




150th Anniversary 1864/2014

THE SENTINEL

Washington Attacked: The 1864 Invasion & 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign



M.A.P.

showing Routes and Camps
of the Army of the Valley Dist.
from Staunton, Va. to Washington, D.C.
and back to Strasburg, Va.
from June 27th to July 22nd, 1864
to accompany Report of
Col. Tolbert's Topo. Eng. V. D.

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The Sentinel

A publication
of the National
Park Service



Mission

The National Park Service preserves unimpaired the natural and cultural resources and values of the national park system for the enjoyment, education, and inspiration of this and future generations. The Park Service cooperates with partners to extend the benefits of natural and cultural resource conservation and outdoor recreation throughout this country and the world.

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The 1864 Campaigns



Abraham Lincoln was convinced he would lose. The Civil War was supposed to end in 90 days. It now dragged into its fourth year in 1864. Lincoln's popularity reached new lows. The war to save the Union and to terminate slavery seemed endless. Patience was breaking. War-weary Northerners despised the draft; detested war-time taxes; decried rampant inflation; and despaired over suppression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

And then there were the casualties. Hundreds of thousands of wounded - tens of thousands of dead. Casualties in the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg alone produced more dead and wounded Union and Confederate soldiers than in every previous American war combined.

"It seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be reelected," a dejected Lincoln informed his Cabinet near the end of August, 1864. Only ten weeks remained before Election Day. It was not supposed to be this way. Lincoln had expected a different outcome. The year had dawned hopeful. The President finally had discovered the general that would bring him victory - U.S. Grant.

Ulysses S. Grant rated as the North's best commander. The former store keeper from Galena, Illinois, had purveyed his West Point training into stunning and smashing successes. He had captured one Confederate army at Fort Donelson and captured a second at Vicksburg, securing the Mississippi River for the Union. He had defeated Southern armies at Shiloh and Chattanooga, and his military stardom propelled him to promotion as lieutenant general - the loftiest rank bestowed to George Washington.

President Lincoln had never met his new commander. Then Grant unexpectedly arrived at a White House reception in March, 1864, and an onlooker described his first impression: "He had no gait, no station, no manner, rough, light-brown whiskers, rather a scrubby


look." The observer noticed Grant's trademark appearance. "He had a cigar in his mouth, and rather the look of a man who did, or once did, take a little too much to drink." But despite Grant's "slightly seedy look," the recorder was transfixed by Grant's "clear blue eye and a look of resolution, as if he could not be trifled with."

General Grant conceived a master plan to win the war. Conferred with the title of commander of the armies, he now could choreograph the maneuvers of the armies. Grant envisioned two targets that could collapse the Confederacy - Richmond, the Southern capital; and Atlanta, a vital transportation and logistics center. To ensure the Confederates could not transfer reinforcements to these threatened targets, Grant ordered simultaneous attacks against Confederate positions along six different fronts from Virginia to Georgia to Alabama.

Grant's principal nemesis was General Robert E. Lee. Lee controlled the Virginia defense, and he had defeated five U.S. generals who had dared to move against Richmond. But Grant was undeterred by Lee's fame and prowess. "I am heartily tired of hearing what Lee is going to do," Grant complained to a subordinate. "Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." According to one officer, Grant's face showed three expressions: "deep thought, extreme determination, and great simplicity and calmness. . . . He habitually wears an expression as if he had determined to drive his head through a brick wall and was about to do it."

Even Confederate high society expressed concern about Grant. "He don't care a snap if men fall like the leaves fall; he fights to win, that chap does," wrote Richmond diarist Mary Boykin Chestnut. "[T]hey have scared up a man who succeeds, and they expect him to remedy all that has gone wrong."

Unfortunately for Lincoln and Grant, much would continue to go wrong.



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The Shenandoah Valley:

1864 Avenue of Invasion


By Shannon Moeck, Park Ranger,
Cedar Creek and Belle Grove National Historical Park

An important theater of operations throughout the Civil War, the Shenandoah Valley witnessed its most significant campaigning and bloodiest fighting in 1864. Varying in width from three to thirty miles, the Valley runs roughly 140 miles southwest to northeast. Two majestic mountain ranges—the Alleghenies to the west and the Blue Ridge to the east—define the Valley. The two forks of the Shenandoah River flow north through the Valley, coming together above the Massanutten Mountain, which bisects the Valley for nearly 50 miles. Since the river flows downhill, the northern terminus of the Valley is considered the “lower,” while the southern (upriver) end is the “upper” Shenandoah Valley.

The Valley’s strategic importance during the Civil War was due to several key factors. The region was a top producer of wheat and grains in the decades leading up to the war. These vast agricultural resources helped sustain the Confederate war effort, earning the Valley the nickname “Breadbasket of the Confederacy.” The Valley also provided the Confederacy with raw resources of iron ore for its industrial war manufacturing. A transportation network of railroads and roads supplied these much needed goods to General Robert E. Lee’s army operating around Richmond. Especially important was the macadamized Valley Turnpike, which ran the length of the Valley. It became an avenue for the rapid movement of troops and supplies and was commonly used as a back door approach for Confederates moving toward Washington, D.C.

In 1862, Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson conducted his brilliant “Shenandoah Valley Campaign” as a diversion to keep the Federals away from Richmond during Major General George B. McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign. The following year Union forces were swept from the Valley during Lee’s second invasion of the north in a campaign

the culminated at the Battle of Gettysburg. As a result of these Confederate victories, the Shenandoah Valley became known as the “Valley of Humiliation” for Northern commanders.



Major General David Hunter

By the spring of 1864, Valley residents had grown weary of the conflict after sustaining three years of war and seeing their livestock and food seized by armies on both sides. They would soon face even greater losses during the destructive campaigns that summer and fall. After the war, a Valley resident reported, “Yankees were here in ’62... We could not keep anything that was good, and we thought we were having a hard time, but affairs weren’t quite so dizzy those days as they were later in the war.”

President Abraham Lincoln knew that many northerners were also growing weary of the war, threatening his chances for reelection that November. His best chance of ensuring victory in the polls was military success on the battlefield.

In March of 1864, Lincoln promoted Ulysses. S. Grant to General in Chief of all Union armies and Grant quickly organized an offensive across all fronts of the war, including a thrust up the Shenandoah Valley. In addition to meeting opposing armies on the battlefield, Grant’s plan also dictated the destruction of all agricultural resources that supported the Confederacy, ushering in a new policy of “Total War.”

The 1864 Valley Campaign began in May with Grant’s orders to have Brigadier General George Crook and Major General Franz Sigel’s men converge in Staunton, Virginia. Crook’s men were ordered to advance south

through West Virginia and to cut all rail links from Virginia to the west. Sigel's 10,000 men were ordered to move south through the Shenandoah Valley. This strategy would keep Confederate forces engaged in the Valley, rather than heading east to reinforce Lee as Grant advanced south towards Richmond.

While Grant and Lee were battling at Spotsylvania Courthouse, Sigel's army was blocked by Confederates commanded by Major General John C. Breckenridge at New Market on May 15, 1864. As the battle raged, fearing the Federals would exploit a dangerous gap in his line, Breckenridge sought for men to fill it. With no veteran troops available Breckenridge, after a pause, ordered the cadets from the Virginia Military Institute to move into position saying, "Put the boys in, and may God forgive me for that order." Breckenridge made the right move. Sigel was defeated at New Market, and retreated down the Valley to Strasburg, crossing Cedar Creek by dusk on May 16.

After the discouraging loss at New Market, Grant replaced Sigel with Major General David Hunter, who was given the same orders; destroy the rails and supplies as he moved south to meet Crook in Staunton. Meanwhile, Lee moved Breckenridge's division east to reinforce the Army of Northern Virginia at Hanover Junction. This left Major General William E. "Grumble" Jones to command only a small Confederate force in the Valley.


The Battle of Piedmont occurred on June 5 while Hunter was making his way to Staunton. Hunter crushed the smaller Confederate army, killing Jones and taking nearly 1,000 prisoners. Moving on to Staunton, Hunter was joined by Crook's army marching from West Virginia. Hunter implemented "Total War," destroying everything that was useful to the Confederate war effort. The Federals targeted mills, barns, and public buildings, and Hunter even allowed widespread looting by his troops. This devastation earned him the nickname "Black Dave." On June 11, Hunter occupied Lexington



The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in the wake of Hunter

and the following day, ordered the Virginia Military Institute and the home of former Virginia Governor John Letcher to be burned. Hunter then turned his sights toward the Confederate hospital complex and rail and canal depots in the town of Lynchburg, VA.

The threat posed by Hunter caused Lee to make a decision that would impact his ability to take offensive action against Grant in the Richmond/Petersburg area. In a bold move, Lee decided to send his Second Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early, to face Hunter. The mission laid out by Lee was threefold; to protect Lynchburg, to drive Hunter's army out of the Shenandoah Valley, and, if successful, to invade Maryland and threaten Washington, D.C.



Lieutenant General Jubal Early

Early and his corps arrived in Lynchburg to join in its defence on June 17. Hunter had been slowly making his way to Lynchburg as he laid waste to the houses and farmland of the Valley, giving the Confederates time to reinforce the town before he got there. After sparring with Early on June 18, Hunter withdrew into West Virginia, which accomplished Early's first mission of saving the town as well as his second, to pursue Hunter and push him out of the Valley. With the Valley free of Federal troops, Lee's final order to Early could now be carried out. The Valley, a natural avenue of invasion into Maryland, lay completely open.

WASHINGTON TARGETED

By Brett Spaulding, Park Ranger,
Monocacy National Battlefield

After successfully defending the city of Lynchburg, Virginia, and driving Union Major General David Hunter from the Shenandoah Valley, Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early decided to carry out the rest of his orders. With the Second Corps, over one-quarter of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, Early had accomplished his first task. Next, Lee wanted Early, if he judged it still possible, to move down the Valley and threaten the North. This would force Union Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant to divert troops from the Petersburg, Virginia area and relieve the pressure on Lee. Early's ultimate task was nothing less than the seizure of Washington, D.C., which he reasoned would surely affect the 1864 Presidential election, tipping the tide toward the Democratic Party, which was running on a peace platform.

Early was an excellent choice for the mission. Lee often referred to him as "my bad old man" because of his profanity and gruffness. A source of his legendary bad temper might have been rheumatoid arthritis. At times, he suffered severely and required assistance to mount his horse. In spite of his disability and character flaws, Lee recognized that Early was a fighter who had earned his stars at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, and proven his ability to command independently at Chancellorsville.


On June 23, 1864, the last major invasion into Union territory began. Despite soaring temperatures, Early made excellent time – traveling an average of 20 miles per day. When passing through Lexington, Virginia, Early and his men paid homage at the grave of Lieutenant General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, Early's old commander. They arrived in Staunton, Virginia on June 27, where Early reduced his wagon train, gathered supplies, and reorganized his command, changing its name from the Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia to the Army of the Valley District.

When Early arrived in Staunton a dispatch was waiting from Lee. Early replied, informing Lee of his actions and intentions, stating that he had decided, "to turn down the valley and proceed according to your instructions to threaten Washington and if I find an opportunity – to take it." He also acknowledged the effort to release Confederate prisoners at Point Lookout – his first indication of such a plan.

Resuming the march on June 28, the army continued its fast pace north and reached Winchester, Virginia, on July 2. Upon arriving, Early received a second message from Lee. It directed him to remain in the lower Valley and destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. In an attempt to delay Hunter's expected return to the Valley, Early had already set plans in motion to accomplish this.

Early's army did not encounter any Union forces until July 2, when he fought Hunter's reserve division, which had remained in West Virginia. Hunter's subsequent retreat removed the last Union forces from the Valley, leaving it undefended until after Early returned to Virginia. After retreating, Hunter told Grant that Early had returned to Richmond, information that Confederate deserters in Petersburg confirmed. This misinformation enabled Early to move down the Valley without encountering additional Union opposition.

After destroying the railroad, Early ordered his army to begin crossing the Potomac River into Maryland on July 5. Once across, they would destroy the canal and resume their march. The invasion into the north had commenced and Early and his army had their sights fixed on the grandest prize of the war – Washington.



View of Harpers Ferry from Maryland Heights —

The key to the defence of Harpers Ferry in July, 1864



HARPERS FERRY STALLS an INVASION

By Dennis E. Frye, Chief Historian,
Harpers Ferry National Historical Park

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant had taken command of the Union armies in the spring of 1864, and “Unconditional Surrender” Grant was smashing his way toward Richmond. By early summer, the combatants were bogged down in trench warfare near Petersburg, Virginia (now Petersburg National Battlefield). General Robert E. Lee, desperate to break the siege, dispatched Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early with about 14,000 men on a diversion mission to threaten Washington. Early chose the Shenandoah Valley as his portal to the capital—and Harpers Ferry stood in his way.

“The enemy are approaching, by way of Charlestown, in heavy force,” pronounced Brigadier General Max Weber just before noon on July 4. The current base commander at the Ferry then informed Chief of Staff Henry Halleck in Washington that if reinforcements did not arrive, “I must leave the town, but shall hold Maryland Heights at all hazards.”

“It was time for the yearly ‘skedaddle,’” announced provost clerk Charlie Moulton as he watched the quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance supplies hurried across the Potomac for safekeeping. Indeed,

one year had passed since the last evacuation during the Gettysburg Campaign. “At no time during the war was there as deep a gloom on Harper’s Ferry as on that anniversary of the birth of our nation,” recorded town resident Joseph Barry. “The people had entertained the fond hope that the war was nearly over.” Confederates soon approached Bolivar Heights, pressing against the Federal left along the Shenandoah, employing tactics similar to Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s during the 1862 siege. After heavy skirmishing Weber pulled his forces back into the defenses of Camp Hill. With Bolivar abandoned, the Confederates pressed forward with their sharpshooters, hiding themselves “in the houses and behind fences and in the orchards and everywhere to keep out of sight and pick off our men.” The chief of artillery, poised upon Maryland Heights, inquired, “Will it do to throw shell into or over Bolivar? The d—d town is full of rebels.” The artillery opened fire, blasting Bolivar Heights. “Every house in Bolivar was damaged to a more or less extent,” Moulton wrote.

During the early evening of July 4, Weber abandoned Harpers Ferry and retired to the defenses of Maryland Heights, where he had 30 days rations in storage. Federal troops removed the pontoon bridge and set the B&O Railroad bridge on fire.



Major General Franz Sigel:

Commanded the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1864. In early July he arrived in Harpers Ferry to oppose Jubal Early. Sigel orchestrated a defensive stand on Maryland Heights that caused a crucial four-day delay in Early’s march toward Monocacy and Washington. During Sigel’s time in Harpers Ferry, missionaries working to educate former slaves found a patron in the German-American general. A former New York City schoolteacher and an ardent abolitionist, Sigel promptly granted the missionaries’ requests for rations, quarters, and classroom materials.

“It was a grand and sublime sight to look over into the Ferry and see the flames shooting upwards from all parts and directions of the old town . . . and listen to the deep booming of the shells over our heads all through the night,”

observed Charlie Moulton from his new perch on Maryland Heights.

The next morning the signal station on the Heights spied long Confederate columns crossing the Potomac about eight miles upriver near Shepherdstown. The Southerners crossed continuously for 40 hours. Then the Rebels turned south, adhering to Early’s directive: “Compel the evacuation of Maryland Heights. . . . Promptness and dispatch are absolutely necessary.”

Meanwhile Major General Franz Sigel had arrived with his command. Additional reinforcements had hurried from Washington, bolstering the Union troop strength on Maryland Heights to about 10,000 men. Authorities in Washington, meanwhile, began to panic. “We have almost nothing in Baltimore and Washington, except militia, and considerable alarm has been created,” Halleck informed Grant. If the Maryland Heights position collapsed, Washington was vulnerable. Halleck urged Grant to send someone to the empty defenses of the U.S. capital.

As Sigel watched the Confederate army approach from the Maryland side of the Potomac, he grew annoyed by Rebel sharpshooters in Harpers Ferry. They were posted along the old U.S. Armory river wall and the B&O trestles, firing across the Potomac into Union supply trains coming up from Sandy Hook. Sigel “notified citizens to vacate houses, as he would shell the town.”

Grade-schooler Annie Marmion never forgot the next two days. “The little Village of Harper’s Ferry had its worst experience of a Bombardment.” Annie’s family, and more families and friends, huddled in their stone cellar “low enough to escape the cannon balls and the shells” and strong enough to protect “against the musket or rifle balls of the sharpshooters.”


Not everyone escaped unscathed. A shell struck the house of Thomas Jenkins, shattering it badly and injuring his family. An African American woman who had ventured forth for water was killed, her lifeless body stranded on Shenandoah Street all day. A shell penetrated the house of James McGraw on High Street, but passed directly through without injuring anyone. Its momentum carried it into an adjoining house “where it fell on a bed without exploding.” Miss Margaret Kelly was in the room “when the unwelcome visitor intruded and settled down on the bed.” Even Annie Marmion’s refuge was no longer safe. A shell crashed through a dormer window, startling the refugees and “covering them with plaster and broken slate.” Another dropped “in their very midst, but fortunately into the unsightly hogshead of water where it boils and hisses, steams and sputters,” but does not explode.

Control of the indomitable Maryland Heights determined the outcome of every major engagement at Harpers Ferry.

Sigel was more concerned about the Maryland side of the river. Throughout the day on July 6, Confederates probed all along his Maryland Heights defenses, searching for a weakness. The enemy line extended nearly two miles from the Potomac to the top of Elk Ridge. The Confederates tested Sigel's left along the river, but they failed to turn the flank. The next day, the Confederates advanced to within 600 yards of the Union defenses. "The enemy made preparation for a general attack,"

reported Sigel. The guns on Maryland Heights opened fire. The Confederates tried to bring artillery into position to support the attack, but were "unable to do so on account of the field batteries and heavy [cannon] pieces in the forts, which shelled their artillery, infantry, and trains for a distance of four miles."

A frustrated Jubal Early did not expect the Maryland Heights defenders to remain. They had evacuated the mountain during Jackson's siege in 1862 and again during the Gettysburg Campaign in 1863. Early anticipated their departure once again. "Old Jube" had expended four days about Harpers Ferry, trying to remove the Yankees. They would not oblige this



(National Park Service/Harpers Ferry Center Commissioned Art Collection/artist Hugh Brown)

This 100-pound Parrott Rifle atop Maryland Heights could be rotated 360 degrees, enabling Union artillerymen to attack Confederates approaching from any direction. The gun's very presence on top of the mountain was an engineering feat, considering the cannon tube alone weighed nearly five tons. In July 1864 it was used to prevent Lt. Gen. Jubal Early's army from seizing Harpers Ferry, stalling his advance on Washington.

time. "My desire had been to maneuver the enemy out of Maryland Heights," Early revealed, "But he had taken refuge in his strongly fortified works, and as they could not be approached without great difficulty. . . . I determined to move [around] the heights."

"No signs of the enemy could be seen on our front," the signal station reported on the morning of July 8. Early's army had rushed east toward Frederick, interposed between Maryland Heights and Washington, and Sigel was cut off from the capital. The danger had passed for Harpers Ferry, however. Now all eyes focused on Washington. The defenders of Maryland Heights had stalled Early for four days—

four days that earned Grant invaluable time to rush troops north to defend Washington, and just enough time for General Lew Wallace to make a courageous stand at Monocacy. Maryland Heights had met its final test of the Civil War. Never again did the Confederates threaten the "citadel of Harpers Ferry."



It is Not Civilized War. . . .

By Stephen R. Bockmiller,
Advisory Board Member,
Heart of the Civil War Heritage Area

In 1864, after three years of bloodletting and with seemingly little progress toward victory, Union strategy expanded to include breaking the will of the Confederate citizenry to support the war effort.


On May 21, Union Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant gave Major General David Hunter command of the forces in the Shenandoah Valley. Ordered to employ “scorched earth” tactics and disrupt any activity that could support the Confederate war effort, Hunter pressed his orders to the limit. Contrary to limitations in Grant’s orders, hundreds of homes and other private property were destroyed in the following weeks.

At Lexington on June 12, Hunter ordered the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) razed and ex-Governor John Letcher’s home burned in retaliation for his exhorting his fellow citizens to resist attacks on their communities. Washington College was ransacked

as well. Hunter ordered these actions against the opinions and advice of several of his subordinates and staff. Many Union officers and men found their orders objectionable. When one cavalry officer was later asked where he served, he was embarrassed to admit “Yes, I am one of the ‘barnburners,’ destroyers of homes, etc. I don’t like such work. . . It is not civilized war. . . Harshness is never of any use. We lose by this.”

Southern newspapers screamed at what they described as Hunter’s terrorism of women, children and old men. To confront Hunter, Confederate General Robert E. Lee sent Lieutenant General Jubal Early and 8,000 men from the lines near Cold Harbor. Early and Hunter met in battle at Lynchburg on July 18. Confederate victory forced Hunter to retreat into West Virginia as far west as Charleston and Parkersburg.

Now, it was the Confederates’ turn. With Hunter’s forces in disarray, Lee provided Early additional troops and ordered him to drive down the Valley and threaten Washington. The goal: draw Union troops away from Grant’s march on Richmond.



The Hagerstown Bank (left) and Updegraff’s Hat Store on West Washington Street, Hagerstown, MD

As rebels crossed the Potomac into Maryland, Confederate Brigadier General John McCausland arrived at Hagerstown on July 6 with 1,500 cavalymen. McCausland, a graduate of and professor at the recently torched VMI, was personally incensed at Hunter’s treatment of the civilian population and his alma mater.

Early’s invasion introduced a new element to the war: ransom. He had done this once before in York, PA on June 30, 1863, but only as an alternative to burning rail facilities and Union supplies which would put the entire city at risk. By offering this option, out of control fires would not spread beyond military targets and render York “collateral damage.” But now, ransom became part of the tactics and strategy.

McCausland handed a demand to Hagerstown's leaders for \$20,000 and 1,500 complete sets of men's clothing. When town leaders protested, McCausland bluntly pointed out that the residents of the Valley were offered no such option. The cash levy amounted to about \$3 per every citizen in town.

James D. Roman, President of the Hagerstown Bank, arranged to leverage the cash deposits of three local banks so the town of 6,500 could meet the demands once assurances were received from town leaders that bonds and taxation would repay the banks. The clothing demands were impossible to meet. After a heated exchange, McCausland and town leaders reached a secret agreement. The rebels would accept all the clothing that could be collected in three hours. Town leaders had to keep the secret from their fellow citizens to prevent any withholding.

Once the deadline passed, Hagerstonians uniformly held their breath when they realized they hadn't


come close to collecting enough clothing. However, they were both bewildered and relieved when the rebel horsemen left town that night. Quartermaster Captain John C. Van Fossen presented the town with a receipt for the cash, an inventoried receipt for the clothing collected and a statement that Hagerstown would be subject to no further demands.



Quartermaster Captain
John C. Van Fossen

On July 7, the cavalry advance of Early's army met a small Federal force at Middletown. In 1862, Union troops had marveled at Confederate discipline and the sight of two Confederate soldiers hanged for scavenging. However, this time, stores and homes were looted, horses were "requisitioned," and some locals fought back, killing several Confederates.

Early pitched camp just east of Middletown on July 8. Town Burgess William Ervin was summoned. He reported to Early accompanied by Dr. Strobel, pastor of the Evangelical Lutheran Church Zion. Five thousand dollars was demanded of Middletown - about \$8 for every person in the town of 600 residents. Ervin explained that compliance was




Civil War era bank note and city of Frederick, MD ransom note.

impossible. After some negotiation, Early demanded \$1,500 from the town by 7 a.m. the next day (July 9). The remaining \$3,500 was to be provided by the residents of the surrounding country by the next evening. The town's amount was paid on time. Due to the appearance of Union forces coming from the west, the rebels left town before they could collect the remainder. Middletown too received a receipt for her payment.

On July 9, as the Battle of the Monocacy raged south of Frederick, Early left a small force in that town to collect a \$200,000 ransom. Mayor William Cole protested that such an amount demanded of a city of 8,000 was absurd - that the entire municipal budget was only about \$8,000 per year. The demand was roughly \$25 for each resident in town. These pleas fell on deaf ears. The demand was met when five banks provided the cash, but only when the municipal government offered assurances they would be repaid. The same day, Frederick native Bradley Johnson was cutting across central Maryland with a body of Confederate cavalry. He sent a detail ahead to Westminster to demand 1,500 sets of men's clothing, but when Johnson arrived with his main force, nothing more was said of the matter.

Even after the end of Early's invasion of Maryland, the threat of the torch had not passed. Two cavalry



THE REBELS PILLAGING AT THE HAGERSTOWN DEPOT.

brigades under McCausland and Johnson re-entered Maryland on July 29. Chambersburg, Pennsylvania leaders refused to pay a \$100,000 tribute, mistakenly gambling that the Confederates were bluffing or nearby Union cavalry would disrupt the plans. A large section of Chambersburg was destroyed the next day. Although done in retribution to Hunter's actions in Virginia, burning Chambersburg outraged many in the north. It served as a rallying cry for Union forces as the Federal vice tightened on the Confederacy. The last town ransomed was Hancock, Maryland, which was occupied by rebels on their return to the Potomac. On July 31, \$30,000 was demanded of this town of less than a thousand, but executing the demand was hampered by the arrival of Union cavalry in the vicinity and a near-mutiny by Marylanders in

Johnson's Brigade who were outraged at the thought of burning a Maryland town.

Rather than leading to victory, these harsh Confederate tactics stiffened Union resolve and helped to bring about a quicker end to the war just nine months later.

*In 2014, you can join these towns for commemorations of the Ransom Events of 1864:
Hagerstown – July 4, Frederick – July 5,
Middletown – July 12,
Chambersburg – July 18–20, Hancock – July 26.
For more information visit
www.heartofthecivilwar.org and
www.explorefranklincountypa.com*



www.heartofthecivilwar.org

THE RIGHT ARM OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

By Brett Spaulding, Park Ranger,
Monocacy National Battlefield

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O), headquartered in Baltimore, Maryland, was crucial to the Union war effort. The B&O provided essential logistical support, moving men and supplies between Washington and Baltimore, and from Baltimore through Maryland and northern Virginia to the Ohio River where it connected with other railroads to the west. At the outbreak of the war its President, John W. Garrett, whose sympathies lay with the South, declared it a Southern line. However, Garrett soon realized that his railroad depended primarily on Northern commerce for its survival, and he became a staunch supporter of the Union. He was often called to Washington for advice on transportation matters and was held in such high regard that President Abraham Lincoln came to Garrett's defense when his allegiance to the Union was called into question.

In June of 1864, Lieutenant General Jubal Early invaded the North; his ultimate goal was the capture of Washington, D.C. He failed in this mission, largely due to several critical actions taken by the B&O. In late June, having driven Union Major General David Hunter's army into West Virginia, Early's army began a march north through the Shenandoah Valley. Because there were no longer any Union units in the Valley, Early's march was undetected until he neared Winchester, Virginia.

As refugees flooded north, B&O agents stationed in Winchester received reports of a large body of Confederates operating in the Valley. They understood the railroad would be a primary target, so reports were forwarded to Garrett who promptly sent the news to Washington. Washington did not take the reports seriously since Confederate raids were a common occurrence, but Garrett became concerned as the reports continued to arrive. His stress increased on July 2 when Union Major General Franz Sigel requested 150 railroad cars to evacuate stores from Martinsburg, West Virginia. The cars were provided, but the Union high command still did not consider the threat serious, and no action was taken to reinforce Sigel.

On July 3, Garrett took a different approach as continued reports pushed the estimated Confederate strength upwards of 30,000 men, and Union cavalry near Martinsburg clashed with Confederates. Unhappy with the lack of action from Washington and fearing for his railroad, Garrett met with the Middle Department and VIII Army Corps commander, Major General Lew Wallace, headquartered in Baltimore. Wallace agreed to send men to Monocacy Junction, the western limit of his department, in order to protect the nearby iron railroad bridge across the Monocacy River. Destruction of the bridge would cripple the railroad's ability to quickly move troops west. Garrett immediately made the resources of his railroad available to military authorities for troop movement.



He made arrangements for two trains to move Wallace's troops from Baltimore on the afternoon of July 3. Later that day another train was made available to carry reinforcements sent by Chief of Staff, Major General Henry Halleck from Washington to Harpers Ferry. Two days later, when Wallace decided to send all available forces in his department to Monocacy Junction and personally take command there, another special train carried them west. On July 4, a B&O train evacuated sick and wounded soldiers and hospital stores from the military hospitals in Frederick, which lay in the projected path of Early's army.

During the crisis Garrett maintained a vigilant watch. He received numerous telegraph messages from his employees reporting on Confederate activity and the progress of trains. This enabled him to keep his finger on the pulse of the situation and ensure that Washington was kept informed with the latest information. This was evident on July 5 when President Lincoln contacted Garrett by telegraph and asked about the situation at Harpers Ferry. He contacted Garrett again on July 9 for information on the Battle of Monocacy. It is clear that Lincoln trusted Garrett and understood he would have the latest information.



B & O President—John W. Garrett

When one of Garrett's employees told him that it appeared that Wallace was unsure whether he could operate beyond the Monocacy River, the western boundary of his department, Garrett contacted Washington and requested that Wallace be given permission to extend operations, which was done. When he received a message from Monocacy Junction requesting ammunition, Garrett offered a fast passenger train which could be ready in 20 minutes. To ensure there was no disruption of the railroad or the telegraph during the crisis, he ordered an extra 120 telegraph repairmen and roadmen to remain on duty between Monocacy Junction and Baltimore.

Once Garrett received word that the general in chief, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, was sending reinforcements from the Petersburg, Virginia, area by steamship, he arranged for one of his best employees to oversee offloading of the steamships near Baltimore and transfer of the Union soldiers to fast trains which would speed them west. When the first ship arrived and the officer in charge refused to offload his men before his commander arrived, Garrett intervened. He contacted Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and requested that he countermand the order, which was done. Over the next 26 hours six separate trains transported 3,400 veterans of the Third Division, Sixth Corps to Monocacy Junction. Trains were also used to send dismounted cavalry, which arrived with the Sixth Corps troops, to Washington.

After the Union defeat at the Battle of Monocacy, Garrett once again made arrangements for three trains to transport Wallace's tired troops back to Baltimore. Trains were used a few days later to transport the Sixth Corps troops to Washington to pursue Early, who had moved back into Virginia after his failure to take Washington.


The B&O did not escape unscathed from the crisis. As Early's army neared the Potomac River, part of his men were detached to destroy as much of the railroad as possible to prevent reinforcements arriving from the west. A brigade of cavalry had been ordered to destroy the B&O Railroad at various points between Cumberland, Maryland, and Martinsburg. At Duffield's Depot, located between Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, the railroad was also destroyed. Following the Battle of Monocacy on July 9 the depot at Monocacy Junction was completely burned and the railroad bridge was damaged. Despite these damages, the Confederates were only able to disrupt communications and railroad service briefly, for

such was the efficiency of the B&O that it was up and running once more only a few days later.

The B&O Railroad and John Garrett provided immense aid to the Union during the Confederate invasion. The men of the railroad provided intelligence and fast transportation. Garrett alerted the Union high command of the invasion, convinced Wallace to meet the threat head-on, arranged for transportation and disseminated information. He had a grasp of the

situation, took the initiative, and was insightful enough to transmit only the most pertinent information to Washington. Following the invasion Lincoln referred to Garrett as:

“The right arm of the Federal Government in the aid he rendered the authorities in preventing the Confederates from seizing Washington and securing its retention as the Capital of the Loyal States.”



THE BATTLE OF MONOCACY

By Tracy Evans, Park Ranger, &
Gail Stephens, Volunteer/Author,
Monocacy National Battlefield

When John W. Garrett, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O) president, heard rumors through his railroad agents about a Confederate army heading north through the Shenandoah Valley toward Harpers Ferry, Garrett sent these messages to the Union high command in Washington but no alarm was sounded because they all counted on the return of Major General David Hunter's army to the northern Valley. Hunter had assured them he would arrive soon via the B&O, but he was wrong. His army would miss all the action.

Garrett next went to Major General Lew Wallace, commander of the Middle Department, headquartered in Baltimore. Garrett told Wallace he had to protect the iron railroad bridge which crossed the Monocacy River at Monocacy Junction, just south of Frederick. The bridge would be crucial if troops had to be sent west to confront a Confederate threat. Wallace decided to take action and took a train to Monocacy Junction on July 5 to assess the situation. Like the forts around Washington, Wallace's


department had been stripped of veterans who had been sent to the Army of the Potomac to replace those lost in May and June during the bloody Overland Campaign. By July 7, Wallace, convinced of the threat, had mustered only 3,200 men, mostly militia, and seven pieces of artillery to defend the bridge.

Wallace's worst problem was that neither he nor the Union high command knew the size of the Confederate force or its

objective. Were they heading east toward him or were they heading north into Pennsylvania? Was it an army or merely a cavalry raid? Then, a stroke of luck; on the evening of July 6, Lieutenant Colonel David Clendenin, with five companies of the veteran 8th Illinois Cavalry, reported to Wallace at the Junction. Wallace ordered Clendenin to take two pieces of artillery, head west across the mountains and find the Confederates. On the morning of July 7, in the Middletown Valley just across the Catoctin Mountains from Frederick, Clendenin found the Confederates in the shape of Lieutenant General Jubal Early's cavalry advance. For the next two days, Clendenin's cavalry and part of Wallace's infantry fought Early's cavalry west of Frederick, as Early's 15,000-man army converged on Frederick from the west.

On the evening of July 8, Wallace was with his men west of Frederick, when he received word that part of Early's infantry was approaching Monocacy Junction from the southwest. Wallace ordered a retreat to the junction, so his force would not be trapped between the portions of Early's army coming from the west and that approaching from the southwest. He now knew where Early was headed; the Union capital was not safe.

Wallace stationed his small force – now augmented to over 6,600 after the 3,400-man veteran Third Division of the Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac reinforcements arrived – on the south bank of the Monocacy River, placing the river between himself and the Confederates. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant had sent the veteran troops north to reinforce Hunter when he arrived. Wallace had simply ordered the trains carrying them to be stopped at the junction. When the commander arrived and demanded to know why his men were being stopped, Wallace told him a Confederate army was within a few hours march. The men of the Third Division had enjoyed a respite because they had gotten to Baltimore via a steamship trip up the Chesapeake Bay. In "History of the 87th Pennsylvania Volunteers," soldiers described the trip as "delightful, for the weather was cool and bracing and the air invigorating. The military band of the 87th played its best selections, including 'Maryland, My



Major General Lew Wallace

Maryland.” These men did not know that they would soon be fighting a Confederate army within 40 miles of the nation’s capital, just as Early did not know he would be facing veterans.

On the night of July 8, Lew Wallace performed the first of two important services to the Union. He informed the Union command in Washington that a Confederate army was about 40 miles up the Georgetown Pike, the main road to Washington, and he would attempt to hold them. Wallace hoped this message would spur action to reinforce the city and it did. The commander in Washington told Grant he would not be able to hold the city without reinforcements, so Grant immediately ordered the remainder of the Sixth Corps, some 10,000 men, transported on steamships from southern Virginia to the beleaguered Union capital.

On July 9, Wallace performed his second service when his small army of 6,600 men and seven guns held back Jubal Early’s far larger army for an entire day. Early’s army was more than double the size of Wallace’s force, and he had 36 pieces of artillery to Wallace’s seven. Wallace stretched his troops along a three-mile line on the south side of the Monocacy River. The Middle Department troops were ordered to defend the area from the railroad bridge north to the Baltimore Pike in the event of a Confederate flanking

movement, and to protect the Union retreat route to Baltimore. Wallace placed the Third Division veterans in two lines across the Georgetown Pike south of the river, where he believed Early would concentrate his attack. A small force was stationed north of the river at Monocacy Junction to protect the railroad bridge. Wallace had a simple goal; to delay Early and give time for reinforcements to reach Washington.

Confederate skirmishers advanced down the pike at approximately 8:30 a.m. Confederate artillery was set up on the Best Farm, firing on the Union men protecting the bridges. Confederate sharpshooters in Best’s barn fired on the defenders near the bridge and Union artillerymen on the heights above the river. This problem was removed when Union artillery rounds hit the barn and set it on fire. Captain George Davis, who was in command of the Union skirmishers at the junction remarked on the action involving his men:


“When the enemy advanced, about 8:30 a.m. along the pike from Frederick ... I brought up my 10th Vermonters to this point, and after a severe fight for about an hour, the enemy retired. I knew nothing of the plan of battle except as apparent to the eye. About 11 a.m. a second, a more severe attack was made upon our right and rear by which they intended to

...continued on page 24

UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR MAN OR HORSE: THE POINT LOOKOUT MISSION

By Barbara Justice, Park Ranger,
Monocacy National Battlefield

Point Lookout Prison, located in southern Maryland where the Potomac River meets the Chesapeake Bay, was the largest Union prison camp. Established in 1863, it was a military hospital that was converted to accommodate prisoners. In July 1864, it held 12,000 –



Point Lookout, MD

14,000 Confederate prisoners. Conditions, like in all prisons, were deplorable, with soldiers suffering from exposure and disease.

On June 26, at Staunton, Virginia, Lieutenant General Jubal Early received a message from General Robert E. Lee informing him that an effort would be made to release the Point Lookout prisoners. The mission would require a cavalry detachment to cooperate with a naval landing party. Once liberated, the prisoners would march to Washington where they would join Early’s army and attempt to seize the Union capital.

On July 6, as Early’s army crossed the Potomac River near Sharpsburg, Maryland, Early received word the raid on Point Lookout would occur on July 12. On July 8, Early ordered Frederick native Brigadier General Bradley Johnson to take his cavalry and destroy railroad lines north of Baltimore and south to



Washington, then ride to Point Lookout and seize the prison. Johnson told Early:

“The march laid out for me was utterly impossible . . . it gave me four days, not ninety-six hours, to compass near three hundred miles . . . but I would do what was possible . . .”


Brig. Gen. Bradley Johnson

Two steamers, under Commander John Tyler Wood, were loaded at Wilmington, North Carolina with 20,000 small arms and a battalion of Confederate marines. The steamers put out to sea the night of July 9. Federal authorities, however, had beefed up security at the prison because of the presence of Early’s army in Maryland and a Confederate deserter reported that Point Lookout was one of Early’s targets.

The morning of July 9, Johnson’s brigade of 1,500 men and a horse artillery battery watched the Confederate army engage Union defenders along the Monocacy River and then moved east destroying railroad bridges and cutting telegraph lines. On July 10 they proceeded to Cockeysville, fourteen miles north of Baltimore. Meanwhile the steamers reached Fort Fisher, North

Carolina and prepared to head out to sea. Then Wood received word from Confederate President Davis that the Union knew his plans. Wood cancelled the mission’s naval portion, but was too late to inform Early or Johnson.

At Cockeysville, Johnson detached Major Harry Gilmor and 135 men to destroy the Gunpowder River railroad bridge. Gilmor burned the station, two trains, and backed another train onto the bridge destroying the draw span. On July 13, Gilmor headed to Rockville, but learned that Early was retreating and moved to meet the Confederate army at Poolesville.



Major Harry Gilmor

After detaching Gilmor, Johnson moved south to effect his twin missions of cutting the railroad to Washington and seizing Point Lookout. On July 11, he burned Maryland Governor Bradford’s home in retaliation for the burning of Virginia Governor Letcher’s home. Johnson continued south and was within a day of his target when he received an order from Early recalling him. On the night of July 12, Johnson rejoined Early for the retreat to Virginia.

...continued from page 23

cut us out and take us prisoner. I had been warned of this flank movement... and repelled the attack. The third and last attack began about 3:30 p.m. The wooden bridge over the Monocacy had been burned, without notice to me. At the same time the 9th New York pickets were all withdrawn. The enemy came with overwhelming numbers and desperation...”


When the Confederate cavalry found a ford across the river west of the junction, Wallace ordered the turnpike bridge burned and recalled other veteran units attached to Davis. By the end of the day, only 75 men remained under Davis’ command. He defended the railroad bridge to the last and retreated across it with Confederates in pursuit.

Early’s cavalry commander, Brigadier General John McCausland, with 1,200 Virginia cavalry, found the ford, crossed the river, and moved to the attack about 11 a.m. Part of the veteran units in formation across the pike moved into the fields of the Thomas farm to their left and hastily formed a defensive line which repulsed McCausland’s initial dismounted attack. The

Union troops were concealed behind a fence on the Thomas farm. The unsuspecting Confederates fled from the field when the Union troops unleashed a volley of lead that ripped through them at about 125 yards.

About 2 p.m. McCausland made a second attack which moved around the left end of the Union line, forcing the veterans back to the Georgetown Pike. McCausland’s cavalry seized control of the high ground around the Thomas house, endangering Wallace’s entire force. Wallace noted that the Confederates had wavered in the attack, and sent the 87th Pennsylvania and 14th New Jersey regiments forward in a counterattack. Up the lane they charged and drove the Confederates out, reestablishing the Union line on the Thomas farm from the turnpike bridge to the Thomas house. McCausland’s men attacked once more, but were again pushed back.

Early now ordered his finest infantry division, 3,600 veterans commanded by Major General John B. Gordon, to cross the river and end the battle. Around



Major General John B. Gordon

3:30 p.m. Gordon's three brigades attacked. They moved from the Worthington farm to the east onto the Thomas farm in an echelon attack. First to engage was Brigadier General Clement Evans' Georgia brigade, followed by Brigadier General Zebulon York's Louisianans. In bloody fighting, the two brigades, aided by more than ten Confederate guns deployed across the river and on the grounds of the Worthington farm, pushed the Union line back onto the

Georgetown Pike. Brigadier General William Terry's Virginia brigade was ordered to attack the Union line near ruins of the bridge on the Georgetown Pike. The Union line held until Gordon himself moved with the men of the famed Stonewall brigade along the bank of the river where they were hidden from the Union troops. Up they came over the bluffs and hit the right of the Union line vertically. The end came at about 4:30 p.m. when the Union veterans retreated in disorder from the fierce surprise attack.

Gordon's entire assault took less than two hours, but

he suffered 698 of the estimated 900 total Confederate casualties. Gordon wrote that "The battle of Monocacy was one of the severest ever fought by my troops."

The final action of the battle of Monocacy occurred during the retreat. Lieutenant Colonel Clendenin and the 8th Illinois Cavalry withdrew down the Georgetown Pike. They were closely pursued by the 17th Virginia Cavalry, commanded by Major Frederick Smith. In the streets of Urbana, Maryland, disaster struck the Virginians when the flag bearer of Company F was shot in the shoulder and the flag was seized by Union cavalymen. That flag is today on display in the visitor center at Monocacy National Battlefield

The Confederate victory came at a high cost for, in addition to his losses, Early was forced to spend the night in Frederick. This delay meant that his army reached Washington just as Grant's reinforcements were entering the city two days later. The arrival of these Union veterans was a key factor in Early's ultimate failure to take Washington. Wallace's fierce defense had cost him 1,294 casualties but his action had saved the Union capital. As Secretary of War Edwin Stanton told Wallace in late July, the battle was "timely, well-delivered, well-managed and saved Washington City."



The Final Stand by Keith Rocco

When War Came on the Rockville Pike

The Confederate Advance on Washington

By Susan Claffey, President,
Alliance to Preserve the Civil War
Defenses of Washington

The battle of Monocacy ended near sunset on Saturday, July 9, 1864. Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early's men were weary from weeks of marching, fighting, and the exertions of winning the day's battle. However, there were artillery and wagons to get over the river, dead to bury, and wounded to transport to hospitals in Frederick before they fell asleep on the fields beside the river. Forty miles away lay their prize—Washington City, the Union capital.

With Brigadier General John McCausland's cavalry leading the way, Early resumed his bold quest at daybreak Sunday, July 10. As the sun ascended ever higher, heat and humidity rose with it, and Confederate Sargent John Worsham recalled that it was "terribly hot, and the men straggled a great deal." Over hill and dale they trudged along the Georgetown Pike, today's Route 355, through Urbana, Hyattstown, and Clarksburg, up Parr's Ridge to Gaithersburg. In 1864, it was a narrow dirt path about eight feet wide that wound past farms and villages through a land of divided loyalties, populated mostly by small farmers and scattered slaves.

On July 9, Union Major William Fry had been dispatched to assemble a cavalry force to oppose the Confederates. By nightfall he had 500 cavalrymen and was headed from Washington to reconnoiter above Rockville. On July 10, Fry established a skirmish line at Summit Hall, a 300 acre farm just south of Gaithersburg owned by John DeSillum, a prominent, wealthy bachelor and a slave-holder who was a strong supporter of the Union. Fry's force quickly vanished toward Rockville when the Rebels appeared. Shortly after, a Confederate officer arrived and advised DeSillum that General Early would be coming for dinner.

By late afternoon, McCausland's rebel cavalry had reached Rockville where they quickly brushed aside Fry's men and halted. Arriving Confederate infantry set

up camp at the county fairgrounds east of town, today's Richard Montgomery High School's playing fields. Early's army had marched 20 miles on July 10 and was strung along five miles from Summit Hall to Rockville.



Mary Dawson

That evening, McCausland honored the Montgomery House hotel in Rockville with his patronage, and to the delight of local Southern sympathizers, including the mayor, bid his regimental band to play. Just south of town, the Dawsons of Rocky Glen farm, known Lincoln supporters, were visited by a small group of Confederate soldiers who demanded food. Squashing fear, Mrs. Dawson laid out a meal for the Confederates who ate and departed

without incident, to the family's relief.

At Summit Hall DeSillum recorded that,

"Early and staff sat down to the table. A conversation commenced about the war and its cause. They saw I was a slave holder, and my remarks about John Brown's raid suddenly caused a Colonel Lee to abruptly demand of me 'whether I was for coercing the south!' As I did not intend to lie or act the coward, my reply was 'I wanted the south whipped back under the Constitution, union, and government of the United States—with the rights and privileges she had before the war.' Lee in a rage told me, 'You are an abolitionist—it is no use to blame the devil and do the devil's work.' and was very insulting."

DeSillum's farm was stripped for food, fodder, and livestock, and its fences torn down for firewood. DeSillum confronted Early: "Do you intend, sir, to give me up to be indiscriminately plundered?" Early replied: "It is plain where your sympathies lie. You cannot expect favor or protection." His sister, having already figured that out, had hidden \$3,000 and some

government bonds under her skirt. On the nearby farm of Ignatius Fulks 1,800 cavalymen and their animals camped with similar devastation.

Early arrived in Rockville at daybreak July 11. Here he had a choice to make—continue down what is now called the Rockville Pike and cross into northwest Washington a mile west of Fort Reno, or take his army east via New Cut Road, today's Veirs Mill Road, to the Seventh Street turnpike at Leesborough, modern Georgia Avenue in Wheaton. Here the Confederates could turn south to the northern corner of the District. Early hedged his bets. His cavalry would test Fort Reno. He and the bulk of his men would move east.

McCausland's cavalry headed down the pike toward Fort Reno and reached the settlement of Montrose where the old road to Georgetown broke off. The old road, built by British General Edward Braddock in 1755, paralleled and then rejoined the pike at Darcy Store (Bethesda). McCausland ordered part of his command down the old road to protect his flank. They were seen by a young girl in the loft of a nearby cabin, which was the famous "Uncle Tom's Cabin" in today's Josiah Henson Park.



"Uncle Tom's Cabin" in Josiah Henson Park.

Major Fry's men had continued an orderly retreat down the Georgetown Pike to Darcy Store. They passed a white wooden church high on a hill west of the pike—the Bethesda Meeting House. Still standing today as Temple Hill Baptist Church, it was built in 1850 on the foundations of its 1820 predecessor. The structure contained a slave gallery above its sanctuary and served a Presbyterian congregation organized

in the 1700s. The Bethesda meeting house would ultimately give its name to the community of Darcy Store.

At Bethesda, Colonel Charles Lowell took command of the Union cavalry. Late in the morning a sharp skirmish erupted when McCausland's main force encountered the waiting Union cavalry. Corporal Valorus Dearborn noted in his journal:

"Checked the enemy here and held him for the day notwithstanding they used their artillery and sharpshooters. It was rather warm but the boys soon got used to their fire and took things cool."

McCausland and Lowell continued to duel as McCausland moved down today's Wisconsin Avenue. About two miles in advance of Ft. Reno, Lowell formed a line which halted the Confederate advance. From this vantage point, McCausland probed the northwest sector of Washington's defenses and pronounced them unassailable.

Meanwhile, Early and his main force marched to Wheaton and then south toward Washington.

Panicked citizens fled and one witness noted, "Families with a few of their choicest articles of household furniture loaded into wagons were hastening to the city." Only a few hundred Union soldiers stood in Early's way but time and distance took its toll and the invaders "stretched out so thin from straggling that it looked like a line of skirmishers." Early described the day:

"[It was] an exceedingly hot one and no air stirring. When marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating cloud of dust and many of them fell by the way.... I pushed on as rapidly as possible..., [but] it became necessary to slacken our pace."

Early's first units and Early himself arrived into full view of Fort Stevens just before noon. Rebel scouts reported the fort as lightly manned and those Confederates that had arrived gathered for an assault. Early's moment for eternal military glory had arrived.

The Alliance to Preserve the Civil War Defenses of Washington is a 501(c)3 organization dedicated to preserve, protect, improve, interpret and connect the Civil War Defenses of Washington.

Washington's Civil War Defenses and the Battle of Fort Stevens

By Dr. B. Franklin Cooling,
Civil War Historian


Capture of Washington D.C. was always an object of Confederate strategy. Similarly, most Union generals focused on taking Richmond. By tradition, reducing the enemy capital is part of war. The British had done so fifty years before, burning public buildings and routing the young American government. By the close of the Civil War, Washington was the most heavily fortified city in North America, perhaps even in the world. Sixty eight enclosed forts

boasted 807 mounted cannon and 93 mortars in 1,120 emplacements, 93 unarmed batteries for field guns with 401 emplacements and 20 miles of rifle trenches plus 3 blockhouses according to the army's official engineer report of the time. Miles of military roads, a telegraphic communication system, and supporting infrastructure including headquarters buildings, storehouses, and construction camps ringed the city. Thus, "the finest existing example of the system of defenses based upon a series of detached forts connected by a continuous trench line" contributed to a sense of "seeming

impenetrability." Yet, that system came close to failing at a critical juncture in the war and might well have cost President Abraham Lincoln his life, the Union its war, and the country national unification. This story finds scant attention in history books, but can be explored firsthand at Fort Stevens, site of the critical battle during Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early's 1864 attempt to capture the capital.

The Battle of Fort Stevens

The two day affair that prevented capture of the Nation's Capital



took place on July 11 and 12, 1864. Coming two days after the battle of Monocacy, Fort Stevens and the contest near Frederick, Maryland constitute the “battles that saved Washington.” Monocacy delayed the attack; Fort Stevens ensured the attackers would not breach the formidable but thinly manned defense line encircling the city. It was Fort Stevens that prevented Confederates capturing the political and logistical nerve center of the war and changing the course of history.



Fort Stevens.

Forts on both sides of the Potomac and east of the Anacostia were involved. Fort Reno, atop the highest point in the District of Columbia at Tennytown, mounted a signal station that informed defenders of Early’s every move. Fort Totten to the east near the Military Asylum or Soldiers Home (where the Lincoln family shared a summer cottage offering relief from the city’s sweltering heat) provided a signal station and telegraphic link to the War Department downtown. Lincoln knew of and visited garrisons at both forts. The epicenter of the battle, however, would be at the fort bearing the name of fallen Union hero, Major General Isaac Ingalls Stevens, on the Seventh Street Road (modern Georgia Avenue).

The contest that unfolded at Fort Stevens included the direct participation of the President of the United States, marking the only

time in American history where the sitting chief executive came under targeted enemy fire. Lincoln was no stranger to the fort, having, a year or so earlier, comforted the owner of the property, free African-American woman Elizabeth Thomas, whom the soldiers would call “Aunt Betty.” During the fighting Lincoln ventured to the fort to see the unfolding battle, having been invited by the general in charge, Major General Horatio Wright. Lincoln visited the fort both days of the battle and observed the fighting from a sharpshooter-swept parapet.

Early arrived in Washington about noon on July 11. His weary, dusty army straggled badly and could not form for a full assault. As a result, what ensued for the rest of July 11 was sharpshooter and skirmish action by an ersatz band of reserves, convalescents, and a few Army of the Potomac veterans that held back whatever Early’s

subordinates could throw at them. There were casualties on both sides, but the Union lines held and as Lincoln rode back to the White House for the night, many people felt the city was saved.

The next morning Lincoln wired hysterical Baltimoreans to be “vigilant but keep cool” as he hoped neither city would be taken.

Early had planned to renew his attack on July 12, but during the night he received a message from a cavalry commander who had heard reinforcements were on their way to Washington from Petersburg, VA. This suspicion was proved true when he spied blue-clad veterans of the Sixth Corps in the works. Early realized he could not crack the line of fortifications and decided against a full assault.

Perhaps to stiffen civilian resolve and military resistance, Lincoln, Mrs. Lincoln and other dignitaries

appeared in carriages about mid-afternoon on July 12. This venture to see the combat first-hand could have cost the President his life.

As Confederate soldiers continued to fire at the fort, assistant surgeon C.V. A. Crawford of the 102nd Pennsylvania was shot near where Lincoln stood. This shot could easily have wounded or killed Lincoln nine months before his assassination in Ford's Theater.

Wright prevailed upon the president to issue an order to fire civilian houses harboring Confederate sharpshooters in front of the fort (on the grounds of what later became Walter Reed Army Medical Center). He did so, and the houses went up in smoke, leaving dead and dying Confederates littering the premises. Just for good measure, Wright sent out a sortie of veterans to ensure Lincoln's safety. Early's men were already preparing to withdraw, and Wright's counterattack sped them along. All told, perhaps 1,000 men fell in the fighting before Fort Stevens, seeking to either save Mr. Lincoln and his City or conversely, to capture it.

The Result

Early may have succeeded in scaring Lincoln as he later claimed, but his army had not captured the capital as General Robert E. Lee had hoped. In the only battle inside the District of Columbia during the war, the defenses had held. Even so, Monocacy and Fort Stevens symbolized the continuing peril of the Union. London newspapers proclaimed the Confederacy to be a more formidable enemy than ever. Union general-in-chief Ulysses S. Grant had been caught off-guard and nearly lost the capital. Lincoln's political fortunes sunk to their lowest depths and his reelection and ultimate victory to preserve the Union remained in doubt. The threat to Washington provided a wake-up call that changed the direction of the final period of the war. Grant continued his tenacious hold on Lee even though Early remained a hovering threat in the lower Shenandoah Valley until Major General Philip Sheridan ended that annoyance with conclusive victories at Third Winchester, Fisher's Hill and Cedar Creek in September and October. Together with Sherman's capture of Atlanta and David Farragut's naval

victory at Mobile Bay, the fortunes of war shifted and Lincoln secured reelection. The end of the war was in sight.

As conflict wound down, the engineers and garrisons in Washington's forts continued to expend money and labor bolstering the works. After Appomattox, they maintained some of the forts as long as possible conflict threatened with France over Mexico. Then, landowners gradually reclaimed the ground and cut timber that buttressed walls and structures in the forts. Cannon, tools and equipment returned to depots in the city and engineers wrote reports seeking to prevent a recurrence of an unprotected national capital. Battleground National Cemetery and the cemetery at Grace Episcopal Church preserve "bivouacs of the dead" for the fallen from the Battle of Fort Stevens.



The Forts Today

One can stand today where Lincoln stood atop the Fort Stevens parapet (the spot marked by a veterans' stone marker and bas relief), and marvel why posterity has never designated this singular event as one of the pivotal episodes, or even lost Confederate opportunities of the Civil War. Lincoln's death at that point or the loss of the capital could have elected George B. McClellan and the peace party to the executive office, leading to a negotiated settlement with the Confederacy. National unification and emancipation would have been nipped in the bud. Neither were assured at the time of Fort Stevens. Three crucial postwar civil rights amendments might not have occurred. All that might have turned out differently if the Defenses of Washington had not held on July 11 and 12, 1864 at Fort Stevens.

Years later, a Senate commission seeking park land for a burgeoning city ensured that at least some of the forts and their undeveloped landscape would form the basis of a fort circle park system to benefit residents with fresh air and green space. More recently,

Maryland and Virginia jurisdictions have saved the last remaining vestiges of these sentinels from another era. They still number among Civil War preservationists endangered species lists.

Today, a parapet and magazine, reconstructed by the Civilian Conservation Corps at Fort Stevens, together with nearby Battleground National Cemetery, give a sense of this forgotten field. The McMillan Commission Report of 1902 established the idea of using the remaining forts as core elements for urban parkland.

Today's Defenses of Washington forts help draw visitors to the city's history and the national heritage beyond the National Mall. Visitors can experience reconstructed earthworks and the only true visitor's center devoted to the topic at Alexandria's city-run Fort Ward Museum & Historic Site. Arlington County's Fort C. F. Smith, Fort Marcy, managed by George Washington Memorial Parkway, and Fort DeRussy, managed by Rock Creek Park, provide examples of un-restored but preserved forts. Among the forts managed by National Capital Parks - East is Fort Foote, in southern Maryland, where fascinating river

fortifications and remounted 15-inch Rodman seacoast guns offer unique attractions.

Battleground National Cemetery and a set of Brightwood Neighborhood Trail markers, many of which relate to the Battle of Fort Stevens, are worth a pilgrimage to the site to this crucial battleground of the Civil War.

Perhaps Major Henry Kyd Douglas, of Early's staff, best captured the lasting impression of the battle at Fort Stevens. According to his report, as the Confederate army prepared to de-camp, Early quipped in his falsetto drawl:

"Major, we haven't taken Washington, but we've scared Abe Lincoln like hell!" "Yes, General," rejoined Douglas, "but this afternoon when that Yankee line moved out against us, I think some other people were scared blue as hells brimstone!" Early's second-in-command, former Vice President of the United States, Major General John C. Breckinridge, asked was this true?

"That's true," muttered Early, "but it won't appear in history!"



During the...

150th Anniversary

of Washington Attacked:
The 1864 Invasion

and the 1864 Shenandoah
Valley Campaign

...we've got you covered!

The National Park Service, Civil War 150 social media team will bring you the most up-to-date coverage during the anniversaries so that you can follow all the events and activities no matter where you are! Be sure to visit, like, and follow all of our web and social media sites.





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Civil War Defenses of Washington in DC, VA, MD

2014 is the 150th Anniversary of the founding of the Military Road School

The Military Road School was established in 1864 directly under the gaze of Fort Stevens in Washington, D.C., on donated land for the purpose of educating the children of former slaves. It continuously served as an educational institution for African-American children in Washington and nearby Maryland until closing as a public school in 1954. The current structure, located in close proximity to the fort, was designed by Municipal Architect Snowden Ashford in 1911 and constructed in 1912. It was placed on the District of Columbia Inventory of Historic Sites on July 23, 1998, and the National Register of Historic Places on July 25, 2003.



Sites Managed by the National Park Service



Rock Creek Park

Battery Kemble
Fort Bayard
Fort Bunker Hill
Fort DeRussy
Fort Reno
Fort Slocum
Fort Stevens
Fort Totten

National Capital Parks – East

Fort Carroll
Fort Chaplin
Fort Davis
Fort Dupont
Fort Foote
Fort Greble
Fort Mahan
Fort Ricketts
Fort Stanton

George Washington Memorial Parkway

Fort Marcy

Owned by Local Governments

Virginia

Fort Ethan Allen, Arlington County
Fort C.F. Smith, Arlington County
Fort Ward, City of Alexandria
Fort Willard, Fairfax County

Maryland

Battery Bailey, Montgomery County

Defenses at
Fort Stevens

Chasing Jubal Early

By Dr. B. Franklin Cooling,
Civil War Historian


After repelling the Confederate attack at Fort Stevens, Major General Horatio Wright received the task of pursuing Jubal Early's departing army. Early had a 24-hour head start. Returning through Rockville to gain Potomac passage near Poolesville, his cavalry rebuffed initial Federal pursuit. Eventually Wright's expedition went out River Road from the Washington defenses, paralleling Early's route from Rockville. They never intersected. By July 14, Early's army had escaped to Virginia en-route to sanctuary in the Shenandoah Valley. Having wrought havoc on northern territory and threatened Washington, he and his army

survived to fight again in the Valley in the autumn of 1864.

Early sent Brigadier General John McCausland's cavalry to ransom or destroy Chambersburg, Pennsylvania at the end of July in retaliation for continuing Union depredations against Virginia civilians. The key to catching Early lay with concentrating Union forces in the region. That task eluded Lincoln for the next two months while his fate in the fall elections remained in doubt. Only

when Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant ordered Major General Philip Sheridan and a unified

army superior in numbers to the Valley, would Early be caught and severely thrashed in the autumn at Third Winchester, Fisher's Hill and ultimately Cedar Creek. The paths of Wright and Early crossed again when Wright helped rally Sheridan's routed troops at Cedar Creek. The threat to Washington was finally over.



The Alliance to Preserve the Civil War Defenses of Washington

By Susan Claffey, President, and
Loretta Neumann, Vice President - Alliance to
Preserve the Civil War Defenses of Washington

The Alliance to Preserve the Civil War Defenses of Washington is a non-profit organization formed to help preserve, protect, improve, interpret, and connect the Civil War Defenses of Washington for present and future generations. The Alliance also seeks to integrate these sites into their communities through educational, environmental, and recreational experiences that create neighborhood pride and ownership. Our primary focus is on those sites owned by the National Park Service. We also support similar efforts for the Civil War Defenses managed by local governments in Virginia and Maryland.

We have two major initiatives underway. The first is the commemoration of the sesquicentennial of the Battle of Fort Stevens in July 2014 - the only Civil War battle fought in the nation's capital and the only time a sitting President (Lincoln) has come under targeted enemy fire. We want to assure that the battle and the objectives for the Civil War - the end of slavery and the continued union of the states - are honored and understood. Our second major activity is the enactment of legislation in the U.S. Congress to designate the Civil War Defenses of Washington as a National Historical Park.

To further our goals, we seek partnerships with others interested in Civil War preservation. For more information, see our website: dcccivilwarforts.org and click on "contact us" to send a message.

Virginia's Forts

By the end of the Civil War, the Union constructed 33 forts, 25 batteries and 7 blockhouses in Virginia to protect Washington, D.C. In fact, the Virginia defenses represent the first phase of Washington's defenses. Most are long gone but several remain and are worthy of a visit.

Fort Ward, operated by the City of Alexandria, is the best preserved of all the remaining defenses. Its museum interprets the site's history and offers exhibits on Civil War topics and education and interpretive activities throughout the year. The historic site also interprets Alexandria as an occupied city, its role as a vital Union Army crossroads, life within the forts, and the everyday lives of Civil War soldiers and civilians. The historic fort has had extensive restoration and provides visitors with an excellent understanding of Civil War-era military engineering.

Fort Marcy and its counterpart, Fort Ethan Allen, were hastily planned and built to protect the Chain Bridge

approach to Washington, D.C. Fort Marcy's earthen walls, trenches, rifle pits, and parade ground remain and are managed by the National Park Service.

Fort Ethan Allen is under the jurisdiction of Arlington County which has recently installed some superb interpretive panels. The remains of the fort, a portion of the earthen walls, now overgrown, are still visible to visitors. Fort C. F. Smith, also in Arlington, is still perched high over the Potomac and Georgetown. It functioned as part of the defenses that protected the Aqueduct Bridge of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and a few of its earthworks remain today.

Fort Willard, now located in the Belle Haven area of Fairfax County, was the southernmost fort built to defend the nation's capital. It is currently undergoing preservation to protect remaining earthen walls and trenches.



Fort Ward Museum & Historic Site,
4301 West Braddock Road, Alexandria VA.

Construction of Fort Ward began in July 1861, shortly after the First Battle of Manassas. Part of the Civil War defenses protecting Washington, it is now owned by the City of Alexandria, which began restoration of the fort in 1961 for the Civil War Centennial. Today, over 90 percent of the earthwork walls are restored. The Fort Ward Museum interprets the fort's history, offers exhibits on Civil War topics, and has extensive research files. Archaeology and oral histories are also yielding information on African American life at Ft Ward ca. 1860 to 1960.

THE WOUNDED OF MONOCACY


By Kyle Wichtendahl, Director of Programming,
National Museum of Civil War Medicine

Though the Battle of Monocacy was not the largest engagement of 1864, many veterans remember it as some of their hardest fighting of the war. After the smoke cleared on the afternoon of July 9, nearly 1,500 dead and wounded lay on the fields south of Frederick, Maryland.

When evaluating the aftermath of the battle, we usually focus on Jubal Early's march toward Washington and the Battle of Fort Stevens. However, while the campaign moved on, over a thousand Union and Confederate soldiers in the vicinity of Monocacy Junction still required urgent medical care. In the early days of the war, medical activities were often so poorly organized that thousands of wounded languished on the field for want of attention. By 1864, three years into the war, both sides had developed organized systems to transport, treat, and care for combat casualties long-term. The wounded from Monocacy benefited from a coordinated response that likely saved many lives.

While fighting still raged, improvised hospitals were established on the field. Confederate surgeons transformed the Worthington House into a substantial hospital that treated mostly Confederate wounded, and Union surgeons designated the Gambrill Mill as their central field hospital, despite being subject to artillery fire. At the close of the battle, Confederate forces held the field, and with it, the wounded of both sides. While Union troops retreated toward Baltimore, several Union medical officers remained behind, working together with their Confederate counterparts to treat casualties.

Confederate ambulance wagons transported the wounded into the city of Frederick, but the burning of the covered bridge across the Monocacy River during the battle obliged them to ford the river. A wounded prisoner, Corporal Roderick Clark of the 14th New Jersey later recalled a rough crossing that nearly pitched him into the water as the ambulance struggled up the steep riverbank. From Frederick, Confederate wounded who were stable enough to travel immediately were sent to hospitals in Winchester, Virginia, but the critically injured remained in



Frederick's General Hospital Number One, circa 1865.
Photo Credit: Museum of Civil War Medicine

Frederick along with the Union casualties. When Early's army moved south toward Washington on July 10, these wounded were left behind. Union cavalry quickly moved in and reclaimed the city, including hundreds of Union and Confederate patients.

Conveniently, Frederick was already a major Union hospital center. In 1862 the city hosted a massive network of military hospitals which cared for over 10,000 casualties from the Battles of South Mountain and Antietam. In 1864, General Hospital Number One, supervised by Assistant Surgeon Robert. F. Weir, operated on the grounds of the old Hessian



Assistant Surgeon Robert F. Weir.
Photo Credit: Museum of
Civil War Medicine

Barracks (today the site of the Maryland School for the Deaf). The hospital did not evacuate during General Early's occupation of Frederick. According to Weir, "the hospital having a capacity for 2,500-3,000 patients was undisturbed. It had on hand a full equipment of instruments, medical and quartermaster supplies which were not touched by the

enemy." Many of the hospital's resident nurses did flee Frederick in anticipation of the Confederate occupation, but Frederick residents volunteered and served as temporary care-givers. With their help, General Hospital Number One provided a high level of care for all of the wounded from the Battle of Monocacy.

In the weeks and months that followed, patients were gradually transferred away from Frederick. Most were sent to hospitals in Baltimore where Confederate patients would eventually be exchanged for Union prisoners. Some Union patients went to York or other locations in southern Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, many patients did not recover; the dead from General Hospital Number One were buried in Frederick's Mount Olivet Cemetery. The Union dead were later transferred to Antietam National Cemetery.



www.civilwarmed.org



These Honored Dead

By Gordon Berg,
Alliance to Preserve the Civil War
Defenses of Washington

The Civil War dead rest in many places, some hallowed, some not. Battleground National Cemetery is one acre of hallowed ground in northwest Washington, D.C. It is the final resting place of 41 soldiers and is unique among national cemeteries. To be interred at Battleground required one to be a Union defender of the Nation's Capital during the Battle of Fort Stevens. Forty were buried at Battleground in 1864; the forty-first, Edward R. Campbell, 2nd Vermont Infantry, died in 1936 and chose to join his long dead comrades.

All of Battleground's dead are identified. We know their names because Captain James M. Moore, appointed head of the Quartermaster Corp's Cemeterial Division, led a systematic search and recovery of Union dead on the battlefield. Their names appear on the headstones encircling the flagpole at the cemetery's center. Unfortunately, five were misidentified when buried. National Park Service Ranger Ron Harvey uncovered their true identities and signage tells visitors who is really buried at Battleground.



Battleground National Cemetery circa 1910-1930. Photo Credit: Library of Congress.

However, there are 44 headstones. The other three belong to the wife and three children of the cemetery's first caretaker, Union Army veteran Augustus Armbrecht; his wife and one child share a headstone. Battleground also contains an 1871 caretaker's lodge, four commemorative monuments honoring units that participated in the battle, and a memorial rostrum added in 1921.

Battleground's location is a story in itself. In a 1935 interview, the last surviving veteran of Fort Stevens, 91 year-old Edward Campbell, recalled participating in a nighttime detail to recover Union dead after the battle. Campbell contends, President Lincoln and a few aides rode up and Lincoln held up his hand and said "I dedicate this spot as the Battle Ground National Cemetery." Even if this recollection is the cloudy memory of a wistful old soldier, it adds to Battleground's mystique.

Who may have shown up that night didn't interest farmer James Mulloy. He owned the prime acre of high ground designated for Battleground and resented the Army taking it so he sued. The suit lingered until 1868 when the government paid Mulloy \$2,600 for the land.

The Confederate dead at Fort Stevens found no revered ground in which to rest. General Early left his dead when he retreated. Private

Thomas Welles, son of Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy, reportedly led a gang of 50 black men the day after the battle to bury enemy dead in mass trenches near where they fell. In 1874, seventeen bodies were reinterred from the trench on Thomas Lay's dairy farm and, thanks to the efforts of Reverend James B. Avirett, reburied in a single grave at Grace Episcopal Church in Silver Spring. In 1896, they were again moved and reburied under a nine-foot granite shaft, the largest memorial stone in the churchyard.

Union dead from Monocacy and Cedar Creek did not get a cemetery exclusively their own. The bluecoated dead from Monocacy sleep eternally in Antietam National Cemetery while those from Cedar Creek were removed from the battlefield and interred at Winchester National Cemetery.

No national cemeteries were created for the South's dead. The 408 unknown Confederate dead from Monocacy rest under a monument erected in 1914 by the United Daughters of the Confederacy at Mt. Olivet Cemetery in Frederick, MD. Many of their brethren from Cedar Creek were buried at Stonewall Confederate Cemetery, within Mt. Hebron Cemetery in Winchester WV.

Whether memorialized in a cemetery or unmarked in some forgotten field, the soil that holds our Civil War dead is forever hallowed.

A COUNCIL OF WAR

By Barbara Justice, Park Ranger,
Monocacy National Battlefield

Starting in mid-June, over a period of six weeks Lieutenant General Jubal Early's army drove Union forces, commanded by Major General David Hunter, out of the Shenandoah Valley, defeated Union troops at Monocacy, threatened Washington, D.C. and made several Union cities feel the hard hand of war. On July 24, Early's army defeated Hunter again at the Battle of Second Kernstown and drove his army across the Potomac River. Early once again owned the Valley and menaced the Union. On July 30, Early's cavalry burned Chambersburg, Pennsylvania when the people were unable to produce the ransom. Confederate Brigadier General Bradley Johnson wrote, "...in 5 minutes the town was ablaze at over 20 different parts." By the end of July Early's success had caught the attention of Union Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant who was anxious to close the Shenandoah Valley to the Confederacy and "determined to put a stop to this" once and for all.

A determined Grant left his headquarters at City Point, Virginia (now a unit of Petersburg National Battlefield) and arrived at Monocacy Junction on August 5 to find Hunter's army "scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy." Grant called a conference of the generals at the nearby Thomas Farm. Glenn Worthington, a young neighbor of the Thomas Family, recalled that Generals Grant, Hunter, Wright, Ricketts, Crook and others "assembled in an upper room" of the Thomas House to discuss the situation. Grant asked Hunter where Early was. Hunter replied that he did not know. Afterwards Grant ordered that the army advance toward Harpers Ferry, West Virginia and up the Shenandoah Valley. Grant then informed Hunter that Major General Phillip Sheridan, one of

his favorites, would command the force; this demotion led to Hunter's resignation. Grant immediately telegraphed Sheridan to come to Monocacy Junction.

Grant remained overnight at the Thomas home and the next morning ate breakfast with the family. Glenn Worthington wrote that Grant lifted 7 year-old Virginia Thomas on his lap and inquired,

"Well, Virginia, what are your father and mother? Are they Rebels or Yankees?" To which the little girl replied, 'Mamma, she's a Rebel, but papa, he is a Rebel when the Rebels are here and a Yankee when the Yankees are here.'... General Grant laughed heartily at the perfectly frank reply..."

Grant met briefly with Sheridan at Monocacy Junction before boarding an eastbound train back to City Point. Sheridan boarded a westbound train with Grant's instructions that: "It is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage and stock...such as cannot be consumed, destroy...If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste."



Grant meets Sheridan at Monocacy Junction.

Thomas Farm - Monocacy National Battlefield



HARPERS FERRY

THE BASE OF OPERATIONS FOR SHERIDAN'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN

By Dennis E. Frye, Chief Historian,
Harpers Ferry National Historical Park

Following the scare on Washington in July, 1864, Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early returned to the Shenandoah Valley and planted his army firmly along the Potomac border. Early's raid had worked—Union Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant had been forced to siphon troops away from his siege of Richmond and Petersburg. Early's new mission was to continue aggressive action and pose as a menacing threat. He responded with alacrity. He disrupted the B&O Railroad, destroying tracks and bridges without impediment. Early's cavalry ransomed the cities of Hagerstown and Frederick, threatening fiery destruction if the bankers did not pay the bounty. When its citizens failed to honor a ransom, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, went up in flames—the only Northern city destroyed during the war. Early's strategy of harassment, intimidation, and irritation prompted a strong Federal response—one in which Harpers Ferry would play a critical role.

Grant issued adamant instructions for a fresh Shenandoah strategy. "Give the enemy no rest," he ordered Major General Philip H. Sheridan, his hand-selected new commander for the Shenandoah Valley army. "Follow him to the death." Wipe out Early, but also make war on the population. "Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting." Grant intended to end this war through the dual punch of defeating the Confederate army and breaking the will of the Southern people.

Sheridan had a reputation. The West Point graduate had served under Grant as an infantry commander, and recently had led Grant's cavalry operating against General Lee. Sheridan was aggressive in combat, progressive in strategy, and impressive in results. No previous Federal commander in the Shenandoah—the "Valley of Death" for Union generals—had defeated the Confederates here. Grant had confidence that Sheridan would break that record.

Sheridan arrived at Harpers Ferry on August 6,

and promptly established his headquarters at the Lockwood House. James E. Taylor, a sketch artist assigned to cover Sheridan's army for Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, found Sheridan an interesting specimen. "His head was abnormally large with projecting bumps which from a phrenologist's view denoted combativeness. His body and arms were long while his pedals were disproportionately short, 'duck legs,' in fact." Taylor, who met Sheridan for the first time at the Lockwood House to request a horse, further noted, "The general's voice was anything but musical and when exercised under excitement, had a rasping sound, and croaking intonation when in its normal key."



Sheridan's headquarters in the former armory paymaster's house. Newspaper artist James E. Taylor's rendering was such an accurate and detailed depiction that National Park Service architects used it to guide the building's exterior restoration 100 years after the war. Photo Credit: Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper.

Sheridan identified Harpers Ferry as his base of operations. His army was almost triple the size of the Valley's previous Federal armies. Nearly 50,000 infantrymen, cavalrymen, and artillerymen depended on quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance supplies from the Ferry. Soon the depot buzzed with so much activity that "there was nothing but a perfect jam all day and night in the streets," recorded Corporal Charlie Moulton. Fortifications were strengthened across Bolivar Heights. Enclosed behind the ridge was the largest mule corral and wagon park in the Shenandoah Valley. Thousands of mules and hundreds

of white-canvassed wagons rotated to and from the corral as the Federal army commenced its supply shuttle service.

Hundreds of civilians were hired by the government to support this massive logistics operation. Storekeepers, and storehouse and receiving clerks tracked tons of quartermaster goods. Forage masters watched over oats and hay for the mule teams. A veterinary surgeon cared for the creatures while masters of transportation and the superintendent of the corral coordinated the mule labor. Blacksmiths, wheelwrights, carpenters, saddlers, and painters maintained the wagons. The wagon master supervised the trains and the teamsters drove the mules. Dozens of laborers loaded and stacked the wares. The rolls showed 289 civilians performing 35 different jobs. Not since the days of the U.S. Armory and Arsenal had so many civilians been on the government payroll.

And pay was good. Local resident Joseph Barry worked as the forage master at a salary of \$75 per month—almost five times the pay of a private. The superintendent of the corral, veterinary surgeon, boss wheelwright, boss carpenter, brigade wagon master, and the superintendent of laborers drew equal amounts as Barry. Only the storekeeper, master of transportation, and the master mechanic received more (\$100 per month).

The pay was exceptional but not always guaranteed. Captain George A. Flagg, the quartermaster at Harpers Ferry, became “much embarrassed to procure the requisite labor required in his department because of his inability to pay the Government employees.” Flagg had been operating the post for several months, but during that time had been “compelled to run his Department without a dollar.” He pleaded with the War Department: “Many of the Quarter Master employees are poor men, relying upon their daily labor to support themselves and families, and are literally without money.” Flagg’s superior officer labeled this practice “a great injustice to the laborer,” and believed it brought the government disrespect. The plea ended with a warning: “The present demand for every soldier in the field is ample reason why such a condition should not exist. Otherwise, enlisted men will be drawn upon to perform all quarter master labor.” This was the magic phrase. Pay arrived promptly.

Sheridan, a former quartermaster himself, understood that an army at the front could not fight and survive without logistics in the rear. “Little Phil” knew his success demanded a dependable, responsible, and


tough manager who appreciated security and could deal with scrutiny. He selected a St. Louis lawyer and politician for the job. Brigadier General John Dunlop Stevenson arrived in mid-August. A native of the Valley of Virginia, Stevenson was a loyal Unionist. He had fought with Grant and Sheridan during their major campaigns in Tennessee, and now, at age 44, they called him “home” to clear the Rebels from his native Shenandoah Valley.



Brigadier General John Dunlop Stevenson.
Photo Credit: Library of Congress.

Stevenson established his headquarters at the master armorer’s house, and took command over the newly designated Military District of Harpers Ferry. It consolidated, under one central command, various towns and depots along the Baltimore & Ohio and Winchester & Potomac Railroads, along with adjoining counties. Stevenson had four missions: protect the railroads and depots; ensure safe transport, via wagon trains, to and from the front; meet and defeat Confederate guerillas; and enforce martial law. None of these were new to Harpers Ferry commanders, but they had all failed because they were never considered part of a singular, logistical mission. Stevenson summarized his purpose succinctly: “The loss of one train by a careless officer could defeat a campaign.”

Confederate Colonel John Singleton Mosby considered enemy logistics his principal prey. “The line that connects an army with its base of supplies is the heel of Achilles—its most vital and vulnerable point,” theorized Mosby. His “incessant attacks” were designed to compel the enemy either to “greatly contract his lines or to reinforce them.” If Mosby could draw Federal troops to the rear to protect lines, Sheridan would have fewer men to fight on the front, thus evening the odds for outnumbered Confederates. To carry out his strategy, Mosby identified three specific objectives: destroy supply trains; isolate an army from its base; and break up means of conveying intelligence.



Mosby's attack on a supply train near Berryville, Virginia.
Photo Credit: Frank Leslie, *The Soldier in Our Civil War*.

Mosby struck first. The “Gray Ghost” spied a wagon train one week after Sheridan’s arrival. The train totaled almost 1,000 wagons, stretching more than 10 miles, and requiring four hours to pass a single point. This was perfect fodder for Mosby. He ensnared his prey near Berryville, about 20 miles south of Harpers Ferry, where he burned wagons and departed with captured mules, cattle, and Federal prisoners. Following Berryville, however, not one successful Mosby interruption occurred in the Valley through the end of Sheridan’s campaign in December. Despite ample opportunities, Mosby failed to disrupt wagon trains, interrupt essential railroad traffic, intercept Union reinforcements, or recover captured Confederates. Moreover, he failed in his overall mission to sever the enemy’s supply


lines. He failed because Sheridan and Stevenson introduced countermeasures that the guerilla chieftain could not overcome, such as aggressively chasing the Confederates and keeping them on the defensive.

Ascertaining that civilians harbored guerillas and provided them with intelligence, Stevenson crafted rules and regulations that restricted citizen movement, communication, and commerce. “The most stringent laws are now in force here,” observed Charlie Moulton. “All baggage belonging to civilians and all freight arriving [must be] searched to see that no smuggling is going on.” No person living outside the limits of the district was allowed inside the lines, “except twice a month, and then his pass is limited to 6 hours each time.” No person could procure more than \$50 worth of supplies for an entire family per month. All goods required proper permits before they could pass through the lines.

Stevenson had an additional rule that made life even more uncomfortable. If any guerilla interruption occurred on the rebuilt W&P Railroad, “all disloyal residents of Charlestown, Shepherdstown, Berryville, and Smithfield are to be ousted and confined in Fort McHenry during the war and their house burned.” General Sheridan had a warning for the residents astride the railroad in Jefferson County. “Those people who live in the vicinity of Harper’s Ferry are the most villainous in this Valley, and have not yet been hurt much. If the railroad is interfered with, I will make some of them poor.” Stevenson’s General Orders No. 23 was posted every 300 feet along the entire 30-mile length of the W&P tracks. Not a single incident occurred.

While Stevenson conducted warfare behind the lines, Sheridan was busy smashing the Confederates up the Valley. Two days before “Little Phil” launched his campaign, General Grant traveled to Charles Town to confer with Sheridan via the B&O to Harpers Ferry. While at Harpers Ferry, Grant spent the night of September 16 at General Stevenson’s headquarters at the former master armorer’s house. “He is a very plain looking man,” Moulton described. “He always has a cigar in his mouth. He was here only two days and during that brief period used up a box of cigars.”

In the next 32 days, Sheridan’s men fought four major battles in the Valley—and won every one. The cannon on Maryland Heights fired 100-gun salutes to honor Sheridan’s successes. Fifteen captured battle flags were paraded through Harpers Ferry by their proud captors. “The men who took the flags had the honor



The former smith and forging shop at the armory (center) became the nucleus of Sheridan’s supply depot. An average supply train included 1,000 wagons, hitched to 6,000 mules—and would stretch for more than ten miles. Photo Credit: Library of Congress, sketch by A.R. Waud.

to convey them to Washington,” admired Moulton, “where they were each the recipients of a handsome medal [the Medal of Honor].”

Thousands of captured Confederates were processed through Moulton’s provost marshal office at Harpers Ferry. “I could not begin to tell you how busy we have been during the past few weeks,” Moulton informed his mother at the end of the first week of October. “Altogether some 4,000 Rebels have passed through our hands.” In just three weeks, Sheridan’s battlefield successes had nabbed nearly one quarter of Early’s army. Unlike 1862, when prisoners were paroled and exchanged, POWs were imprisoned in 1864.


The deluge of prisoners challenged General Stevenson. Transporting the captives from the front to the rear required armed escorts through miles of enemy territory. This presented an inviting target for Mosby. Yet Stevenson managed to match Mosby’s wit, moving more than 7,000 Confederate prisoners to Harpers Ferry during Sheridan’s Valley Campaign. Upon arrival, they were turned over to the provost marshal. Corporal Moulton, the most experienced clerk in the provost office, supervised the prisoner processing which involved four steps: identification, description, search, and shipment.

Moulton was one of the first to witness and understand Sheridan’s success. Before the end of August—prior to any major engagement—Moulton’s workload dramatically increased. “Since Sheridan’s operations commenced we have had an average of about 100 prisoners every day. . . . On one occasion a squad of 225 came in about 11 o’clock at night.” These unprecedented numbers forced the provost marshal “to remove the Guard House to a large and more spacious building. It is now located in an old factory building, four stories high, the Federal, Rebel, and Citizen prisoners being placed in separate rooms. The building being so high it requires a smaller guard than before, as the prisoners have no way to escape, but to leap out the windows and break their necks.”

Even the new Guard House became inadequate as Moulton grappled with multiplying numbers. He counted 1,400 in one day alone. Soon, he learned that

2,000 more were coming from Martinsburg. “I wish I could have a chance to take a gaze at the pile of Rebs we have got ‘corralled’ in Bolivar tonight,” Moulton addressed his brother. Before him in the lower town, he saw prisoners “stretched in line and [occupying] as much distance as from our house to the factory (nearly one-third mile). It does seem as if we [will] never get through with them and it is a fixed certainty that we won’t as long as ‘Philly’ travels about the Valley.” Though amazed at the numbers, Moulton was more pleased with the Southerners’ disposition. “A large number of them wish to take the oath [of allegiance to the United States].” Resigned Confederates rejoining the Union represented ultimate victory.

Before sending any prisoners forward, Moulton and his fellow clerks obtained names, ranks, and physical descriptions of each prisoner, including height, weight, eye and hair color, and complexion. Once identified, a prisoner was searched thoroughly. “You ought to see the pile of knives and other ‘relics’ we have on hand,” Moulton described. After the officers were separated from the enlisted men, the prisoners were placed on guarded railroad cars for lengthy transports to prisons far away in Delaware, Maryland, New York, and Ohio. By November 1864, a lull had settled in the Valley. Sheridan had conquered Early, the Mosby menace had subsided, and 100 miles of Valley terrain had been burned or stripped clean. The Confederacy had not surrendered, however, and Sheridan determined to put his troops in position to finish off Lee’s army near Richmond. On December 1, Sheridan began transporting thousands of bluecoats out of the Valley toward central Virginia. With most of the army gone, Harpers Ferry quieted considerably. The massive logistical mission that was so critical to Sheridan’s successful Valley Campaign was over.



Battle of the Wilderness

Fredericksburg

Battle of Spotsylvania Court House

Fredericksburg & Spotsylvania National Military Park

Potomac River

Totopotomoy Creek (Rural Plains)

Cold Harbor

Richmond


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
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Ringgold

ROCKY FACE

Rocky Face
May 9

Snake Creek Gap

Resaca
May 13-15

Western & Atlantic Railroad

Adairsville

Rome

Kingston

Oostanaula

Etowah

Coosa

ALLATOONA MOUNTAINS

Acworth

Pine Mountain

Roswell

Brush Mountain

Pickett's Mill
May 27

New Hope Church
May 25

Dallas
May 28

Kolb's Farm
June 22

Lost Mountain

Marietta

Kennesaw Mountain
June 27

Peachtree Creek
July 20

Georgia Railroad

Ezra Church
July 28

Atlanta
July 22; occupied
September 2

Jonesboro
August 31-
September 1

ALABAMA

North



0 10 20 Kilometers
0 10 20 Miles

Atlanta & West Point Railroad

Macon & Western Railroad


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Showdown in the Shenandoah Valley

The 1864 Valley Campaign

By Eric Campbell, Chief of Interpretation,
Cedar Creek and Belle Grove National Historical Park

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it was the principal storehouse... for feeding their armies... It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us... I determined to put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field of operation...

Thus Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant put in motion the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign, placing Major General Philip Sheridan in command, with directions “to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death...” Just over two months later, Sheridan delivered a series of stinging defeats, during the largest and bloodiest battles fought in the Valley, which wrested away Confederate control of that vital region and laid much of it in ashes, forever removing its ability to sustain Confederate armies. Although smaller and less costly than other more famous campaigns, Sheridan’s operations in the Valley had tremendous military and political impacts that fall.

With his appointment to the Valley, Sheridan was heavily influenced by the three principal directives he received from Grant; defeat Lieutenant General Jubal Early’s Army of the Valley, destroy the Valley’s resources and, above all, avoid defeat yourself. Thus, throughout August and early September, Sheridan was ruled by caution, maneuvering and skirmishing throughout the lower Valley, but avoiding major battle. Sheridan also took time to organize and mold his new Army of the Shenandoah, approximately 40,000 strong. This lull gave Early a false sense of confidence; a belief that Sheridan was overly cautious. He continued to disperse his smaller army (approximately 15,000 strong) in order to maintain his threats along the Potomac River and the B & O Railroad.

Growing impatient with this lack of progress, Grant traveled to the Valley on September 15, in order to

push Sheridan into action. Their meeting was short, for Sheridan recently received news through a civilian (Unionist Rebecca Wright of Winchester) that Early had just been weakened by the removal of an infantry division and other troops. Approving Sheridan’s offensive plan, Grant simply told him: “Go in!”


Third Winchester

Early was concentrated near Winchester, although he had unwisely divided his forces, sending some north toward Martinsburg and the Potomac. Learning of this, Sheridan decided to strike directly west from Berryville, hoping to overwhelm Early before he could concentrate his scattered forces. One flaw to this plan was that it funneled the bulk of Union infantry through a ravine known as the Berryville Canyon.

Union cavalry splashed across the Opequon Creek before dawn on September 19, initiating the Third Battle of Winchester, the largest and bloodiest engagement fought in the Shenandoah Valley. Recognizing the threat, Early scrambled to concentrate his scattered forces and form them on high ground east of Winchester.

Sheridan’s plan immediately miscarried as his baggage trains created a “traffic jam” the length of the Berryville Canyon, which slowed the Union advance to a crawl. It was 11 a.m. before Sheridan’s columns emerged from the Canyon and formed for an attack. Using two of his three corps (Sixth and Nineteenth), Sheridan began to advance around 11:40 a.m. and his lines soon passed through the First Woods and across the Middle Field. As they approached the Second Woods, a gap began to develop in the Union line.

Desperate to slow the Union advance, Major General John Gordon, one of Early’s division commanders, ordered a counterattack, which penetrated this gap and splintered the Union line. Sheridan rode into the confused masses and personally rallied his troops and reformed their lines. The battle settled into a



Jedediah Hotchkiss map of the Battle of Third Winchester.

static slugfest, with the opposing lines exchanging deadly volleys at close range. One Union veteran later wrote, “The roar of battle, as the two lines fairly met, sounding in a thunderous burst of volleys, pealed up . . . and smoke and flame streamed out in a long line, as though the whole forest had been suddenly ignited.”

While Early had temporarily staved off destruction, Sheridan still had troops not yet engaged, including Major General George Crook’s Eighth Corps. At 3 p.m., Sheridan ordered Crook to turn the Confederate left. Crook’s forces straddled Red Bud Run and launched a devastating attack around 4 p.m.

Early gave ground and pulled his line back into the shape of an inverted L, with the short arm stretched across the Valley Pike facing north. Near 5 p.m. Sheridan ordered his final forces into the attack; two divisions of cavalry who galloped in from the north. This enormous force of thundering hooves and flashing sabers was imposing. A New York veteran later wrote, “Looking in the direction of the setting sun, our

men saw the most impressive sight . . . thousand[s] [of] sabers glistened . . . The cavalry poured upon and rushed through a great herd of stampeding rebels.”

Despite the valiant resistance of the Confederate infantry, this final onslaught was simply too much. Early’s lines cracked, fell back, rallied and then broke again. As darkness fell, Sheridan drove Early’s army off the field and sent it “whirling through Winchester.” The Confederates were in full retreat and Sheridan had his first major victory of the campaign. The cost, however, was heavy. Total casualties exceeded 8,600 (approximately 5,000 Union and 3,600 Confederate) and Sheridan realized the campaign was far from over.

Fisher’s Hill

That evening Early fell back to Fisher’s Hill, south of Strasburg. This range of hills

stretched across the Valley floor, from the Massanutten Mountain to Little North Mountain. “This was the only position in the whole Valley,” Early explained later, “where a defensive line could be taken. . .” Although his losses at Winchester had reduced his strength to around 10,000, Early hoped the natural strength of Fisher’s Hill would deter Sheridan from attacking. It was a false hope. Sheridan arrived at the base of the hill on the evening of September 20. Recognizing that a frontal assault would “entail unnecessary destruction of life, and . . . be of doubtful result,” Sheridan met with his corps commanders to develop another plan. Crook suggested a flanking maneuver against the Confederate left, similar to the one he had executed at Winchester. Sheridan approved the plan and the Eighth Corps began their march the evening of September 21.

Every possible effort was taken to conceal Crook’s march and the final stages, which took place on the afternoon of September 22, included ascending the



"Battle of Fisher's Hill" by Jedediah Hotchkiss.

wooded slopes of Little North Mountain. This placed Crook squarely opposite Early's left. Around 4 p.m. Crook ordered an advance and the 5,500 men of the Eighth Corps rolled down the mountainside and directly into the Confederate left and rear. They crashed into the main Confederate line, according to one Union soldier, "sweeping down their works like a western cyclone..."

Early attempted to redeploy his line to face this new threat, but it was too late. Once flanked, Early reported, "panic seized [the men]...and without being defeated they broke, many of them fleeing shamefully." Early quickly ordered a withdrawal and as darkness descended his army was in full retreat southward toward Harrisonburg and beyond. For the second time in three days Early had been put to flight. That, along with the 1,200 casualties he had suffered (including more than 1,000 captured), caused Confederate morale to plummet.

Sheridan's hopes of following up this victory with the complete destruction of Early's army went

unfulfilled. By September 25 Early had withdrawn all the way to Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge Mountain, southeast of Harrisonburg. Union troops reached that town on the following day and encamped around it. Sheridan now believed the campaign was all but over. Having successfully retaken the Valley, he decided to carry out the second of Grant's directives; systematically destroy the Valley's rich agricultural resources. This episode would go down in history as "The Burning," and would turn large sections of the Valley into a vast wasteland.

Compounding the misery of Early's men was not only their inability to stop the destruction; but that many were natives of the Valley, and thus literally watched their own farms go up in flames. Despite the inaction of the infantry, Southern cavalry made constant harassing raids on the Union rear. Growing sick of this skirmishing, Sheridan angrily ordered his cavalry chief, Brigadier General Alfred Torbert on October 8 to either whip the Confederate cavalry or "get whipped themselves."

Tom's Brook

Torbert's two divisions smashed the outnumbered and ill-equipped Southern horseman at Tom's Brook on October 9, driving them from the field and pursuing them over twenty miles to Woodstock. Known henceforth as the "Woodstock Races," Tom's Brook effectively destroyed the Confederate cavalry in the Valley.

Cedar Creek

Confident the campaign was now over, Sheridan camped his army, 32,000 strong, on the bluffs along the north bank of Cedar Creek. Early's poorly equipped and ill-fed army seemed to pose little threat so Sheridan traveled to Washington, D.C. on October 15 to confer with higher authorities about future movements, feeling secure that he would return before anything significant occurred.

...continued on page 55

The Shenandoah Valley in Flames

By Shannon Moeck, Park Ranger,
Cedar Creek and Belle Grove National Historical Park

What is the worst in war, to burn a barn or kill a fellow man? Confederate Cavalry Officer

The Shenandoah Valley became a prime target in 1864 as the American Civil War took a turn from a limited war to "Total War." When Major General Philip H. Sheridan took command of the Army of the Shenandoah on August 6, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant ordered him to: "Give the enemy no rest... Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste." The object of these orders was three-fold; to disable the Valley's use as an avenue for invasion, to destroy the "Breadbasket of the Confederacy" and to break the Southern will to fight.

This change was devised not only to destroy supplies, livestock and food meant for Confederate armies, but also to break the willpower of the Southern people to fight on. Sheridan, who carried out this new policy in the Shenandoah Valley, justified this new practice:

Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see but little of the horrors...(of war) and even grow indifferent to them as the struggle goes on, contenting themselves with encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause...It is another matter, however,

when deprivation and suffering are brought to their own doors. Then the case appears much graver, for the loss of property weighs heavy with the most of mankind; heavier often, than the sacrifices made on the field of battle. Death is popularly considered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life...

Sheridan immediately began the destruction in the lower Valley. On August 17 Sheridan reported, "I have burned all wheat and hay, and brought off all stock, sheep, cattle, horses, &c, south of Winchester." After his successes at the battles of Third Winchester and Fisher's Hill. Sheridan's cavalry raided as far as Staunton and Waynesboro. Grant wanted Sheridan to follow the rail lines east and destroy Lee's supply lines as he went.

Sheridan, however, felt that Lieutenant General Jubal Early was still a threat in the Valley and believed that such a movement would stretch his supply lines too thin, and suggested a different plan: "My judgment is that it would be best to terminate this campaign by the destruction of the crops, &c., in this valley, and the transfer of troops to the army operating against Richmond." Grant responded, "You may take up such position in the Valley as you think can and ought to be held, and send all the force not required for this immediately here. Leave nothing for the subsistence of an army on any ground you abandon to the

enemy.” Sheridan commenced a dramatic war on the countryside on September 26, 1864 that would last for thirteen days. The destruction began in Staunton and moved down the Valley, northward to Strasburg, covering a length of 70 miles and a width of 30 miles. This destruction infamously became known for generations simply as “The Burning.” The men were ordered to move fast, destroy everything that could be useful to the enemy, then move on quickly to new targets. They were instructed to spare houses, empty barns, property of widows, single women and orphans and to refrain from looting.

Colonel James H. Kidd of Brigadier General George Custer’s brigade described the scenes as they set fire to a mill in Port Republic, “What I saw there is burned into my memory. The anguish pictured in their faces would have melted any heart not seared by the horrors and ‘necessities’ of war. It was too much for me and at the first moment that duty would permit I hurried from the scene.” Regardless of personal feelings about the suffering of civilians, there was an element of revenge in the campaign. Brigadier General Wesley Merritt described the area as a, “paradise of bushwhackers and guerrillas. Officers and men had been murdered in cold blood on the roads while proceeding without a guard through an apparently peaceful country.” The most notable death was of Sheridan’s engineer officer Lieutenant John R. Meigs, who was killed near Dayton by Confederate scouts. In retaliation for this, Sheridan ordered “all houses within an area of five miles burned.” Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Wildes of the First Infantry Division of the 8th Corps, concerned about the order of retaliation on the townspeople encouraged Sheridan to reconsider order to burn the town. After some thought, Sheridan withdrew the order to burn Dayton.

The flames destroyed much of the hard labor of Valley civilians. The fear of potentially losing everything inflicted a psychological hardship on these people. The weakened Confederates could do little to stop the destruction. One Southern soldier later recalled:



Alfred Waud wartime sketch showing troopers under Brig. Gen. George A. Custer burning the Shenandoah Valley.

We had an elevated position and could see the Yankees out in the valley driving off the horses, cattle, sheep and killing the hogs and burning all the barns and shocks of corn and wheat in the fields and destroying everything that could feed or shelter man or beast...

On October 7, Sheridan reported to Grant, “I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay and farming implements; over 70 mills, filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep.” While the agricultural devastation was important, Sheridan also assessed the psychological impact on the residents writing, “The people here are getting sick of war.” Sheridan had successfully made the Valley “untenable for a Rebel Army.” As destructive as “The Burning” was, little did the rest of the Southern populace realize it was only a prelude of the North’s new “Total War” policy. Major General William T. Sherman would prove that throughout the upcoming winter and following spring in Atlanta, central Georgia and South Carolina.

Sheridan did not realize that on October 13 Early had received 3,000 reinforcements from General Robert E. Lee, along with instructions to launch an offensive to regain the Valley. While the natural strength of the Union position ruled out a frontal assault, Gordon devised an unexpected alternative. After toiling up the steep slopes of Massanutten Mountain on October 17 to Signal Knob, where the entire Union army was visible, he returned with a bold plan. Despite the long odds, Early approved and put the plan into motion on the night of October 18. It was one of the riskiest and most audacious assaults attempted during the entire Civil War. Early split his smaller army into three columns in order to place the bulk of his force against the Union left, held by the Eighth Corps. It would take perfect coordination and absolute surprise to have any chance of success.

Following an all-night march along the base of the Massanutten Mountain, including two river crossings, the Confederates rolled out of a dense fog in the predawn hours of October 19. Most Northern soldiers were still in their tents and the few who managed to form a line were quickly overwhelmed. Within minutes the Eighth Corps was routed and fleeing. The Union Nineteenth Corps, commanded by Major General William Emory, was struck next on both its left and front. Although given more warning, Emory's lines were soon forced back and Belle Grove fell to the Southern advance around 7 a.m. That left only the Union Sixth Corps, which had set up its line along the banks of Meadow Brook, to face the Confederate advance.



“Battle of Belle Grove or Cedar Creek” by Jedediah Hotchkiss.

Fighting stubbornly, the Northern line continued to withdraw. The only sustained stand offered by the Union army that morning was made by Brigadier General George Getty's Sixth Corps division located on a prominent hill where the town cemetery overlooked Middletown. For 90 minutes (8 to 9:30 a.m.) Getty repulsed three attacks and withstood a 30 minute artillery bombardment. Finally, faced with overwhelming odds and nearly cut off, Getty withdrew. By 10:30 a.m. the Army of the Shenandoah was bloodied, battered and on the verge of a demoralizing defeat. Cedar Creek appeared to be a stunning Confederate victory.

Early assumed the Union army would conduct a full retreat and ordered his lines to halt just north of Middletown. Believing his own men were too exhausted, and recognizing that his lines were

weakened by the loss of men who were plundering the Union camps, Early felt the best he could do was "hold what had been gained" (including over 1,000 prisoners and 24 cannon). Early's plan was to secure his captured spoils and hold on until darkness could cover his withdrawal. Frustrated, Gordon urged his commander to continue the advance, later calling this delay the "fatal halt." During this debate Early, Gordon and the rest of the Confederate army heard cheering from the Union lines. Although they did not know it, this celebration marked the arrival of Sheridan, and with him, a turning point in the battle.

Returning that morning, Sheridan had no idea of the disaster that had befallen his army. Soon, however, the sounds of battle reached him, followed by fleeing Union soldiers spreading rumors of defeat. Riding hard, he rallied his troops along the way, and arrived

I tender to you...the thanks of the nation.

The Political Impacts of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign

By Eric Campbell, Chief of Interpretation,
Cedar Creek and Belle Grove National Historical Park

In September, 1864 President Lincoln was growing impatient with Sheridan's lack of progress. Sheridan's caution resulted from the final directive he received from Grant; avoid another Union defeat in the Valley. With the presidential election looming in early November, another disaster in the Valley would be devastating. Sheridan later wrote, "in consequence of the instructions of General Grant, I deemed it necessary to be very cautious..." For Lincoln's part, having witnessed a parade of military ineptitude in the Valley throughout the war, it is little wonder he felt Sheridan was repeating the same pattern.

With his decisive victories at Third Winchester, Fisher's Hill and Tom's Brook, however, along with "The Burning," Sheridan had put Lincoln's fears to rest. The campaign seemed over. And then came Cedar Creek.

An audacious pre-dawn surprise attack by Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early initially routed Sheridan's army, seemingly beyond repair. It was a stunning reversal, felt throughout Union ranks.

One Northern soldier later described his despair that morning:

...the Army of the Shenandoah...was in danger of annihilation...humiliated by an undeniable defeat... Gloomily our men tramped across the fields, depressed in spirits... They feared that their former victories had all been rendered profitless by this one miserable defeat. They reflected what a crushing weight the news of this battle must fall upon the North, and they trembled for the Union cause.

The Union war effort was in jeopardy, something Sheridan clearly understood. He later described his first sight of his army upon completing his famous "Ride" that morning:

...there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of a panic-stricken army—hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs of others unhurt but badly demoralized... all pressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling only too plainly that a disaster had occurred at the front.

Rejecting suggestions to order a full-scale retreat, Sheridan realized any type of withdrawal would

be, by all appearances, a defeat. Thus the Union counterattack came, and with it a total reversal of fortune, both on the battlefield and home front.

Within weeks an epic poem, “Sheridan’s Ride” was published, extolling Sheridan’s inspirational leadership. Immensely popular, the Republican Party used it as a campaign tool to remind voters that tide of the war had changed. “Sheridan’s Ride” even appeared on the front page of the New York Tribune on Election Day in an attempt to sway voters.

Lincoln certainly recognized the importance of Sheridan’s victories and penned his congratulations three days after the battle, “I tender to you and your brave army the thanks of the nation and my own personal admiration and gratitude for the month’s operations in the Shenandoah Valley and especially for



Thure de Thulstrup’s 1886 painting “Sheridan’s Ride”.

the splendid work of October 19, 1864.”


on the field around 10:30 a.m. “Sheridan’s Ride,” later celebrated in art and poetry, forever cemented his status in American history. Sheridan immediately rejected all suggestions to order a full-scale retreat, and instead began to plan for a counterattack.

Preparations took several hours, but by 4 p.m. Sheridan ordered his counterattack to begin. Hoping to quickly overwhelm the smaller Confederate army, Sheridan instead saw his advance meet determined resistance. The fate of the battle hung in the balance. At this point, Union cavalry, led by Brigadier General George Custer struck hard. The Confederate line unraveled and the retreat quickly turned into a route.

By 5 p.m. the Confederate Army of the Valley ceased to exist. Losses included over 1,200 prisoners and 48

cannon, including all 24 of the Union cannon they had captured that morning. Total casualties numbered approximately 8,600 (5,700 Union and 2,900 Confederate), making it the second bloodiest battle in the Valley.

Cedar Creek was a momentous Union victory. It marked the end of Sheridan’s overwhelmingly successful campaign, which crushed further Confederate resistance in the Shenandoah Valley, and occurred on the eve of the presidential election. For the Confederacy, the campaign was a humiliating disaster, and one of a string of setbacks that fall and winter which ultimately led to final defeat less than six months later.



Stephen Dodson Ramseur

Shortly before the Battle of Cedar Creek, Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur learned his wife had just given birth to their first child. Mortally wounded, he died the next day; his young wife a widow and Mary, his daughter, fatherless. While on his deathbed in Belle Grove, Ramseur was visited by former West Point classmates, including George Armstrong Custer.

This monument marks the location where the regiment made a sacrificial stand, losing nearly 70 percent of its men. Dedicated in 1885, it honors both the Vermonters and the Confederates whom they fought.



8th Vermont Monument

Shenandoah At War

The Shenandoah Valley Battlefields National Historic District

By Terence Heder,
Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation

"If this Valley is lost, Virginia is lost."
– Gen. "Stonewall" Jackson.

During the Civil War, control of the Shenandoah Valley was critical to Virginia and the Confederacy. The Valley witnessed Jackson's brilliant 1862 Valley Campaign, Gen. Robert E. Lee's advance to the Confederate "high tide" at Gettysburg, the VMI Cadets' valiant charge at New Market, and Gen. Philip H. Sheridan's final campaign to crush Confederate hopes in the Valley—which included The Burning, the fiery destruction of the region's agricultural bounty.

During the Civil War, the Valley was often history's stage. And the historic towns, sites, and landscapes that bore witness to the pivotal events of those years

are still with us today, still looking much as they did 150 years ago.

In 1996, Congress created the Shenandoah Valley Battlefields National Historic District as a National Heritage Area to protect these resources for future generations. The Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation (SVBF) serves as the non-profit manager of the National Historic District. The SVBF works with partners to preserve the Valley's Civil War battlefields, coordinate the interpretation of the region's Civil War story, and promote the Valley as a visitor destination.

Together, the SVBF and its partners have protected 4,530 battlefield acres since 2000, bringing the total to 7,134 acres, including large tracts at Third Winchester, Second Winchester, Kernstown, Cedar Creek, Fisher's Hill, Tom's Brook, New Market, Cross Keys, Port Republic, and McDowell.

Shenandoah Valley
Battlefields National
Historic District



The SVBF has also collaborated with partners to interpret the history of these battlefields and related sites. Hundreds of sites tell the dramatic story of soldiers and civilians during those storm-tossed years – historic buildings, battlefields, courthouses, cemeteries, walking trails, museums, and more. Few areas can tell all sides of the Civil War story like the Valley: brother vs. brother, political upheaval, major battles, partisan warfare, civilian life – and civilian destruction.

Most poignant of all are the battlefields, the landscapes that saw so much struggle and sacrifice, such as the Middle Field at Third Winchester, Rienzi Knoll at Cedar Creek, the “Field of Lost Shoes” at New Market, the Coaling at Port Republic, and Sitlington’s Hill in McDowell. Today, visitors can walk the fields and learn the stories of famed names such as Jackson, Sheridan, Mosby, and Custer – and the smaller stories of the individual soldiers who gave their all.

This year’s 1864-2014 Sesquicentennial is an especially meaningful time to visit. The stories of 1864 in the Valley are some of the most famed of the Civil War: from the VMI cadets, Jubal Early’s drive to Washington, and the stone wall at Second Kernstown – to the “Basin of Hell” at Third Winchester, the

devastation of “The Burning,” and Sheridan’s dramatic ride to turn the tide at Cedar Creek. In 2014, sites throughout the Valley will commemorate the 150th anniversary of that year with a series of programs, including two conferences and major battle commemorations at New Market, Second Kernstown, Third Winchester, and Cedar Creek.

The SVBF and its partners provide a host of tools to help visitors. Cedar Creek and Belle Grove National Historical Park’s Visitor Contact Station offers information on both the park’s story and the wider Valley. The SVBF has established Civil War Orientation sites in Winchester, Harrisonburg, McDowell, Middletown, and Luray. Printed materials include the Shenandoah At War visitor guide, driving tours, maps, and booklets. And multi-media media tools include animated maps, orientation films, and a film on Jackson’s Valley Campaign.

Within the Shenandoah Valley National Historic District, there are limitless opportunities to experience the Valley’s Civil War story. To learn more about the sites and events in the National Historic District, visit www.ShenandoahAtWar.org.



New Market Battlefield

1864

Emancipation in Border-State Maryland

By Gail Stephens, Volunteer/Author,
Monocacy National Battlefield

In August 1864, Annie Davis, a slave in Maryland, wrote President Lincoln, “It is my Desire to be free. to (sic) go to see my people on the eastern shore.” Her mistress would not let her go, so Annie Davis asked the president whether she was free. She was not. The Emancipation Proclamation, which Lincoln had signed more than a year earlier, freed slaves in the ten states of the Confederacy, but not in the slave states which remained in the Union, including Maryland. Though Annie Davis was still a slave, her freedom was imminent, thanks to the efforts of Maryland Unionist politicians, a Union major general from Indiana, and the slaves themselves.

In 1864 there were about 87,000 slaves in Maryland, most of them in the counties along the Chesapeake Bay. Maryland was also home to the largest population of free blacks in the nation, about 84,000. Though a slave state, Maryland remained in the Union because according to one historian, “The Union needed Baltimore and Baltimore needed the Union and both needed the Baltimore and Ohio,” a reference to the thriving commerce and industry of Baltimore and the all-important Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. When it appeared Maryland might secede in April 1861, Lincoln, who realized the state’s importance to the Union, ordered troops stationed at important points. The steady hand of a Unionist governor and the Unionist sentiments of a majority of Marylanders also kept the state from seceding.

Slavery began to collapse early in the war. In 1861, Maryland slaves began freeing themselves by escaping to the encampments of Union soldiers, who prevented their former owners from seizing them. In 1862, Washington, D.C. became a haven when slavery was abolished there. In 1863, the Union army began enlisting free black men. Ultimately, the need for fighting manpower dictated enlistment of all Maryland black men, including slaves. Before the end of the war, 10,000 black Marylanders would serve in the Union army and navy. By 1864, a slave who could have sold for \$2,500 in 1860 was worth only \$400.



United States Colored Trooper with family.
Photo Credit: Library of Congress

The Union Party, which was committed to emancipation, won control of the Maryland General Assembly in 1863. Led by the Unionists, the assembly called for a constitutional convention to consider emancipation. The 96 delegates to the convention would be selected in a special election in April 1864.

President Lincoln urged Marylanders to abolish slavery in a March 1864 public letter, “It need not to be a secret, that I wish success to emancipation in Maryland. It would aid much to end the rebellion. Hence it is a matter of national consequence, in which every national man may rightfully feel a deep interest.” In early March, Lincoln also made his position clear to his new military commander in Maryland, Major General Lew Wallace, “Wallace, I came near forgetting that there is an election nearly due over in Maryland, but don’t you forget it.” The Secretary of War told Wallace the President had his heart set on emancipation in Maryland but did not want the obvious military intervention which had marred previous elections. Wallace was being put on notice he was to ensure pro-emancipation candidates were elected in April but without a Union military presence at the polls. This kind of scrutiny made the battle-tested Wallace nervous, but he had been a

politician before the war and understood the system. Wallace would have a decisive influence on Maryland emancipation.

Wallace favored freeing Maryland slaves without compensation to their owners, writing his wife, "My policy is to make it free without compensation. The probability is I shall succeed." On March 28, Wallace took an important first step by becoming the first Union commander to make the trip to Annapolis to confer with Maryland Governor Bradford. Wallace's chief concern was to learn whether Bradford would prevent those with Southern sympathies from voting.

Bradford assured him Maryland law required local judges of election to administer an oath of loyalty to potential voters and it would be enforced. At Wallace's request, the governor had this information published in Maryland newspapers. Wallace also allayed the governor's concern about the presence of soldiers at the polls by promising to send them only when called out by the judges of election, and ordering that they act with "great caution and forbearance." Emancipation carried in the April election. Sixty-one of the 96 seats in the constitutional convention went to those who favored emancipation. Wallace had obeyed Lincoln's order. One opposition paper said that the election resembled those held before the war.

The Convention met in Annapolis, and on June 24, immediate emancipation without compensation passed. The Declaration of Rights in the new Maryland constitution read "... hereafter, in this State, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude; ... all persons held in service or labor as slaves are hereby declared free." Maryland voters would still have to approve the new constitution in October.

The July 1864 Confederate invasion, ironically, sealed the fate of slavery in Maryland. The convention delegates, angry that their state had been invaded, met again and passed a strengthened loyalty oath, which prevented most slave owners from voting and ensured passage of the new constitution.


On November 1, 1864, Annie Davis got her wish; Maryland became the first border state to free its slaves. In celebration, General Wallace ordered the firing of a one hundred gun salute from Ft. McHenry.

Slave owners were not ready to give up and made one last attempt to maintain slavery of a kind. Maryland law enabled judges of orphans' courts to apprentice the children of any free negro to a white person if it was found that the parents of the child were unable or unwilling to support them. Males could be held as apprentices until the age of 21 and females until the age of 18. Slave owners began hauling the children of their newly-freed slaves before sympathetic judges, who in spite of the protests of the parents apprenticed the children to their former owners. This also forced the parents to stay near their former masters and often to labor for them.

Wallace took action, issuing an order which put all former slaves under military protection until the Maryland legislature could take action. Wallace also lobbied the Maryland General Assembly to abolish Maryland's 1860 Slave Code and pass the 13th amendment to the US Constitution, which ended slavery in the nation. It worked; in early 1865, the Maryland General Assembly repealed the antebellum slave code in its entirety and adopted the 13th amendment. Wallace left his

Maryland post in 1865, satisfied he had done what he could.

Maryland did not treat its black population equally until the 20th century, but it had ended slavery through a peaceful constitutional process. Maryland had shown the way, aided mightily by General Lew Wallace.



General Lew Wallace. Photo Credit: Library of Congress



Cedar Creek & Belle Grove National Historical Park is a partnership park, in which the National Park Service works with several key partners to create and manage the park and its resources. These Key Partners are all non-profit or governmental organizations and include:



In 1996, Congress designated eight counties in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia as a National Heritage Area - the Shenandoah Valley Battlefields National Historic District - which preserves and interprets the region's significant Civil War battlefields and related historic sites. The effort is led by the Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, which works with partners to preserve the hallowed ground of the Valley's Civil War battlefields, and to share its Civil War story with the nation.

For more information please visit: www.shenandoahatwar.org



Belle Grove, Inc., operates Belle Grove Plantation and protects sensitive battlefield land. It also owns Harmony Hall (Fort Bowman), an early settlement site on the Shenandoah River.

For more information please visit: www.bellegrove.org



The mission of the Shenandoah County Government is to promote an organizational environment that emphasizes the efficient delivery of high quality services to the public, assist the Board of Supervisors in carrying out its strategic objectives, and effectively communicate information about County operations and services to citizens, the Board of Supervisors, the public, the employees, and the media.

For more information please visit: www.shenandoahcountyva.us



Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation mission is to preserve lands associated with the Battle of Cedar Creek, and to educate others about the importance of the battle in our local and national history.


For more information please visit: www.ccbf.us



Helping people protect, enhance, and enjoy the places that matter to them. The National Trust for Historic Preservation provides leadership, education, advocacy, and resources to save America's diverse historic places and revitalize our communities. The National Trust for Historic Preservation is a private, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to saving historic places and revitalizing America's communities. Recipient of the National Humanities Medal, the Trust was founded in 1949 and provides leadership, education, advocacy, and resources to protect the irreplaceable places that tell America's story.

For more information please visit: www.preservationnation.org

A MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, JON JARVIS



“The Civil War’s social, political, and economic effects were profound as the nation divorced itself—with great violence—from an institution that reduced human beings to property. The war transformed our conceptions of race and freedom. It changed ideas about death and religion. It remains to this day our greatest national upheaval.

The places where the war was fought are among our nation’s most sacred sites: Gettysburg, Shiloh, Antietam, and Manassas. The names themselves evoke not only the great struggle, but the personalities and events of that incredible time.

Over 75 of these battlefields and related sites are now national parks. For the National Park Service, serving as the steward of these places which occupy such a defining role in American memory, is not just a great honor, but a solemn responsibility. Helping our visitors understand the triumphs and tragedies of our incredible past is one of the National Park Service’s most important roles as keeper and interpreter of these iconic American places.

The National Park Service is proud to be the steward of that legacy. I can promise you that we will be here every day of every year watching over this place, to keep it and protect it; to pass its story on to future generations of Americans. It is not simply a battlefield that we preserve here. It is our birthright as a nation, purchased at an unimaginable cost, and one that we will care for with all the reverence it demands.”

- Director Jon Jarvis
July 21, 2011



M. A. P.

showing Routes and Camps
of the Army of the Valley Dist.
from Staunton, Va. to Washington, D. C.
and back to Strasburg, Va.
from June 27th to July 22nd, 1864
to accompany Report of
Col. Tolbert's Top. Eng. V. D.

