as confidence. Further, archeological information from Rosebud might be compared with that from Wolf Mountains to help answer questions about Indian logistics and armament on the eve of the Little Bighorn, in the early summer of 1876, versus that at the close of the warfare in January 1877. Archeological examination of the battlefield might yield information affecting conclusions about army ammunition resources and thereby help to explain Crook’s decision to pull back south into Wyoming rather than press on north in a movement that might have changed the course of events with respect to army strategy and the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Finally, the ten buried dead of Crook’s command have never been located on the field. Archeological investigation of the site could help determine the place and historical disposition of those remains.

³ This section was taken from the context study *The Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 in Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Nebraska*, written by Jerome A. Greene, 2003.
Euro-Americans through migration west via the emigrant trails seeking California’s gold and Oregon’s abundant land. The tribesmen, facing ever constricting hunting territory in their normal seasonal peregrinations, confronted the additional complications of seeing their land exploited by whites, a factor that aggravated existing intertribal schisms and generated new ones.

In 1868, in the wake of mounting conflict between the army and the Lakota and Cheyenne on the Northern Plains, the government convened an assemblage at Fort Laramie, Wyoming. The resulting treaty created the Great Sioux Reservation embracing what is now the western half of the state of South Dakota and designated adjoining areas in present Wyoming and Montana as “unceded hunting grounds” on which the tribes could presumably live and hunt in perpetuity. It was the establishment of the reservation and the Indian peoples’ resistance to settlement upon it, that proved the catalyst for the long period of conflict with the army that followed in 1876-77.

On the Northern Plains, capitalistic enterprises fostered repeated confrontations with Lakota remaining away from the reservation agencies. In 1873, a military-escorted surveying party for the Northern Pacific Railroad penetrated the Yellowstone River lands occupied by several bands of Lakota, mostly Hunkpapa and Oglala who had not subscribed to the Fort Laramie protocol. Warriors from the assorted bands aggressively resisted the intrusion in two encounters with Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer’s Seventh cavalrymen along the Yellowstone in August in which neither side sustained more than a few casualties. Increasingly augmented by Indians leaving the Great Sioux Reservation agencies, these “Northern Sioux” as authorities termed them, were perceived as disruptive influences among the reservation bands. In 1874, a more serious provocation occurred with Custer’s movement into the Black Hills, a part of the Great Sioux Reservation, ostensibly to locate a site for a post but in reality to verify reports of deposits of gold.

Coupled with the army incursions into the Yellowstone country, the intrusion into the Black Hills and the reports of expedition geologists confirming the existence of gold provided the major causes for the largest Indian war in American history. Within a year, as miners flooded into the Hills, the Ulysses Grant administration tried to buy the region from the Lakota. Failing that, officials formulated plans to not only facilitate civilian occupation of the Black Hills but to militarily compel the “Northern Sioux” onto the Great Sioux Reservation. Accordingly, early in 1876 following the tribesmen’s noncompliance with a War Department ultimatum to remove to the reservation, the army mobilized to force their submission.

Over the course of twenty months between January 1876 and September 1877, the army under the direction of Commanding General William T. Sherman, Missouri Division commander Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, and their subordinate officers, mounted nine campaigns against the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, each of which produced at least one engagement of varying magnitudes.

**Historical Background of the Battle of the Rosebud**

The Battle of the Rosebud, June 17, 1876, was the second major confrontation between the army and American Indians in 1876. The first had occurred three months prior when troops under Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds attacked a village composed largely of Northern Cheyenne Indians along the Powder River in Montana Territory on March 17, 1876. Brigadier General George Crook, a prominent senior officer with extensive American Indian war and Civil War service, factored significantly as part of a grand strategy conceived by the Military Division of the Missouri commander Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan. Under Sheridan’s plan, Crook’s army would enter southeastern Montana more or less simultaneously with a column from Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory, and another from Forts Shaw and Ellis, Montana. Crook’s force was to
operate in conjunction with the Dakota and Montana columns along in the Yellowstone-Powder River country, and help in subsequent operations to locate and attack the Indians.\(^4\)

In accordance with the plan, the Wyoming column under Crook headed north from Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, on May 29, 1876. The command numbered about 1000 men belonging to ten companies of the Third Cavalry, five companies of the Second Cavalry, three companies of the Ninth Infantry, and two companies of the Fourth Infantry, besides some 85 civilian scouts, packers, and teamsters accompanying the wagons, and several news correspondents. Within days, the force was augmented with the arrival of 65 Black Hills miners who decided to remain with the command for security reasons. On June 7, the expedition bivouacked near the mouth of Prairie Dog Creek along the Tongue River at the Wyoming-Montana boundary where they awaited contingents of Crow and Shoshone auxiliaries expected from those tribes’ agencies. Meanwhile, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were camped along the lower Rosebud Creek gradually en route up that stream toward familiar summer haunts along the Little Bighorn River, one stream west of the Rosebud. They were aware of the army movements to the south and a small body of Cheyenne warriors under Little Hawk had gone to scout the situation, and perhaps, steal army horses. Late on the afternoon of June 9, this band of warriors appeared on the bluffs overlooking Tongue River and Crook’s camping ground and opened fire on the distant troops. Although they were shortly driven away by cavalry fording the stream and ascending the bluffs, the action proved a portent of things to come and reflected the determination of the tribesmen to resist government encroachment into what they considered to be their lands.

On June 11, Crook moved his force southeast to the banks of Goose Creek establishing Camp Cloud Peak near present day Sheridan, Wyoming, while awaiting arrival of American Indian auxiliaries. Three days later, 176 Crows appeared with their leader, Old Crow, shortly followed by the arrival of 86 Shoshones. Thus reinforced and with his infantry mounted on mules, on June 16, the general left his wagons behind at Goose Creek and started north for Rosebud Creek where reports from his guides indicated that the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne were most likely encamped. That day, the column rationed for four days and with the contingent of Crow and Shoshone allies leading and teeming along its flanks, passed down Goose Creek and forded Tongue River, then angled northwest to gain the divide between Tongue and Rosebud Creeks. At that point, Crook temporarily halted his command so that his scouts might inspect a distant buffalo herd whose actions had alerted them that it had been alarmed by Indians and that the village might be nearby. While investigating, the scouts sighted warriors in the distance further bolstering the view that the village lay on Rosebud Creek. In fact, the village stood some twenty miles farther downstream along a tributary now known as Davis Creek, where the occupants had raised their tepee on their route west from Rosebud Creek to the Little Bighorn River. Other Indian camps were also located to the north on both the east and west sides of the Wolf Mountains. Villages of both Northern Cheyenne and Lakota were located along Sundance Creek (now known as Reno Creek), on the western flank of the Wolf Mountains; in addition, a camp led by Cheyenne council chiefs American Horse and Magpie Eagle, were located at Trail Creek, a tributary to the Rosebud along the eastern flank of the mountains.\(^5\) The army’s perception that a village lay nearby, however, factored significantly in the course of the coming engagement.

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On the evening of June 16, after marching thirty-three miles, Crook’s troops camped on the south fork of Rosebud Creek. The Crow and Shoshone allies concerned over the apparent proximity of the Sioux-Cheyenne presence refused Crook’s requests to scout during the night. The scouts had reason for concern; that night the Lakota and Cheyenne were heading toward the troops. When the young men in the Reno Creek villages learned from their scouts that the soldiers would likely head north along the Rosebud, they hurried to prepare themselves for battle. As was customary when planning to go into battle, the warriors donned their fine clothing and war bonnets and placed protective amulets and war charms on their persons. They prepared their ponies with appropriate decorations for the upcoming action.

A group of Cheyenne and Lakota warriors led by Little Hawk, headed east into the mountains along Sioux Pass Creek on the evening of June 16. They rode most of the night, and by the time they came near the encampment on the Rosebud, both the warriors and their horses were tired and paused to rest. In the meantime, another party from the Reno Creek villages had headed east through the mountains following a more northern route; this party included Young Two Moon, Black Coyote, his wife Buffalo Calf Road Woman, and her brother Chief Comes In Sight. As this group reached Trail Creek, they were joined by warriors from the camp of American Horse and Magpie Eagle. Together they proceeded south along the Rosebud.7

On the morning of Saturday, June 17, as the soldiers prepared breakfast and readied for the march, some of the Crows and Shoshones ranged to the north. At 6 a.m., the troops started from the bivouac moving down the south fork tributary beyond its junction with main Rosebud Creek, which shortly turned directly east for approximately two and one-half miles before sharply turning north once more.

Meanwhile, the Crow scouts had encountered the American Horse warriors at Corral Creek near its intersection with Rosebud Creek, about 10 miles north of Crook’s troops. After an exchange of shots, the Crows retreated to the south heading back toward the soldiers, with the Cheyenne and Lakota warriors in pursuit.8 Scouts within sight of the troops signaled that they had important information.9 At that point, Crook’s men were three miles from their bivouac site and at the point where the stream angled east. Unaware of the enemy warriors pursuing the Crows, the command stopped to await the scouts’ news and learn its interpretation by Crook and his staff. The horses were unsaddled and picketed, and the men casually fashioned makeshift tents with their blankets to ward off the morning sun. After an hour, a building commotion drew attention to the northwest where distant firing presently erupted. It was approximately 8:30 a.m. Several of the Indian scouts dashed in to announce that the Sioux were approaching. At about that time, Little Hawk’s men charged the troopers followed soon after by the warriors from the American Horse contingent, together advancing quickly from the north and northwest.10 The entire Crow-Shoshone body quickly mounted, raced forward, and immediately joined battle with Sioux and Cheyenne warriors. In retrospect the scouts here played an enormously heroic and instrumentally important role in staving off this major initial attack on Crook’s command while his soldiers re-saddled and otherwise prepared for combat. Hurriedly, the surprised soldiers started forward, the Fourth and

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7 Marquis, “Wooden Leg” in A Warrior Who Fought Custer, 199; Young Two Moon to George Bird Grinnell, September 12, 1908, White Shield and Young Two Moon to Grinnell, and John Stands in Timber to Powell, 1957-1965, all cited in Powell, Sacred Mountain, 956-7.
8 White Shield to Grinnell, White Elk to Grinnell, Young Two Moon to Grinnell; cited in Powell, Sacred Mountain, 959. The Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council stated in 2005 that the Battle of Rosebud started at this confluence of Corral Creek and the Rosebud Creek on what is now the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Resolution no. NCT-125 (05).
9 It is likely that the signaling scouts were Shoshone who had been posted on a high crest north of the field and who probably saw the retreating Crow scouts to the north and in turn signaled the troops to the south. Powell, Sacred Mountain, fn.19, p. 1364.
10 Marquis, “Wooden Leg” in A Warrior Who Fought Custer, 199; Young Two Moon to Grinnell; both cited in Powell, Sacred Mountain, 956, 959.
Ninth infantrymen and the civilian packers and miners moving out afoot in skirmish order from the north side of Rosebud Creek. As they advanced, they witnessed the Sioux and Cheyenne pressing the Crows and Shoshones back everywhere in their front. On the left and right of the line, the cavalrymen joined in the counterassault, and soon, on Crook’s direction, a battalion of Third Cavalry under Captain Anson Mills charged forward up the ridge facing the right of the command clearing its crest of warriors. Mills’s movement significantly secured a vantage along the ridge that the attacking tribes had themselves sought. At the onset of the attack, Crook sent a battalion under Captain Frederick Van Vliet to cross the stream and occupy a sharply rising plateau to the south. Van Vliet’s men ascended the high ground in time to drive off assembling warriors in that quarter. The captain remained on the summit through most of the early action. Following Mills’s successful charge to drive the warriors away, Crook established his headquarters on a forward prominence near the center of the fighting (today termed Crook’s Hill) from which he directed operations.

The warriors included Lakota from the Oglala, Minneconjou, Sans Arc, Brule, Hunkpapa, and possibly the Two Kettle and Blackfeet Lakota subtribes, together with their Northern Cheyenne allies. Estimated at around 1500 strong, but perhaps numbering only half that figure, the tribesmen generally congregated near a conical hill to the northwest and some 1200 yards from Crook’s Hill. From here, they maintained long-distance exchanges with the soldiers while repeatedly using their skilled horsemanship, rapid movement, and tactical savvy to exploit every conceivable opening in Crook’s ponderously forming defensive line, forcing the general to commit almost his entire force to stem the tide. In an ebb and flow style of fighting, the warriors took full advantage of the tortuously undulating terrain, bodies of them variously falling back—virtually disappearing and reappearing before the numerous charges of the different units—then advancing along the flanks when appropriate to their objective. It was likely that these rapid movements by the warriors in different quarters of the field later resulted in inflated estimates of their numbers. The packers and miners assumed a position west of Crook’s Hill and succeeded in checking the advances of the warriors from the area of the conical hill. During the earliest fighting, Lieutenant Colonel William B. Royall with four companies of the Third Cavalry, occupied a ridge near the western periphery of the field. Royall ordered Captain William H. Andrews to take the ridge farther west, which was occupied by the tribal warriors; in turn, Andrews ordered Lieutenant James Foster to clear away the Lakota and Cheyenne from ridges to the left. The point and ridge successfully taken by Andrews and Foster mark the most western points on the battlefield occupied by the troops. Meanwhile, warriors north and west of Royall’s men delivered a withering fire forcing the troopers to stay hidden behind the slope. After two hours, Crook ordered the officer to join the main command preliminary to a march down Rosebud Creek. Besieged by attacking tribesmen, however, Royall could only pull his command back in intermittent stages. As he attempted crossing open terrain from his third position to join Crook, the Sioux and Cheyenne opened a furious barrage involving much hand-to-hand fighting, and the action accompanying Royall’s withdrawal constituted the bloodiest of the battle. Company L under Captain Peter Vroom was nearly cut off and destroyed before the others came to its rescue; Vroom lost five men killed and three wounded in the action. A combination of firepower from the Ninth infantrymen, Crows, and Shoshones probably saved Royall’s command from annihilation. During this fighting, Captain Guy V. Henry, of Company D, Third Cavalry, fell with a severe gunshot wound that shattered his face and subsequently blinded his left eye. As warriors tried to reach the stricken captain, the Crows and Shoshones rushed forward and drove them back, while a Shoshone scout named Tigee won personal distinction for risking his life to keep the injured Henry from being captured.

Probably Crook’s superior numbers would have eventually succeeded in driving the warriors away, but the general instead focused on the village that he believed existed nearby perhaps but six or eight miles down Rosebud Creek Valley. Late in the morning, as the battle raged around his headquarters position on a high ridge overlooking the combat, Crook withdrew Captain Anson Mills’s battalion of the Third Cavalry and Captain Henry E. Noyes’s battalion of the Second Cavalry, and sent them east and north down the valley under
Mills’s overall command to find and destroy the encampment. Reportedly, Crook’s battalion commanders were perplexed over the withdrawal of half of his cavalry command, and the warriors, seeing the troops pull back, renewed the intensity of their attack. Mills’s orders were to seek out and attack the village securing it until Crook and the balance of the command could advance. Mills reached the creek and proceeded north since some of his officers feared an ambush on their flanks as they continued down the narrowing valley. Becoming alarmed at the re-inspired commitment of the Sioux and Cheyenne with half his cavalry committed to Mills’s sortie, Crook saw his command on the defensive and even faltering before the onrushing warriors, who vigorously resisted every effort of the soldiers to mount an offense. With certain desperation, the general dispatched an aide to order Mills back to the action. By then, that officer had advanced some distance down Rosebud Creek Valley, and when Crook’s directive arrived, the captain moved west out of the valley, cutting cross-country to emerge on the battlefield in the rear of the attacking tribesmen. By that time, “the warriors had had enough of this back-and-forth fighting. They were tired and hungry, having ridden all night and fought most of the day. Few of them had eaten.”11 With Mill’s sudden approach, the warriors pulled back and melted into the ridges north and west of the soldiers’ positions effectively ending the fighting after six hours’ duration.

Next, Crook decided to move his command down the valley and capture the village that he believed was there. Yet his Indian allies balked at passing down such a narrow confine where they might be attacked again, and Crook soon agreed. His casualties numbered nine soldiers and one Shoshone scout killed, and twenty-three soldiers wounded. Except for thirteen dead Lakota and Cheyenne who were scalped by the Crows and Shoshones, the full extent of American Indian casualties went unknown to the army; however, later accounts from warriors who fought at the Rosebud indicated that five more had been wounded. The Cheyenne have stated that their only fatality that day was Black Sun who entered the battle anticipating his death.12 With Crook’s wounded needing attention, and with his rations low and his ammunition largely exhausted, the commander decided that pursuit would be fruitless. He would return to Goose Creek where his wagon train awaited and then determine what to do next. Late on the 17, soldiers from the command buried the soldier casualties in a trench along Rosebud Creek, the exact location of which is unknown. On the morning of June 18 the column snaked its way south. The Crows departed reportedly somewhat distressed over Crook’s perceived delay in reinforcing them at the start of the engagement. Next day, the command reached the wagons. On June 20, most of the Shoshones pulled out and headed home to their reservation in Wyoming. On the 21, the train started for Fort Fetterman for supplies, bearing Crook’s wounded from the Rosebud battle to the hospital at that post. For the next several weeks, Crook remained at Goose Creek awaiting reinforcements and fresh supplies before renewing his campaign.13

Lakota and Cheyenne accounts of the Battle of the Rosebud indicate that the surprise attack of the warriors on Crook’s column was a defensive measure intended to keep the soldiers from advancing on the various Indian camps on Reno Creek and Davis Creek, some twenty miles to the north. Unlike most other Great Sioux War engagements beyond the Little Bighorn, the Rosebud action elicited a number of valuable Indian accounts. The Cheyenne named Chief Comes in Sight fought actively that day, repeatedly drawing the soldiers’ fire toward him. At one point, near the Gap, he rode back and forth before the soldiers who fired on him and wounded his horse, causing the horse to somersault and drop Chief Comes in Sight to his feet. As the Northern Cheyenne

11 Powell, Sacred Mountain, 998.
13 Thoroughly documented presentations of the Rosebud action appear in Neil C. Mangum, Battle of the Rosebud: Prelude to the Little Bighorn (El Segundo, CA: Upton and Sons, 1987), 51-88; and J. W. Vaughn, With Crook at the Rosebud (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1956), 47-147. Black Sun (or Black Moon, depending on the translation) prepared for battle by covering his entire body with yellow paint. Instead of putting on his best clothing he wore only a loin cloth and tied the body of a holy weasel to his scalp lock. As he rode into battle, he sang “I do not wish to be an old man/ This day is mine to die.” During the fighting, an enemy shot Black Sun from behind and subsequently died that night in his own tepee. Powell, Sacred Mountain, 961, 999.
warrior Little Hawk recounted, “He was walking away and all the soldiers were shooting at him as hard as they could. His sister [Buffalo Calf Road Woman] was with the party riding a gray horse. She looked down and saw her brother there and rushed down to meet her brother and he jumped behind her and she brought him off. Neither was hit.” The Cheyenne remember her bravery by referring to the battle as Where the Girl Saved Her Brother.

In another incident, a Minneconjou warrior, White Bull, encountered a Shoshone scout and the two fired at each other. Each missed, but White Bull ran the man down hurting his leg. Years later, White Bull was later known as The Man Who Lamed the Shoshone. Of the action at Rosebud Creek, White Bull remembered: “It was back and forth that day. All day long the Indians of both sides charged back and forth [on] horseback. . . . There were many thrilling rescues . . . .” White Bull saved a man named Hawk Soldier when he fell from his pony, and later saved another man who had become pinned beneath a fallen mount. For the young Cheyenne boy Limpy (whose gait was affected by a deformity), this was his first fight. When his horse was shot from under him, Limpy tried to behave as a warrior: custom indicated that a “man whose pony was shot should show his bravery by taking off the horse's bridle and calmly walking away.” But while he was pulling away the bridle, he came under fire, and soldier scouts were moved in to count coup on the boy. His tribesman Young Two Moon rode in amongst the firing, and Limpy—who had climbed upon some rocks—was able to jump onto the horse and together they rode off to safety. Another episode remembered by Young Two Moon involved a soldier who was having difficulty mounting his horse when the troops at one point fell back. “White Shield rode between him and his horse to knock the reins out of his hand and free them. He killed and counted coup on this man who had a bugle.” Another soldier also lost his horse and became stranded. “A Cheyenne named Scabby Island [or Eyelid] rode up to the soldier and tried to strike him with his whip. The soldier caught [the] whip and pulled [the] Indian off his horse. This soldier and Indian got away unhurt.” Young Black Bird was especially brave during the fighting, and after the battle the Cheyenne chiefs and headmen honored him for being the bravest of all; as a result his name was changed to White Shield. The warrior accounts are replete with descriptions of individual actions, affording rich personal chronicles of the Lakota’ and Cheyenne’ fight with Crook’s men.14

To the Northern Cheyenne the battle was more important than the individual acts of risk and bravery; for the tribe, it marked an important benchmark in their spiritual lives and their history. “Two great tragedies overshadow everything else in Cheyenne tribal history; two disasters were of such tremendous spiritual proportion that they affected all other events in Cheyenne life after their occurrence. They struck at the very heart and soul of Cheyenne identity. . . . These tragedies were the capture of . . . the Sacred Arrows, by the Pawnees in 1830 and the destruction [of] Esevone, the Sacred Buffalo Hat . . . in about 1872.” The Creator gave Esevone to the People, and it is through her that the Creator “pours His life into the lives of the Cheyenne women” and also blesses female animals and plants. “Thus, since the Sacred Buffalo Hat came to live with

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them, the People’s continuation as a tribe was assured, and there was always food for them. . . . Then about 1872, the Sacred Buffalo Hat was desecrated, her horn ripped off in a fit of anger by the wife of the temporary Keeper. The final fighting with the whites followed hard upon that dreadful sacrilege.” The Elkhorn Scaper and the Kit Fox military societies were the special guardians of the Sacred Arrows and Evesone. Prior to the Rosebud Battle, the two societies had become bitter rivals, which weakened the unity of the tribe “at this time when, more than ever, the Northern People had to be united if they were to survive in their own country.” Many Cheyenne believed that a great victory was needed to demonstrate to Esevone the “true oneness of the Northern people. . . . Then, in spite of her mutilation, it was hoped that she would abundantly bless the People again. The victory at the Rosebud was a great display of the People’s old unity. There, Elks and Kit Foxes fought as one against the soldiers, stopping their advance and making them pull back toward the south.” As a result, the time was right for renewing Esevone’s lodge, and this ritual was completed before four nights of victory dances were held. Due to their victory on Rosebud Creek and the renewing of the lodge, the Cheyenne “felt a new sense of power and purpose . . . a new confidence that they could overcome any enemies who came attacking, even if those enemies were soldiers.”¹⁵

Crook also claimed victory in the Battle of the Rosebud. The engagement in reality was more of a stalemate. Tactically, Crook held his position, but that success was meaningless to the warriors who departed for their village once the fighting ended. More imperative, his action in withdrawing from the war zone without immediately communicating with the rendezvousing Dakota and Montana columns, commanded by Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry and Colonel John Gibbon, respectively, introduced a subtext of momentous import. Terry and Gibbon meantime conferred with Terry’s subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, and decided to send Custer and his Seventh Cavalry regiment forth to pursue a recently discovered Indian trail leading west toward the Little Bighorn River. Custer’s command departed the Yellowstone, ascended Rosebud Creek, and took up the chase. On June 25, he attacked an enormous village on the Little Bighorn—the same village from which warriors had ridden to strike Crook’s force eight days earlier. Custer’s immediate battalion was destroyed in the ensuing action; despite desperate fighting, two other battalions, besides a pack train, took up a secure position on bluffs overlooking the river. Two days later, after the Indians had departed, Terry and Gibbon arrived to rescue the besieged command on the bluffs and to bury Custer and his men.

Whether or not Crook’s battle with these same warriors at the Rosebud and his subsequent decision not to immediately attempt communication with Terry and Gibbon directly contributed to the army disaster at the Little Bighorn cannot be conclusively answered. Although logistically Crook could not have continued north because of lack of sufficient provisions for his command and the need to treat his wounded, he nonetheless might have attempted to properly notify his colleagues in the wake of his action on the Rosebud. Had he done so, it is likely that the circumstances affecting Custer’s demise in the precise manner that it occurred would not have been present. Therefore, in the Battle of the Rosebud and in Crook’s outward neglect in not at least conveying information about his action, possibly lay the seeds for what happened at the Little Bighorn. In fairness to Crook, however, he lacked intelligence as to the location of the other columns. The implicit critique of his actions, though never officially expressed, haunted him to the end of his life causing him to blame certain of his subordinates for the setback and otherwise marred public perceptions of Crook as an Indian fighter.

Current Tribal Perspectives on the Significance of Rosebud Battlefield

There are songs among both the Lakota and the Northern Cheyenne about the “manly-hearted” Cheyenne woman who rescued her brother from Shoshone warriors leading them to know the Battle of the Rosebud as “the battle where the girl saved her brother.”

¹⁵ Powell, Sacred Mountain, xvii-xviii, 999-1002.
Though it is said that Crazy Horse just “knew” where the soldiers would be and how best to attack them, the Cheyenne-Lakota alliance at Rosebud had a great deal of intelligence about Crook’s column, at least in part because of the Cheyenne engagement at Tongue River on June 9. They knew that some of their own people, recruited at Ft. Laramie, were scouting for Crook, and so the Oglala sang songs about their friends who were coming with the soldiers.

In response to a request from General Crook for “fighting men,” a council of retired chiefs had selected Plenty Coups and Medicine Crow to lead 176 Crow warriors –“not scouts”-- to join the expedition. Chief Washakie led 78 Shoshone warriors who, like the Crow, were especially motivated to fight the Cheyenne and the Lakota.

The Lakota and Cheyenne Indians were very confident because of their numbers. They were not engaged in a grand strategy but felt sure that they would be victorious in any fights with the army. Their aim at Rosebud was “protective.” That is, they wanted to hurt Crook enough to turn him back away from the great encampment along the Little Bighorn. They also had the additional incentive of “fighting three enemies” since there were many Crow and Shoshone warriors with the soldiers. The Lakota have said that the best warriors among all the Indians at the Rosebud that day were the Shoshones.16

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16 In 2005, the Montana Preservation Alliance began a project to collect ethnographic data about the battle; this study may result in additional tribal information being revealed about the event.
9. MAJOR BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES


Previous documentation on file (NPS):

__ Preliminary Determination of Individual Listing (36 CFR 67) has been requested.
☐ Previously Listed in the National Register. NR # 72000735; 08/21/72
__ Previously Determined Eligible by the National Register.
__ Designated a National Historic Landmark.
__ Recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey: #
__ Recorded by Historic American Engineering Record: #

Primary Location of Additional Data:

☐ State Historic Preservation Office
☐ Other State Agency
☐ Federal Agency
☐ Local Government
☐ University
☐ Other (Specify Repository): Author’s collection

10. GEOGRAPHICAL DATA

Acreage of Property: Approx. 4,220

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Verbal Boundary Description:
Beginning at the southeast corner section 7, T7S R39E; thence north along the east side of section 7 approximately ½ mile to the east half corner of section 7; thence west approximately 6,930 feet along the center line of section 7, T7S R39E, and section 12 T7S R38E, to the east boundary line of the Crow Indian Reservation; thence south along the east boundary of the Crow Indian reservation approximately ½ mile to the north line of section 13; thence east less than ½ mile along the north section lines of section 13 to the corner of section 18; thence south along the west side of section 18 and 19, T7S R39E, approximately 1 and ¼ miles; thence east approximately ¼ mile; thence south to approximately where a road crosses the west quarter line of section 19; thence following the north side of the road in a southeasterly direction approximately 0.2 mile past a building to where the road turns to a northeasterly direction; thence approximately ½ mile in a southeasterly direction to the intersection of this line with the 4600 foot contour line (shown on the Half Moon Hill quadrangle map), this intersection being in the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section 30, T7S R39E; thence following the 4600 foot contour line in a generally southeasterly direction along the southern side of a mesa known as Van Vliet’s Ridge for approximately ½ mile to the easterly most point of said contour line; thence southeast approximately 0.3 miles to a point where this line intersects the 4600 foot contour line again,
this point being in the southwest quarter of section 29; thence in a southeasterly direction along an unnamed drainage approximately 0.4 mile until it intersects with the southern line of section 29; thence east along the section line of section 29 and 28 approximately 0.55 miles until it intersects with the 4300 foot contour; thence along the contour in a generally northeasterly direction until it intersects with the western side of the east half of the east quarter of section 28; thence north to the southern side of the north quarter of section 28; thence west along the quarter section line approximately 2700 feet; thence north approximately ½ mile to the approximate center of the southwest quarter of section 21; thence west approximately ¼ mile to the eastern side of section 20; thence north approximately ¾ mile to the corner of section 16; thence east along the section line to the right of way on the west side of Highway 314; thence northerly along the right of way (which varies from approximately 70 to 90° west of the centerline of the highway) to the north side of section 16; thence west across the north line of sections 16 and 17 to the northwest corner of section 17, which is also the southeast corner of section 7 and the point of beginning.

Boundary Justification:

The boundaries of the Rosebud Battlefield/Where the Girl Saved Her Brother contain the majority of the core areas of the action of June 17, 1876, where the Lakota Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, Shoshone, Crow, and Crook’s soldiers fought. The heart of the battlefield is within these boundaries, where the key battle positions and strategic landscape features are located, and where the majority of the action took place. Importantly, the boundaries include the locations of the decisive movements—the retreat of Royall to safety and Mills’s return to the encounter—which proved to be the turning point of the battle. As a result, the Lakota and Cheyenne left the field and casualties on both sides were kept to a minimum.
11. FORM PREPARED BY

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DESIGNATED A NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARK
October 06, 2008