**Scheduling the Prime Minister's Visit**

A schedule is the most important part of any visit. After you have toured the farm, schedule the day.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| December 17, 1956 (Monday) | 8:48 a.m. | The President will call for the Prime Minister at Blair House and they will motor to Gettysburg Farm. |
| | 11:00 a.m. | Approximate arrival time |

(WHERE WILL THE TOUR GO? WHERE WILL THE PRESS CONFERENCE BE HELD?)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| December 18, 1956 (Tuesday) | 8:50 a.m. | The President and the Prime Minister will depart Gettysburg Farm. |

**Menu Plan and Shopping List**

Careful planning is required so that everything is available to make the Prime Minister feel at home.

**Proposed Luncheon Menu**

**Proposed Dinner Menu**

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## WAGING PEACE, THE NEHRU VISIT

The next head of government to visit Washington was Prime Minister Nehru of India.

India had been a source of fascination to me for many years, even though I had never been there. I had read about the modern development and government of India and frequently had expressed a hope of paying a visit to that subcontinent.[3]

But Mr. Nehru was no stranger to me. He had visited Columbia University while I was its President, and on that visit I had been privileged to hold an extensive conversation with him. Over the years

[3] This hope, repeated casually during the 1956 campaign, inspired one of those single-minded partisan comments common in the heat of elections. One of my political associates, under the impression that I was planning such a trip and was about to start off without delay, exploded, *"India? We need him more in Ohio!"*



Mr. Nehru had been to many Americans a somewhat inexplicable and occasionally exasperating personality. Early in his career he had leaned to Marxism; later as a lieutenant of Gandhi's in the independence movement he spent a number of years in British jails; as Prime Minister he seemed to some observers to be treading the Communist line at times, and he was often Delphic in the ambiguity of his statements.

He seemed to believe—most unrealistically, I thought—that peace in the dawn of the nuclear age could be brought about by voluntary, unilateral disarmament on the part of the West. In this, perhaps, he had been bemused by India's success in the use of passive resistance in achieving independence from the British. As I said one day to a visitor, "Gandhi used passive resistance against Britain. But the British, with their advanced stage of civilization and their deep respect for human life, refrained from the use of force in India because of the moral brake they put on themselves. Should Nehru try passive resistance against the Communists, I'm such he would get a rude awakening."

One thing about Mr. Nehru that was difficult for most Americans in government to understand was his evident confidence in his ambassador to the United Nations, V.K. Krishna Menon. To many of us, Mr. Menon appeared to have more respect for Communist doctrine than for Western culture, government, or leaders. Under a cloak of humility and modesty, he never hesitated to take upon himself the role of consultant, adviser, and authority on every kind of difficult international situation. By July of 1955 Mr. Menon had visited me twice in company with Secretary Dulles to talk about establishing a basis of mediation between Red China and ourselves. Both times I had told him bluntly that there was no use of ever mentioning the subject as long as Americans were unjustly held as prisoners by the Communists in Red China, to be used as pawns in bargaining.

About six weeks before Mr. Nehru was scheduled to come to Washington he wrote me about the Israeli invasion of Egypt. This he labeled as "naked aggression" and the Anglo-French action an affront to the United Nations. He urged that I use every means at my disposal to halt the drive toward general war. A week later he wrote to me again, this time on Hungary. The tone of the two letters was markedly different. In the latter, he said, "I have indeed been greatly troubled by what has happened there and I drew the attention of Mr. Bulganin to it. He has briefly replied and has promised to send a fuller reply later."

Mr. Nehru wrote that he had been informed by the Soviets that they had previously decided to withdraw their troops from Hungary, but subsequent events compelled them to intervene "temporarily to protect the lives of their own people as governmental authority appeared to have vanished and mutual killing was taking place." He seemed quite

ready to accept this explanation of a most hideous crime. Yet, in the same letter in which he rationalized Russian conduct, he went back once again to the hateful "aggression" in Egypt, which he said "has powerfully moved the countries of Asia and Africa." This drove home to me the fact that most neutralist nations tended to criticize armed intervention in Suez while almost ignoring it in Hungary or to equate Hungary and Suez, though the dead in Hungary exceeded those in Suez by 25 to 1.

Prime Minister Nehru arrived in Washington on December 16, 1956. On the following morning I called for him at Blair House and together we drove to my farm at Gettysburg, where we spent that day and part of the next in some fourteen hours of conversation.

Returning to Washington on the 18th, Mr. Nehru came to the White House the next morning and we continued private talks in my office. Following our conversations I made fourteen pages of notes on them.

Of immediate concern, of course, was Egypt and the Middle East. "Nasser, in my opinion," said Nehru, "is the best of the group of Egyptians—mostly military—for whom he is the spokesman. If Nasser were to be removed, his successor would be someone far more inimical to the West and more unreasonable in his actions."

The Prime Minister was obviously interested in the diplomatic negotiations the previous year leading to the cancellation of the Aswan Dam offer. I gave him the facts of the negotiations that were finally used by Nasser as an excuse for seizing the Canal Company in late July. Mr. Nehru seemed astonished to learn that our original offer had to all intents and purposes been rejected by Egypt before we had publicly withdrawn it and that Nasser was scarcely justified in pretending to be surprised when our own loss of interest in the project was announced.

"Arab leaders tend to get excited when they address a crowd, "Mr. Nehru commented, "and they can be counted on to talk in extravagant terms under such circumstances; more attention should be paid to their studied, written statements," he maintained, "than to their oratory." He had a low opinion of the pro-Western Premier Nuri as-Said of Iraq, but did not mention the Baghdad Pact as such.

In contrast to the mild letter he had previously sent me, Mr. Nehru described his horrified reactions to the Hungarian affair. India, he said, had sent at least token help by shipping certain cargoes of food and other supplies to the Hungarian refugees. He did venture a guess that Soviet action in Hungary spelled the eventual death knell of international Communism. His explanation ran something like this: "In spite of the fact that Hungary has been under the complete domination of the international Communists for a period of ten years, the Communist bosses have made so little progress in converting the people to their ideology that the world has witnessed the spectacle of an uprising in which



people were perfectly ready to be killed rather than submit again to their Communist overlords." He concluded that the demonstration of this fact to the world must have given a terrible shock to the men in the Kremlin, so shocking that they would likely have to make a reappraisal of their plans. Perhaps, he said, the Communist appeal from now on would be couched in language more likely to cater to the dissatisfied and needy of the world, while threats and the effort to dominate by force would become less blatant. This would be a propitious moment, he suggested, because of the blunder of the Soviets in Hungary, for the Free World to move to strengthen the faith and hope of those who would like to live in independence but who have been misled, at least partly, by Communist doctrine. "Nationalism is stronger than Communism," he added.

Of Communist China, he said, "I feel it is only logical that any government controlling six hundred million people will sooner or later have to be brought into the council of nations." This contention became more valid with each passing year, he said, because Chiang Kai-shek and his army on Formosa were showing the ravages of time and eventually Formosa would be a weakened area which, almost by force of circumstances, would fall into the hands of the Communists.

The Prime Minister outlined the reasons why India had, since independence, pursued a policy of neutrality. First he insisted that he used the word "neutrality" in its traditional sense, to mean simply a position of aloofness from power combinations, particularly power combinations at war or threatening war between themselves. He made clear that he did not use the word to distinguish between concepts of government based on the dignity of man and those based on dictatorship.

He said that India might, logically, fear major attack from two countries only—the U.S.S.R. and China. Either one, however, would experience difficulty in conducting large conventional military operations against India because of the fortunate location of the Himalayan mountain chain. Furthermore, he felt that both these countries had vast internal problems and would probably confine their aggressive intentions to nations that posed a threat or supplied a tempting prize to the Communists. India fulfilled neither condition. If ever a world war should come about, he felt, the Communists would be too much interested in other areas to attack India.

"Neutrality has another advantage," he said. "India and China have eighteen hundred miles of common border. Any attempt to maintain a defense of this long border would be such an expensive proposition as to render India completely unable to raise the standards of living of her people. Starvation and disease would make the nation even more susceptible to Communist penetration."

The Prime Minister suggested one final reason for India's continuance

as a neutral. Any nation giving up neutrality to enter into a defensive organization should be able to do its part. India was in no position whatsoever to arm in proportion to its population and geographical size. Any definite alignment by India with the Free World would serve to weaken rather than to strengthen the combination.

Our conversation then turned to socialism. According to my notes Mr. Nehru expressed his thoughts in this fashion: All countries are a "little bit socialistic"—there is no such thing as pure free enterprise practiced anywhere. The extreme of Communism is practiced in the Soviet Union and Iron Curtain countries, all others having some form of incentive enterprise.

The appropriate level of state management is often determined by the conditions prevailing; it differs, for example, according to the stage of development within a nation. In less-developed nations, capital must be acquired for industrial progress and at times only the government can do this job. In India they refer to these two phases of economic development as the public and private sectors, not as socialism or free enterprise.

On the subject of Pakistan the Prime Minister was less detached. He reviewed the historical developments that led to the 1947 partition. He felt that the British had made an egregious blunder in dividing the subcontinent of India between two nations, India and Pakistan. The Pakistani, he insisted, had not obtained independence by their own efforts; they had obtained it through the success of Indian nationalism. He went on to describe the difficult administrative job brought about by partition and emphasized the difficulties that arose out of the forced migrations of people between the two countries—Hindus moving from Pakistan into India, and Moslems from India into Pakistan. Furthermore, India did not accept the theory of organization of states along religious lines. As a proof of this, Mr. Nehru cited the presence of forty million Moslems remaining in India and the fact that Moslems were represented in his own Cabinet. The huge migrations of peoples, he said had ceased for a while, but now had been renewed, not by any movement of people from India into Pakistan, but rather by the determination of Indians in East Pakistan to leave that part of the country. India, he claimed, was forced to absorb these people at the rate of one thousand a day.

Mr. Nehru said that among the several outstanding problems between India and Pakistan he would consider none insuperable. Three of them were:



(1) the division of the waters of the Indus River Basin between Pakistan and India;

(2) the settlement of property claims arising out of the migrations back and forth across the border;

(3) Kashmir.

"Of these, the only one I think will cause real difficulty in settling is the last," he said. He asserted that the people of Kashmir wanted to belong to India, but he did not explain why he had always opposed a vote on that question in the region. He reviewed in detail Kashmir's tribal invasions after the partition, the employment of Indian troops to stop the invasions, and the establishment of armistice lines. "Economic and political life," he pointed out, "has now become crystallized around the existence of this armistice line," which gave Pakistan one-third the territory and one-fourth the population of Kashmir. If the United Nations would approve of this status quo as a basis for permanent settlement, Mr. Nehru believed, both sides would eventually agree, although there would be some grumbling.

One thorn in the side of India at the moment was the existence of the small enclave of Goa on its west coast, in Portuguese hands since the early sixteenth century. Despite recent disputes, Mr. Nehru said that India harbored no intention of using force to settle this matter.[4] According to him Goa was of no economic value to Portugal and existed merely to satisfy the Portuguese feeling that it helped to make them an "empire."

The Prime Minister thought the United States could be of help in both the Goa and Pakistan problems. He thought we should urge Portugal to release Indian prisoners they held, one of whom was a member of the Indian Parliament. This he said would be only a gesture, but it would at least show respect for India. In the Pakistan problem we might help by urging Pakistan to cease using its newspapers, which he said were really state-controlled, to incite the fears of the Indians. He said that if Pakistan's newspaper propaganda would talk peace instead of war, the whole situation would be much ameliorated.

The Prime Minister believed that the wide gulf dividing the Soviets and the United States was partially created by each side. Although he did not attempt a judgment as to the degree of guilt, he was clearly of the opinion that if one of the two parties should make an honest effort toward conciliation the other would go along.

[4] Apparently he later changed his mind: Goa was taken over forcibly by India in December of 1961.

Speaking of Europe, Mr. Nehru seemed sympathetic with Russian fears of a rejuvenated Germany. He had concluded that the problem of a divided Germany would be settled only if a European organization could be set up that to the Russian mind would be a guarantee of their own safety. As a possibility he talked about the establishment of a neutral belt reaching down from Northern Europe into the Mediterranean, the belt to include all the present satellite states, as well as Germany. When I voiced grave doubts that a people as dynamic as the Germans could ever be successfully treated as neutrals, he agreed.

I tried to underscore the difference between our objectives and those of the Soviets. "In every public statement and expression of purpose," I pointed out, "we seek only the right of every people to determine for themselves their form of government and status in the family of nations. The Soviets, on the other hand, both by announced purpose and by action, have demonstrated their determination to dominate the world." I cited the fate of the captive nations of Eastern Europe as a type of colonialism that was far more serious and cruel than that practiced in the past by some of the Western nations—the latter a dying practice that still excited the resentment and even hatred of the Afro-Asian bloc.

"Moreover," I went on, "there has been, in recent years, a tremendous change in the relations of former colonies and their former mother countries." New nations were springing up rapidly. "I fail to understand," I said, "why all Asians are not far more alarmed by the forceful domination of Eastern Europe by Russia than you are by the few vestiges of Western colonialism. Despite colonial histories and our recent troubles in the Middle East, the Western nations are primarily interested in the progress of humanity. By contrast the Hungarian revolution has provided convincing proof the Soviets are interested only in its domination, no matter by what means including forceful suppression."

I was disappointed to find that none of this seemed wholly convincing to the Prime Minister; at least he gave no expression of emphatic concurrence.

But I kept trying. "One of the world's troubles is that no one can put any real trust in the pledged word of the Russians," I said. "Time and again they have violated promises, understanding, and even written agreements. In these circumstances, we have found it impossible as yet to make any cooperative progress with the Russians in the problems of stopping nuclear testing, working toward mutual disarmament, or solving the difficulties of a divided Germany." We had come to the conclusion that only agreements that carried within themselves the *certainty* of enforcement would be useful in dealing with the Soviets. I argued that if there was any sincerity in the Soviets' professed desire for peace and general disarmament they would willingly agree to a kind of mutual



inspection that would assure justice to both sides and inspire confidence. Finally I commented that the flat refusal of the Soviets to agree to some kind of reasonable arrangement should alarm the uncommitted nations of the world, just as it made the United States and her Western associates determined to protect themselves and their rights, by force, if necessary.

The Prime Minister did not in any way deny the logic of such beliefs; he merely expressed the opinion that because the natural attitude of the Soviets was a suspicious one and because they felt themselves "looked down upon" by the Western world, the West might be well advised to initiate conciliatory moves on a unilateral basis and thereafter examine the Soviets' reaction If these moves should prove successful, the way would be open for further progress.

I pointed out that in Korea, Indochina, Formosa, Greece, and elsewhere, the Communists had been stopped in aggressive action only by the interposition of Western resolution and force, and that until there could be convincing proof that the Russians were genuinely dedicated to peace, and ready to meet us halfway, there was not hope of inducing the West to go into unwise ventures shich would be interpreted by the Soviets only as weakness and invitation to further aggression.

The Prime Minister again remarked that in the long run Communism would defeat itself. With this I agreed, but observed that it was rather cold comfort to realize that the historically inevitable doom of dictatorships often occurred only after the passage of much time, the loss of life, the postponement of peace. This fact could make the matter purely academic so far as any single generation was concerned.

I liked Prime Minister Nehru. I deeply sympathize with the agonizing problems that the Chinese aggression later caused his nation. He sincerely wanted to help his people and lead them to higher levels of living and opportunity; I think it only fair to conclude that he was essential to his nation. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was not easy to understand; few people are, but his was a personality of unusual contradictions.

On a trip to India several year later, I came to see a small example of the fact that this distinguished man of non-violence could, on occasion, swing a mighty stick to clear his way through a crowd. More curious was his apparent tolerance, relatively speaking, of Soviet attitudes—of their determination for world domination, their refusal to enter into meaningful disarmament agreements, and their brutal suppression of the Hungarian people. One explanation, of course, was the fact that his own country had lived so long under foreign domination. But I think the answer goes deeper than that; as an Asian from a less-developed nation, it is possible that Mr. Nehru felt more resentment of an intangible Western condescension toward his people than he felt toward any

specific act of violence that either East or West might commit. Life, after all, is cheaper in the Orient, or so it would appear; recognition as equals by the "white" race is not. Perhaps Mr. Nehru, despite his excellent Western education and flawless English, was able to identify with the Soviets at times as "fellow Asians," a point that came out continually in his hope that the West could do something to make the Soviets feel they "were not being looked down upon." Intellectually he could never support Communist aggression, but his condemnation of such policies was tempered with sympathy. This feeling—if my conclusion is valid in his case—is shared by millions upon millions in Africa and Asia. It will be years, probably generations, despite the best efforts of the West, before this will no longer be so.

# NEHRU VISIT — DECEMBER 16-20, 1956

## Objectives of the Nehru Visit

### U.S. Objectives in the Nehru Visit

1. To develop good will and to increase the Prime Minister's understanding of our major foreign policies. These include our support of the standards of international conduct laid down in the UN Charter and firm opposition to the Communists' disregard of those standards; our conception of the role of collective security, including regional security; our conviction that Communist China has not purged itself of aggression against the UN or demonstrated its willingness to abide by the Charter; and our disarmament policy, which is both sincere and sound.

2. To bring out the broad and significant areas of agreement between the United States and India. This type of agreement exists on certain standards of international conduct, including non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the development of non-military international cooperation, both within and without the UN; the need for establishing armament controls and inspection safeguards; the importance of rapid economic expansion in underdeveloped areas; and democratic liberties and representative institutions.

3. To "agree to disagree" with the Prime Minister on those specific foreign policy issues, such as Goa, Kashmir and United States military aid to Pakistan, which clearly involve differing Indian and American concepts of national security or national interest.

4. To give a sympathetic hearing to the Prime Minister's views and make him feel he has been consulted on the problems discussed.

5. To establish a closer personal relationship between the President and the Prime Minister in order that they may continue fruitful consultation on problems of mutual concern.

### Estimated Indian Objectives in the Nehru Visit

1. To impress upon the President the rationale of controversial Indian foreign policies, including that of "non-involvement" or neutrality; opposition to regional collective security pacts; the importance of a rapprochement between the United States and Communist China; and the need for more rapid progress towards disarmament.

2. To



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2. To point out the areas of agreement between India and the United States on foreign policy issues.

3. To soften the U.S. position regarding certain issues where Indian and American policies are clearly divergent and likely to remain so—such as Goa, Kashmir and United States military aid to Pakistan—and, correspondingly, to isolate Pakistan and Portugal from further U.S. political support.

4. To strengthen the personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the President, with a view to continuing close consultation on world problems.

5. To obtain, if possible, a Presidential attitude favorable to the extension to India of a large scale United States Government loan in the near future.

# PERSONAL REQUIREMENT SUGGESTIONS

## VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER NEHRU OF INDIA

The Prime Minister's requirements are stated, by members of the staff of the Embassy of India in Washington who have visited in the Prime Minister's home, to be rather simple; that he is not particularly interested in food as such; that he smokes incessantly and usually refrains from drinking any alcoholic beverages. Me may sip various selections of wine during a meal, but fruit juices should be served before and during meals.

Cigarettes: English cigarettes such as 555 and Black and White are his favorites. If these are not available Virginia Rounds and Benson and Hedges are acceptable. The State Department will have these available.

Alcoholic Beverages: Prime Minister Nehru does not drink much, if anything in public, but if the host serves Scotch, Bourbon and other beverages he might join in drinking. A variety of fruit juices would be appreciated.

Breakfast: The Prime Minister customarily at home helps himself to prepared cereals such as oatmeal, corn flakes, etc., fresh fruit and/or fresh fruit juices, eggs prepared any style. If pancakes or some such similar American breakfast were served he would probably enjoy it.

Luncheon and Dinner: The Prime Minister is said to have no dietary limitation, but is considered inadvisable to serve beef or pork at formal luncheons and dinners due to religious prohibitions among certain classes of Indians. However, at private luncheons and dinners the Prime Minister might well enjoy filet mignon or something of that type. After lunch or dinner the Prime Minister would be glad to have real coffee (not decaffeined). Fruit juices should be served before lunch and dinner along with alcoholic beverages.

Tea: The Prime Minister enjoys afternoon tea at about 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. Apparently this is something of a ritual in a tea producing country such as India. The Embassy of India in Washington will furnish a special brand of Indian tea which will be made immediately available upon arrival. It is recommended that the tea be prepared as follows:

Place the tea leaves in a pot using one teaspoon of tea to each cup of the finished product adding one teaspoon of tea "for the pot". At the moment that the water begins to boil it should be poured on the tea leaves in the pot. The Prime Minister likes his tea a little stronger than most Americans. It is suggested that an additional pot of hot water for diluting the tea be available, if necessary; a small pitcher of cold milk which may be poured into the cup of tea, if desired. Sugar and lemon, and small cookies and/or small sandwiches should be available.

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The Prime Minister does not care to be served breakfast in his room, but would rather come to the breakfast room or dining room. The Prime Minister customarily wears a fresh rose bud in his tunic every day. If a red, pink, yellow or white rose bud is available it is certain to be appreciated.

Mrs. Gandhi's requirements are virtually the same as the Prime Minister's. At private functions she may eat beef and sample wines, etc.

Mr. Pillai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs, will eat most anything and enjoys Scotch and Soda. The two personal assistants the Prime Minister are vegetarians, as are Ambassador Mehta and Mr. Krishna Menon. Care should be taken to serve them extra portions of vegetables when they are present.

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# EISENHOWER HOME FLOOR PLAN






# DEPARTMENT OF STATE
## FOR THE PRESS

December 12, 1956 NO. 620

PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
OF HIS EXCELLENCY JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA
December 16-23, 1956

Members of the Party:

His Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru
Prime Minister of India

Mrs. Indira Gandhi
Daughter of the Prime Minister

His Excellency G. L. Mehta
Ambassador of India
and Mrs. Mehta

The Honorable N.R. Pillai
Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations of India

Mr. M. O. Mathai
Special Assistant to the Prime Minister

---

Mr. Om Prakash
Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister

Mr. N. Sreeraman
Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister

Abdul Hamid
Personal Attendant to the Prime Minister

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SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15

6:00 p.m. (London Time) — The Prime Minister and party will leave London Airport aboard the Columbine III for Washington.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 16

12:00 noon EST — The Prime Minister and party will arrive at MATS Terminal, Washington National Airport, where he will be met by the Vice President and Mrs. Nixon, other United States Government officials, and members of the Diplomatic Corps. Full military honors will be rendered.

12:35 p.m. — The Prime Minister and Mrs. Gandhi will arrive at the White House accompanied by the Vice President and Mrs. Nixon.

1:00 p.m.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 16 (cont.)

1:00 p.m. The President and Mrs. Eisenhower will have a private luncheon for the Prime Minister and Mrs.Gandhi at the White House.

3:30 p.m. The Secretary of State will call on the Prime Minister at the President's Guest House (Blair House).

5:00 p.m. The Prime Minister and Mrs. Gandhi will meet the Indian Community at the Embassy of India, 2700 Macomb Street, Northwest.

8:00 p.m. The Chief Justice and Mrs. Warren will give a dinner in honor of the Prime Minister and Mrs. Gandhi at the Supreme Court.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 17

9:00 a.m. The President will call for the Prime Minister at the Blair House and leave immediately by car for Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

11:00 a.m. The President and the Prime Minister will arrive at the President's farm at Gettysburg.

1:00 p.m. Mrs. Eisenhower will entertain at luncheon in honor of Mrs. Gandhi at the White House.

The Prime Minister will dine privately with the President at Gettysburg.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18

9:00 a.m. The President and the Prime Minister will leave Gettysburg.

1:00 p.m. The Vice President of the United States and Mrs. Nixon will give a luncheon in honor of the Prime Minister and Mrs. Gandhi at the 1925 F Street Club.

5:30 p.m. His Excellency the Ambassador of India and Mrs. Mehta will give a reception in honor of the Prime Minister and Mrs. Gandhi at the Embassy of India.

8:00 p.m. The Secretary of State and Mrs. Dulles will give a state dinner in honor of the Prime Minister and Mrs. Gandhi at the Pan American Union.

11:15 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. The Prime Minister will address a nation-wide audience on radio and television.

GENERAL SNYDER'S PROGRESS REPORTS - Sunday, 16 DECEMBER 1956

0854 - The President departed the White House by motorcade for the National Presbyterian Church.

0858 - Arrived at the Church. Attended the 0900-hour services.

0954 - Departed the Church.

0957 - Arrived at the White House.

1235 - His Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, arrived at the White House. He was accompanied by: Mrs. Indira Gandhi, his daughter; N. R. Pillai, Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs; M. O. Mathai, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister; Vice President and Mrs. Nixon; Secretary of State and Mrs. Dulles; and Admiral and Mrs. Radford.

1300 - The President and Mrs. Eisenhower gave a small private luncheon at the White House for Prime Minister Nehru and Mrs. Indira Gandhi. John and Barbara Eisenhower were among those present.

I visited with the President during the afternoon. He went for a swim.

The President got a little upset at bedtime because Sgt. Moaney had gone to Gettysburg and taken his bottle of Agarol with him. There was none available for the President's night dose.

GENERAL SNYDER'S PROGRESS REPORTS - Monday, 17 DECEMBER 1956

0805 - Went to his office.

0848 - The President departed the White House by motorcade for Blair House. Here he alighted from his limousine to greet Prime Minister Nehru. The two of them got into the limousine and proceeded to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

1057 - Arrived at the Gettysburg Farm.

1400 - The President and Prime Minister Nehru departed the Farm and motored to the Feaster Farm. The President showed Nehru his black Angus cows.

1414 - Returned to the President's Farm.

1417 - Motored to the Neuman Farm.

1424 - Departed the Neuman Farm and motored to the Virginia Memorial Statue of Robert E. Lee. Here the President gave a brief account of the Civil War.

1434 - Departed the Virginia Memorial Statue and returned to the President's Farm.

1440 - Arrived at the Farm. The President showed Nehru the air-conditioning system the horses; and the heifers in the barn.



1448 - Went inside the President's house.

The President sat with Nehru all day long -- two hours in the car and the rest of the day on the porch with the exception of the hour from 1400 to 1500 at which time the President and Nehru looked over the cattle and went to the Lee Monument on the battlefield.

2130 - The President went to bed. Nehru dictated to his stenographer from 2130 hours until 2400 hours.

GENERAL SNYDER'S PROGRESS REPORTS - Tuesday, 18 DECEMBER 1956

0700 - The President was up. He sat on the porch until Nehru came to breakfast.

0850 - The President and Nehru departed the Gettysburg Farm by motorcade for Washington, D. C.

1038 - Arrived at Blair House. Nehru alighted; there was a short exchange of farewells; and the President proceeded to the White House.

1042 - Arrived at the White House.

1058 - Conference with Vice President Nixon until 1129 hours.

1258 - Returned to the Mansion.

1300 - BP: 116/74/68 regular

There were no accentuations of beats in any stage of the blood pressure reading. This is the most satisfactory blood pressure reading that I have noted for months.

1425 - Returned to the office.

1433 - Conference with Secretary Dulles until 1500 hours.

1500 - Conference with Emmet Hughes until 1545 hours.

1640 - Departed the office and went to the Dental Office. Had 1 1/2 hours in the dental chair preparing the 7th upper molar for a gold crown because of split in tooth which was sensitive to cold.

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## THE PRESIDENT

### ...nfers with Nehru

Pres. Eisenhower discussed global problems with Indian Prime Min. Jawaharlal Nehru at the White House Dec. 16 & at Mr. Eisenhower's Gettysburg, Pa. farm Dec. 17–18. The talks also continued in the President's auto, in which the 2 leaders were driven to Gettysburg Dec. 17 and back to Washington Dec. 18.

Nehru warned that, to India & to radio–TV address from Washington Dec. 18 that India's neutralist policy "does not mean passivity of mind or action, lack of faith or conviction...[nor] submission to what we consider evil." In its pursuit of peace, he said, India had "chosen the path of non–alignment in any military or like pact or alliance." This, he asserted, was "a positive & dynamic approach to such problems that confront us." Nehru, warned that, to India & to other countries of "resurgent" Asia that had just "won back their independence," "colonialism, in any form or anywhere, is abhorrent." Even the "tragedies" of Hungary & Egypt have one hopeful aspect," he said, "for they have demonstrated that the most powerful countries cannot revert to old colonial methods or impose their domination over weak countries. World opinion has shown that it can organize itself to resist such outrages."

The U.S., Nehru declared, "has added greatly to its prestige by upholding worthily the principles" of the UN Charter in the face of "grievous transgressions of the moral standards freely accepted by the nations of the world." He pointed out that technology had made the U.S. the leader" of "a new age" in which "the whole world is our neighbor and the old divisions of continents & countries matter less & less."

India, he said, believed "above all... in liberty, equality, the dignity of the individual & the freedom of the human spirit" and therefore was "firmly wedded to the democratic way of life." India believed, he said, "in nonaggression & noninterference by one country in the affairs of another & in the growth of tolerance between them & the capacity for peaceful co–existence. We think that by the free exchange of ideas & trade & other contacts," nations "will learn from [each] other and truth will prevail. We, therefore, endeavor to maintain friendly relations with all countries, even though we may disagree with them in their policies or structure of government."

Nehru, speaking to Indian residents of Washington Dec. 16, denied that his foreign policy was one of "sitting on the fence." "We just act..[&] judge every issue independently," he said. By this course, he indicated, India could "be helpful in bringing other countries together & promoting understanding." "Because there is so much fear & jealousy, it is good to have some sort of bridge in the world," he said...

Wednesday, December 12 —Tuesday, December 18, 1956



## THE PRESIDENT

### *Pleased by Nehru Talks*

Prime min. Jawaharlal Nehru of India flew to New York Dec. 20 after 4 days of discussions with Pres. Eisenhower on world problems.

In a joint communique issued before Nehru's departure, the 2 conferees expressed a conviction that "the greater understanding of their respective policies reached at these talks will facilitate the constant efforts of India & the United States toward the achievement of peaceful & friendly intercourse among nations." The communique reported that "the talks confirmed the broad area of agreement between" the 2 countries.

#### Nehru Explains Views

Nehru told reporters in Washington Dec. 19 that, in his talks with Mr. Eisenhower, he had "gathered the impression" that U.S. policy "is a flexible policy adapting itself to circumstances" and "not as rigid as I thought." He conceded, however, that he did not know whether U.S. policy regarding Communist China was less rigid than he had thought. Among views Nehru expressed at his Dec. 19 press conference:

*Hungary*—I imagine that people in the Soviet Union are not very happy about events in ...gary, if I may put it mildly in that way." There ...o question of India refusing" or not refusing "to condemn" Soviet action in Hungary. "The whole point was: Are we going to satisfy ourselves by a strong denunciation of condemnation or are we to have some constructive approach to the problem." India "expressed our disapproval.. in very strong terms" but also urged "a constructive approach"—action by the UN Secretary General "to get things going."

*China*—"I did not bring any particular message from Red Chinese Premier Chou En–lai to Pres. Eisenhower, but "I told the President...the gist of our [Chou's & Nehru's] talks in regard to some matters of common interest." "I would say that they [the Chinese Reds] have certain complaints...in the sense of steps taken or not taken." They say they "have gone several steps forward, but there has been no favorable reaction" from the U.S. India's recognition of Communist China & refusal to recognize Natl. China "should indicate our views on the subject" of whether the UN, the U.S. & other free countries were wrong in recognizing the Nationalists. "Legally & constitutionally speaking, there is only one China," and each of the competing regimes "claims to be the real article." "Obviously, the Formosan Govt., at the most, is the Formosan Govt. It is not China."

*Middle East*—India had "no particular magic" plan to settle the suez Canal or Arab—Israeli problems; "we function" in the UN & "on the diplomatic plane." Any steps to clear the canal should be "subject always to the sovereignty of Egypt, and we don't want to ask for steps...which offends that sovereignty in any way." A question as to whether he would agree to a Suez settlement that would allow Egypt to continue to bar Israeli ships would have to be answered "slightly indirectly," Although Egyptian Pres. Gamel Abdel Nasser had said he accepted the Suez convention of 1888 "completely," "his interpretation of that was that if he is at war with a country, then it does not apply." Some court such as the World Court "should be asked to interpret it, and whatever interpretation they give should be accepted." India had recognized Israel but "felt that we would be able to help in this matter more by not going a step further and...exchanging diplomatic missions....Our relations & contacts with the Arab nations are very considerable, and in this matter there is considerable passion....Of course we sympathize with many of the claims of the Arabs, their territory...refugees... [&] other matters."

(Pakistani Prime Min. Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy told *N.Y. Times* correspondent A. M. Rosenthal in Karachi Dec. 19 that although he condemned Anglo–French & Israeli attacks on Egypt, Pakistani sympathy for Egypt was cooling because of Nasser's ties with the USSR & India & Nasser's contempt for feelings of other Moslem countries.)

Soviet Union—"There is a great deal of good & bad, both," about the USSR. "Obviously there are many things in the Soviet Union...with which I do not agree." The Soviet people "are an extraordinarily friendly people..and passionately desirous of peace. I believe also that many recent tendencies in the Soviet Union have been in the right direction of liberalization, democratization..."

Although "I don't think" democracy will come to Russia in the form of parliamentary government, "I should imagine that the other forms of democratic expression, that is, the people's will prevailing..will almost inevitably take shape." The word "colonial" does not apply to the USSR in the usual context "but it does apply in other contexts. That is, if you say the Soviet Union dominates over another country [as in Hungary], it is perfectly correct...& it is a bad thing."

*Disarmament*—"The important thing" was "the necessity to create a certain confidence that no party will misuse" disarmament. "Therefore, I suppose it is essential" to have "some kind of checking & inspection." "I do feel that...the 2 main parties concerned are remarkably near each other"; "what was put forward is not very different and can be ironed out." "The background of lack of confidence...is the real thing, not the proposals."

*Kashmir*—"The beginnings of the Kashmir trouble" were "armed aggression on Kashmir," as was "acknowledged" by the UN commission that handled the situation. There was no plebiscite because "the first thing laid down" by the UN commission "was that Pakistan armies should withdraw & the aggression should cease." "They haven't withdrawn yet. Nothing else follows unless that is done."

India—"I disclaim entirely... any claim to moral force for India as a country." "Our leader," the late Mahatma Gandhi, was "a very powerful" exponent of moral force. He "influenced India greatly in the right direction and we tried, to some extent, to follow what he said...I do not wish anyone to imagine that we in India think ourselves more moral...or better in any way than others." (The Indian Govt. Dec. 19 rejected demands that its political opponents be permitted to use the Govt.–controlled All–India radio to campaign for the Feb. 1957 elections. An Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman revealed Dec. 21 that India had warned Portugal that action would be taken against further alleged violation of Indian air space by Portuguese planes en route to Goa. The warning was sent through the Egyptian Govt., which handled India's interests in Portuguese possessions in India.)

Wednesday, December 19—Tuesday, December 25, 1956


Skeet Range
Guard House
Riding Ring
Putting Green
Barn/Stable
Eisenhower Barbecue
Home
Greenhouses
Garden
Playhouse
Helipad
Cattle Barns
Herdsman's House
Bull Shed
Show Barn
Bull Shed
Pond