BRANDON BIES: All right, this time we're all set. We're going to go ahead and get started. I'm just going to give a brief introduction, and then we'll just act like we're having a casual conversation about your experiences except there'll be these cameras and things going, which I'm sure you're used to. We have a few -- We have pretty much the entire afternoon, and I'll let you know if it's not enough detail or too much detail or anything --

JOHN DEAN: Yes, interrupt me any time you feel like it.

BB: Fantastic. Thank you. To go ahead and get started, today is Tuesday, October 2, 2007. This is the Fort Hunt Oral History Project, and we are here interviewing Ambassador John Gunther Dean, a veteran who served at P.O. Box 1142 [00:42]. This is National Park Service historian Brandon Bies as well as Fort Hunt Oral History Project team members Vincent Santucci, Sam Swersky, and Eric Oberg. And with that, Ambassador Dean, first of all thank you very much for being [01:00] willing to not only participate, but to travel as far as you have to participate. And if we could just start off a little bit with your own personal background, just briefly when and where you were born, a little bit about your family, and if I remember correctly from other interviews, I believe in fact "Dean" was not even your original name. So if you could just cover that for a few minutes.

JD: I was born in February 1926 in the German city of Breslau [01:31], which is the capital of Silesia. My father was a lawyer, and he was -- as the records prove -- he was chairman of the board of directors of a bank, chairman of large corporations, and he was also on the board of Prince Hohenlohe [01:57], who was the last German chancellor [02:00] of Kaiser Wilhelm [02:05] in 1913-1914. He was on his board. Quite unusual, because my
father was also head of the second-largest Jewish community in Germany. I'm saying that because it's fairly important. The German Jews -- and in my time, I forget we've had two Nobel Prize winners from the city of Breslau [02:33]. And they were first and foremost citizens and secondly, extremely tolerant towards all religions. And this is a very important point. I made this all during my life. When I came up as ambassador before Congress, I said, "I am a secular ambassador, and I [03:00] bow down to all religions of the world." Well at birth, my name was Dienstfertig [03:09]. And --

BB: Could you spell that?

JD: D-I-E-N-S-T-F-E-R-T-I-G.

BB: Thank you.

JD: [unintelligible] service done. And I think we got that name in 1742 when Frederick the Great [03:32] gave names to the Jews in that area. After Kristallnacht [03:41] of 1938, my father was told more or less in very clear terms by his friends, including the head of the police force of the city, saying, "Joseph, it's time to go [04:00] and leave."

Unfortunately, we couldn't take much with us. Quite a bit was confiscated. And we left in 1938, via Holland and England, and we arrived on the Queen Mary [04:15] in the United States, beginning of '39.

BB: Did you have any trouble coming through -- obtaining visas and things of that sort?

JD: No. I went to -- very frankly, the American -- I had an affidavit from my father's family, who lived in the states, who had been there since 1870 or something like that. And the old lady had made a fortune, and they had given me an affidavit at the American Consulate. And his name was Rose [04:50], R-O-S-E. He put my parents on my affidavit, and we got our visa to go to the states [05:00] very, very quickly. And Mr.
Rose was later on the board when I entered the foreign service, and I remembered the
guy, and he remembered me. It was a wonderful coincidence. We came to the states,
and the old aunt who lived in very great style, very, very fashionable hotel in New York,
and said, "You know, I sent you a telegram, but Dienstfertig [05:26], nobody could
recognize it, and it was never delivered. You go into court." And my father being a very
legal man, we went to court -- the City Court of New York -- in March of 1939, and the
name was changed to Dean. And since that time, I'm known as -- I kept the "Gunther" in
there to prove that was the old Germanic part of John Gunther Dean [05:53].

BB: So was your original first name "Gunther"?

JD: No, no. There was no original name, and I went to school [06:00]. I had an English
governess when I was a child, so English was no problem. And as I went to P.S. 99 in
New York, and Mr. Latterberg [06:16] [spelled phonetically] was the principal, and he
said, "Well, Gunther's not a name. Why don't you take another name?" And there was a
very famous author at the time: John Gunther! And he said, "Why don't you take John?"
And I said, "Oh, I like 'Tom,' sir." "But 'John Gunther' is well known, so why don't you
take John?" And that is how I got the name John Gunther. And I have used that name
John Gunther Dean [06:44], and I've tried to do something with that name to help the
country which took me in.

BB: And so as of March of 1939, you became John Gunther Dean.

JD: Right.

BB: I understand. With your family, you came over -- again, you came over to the United
States with [07:00] your mother and your father. Any siblings?

JD: No, my brother had died the year before. A young man -- there weren't any antibiotics,
and he died. I will say, because some people criticize me for some of the things I did in my career. I did have members of my father's family who were in the Holocaust and were unfortunately destroyed. And on my mother's side, a very nice Catholic lady saved my grandmother on my mother's side and her two brothers. And I'm still today -- that woman had children with my mother's brother, and I'm still today in 2007 taking care of the grandchildren of that lady to show my gratitude, what she did for my family. And the lady -- the girl in question came to the states, and she has a job now in Paris with an American publishing company. And I'm trying to show that we have always operated and worked with all people. Religion was never a factor.

BB: Would you say that in your time in Germany, prior to coming to the United States, as the early ‘30s became the mid- and then the late-‘30s, could you characterize the level of anti-Semitism that you and your family faced? Do you feel that it was fairly typical of the experience of many Jews at the time?

JD: I think this is a question which would need a long answer, but I will try to say something which most people don't fully realize. The German Jews in general were highly assimilated, and they were very much part of the nation. And they saw themselves first and foremost as Germans, and the religion was between themselves and their makers, and they were very, very tolerant. For example, one of the things -- I've just asked them to look and where they find it -- we had a very well-known painting of Christ with the disciples at Lake Tiberias. This was in our home. It was one of the paintings we were not allowed to take with us, you see? The German Jews were part of the assimilated world. They were German citizens, and the religion was something else. This is not the case of a lot of Jews in the Ukraine, or say yet in Poland, or in Russia, where they...
were living in areas where they couldn't assimilate. This is a -- and therefore, they were strangers in their own countries, so to say. They were not allowed. The Germans Jews who were therefore somewhat different. Another group -- the Spanish Jews. The Spanish Jews were kicked out at the same time as the Muslims, in 1492. And the Jews were protected by whom [11:00], after 1492? Most of the Jews went to Salonika [11:08], which was at the time under the control of the Ottomans. And there they lived, happily until 1942, when the Germans more or less tried to liquidate them. And they speak still today, the same language of Ladino, which was the language of Spain, and Mr. Sarkozy's ancestors also come from Salonika [11:40]. And that's a different option. The German Jews, which I represent, as far as I understand it, they came largely -- they were Khazars [11:53], if that means anything to you. Those were shepherd people in the Caucuses, who converted [12:00]. About the 11th century. The prince was approached by somebody who came from Byzantium, and somebody who came from Mecca. "You have to become either Christian or Muslim." So the prince said, "Isn't there something in between?" And they said, "Well, there are the Jews." "Well, I'll take it." And these people were shepherders, and they moved with time. And in my family, they were living in Silesia [12:36], in the little town of Nohstadt [12:40] [spelled phonetically], at least since 1600. And that is very common. These people then intermarried by themselves. That gives you a long story about something most people don't know much about. But there is a big difference between the German Jews that you have [13:00]. For example, the German Jews who came in 1848 to the United States, Goldwater and company, they were -- mostly became peddlers and moved around the West, and they became the oldest of the Martin stores. Now, the people who came from Russia and from
Poland, who could never assimilate: they came with the Polish wave in the 1880s or so, and they moved, and Hollywood is full of those people. And they felt that the religious factor -- a very important factor. And as we moved into the 20th century, they became Zionist while the German Jews became much more -- my father, for example -- stop me if this doesn't interest you -- and Mr. Warburg [13:59] who was a [14:00] well-known name in finance in the whole world and now has been raised to the peerage in England. Mr. Warburg was head of the Jewish community in Hamburg [14:12]. And my father was head of the Jewish community in Breslau [14:16]. They were asked to go to Israel in 1928 and 1929 for the opening of the Hebrew University [14:26]. And what they said then, I have repeated before the American Congress when I was being sworn in as ambassador. They said, "We are" at the time "German citizens, and our faith is between ourselves and our maker. But we happen to be of Jewish faith, but we respect every religion around." I said the same thing before Congress, and you could find that in the records of the [15:00] American Congress.

BB: And so, being from a family of your backgrounds and level of assimilation in Breslau [15:08], what was it like -- can you describe the level of discrimination and anti-Semitism [15:16] that your family -- did you experience any whatsoever?

JD: None. I will tell it. We moved from New York, and my father got an offer in Kansas. So we moved to Kansas City, Missouri. And all I can tell you is, like all the kids, I had a paper route, and made a little extra money. And people thought, "Gee whiz. They have these beautiful paintings and this fancy furniture." People were so nice to us. Unbelievably nice. Now, my father then joined a reformed Jewish church. A synagogue. And it was [16:00] a meeting hall; you would never know that you were in any kind of
religious setting. And if you are interested, in the United States, the Cincinnati rite [16:10] is a very liberal rite of Judaism. And when the church next door burned down, we lent our meeting ground for the people of the church, and they came on Sundays, and we went on a Saturday, where people went. But you see, quite the contrary. In the Middle West, the openness. And I'm talking about the only experience I had: it was open arms! The only thing is, I wanted to baseball like all the other kids, but I didn't know how to play baseball, and I was getting pretty good at it, so I'm fine. I wanted to play basketball. I went to a high school and a junior high school. And boy, oh boy, people were nice to me. My father did have an unfortunate incident, which I'll mention [17:00]. He was a lecturer at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas. And one day in 1940, Lindbergh [17:11] came and gave a lecture. And Lindbergh's lecture was very pro-Nazi [17:19] Germany. And my father who sounded very much like Dr. Kissinger [17:24] did at the beginning of his career, with quite a heavy accent, spoke up and said, you know, "We should help the Allies who are fighting, the British in particular. We should help the British with the French, who had fallen by that time." As a result, he lost his lectureship, and he had to get a job doing something else. But all I can tell you is, the Middle West didn't have any anti-Semitism [17:57]. And certainly [18:00], we also assimilated. We were first and foremost Americans. And religion, if we could help anybody, we did.

BB: Were you living in -- you said this was in Kansas City?

JD: Kansas City, Missouri.

BB: Where you in Kansas City, Missouri during Pearl Harbor [18:21]?

JD: Yes. And I got the message from my classmate that it had been bombed, and that's when I got it. On the 7th of December 1941, and I left Kansas City in '42 to go to Harvard
[18:40], but I was there at Pearl Harbor [18:43]. And you have to understand. A little kid who comes to the states. I had only one idea: be like all the other kids. That's what you wanted to be. And I tried my best, and I couldn't be drafted in 1942, because I was still [19:00] a German citizen.

BB: I was just going to ask. So you were still considered an enemy alien?

JD: I was an enemy alien. In 1942, I went to Harvard [19:08]. And since my father had been a friend of the former German Chancellor, Heinrich Bruning [19:16], who was the head of the Catholic Party, and he was a professor at Harvard. So my father wrote him and said, "Dr. Bruning" -- he was a major figure. He was two years Chancellor of Germany before Hitler [19:30] came in. And says, "My son has applied to Harvard [19:34]." I was the first guy accepted from Kansas City to go to Harvard, but I passed the exam. Barely, I barely passed the exam. I got in! I stayed there until 1944, and when it came up, I volunteered for the U.S. Army [19:53].

BB: So what did you study, your few years there at Harvard?

JD: Well, the first year, you have no choice [20:00]. There's some quite interesting. My father, who was a very learned man, said, "You must remember you are of Germanic extraction." So I had to take a year of German literature from the beginning to the end. And when I came back after the war, my father said, "You're not a complete human being unless you have read "Faust" by Goethe." And I had to take a half-year course in "Faust," and I also took, when I came back from the war, at Harvard [20:44], I audited a course in theology, because I wanted to know more about other religions and realize that all of them basically preach the same [21:00] thing: certain values which are the base for all of humanity.
SAM SWERSKY: Do you want to compare the life in Germany as compared to discrimination in Germany, with this --

BB: Yeah, I guess before we go too much further, we started to touch on this earlier: could you compare your life as a young teenager in Germany with the rise of the Nazis [21:29], to what life was like in the United States? We've heard a little bit about the United States. What was life like? Do you have recollections of the Nazis coming to power?

JD: I'm going to be very frank with you. This is a cultural question of what class you belong to. This is not what people like to hear, I realize that. But I had an English governess. I learned French. I went to a very fancy school [22:00], Von Zawadzkie. In the whole school there were two Jewish people. And people were extremely nice to me. The first time I felt something was in 1935. They put on a play. Now I was in that play. And then they called me in and said, "You know, there are some people who might object to fact that you are in the play. So would you mind not participating?" I was hurt. I was hurt. We lived across the street from a very fancy Count so-and-so Von so-and-so. And the kid went to school with me. The mother said to the boy, "Listen, now we have these laws, the Nuremberg [22:56] laws about Jews. We don't think you should go home [23:00] with this guy Gunter Dienstfertig [23:03]." And the boy said, "He's my buddy. You can't tell me with whom I want to walk home with. I'm going home with him. I don't care." And I continued going home with him as long as we were in the same class. As the Nuremberg [23:24] laws began to bite, it got more and more noticeable. The most noticeable event I do remember was just before we left, which was Kristallnacht [23:38], when the Jewish stores were destroyed. And I will tell you still today, I felt then and still today. There were good people and bad people. But you must remember that the
Germans did have a gripe against the Versailles Treaty [24:00]. And they had a hell of a time making a go of it. And Hitler [24:05] caught onto that, and came to power, because people had the choice between Communism and his form of National Socialism, which turned them into a very racist and a horrible system, which led to the destruction of more 6 million people. And since I just came back now from Germany, I will tell you something. The Germans are making a big effort today to point out something which we should also take note of. I just came from the city of Dresden [24:45], which was badly destroyed in February of 1945, six weeks before the end of the war. There were mostly civilian casualties. They are making an effort to show to the world that there was a [25:00] German culture before 1933 going way back, and since 1945, Germany is a major participant in the new world which is being created today in all forms: science, technology, and culture and all other ways. And I think still today I felt the Germans are good. There's some good Germans, and there's some bad Germans. The difference in the United States was it was a very free country. You can move around. Everybody talking and nobody ask any questions. There was no discrimination. But I was kicked off the streetcar in Kansas City, Missouri, because my father, who was a very open, tolerant person, he had been sitting in a [26:00] streetcar next to a white lady. And a black lady came in on a Saturday afternoon, and she had been shopping. She had shopping bags. So he got up and tipped his hat to give his seat to the black lady. And the white lady said, "Hey. You blah blah blah blah blah!" And the conductor said, "Well, old man, you take your boy and you get off this streetcar. I don't want no trouble around here." The reason was, was black people were supposed to go to the back of the streetcar, and my father didn't make any distinctions from blacks and white. As far as I'm concerned, I still don't
make any distinction with anybody, whether he's black, white, brown, yellow. I don't see
the difference. But that is, I must tell you, the world in Kansas City, when I came [27:00]
and still I believe today, people were open to the world and they had basic values which
are decent. And we have tried to make up for mistakes which were made by everybody,
including slavery, including discrimination. And I think this is the great part of the
United States: that we're trying to improve ourselves. Every human being makes
mistakes. And previous administrations may have made mistakes as well, and surely did.
And Europeans and Asians did. But we have the will to make it a better place.

BB: With that, we'll fast forward back a little bit to where we were talking a little bit more
about your time in the United States and at Harvard [28:00]. You were at Harvard until
1944, at which time -- had you wanted to enlist earlier than that, or were you content with
your studies there at Harvard?

JD: Oh no, I wasn't eligible. You had to be 18.

BB: Okay. So you didn't turn 18 until s--

JD: Correct. 1944.

BB: 1944, okay.

JD: And at that point, I'd finished the semester and volunteered.

BB: Okay.

JD: And the interesting feature is when I volunteered, it included also being sworn in, you
see, as an American citizen, you see? I volunteered. And at one point, I was with
another German guy, who had been a member of the Bund [28:46]. The German Bund.
And he was refused citizenship, and I was given citizenship. And that was very
interesting and strange for me. I entered the service, and in the service [29:00] I was sent
to Fort Belvoir [29:03], Virginia, in the Corps of Engineers [29:05]. And I was in the Corps of Engineers until I got a phone call from a Major Hanson [29:14] [spelled phonetically] in the Pentagon [29:15], and he said, "[speaks German]?" And I said, "[speaks German]." "You speak like a German?" I said, "Yeah, I speak like a German." He said, "Okay, go back." And I went back to Fort Belvoir [29:30]. And when we finished our training, we were on the parade ground. Everybody's name was called, except my name. One step forward, turn left, and all of them marched off. And I was the only guy left on that field. And the administrative officer said, "Dean, come up here." And I got a nickel [30:00]. And I was sent, and the staff guard took me with my duffel bag and my uniform as a buckass private to Alexandria, Virginia, at the corner of Queen Street and the Main Street there. And there is a drug store. You call this number here, and somebody's going to pick you up. I saluted.

BB: We've got to end. I got a few seconds left on this tape, and then we're going to have to flip that. So before we get too much into 1142, how long were you in the Engineers [30:39] for at Fort Belvoir [30:41]?

JD: Four months.

BB: And that was -- were you preparing to go overseas at that point?

JD: Definitely, I was -- as a matter, I came across my buddies. They didn't go as a unit, because they finished in October -- we all finished in October. We were replacements for the guys killed at the beaches of Normandy [31:00]. And they got really chewed up. They got chewed up at the Battle of the Ardennes [31:07], because I came across these people later on, and I asked, "What about the other guys?" and I mentioned all their names. And when I was in the Army [31:16] at Fort Belvoir [31:16], some of the people
were illiterate, so I made a deal with a guy. I said, "You clean my rifle, I'll write your letters to your wife." And the preacher came around and read the letter to his wife. He was 18 and a half years old, and he was married.

BB: With that, will you go ahead and just switch this tape.

(End of Tape 1A)

(Beginning of Tape 1B)

JD: Many of them died about '85 or '86, or so.

BB: Okay. With that, we’ll pick right back up on our second side of the tape. You have, we have just talked a little bit about your time at Belvoir [00:19]. So, it sounds like you were in training there at Belvoir, for the Engineers [00:23], you mentioned, as replacements for the D-Day [00:25] invasion. Did you become a U.S. citizen at Belvoir, or --

JD: At Belvoir. As a matter of fact, I have my naturalization papers somewhere, but I don’t have them with me --

BB: Sure.

JD: However, I have a diplomatic passport in the United States. But I have my naturalization paper and there I am, in uniform. And I had my hair cut real short, and that’s the picture from naturalization.

BB: Fantastic.

JD: In Washington, D.C.

BB: And so, your time at Belvoir had nothing to do with intelligence [01:00].

JD: Nothing at all. I was a common engineer. And I even got hurt there, and I had to be hospitalized in the middle of maneuvers; I must have been clumsy, or something.

Anyway, and my buddies were nice guys. My buddy was Corvin, Corvin Dean [01:20]
[spelled phonetically]; you see C. D. He was illiterate. I wrote his, I wrote his letters, and he cleaned my rifle. But he got killed. Bains [01:29] [spelled phonetically] was another illiterate guy from the Appalachian Mountains; I wrote his letters. And I saw some of these guys when I came back from Schlitler [spelled phonetically]; that’s when I saw them, in Bremerhaven [01:44]. Some of the guys being sent home.

BB: Got you. We’ll talk about that when we get there; that’s fantastic. And so -- I’m sorry for interrupting you earlier. So, you were recalling this story how you were called out, and you were the only one left on the parade ground. And [02:00] then, at which point, you were given orders to report to somewhere else?

JD: I was given orders to -- I got a piece of paper, you call this number, and a staff car is going to take you to Alexandria, Virginia. So, from Fort Belvoir [02:18] I went to Alexandria. And then I was told -- sure enough, there was a drugstore at the corner. And I put the nickel in, I called the number, and I said, “Private Dean reporting, sir.” “Yeah. You stand outside, and we’ll pick you up.” So I took my duffel bag and I stood there at the corner, and sure enough, staff car came -- I felt very important -- and I went to Fort Hunt [02:45]. Now, you should know something -- I’m going to open the parentheses [spelled phonetically]; you may know it. OSS [02:54] had a station where the underpass was -- did you know that? There was a [03:00] big estate --

BB: Was that Collingwood [03:03]?

JD: Collingwood.

BB: Could you, since we’re on that subject, could you elaborate on that a little bit?

JD: Well, there was a huge estate, going toward Fort Hunt [03:14], on the left side, on the left side overlooking the river. And when I went into town, you know -- I used to hitchhike --
and sometimes, you know, the people going to Collingwood [03:29] would take me, but they were always very secretive. And these guys were -- there was no CIA [03:35], it was OSS [03:37] -- and we were strictly Army [03:37]. And then we went -- my first day, I was driven to Fort Hunt [03:46], and there I reported, and I was put in the barracks. And at that point I started my career [04:00] at 1142. And I want to say the buddies I had at Fort Belvoir [04:08] were people who did some of the most difficult fighting, mostly in the Ardennes [04:18], they got chewed up badly. When I came to 1142 [04:24], I met a completely different crowd of people, had a completely different background. And then I realized, at that point, that this Major Hanson [04:36] had something to do with having me transferred, where my background as a German speaker, and I spoke good French also, could be used. Now, we had at Fort Hunt -- all I can tell you is, people who spoke Russian, people who spoke French, people who spoke Italian, and people who spoke German. I do not remember anybody who [05:00] spoke Japanese.

BB: Great. With 1142 [05:07]; had you ever heard of this place before?

JD: I’d never heard of it before. And then, look, at 1142 -- the problem was telling my parents, you know. You’re in the Army [05:23], you know. And my old man and my mother figured out that I was doing something to do with intelligence. But you have to remember, and place yourself at the time of that period -- the United States, and I think I said this to you earlier, before we did the taping -- listening to other people was not something which was a trait; it was considered underhanded. We were a nation that was, basically, open to the world; we didn’t think [06:00] anybody -- well, the Japanese had been nasty and underhanded by [inaudible].

[phone rings]
Take it, take it. I’ll take it. Is this for you? It’s for me?

BB: Not important; it’s not for you.

JD: It’s not for me. Oh, I see.

BB: Let’s see -- and so, with 1142 --

JD: Let me go back to this point - -you see, first of all, whatever we did at 1142 [06:43], which was obtaining intelligence about the adversary, or potential adversaries, the same existed in Oberursel [06:55]. Now I assume you know that, because the Germans [07:00] had that center before we did; we imitated. The interesting feature was working with the -- it is not a trait of the United States to be, at that time, suspicious or underhanded. We were a pretty straight, decent people, and Pearl Harbor [07:32] came as a shock to us, that somebody would attack us without giving us fair warning, so to say, so you see. 1142 [07:43] was engaged in something which we needed in order to know what the adversary, or potential adversaries, were doing. And I’m going to say something which, up to you [08:00] whether you want to keep it in there; we were not only interested in what the Germans were able to do, we were at war with the Germans; what the Italians were able to do, we were at war with the Italians. What the French were doing, on the one hand, we were working with the French; on the other hand there were people in France who were working with the adversary. But we were also interested in knowing about a country that was our ally at the time, the Soviet Union [08:42], and that became an important element. When we -- I saw some of the German prisoners we had, who had pictures with them of how they entered [09:00] what is now today the Ukraine in the German army. And they had pictures of arches of triumph made out of flowers. I couldn’t quite understand at the time, because they felt, that at the beginning of the invasion of the Germans, some of the
people felt they were being liberated from Stalin [09:32] communism. Now I saw -- for me, an 18 and a half year-old kid, this was a new factor in life; and so it was with most people. And then we had at 1142 [09:46], the Vlasov Army [09:50] colonels. I saw colonels, or generals -- do you know what the Vlasov people were?

BB: We’ve heard about [10:00] them before, but could you please try and explain?

JD: At one point, when the Germans had moved into Russia, very deep, deeply, there were atrocities. And some of the Russians were taken prisoner. Now some of the Russian prisoners, they volunteered to work with the Germans against the country of their origin. And they were under a General Vlasov [10:38], and they fought with the Germans and helped the Germans in places not involved directly with the Russians. For example, my wife, who’s of French extraction, her village in Southwestern France was occupied [11:00] by, when the Germans occupied Southern France, by Vlasov Army [11:08] people. And she said it was strange, because they were mostly Asians, you see. And we had these people, and Mr. Diamond [11:20] [spelled phonetically], who was a fluent Russian speaker, he was at 1142 [11:26] and he later on wrote a book with Ms. Rice [spelled phonetically] together -- and he was an outstanding Russian specialist. He was very much involved with the Russian speakers, because we didn’t have that many Russian speakers. And I will give you, afterwards, the -- his obituary, because when he died he really got a terrific write-up. And he was one of the fine people of 1142. And this is one of the areas which is [12:00] not well known about 1142 [12:04], the role -- and there, also, Hilger [12:09] comes in, because Hilger was the great expert on Russia. And I’m going to tell you something; we knew nothing, really, about Russia in 1944. And these German prisoners, and Hilger [12:30] in particular, opened our eyes what was
going on in Russia. And Hilger was the great expert, and I assume you want to delay this
to later --

BB: If you don’t mind doing that.

JD: We do, I do, whatever you want me to do.

Vincent Santucci: One question, just to note timeframe for that. Did that appear to change,
did that shift toward the interest in the Russians change while you were there, or was it
present [13:00] when you came?

JD: It became more evident to me as I was there. Now, I’m going to tell you something -- if
you watch television, especially British television, every so often -- what happened to the
Vlasov [13:16] officers, I will mention it. As part of the agreements between Stalin
involved, the agreement was that after the war, the officer corps who were in Western
hands, of the Vlasov army, would be turned over to the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union
[13:51]. And every one of these officers turned over was killed by the Soviets [14:00].
And I have seen on television, with my own eyes, British officers who were involved in
turning them over, crying in the ‘90s, 1990s, on television, that this agreement was
carried out. And nobody held back any of the Vlasov [14:23] people, because that was
part of the agreement. It’s one of the sad stories in a war where many things happened
which not everybody is happy with at the time. Or, certainly later.

BB: Sure. So, with 1142 [14:52], first of all -- do you recall, roughly, when you arrived at
1142? Was it still 1944 [15:00]?

JD: 1142 -- October --

BB: October ’44? Okay, great.
JD: And it stayed that way until I left, because when I -- When I left the service in August ’46; I left from 1142. And in my discharge papers it says Post Office Box 1142, and I got my medal right there on the discharge papers.

BB: Outstanding.

JD: And I want to say something. The Army kept its word. You see, we were at -- we don’t really existed. Every one of us got the Commendation Medal.

BB: Do you recall specifically what medal that was? Which was, did -- just the Army Commendation Medal?

JD: Army Commendation Medal. And then we got -- everybody got something else. I don’t -- I got my papers that I got when I was discharged. But I will tell you one thing; I think all of us who were there were proud to serve the United States Army. I think, whether they had Baptist background, or that background, whether they came the sons of American ambassadors, or professors of German, or people who had fled the Nazi regime, or people who spoke Russian, who came from Russia, or those who were Italian speakers; we all were proud to have served. And I will say the commander -- I don’t remember the guy’s name -- but I had to ride horses for him, because he liked to ride horses.

BB: Was it John Walker?

JD: Walker.

BB: Colonel Walker. He was -- you’re going to meet his children this week.

JD: Colonel Walker, that’s right, Colonel Walker. Yes, sir, I was riding Peanuts, that was a little horse, and there were horses at the entry, at the right there were stables, at the time. And since I knew how to ride horses, and I did that with other people.
BB: Well, you ought to share that. His son and daughters will be at the reunion.

JD: He was a fine boss. You know, we were all enlisted, the ones I knew, were enlisted, but they all had a very fine background. And he was such a gentleman, and a nice person.

BB: When you arrived at 1142 [17:36], were you briefed on what this operation was? Or were you left to quickly figure it out for yourself?

JD: They gave you an introduction, how to press the button, and what to look for, and stuff like that. Sure.

BB: And what were you told that your role was going to be there, your job was going to be?

JD: Listening to people’s conversations and getting intelligence, [18:00] which would help the United States.

BB: Okay.

JD: Now, intelligence came sometimes when we listened, or when we looked at the personal effects. The guys had certain things on, when they were in the Army [18:16] in North Africa [18:17], when they were invaded -- Russia, and stuff like that. And then, you see, as the place was being built up, we got more important people coming, you see. At first there were just people who were picked up in North Africa. It was only after, you see, after the invasion of France, that Hilger [18:42] had a chance to volunteer to work with the United States. The Italy operation, which was before the North Africa [18:53] operation, they were mostly prisoners of war we took in North Africa, and some of those guys were shipped back there, and then they [19:00] asked us to go through role of certain officers, and stuff like that.

BB: And so, you were primarily a room monitor, listening in on these conversations --

JD: Room monitor, and then, as people came, some of these important guys, our job was to
be nice to people. And that was taking them out to have coffee and [speaks German].

And there’s a hotel there in Alexandria which I liked very much that had good coffee and cake, and we took people out, and it was spring. At one point, I was also asked, since I knew people in the diplomatic community, I was asked to ask people in the diplomatic community certain questions. And that was cut short because, all I can say is, there were advances made [20:00] which I didn’t respond to. So I was not interested in following up this particular lead, of what they were interested in. Well, we were trying to help the U.S. government get, obtain intelligence, and it came in various forms. The interesting feature, and perhaps because I was already interested in the idea of going to college, I was interested in Hilger [20:34]. And then -- that was later, after the end of the war with Germany, when we got the guys who were on U-boat 234 [20:50]. And that, the difference was -- and I only learned this very recently -- that we were told the cargo on that ship was mercury [21:00]; actually, it was uranium oxide. All it was -- you know, look, you have to put yourself back in the time, you know. They didn’t want everybody to know; but we already knew a hell of a lot. And the question of this U-boat, and Captain Fehler [21:19]; I’ll discuss it whenever you people want to discuss it.

BB:  Let’s talk a little bit more for right now with your initial duty, which was the listening post and listening in. Did you listen in on mostly the room conversations --

JD:   Exclusively, exclusively.

BB:  Did you ever listen in on actual interrogations, or just --

JD:   No, I was not involved. And officers did the interrogating, except Mr. Schidlovsky [21:49] [spelled phonetically]; write down the name.

BB:  Alexis Schidlovsky.
JD: Yeah.

BB: Yes, we have the name.

JD: He was very, very good. Schidlovsky even got the Legion of Merit, or something; he got something. He was very, very good [22:00]. There was a guy there, Sussman [22:03] [spelled phonetically] --

BB: Sussman?

JD: Zuckermann, Zuckermann [22:08]. And he was very good on current intelligence about the location of German units; so, that’s knowing where the unit was located. It’s the 11th Infantry of the German 2nd Division in this place. He was very good, and he worked so much harder -- when I was, had a little bit of free time, I had a very nice girlfriend who was a British officer in the British navy. And she was stationed in Washington, and I wanted to get away. But Zuckermann [22:47] and Schidlovsky [22:48] worked hard as hell; they were top-notch. I was, as a matter of fact, I once over-stayed my leave, and so I didn’t get moved to be a staff sergeant [23:00].

BB: So, these room conversations, the listening in that you would do -- does any particular room conversation stand out, do you remember any time --

JD: One of them was, and I heard it for the first time, the word [speaks German], the splitting of the atom. Now, whether this is recorded; I don’t -- did I push the button? But I knew, was my uncle Otto Stern [23:30], not 1943 -- 1948. He had worked in Germany with Hahn and people like that, and he was fleeing and he went to the States. He got the Nobel Prize in 1948 in physics, so I knew the word [speaks German]. I know nothing of how you get to that, and I’m not at all a scientist, but I knew that’s the time you press the button, because that was of major interest to the United States.
BB: So [24:00] can we talk -- you referred to “pressing the button.” How would a typical room monitoring, how would that go? Would you -- what we’ve come to understand is that you would take some notes and then at times you would record conversations. Is that correct?

JD: Mostly record. You took notes and you gave them to Mr. Vogt [24:18], V-O-G-T. He was the staff sergeant -- no, sorry, sorry, the master sergeant in charge of the enlisted people. And he was of German extraction, a nice guy --

BB: Was he an older, a little older?

JD: Yes, older.

BB: I think his picture is in that --

JD: I’m sure that it is. And he’s -- he must be dead a long time ago. He must have been in his 50s, which to me seemed very old, when you’re 18 and a half, I tell you; very old. And he would, he kept the discipline, so to say. We had people among us -- Sharp [24:56] [spelled phonetically], Sergeant Sharp -- and he had been head of a [25:00] boys’ school, and he was damn good. And, you know, Craig [spelled phonetically] -- I saw his picture in there, all these [unintelligible] guys.

BB: And so, who did you specific -- did you report to Vogt [25:15]? Was he your --

JD: I just turned the damn stuff in; I don’t remember. We all turned the stuff in, and we were told not to talk much about the thing. But then they used us younger guys -- I was used because Heinz Schlicke [25:37], when he came, he was young, sports-oriented, and he wanted -- we wanted to be nice to him. So somebody had to go and do things with him; so I did. He was a nice guy -- he was Nazi [25:49] -- yes, he was a good Nazi, and he was at Peenemunde [25:52]; so what? My job was to see what he could do for the United
States. And I was told to do this [26:00]. That’s it. And I would recommend that we do the same stuff, that we do the same stuff with everybody, even if we don’t like what he did before. We should do it today, in the year 2007. The only way you can get to somebody is by working and talking to him, even if you disagree. I’m sorry that I’m interjecting my personal value --

BB: And you’re certainly permitted to do so. Just -- we have a couple of minutes left, and then we’re going to have to switch the tape. So I just want to talk a little bit more about the room monitoring. You said you would make these recordings -- how were they made, do you remember what they were made on? Was it just a record or something?

JD: It was a recording. And among the pictures they showed me, there were a number of people whose job was to do the mechanical side [27:00]. I had nothing to do with mechanics; I still to this day, in 2007, I’m not very comfortable with mechanics things. My sons, yes; they can overhaul an engine and everything else. I’m not good at this, but we had people, and pictures of them --

[talking simultaneously]

JD: -- they’re very much part of this, and they were very nice guys. They knew how this thing worked; I had no idea. All I knew -- how to press the button, or go and take somebody to have coffee, or go riding with a guy, or play tennis with a guy; and that’s it.

BB: Was the sound quality when you were listening in -- was it fairly clear? Could you hear? Or was --

JD: Yes, it was clear enough. At 18 and a half, your ears are pretty, much better than they are today, at 81 and a half. You could listen very well what people were saying. It depended, you see, somebody decided to put this guy in -- now, some of these guys were
obviously stoolpigeons [27:56]. To get the guy to talk, you see [28:00], on a subject that interested us, and we knew that this guy knew something. Now, see, this is the way intelligence works, and I accepted all of this. Our duty at the time -- this is a very important factor. Yes, I worked with CIA [28:17] all my life; I worked with DIA [28:20]. I worked with Mr. Gates [28:23]. Yes, I knew him in previous incarnations; he’s now Secretary of Defense. It’s obvious -- we like to know what the opposition is doing. But for that you have to have contact. And this is a very important thing. You see, we used these people -- not shunting them aside because they were Nazis [28:47]; no, how can they help us, and maybe they’ll understand that what we’re trying to do is pretty nice. For that, you have to have contact. That is a very important issue [29:00], because when you talk about what we’re doing in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Lebanon, and all these kind of things, in order to change somebody’s mind you have to have a chance of talking to him. It doesn’t mean you agree with him, but you have to have a means of convincing him it’s in everybody’s interest that you find a way of working with me.

BB: We have to change the tape. We have to change our tape, so that’s a perfect way to end, for right now.

(End of Tape 1B)

(Beginning of Tape 2A)

JD: -- that new system. It’s still today as an old man. I’m doing it -- I think -- I believe what I was told in Kansas City, that we are a great nation, and we have a job to do around the world. Yes, I was a boy scout, and still today at 81 and a half, I stop when I see an old lady who can’t cross the street. I’ll still do it. There’s nothing wrong with that, and I still believe today that that is what is worthwhile. That is definitely what is worthwhile in my
life, in your life, of serving the country in one way or another. That’s what I’m trying to do -- sort of trying to talk to the CIA [00:50] because in my life after 1142 [00:54], by accident, maybe just by coincidence [01:00], I had an opportunity of serving the country. At 81, what I’m trying to tell people, “Please, think long term,” and when you get high up, if you have an opportunity, you owe it to the president. Now, I don’t know whether you all -- you all know --

BB: This one -- you need to turn the light on.

JD: Oh, okay.

BB: There’s a -- and if you don’t mind, I’m just going to give another brief introduction since we’re at the beginning of a tape, and then we’ll let you pick right back up where you were. Today is Tuesday, October 2, 2007. This is part of the Fort Hunt oral history project. We are here interviewing Ambassador John Gunther Dean about his experiences at 1142. This is the National Park Service team, including myself, Brandon Bies; other team members Vincent Santucci [02:00], Sam Swersky, and Eric Oberg, and this is the second in a series of tapes, and with that, Ambassador Dean, I didn’t mean to interrupt you before. If you want to pick right back up where you were, and then we have all sorts of other questions, of course, we’d like to ask.

JD: I just would say, I think, in serving the country, you give orders, and there are always superiors at whatever level you serve. I felt that you bring to your job certain values. The values I brought were quite typical of the average Middle Western, well-educated person with a European background, but I’ll always -- within channels, I repeat, within channels [03:00], always told my boss. It very often was the president of the United States, and different presidents, how I saw the situation, and what is the solution. That
doesn’t mean you are opposed or politically inclined. You just are trying to do the best you can for your country, and when you say things which are not particularly popular, you’re doing your job, and I will tell you the saddest moment in my life: when I rushed back from India after the assassination of the president of Afghanistan [04:00], and I had appointments with the vice president, the prime -- the secretary of state, and the head of the CIA [04:09] to tell them what I was told on one of the key players in the -- in the world, and nobody wanted to listen, and I was declared mentally deranged. I think we owe our superiors, whether you’re in the Park Service, in the military, in the Navy, in diplomacy, in CIA [04:47], DIA [04:48], whatever it is, you owe them the truth. The truth may not be politically what people want to hear [05:00], but what you owe your country -- and that’s where 1142 [05:06] comes in. You owe them what you know and what you think you’ve heard and what the other guy told you privately. This is very, very important. I’m saying this because in the final analysis we decided to have an interesting life by serving -- by serving in the Park Service, by serving in the military. The only difference is, having been in the military, and you must remember, I was detailed in Vietnam [05:48] for two years and one month as deputy for courts with the assimilated rank of major general in Vietnam [06:00]. I worked for four-star general Fritz Kroesen [06:07], today. He was at the time a two-star general, and three-star General Dolphin [06:14] [spelled phonetically], but I always gave my view, even if people didn’t like it, which meant I would work with Vietnamese who had the same views, say, “John, you’re right. Try to find a peaceful solution,” and I passed that on to my bosses, and today when you go to Vietnam [06:43], to the number one tourist attraction in all of Vietnam, the Cham Museum [06:51] in Da Nang, you’ll see in the
catalogue, “Thanks to Ambassador -- Mr. Dean [07:00], there is not a single piece of sculpture missing in that museum because he protected the patrimony of Vietnam [07:14] and the whole world and he did this on instruction from the government in Washington.”

I was trying to show this way. In some way, themselves, the Vietnamese recognize today that certain aspects of what we did was good. That is my job, and that is the job of everybody who works for the U.S. government. Sorry, I opened this parenthesis. I had to get it off my chest.

[laughter]

BB: So, you – ready to go back to 1142 [07:51]?

JD: Whatever you like.

BB: Outstanding. Well, thank you, thank you. We were talking a little bit about transcribing and what your [08:00] roles were there with transcribing -- excuse me, with monitoring, with monitoring. Did you transcribe at all? When you -- when you made these recordings or what --

JD: I did not do transcribing.

BB: So, you took -- so, you took that recording --

JD: That was done by the -- by the staff, so --

BB: Okay, so your role was simply to listen and --

JD: Listen and --

BB: -- take some notes and --

JD: -- take some notes and then tell them that --

BB: Got you. Would you ever -- would you have to brief someone? Would you say, “Hey, you won’t -- you know, here’s what I just heard in this room conversation,” or would this
all be done through official channels on the --

JD: No, this – sometimes you would tell others.

BB: Okay.

JD: Yeah -- in addition to that, we had the holding hand relationship of these high level people, and this is basically where I am going to try to pass onto you -- and you might get it later -- is on Hilger, who played a major role in explaining to the United States the Soviet Union, Stalinism, Communism, and the great cultural and technological ability of the Russian people, and perhaps giving you a link to a German ambassador who has access to the German archives on Hilger will make a major contribution in explaining, perhaps, the difference between some of the German views of the Russians today and how we have a tendency of seeing things in black and white rather than in shadings. Do you see what I’m saying? And Hilger was the man who influenced us on how we see the Russians and what is going on in Russia, and my impression of Hilger is so important. He was a highly educated man, spoke fluent Russian, fluent German, fluent French, actually fluent, not one word of English, and his entire -- he was also a highly religious person. He was a devout Catholic, and he made differences between Russian literary people and Russian historians, Russian figures in history, and different phases of Communism, and as the war went along and he became only involved in trying to do something against the Hitler regime when his son was killed at Stalingrad, and after the Germans surrendered, the whole U.S. Army in Stalingrad, and then he tried to -- I’ll tell you the thing about the Russians. So, it was not an all-black and all-white situation, and we still have today a number of people would could only see the world in terms of black and
white. And 1142 [12:16] was for me the beginning of working with intelligence
operations, and I’ve continued to work with intelligence operations all my life, but I also
told them when they were wrong. Go back to your 1142.

[laughter]

BB: So, did you -- we touched upon this earlier. Did you personally do any actual
interrogations?

JD: No.

BB: And I’m -- and I’m not talking about what you did with Hilger [12:53] and Schlicke
[12:53], the actual interrogations.

JD: Some people did. I’m going to tell you, at 18 and a half, I looked too damn [13:00]
young, you see, to give any credence. You see, he even put bar -- a couple of bars and
old leaf on somebody like Sharp [Arthur] [13:09], who was a middle-aged man, people
like that. I was too young. I never had an interrogation job. I will say one thing. There
was never any threats as far as I know because we’re living in the year 2007 and we have
all this thing in the past. At 1142 [13:32], there was no pressure. There was
psychological power being used. We put a stoolpigeon [13:41] in because this guy was
knowledgeable on atomic energy. Or he knew exactly the location of German army units
in this particular period of particular interest to the United States. Well, this guy was
very good at knowing something about the [14:00] situation in Russia or whatever it was.

BB: Just since you brought it up again, could you talk a little bit more about the stoolpigeons?
Do you remember anything about how they were recruited, how they were treated, and
how they were used?

JD: Stoolpigeons [14:15] usually were Germans who -- or somebody who could act like a
German and would be briefed ahead of time, and then since most of these rooms were for
two, we would put in that room as the guy came in, you know, being brought in, he had --
he had a roommate, and they started talking, and this fellow was obviously used in order
to bring the subject on the -- to the discussion of the subject of interest to the higher ups
in a particular field, and this guy was well-briefed on this. He could be somebody who
we got -- a former [15:00] prisoner who we brought over, or it could be somebody of
German background or Russian background who could act like he was a former member
and he knew all of, “I was in this unit, that unit. Oh, no, I was far away. What are you
doing here? Better be careful. Don’t talk too much,” and this kind of stuff. They were
very good, and that is a function of intelligence, and I’m going to tell you, whether you
were in the military or whether you are in science, in technology, in business, you want to
know what your competitor is doing, and I think the role of intelligence is essential to the
making of policy, whether it is great strategic policy and diplomacy or whether it is in
promotion of your brand of IBM [16:00] or whether it is of importance to the military
knowing what the other guy -- what kind of weapons the other guy is producing.
Intelligence is important in every field. You want to know whether the employees are
also honest. I mean, I think intelligence is an important function. That is why I have
worked all my career with everybody in all the intelligence agencies, but I’m going to tell
you something, which I think you should know. During the Second World War, at P.O.
Box 1142 [16:41], there was unanimity. We were facing a country that had behaved
against the norms of society. We all believed that. This is [17:00] less certain in today’s
world because there’s no open war, and with like an open war in Iraq, there’s still a lot of
people saying this isn’t -- when I was in Vietnam [17:14], I still spoke up, and the good
thing about the military -- I will say it again. Your views were passed on. Nobody said, “No, I’m not passing on these views.” Do you see what I’m saying? Maybe this guy knows more than I do, the boss said, and I’ve had General Kroesen [17:38], who’s a four-star general, and he knew that I was always in Vietnam looking for a dialogue with the Vietnamese high ranking military officers with whom we were working, and at 1142 [17:56], we always were trying to work with other people [18:00] and knowing what the other guy is thinking, and will you come and work with us? But we had a certain aura of being not only mighty but representing human values, which were accepted, and that’s why some people were willing -- not only that the Germans knew they were losing the war, but Hilger [18:31] came and determined it wasn’t even clear yet. Well, go ahead.

BB: With -- on the subject of the stoolpigeons [18:47] and on the subject of winning the war and whatnot, did -- from what -- realizing that you may not have been directly involved, do you know if it was easy for the Americans to recruit stoolpigeons from the German prisoners, or [19:00] --

JD: I don’t know, but certainly among some of the Germans we had working with us or Russians working with us, they were American citizens, and they could be trained in such a way they could act as a stool pigeon.

BB: So, that happened on a --

JD: It required training, you see, not -- they had to be credible, so we had to -- “I was in this unit, and I -- oh, you’re from -- you’re from Berlin. I’m from Frankfurt. Oh, yeah, what school did you go to? Yeah, do you remember so and so?” Stoolpigeons [19:37] had to be trained to be credible to whatever you’re trying to do, and that’s still the case today.

BB: Sure, and so it was common then to use not just German prisoners but American citizens
themselves --

JD: Oh, certainly.

BB: -- with training --

JD: Definitely.

BB: -- as stoolpigeons. Do you know if that was fairly successful [20:00]? Did it -- did it work out fairly well?

JD: I was not at a level --

BB: Okay.

JD: No, no, you know, deals --

BB: Sure.

JD: -- we had [unintelligible] --

BB: Absolutely.

JD: No, that’s not at that level.

BB: Absolutely. Do you know -- you had mentioned earlier that there was no coercion. I’m assuming there was no physical coercion that you know of --

JD: No physical coercion --

BB: -- that was there.

JD: It was psychological, I think, where some high-rank officer would come in and shout and something like that. Yeah, you tried to make the other guy give the information you want, but there was no physical -- and with -- I would honestly say, there was no physical effort of any form, of keeping them awake or -- you know.

BB: Do you know what the most successful method was in [21:00] interrogations and getting information? Was it -- do you know if it was just sitting down and trying to have a
discussion with a prisoner like we are right now --

JD: Oh, no.

BB: -- or -- okay.

JD: It was -- it was two forms.

BB: Okay.

JD: It was like when Hilger [21:17] was willing to cooperate, then he gave forth, you see, and people interrogated -- high up people who knew something about Russia and everything else or -- Schlicke [21:31] was finally brought about to work because the Germans lost the war, okay, but he was willing to cooperate. He was not going to say, “Oh, no, I want to go back to Germany,” or something. I think the best way of getting information was when they were among themselves and talking about themselves [22:00] and not interrogation.

BB: So, the actual -- the monitoring, the listening --

JD: Yeah, the monitoring and having a guy in there who brought it to the subject. If it was just two strangers in there, you would be listening to, “Do you know this girl?” “Oh, yeah she had breasts like this,” you know? We heard a lot of that crap, I tell you. No, but in order to get to the subject, you may have to go through, “You remember her,” you see, and then the guy would bring it to the subject he wanted to listen to.

BB: I understand.

JD: And that was obviously technology and location of troops. That was very, very important, and it was what the army needed. They would let people know what they wanted. Honestly, the colonel had to know what they wanted, and then he told people, you know, how to use the system.
BB: Do -- you were [23:00] mentioning some of the different subjects. When you were there, was there much of a concern specifically on the U-boat threat, and of course I’m not talking about the U-234 [23:10] but the actual -- the systematic U-boat --

JD: Yeah, U-boats were -- U-boats was something of interest, yeah, but you must remember, most of the prisoners when I was there at the time were from North Africa [23:20], Italy, and the people taken after the landing in Normandy [23:29], there was enough going on right there on the spot to --

BB: So, mostly land -- German land forces, German army or Luftwaffe or something?

JD: Yeah, how did you get somebody who knew something on U-boats? That one was more difficult. I say that was more difficult because either they were sunk -- they didn’t want any U-boats that surrendered. Do you see what I’m saying?

BB: Absolutely.

BB: Do you remember realizing there wasn’t much U-boat activity while you were there [24:00]? Do you remember if there were any United States Navy personnel stationed -- or do you remember just Army [24:09]?

JD: I remember only Army.

BB: Okay.

JD: Now, I go back to this at 18 and a half --

BB: Absolutely.

JD: -- buckass private who wanted to be a sergeant. I didn’t know many of the things going on, but what I found -- and I will tell you later -- I have pictures of guys who were there much later, and these are cut out of the newspaper. Gehlen [24:41] [ I never met Gehlen, and the Nazi [24:49] spies, and here they talk about it [25:00]. I think I’m going to give
it to you, and --

BB: Outstanding. Great. Yeah, we’ll take a look at it and maybe look at it a little bit during the break.

JD: Gehlen.

BB: And so again -- so, your time at 1142 [25:15], you primarily were a room monitor, and then was there a particular time that you remember where your duty shifted from being a room monitor to working with folks like Hilger [25:26] and --

JD: No, it was part of the thing that you were being used as you could be useful --

BB: Okay.

JD: -- and that’s as simple as all that.

SS: Previously, you talked about looking at documents and personal items.

BB: Yeah, as Sam just brought up, did you specifically work with many of these captured documents --

JD: No.

BB: -- or anything --

JD: Not at all.

BB: Okay, but there were other people there at 1142 --

JD: Probably did. You know, I can only say what I was doing.

BB: Sure.

JD: One was taking care of making life more pleasant for big shots [26:00], and that was my job to go out and do things with them, and the other one was monitoring, and that’s period. They may have done all kinds of other activities as far as I know, but I think the one thing I can say -- the people who I knew and they were -- mostly enlisted -- were
culturally well-equipped and able in different languages, and we all were trying to help the United States win the war, and it introduced me, personally, to what’s intelligence, and as a result of that experience, I’ve worked all of my life with all the intelligence agencies, but I will tell you what was much easier during the Second World War -- there was cooperation among the various OSS, Army, Navy. There was no Air Force at the time, intelligence. There was other people working in -- the world which followed the Second World War, the operations of intelligence overseas became to the point where it became that different intelligence services were working against each other in specific countries, and you will find in Newsweek somewhere that as ambassador in Thailand, I had to remove the head of the CIA stationed at the post and the head of Drug Enforcement Agency. They were working against each other, but the principle of using intelligence, and the difference, I think, with the post-war period from 1942 is the intelligence people also had people provoking and getting intelligence, but you needed -- since February or March of 1961, the agreement of the ambassador before you could entrap somebody to get pressure on the person -- “I’ll reveal that photograph or what I know about you,” and that was -- it became very important in the fight against narcotics. On the one hand, you had intelligence operations who used drugs as a way of entrapping somebody, and then you have another agency. Their job is to avoid that happening, that the person gets involved in drugs, and you can go very high up to the level of prime minister or president or wives in order to get the goods, which intelligence gives you, but that is using somebody for that purpose. That’s like the guy you send into a room in order to provoke the conversation.
BB: And so at 1142 [29:51], you’re going with a current subject of working together versus working against one another. What other agencies or groups do you remember [30:00] having anything to do with -- specifically with 1142? You mentioned OSS [30:06] earlier --

JD: I did.

BB: I’d like to refer to that --

JD: But it was outside at Collingwood [30:09].

BB: So, you don’t remember any involvement of OSS with the --

JD: No, not at my level.

BB: Okay.

JD: You have to understand that when it came, for example to science, we had a guy who understood science. If it came to the positioning of forces, you had specialists who knew exactly what element was there that -- I was a kid who had two years of college, and that’s all.

BB: Do you remember anything specifically with the Pentagon [30:36]? Again, realizing at your level, do you know if there was interaction directly?

JD: Definitely. I was recruited by Major Hanson [30:45] in the Pentagon. That’s the best I can give you.

BB: Sure.

JD: I was called to see the guy, and obviously these guys were smart, and whatever we were doing was being used at very high places, but that is [31:00] where Hilger [31:01] comes in. Hilger was a subject of U.S. national policy, you see, and understanding of the people. Schlicke [31:13] was getting him to cooperate and getting us the knowledge that
Braun gave us on rocketry, and he was on nitrogen. He was willing to do it. The country had lost the war, but there were certainly other people who refused to cooperate. This is [Ich bin eine Deutsche] -- “I’m -- that’s it. Fuck you guys,” and you have to understand, you know -- after the Second World War, our standing was very high. We had moral power and military, economic, cultural, and scientific power, and human morality on our side. This eroded as time went on with the Southeast Asia involvement. We ourselves began to doubt, and we have --

(End of Tape 2A)

(Beginning of Tape 2B)

BB: Okay, we’re all set and back.

JD: You see, there’s a difference. There wasn’t -- as far as I remember there were hardly no Americans who were against the war after having been attacked at Pearl Harbor and the Nazis knowing -- but I do have a question. Why did nobody bomb -- U.S. or British -- the railway leading to the concentration camps? We knew where every concentration camp was. Why wasn’t the concentration camps bombed? We were bombing all other kinds of targets, including civilian targets.

BB: Do you know if any of that information came out of 1142 specific to concentration camps?

JD: No, no, no. You see, your problem with this interview is very simple. I have a great number of much more important experiences after 1142.

BB: Sure.

JD: For me, 1142 was understanding the importance of intelligence, and all during my career until today, as an old, broken-down, retired ambassador, I still believe that intelligence is
very important. But I also believe that the way you get intelligence -- what really makes us great is what we stand for, not necessarily that we can make this particular rocket or this particular bomb, whether it be atomic, nuclear, whether it be [02:00] germ or whether it be any other kind of high technology. What makes us great is what we think is our mission as a very important country in this world, and whatever the outcome is of this presidency or future presidents, we’ll always be one of the great players of this world, and what 1142 [02:35] did bring out -- that other countries are just as smart as we are. We’re not the only guys around, and that -- I also learned that lesson.

BB: So, did that make an impression upon you that -- did you go into 1142 thinking, “Hey, America has the best technology around?”

JD: I had no idea.

BB: Okay.

JD: I didn’t know what I was getting into [03:00]. I knew that -- I had buddies who were very different from the buddies in Fort Belvoir [03:08], who were illiterate. These guys had all -- an education. That’s the only difference, but the same spirit animated us: serving, and because we had no problem -- look, I went later in life as deputy for courts and high court for two years and one month. I served at embassies -- for war embassies. Lebanon, a very good example. India involved with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cambodia, a whole war going on. All I can tell you is Laos, a whole war going on, but that war -- it was run by the intelligence agency, not by the state department policy operation [04:00]. What I learned was at 1142 [04:05], we had all things on our side, and we were largely accepted. That made a big difference, and we behaved, in dealing with prisoners or people who came over, according to the law. Listening was never
prohibited, but torturing was prohibited, and we never did.

BB: Do you ever recall any stories at 1142 of another way of getting information, being the intimidation factor in terms of the German fear of the Russians and of Americans pretending to be Russian soldiers or anything like that?

JD: No, that -- Dallinn [04:59] is the only one who [05:00] would know that.

BB: Okay.

JD: I knew about the presence of these colonels from the Vlasov Army [05:08], from Dallinn [05:10]. Dallinn was one of us, you see. Dallinn was born in Berlin, although his father was this big professor and had been very active in the 1917 revolution.

BB: Right.

JD: And Dallinn was much more shaded than most you see, and no, I knew Duvall [05:32] [spelled phonetically], who was working with the French because I spoke French, but I had no contact with the French situation.

BB: Okay.

BB: I guess shifting gears just a little bit, we’ve talked a little bit about what you -- your actual role was. If you wanted to take some time now and talk a bit about some of the specific names, we’ve already talked a bit about Hilger [05:56], but other folks like Schlicke [06:00] or any others that stick in your mind, what your role was with how they came to be at Fort Hunt [06:05] and things like that.

JD: Well, let me start with Schlicke.

BB: Sure.

JD: In -- you could ask a question. It would --

BB: No, go right ahead. No.
JD: What happened with the -- in January of 1945, the war was going badly for the Germans. Hitler [06:27] sent U-boat number 234 [06:31] to help the Japanese allies. You have the documentary. Now, how we got involved is we got it after these people came to 235, and it was the following -- that we -- that a -- this submarine was on its way to Japan, and it had, we were told, mercury [07:00] for $300 million, which was a number so extraordinary in 1945, but it wasn’t. It was actually uranium oxide on there, and the captain was Captain Fehler [07:14]. It had a German four-star general on it, and if I reached back, I’d give you the name somewhat.

BB: Was it Kessler [07:22]?

JD: It --

BB: Ulrich Kessler?

JD: It was an air force general.

BB: And Luftwaffe. Yeah, that’s Ulrich Kessler.

JD: And it was -- and it was two colonels -- Japanese colonels who committed hari-kari because -- and then there was our friend Heinz Schlicke [07:43] on there. Now, that U-boat was on its way and got as far -- as I remember it -- as far as Uruguay and was then supposed to go -- you have to remember at that point, in May of 1945 [08:00], Japan was very much still in the war. The atomic weapons -- we had -- we weren’t using it and may not have had it, and the Germans had been very far advanced on atomic energy. Hahn -- Professor -- was it Hahn or whatever -- was the head of it, and that’s where my uncle came in -- Otto Stern [08:30] was -- he had been down -- but these guys -- the Jewish people left and fled, you know, okay. So, when this boat surrendered, 234 [08:42], the two Japanese committed hari-kari because Fehler [08:45] said, “I will only surrender to
the Americans.” All I know that -- at that point, these guys came -- some of these guys came to [09:00] P.O. Box 1142 [09:06], and it took quite some time, to be very frank, for Heinz Schlicke [09:15] to come around to working with us and the willingness to work with us, and it was only later that I was sent with prisoners who were being sent back to Europe, and I was put on a ship, and I went back, and I delivered these guys, and everything was so well planned, I was in luck. In Normandy [09:47], it was pretty normal, and at that point I was asked to go to Kiel, British zone, and there I was told that [10:00] -- that since I’d known Schlicke [10:04] that I should go and get his wife and two kids. Everything was worked out. I will tell you, it’s the biggest bullshit if you’re thinks it’s something like you see in Hollywood. I was being passed from one guy to another guy who were agents of the U.S. and everything else, and then I had to go into and get the wife and the two kids, and I spent very little time getting over the border, and that’s where the kids would say, “Hey, Mommy, Mommy, pee, pee,” and I said, “Let’s go, let’s go.” I -- you know, in civilian clothes, if you get caught, that’s the one thing you do, which is dangerous. I got on the other side and since they had taken off in January and this was much, much later, the husband and wife hadn’t seen each other [11:00]. I fixed up in the place where I was told to go, and it was in a barn, and I made a lot of hay for them, and I took the two kids, and husband and wife had seen each other for the first time in a hell of a long time, and she didn’t even know that he was alive, you see, and at that point, somebody else took over the next day, and I was out of it. All I know -- that he got back, and it was in South Hampton, I believe, somewhere on Long Island that they first put him, and he worked with us, and he gave us the secrets of infrared we didn’t have, and he then stayed with his wife and children in the United States, and he died last year --
BB: Right.

JD: -- and Schlicke [11:52] was a good Nazi [11:54]. He had worked in Peenemunde [11:56], but I want to tell you something [12:00]. I learned something from this thing. Well, obviously you work with those who disagree with you in order to find a way of learning from them, or go out fighting -- converting them to your point of view. You don’t just let them stew. Use diplomacy. Don’t hit them over the head and say, “You must work with me. You must work with me.” Do you see what I’m saying? Now, this gets you -- this is the main reason I’m here. I’m trying to say something. Intelligence is used -- it has to be used intelligently, and you have to try to have realistic aims for your country, and you cannot separate moral attraction, your soft power, from your hard, military power or economic power. Might doesn’t make right by itself. It’s only if you have morality on your side, and I want to tell you something that’s going to make you want to throw away the entire interview. Democracy means different things to different people. My wife has a house in Switzerland, as everybody knows. I spent a long time there, and the people in Switzerland have a completely different idea of democracy. The city of Lausanne [13:56] was asked to vote [14:00] because the government -- the central government wanted the Olympics near Lausanne. The city Lausanne said, “We are against having the Olympics in Lausanne [14:15] because we don’t want to add to the debt, which has to be incurred to prepare the city for this.” That is one form of democracy. Another way in Switzerland -- you go and meet, and they vote whether they are yes or no. We have a democracy which uses a very important system, our Congress and our representatives or senators. They speak for us, and they represent different positions, the rifle lobby, the Israeli lobby, the Saudi lobby, the butter lobby, the
dairy lobby [15:00]. They represent the weapons industry. Yes, we are democratic. We do vote a great deal, but the concept of democracy and how it operates may be different, and it may start differently. We have a tradition of democracy, which the Russians never had, so when you move into a democracy, it takes time. You have to get used to this idea, and I’m saying -- it’s because we have different backgrounds, and the word means different things. I think I learned this, but intelligence is what you need.

SS: I have a question.

JD: Yes, sir.

SS: If you’re between 18 and your early 20s and you’re dealing with people who are good Nazis [15:57], as you say, there has to be -- could you talk [16:00] about your personal feelings? I mean, you obviously have to suppress your personal feelings, and you’re dealing with people --

JD: No, I got orders to work with a guy because there must have been a reason, and what I was asked to do, to engage in sports with him. Let me tell you; ever heard of ping-pong diplomacy?

[laughter]

Isn’t that another way of trying to win over the Chinese? And I’m going to tell you something. In my job as ambassador in the Far East, and I had two important jobs, and that was chief of mission also in Laos -- you bet I worked with the Chinese Communists, and I worked in Laos with the Vietnamese. That’s the only way that you can convince them that what you’re trying to do makes some sense to everybody. The only way to get somebody to work with you is to say, “This is also of interest [17:00] to you.” Nobody’s going to say, “Just because you love me, you’re going to be on my side.” Let me tell you
something. I’ve been married 54 years, and the reason I’ve had a wonderful marriage is I understood marriage requires concessions by both sides, and that is what diplomacy’s all about. I cannot hit you over the head because sooner or later the guy is going to say, “I’m going to get even with you. I’m going to find another partner who’s going to go get even with you -- with you.” That is why I am -- I am a great believer in diplomacy of defending our country because you can only play this role if other countries accept it.

I’m going to tell you something, which a great statesman once told me. Please listen. Leadership is given [18:00] to you. It’s not taken. This is a founder of Action [spelled phonetically], which is the great operation, and he was the one who taught me that. Leadership is given to you, and we should always -- you have to act in a way that others accept you. That doesn’t mean they like you. It means they accept you because you stand for something, and they can live with that, but when you trample on somebody else’s identity, they may not like it, even if you think you are the only one who holds that truth, and democracy means different things to different people. It is the right way to go, meaning have the people govern [19:00], but I’m going to be honest enough to say, when you had the draft, when people were killed, you bet members of Congress paid attention because the father of somebody who had a little bit of clout would say, “Hey, my son got killed. I don’t think this was a good idea.” When you have an Army [19:29] which is largely volunteers and they are professionals or you have civilians in large numbers out of control who are going for the money, they may not be standing for the kind of values which you want to represent. I’m saying this. I would like to tell you I’ve worked for more Republicans than for Democrats, and I don’t care. I think [20:00] I’m interested in defending the long-term interest of our country, and in the military, I found it was very
easy to dissent, but you still carried out what you’re asked to do, but you had the right to speak up.

VS: And with that note, just going back to 1142 [20:22]. This is very interesting. You -- I think you answered it, but I wanted to ask you again. You opened the sentence by saying “our duty at the time” referencing 1142. How would you complete that?

JD: At the time was to defend our country against an attack in Japan -- by Japan and against a wicked regime in Russia. Now, let me tell you something. Would any of you venture to tell me [21:00] how many Russians were killed during the Second World War?

BB: A lot.

BB: I would say about 30 --

VS: Fifteen million to 30.

JD: Any other guess? Twenty-six million. How many Americans were killed during the Second World War?

BB: Four hundred thousand.

JD: Four hundred thousand. Even if Stalin [21:26] is responsible for four million people, which -- who he killed himself -- some of his own people -- do you see what I’m saying? It’s still 22 million people. Something happened in history, and that is, whoever writes history, that is the accepted version. Most people don’t realize during the Second World War when I was at 1142 [21:54], the hosts of all the international meetings, whether it was Tehran [22:00], Potsdam [22:01], wherever it was -- who was the host? Stalin [22:05], always -- because, to be very frank with you, the German army was defeated by the Russian army, and it was brilliant strategy, including the use of heavy artillery in line with advancing infantry, which some of these Russian generals invented, and it was in
Stalingrad [22:37] that the whole German army surrendered. What was Stalin all about? He says, “Give us a second front. Please, I need a second front. I can’t have the brunt alone.” The mutual suspicion among the western world and the [23:00] Russian world predated even the Second World War, and it continued during the Second World War, but for strategic reasons, we were allies and worked together, except the only country that won the Second World War was the United States because our country had not been directly attacked. Our entire nation was mobilized. Our industry and technology was booming, and we contributed by our air power and equipment to the Russians winning the war. The only guy who really got a free deal was De Gaulle [23:58] because his country lost the war [24:00]. He ended up, in the famous saying, [speaks German] as they said around the surrender table because the free French had brought enough sacrifices to be part of the deal. What I was interested in doing -- and I don’t know how much longer you want to go on -- with Hilger [24:29], I would like to give you -- and I need it back. When I came to Vietnam [24:41], and this is how 1142 [24:43] comes -- gets involved. I got to 1142 as a kid of 18 and a half and stayed there till I was 20 and a half, and then the captain of the U-boat 234 [25:01], Fehler [25:02], I met him again in Da Nang [25:07], where the Germans had given a hospital ship as their contribution to the U.S. effort in Vietnam [25:21]. It was a big ship. It was -- I think it was Hope or something like that. The commander of that ship was Captain Fehler [25:33] of U-boat 234 [25:35], and the guy who was working with him was -- here’s his picture. It still has one of -- speak -- December 1971, speaking with the second secretary of the German embassy, Noiburt [25:52] [spelled phonetically], on board of the SS Hilgerland [spelled phonetically]. That was the name of his ship, the SS Hilgerland, and he was the captain
of it [26:00], Captain Fehler [26:02], and this guy -- I worked with him because he was helping us get all these poor women and children and civilians who were wounded and getting on board ship, and that was the German contribution. This -- do you -- do you want me to continue?

BB: You can wrap up, and then we’ve got to switch tapes in a few seconds.

JD: And Noiburt [26:26] became a German ambassador -- bigtime, and I just saw him, and I talked to him about Hilger [26:38]. He was a bigtime ambassador in Paris, among other places, many other ambassadorships, and I work with German ambassadors, and they’re willing to work with you guys and see what Hilger did with it, and is in the German embassy files.

BB: That would be fantastic.

JD: And [27:00] here is the address, but that I need --

BB: Absolutely.

JD: I need it more than back --

BB: Can we give it to you Friday?

(End of Tape 2B)

(Beginning of Tape 3A)

JD: What happened was that they were passing messages to me about the North Vietnamese [00:13] willing in 1967, in January 1967, to find a way of talking with the United States. On January 23-25 of 1967, Robert Kennedy [00:34], the brother of the President, and Attorney General, came to Paris. Ambassador [Charles] Bohlen [00:50], one of the greatest American ambassadors, was ambassador in Paris. He'd also been ambassador in Moscow among other things. Said, "Dean, you are [01:00] control officer." And I went
out and greeted Attorney General Robert Kennedy [01:12] in Paris. Lo and behold, there were about -- hundreds of Americans out there waiting for him at the press, grinding away because he was hoping to run for president in ‘68. And he was at odds with Johnson [01:34]. I was controller there which meant I took him around and acted as interpreter and note-taker. Now this is very important, what I'm saying. Among other people we saw was Andre Malraux [01:51], who was one of the great intellectuals of the 20th century, and he had just come back from China. And he said [02:00], when we went to see him -- and he was minister for culture in the government of France -- and he told, "You know, you should reestablish relations with Beijing. This guy, Mao Tse-tung [02:19], you may not like him, but that's a country on the go." And then on the 27th or 28th of January, we got a call to come over to the foreign office, the French Quai d'Orsay [02:35]. And there we were told there were four people in the room. Mr. Vanden Heuvel [spelled phonetically], a personal friend of Robert Kennedy [02:48], who is still alive, by the way, John Gunther Dean [03:00], and the head of the Asia division Etienne Manoch [03:07] [spelled phonetically]. And he said the following, "I have a message from Ho Chi Minh [03:14] and Hanoi. That if you stop the bombing of North Vietnam [03:20], you can have direct contact and conversation with the North Vietnamese of finding a way to end the war. Well, I may not be the most brilliant guy in our foreign service, but I realized I had something of historic importance. Arthur Schlesinger has written this up in his book about -- and I took notes but this is not in the book. I took notes, and went back in the afternoon and said, "Is this what you said?" "Yes [04:00]." I sent a message, top secret, eyes-only, for the Secretary of State. And a day later, my wife and I went on leave, because it's an exhausting job when you're controller officer or something like that.
I had been seeing all the important people with him in the world, there in Paris. We were in Upper Egypt when I got a phone call from Washington, in Upper Egypt at the hotel. "John, you're on the front page of the newspapers, and the president of the United States says, 'Who is that son of a bitch, John Gunther Dean? Fire him.'" My cable had found its way into the newspapers. It was a struggle among people supporting Kennedy and Johnson. Johnson, as you remember, had fabricated the Tonkin Incident to keep this thing going, and was unwilling to find negotiations. All I know is Robert Kennedy reported this thing, and the message found its way in the newspapers, and my ambassador, Ambassador Chip Bohlen happened to be in town. And he found the guy who leaked it. It was a man who was closely linked to maintain liaison with Congress. And as a result, I was not fired from the State Department, but the peace signal became a very, very important document. And from that day on, January 1967, I did what is generally known as "cover your ass." [laughter]

Meaning, protect yourself, because the lowest ranking man gets blamed when something goes wrong. And from 1967, I kept all of my papers, including incoming papers, including when I was making peace in the peace conference where John Negroponte and I were working together on the peace conference. We had different views. I believed negotiation was the right way, not unilateral withdrawal. That happened in Paris. Then I was in -- I liked John. I want to make it very clear. I'm a friend of his, and he's an able person. I want to be very frank with you. He is a very able, highly intelligent man. It's okay to have different views. I may not be right. I may be wrong. But it's our job to say what you know. This thing -- and I gave all of these papers,
whether it was -- I understood -- I continued working with all the intelligence agencies, because I had learnt that you got to have evidence to prove your position. I'd learnt when we listened to information. We had evidence. We had the guy's voice. Does anybody know [08:00] -- and I'm sure you don't know -- that Arafat [08:03] had given by voice to the meeting in Beirut in 2002. The agreement of the Palestinians to the King Abdullah's plan -- he was Crown Prince Abdullah [08:26] then -- agreement of mutual recognition of Israel by all the Arab countries in return for establishing the state of Palestine and access to East Jerusalem and everything else. And that was a voice thing which is on a voicemail. I learnt this at 1142 [08:51] that you can listen to the voice and that's evidence. Do you see what I'm saying? Do you see how important is this for today [09:00], and Mrs. Rice is going to have a conference in November on the Middle East?

VS: Well, this is very good. We do want to save time about for the British girlfriend though. We want the details. Wait, go ahead, Brandon: you had a couple of other questions.

BB: Yeah, and I apologize. I want to try to stay -- and I'm glad we've come full circle and back to 1142 [09:23]. We have lots of really, really specific questions.

JD: Okay, ask them, then go on. There.

BB: Okay. Because I want to make sure you get to your dinner appointment, and none of us upset our wives or anything. So we were talking a little bit, to follow up with Schlicke [09:39]. Just a point of clarification: did Schlicke come with you to Germany?

JD: No.

BB: Okay, so you came via -- you actually --

JD: Actually it was prisoners. I delivered the prisoners to the American authorities, and then I was taken in hand by, I assume, intelligence people, and I was asked to go to Kiel and I
was moved on [10:00]. Listen. I'm going to make it very clear. I was a little actor. The only thing I did -- I knew how to speak German, and I could look and act like German in civilian uniform, and I went into a country which had caught me in this thing, that would've been pretty bad. And all you do is you do your duty. And what do you think these guys doing who are fighting now in the Iraq and somewhere else? You do your duty.

BB: With some other prisoners -- from your recollections -- you mentioned once earlier Wernher von Braun [10:39]. Do you remember if he was ever at 1142 [10:43]?

JD: I can give you no answers because I know nothing about that.

BB: Okay, okay. We spoke at a great length about Hilger [10:51] already, and this could be very valuable to get in touch with folks who know more about him. Some other prisoners though, we mentioned a little bit about Reinhard Gehlen [11:01]. You had no interaction with Gehlen?

JD: No.

BB: Okay, all right. You mentioned -- we've spoken about Fehler [11:08] which that's a fantastic story about Fehler -- the gentleman who knew about the French, Duvall [11:16]. Can you share any information about him, because that's --

JD: All I know, he spoke French.

BB: Okay. And he was a prisoner though?

JD: No, no, no, he's an American.

BB: Oh, an American.

JD: American, Duvall.

BB: Got you. Okay.
JD: He may have even had a different name. I don't--

BB: Okay. So he was an American staff at 1142 [11:34]?

JD: He was 1142.

BB: Search Duvall on the list.

JD: Duvall [11:37]. You have him on the list, just--

BB: We'll check, John--

JD: It's amazing. I remember all these names 63 years ago. I don't remember what happened yesterday.

BB: Okay. Some other to quote--covering some of the German prisoners. I think you mentioned to Eric earlier, and you mentioned here as well, a gentleman named Hahn [Otto] [12:00] who did work with nuclear?

JD: Yeah, well he was a big guy in Germany.

BB: Okay. He was not at--

JD: No, oh no.

BB: Okay, okay. All right.

JD: He was the guy who--the prime mover behind--I think it's something like that. But the atomic--the nuclear program of Germany.

BB: Okay. Do you--again, realizing completely that your views were that of an 18 and a half year old, do you have a feeling or any sense that anything at all that went on at 1142 [12:33] somehow assisted the American nuclear program, the atomic program?

JD: It definitely did. Definitely we had people who knew something about it. Now, I am not at that level, but they probably told them who the names were, and what level they were at and something like that. You see, that is what [13:00] they could find out. But they
didn't have the bomb yet. But they were close, because they sent that stuff over to the Japanese. And you must remember, in many of the sciences, if you look at the Nobel Prize winners, the Germans had a lot of the Nobel prizes before 1933 in the sciences, and energy, nuclear was one. Physics was a lot of it. I'm including the guy who happened to be Jewish. So if he hadn't been Jewish, he probably would've -- by the way, in case you want to know, I want to say this: did you know -- what the hell. Just a second. The German had a funny system deciding who was Jewish and who wasn't Jewish [14:00]. Did you know that Martin Meech [14:02] [spelled phonetically] who was the deputy to Goering [14:04], was half-Jewish? And Goering said, 'I decide who's Jewish and who isn't Jewish." You know who the Red Baron [14:16] was during the First World War?

BB:  Sure.

JD:  What's his name?

BB:  Von Richthofen.

JD:  You know what his mother's name was? Mendelson [spelled phonetically]. And he was half-Jewish. Again, they never had any qualms about making Richthofen the great hero. I'm sort of trying to be even-handed. I'm not trying to absolve Hitler [14:43] and the horrible things that happened. On the contrary. I think when in 1948, they gave a state, it was a decision of the world community. Had nothing to do [15:00] with any other crap. It was a decision of the world body, except it gave a piece of real estate that belonged to somebody else. Okay.

BB:  To finish in our prisoners, another one -- and this name's come up before -- is Hertz [15:19], who I believe was the son of the --

JD:  I gave you -- Hertz turned out to be a lemon. That's all I heard.
BB: Okay. Did you work with him directly?

JD: No.

BB: No, okay.

JD: I heard from the other guys, who -- now, Papa Hertz.

BB: Right.

JD: Got a whole -- was taken by the Russians. They built a whole laboratory in the Crimea, and we got the son who had a PhD, and we found him of no real interest.

BB: Are there any other specific prisoners that stick out in your mind, you know, that you dealt with or you remember hearing about?

JD: I cannot remember.

BB: Okay.

VS: Does he know the name "paperclip [16:00]?

BB: Yeah, Operation Paperclip, does that mean anything --

JD: Doesn't mean anything to me.


JD: No, sir.

BB: No? Okay.

JD: I do not.

BB: Getting a little bit -- well actually, while we're on that subject of other locations, how about a place called Pine Grove Furnace up in Pennsylvania?

JD: No, sir.

BB: This would've been a location where it was kind of used as a holding facility for prisoners
prior to them coming to 1142.

JD: No, sir.

BB: Okay, next one. See, now we'll do them quick here. This is great.

JD: Sure.

BB: Are you familiar with another camp similar to 1142 [16:47] on the West Coast?

JD: Not at all.

BB: Okay.

JD: And first I've ever heard of it.

BB: It was called Camp Tracy [16:54]. It was in Byron Hot Springs, California. It also had a P.O. Box number. It was P.O. [17:00] Box 751.

JD: Terrific.

BB: And it was originally -- So this does not ring any bells?

JD: None whatsoever.

BB: We'll tell you, in fact -- you'll probably learn a little bit about that over the weekend at the symposium, but I just wanted to see if you knew anything. And that was primarily -- and you had just a little bit earlier -- you said you didn't remember anyone dealing with Japanese at 1142 [17:23].

JD: None. No.

BB: That was the original purpose of Tracy.

JD: I see. That makes a lot of sense.

BB: Okay. Getting -- we talked a little bit about Germans. How about Americans? We went through a little bit earlier. I know you were going over a little bit with Vince during one of the breaks on the photo. Did any of your American colleagues -- CIA [17:44] -- you
mentioned Dallinn [17:45] already and Schidlovsky [17:47] and some other in the program. Anybody else we haven't talked about?

JD: Weiss [17:50].

BB: Carlo Weiss?

JD: Carlo Weiss, first rate. Speaks Italian, is Jewish, married a lovely gal, an American gal [18:00]. Comes from a wealthy family from Trieste, and he spoke Italian, German, French. And was a educated person, got a very good degree after the war still. Good man. Pins [18:17] I mentioned during --

BB: And real quick -- I'm sorry to interrupt, but with Weiss -- We have not located Carlo Weiss [18:22] yet. Do you know if he's still living, or?

JD: I have no idea. I kept track of him until he got married. We come from I would say background which was close. Very like -- he's on the picture here.

BB: Yes, that's him on the front. That's Carlo.

JD: That's Carlo. And he married a nice girl, and I met them afterwards, and he kept in contact.

BB: Do you know if he moved back to Italy?

JD: It could be because they were big stuff. Now he did go back and forth at one point. Nobody had an American wife, and my guess is, if he is [19:00] alive, his children are alive. And it's an interesting family. They come from Trieste, because Trieste played a major role in U.S. relations, as you know, whether it's Austrian or whether it's with this country or that country. It's oddly near Croatia and that area. And Carlo [19:24] was a good man. They lived in -- was it Hastings, I imagine? I imagine his family had a big home there.
BB: Okay. You started talking -- sorry, I cut you off. You were talking about Rudy Pins [19:40]? 

JD: Rudy Pins was a nice guy. Still is, probably, a nice guy. And he liked to picture himself and Pins for the [speaks German]. It was the people of this group [20:00] -- still had a great deal of respect for the German aristocracy. So we kidded him and Lachman will confirm this, that Pins [20:11] [speaks German]. He liked that. He was a good guy. He was a very likeable person.

BB [affirmative]. Any other Americans? We could probably go on for quite a while.

JD: I told you.

VS: Spivey monitoring?

JD: Your name?

MS: Wayne Spivey [20:28]?

JD: No, that name doesn't --

BB: He was actually a -- He was in the evaluation section.

JD: Oh yeah. That was a different world altogether.

MS: Okay.


BB: Was that in Labarre?

JD: Labarre. Comes from Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

BB: [affirmative]

JD: And his family might still be there. Give me the name.

[talking simultaneously]
JD: He's [21:00] dead, isn't he?

BB: Labarre? I believe so.

JD: Yeah, because he was considerably older. He was a playboy, and smart as hell. And afterwards -- I'm going to be very frank -- since he was a bachelor and I was a bachelor after the war, I was invited to come to the Waldorf-Astoria [21:20] at one point, and he had suites there. He would have beautiful gals and everything else. Louis was a good guy who would spend time in Europe and spoke fluent German.

BB: If you feel like just perusing, we can go -- here's a list of some of the -- we have -- these are for you to keep. We have several other pages, but some of the folks on here, we -- I don't know how late, and if now's not a good time to do this, we --

JD: Zuckermann [21:46], I just mentioned

BB: Right.

JD: Zuckerman was the smart guy, but considerably older than we were, and he was very, very good on location of units. He was very good at it [22:00].

BB: And these are all enlisted men that you're looking at, right? We have a whole other list for officers. I'll get to the officers.

JD: Pins, I told you.

BB: Sure.

JD: Yeah, the name “Pierre,” there’s an I missing; Bader [22:40].

BB: Pierre Bader. Is it pronounced Bah-der or Bay-der? Yes.

JD: Pierre. Is that P-E-R. It's P-I.

BB: Right, yeah. I think that's a typo.

JD: I remember him.
BB: Okay.


BB: Do you remember anything about him?

JD: In spite of his name he was Jewish, from I think via Holland. A well-to-do family.

That's all I remember.

BB: Sure.

JD: That's all I remember. Winkler [23:19]! You were right. Winkler. Winkler had been in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade [23:31]. Now this, you have to remember something. You have to remember all of our history, the good sides, and the bad sides. Because the McCarthy era was rough on a guy like Winkler. Winkler [23:46] was a prince of a guy who had volunteered and had fought in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade [23:55] in the Spanish Civil War. When I was a kid with my [24:00] English governess and having all these people around the house, I was -- I had a map of the Spanish Civil War, and I was clearly not on the side of Franco, against Franco. We thought that loyalists were great. Winkler [24:20] had fought in it, and I'm going to tell you something, I went with him to a number of events during the second World War while I was at 1142 [24:33]. And later on, this was held against me, that I'd been to some of these gatherings, because these were gatherings who had taken the sides with courage. And Franco was considered, during those years, as the adversary. And Winkler [24:56] was a first-rate German guy, no Jewish connection [25:00] whatsoever, a great guy who put his body where his mouth was. And it got him into trouble in the era following 1142 [25:13]. And I'm glad for my own sake and my own conscience that I was able to say this. And [inaudible].
BB: That's great.

VS: Arnold Kohn.

[talking simultaneously]

[audio break]

JD: I talked about Winter. Richard Winter [25:37] was from Vienna. He's tall, about six feet three. Thin as a rail. And he was a good guy. Is he still alive? He may be --

BB: We haven't found him, probably because his name is -- an American, he would just be Winter, right?

JD: Winter.

BB: Which unfortunately is a fairly common name.

JD: Richard Winter [26:00] is very tall, and upper-class, loved the girls. That's all I can -- okay. He was six foot three, but he was thin, like this, and definitely [inaudible]. And Kiefer, I told you I was under "definitely."

BB: What do you remember about Kiefer [Alexander] [26:19]?

JD: Kiefer is an American, and he was involved with his father with something like foreign relations or something like that. Definitely. A good guy, very good guy. Very good. Lebarre, I did. Hoppe [Robert], yes, I remember the name. Definitely Hoppe. I remember the name. Kusumoto [James], I don't remember. Martin Finger. Borg [spelled phonetically]. Michael Mash [spelled phonetically], Walther Gross, Wilson Gartner. Just a second. Reibert [spelled phonetically], Weiss. Peter Weiss [27:00], the name sounds familiar. Raymond [Kenneth], Mandel [George] [27:05], yes, he's mentioned in the article.

BB: Correct.
JD: You mention him in the article, but I'm going to tell you something. I'd like to go off the record for one minute.

BB: Okay.

JD: I learnt at 1142 the importance of intelligence and as I got more and more responsibilities in life, I continued to have a very good relationship with all the intelligence agencies. Do any of you venture to give me a guess how many intelligence agencies are at a large American embassy?

VS: Seven?

JD: He's pretty good.

[laughter]

I'll tell you. One, Army, Navy, Air Force intelligence. DIA. CIA. FBI. Drug Enforcement Agency. I'm just giving you some of the more central ones. The real problem is that sometimes the orders they get from their home office may be completely contrary to the orders they get from somebody else. And this is where the 1142 experience is useful, because it brought a new dimension in: sound. I've used documents as my way of proving things. You have used sound and in today's world, sound is more and more used. The intelligence -- how many people listen to my conversation when I'm in Paris? I guarantee you, they are more than just the Americans who are interested. I'm not an important guy at all, but they want to know what I'm doing or what I'm thinking. And there may be people who hate my guts who also want to hear about it. I will say something which is very nice. The American government asked the French government when I left for France to give me protection. And you will be surprised at first when I moved in, the police came around quite
regularly, and I'd go and see a senior police officer to say I'm okay.

BB: With that, I want to shift back a little bit to 1142 [30:23], and talk a bit -- We talked about some of the enlisted men. Do you remember any of the officers? We talked about the post commander, Walker [John] [30:32].

JD: Lachman, Lachman.

BB: Alexis Lachman, the older brother.

JD: The older brother. And the other one I remember is the commanding general. The commanding colonel.

BB: Right, Walker.

JD: Walker [30:39].

BB: Do you remember -- Does the name -- this was also an officer -- Paul Kubala [30:45]?

JD: No.

BB: No?

JD: There was another guy, who if you mention the name, it'll come back. There was one guy who was very good. He was an officer, a captain, and he was friendly with us. And he was good.

BB: There is a gentleman at the end of the war. He was only there [31:00] once the war ended, so for the very last few months, who was the -- he was the Post Adjutant for a while. His name was Arnold Kohn [31:08].

JD: No.

BB: K-O-H-N?

JD: No.

BB: Okay.
SS: [unintelligible]

BB: Sure. Sam was just suggesting just a few questions about what was it like working with the group of people. Were the people you were working with, be they Jews, non-Jews, German-born, American-born, how did you get together?

JD: We all got together on one thing: working for the U.S. Army and for our country, period. That was the common link. What do you think I had in common with Duvall [31:46], or we had -- sometimes, somebody had common past. We also -- there was a question of fairly cultured people. They were not stupidos. I could relate to these people [32:00] a lot easier than the guy who was illiterate from the Appalachian Mountains. I got along real fine. We did things together. But we had our own social life. I had a girlfriend at --

(End of Tape 3A)

(Beginning of Tape 3B)

JD: I think what the -- we were all on the same wavelength, and we knew why we were doing it, and we felt good about doing it. Everybody was an American, whether you were an American of one year’s standing or a Mayflower descendant.

BB: Did you talk shop very much? Did you talk about what you were doing?

JD: No, no, no. It was all--you know, I read an interesting thing today about --

BB: You had a British girlfriend. Do you -- did you notice any British influence over 1142 [00:41]? Was there a British liaison?

JD: I did not see that. The girl was part of the military mission of -- in Washington of the British, and she was a good-looking lieutenant, I think, in the British Navy [01:00], and she was good looking, and since I had some friends who were well to do, so we would go to cocktail parties and stuff like that.
BB: Did you have a Catesby ap Jones [01:12]?
JD: That?
BB: Yeah, and did -- there was another --
JD: No, I -- any --
BB: -- a number at --
JD: I think Penny Peacock [01:19] was her name, and she married a Mr. Edwards. I am the godfather of the child. She went to live in South Africa. She married an officer [inaudible].
BB: But as for -- as for any British --
JD: No, I didn’t --
[talking simultaneously]
BB: Disregarding your girlfriend, none at 1142 [01:36]?
JD: None, no, none.
BB: Okay. Another little side of 1142 that not a lot of folks, including people who were there, knew about was another program separate from the interrogation program, which was an escape and evasion program, where Americans were helping American prisoners escape, sending them coded messages --
JD: I -- this was not in [02:00] my domain.
BB: Okay, so you’re not familiar with that.
JD: That’s right.
BB: Did -- I’m going to run by a name of a building. Some of the buildings at Fort Hunt [02:09] had nicknames.
JD: Okay.
BB: One of them was called the “Creamery [02:12].”

JD: No, I never heard of it.

BB: Okay, and --

JD: I think the picture I sent you was the barracks --

BB: Yes.

JD: -- where we were living.

BB: Yes, you’re absolutely right.

JD: There were two of them like that, and I took my wife one day to show her, but there’s nothing left.

BB: That’s right. Do you remember -- when you were there, do you remember the old gun batteries, the concrete gun batteries that had been there for years?

JD: Well, I remember the old concrete buildings went up --

BB: Yes.

JD: -- which are now off limits, you know, big sign.

BB: Yeah.

JD: And they did have stuff there, as well as -- I can’t remember anything precise.

BB: Sure.

JD: All I know, I was trying to take my wife to show her that’s where I was working, but it is off limits.

BB: And so [03:00] -- and you’ll get to see them again over the weekend. We’re not going to be able to go inside, but you -- they’ve been cleaned up a little bit. At other remembrances of the fort, did you -- what was your daily routine? Did you get up every morning and go to the parade ground and salute the flag, or was it formal --
JD: No, no, no, no, every so often we would have a formation. Vogt [03:25] would count us, and since I came back from my girlfriend once, he said, “Hey, you didn’t come back on time,” or whatever it was. “Therefore, you’re not going to be promoted to staff sergeant.” I remember that, and I’ll tell you an interesting little story. You know, we’re very close to the Potomac, and I tell you, $21 a month doesn’t go very far, especially if you have a girlfriend, so I made a bet with the guy: “I can swim across the Potomac.”

[laughter]

And, “How much?” “Twenty dollars.” Now, you have to realize, $20 is a month’s pay, so I swam across. Number one, I didn’t realize that the sewers of Washington go out there --

[laughter]

-- and as I was swimming, I was going [gags]. Head above the water because all the shit was floating right in the middle.

[laughter]

Secondly, I didn’t understand the second part, that there’s a current --

[laughter]

-- and hence when you swim and you want to get over here, you have to swim this way --

BB: At an angle.

JD: -- in order to end up over here. Well, when I got on the other side, I was filthy with all that shit, but I did get my $20, and I was very pleased that I could use it, and this is a memory which I do not forget because I warn people, “Don’t swim across.” It may be cleaned up better today [05:00], but in those days, at 1142 [05:03] -- and there was a very
nice -- as you entered on the right, there was the -- for the horses, and that’s where I was riding Peanuts, and the commanding general asked me to exercise the animal and if I had somebody else -- I knew how to ride, so okay.

BB: So, did you have to swim back across the river?

JD: Oh, I sure did. I bet my $20. You bet for $20 I was willing to do most things, but I didn’t know. I was stupid.

[laughter]

I might have done it anyway. I’m not sure.

BB: So, do you remember the parkway -- the roadway --

JD: Yeah.

BB: -- that we all work for is the George Washington Memorial Parkway. The old Mount Vernon Highway, right along the river -- do you remember if you went up and down that road on your way?

JD: Yes, that was it. As a matter of fact, we hitchhiked mostly.

BB: Oh.

JD: Can you put it off for a second? I will [06:00] tell you something very unpleasant.

[audio break]

No, tell me about -- is there something I should know about --

BB: He -- it’s a gentleman. He was a soldier. His last name is Bedini [06:15]. He worked at 1142 [06:18] in that -- in that escape and evasion program.

JD: Oh, I see.

MS: A lot of other veterans recognize his name.

JD: I know.
BB: Because he was there for quite awhile --

JD: Yeah.

BB: -- but he was in a different program.

JD: I was there for not quite two years from October ‘44 to August ‘46.

BB: Do you remember if your program had a name, what it was called?

JD: I have no idea.

BB: Okay.

JD: No, you see, the thing which is great about -- first of all, it introduced voice as a way of getting intelligence. Listening was the first thing. We learned it from others [07:00], by the way, as with Oberursel [07:03], and you have, I’m sure, the entire exchange with Oberursel and -- they were the ones that did the listening on the German side. Secondly, it showed a sign of the army becoming aware of the importance of intelligence, and it was different from the guys in OSS [07:32] and Collingwood [07:33], which was quite different. We knew they were there, but we had -- not allowed to have any contact, but we would be picked up quite often when we would hitchhike by fancy people who had a place there, you see, and the maid or driver would stop to give us a lift up to Collingwood [08:00].

BB: Do you remember anything or have you learned since what the OSS [08:05] activities were at Collingwood --

JD: No, sir.

VS: And how did you know they were OSS? Was it rumor?

JD: No, they told them, among us, I mean, we knew. I mean to say we knew that this was OSS, and you stay off, that there’s no contact.
BB: Did they -- did they know that -- because they’re OSS [08:21], they knew a lot?

JD: I wasn’t enlisted, but there may have been real contact between the colonel and general OSS people. That’s obvious, but we were doing the limit of work we knew how to do because we had an education or had lived abroad and had a knowledge of a language which was perfect, and they were used to do something because I could be passed off as a German -- getting Mrs. Schlicke [08:50] and her kids. The interesting thing for you – and that is something where 1142 [09:00] could play a major role, and that’s why I gave you this thing, but you have to give me back, these things I gave you. Is -- you have to understand that today, Schroeder [09:12], who was secretary of state -- prime minister in the German government, had a very privileged relationship with Mr. Putin [09:23] today, and Entire [spelled phonetically], Gazprom, and all the things you read in the newspaper, and he represents a very important segment of German opinion. Don’t believe that he is an outsider. Do you see what I’m saying? Mrs. Merkel lived under Russian [unintelligible], and she is a good gal, damn good gal, but she also -- the Germans have a long tradition of working with the Russians. We do not, and when Hilger [09:58] came, he gave [10:00] us a message. What I’m saying to you is -- and that is based on my working with him, but also working with German ambassadors all along. Wasn’t Hilger [10:18] a little bit more shaded in saying, “Beware of Stalin [10:23] and his cruelty and what he’s trying to do, and, on the other hand, look what he has done to the Volga Germans who were moved to Siberia. Look what he has done, and his cruelty.” On the other hand, there are lots of good Russians, and they rallied in the defense of their own country around Stalin in spite of the fact they hated the guy because they didn’t want to be occupied [11:00] by the Germans. Do you see what I’m saying about occupation?
The French didn’t want to be occupied by the Germans. We didn’t want to be occupied by the British. What is it -- Thomas Paine, “Give me liberty or give me death?” Does that surprise you that some of the Palestinians are saying the same thing? “Give me liberty, or give me death.” I’m not saying I’m right, please. But I’m trying to understand, and what P.S. 1142 [11:49] had -- it had a lot of people who understood other cultures. Let me tell you, this is one of the great things of 1142. They understood the Germans [12:00]. They understood the French. They understood the Russians. Dallinn [12:07] wrote a book with Mrs. Rice, and Dallinn’s father was a famous professor at Columbia, but he started, you must remember, as an active communist in the 1917 revolution and only left in 1923, when the Mensheviks, the more moderates, were thrown out. I’m trying to say, let us try to understand others. Did you know that General Marshall [12:41] and I happened to be wrong with the museum, which is now being built? He didn’t want us to break all the relations with mainland China, but the mood of the time was, “Chiang Kai-shek [13:00] alone. Nobody else.” Yet he -- apparently, I was told -- said, “Yes, Chiang Kai-Shek, but keep somebody -- know what’s going on,” and did you know that after I left the service in 1989, I was given a top-secret clearance? I was in the board of directors of a company in Beijing from 1991 to 1998 or 1999. Yes, and I was impressed because I’d learned at 1142 [13:53] the best ways to get a little bit of intelligence and find out for yourself. You don’t have to listen [14:00] to what the newspapers tell you as the only source of your information.

BB: A couple of last follow-up questions. You’ve mentioned folks like a Hilger [14:15] and Schlicke [14:16] a fair amount. At 1142, do you remember where they stayed?

JD: Oh, they had houses, very --
BB: Okay.

JD: -- nice little cabins, and Hilger had one of them and Pins [14:26], I think, you told me --

BB: Had a photograph.

JD: Had the photograph of it --

BB: Yeah.

JD: -- and that’s a -- all these quote “guests” -- and some of them had very nice quarters. You were trying to win them over by making life as pleasant as possible, you see, under the circumstances. You weren’t -- you’re doing the opposite what may be done in Cuba. You were trying to win their people over by trying to say, “Hey, this is what we’d like you to do [15:00]. This is what we stand for, and don’t you think we have something in common?” Do you see? This is the approach. Now, this is what I’m -- why I’m here. I’m trying to tell you the approach of 1142 [15:11] with their cabins for these people and these little sergeants or corporals or privates like Dean took them out for a spin and had a normal life. Go to town and have a -- have a piece of cake and coffee. Make it normal. They’re not prisoners and being given corporal punishment. On the contrary, we’re trying to win over people. Maybe 1142 was a beginning of a diplomatic approach to obtaining intelligence. I don’t know. You’re in a much better position because you look at the overall picture.

BB: So, it sounds like obviously there was a great deal of privilege [16:00] and trust given to these -- the folks like, like Schlicke [16:04], and Hilger [16:04]. The -- do you know, were these cabins, these huts that they were given, were they monitored, or were they --

JD: I can’t tell you --

BB: Okay.
JD: -- because I don’t know. I went in these things, you know, I’d pick them up and let us go to town and stuff like that, and we’d be given a car and stuff like that.

BB: Do you remember, were there a lot of these little buildings or just a --

JD: Well, I remember at least two or three.

BB: Okay.

JD: That’s all I can tell you.

BB: Were they in view of everything else, or were they out in the woods, or --

JD: No, they were visible.

BB: Okay.

JD: You could see them.

BB: Okay.

JD: I don’t think they would have been -- there may have been other ones in the woods. You know, it wasn’t our job. You know, in the military, you’re fairly disciplined, and I’m going to tell you something. The whole generation today that has never been in any kind of a service lacks discipline, and you learn that, and 1142 [16:59] had a discipline. I [17:00] was punished when I was late because I had a girlfriend and I came back late, and I -- there was discipline. Yes, we tried to live within the discipline. It was a military operation.

BB: We have about five or 10 minutes left of this tape. I’ve gone through most of the questions that I wanted to go through. Anybody else have stuff that they want to --

VS: Question. You said you went to the post office in Alexandria [17:33].

JD: Yes, for mail.

MS: Okay.
JD: So that -- I would write letters and mail my letters, and, you know, you -- I didn’t mail any letters from P.O. 1142. I went to the post office and mailed my letters. I wrote my parents, you know, and I think I wrote people I could write to outside my parents, and it is a nice post office. It’s near the Mason Hotel there where I took people for coffee. Can I answer any questions? I mean, that’s what I’m here for.

BB: Oh, yeah.

SS: Was there a change in the operations after the war had concluded? I think you had said you had stayed until 1946. How did things happen afterward?

JD: I -- yes. When a country loses the war, and we were only in charge, and you explained that, to people on the German side or Russia or France or something like that or Italy. The countries had lost the war. When they lose the war, they’re a little bit more willing to find a way of working with you because they’re thinking about their own future. Mind you, Schlicke only worked with us after the war, and we had quite some time before I was asked to take the prisoners back and go get his wife out, and the answer is -- the answer is definitely the mood was much more, we had won, and the people -- there were people who didn’t want to cooperate with us. Mind you, this you have to understand. They had fought in the German army, and maybe -- and I -- and the sad thing I talked about with the Vlasov army was they had no place to go, and I’m going to say we had learned the lesson -- or it was a deal. Has anybody thought today, here we are on the second of October? About a million and a half Iraqi refugees in Syria -- I was in Jordan in May, I think, saw the top guys over there. They had more than half a million Iraqi refugees. What’s going to happen to them? Don’t we also care the kind of situation we leave behind afterwards? And this is something which I thought 1142
was pretty good at. We obeyed, as far as I could see, the international
conventions on prisoners. I’m saying that in spite of the fact it was an intelligence
operation, I would say 1142 obeyed the laws. Now, listening and using your brain to get
somebody’s knowledge -- that’s something else, but nobody ever [21:00] interrogated
with force, and asking questions was perfectly all right. As far as I knew -- at least, I was
not aware of it, and I still feel that 1142 [21:15] made a major contribution in many ways
of showing the importance of intelligence before we had an intelligence operation. It was
an army operation. Make that very clear. See, there was no CIA [21:35]. The OSS
[21:36] was -- it was a small-time operation. Now, the OSS operation played a major
role in Italy and the surrender of Italy. You played a major role in the -- using prisoners
and people, who at one point came [22:00] to us, in getting information, which was either
of immediate tactical importance -- that’s the question of who’s stationed where and what
kind of enemy are we going to encounter -- or using science, technology, and using both
direct contact or listening to get intelligence, and that was, for the time, very new
technology.

VS: Two quick questions, and then one --

SS: Hold on one second, hold on one second.

VS: Okay.

MS: Should I check with you, or do you think --

MS: Yeah.

BB: How much longer do you think we’ll --

MS: Five minutes, tops.

BB: Okay.
MS: Well, this has five minutes left, easily.

JD: But you call it. I’m willing to relax, and my wife may be back. I don’t know.

BB: Yep, we’re good.

MS: Are you ready?

BB: Go ahead.

VS: Camp Ritchie [23:00]. Did you ever hear of Camp Ritchie?

JD: Yes.

MS: You didn’t go to Camp Ritchie, did you?

JD: No, but Camp Ritchie was the intelligence --

BB: Leave it on.

JD: -- center --

BB: Okay.

JD: -- and there was cooperation --

BB: All right.

JD: -- with Camp Ritchie --

BB: Okay.

JD: -- and 1142 [23:14].

BB: Okay, we’re good.

JD: Definitely, but there was definite cooperation with Camp Ritchie and 1142.

VS: Okay, so just to restate, you were familiar with Camp Ritchie. You were --

JD: Yes, I did, and how -- and there was interchange with Camp Ritchie [23:35].

VS: You made the reference -- you --

BB: Did you ever go to Camp Ritchie?
JD: No.

VS: You referenced that you thought that listening in at that time was underhanded. That was the word you used.

JD: No, it was used in the average American way. You don’t go eavesdropping, you know. On the other hand, I believe for the Army [23:58] -- and this is [24:00] essential in the protection of your national interests and your army people. Well, obviously you want to know what the adversary’s up to, but to the average person, listening in is -- do you think using a woman to blackmail somebody is something we are proud in doing or is something that might be used because it might be necessary to get information?

VS: That wasn’t used at 1142, though.

JD: Never at 1142 [24:39] as far as I know. I mean -- but it’s used in many, many intelligence operations, and as ambassador, you are very much aware of what every intelligence operation [25:00] under your command is doing, and they need authorization from the ambassador, until a few years ago.

VS: Were you ever sent around on assignment outside of 1142 [25:14] during that time period?

JD: Never.

VS: Didn’t take a train ride to Texas?

JD: Never.

VS: Any involvement with FBI? Any knowledge of FBI [25:22]?

JD: No.

VS: Okay. Since you have sort of a global view of things --

JD: Yeah.
VS: -- you know, Mexico necessarily wasn’t our great ally to the south.

JD: No.

VS: Any listening, monitoring to --

JD: I have no -- I have no idea.

VS: Okay.

JD: I know nothing about Latin America, and I was -- my wife and I were afraid of being assigned there. I don’t speak Spanish as you do, and as a result, I know really nothing about it. I know 1142 [25:53]. I was taken to 1142 because I knew something about Germany and I could speak like a German and could act like a German [26:00] at the time, and I was the guy who was young and willing to help the country.

SS: I’m curious how you would respond to the thought that maybe our enemies today hold religious views that are not sort of --

JD: Well, I’m going to -- okay. I’m going to tell you something.

SS: We’re in over -- it’s -- martyrdom might be something that’s to be looked for, or it’s that salvation comes from Allah and God’s path because they [unintelligible] an actual leader.

JD: Let me -- let me tell you. I said that earlier. I am known in the foreign service as being a secular ambassador, and respecting all religions, including people who are religious to the point of carrying it out, which maybe -- the question of dying for your faith is not peculiar to Shi’a, Sunnis, Christians, or Jews. If I remember, the Crusades was basically a religious movement in support of a religious view, and they massacred anything that came in their way, including Jews and including Muslims. I think one has to be very careful not to associate religion, necessarily, with anti-Americanism. There are lots of anti-Americans who are not necessarily Muslims. They could even be Jews. They could
even be Christians [28:00]. It is just that we -- and I will be glad to show you. I have it here. I have a letter from Prime Minister Gandhi [28:15] to the President of the United States, saying, “How can you, Mr. President, the Chief of State of the most secular state for more than 200 years, support the most fundamentalist Muslim in the entire world? Bhulbatim Patmatchar [spelled phonetically].” Thank you.

VS: Hey, I’m going to ask one last [29:00] question. I asked this before. I just want to bring it into perspective again. You know, I think your discussion of Hilger [29:06] was very enlightening to me in terms of opening up that perspective on the Russians, and --

JD: I think -- I think it’s something to explore. How did we get into this situation of either you’re with us or against us? The world is either black or white, and Hilger, who understood the Russians and told us about the problems of Stalin and all of this and the massacre of his own people and stuff like that, and yet, if you go today, Stalin [29:43] is still perceived as the guy who won the war. Was Hilger [29:49] -- when the German archives -- was he shaded? He stands right in back of that famous picture, Ribbentrop and Molotov [30:00]. That’s Hilger. Obviously he was in favor of making peace. Was it a tactical move to gain time for the Germans, or was it a belief this is the best way of dealing with the Russians at the time, and the Germans have to be alone? I don’t know. What is in their files? All I know, having worked with German ambassadors all over the world, when they mention the name and I mention Gustav Hilger [30:35], they stand up. There was a giant of a German diplomat. Let us find out why are we still today mutually so leery and so [31:00] -- always thinking the worst what the Russians will do or any communist country will do. This is -- but I -- it’s a basic question. Why can we work with Tito, who is a communist and part of the Marshall plan? Why can we work today
with the -- with the Chinese? Is it only that we adjust to reality? From the Chinese point of view, do you really wonder whether the Chinese don’t hold a grudge, why we supported Chiang Kai-shek [31:43] all these years after what the Japanese did to the Chinese? Do you see what I’m saying? History -- what I’m saying to you, and let me close this way, the importance of what you’re doing is that history looks at a [32:00] problem with a little bit of hindsight, but only if people learn from history will it have an impact on this --

[end of transcript]
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