

Fire Island Watch Hill Restaurant Structure Fire

Serious Accident Investigation

Factual Report



National Park Service
Fire Island National Seashore
October 29, 2019

SERIOUS ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION FACTUAL REPORT

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Incident Name: Fire Island Watch Hill Restaurant Fire
Location: Fire Island National Seashore
120 Laurel Street, Patchogue, NY 11772
Date of Incident: September 4, 2019

SERIOUS ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

Team Leader:

David L. Williamson, Structural Fire Manager, NPS, Interior Region 2

 10/29/2019

Signature Date

Team Member:

Hassan Ford, PE, Fire Protection Engineer, NPS, Interior Region 1

HASAN FORD Digitally signed by HASAN FORD
Date: 2019.10.29 10:04:47 -0400

Signature Date

Executive Summary

On Wednesday, September 4, 2019, a fire occurred in the Watch Hill restaurant at the Fire Island National Seashore, located near Patchogue, New York. No injuries were reported and the majority of the fire was contained to the snack bar, kitchen, mechanical room and public restrooms, along with the adjacent attic area. Smoke damage occurred throughout the structure along with damage related to firefighter suppression efforts and overhaul.¹

The Watch Hill restaurant contained the restaurant, outside canopy dining area, outside bar, snack bar, and public restrooms. At the time of the fire, the restaurant was closed for the day.

The fire was detected by a boater that was in a slip adjacent to the west side of the restaurant. The boater notified 911 at 1:38 AM. The Davis Park Fire and mutual aid fire departments were dispatched one minute later and responded to the park. At 1:45 AM flames were reported to be through the roof and 20 feet in height. The Davis Park and Patchogue fire departments arrived at 2:02 AM. The fire was extinguished at 3:41 AM.

The Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD) and the National Park Service (NPS) investigation into the origin and cause of the fire was inconclusive, however there did not appear to be any indications of an intentionally-caused fire. Accidental causes of the fire were considered, including water heater malfunction or careless discard of smoking materials.

The total dollar amount of the loss for the NPS and concessioner property is unknown at this time. The building has a replacement value of 1.2 million dollars as recorded in FMSS and is determined to be a total loss. The area of the origin of the fire was determined to be the south wall of the women's restroom, adjacent to the water heater in the mechanical room. It could not be determined which side of the wall the fire started on. All other potential accidental fire causes were eliminated. There were no indications of an incendiary fire cause. The fire cause determination is undetermined. The fire classification is accidental.

¹ NFPA 901, Section 3.3.81: Overhaul. The fire department act of making a fire scene safe after the fire is controlled, such as extinguishing or removing burned material and checking inside walls and hidden spaces.

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Acknowledgments

The actions and efforts of park personnel and emergency responders during and after the fire emergency are greatly appreciated. In addition, the following acknowledgements are given for individuals and agencies that supported the work of the team:

- Fire Island National Seashore Superintendent and park staff
- National Park Service Interior Region I Office, Facilities Division and Structural Fire
- National Park Service Interior Region 2, Facility Management Program Coordinator
- Suffolk County Police Department Fire Investigators
- Washington Support Office, Structural Fire

Abbreviations

FIIS	Fire Island National Seashore
FMSS	Facility Management Software System
FPCA	Fire Protection Condition Assessment
HVAC	Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning
IMARS	Incident Management Analysis and Reporting System
ITM	Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NPS	National Park Service
PSFC	Park Structural Fire Coordinator
RM-58	Reference Manual 58, Structural Fire
RSFM	Regional Structural Fire Manager
SCPD	Suffolk County Police Department
SAIT	Serious Accident Investigation Team
SFDMS	Structural Fire Data Management System
SFMP	Structural Fire Management Plan
WASO	Washington Support Office

SAIT Objectives and Investigative Process

On September 6, 2019, the NPS Fire and Aviation Management Division Chief delegated authority to the Serious Accident Investigation Team (SAIT) to conduct a fire origin and cause investigation at Fire Island National Seashore (FIIS). The duties outlined in the delegation of authority included:

1. Conducting a NPS led fire cause investigation.
2. Organizing, managing and conducting the accident investigation in accordance with Departmental Manual 485 Chapter 7 and NPS Reference Manual 50B, Occupational Safety and Health Program and Reference Manual 58, Structural Fire Management.
3. Providing for in-briefings and out-briefings with affected personnel and agency officials, including the park superintendent.
4. Coordinating information exchange between team members, local fire cause investigators, NPS leadership, regional facilities staff and others who may be involved with investigating or ensuring recovery post incident.
5. Maintaining liaison with the affected park and regional office staff.
6. Maintaining liaison with any law enforcement investigators from the local county or NPS Investigative Services Branch (ISB) assigned agents who are, or may conduct, their own legal/criminal investigations.
7. Approving requests and allocating funding for resources to assist with the investigation.
8. Requesting technical, logistical or other support required to conduct the investigation.
9. Providing the following formal briefings/reports within the identified time frames:
 - a. Factual Report (45 days).
 - b. Briefing the Board of Review (BOR) in regard to the investigation and findings.
 - c. Conducting additional investigations and performing additional follow-up actions as requested by the BOR or the NPS Director.

The SAIT conducted an on-site investigation on September 7-8, 2019 to examine the fire-related damage and to develop an origin and cause of the fire. Interviews were conducted with park personnel and the restaurant concessioner. The Watch Hill restaurant fire damage was also evaluated. Photographs were taken to assist with analyzing potential ignition sources, first fuels ignited, and fire extension.

Following the on-site examination, the team conducted additional research into the water heater, fire and security logs and local fire investigation reports.

An extension to the factual report was requested by the SAIT leader and was approved with a timeline of no later than November 18, 2019.

Overview of the Park

Fire Island National Seashore (FIIS) is located on Long Island, New York. The Seashore encompasses 19,580 acres of upland, tidal and submerged lands along a 26-mile stretch of the 32-mile barrier island. It is a part of a much larger system of barrier islands and bluffs stretching from New York City to the very eastern end of Long Island at Montauk Point. FIIS was established by Congressional legislation on September 11, 1964. The Watch Hill area is located on the western edge of the Otis Pike Fire Island High Dune Wilderness, directly across the Great South Bay from Patchogue, Long Island. It is accessible by Watch Hill Ferry, private boat, foot, and very limited vehicle use.

The Watch Hill restaurant was constructed in 1980 and is a 3140 square foot wood frame, non-historic structure, located within the Watch Hill area of FIIS. The destroyed building is within the Love Watch Hill & Sailors Haven LLC concessionaire land assignment. The current two year contract expires December, 2020. A new 10-year concession contract is scheduled to be signed and begin January 2021. Primary uses of the destroyed concession operation includes full sit-down restaurant, snack bar, outside seating area, and bar. The building accommodated 115 total seats and guests around the boardwalk. The restaurant is popular with boaters, campers, island residents and day-trippers. The structure received a capital improvement in 2006.

Structures located at FIIS Watch Hill includes a visitor center, marina, snack bar, general store, housing, and a restaurant.



Figure 1 – FIIS Location




Figure 2 – Watch Hill Site Plan




Figure 3 – Watch Hill Restaurant Floor Plan

Building Description

The Watch Hill restaurant is a single-story, 3140 square foot, wood framed building constructed in 1980. The building also contained, an outside canopy dining area, outside bar, snack bar, and public restrooms.

The building is located at the Watch Hill Marina, adjacent to the marina store, public restrooms and dock C. The building is in close proximity to the access driveway and three fire hydrants are located within 200 feet of the building.

Fire protection features included a kitchen exhaust hood fire suppression system and portable fire extinguishers. There was no fire alarm or fire sprinkler system installed in the building, nor were either required. The replacement value of the building is recorded in FMSS as 1.2 million dollars.



Photo 1 – Post Fire Photo of the West side of the restaurant



Photo 2 – Post Fire Photo of the East side of the restaurant



Photo 3 – Pre Fire Photo of the restaurant bar area



Photo 4 – Pre Fire Photo of the restaurant dining area

Events Prior to the Incident

In the early afternoon of Tuesday, September 3, 2019, two restaurant employees reported smelling propane. They traced the smell to the mechanical room. Both employees reported the smell soon dissipated. There was a dispute between two employees at approximately 9:25 PM that evening. The concessioner and his family were having dinner in the restaurant at the time of the dispute. The Suffolk County Police and park rangers were notified and responded. The two employees were escorted to their respective housing for the night. Suffolk County Police and park rangers departed the scene at approximately 12:57 AM. The dispute appears to be unrelated to the fire. At approximately 1:00 AM the concessioner's wife returned to the restaurant to ensure all doors had been locked. She did not detect anything unusual at that time.

Weather

The following historic weather report information was reported for Fire Island, NY:

Date	Time	Temperature (F)	Wind Direction	Wind Speed (mph)
Sep 4	2:05 AM	66	SW	.63

Report of Fire

On Wednesday, September 4, 2019 at approximately 1:35 AM, boater #1, docked on the west side of the marina in slip D34, reported seeing fire coming from the middle of the restaurant. The boater called 911. Boater #2 went to notify the park rangers. The Suffolk County Dispatch Center received a 911 call at 1:38 AM from boater #1 reporting the fire. Fire crews were dispatched at 1:39 AM. The first fire units from Davis Park and Patchogue fire departments arrived on the scene at 2:02 AM. FIIS park rangers were notified of the fire at 1:42 AM by the Suffolk County Dispatch Center and arrived on scene at 2:20 AM.



Photo 5 – Approximate boaters, who reported the fire, view of the restaurant

Fire Department Actions

The following fire departments responded to the scene and performed firefighting operations; including forcible entry, fire suppression and overhaul operations within the building. The firefighters from Hagerman and Patchogue fire departments arrived on scene via the Watch Hill Ferry and utilized the fire apparatus on scene.

Blue Point

Ocean Beach

Davis Park

Ocean Park

Fire Island Pines

Patchogue – Incident Command

Hagerman

Suffolk County FD Marine Unit

Ocean Bay Park

Fire suppression was conducted initially as a defensive operation then transitioned to an offensive operation once the bulk of the fire was extinguished. The fire was reported as extinguished at 3:41 AM. No injuries were reported by the incident commander. It was reported that since the fire hydrants were pointing towards the docks and not the structure it was difficult for the fire crews to connect their hoses. The Davis Park firefighters used the fire hose stored in the NPS hose boxes located in the vicinity of the restaurant, in addition to their own hoses, for suppression activities. After the fire, the hoses were inspected and deemed unserviceable by the firefighters and NPS personnel. By approximately 5:51 AM all fire department personnel had cleared the scene.

The SAIT leader requested a copy of the Patchogue fire incident report, but the report has not been received as of the date of this report.

Local Fire Investigation

On Wednesday, September 4, 2019, at approximately 3:30 AM the Suffolk County Police Department Arson Squad received a request from the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD) to investigate the fire. Four detectives from the SCPD Arson Squad responded to the FIIS Watch Hill restaurant and arrived at approximately 5:15 AM. The fire investigators conducted an origin and cause investigation, aided by the Suffolk County Fire Marshal's accelerant detection K-9. The conclusion of SCPD's investigation was that the fire was classified as undetermined. The report stated "At this time it is not possible to rule out an unspecified malfunction of the water heater or careless discard of smoking materials as possible causes of this fire."

Refer to Suffolk County Police Department Arson Squad investigation report 19-498833 for the complete origin and cause report (Appendix D).

SAIT Investigation

Information was requested from the NPS Interior Region 1 and FIIS on September 6, 2019 to gather facts and to plan for an onsite investigation. A detailed request for information was transmitted to the NPS Interior Region 1 and FIIS on September 17, 2019. A shared folder was established to collect pertinent information, reports, and photos. A delegation of authority was developed by the NPS Chief of Fire and Aviation and delivered to the team.

The SAIT met on-site at FIIS on Saturday, September 7, 2019, at approximately 8:00 AM and conducted an in-briefing with the park superintendent, chief ranger and the chief of maintenance. During this meeting, additional discussion focused on the events preceding the fire, normal activities in and around the building, as well as next steps in the investigation. Park personnel confirmed there was no hot work activity, painting, repair work, or other maintenance activities ongoing at the restaurant. Smoking was not allowed in the area of the fire. Following the in-briefing, the SAIT traveled to Fire Island and conducted a walk-through of the Watch Hill restaurant to collect additional data and take photographs.

A systematic approach was used during the on-site investigation. Beginning with an exterior walk-around of the building and then transitioning to an interior walk-through; starting with areas of less fire damage and moving to areas with more fire damage.

The area of most fire damage was found to be the women's restroom south wall that divides the restroom from the mechanical room. The propane fueled water heater is

located in this area on the opposite side of the wall. The ceiling joists and all of the roof structure had been burned away in this area. The wall separating the women's restroom from the mechanical room was constructed of 2x4 wooden studs and top/bottom plates, gypsum board (sheetrock) was installed on the restroom side of the wall. The mechanical room side of the wall had no wall covering. The water heater was installed in a compact space with less than six inches of separation from the combustible construction on all sides except the front. The front of the water heater had combustible storage within eighteen inches of the burner opening. This combustible storage did not contribute to the fire due to the fact the material was intact after the fire with only smoke and heat damage. Two wall studs and approximately twenty-four inches of the top plate of the wall separating the women's restroom from the water heater were completely consumed by the fire. No other wall studs or top plates in the building were completely destroyed. The remainder of the mechanical room sustained heat and fire damage but the contents were not completely destroyed. The ceiling of the mechanical room was open to the roof deck and supporting members.

Three fire rated doors were found in the structure; mechanical room door, and two doors leading to the kitchen from the prep area. All of the fire rated doors were found to be held open with wooden wedges or a concrete cap block at the time of the fire. Although there were fire rated doors installed in these areas the walls in which they were installed were not rated assemblies. Due to these doors being open, the fire was able to receive an unrestricted supply of air from both the open ceiling area and open doors.

There were reports that the chef entered the building through the rear door after the fire was discovered and turned on the kitchen exhaust hood fan. A follow up with the chef clarified that he always left the exhaust hood fan on overnight and on the night of the fire he entered the front door of the restaurant to assist the Patchogue Fire Department and left through the same door. There was no indication that the airflow from the exhaust fan contributed to the spread of the fire.

The concessioner received a large food delivery on Monday, September 3, 2019. There was a large quantity of liquor and beer in the storage room. The register in the snack bar had remnants of the \$250.00 left for change in it. An ATM machine owned by the concessioner with a reported \$20,000 in it was removed by the concessioner after the fire and prior to our investigation. All exterior doors appeared to have been locked at the time of the fire. There was no apparent signs of forced entry except that made by the fire department personnel during fire suppression.

The concessioner stated that the pilot light of the water heater would occasionally be blown out as the result of a downdraft of air from the vent. No service request was initiated for this issue.

The MoistureShield composite decking material installed throughout the Watch Hill Marina area has an adequate amount of reclaimed wood to have a flame spread rating of 100 and a smoke developed index of 350. This product was deemed appropriate for use adjacent to buildings and in exit egress routes.

At the conclusion of the investigation of the building, the team made contact with the park superintendent and chief ranger to conduct an out-briefing on September 8 at 10:00 AM. The park staff was advised that the SAIT site inspection was completed and the building was turned back to the park for securing while awaiting the concessioner's insurance company's adjuster and fire investigator.

The team completed their work at FIIS and departed on September 8 at approximately 11:00 AM.

Follow-up Investigation

The fire investigator from the SCPD was contacted on September 17, 2019 to discuss findings and request photographs and a copy of their report. The report and photographs were received on October 9, 2019.

A detailed review of all photographs was conducted, comparing areas of charring, burn patterns, and equipment locations. The area of origin was confirmed to be in the area of the women's restroom, adjacent water heater in the mechanical room consistent with the SCPD investigation report. The exact point of origin could not be determined.

There was no preventative maintenance program in place by either the park or concessioner to inspect the water heater and it was undetermined if one was required by the manufacturer. The kitchen exhaust hood and the hood fire suppression system had been properly serviced in May 2019. The concessioner's contract, appendix H, Maintenance Plan, does not specifically list the water heater as an interior system requiring maintenance. However, Appendix H 1) states; "Pursuant to the Contract, the Concessioner is solely responsible for the maintenance of all Concession Facilities to the satisfaction of the Service. The Concessioner must conduct all maintenance activities in compliance with Applicable Laws. Applicable Laws include, but are not limited to Service standards, DOI and NPS Asset Management Plans, NPS Management Policies, and manufacturer recommendations and specifications."

The data collected through interviews, on-site investigation, and follow-up review of the documentation were analyzed to develop possible hypotheses as to the fire cause. Potential ignition sources included the propane fueled water heater, electrical distribution circuits and improper disposal of smoking materials. Potential ignitable fuels in the area of origin were identified and considered, which included combustible items in the women's restroom plastic trash receptacle, stored combustibles and combustible construction in the area of the water heater.

Determination of Fire Cause Process

Potential ignition sources

- Propane fueled water heater: The water heater was manufactured by the A.O. Smith Company. The model and serial number of the water heater were unable to be verified by either a data plate or from the park's records. The SCPD did discover that there were several fire hazard recalls for this make of water heater, but was unable to verify if the recalls pertained to this specific heater since the model and serial numbers were not available. It could not be determined if the deformities to the water heater visible in the photographs were in place prior to the fire or occurred as a result of the fire. The concessioner stated that the water heater would occasionally "flare out" due to excessive down draft from the water heater vent. This would cause the water heater to need to be reset. On September 3, 2019 two employees stated to the SCPD investigator that they had smelled propane briefly in the area of the mechanical room, but the smell had quickly dissipated. There were no records of the water heater having been serviced or repaired.

- Electrical distribution circuits: Electrical conduits in the area of origin appeared intact and without failure, although several electrical junction boxes were found throughout the building without covers properly attached.
- Improper disposal of smoking materials: Although the restaurant was a no smoking area it was common for employees to occasionally smoke in the women's restroom. It is not known if any employees had been smoking in the women's restroom the evening prior to the fire. The last employee left the restaurant at approximately 10:30 PM prior to the fire being reported at 1:38 AM, three hours later. The plastic trash can appeared to be no larger than 10"x14"x15" in size. The trash can was completely melted and appeared to be a victim of the fire, not involved in origination of the fire.
- All other potential accidental fire causes were eliminated. There were no indications of an incendiary fire cause.
- The fire cause determination is undetermined.
- The fire classification is accidental.

Potential first fuel ignited

- Combustible storage: The mechanical room was used for storage of combustible material, such as soda machine distribution equipment, cleaning equipment, and supplies. A review of post-fire photographs does show a moderate amount of combustible storage within eighteen inches of the front of the water heater, however this material was still intact. It is not known if any combustible storage was on either side of the water heater.
- Combustible construction: The building construction material consists of wooden walls, floors, joists, rafters, and roof deck. The mechanical room walls and ceiling were not covered, leaving the wooden structural members exposed to the interior of the room.
 - Two wall studs and approximately twenty-four inches of the top plate of the wall separating the women's restroom from the water heater were completely consumed by the fire.
 - Areas of heavy char and low burn were noted on the existing studs and bottom plate adjacent to the water heater.
 - The wall's wooden structural members may possibly have been the first fuel ignited.
 - The possibility exists that long-term exposure to heat in this area could have caused pyrolysis² of the combustible wall structural members, making them more susceptible to ignition. This condition may have existed over a long period of time.

² NFPA 921, Section 3.3.150 Pyrolysis. A process in which material is decomposed, or broken down, into simpler molecular compounds by the effects of heat alone; pyrolysis often precedes combustion.

Causal Findings

- 1) The classification of the fire is undetermined³. No evidence or indicators of an intentionally-caused fire or naturally-caused fire were identified and possible causes are indicative of an accidental fire.
- 2) The probable⁴ cause of the fire could not be determined, although three possible⁵ causes were considered:
 - a) Propane fueled water heater malfunction
 - b) Electrical distribution circuits
 - c) Improper disposal of smoking materials

Findings

- 3) The park had an existing Structural Fire Management Plan (SFMP) on file dated March 2014. The SFMP was overdue for its five year comprehensive review and update as required by the Structural Fire Reference Manual 58 (RM-58) section 5.2 by six months. The park is currently in the process of reviewing and updating the SFMP.
- 4) Formal agreements are in place with the local fire departments and pre-incident tours of the park have been accomplished. The fire department agreements and tours allowed the fire responders to be better prepared for this incident and thus prevented damage to surrounding infrastructure.
- 5) No service call was initiated for the downdraft issue with the water heater.
- 6) The kitchen exhaust hood and fire suppression system was being properly maintained.
- 7) The park had no record of the water heater in the Facility Management Software System (FMSS) or of the installation date. Park personnel believe that the previous concessioner installed the water heater on an unknown date possibly as long as ten years ago.
- 8) Annual building fire and life safety and accessibility inspections had not been completed. RM-58 identifies that a park's chief of commercial services is responsible for ensuring that qualified staff conducts an annual fire and life safety inspection in all concession operated buildings.
- 9) It was reported by one employee that it was very common for employees to smoke in the women's restroom even though smoking was not allowed in the restaurant. The employees used the women's restroom due to the powerful exhaust fan in that room. The employees felt that was a way to conceal the smoking from the concessioner.

³ NFPA 921, Section 20.1.4 Undetermined Fire Cause. Whenever the cause cannot be proven to an acceptable level of certainty, the proper classification is undetermined.

⁴ NFPA 921, Section 4.5.1: Probable. This level of certainty corresponds to being more likely true than not. At this level of certainty, the likelihood of the hypothesis being true is greater than 50 percent.

⁵ NFPA 921, Section 4.5.1: Possible. At this level of certainty, the hypothesis can be demonstrated to be feasible but cannot be declared probable. If two or more hypotheses are equally likely, then the level of certainty must be "possible."

- 10) Several electrical junction boxes were found on the underneath side of the building and in the kitchen area without the appropriate cover properly attached.
- 11) The response by the local fire departments was efficient given the remoteness of the building and that all responding fire departments were volunteer. The first arriving fire unit had a response time of approximately 22 minutes after dispatch.
- 12) This fire incident was reported in the Incident Management Analysis and Reporting System (IMARS) and notification was made through the appropriate chain of command to the regional and national offices.
- 13) The responding fire departments noted that the fire hydrants were facing towards the docks and not the structure making it difficult for the fire crews to connect their hoses.
- 14) The fire hoses that were at the park had not been routinely inspected and showed signs of deterioration and rot and were not able to be used during the fire. The use of fire hoses by park or concession personnel is not addressed in the SFMP.

Other findings

- 15) The park has designated a park structural fire coordinator (PSFC) as required by RM-58. WASO reported that there was no record of him being enrolled in the required PSFC training. RM-58 requires a designated PSFC to complete WASO approved PSFC training within one year.
- 16) Storage of combustible material in mechanical rooms is not permitted by International Fire Code, Section 315.3.3 which states "Combustible material shall not be stored in boiler rooms, mechanical rooms, electrical equipment rooms or in *fire command centers* as specified in section 508.1.5."
- 17) Electrical junction boxes are to be provided with covers in accordance with the 2017 NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Article 300-31 which states "Suitable covers shall be installed on all boxes, fittings, and similar enclosures to prevent accidental contact with energized parts or physical damage to parts or insulation."
- 18) There is no indication that this fire was a result of improper management decisions or failures.

Appendix A – Watch Hill Restaurant Floor Plan




Figure 4 – Watch Hill Restaurant Floor Plan




Figure 5 – Watch Hill Restaurant Roof Plan

Appendix B – Photographs

Incident Photos



Photo 6 – East side of the restaurant prior to fire department arrival



Photo 7 - East side of the restaurant during fire department suppression activities



Photo 8 – North side of the restaurant, main entrance



Photo 9 North side of the restaurant, outside bar on left



Photo 10 – East side of the restaurant, snack bar and deck



Photo 11 – Close up of snack bar and outside bar



Photo 12 – South side of restaurant




Photo 13 – Outside dining area



Photo 14 – Outside dining area continued



Photo 15 – West side of restaurant



Photo 16 – Restaurant roof



Photo 17 – Interior of bar area



Photo 18 – Interior of dining area



Photo 19 – Hallway to women's restroom – notice increased damage to ceiling joist closer to the women's restroom



Photo 20 – Women's restroom



Photo 21 – Wall separating the women's restroom for the mechanical room



Photo 22 – Wall separating the women’s restroom for the mechanical room



Photo 23 – Water heater as seen from the women’s restroom



Photo 24 – Water heater front with combustible storage nearby



Photo 25 – Mechanical room with cleaning supplies, soda dispenser equipment and combustible storage



Photo 26 – Rated door to the mechanical room held open by a cap block



Photo 27 – Liquor storage room and office



Photo 28 – Recently delivered supplies



Photo 29 – Remnants of cash in register

SCPD Investigation Photos



Photo 30 – ATM



Photo 31 – Women's restroom before removal of fire debris



Photo 32 – Women's restroom after removal of fire debris



Photo 33 – Water Heater before debris has been removed



Photo 34 – Area of water heater after debris has been removed and area of burnt away wall studs



Photo 35 – Damage to water heater



Photo 36 – Damage to water heater



Photo 37 – Possible heat or fire pattern on water heater



Photo 38 – Manufacturer of water heater