



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service
General Report



Incident: NP18136608 SAR (Search and Rescue) @08/14/2018 15:57

Author: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.
Entered by: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.

Report time: 10/31/2018 14:28
Entered time: 10/31/2018 14:28

Report:

INFORMATION:

On August 14, 2018 at approximately 1445 hours, I was assigned to patrol in the East District of Mt Rainier National Park. While at the White River Ranger Station, Supervisory Park Ranger Walker received a call from South Sound 9-1-1 about an injured climber near Dewey Peak. The injured climber was later identified as Stephen KORNBLUTH.

South Sound 9-1-1 called to find out if the climber fell in Pierce County jurisdiction or Mount Rainier National Park jurisdiction. It was reported the climbing party parked their car at a trailhead outside of Mount Rainier and hiked on the Pacific Crest Trail (PCT) to get to Dewey Peak. It was determined by the GPS coordinates, 46.84183 -121.48527, the fall occurred in Mount Rainier National Park Jurisdiction.

A Unified Command was established with Supervisory Park Ranger Geoff Walker as the Incident Commander at Mount Rainier National Park and Randy Briscoe as the off scene Incident Commander. Other agencies involved were Greenwater Fire Department, Yakima County Search & Rescue, Central Washington Mountain Rescue, and Tacoma Mountain Rescue.

INVESTIGATION:

It was determined that Stephen fell off of Dewey Peak on 8/14/2018 at approximately 1430 hours. Through interviews it was determined at approximately 0730 hours Stephen KORNBLUTH, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] met at the Safeway parking lot located at 152 Roosevelt Ave E, Enumclaw, WA 98022 and carpooled to the PCT Trail Head on SR 410 just outside of the Mount Rainier National Parks East Boundary. They arrived at the trailhead at 0900 hours.

They hiked on the PCT to Dewey Lake and they took a social trail to the base of Dewey Peak. They arrived at the base of summit block at 1130 hours. They dropped their packs and put on their climbing gear. They had a safety briefing from [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] went up the scree field first and placed protection. [REDACTED] went up second. And Stephen went up last and cleaned up the anchors. The ascent was described as a level 3 scramble. Ropes were not required for the ascent, but they added safety to make it more of an adventure. There was a "crappy anchor" set in place by a previous climbing party. [REDACTED] stated he used it as a "joke/bad example" of an anchor. The "crappy anchor" was non load bearing and used to keep the rope from flipping over a large rock referred to as "crappy tower". It was reported there were load bearing anchors set up in other areas.

They arrived at the summit of Dewey Peak without injuries. They signed the summit register and

prepared to climb down. [REDACTED] looked around the summit for the best anchor point for the descent. It was reported there was not a lot of choices for a good anchor point and mostly dark black blades and all the rocks moved. Walking further down the slope [REDACTED] found an anchor point he liked.

[REDACTED] set up the anchor with a 6mm cord wrapped twice around the rock with long cord tails. Then tied a master overhand point, clipped in, and load tested it as a directional anchor. It was reported Stephen did not like the anchor due to cracks in the rock and pointed out another rock with horns [REDACTED] state they could not get to that anchor point without additional rigging.

[REDACTED] and Stephen talked about the cracks in the rock and decided to use to anchor point [REDACTED] chose. [REDACTED] tightened up the directional anchor. The directional anchor was designed to be pulled down. [REDACTED] finished the weight test and "lectured" about the rappel. [REDACTED] had a fear of a rappelling accident. It was also reported Stephen seemed nervous and jittery about the rappel.

They decided to attach a cam backup to the directional anchor. [REDACTED] placed a cam in a rock crack and clove hitched it with a carabiner. [REDACTED] said he checked it for at least an inch of slack. The cam backup was 4 to 6 feet long. The rope was threaded before the backup was built. It was reported by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that the backup did not move while it was being load tested.

[REDACTED] went down first to ensure the rope was ling enough, properly knotted, and not snagged. [REDACTED] made it to the bottom without incident. [REDACTED] went down second without incident. Stephen went down last and cleaned up the gear. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stated that Stephen said he had removed the cam backup on his harness over the radio. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stated they do not remember hearing Stephen said "on rappel". [REDACTED] stated that he thought Stephen was clipped in and ready to rappel.

[REDACTED] stated he was talking to [REDACTED] about the trip. There were suddenly some falling rocks, so they changed position to avoid being hit. They looked up and saw Stephen tumbling/summersaulting downhill. [REDACTED] stated she was thinking; why isn't he placing his arms out to stop himself when he was still on the 20 feet of rock scramble.

He then passed over the edge. There was no sound made by Stephen. [REDACTED] stated he thought he could catch him, but he was too far away. Stephen then fell head first and landed on the rocks. [REDACTED] tried to get to Stephen, but they were sliding downhill. [REDACTED] tried to check for a pulse while [REDACTED] went uphill to call 9-1-1.

[REDACTED] rolled Stephen over, but they were still sliding. [REDACTED] stated he did not find a pulse and started chest compressions and rescue breaths. However [REDACTED] stated he could see blood/air bubbles coming from Stephens' mouth. It was reported [REDACTED] continued CPR for 40 to 45 minutes.

[REDACTED] told 9-1-1 she was at GPS coordinates, 46.84183 -121.48527. At this time a Search and Rescue (SAR) Team was sent to the GPS coordinate. The team consisted of Mt Rainier Rangers and Greenwater Fire Department Firefighters. The team members from Mt Rainier were Supervisory Park Ranger Dan van der Elst, Ranger Gavin Wilson, Ranger Lindsey Pagaduan, and Ranger Anthony D'Amelio. The team members from Greenwater Fire Department were Chief Paul Sowers, Firefighter Richard Starrett and Firefighter Mike Larkin.

The SAR Team arrived at the SR 410 PCT Trail Head and hiked to the supplied GPS Coordinate. Supervisory Park Ranger Dan van der Elst and Chief Paul Sowers stayed at the trailhead. When we arrived at Dewey Lake we were notified [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were departing Dewey Peak. This was

approximately 1700 hours. We decided to split the team up. Mike and I stayed at Dewey Lake to talk to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Witness 2. The rest of the team went to the GPS Coordinate to locate Stephen.

At approximately 1900 hours there was no contact and it was starting to get dark, so we started to hike back to the trailhead. The rest of the SAR Team was not able to locate Stephen, so they started to hike back to the trailhead.

I returned to the trailhead and talked to [REDACTED] Witness 3 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c). [REDACTED] was look there looking for [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated the US Air Force contacted him about the incident. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]s steady climbing partner, so he was there to drive him home and emotional support.

INITIAL ONSCENE INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) AND [REDACTED] Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c):

At approximately 2100 hours [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] exited the trail. I was able to interview them. See supplemental interview report.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS:

The temperature for the day was a high of 73° F with a low of 48° F. The forecast called for a 20% chance of rain. It did not raining in the area that day. The sunrise was at 0602 hours and sunset was at 2018 hours.

MEDICAL HISTORY:

While interviewing [REDACTED] With [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on 8/14/2018. They stated they did not know of any medical conditions or complaints that Stephen had. They only stated they were not sure if he was conscious when he fell.

During an interview on 8/21/2018 [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

For more information of the interview of [REDACTED] on 8/21/2018, see attached supplemental report by Ranger Cavendish.

RECOVERY, TRANSPORT, MEDICAL EXAMINER:

On 8/15/2018 at approximately 0800 hours the recovery of Stephen was coordinated with Mount Rainier Air Operations. The helicopter did a reconnaissance flight and was able to locate Stephen. The helicopter then landed at the Eastside Trail Trailhead to plan out the mission. Upon completion the helicopter completed a short haul recovery. The recovery of Stephen was conducted by Ranger Hansen, Ranger Maine, and Ranger Waterfall.

Stephen was then transported to the White River Ranger Station by Ranger Lindsey Pagaduan. Stephen was pronounced deceased by Doctor Ian Wedmore from Madigan Hospital via telephone. Stephen was

identified by his Washington State Driver's License.

Stephen's body was turned over to Medical Investigator Jeff Looney from the Pierce County Medical Examiner's Office. See Pierce County Medical Examiner's report #18-1642 for more information.

TACOMA MOUNTAIN RESCUE ANCHOR TEST EVALUATION:

On 8/25/2018 Supervisory Park Ranger Daniel van der Elst and Ranger Jason Olson went to Dewey Peak with the Tacoma Mountain Rescue to document the condition of the rappel anchor used by [REDACTED], and Stephen.

In the report it appears the direction anchor without cam backup failed in their test/evaluation and appeared unsafe.

Please see attached Supplemental Report by Supervisory Park Ranger Daniel van der Elst and the TMR Anchor Evaluation for more information.

I gathered the following information:

1. Investigating Officer is Ranger Anthony D'Amelio
2. Reporting Department is Mount Rainier National Park
3. Case Number is NP18-136608
4. Deceased Name is Stephen Robert KORNBLUTH
5. Age is 35
6. DOB is 5/27/1983
7. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
8. Location of Body was base of the Dewey Peak
9. Initial Cause of Death appeared to be a fall with head trauma. (See Pierce County Medical Examiner's report #18-1642 for more information.)
10. Date & Time Deceased Found is 8/14/2018 at approximately 1430
11. Who Found Deceased: Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
12. Date & Time Last Seen Alive: 8/14/2018 at approximately 1429
13. Who saw the Deceased Alive last were Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).
14. Next of Kin, Family Member 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Father) and Family Member 2 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Mother)

CASE STATUS:

There is no further information, evidence, or suspects to report in this case. Case closed pending further information.

General Report

U.S. Department of the Interior , National Park Service

Printed: 12/10/2018 11:37 by

Incident: **NP18136608 SAR (Search and Rescue) @08/14/2018 15:57**

Author: #590 VAN DER ELST, D.

Report time: 11/29/2018 11:15

Entered by: #590 VAN DER ELST, D.

Entered time: 11/29/2018 11:15

Report:

This report provides supplemental detail to Ranger D'Amelio's account of the initial interview of [REDACTED] on 8/14/18 at 21:30hrs, which I was participated in. The purpose of the initial interview was twofold: to establish the basic details of the incident, and to provide detail for planning of the technical recovery.

When describing the events of the incident, the type of anchor used, and possible reasons for the anchor failure, [REDACTED] did not mentioned the cam-and-cordelette backup on the rappel anchor. At the time, when I asked why he thought the anchor might have failed, [REDACTED] said that he thought Kornbluth might have bounced on the rope because he was exuberant, causing the anchor loop to slip off the rock, but did not state that he [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had rappelled with a back-up in place, and that Kornbluth had been instructed to remove the backup before rappelling. When I read Ranger D'Amelio's notes from his interview with [REDACTED], which do refer to the backup anchor, I identified this omission as an area of concern which needed to be explored in Officer Cavendish's followup interview.

End of Supplemental



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service
Supplementary Incident Report



Printed: 12/10/2018 11:43 by

Incident: NP18136608 SAR (Search and Rescue) @08/14/2018 15:57

Author: #1602 CAVENDISH, T.

Report time: 11/29/2018 10:41

Entered by: #1602 CAVENDISH, T.

Entered time: 11/29/2018 10:41

Report:

Case# NP18136608

During the death investigation of Stephen KORNBLUTH, I corresponded with Climber Friend 5 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a friend of Stephen's who was originally part of the climbing party. [REDACTED] had to back out from the trip due to a medial issue. [REDACTED] is a member of the Mountaineers and was a friend and recreational partner to Stephen. I did not conduct an interview with her since she was not on the climb that day, however, I did correspond with her on several occasions. She helped with the recovery response since she was notified relatively early in the incident, is a representative of the Mountaineers, and is also a chaplain. She did the notification to (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) [REDACTED], and help coordinate the pickup of his personal belongings and vehicle between the park and (b) (6) [REDACTED].

Additional materials and clarifying messages were sent back and forth between myself and Climber Friend 5 [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. These supporting emails and messages are uploaded to this case file as attachments. SZ (b)(6)

Dewey Peak Anchor Evaluation

Brief Summary: *Volunteers reconstructed the anchor used by the decedent from photos recovered from their phone. With a volunteer on belay the party conducted two rappels using the anchor. The party estimated the decedent's starting position and rappel setup with information from Mount Rainier National Park rangers who had recovered the body. In both test rappels the anchor slipped to the end of the rock. In the first test the party stopped the rappel for safety reasons before the anchor could come completely off the rock. In the second test the volunteer continued rappelling after the anchor had slipped to the end of the rock however when the volunteer unweighted the system the anchor fell off.*

Purpose:

The purpose of the Dewey Peak anchor evaluation is to help the culture of safety in our climbing community grow.

Procedures:

Tacoma Mountain Rescue (TMR), under their organization's remit of "Saving lives through rescue and mountain safety education" had been in correspondence with the Mt. Rainier National Park Service (NPS) authorities conducting the park's official incident investigation. TMR informed park officials they wanted to recreate the anchor setup from the 8/14/2018 fatality. NPS officials agreed TMR could proceed, and asked to join the party and visit the scene as part of their investigation. NPS requested that no actions were taken until NPS representatives were also on the summit. TMR extended invitations to Climbing Friend 5 (b) (6), (b)(7)(C) and [REDACTED] to join the team as private individuals. On 8/25/2018 TMR arrived at the park and signed in on foot patrol with MRNP Dispatch. The group were met on the summit by two officials from NPS with responsibility for the park's incident investigation.

The anchor used on 8/14/2018: Our party had access to photographs recovered from the decedent's phone. The photographs showed the anchor used for the rappel on 8/14/2018. The photos were taken when the anchor was in use by the first two members of the 8/14/2018 party to descend.

The anchor built on 8/14/2018 was on the north end of the summit ridge. The anchor used 8 mm cordelette the party scavenged from elsewhere on the summit. This material had been tied into a loop with a double fisherman knot. The loop was doubled by folding it in half. The doubled loop was draped over a northward pointing rock protrusion about 15 inches wide with grooves on either side [see Figure 1]. The rappel anchor used on 8/14/2018 had a backup connection in place for the first two members of the party to descend. The backup was a cam slotted in a crack about 5 ft. south of the rock protrusion and 4 feet below it. A second loop of 8mm cordelette ran from the cam to a pair of carabiners hooked to the scavenged cordelette [see Figure 2]. On the north side of the rock protrusion, in the anticipated direction of the rappel forces, a figure 8 loop was tied creating a master point. The figure 8 loop extended below the rock protrusion roughly 2.5 ft. The 8/14/2018 group fed the rappel rope directly through the figure 8 loop [see Figure 3]. Based on information from the surviving party members, all 8/14/2018 party members were clear that the rappel anchor they had built was only optimal for downward forces.

Dewey Peak Anchor Evaluation



Figure 1



Figure 2

Dewey Peak Anchor Evaluation



Figure 3

According to surviving party members the decedent was the last to descend using the anchor. The decedent had been instructed to 1.) Retrieve and bring down the cam and cordelette that had been placed as a backup and 2.) To maintain downward forces on the remaining anchor component.

The rappel stance: Just north of the rappel anchor built by the 8/14/2018 party was a 2-3 square-foot ledge of loose rock. North of this ledge the descent route drops off steeply and curves west. A person rappelling off of the anchor would have stood upon this ledge to set up their rappel device. From this stance the climber is facing south and the rappel anchor is within arm's reach between abdomen and chest height [see Figure 4].

Recreating and testing the 8/14/2018 anchor: On 8/25/2018 our party recreated the anchor shown in the decedent's photographs using equipment they brought to the summit with the same dimensions as the equipment used on 8/14/2018. The equipment was placed on the rock protrusion in the same configuration shown in the decedent's photographs. Those present observed that slapping the protrusion with an open palm from a 6 inch height produced a hollow sound, indicative of rock in a less than perfectly solid position. Our party elected to proceed with testing.

Our party built a gear anchor east of and adjacent to the 8/14/2018 anchor and belayed a party member who agreed to test the rappel anchor.

Dewey Peak Anchor Evaluation



Figure 4

According to information from NPS staff familiar with the incident the decedent was found with the anchor material still attached to the rappel setup, and only a few feet from the master point. For each of the tests described below the volunteer testing the anchor:

- Went on belay
- Set up an extended rappel with autoblock
- Rappelled a short way down the descent route

Results

Initial test with setup used by the first two 8/14/2018 party members:

In this test the rappel anchor did not slip toward the end of the rock protrusion. The backup material described above effectively prevented the cord around the rock from slipping toward the end of the protrusion [see video “Initial Test with Backup”].

Test #1 with the backup material removed

When the rappelling volunteer standing on the rocky ledge tensioned the extended rappel with autoblock to step off of the ledge the forces on the rappel anchor were not downward in direction. Immediately upon weighting the setup to step off of the ledge the cord around the rock protrusion slipped roughly half way to the end of it. The test was halted to evaluate the safety of further testing [see video “Test 1 No Backup”].

Dewey Peak Anchor Evaluation

Test #2 with the backup material removed

When the rappelling volunteer standing on the rocky ledge tensioned the extended rappel with autoblock to step off of the ledge the forces on the rappel anchor were not downward in direction. Immediately upon weighting the setup to step off of the ledge the cord around the rock protrusion slipped about halfway to the end of it. The rappelling volunteer kept his eyes upon the rappel anchor and continued to descend, making it to the top of the steep gulley. When the volunteer unweighted the setup to return to the rocky ledge, the anchor material came off of the rock protrusion [see video “Test 2 No Backup”].

Additional test

The rappelling volunteer performed one other test, to see what would be required to successfully descend on the anchor without the cam in place for backup. The volunteer reported going below the starting ledge and to climber’s right. The volunteer did not continue all the way to the final gully. He reported, “I did manage to get the anchor to not pop one time but that was without weighting the anchor until I got below the step and started moving to the right.”

Discussion

With the backup cam connection removed, the remaining anchor component was at extreme risk to slip off of the rock protrusion under anything but downward forces to the north. A descending climber setting up their extended rappel with autoblock on the rocky ledge north of the rappel anchor would not have been in position to apply downward forces. It would have been necessary to down-climb into the steep gulley without weighting the anchor before applying load to the anchor to achieve a downward direction of pull. A climber following rappel procedures consistent with those taught in the Mountaineers basic climbing course who established tension on the anchor before descending into the gully would have been at extreme risk for anchor failure.

The normal rappel for this climb according to Summitpost.com is an 80 foot descent that can be completed with a 60 meter rope from a large boulder situated 50 ft. east of the anchor the 8/14/2018 party used. The information on Summitpost advises brining extra anchor building material in case the existing setup is in bad shape. Our party descended this way on 8/25/2018. The summit of Dewey Peak is a ridge running north – south. Figure 5 shows a climber leaving the location of the anchor the 8/14/2018 party used. The photographer is standing roughly 50 feet south of where the 8/14/2018 anchor was built. Figure 6 is taken from the same point on the ridge as the photo in Figure 5, however the view is of the standard rappel station which is 10 feet south of the photographer’s position.

Dewey Peak Anchor Evaluation



Figure 5



Figure 6

Decisions that might have mitigated the risk of anchor failure from anything other than downward directional forces:

- Rappelling instead from the location described on Summitpost, and bringing extra anchor material as advised
- Leaving the cam in place for all descending party members
- Having the most experienced climber clean and undertake the critical “downward force” maneuver to get into the gully

Closing

The individuals below performed this analysis and prepared this report. We are available to meet with you to discuss these observations in more detail if desired.

Steve Brown, Strike Team Leader, Tacoma Mountain Rescue

Christopher Hill, Vice President and Strike Team Leader, Tacoma Mountain Rescue

Roland Lanoue, Field Support, Tacoma Mountain Rescue

Climbing Friend 5 (b)
(b), (b)(7)(C)
Climbing Friend 4
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Tests also witnessed by;

Dan van der Elst

Wilderness District Ranger

Mount Rainier National Park



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service
Supplementary Incident Report



<i>Printed:</i>	12/10/2018 11:49 by
<i>Incident:</i>	NP18136608 SAR (Search and Rescue) @08/14/2018 15:57

Author: #590 VAN DER ELST, D.
Entered by: #590 VAN DER ELST, D.

Report time: 09/09/2018 15:03
Entered time: 09/09/2018 15:03

Remarks:

Site Visit and Anchor Assessment

Report:

On 8/25/18 Ranger Jason Olson and I visited Dewey Peak to document the condition of the rappel anchor used by the Kornbluth climbing party, and to observe the activities of a party composed of three Tacoma Mountain Rescue volunteers and two friends of the decedent whose intention was to recreate and test the anchor.

Approach:

We approached Dewey Peak by leaving the Pacific Crest Trail at the park boundary and following game trails south for approximately 1 mile, then ascending climber/game trails to the saddle between Seymour and Dewey Peaks, and ascending the north ridgeline of Dewey Peak to the accident scene. I observed Kornbluth's helmet approximately 100 feet down a rocky slope from the accident scene (which I recovered later in the day).

From the top of the gully at the base of the summit block, we ascended un-ropeed approximately 80 feet of generally secure 3rd class rock and dirt to the summit (3rd class is defined in the Cascade Alpine Guide as "scrambling with the frequent use of hands. There may be moderate exposure; for the average climber a rope will not be desired, but one should be available. Some strength and technique may be need on specific moves.") We used photographs recovered from Kornbluth's phone to identify the rock which had been used as an anchor. I confirmed that the rock had not moved from its original position and was not loose enough to shift by hand, though it made a hollow sound when struck.

Also on the summit was a PCV tube containing a summit register, last signed by Richard Kornbluth, and a rappel anchor consisting of long loops of faded 1" webbing wrapped around a large, secure boulder for descending the vertical west face of the summit.

Testing:

The TMRU party arrived at the base of the summit block shortly after Olson and I did. They also ascended to the summit and began building an anchor on the rock used by the Kornbluth party after I had inspected it. The results of their analysis will be included in the case file. I observed the test anchor and compared it to 8x11 color photographs of the original party's anchor, and the size and placement were nearly identical.

The anchor as originally placed by [REDACTED], with a spring loaded camming device and cordelette back-up, appeared secure and worked as a rappel anchor without failure. Interestingly, when the anchor was weighted, weight was not transferred entirely to the backup cordelette; rather, the twin carabiners connecting the two anchor components appear to press into the back of the anchor rock generating enough friction to keep the forward anchor loop from slipping. Once the backup was removed, as Kornbluth is reported to have done, the anchor became unreliable. It is not known what position the anchor was in after Kornbluth removed the cam and cordelette (which were found on his person after the accident), but we assume that it was in the same position as before the backup was removed. The TMRU team demonstrated that the anchor could be used successfully if the rappeller initially down-climbed to achieve a sufficiently downward vector. However, when the system was weighted near the anchor point with any outward vector, or weighted and then unweighted, the anchor

failed by slipping toward, or off, the end of the rock.

Present in the TMRU party were: Steve Brown, Christopher Hill, and Roland Lanoue of Tacoma Mountain Rescue; and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 4 (b)(5) (b)(7)

Contributing Factors:

Based on my training and experience as a technical rope rescue technician for the National Park Service, and as a recreational alpine climber, the anchor did not meet the criteria of a safe and reliable anchor. Applying the "SERENE" mnemonic (solid, efficient, redundant, equalized, not extending), the anchor was neither solid nor redundant. Without a backup, because of the shallow angle of the anchor rock and the potential for the anchor to slip, the anchor was never better than questionable. I would not have utilized the anchor for life safety. In my professional opinion, poor judgement in anchor placement was a contributing factor in the incident outcome.

Alternatives:

I evaluated the summit for alternate decent options. These include: down-climbing the 3rd class route without use of ropes; slinging other, more vertical rock horns; utilizing nuts, cams, or other rock protection as anchors (including leaving the cam and codelette backup in place); or using the "standard" rappel off the west face.

Descent:

After the anchor assessment was complete, I and the others present replaced the faded webbing on the large boulder anchor and rappelled the vertical west face. I recovered Kornbluth's climbing helmet from the gully and observed damage on the right side and rear of the helmet and dried blood, consistent with [REDACTED]'s report that Kornbluth was wearing the helmet when he fell.

Ranger Olson and descended together with the TMRU party to the Seymour-Dewey saddle, where we separated. [REDACTED] agreed to provide the park service with the write-up and photos of the party's analysis.

End of Report



National Park Service
U.S. Department of the Interior

Mount Rainier National Park
55210 238th Avenue East
Ashford, WA 98304



MORA Case #: NP13-136608

Voluntary Witness Statement

TO BE COMPLETED BY WITNESS (PLEASE PRINT):

Last Name: Witness 3 (b) (6), (b) (7) (C)	First Name: Witness 3 (b) (6), (b) (7) (C)	M.I. Witness 3 (b) (6), (b) (7) (C)	Telephone Number: (b) (6)
Street Address: Witness 3 (b) (6), (b) (7) (C)	City: (b) (6)	State: (b) (6)	Zip Code: (b) (6)
Date of statement: 08 / 14 / 2018			

I, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) do hereby make the following statement of my own free
(Signature)

will and accord concerning the matter of Dewey Peak FATALITY

Which occurred at (location) Dewey Peak

On the date of 08 / 14 / 2018 at 4 + A.M. or P.M.
(Circle one)

YOU ARE NOTIFIED THAT THE STATEMENTS YOU ARE ABOUT TO MAKE MAY BE PRESENTED TO A MAGISTRATE OR A JUDGE IN LIEU OF YOUR SWORN TESTIMONY AT A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. ANY FALSE STATEMENT THAT YOU MAKE AND DO NOT BELIEVE TO BE TRUE MAY SUBJECT YOU TO CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT.

In your own words describe in detail the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, & HOW.

Statement:

I WAS CONTACTED BY SGT. SMITH OF USAF RESPONDING TO PW
ACRS PLB SOS SIGNAL AT 2:49 PM. I ADVISED HIM THAT
IT WAS PROBABLY REAL AND PROBABLY FROM DEWEY PEAK.

Witness 1
(b) (6) (b) THE CLIMB LEADER, IS MY STEADY CLIMBING PARTNER AND
I WAS LISTED AS HIS SOS CONTACT, I SUBSEQUENTLY TALKED TO
MORA AND WAS DIRECTED TO YAKIMA CO. SHERIFF.

TO BE COMPLETED BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Investigating Officer(s):
Anthony Dimelio

Badge #(s):
2913

Investigating Officer(s) Signature(s):
[Signature]

Date Signed:

8/14/2018



National Park Service
U.S. Department of the Interior

Mount Rainier National Park
55210 238th Avenue East
Ashford, WA 98304



MORA Case #: MP18-136608

Voluntary Witness Statement

TO BE COMPLETED BY WITNESS (PLEASE PRINT):

Last Name: <u>Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)</u>	First Name: <u>Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)</u>	M.I. Witness: <u>2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)</u>	Telephone Number: <u>(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)</u>
Street Address: <u>(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)</u>	City: <u>(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)</u>	State: <u>(b) (6)</u>	Zip Code: <u>(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)</u>
Date of birth: <u>(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)</u>		Date of statement: <u>8/14/18</u>	

Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

do hereby make the following statement of my own free

will and accord concerning the matter of Dewey Peak climbing fatality

Which occurred at (location) Dewey Peak - Summit Block

On the date of 8/14/18 at 2:30 A.M. or P.M.
(Circle one)

YOU ARE NOTIFIED THAT THE STATEMENTS YOU ARE ABOUT TO MAKE MAY BE PRESENTED TO A MAGISTRATE OR A JUDGE IN LIEU OF YOUR SWORN TESTIMONY AT A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. ANY FALSE STATEMENT THAT YOU MAKE AND DO NOT BELIEVE TO BE TRUE MAY SUBJECT YOU TO CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT.

In your own words describe in detail the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, & HOW.

Statement:

We arrived at the Dewey Peak Summit block between 11:30am and began to climb to the summit. We signed the summit register, took some photos and enjoyed the views. We began to set up the rappell anchor, which was backed up in the cam. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) rappelled down, followed by me. I got off rappell and indicated that Stephen could start setting up for rappell. He realized that he would start setting up.

A couple of minutes later, I saw Stephen fall. I immediately called 911 (2:30pm) and Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) began CPR. He did not have a pulse initially. After 40-45 minutes Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) discontinued CPR.

TO BE COMPLETED BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER:

Investigating Officer(s):

Anthony DAmelio

Badge #(s):

2913

Investigating Officer(s) Signature(s):

[Signature]

Date Signed:

8/14/2018

Page: 1 of 1

*Form Revised: 03/12/2012



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service
Supplementary Incident Report



Printed: 12/11/2018 10:59 by
Incident: NP18136608 SAR (Search and Rescue) @08/14/2018 15:57

Author: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.
Entered by: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.

Report time: 12/05/2018 12:19
Entered time: 12/05/2018 12:19

Remarks:

INITIAL ONSCENE INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] (b) (7) (C)

Report:

INITIAL ONSCENE INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED]:

I interviewed [REDACTED] at 2130 hours on 8/14/2018 as he walked off the trail after the incident. He used the restroom and drank a bottle of water before the interview. My initial impression was he appeared extremely shaken and was extremely nervous after what happened. He was also jittery and shaking. He had dried blood on his hands, arms, face, shirt, and pants. He was also crying while trying to recall the incident. I talked to him to get him to calm down and build rapport.

[REDACTED] stated the following information in essence. They parked at the Chinook Pass over look at 0830 and started their hike to Dewey Ridge. They took a social trail off of the PCT. They arrived at the base of summit block at 1130 hours.

They dropped their backpacks and put on their climbing gear. [REDACTED] went up first and established anchor points for the rope. [REDACTED] went up second and Stephen went up last.

They reached the ridge without incident and prepared for the descent. [REDACTED] stated they were only on the summit for a few minutes. [REDACTED] established a single anchor point around a large rock. [REDACTED] did a weight test on the anchor. [REDACTED] rappelled down the descent first and made it to the bottom without incident. [REDACTED] rappelled second and made it down without incident. Stephen came down last.

A couple of minutes later Stephen fell 15 yards past him face first. The whole rope and anchor assembly came down with him. [REDACTED] rushed to where Stephen was and rolled him over. Stephen had blood all over his face. [REDACTED] cleared his airway and started breaths and chest compressions immediately. [REDACTED] stated he was not sure if Stephen was breathing or had a pulse. While performing CPR [REDACTED] stated he could see bubbles in the blood coming out of Stephens's mouth.

[REDACTED] stated the Stephen fell at approximately 1430 hours and he performed CPR for 40 to 45 minutes. They started to hike back to the trailhead at 1700 hours.



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service
Supplementary Incident Report



Printed: 12/10/2018 14:30 by
Incident: NP18136608 SAR (Search and Rescue) @08/14/2018 15:57

Author: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.
Entered by: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.

Report time: 12/05/2018 12:15
Entered time: 12/05/2018 12:15

Remarks:

INITIAL ONSCENE INTERVIEW WITH Witness2 (b) (6),
(b) (7)(C)

Report:

INITIAL ONSCENE INTERVIEW WITH Witness2 (b) (6),
(b) (7)(C) :

At approximately 2100 hours [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] exited the trail. I was able to interview them. See supplemental interview report.

I interviewed [REDACTED] at approximately 2100 hours on 8/14/2018 as she walked off the trail after the incident. She used the restroom and had a bottle of water before the interview. My initial impression was she appeared shaken and was nervous about what happened. She was also crying while trying to recall the incident. I talked to her to get her to calm down and build rapport. [REDACTED] stated she met Stephen while attending climbing classes with the Mountaineers. They were in the same climbing class for a few months.

[REDACTED] stated the following information in essence. They parked Stephens's car at the Safeway parking lot in Enumclaw, WA at approximately 0600 hours. Stephen [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] carpooled to Mt Rainier together. They parked at the Chinook Pass over look at 0900 and started their hike to Dewey Ridge.

They reached the base of Dewey Ridge, dropped their backpacks, and put on their climbing gear. They talked about how to safely scramble up to the ridge and used ropes for safety even though they were not really needed. She stated it was a level 3 scramble and could easily be completed without ropes. [REDACTED] went up first and established anchor points for the rope [REDACTED] went up second and Stephen [REDACTED] went up last.

They reached the ridge without incident and signed the Dewey Peak Registry. They all talked about the descent and established an anchor point about a large rock. They tied a "double grapevine knot" around the large rock with a backup anchor. [REDACTED] did a weight test on the anchor since he was the most experienced and weighted the most. [REDACTED] also had a safety discussion. [REDACTED] rappelled down the 50 foot descent first and made it to the bottom without incident. [REDACTED] rappelled second and made it down without incident. Stephen came down last. He removed to backup anchor and set up to rappel down.

A couple of minutes later [REDACTED] saw some rocks falling down and then saw Stephen fall down also. After Stephen fell down the hill [REDACTED] immediately called 911 (at 1430) and [REDACTED] started CPR. [REDACTED]

stated she did not find a pulse initially. [REDACTED] continued CPR for 40-45 minutes. [REDACTED] stated Stephen had head trauma and was bleeding from the mouth.

[REDACTED] went on to say she looked at Stephens gear. She stated Stephen was correctly set up for rappel with an ATC. When he fell down the rope and anchor came down with him and the anchor was still tied.

(climbing party member)

I interviewed [REDACTED] on the phone on 8/21/2018 at 1800 hours; Officer D'Amelio took notes. I introduced myself and Officer D'Amelio and explained that we were doing follow-up interviews at this time. D'Amelio later expressed that [REDACTED] voice sounded more relaxed than the previous interview he had with her on the night of the incident. She told us she had spoken with [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] about the accident and that it was helpful to have them to talk to. I asked [REDACTED] about her relationship with Stephen and [REDACTED]. I asked her about her history climbing with both of them. I asked her about the planning details for the trip. I asked her to take me through the events of that day.

[REDACTED] explained that the Dewey Peak climb was selected by Stephen and that there were initially four climbers planned on completing the trip. Stephen chose Dewey Peak because [REDACTED] likes easy climbs. According to [REDACTED] Stephen was trying to impress [REDACTED] so they could climb together more often. The fourth member of the climbing party was [REDACTED] ended up having to cancel due to a medical issue. As a result, the original plan to do the "Classic Dewey Peak Rappel" with four people changed a bit now that there were only three.

[REDACTED] knew [REDACTED], Stephen and [REDACTED] through the Mountaineers. She said [REDACTED] and Stephen had a good relationship, but they had never climbed together. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had climbed together about three times plus a hike at Lake Cushman. [REDACTED] and Stephen went on a day hike at North Bend and attended climbing classes together. [REDACTED] is a volunteer climbing instructor with the Mountaineers. [REDACTED] and Stephen were really close and hiked and climbed together.

[REDACTED] stated they all met at the Safeway in Enumclaw, WA at approximately 07:30 hours on 8/14/2018. They all drove up to Lake Tipsoo in [REDACTED] car. They talked about the hike and had a GPS Track that was developed by [REDACTED] a friend of [REDACTED]. While hiking they had to change the GPS route due to rocks that blocked the path. The route finding didn't change anything. [REDACTED] said it was mostly a scramble to the summit.

Once they were near the top, [REDACTED] set up a rope for a roped ascent. [REDACTED] went up the ascent first and placed protection. He even used one example of a "crappy anchor". [REDACTED] went up second on a butterfly. Stephen went up last on a figure 8. Stephen and [REDACTED] thought a rope was overkill for the ascent. At the top of the ascent [REDACTED] thoroughly lectured about the "crappy anchor". It was too short, tight, and had no tails. [REDACTED] said he put in another piece of protection in case the "crappy anchor" failed. [REDACTED] stated they took pictures of the anchor and sent them to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. I asked [REDACTED] how far the "Crappy Anchor" was from the location they rappelled. She said it was approx.. 15-20 feet from the "crappy anchor" and not part of the rappel anchor. We discussed the anchor they used on the ascent. I told her it did not look very safe [REDACTED] stated she was afraid we would think the "crappy anchor" was a part of the rappel line.

[REDACTED] continued to explain that upon reaching the summit [REDACTED] and Stephen went over and signed the summit register. She noted there were bugs everywhere. [REDACTED] and Stephen discussed that section deciding that it could have been a scramble. [REDACTED] then went over and selected an anchor point for the descent. [REDACTED] said Stephen told [REDACTED] he did not like the anchor due to cracks in the rock. They talked

about other anchor points and secondary anchor points that were not accessible. They settled on the anchor ^{Witness} s 1 (b) wanted to use.

Once the main anchor was set up, ^{Witness} s 1 (b) did a weight test and lectured about the anchor ^{Witness} s 2 (b) described ^{Witness} s 1 (b) as having a fear of a rappel accident and spoke to them at length about safety and the direction of the anchor. ^{Witness} s 2 (b) stated Stephen seemed jittery and nervous about it. ^{Witness} s 1 (b) continued to test the anchor, ATC, and autoblock separately. They used one rope to rappel from with extra at the end. Before rappelling, ^{Witness} s 1 (b) then had an idea of using a cam as a backup anchor. ^{Witness} s 2 (b) stated she installed it and made sure there was slack in it. The cam was tight, but the cord was loose and had slack. She said that it was placed to prevent the rock from shifting. It was on a separate rock from the main anchor. ^{Witness} s 2 (b) noted here that ^{Witness} s 1 (b) told Stephen not to be annoying about the anchor.

^{Witness} s 2 (b) said ^{Witness} s 1 (b) went on rappel first and made it down without incident. I asked her if she watched the backup anchor to make sure it didn't get weighted when ^{Witness} s 1 (b) was rappelling. She stated she did not remember if the backup anchor got tight during his rappel. ^{Witness} s 2 (b) went on rappel second and made it down without incident. Stephen announced on the radio he had the backup anchor removed and it was on his harness.

^{Witness} s 2 (b) stated she felt some falling rocks so she looked up. When she looked up, she saw Stephen falling, describing it as "tumbling/summersaulting". She remembered thinking: "he could have put his arms out to stop himself" because at that point he was still on the 20deg rock scramble at the top. ^{Witness} s 2 (b) also stated she did not hear Stephen yell or anything. I asked her if she was sure they were close enough where she and ^{Witness} s 1 (b) would have been able to hear Stephen. She confirmed they could have easily heard him if he yelled.

She commented that looking back, she did not hear Stephen yell any rappel commands like they always did in class. ^{Witness} s 2 (b) also stated she and ^{Witness} s 1 (b) both used the rappel commands on the climb and rappel.

I asked her if Stephen complained of not feeling well or if he look fatigued or anything else that might be noteworthy. ^{Witness} s 2 (b) said Stephen did not mention any medical problems. He seemed incredibly happy and in good spirits.

END OF REPORT



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service
Supplementary Incident Report



Printed: 12/10/2018 14:28 by

Incident: NP18136608 SAR (Search and Rescue) @08/14/2018 15:57

Author: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.

Report time: 12/05/2018 12:21

Entered by: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.

Entered time: 12/05/2018 12:21

Remarks:

SECOND INTERVIEW WITH Witness2 (b) (6), ON 8/21/2018

Report:

SECOND INTERVIEW WITH Witness2 (b) (6), ON 8/21/2018:

Ranger Cavendish interviewed Witness2 (b) (6) on the telephone on 8/21/2018 at 1800 hours and I took notes during the interview. Witness2 voice sounded more relaxed than the previous interview. She told us she had talked to (b) (6), (b) (6), and (b) (6) about the accident.

(b) (6) started out the interview by telling us about the planning sequence. The Dewey Peak climb was selected by Stephen and initially four climbers planned on completing the trip. Stephen chose Dewey Peak since (b) (6) liked easy climbs. According to Witness2 Stephen was trying to impress (b) (6) so they could climb together more often. The climbers were Stephen, (b) (6), (b) (6), and Climbing Friend 5 canceled the climb. The original plan was for the "Classic Dewey Peak Rappel" with four people. The plans changed due to only three people involved.

(b) (6) went on to explain everyone's climbing experience and relationships. She informed us the (b) (6) and Stephen had a good relationship, but they had never climbed together. Witness2 (b) (6) and (b) (6) had climbed to together about three times plus a Lake Cushman hike. (b) (6) and (b) (6) went on a day hike at North Bend and attended climbing classes together. (b) (6) was a volunteer climbing instructor with the Mountaineers. (b) (6) and Stephen were really close and hiked/climbed together.

Next, Witness2 (b) (6) explained what happened on the day of the accident. They all met at the Safeway in Enumclaw, WA at approximately 07:30 hours on 8/14/2018. They all drove up to Lake Tipsoo in (b) (6), (b) (6) car. They talked about the hike and had a GPS Track that was developed by Witness3 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c). While hiking they had to change the GPS route due to rocks that blocked the path. The route finding didn't change anything. It was mostly a scramble to the summit. Stephen and (b) (6) thought a rope was overkill for the ascent.

Witness1 (b) (6) went up the ascent first and placed protection. He even used one example of a "crappy anchor". Witness2 (b) (6) went up second on a butterfly. Stephen went up last on a figure 8. At the top of the ascent (b) (6) over lectured about the "crappy anchor". It was too short, tight, and has no tails. (b) (6) said he put in another piece of protection in case the "crappy anchor" failed. (b) (6) stated they took pictures of the anchor and sent them to (b) (6) and (b) (6). (b) (6) went on to say the top anchor was approximately

15-20 feet from the "crappy anchor" and not part of the rappel line. [REDACTED] stated she was afraid we would think the "crappy anchor" was a part of the rappel line.

Upon reaching the summit [REDACTED] and Stephen went over and signed the summit register. She noted there were bugs everywhere [REDACTED] and Stephen talked about how it could have been a scramble. [REDACTED] then went over and selected an anchor point for the descent. Stephen told [REDACTED] he did not like [REDACTED] anchor due to cracks in the rock. They talked about other anchor points and secondary anchor points that were not accessible.

[REDACTED] did a weight test and lectured about the anchor. [REDACTED] had a fear of a rappel accident and talked a lot about safety and the direction of the anchor. [REDACTED] stated Stephen seemed jittery and nervous about it. [REDACTED] continued to test the anchor, ATC, and block separately. They used one rope to rappel from with extra at the end.

[REDACTED] then had an idea of using a cam backup as a backup anchor. [REDACTED] stated she installed it and made sure there was slack in it. [REDACTED] also stated [REDACTED] told Stephen not to be annoying about the anchor.

The cam was tight, but the cord was loose and had slack. It was placed to prevent the rock from shifting. It was on a separate rock/summit block. The rock also appeared to be in the correct direction to be anchored. She stated she did not remember if the backup anchor got tight during rappel.

[REDACTED] went on rappel first and made it down without incident. [REDACTED] went on rappel second and made it down without incident. Stephen announced on the radio he had the backup anchor removed and it was on his harness.

[REDACTED] stated she felt some falling rocks so she looked up. She looked up and saw Stephen tumbling/summersaulting. She remembered thinking; he could have put his arms out to stop himself. He was still on 20' of rock scramble. [REDACTED] also stated she did not hear Stephen yell anything. She could have easily heard him if he yelled.

Looking back she stated she did not hear Stephen yell any rappel commands. They always yelled them in class. [REDACTED] also stated [REDACTED] and she both used the rappel commands on that climb and rappel.

[REDACTED] also mentioned that Stephen did not mention any medical problems. He seemed incredibly happy and in good spirits.

For more information of this interview, see attached supplemental report by Ranger Cavendish.



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service
Supplementary Incident Report



Printed: 12/10/2018 14:26 by

Incident: NP18136608 SAR (Search and Rescue) @08/14/2018 15:57

Author: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.

Report time: 12/05/2018 12:22

Entered by: #2913 D'AMELIO, A.

Entered time: 12/05/2018 12:22

Remarks:

SECOND INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] ON 8/22/2018

Report:

SECOND INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] ON 8/22/2018:

Ranger Cavendish interviewed [REDACTED] in person at his residence on 8/22/2018 at 1025 hours and I took notes during the interview. [REDACTED] appeared more relaxed than the previous interview. He told us he had talked to other climbers with the Mountaineers, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] about the accident.

[REDACTED] started out by telling us his climbing experience. [REDACTED] stated he joined the Mountaineers in 2013. He is a climbing instructor and a Scrambling Committee member for the Mountaineers. He started climbing when he was 19 years old. He was mentored by a National Park Service Rescue Ranger. He was a member of a mountaineering club in Alaska for fifteen years. He is also a kayak instructor. He also helped a friend with the 100 peaks of Mt Rainier Challenge. [REDACTED] is also a mentor to several climbers. He holds mentoring sessions at his house with several stations set up on his property.

[REDACTED] started out the interview by telling us about the planning sequence. During the three weeks of planning for the trip. They talked about climbing Exit 38 and Dewey Peak. The smoke was a concern. Originally it was a 5 person climb. The participants were [REDACTED], Stephen, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] backed out early in the planning stage. After [REDACTED] backed out they planned for the "Classic Dewey Peak Rappel" with four people. They planned on using two 60m ropes for a free hanging rappel. Most of the planning was conducted through email. The planning included a gear list, route info, and other ideas. After [REDACTED] backed out the plans changed to a single rope descent.

[REDACTED] was in a couple of classes with Stephen. The climbing course Stephen was in was eight months long. It was held every other weekend and included 3 climbs (glaciers, alpine, rock). [REDACTED] thought Stephen was a very competent climber, but not overly eager or arrogant. [REDACTED] went on to say Stephen did not have a competitive male ego and was easy to get along with. [REDACTED] was excited about the trip since he thought [REDACTED] and Stephen were "solid" climbers. [REDACTED] elaborated and stated Stephen and [REDACTED] were both open to feedback during the planning and the climb.

Next [REDACTED] explained the ascent and anchor set up. They followed the GPS track from [REDACTED]. They followed it for the first 1/3 of the hike. After going off trail the ridge looked like a better route.

The ridge also provided white rock and better views. [REDACTED] stated it felt like they were the first people to use the area since the indigenous people.

They gained access to the base by going across a class 3 trail. [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] and Stephen to find the ascent route while he relieved himself in the bushes. The ascent was steep and a lot of slippery rock. They went up a gully to a rocky area and staged their packs/gear. They set up and donned their climbing gear for the belay.

[REDACTED] went up the ascent first and placed protection while [REDACTED] and Stephen were on belay. [REDACTED] stated he used the "crappy anchor" since it was there. It was not in a good location. The rope went through the "crappy anchor" and had two other anchor points. The "crappy anchor" was behind "crappy tower". The purpose of "crappy anchor" was to prevent the rope from flipping over. The anchor did not support any weight. [REDACTED] had to clip and unclip at each piece of protection and drag the rope over "crappy tower". Then go behind the tower. Stephen came up last and cleaned up.

[REDACTED] went on to say he used the "crappy anchor" as a joke/bad example [REDACTED] asked Stephen to take a picture of it. They had a clove hitch at the bottom of the hill. They talked about it and used it as an educational opportunity/discussion.

It was a pretty easy hike. The belay line was just for fun and the experience. [REDACTED] went on to say Stephen walked up faster than he could pull the rope up [REDACTED] stated he was worried they would be bored with the climb. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] and Stephen enjoyed the ascent and even the approach scramble was a thrill to them.

[REDACTED] stated he did not remember any complaints from Stephen about not feeling good. They ate lunch before the "crappy anchor" ascent. The packs were left below the "crappy anchor" ascent. They only took their climbing gear and a water bottle to the summit.

[REDACTED] addressed his decision for the rappel anchor. [REDACTED] stated in essence the summit was dark black blades and not a good rappel anchor. All the rocks moved at first. [REDACTED] said he did not see any rappel slings. [REDACTED] went down the slope and found a place for a cam and placed a second one in a crack. He talked to [REDACTED] and Stephen about the location. [REDACTED] then went over and signed the summit register.

[REDACTED] started to look for an anchor spot. As he went up to the top of the summit he found a solid rock area. He found two blocks and chose the one on the right. He walked around to get under the rock. The rock looked solid from below. The anchor was a big rock and his cord was not long enough to wrap it. His slings were not long enough for it either. [REDACTED] took a 6mm cord from another rock.

[REDACTED] then wrapped the 6mm cord twice around the rock with long cord tails. Then he tied a master overhand point knot. Finally he clipped in and load tested it as a direction anchor.

Stephen told [REDACTED] he did not like the anchor due to cracks in the rock. [REDACTED] stated he was a geologist and pointed out the crack did not affect the strength of the rock. The cracks were on a "pancake" on top of the rock. The other cracks actually helped to support the rope to the rock. Stephen pointed out another rock formation with a couple of horns on the opposite side of the peak. [REDACTED] stated it was hard to get to and dangerous to get to. It would also require additional rigging to get to it.

They all talked and decided to install backup anchor. [REDACTED] placed a cam in a rock crack and clove

hitched it to the anchor with a carabiner. [REDACTED] said he checked it for at least an inch of slack. The cam was less than 10 feet. It was closer to 4 to 6 feet. [REDACTED] thought he talked to them about the backup. The rope was threaded before the backup was built. [REDACTED] thought he installed the backup anchor.

Witness 1 (b) [REDACTED] said he focused on the backup anchor to ensure it was loose while loading the directional anchor. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) [REDACTED] said he could see the backup anchor and asked [REDACTED] and Stephen to make sure the backup was not loaded. [REDACTED] stated there was a lot of slack in the cord.

Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) [REDACTED] stated he completed the anchor and tightened it up. The direction of the anchor was a down pull. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) [REDACTED] thought it would be "easy to not mess up". He then talked to them about the direction of rappelling and demonstrated how to test the load.

Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) [REDACTED] stated he did not inspect the backup after [REDACTED] clipped it to the cam. [REDACTED] said he now realizes why. Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7) [REDACTED] stated she built the backup anchor. It was made in case the rock slipped. [REDACTED] stated he was ready to rappel and then realized a backup anchor would be nice.

[REDACTED] stated the lecture about the directional anchor was very well covered and demonstrated. [REDACTED] was concerned it would come off if pulled the wrong direction. There were also no questions. [REDACTED] was comfortable with [REDACTED] and Stephens rappel abilities.

[REDACTED] went first to make sure the rope was long enough, properly knotted, and did not snagged. He was confident in their ability to set up for rappel. [REDACTED] was also the heaviest for load testing. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] made it down rappel without incident.

[REDACTED] stated he remembered talking to Stephen about how to clean up the secondary/backup anchor. You had to adjust the primary anchor to remove the backup anchor. [REDACTED] said he has been thinking about this as a problem.

[REDACTED] remembered asking if Stephen pulled the cam and backup anchor. Stephen said or acknowledged the cam had been removed. [REDACTED] remembered a lot of rock falling around him so he changed positions.

[REDACTED] thought he talked to Stephen a couple of times, but it was not too long. [REDACTED] thought Stephen was on rope and ready to rappel. He came around the rock and was slightly visible from below.

[REDACTED] started to talk about how Stephen fell. [REDACTED] stated he was talking to Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said something like "oh my god". [REDACTED] thought some rocks were falling. [REDACTED] looked at Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) [REDACTED] and said "that was pretty cool". [REDACTED] looked up and saw in slow motion Stephen was moving/rolling completely loose. He then passed over the edge. There was no sound made by Stephen. [REDACTED] stated he thought about trying to catch Stephen, but he was too far away. Stephen fell down head first into the rocks.

[REDACTED] made his way over to Stephen and tried to get a pulse, cleared the airway. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) [REDACTED] was pretty "freaked". [REDACTED] stated he was disassociated and tried to focus on the task. [REDACTED] then called 9-1-1.

[REDACTED] stated he rolled Stephen over, but they were still sliding downhill. [REDACTED] stated he remembered seeing Stephens's skull, but does not know or remember if he was wearing a helmet or if it fell off. [REDACTED] saw at least three lacerations on Stephen's head that were bleeding heavily. [REDACTED] went on to say the anchor and rope came down intact with Stephen and landed 1 to 2 feet from his harness.

[REDACTED] stated he talked to [REDACTED] and she told him that Stephen may have blacked out or was

unconscious at the time of the fall. They both were confused as to why Stephen did not yell out and why was he tumbling?

(b) (7) defined the tumbling he saw as being like a very loose summersault and rolling over shoulder.

(b) (7) also stated there were no tripping hazards under the rock. There was a place to start rappel below the rock. From the rock there were 35 feet of high angle and 35 feet of low angle that he fell from. On the 35 feet of high angel a self-arrest was possible. It was not a hard rock surface. (b) (7) thought Stephen could have grabbed the anchor and fell backwards.

(b) (7) went on to state he swears the secondary anchor was not loaded!

For more information of this interview, see attached supplemental report by Ranger Cavendish.

Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) Interview

Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) was a member of a climbing party involved in an accident that resulted in a fatality. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) was the group's trip leader and a recent instructor to the two other party members, including the decedent.

Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) was initially interviewed on the night of the incident by Officers D'Amelio and Van der Elst.

I called Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) on 08.21.18 to set up a follow-up interview to be done in-person. I identified myself and let him know that Officer D'Amelio was present for the call. During the phone conversation, Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) seemed nervous that I wanted to interview him. He explained he would not be able to meet me anywhere because he was not driving much due to his mental status since the fatality incident. We agreed we would meet near or at his home and work out the details over the next couple of hours. I was unable to secure a library or other meeting room so we made plans to meet Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) at his home in Olympia.

On 08.22.18 1025 hrs, Officer D'Amelio and I met Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) at his home to interview him about the events that occurred on 08.14.18. D'Amelio took notes during the interview. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) was very enthusiastic that we came to his home. When we arrived, he was very welcoming but not quite relaxed. After I explained my line of questioning and once he understood that I have experience in rigging, he seemed to be able to relax a bit. I asked him if he had folks he could talk to about what happened. He told me he was talking with friends from the Mountaineers. He took this moment to let me know that he has told his story to a few within the Mountaineers and that they agreed that he didn't do anything wrong.

I explained to Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) we were there to try and gain an understanding of what might have happened and to identify contributing factors to Stephen's accident. I told Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) I wanted to know about his personal background in roped recreation, more about his affiliation with the Mountaineers, how he came to know Stephen, how the trip was planned and any variables that changed leading up to the day of the trip, and then have him take me through the entire day of the trip. I told him that I had some photos I wanted to refer to at points during the interview. I let him know that he could call for a break at any time.

Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) started rock climbing as a young adult, mentored by a National Park Service Rescue Ranger. In recent years, he helped a friend with the 100 peaks of Mt Rainier Challenge. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) initially joined the mountaineers through his love of kayaking. He was a member of a club in AK for 15yrs and joined the Olympia Mountaineers in 2013. Through classes and time he became one of the Mountaineers' instructors for roped recreation. He met Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) and Stephen through classes but doesn't ever remember being one of Stephen's instructors. He explained there is a lot of rotation based on which instructors are available on certain dates and he would not have memorized anyone early on. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) explained he would also have students over to his home for extra practice. I clarified that these sessions were not sanctioned by the Mountaineers.

In light of him meeting the other party members, I asked about team selection and how comfortable he was with everyone's ability. He described both Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) and Stephen as very capable and that he trusted their abilities when the trip idea came up. The climbing course Stephen and Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) completed was eight months long. It was held every other weekend and included 3 climbs (glaciers, alpine, rock), along with a lot of teaching in a controlled environment. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) thought Stephen was a very competent climber, but not overly eager or arrogant. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) described Stephen as someone who did not have a competitive male ego and was easy to get along with. Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) was excited about the trip since he thought Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) and Stephen were

“solid” climbers. ^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)} elaborated and stated Stephen and ^{Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7)} were both open to feedback during the planning and the climb. ^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)} had more experience with ^{Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7)} as a partner.

During the early planning stages of this trip, there were originally five people. The participants were ^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)}, ^{Climbing Friend 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)}, Stephen, ^{Climbing Friend 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)}, and ^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)}, the trip leader. ^{(b) (6), (b) (7)} backed out early in the planning stage. After ^{(b) (6), (b) (7)} backed out they planned for the “Classic Dewey Peak Rappel” with four people. They planned on using two 60m ropes for a free hanging rappel. Most of the planning was conducted through email. The planning included a gear list, route info, and other ideas. ^{Climbing Friend 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)} backed out closer to the trip date and this changed the plan to a single rope descent. The trip also had a plan A and B. Plan A was to climb Dewey Peak. If the weather or smoke was too bad, plan B was to go rock climbing at Exit 38. There was smoke in the forecast and the group communicated about all of the details by email leading up to the trip. They concluded Dewey Peak was still a go.

On the day of the trip they carpooled as preplanned and started toward Dewey Peak using a friend’s gps track. The friend had warned ^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)} that at a certain point, following their track wasn’t necessarily the right or best route, it was just the route they chose. ^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)} said they did not have any trouble finding their way up and did make a decision to take a different route toward the top. They gained access to the base by going across a third class trail. The ascent was steep with loose rock, common for the area. They went up a gully to a rocky area where they found a good place to stage their packs. They set up and donned their climbing gear for the short climb up the final pitch to the top.

^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)} said he gave them a safety briefing. ^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)} went up the scree field first and placed protection. ^{Witness 2 (b) (6), (b) (7)} went up second. And Stephen went up last and cleaned up the anchors. He then started talking about being at the top. I stopped him here because I wanted to talk more about the ascent. I told him I wanted to refer to one of the photos. I showed him a couple of photos from this ascent that showed some rigging.



He seemed to know why I was showing him the photos and laughed. We looked at the photo and I told him I did not think the anchor looked safe. He agreed and referred to it as a “crappy anchor” set in place by a previous climbing party. He described the ascent as a 3rd class scramble. He said ropes were not really required for the ascent, but they added safety to make it more of an adventure. ^{Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)} stated he used it as a “joke”. I told him I did not understand. He agreed the anchor was “crappy” but explained that it wasn’t

necessary and that he had them use it for practice and to have the opportunity to point out how bad it is. He said the “crappy anchor” was not load bearing and was used to keep the rope from flipping over a large rock he referred to as “crappy tower”. He said he placed some other protection along the way and

then belayed the other two from the top. I told him I still didn't understand why he chose to use it if he agreed that it was a bad anchor. I pointed out that it appeared from the photo that if the anchor failed, it would cause the person on rope to pendulum, which could easily sever the rope on the sharp rocks. He said they didn't really need it and that Stephen climbed so fast he couldn't keep up with the belay. I had a hard time following his logic, but I acknowledged it is hard for me to fully understand without being there. At some point I had to move on as I never understood why he chose to use the anchor. From my experience, there is no room for joking with unsafe rigging.

I then had ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} continue from once they all arrived to the summit. ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} explained they took a moment to enjoy the view. He said they signed the register while he looked for a rock to use for the rappel. ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} went over and looked at the traditional rappel location and decided against it. He decided to look for a rock to use for rigging on the side that they came up. There were limited options because the boulders were either loose or sharp blades. He eventually chose a large rock that he felt was solid. He was able to walk around to the rappel side of the rock and confirm it was not going to move. He explained that once he showed it to Stephen, Stephen expressed that he did not like it. Stephen's reasoning was the rock had cracks in it. ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} said he understood the geology and said the cracks would not be in play due to their horizontal orientation and the other crack was what was giving him a place to put the anchor rope around. Stephen pointed out another location of a boulder with horns but ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} said it was too exposed and would require rigging to get to. Stephen eventually understood what ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} was explaining and accepted the anchor rock ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} chose.

^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} then said he rigged the rock and then admitted, "this might be bad etiquette, but I took the cordellette from the other rappel spot instead of using my materials." He said the cordellette from the other anchor was the perfect length and his slings were all short. He then continued that he built a backup anchor. At



this point I stopped him because this was in direct conflict with my interview with ^{Witness 2 (b) (6)}. ^{Witness 2 (b) (6)} told me that ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} had her build the backup. I asked ^{Witness 1 (b) (6)} if he was sure he rigged the backup. He was. I told him what ^{Witness 2 (b) (6)} said. He seemed confused and then stated he might have had her help with rigging. He then continued with the story as if ^{Witness 2 (b) (6)} had rigged the back up to the anchor. At this point I decided to refer to the photos of this anchor for discussion. When I viewed these photos prior to this interview, my immediate impression was that this was a questionable set up. The anchor was not consistent with something someone with experience would build. I went through the question I always ask: is it safe and does it work. While many of the parts to

this anchor are not orthodox, most of it seemed it could work, but not without risk. The two main problem I could see from the photos as issues were: the angle of the rock relative to the angle of tension when the

rope is weighted and the carabiners on the back up anchor were both oriented with their closure facing the rock's edge and the one most touching the edge is a non-locking carabiner. Both carabiners were in a situation to cantilever under load and the non-locker had the potential to just open. When I showed him the photos and pointed out my concerns, Witness 1 (b) (6) said he did not inspect the backup anchor after Witness 2 (b) (6) built it. Regarding the angle, he acknowledged this and stated he knew it was directional.

Witness 1 (b) (6) told me that he got on rope and gave the other two his usual lecture on how to load-test an anchor by demonstrating it. He emphasized to weight the anchor without leaning out in case it fails. He then explained how important it was that the particular anchor they were using needed to be weighted in the downward direction only and he explained why as it related to the angle of the rock they were using. Witness 1 (b) (6) said he had a fear of someone dying on rappel. He explained the directional and said there were no questions. Witness 1 (b) (6) said he felt confident they both understood. He felt this was "easy to not mess up". At this moment it randomly occurred to him why Witness 2 (b) (6) said she was the one who built the backup anchor. He originally set up the rappel without a backup. Then when he was about to rappel, thought it would be a good idea to have one to make sure the rock didn't slip. I recalled earlier that he said he had not inspected the backup anchor Witness 2 (b) (6) built. I asked Witness 1 (b) (6) if anyone watched the backup anchor when he started to rappel. He thought he told them to check it and assured me that there was slack built into the back-up. He told me that they didn't need the backup. (NOTE: all of the discussion around the backup anchor was inconsistent and confusing).

Witness 1 (b) (6) continued and explained he decided to rappel first, Witness 2 (b) (6) second, and Stephen third. I asked him to explain why he decided on this order. I told him that I was more accustomed to the unwritten rule that the most experienced person goes last. He assured me that both Witness 1 (b) (6) and Stephen were skilled and he trusted them. He stated he went first because he was the heaviest and to fix any problems with the rope (like it being caught up on something).

Witness 1 (b) (6) then explained that he rappelled down, followed by Witness 2 (b) (6). He checked with Stephen by radio to remember to pull the backup anchor materials out to bring down, to which Stephen affirmed. He explained that while Stephen was setting up, they had moved out of the rock fall zone after he heard some rocks come down. He assumed he was coming down.

I had him pause there to ask a few more questions about rigging. I asked him how he knew that Stephen knew how to clean the backup anchor. Witness 1 (b) (6) stated he remembered talking to Stephen about how to clean up the secondary/backup anchor. He explained that the primary anchor had to be manipulate in order to remove the backup anchor. Witness 1 (b) (6) said he has been thinking about this as a problem.

I offered for him to continue with the rest of the story. Witness 1 (b) (6) said that he and Witness 2 (b) (6) were talking. He thought he remembered saying something to Stephen but couldn't be sure. However, he did say they were in shouting distance. He recalled Witness 1 (b) (6) saying something to the effect of "oh my god" and as he looked over toward Stephen, thinking it might be rocks falling, he saw Stephen tumble over the edge. I asked him to explain what he meant by tumbling. He described it as "slow motion" and "loose", "like summersaults", explaining that it didn't seem like Stephen was fighting to not fall. He later clarified that he did not see Stephen falling during the shallow first section. When he saw what was happening, Stephen was at the last bit of the shallow section and went over the edge and fell down the steep section, landing on his head. Witness 1 (b) (6) had a quick thought in his mind to go catch Stephen, but said that it was too far away. Witness 1 (b) (6) said he did not hear any screaming or shouting from Stephen which he later thought about and found odd.

Witness 1 (b) (6) made his way over to Stephen to try and render medical aid: he attempted to get a pulse and clear his airway. Witness 1 (b) (6) described Witness 2 (b) (6) as "freaked out" and himself as "disassociated" and focused on the task. Witness 2 (b) (6) then called 9-1-1 while Witness 1 (b) (6) was with Stephen. Witness 1 (b) (6) stated he rolled Stephen over, but they were still sliding downhill. He remembered seeing Stephen's skull, but does not know or remember if he was wearing a helmet or if it fell off. He saw at least three lacerations on Stephen's head that were bleeding heavily. Witness 1 (b) (6) noted that the anchor and rope came down intact with Stephen and landed 1 to 2 feet from his harness.

During a conversation Witness 1 (b) (6) and Witness 2 (b) (6) had later, Witness 1 (b) (6) said Witness 2 (b) (6) told him that Stephen may have blacked out or was unconscious at the time of the fall. They both were confused as to why Stephen did not yell out and why was he tumbling? He noted that Witness 2 (b) (6) also felt like Stephen was tumbling and didn't understand why he hadn't tried to stop his fall on the shallow part.

I asked Witness 1 (b) (6) about the area beneath the belay, where Stephen would have been standing to connect to the rope for his rappel. I asked if there were tripping hazards and if it was an easy or hard place to stand. I asked if it felt exposed to stand there. Witness 1 (b) (6) said there were no tripping hazards under the rock and that you can easily stand there to connect to the gear. I asked him to describe how much distance of shallow angle at the top from the anchor until the edge. Witness 1 (b) (6) stated there was about 35 feet of low angle that lead to about 35 feet of high angle. I asked if that top section's angle was low enough that it would have been possible for someone to arrest there fall if they had tripped. Witness 1 (b) (6) said that on that top section, he feels like that would have been possible. I asked what the surface was composed of at the top. Witness 1 (b) (6) stated it was not a hard rock surface, but was a mixture of loose rock and soil. I asked Witness 1 (b) (6) what he thought happened. Witness 1 (b) (6) thought Stephen could have grabbed the anchor and fell backwards. I asked him if he thought it was possible that the secondary anchor was actually in play for him and Witness 2 (b) (6). Witness 1 (b) (6) was adamant that the secondary anchor was not loaded. He said he built at least an inch of slack into the back-up anchor and checked to make sure it wasn't being loaded.

At this point I told him I did have any more questions. I asked if he had any. He asked a few question about the process of the investigation. I explained that there would be a separate report from the medical examiner, etc. I thanked him for his time and encouraged him to continue seeking out support from friends.

END OF REPORT

(b) (6) (Stephen KORNBLUTH's girlfriend)

I interviewed (b) (6) by phone on 08.21.18. I identified myself and let her know I was investigating Stephen's death. I explained that our team would be interviewing others. I asked (b) (6) questions about her relationship with Stephen, any history she had with roped-oriented recreation with him, what she knew of his skill level with roped recreation, medical history that might be relevant to the accident, and any other factors that could help explain the accident. (b) (6) followed up this interview with an email on 8/22/18 to provide better details on the medical history that she learned from his brother.

(b) (6), (b) (7) (c). She stated there were no issues with their relationship. She described Stephen as a motivated person. She said he was very excited about the outdoors and really took to the course he completed with the Mountaineers. (b) (6) said she bought Stephen the Mountaineers Alpine Rock Climbing course for Christmas. He was set to graduate this October. It was through this course that he met (b) (6) and (b) (6). (b) (6) also noted that she didn't know (b) (6) or (b) (6) but that Stephen and (b) (6) were good friends and they climbed and hiked together.

She is a nurse by occupation and stated he was not sick and didn't have any medical issues that day that day that she knew of. However, she explained (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

In his early teens, (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) Shortly after moving to WA in 2015, (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

he recalled that, one time, earlier this year, (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

On 08/26/18, I received a text message from (b) (6). While going through Stephen's phone, she found a text message between Stephen and his boss that (b) (6) she wanted me to know about. The texts were from Aug 6th and 7th. (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

She was unaware of this conversation until she went through his phone after the Stephen's accident.

END OF REPORT

Case# NP18136608

Photo log: by Cavendish

Photos provided by: (b) (6), (b) (7) (C) and later resent by (b) (6), (b) (7) (C)

Photos taken by: Stephen KORNBLUTH (cell phone)

NOTE: This photo log has a representative set. The complete photo set is on a disc in evidence.

PHOTO# 0993

Description: Photo showing short pitch climbed just below the summit.

Here Witness2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) is on rope and Witness 1 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) is already at the top providing a belay. The rope is going through an anchor above Witness2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) that the team recognized as a “crappy anchor”.



PHOTO# 0995

Description: This photo shows the “crappy anchor” used during the short climb to the summit. This anchor was already in place when the team arrived. The purple webbing is tied with a water knot and is then connected to the rope with a carabiner.



PHOTO# 0996

Description: This photo is a close-up of the “crappy anchor” at the point it is tied onto the rock. A water knot was used on the sun-bleached webbing. There is little to no tail left on this knot. The purple webbing that then connects to the rope by carabiner is attached to the sun-bleached webbing with a girth hitch, and using the knot, rock friction, and girth hitch tightening to webbing friction to hold it in place.



PHOTO# 0997

Description: This photo shows Witness 2 and Witness 1 at the summit area. Witness 1 is retrieving cordellete from an existing anchor to be used on his anchor.



PHOTO# 1001

Description: This photo shows [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at the summit area. Here [REDACTED] has already retrieved the cordellette from the existing anchor and is carrying it in his hand.



PHOTO# 1003

Description: This photo of Stephen was taken by Witness2 and was also sent to Climbing Friend 5 (b) This photo shows that Stephen was wearing his helmet.



PHOTO# 1006

Description: This photo shows [REDACTED] on rappel. He was 1st to rappel. He is at the break-over where the rappel becomes fully vertical. The first section of the rappel was later described as a shallow slope with dirt and loose rocks.



PHOTO# 1008

Description: This photo shows [REDACTED] on rappel and also shows part of the main anchor, a doubled cordellette tied into a loop using a prusik hitch with long tails. This photo also shows one of the cracks that Stephen expressed concern about.



PHOTO# 1009

Description: This photo shows the main rappel anchor connected to the backup anchor. On this end, two carabiners are attached to a cordellette using what appears to be a clove hitch with one end not closed off.



PHOTO# 1010

Description: This photo shows the other end of the backup anchor attached to a cam. The cam is placed in a crack in the rock. The cam is attached to the cordellette by two carabiners. One carabiner appears to be used to extend the length.



PHOTO# 1011

Description: This photo shows another view of the backup anchor. The cam is hidden in the crack. One carabiner is a non-locking type and the other a locking type. Both carabiner's gates are facing toward the rock and both are making contact with the rock near the corner edge of the rock.




PHOTO# 1013

Description: This photo shows Witness2 (b) (6), (b) on rappel. This photo also has a clearer view on how the rope runs through the main anchor, through a double bite tied into the doubled cordellete (tied off with long tails).



PHOTO# 1016

Description: This photo shows Witness2
(b) (6), (b) further in her rappel. Here she has started into the vertical portion of the rappel.



Case# NP18136608

Photo log: by Cavendish

Photos taken and provided by: Witness2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

PHOTO# IMG0899

Description: This photo shows ^{Witness 1} ~~(b) (6), (b) (7) (c)~~ climbing up to the existing anchor on the short pitch up to the summit.



PHOTO#IMG0900

Description: This photo shows Witness 1
(b) (6), (b) (7) (c) standing behind the rock the “crappy anchor” is tied to.



PHOTO#IMG0901

Description: This photo is a close up of [REDACTED] at the “crappy anchor”. You can also see the rope going through the carabiner attached to this anchor. From where [REDACTED] is located in this photo, he traversed to the picture’s right and set a piece of rock-pro and then belayed the other two team members up to his location.



PHOTO# IMG0902

Description: This photo shows continuing along the traverse toward where he will stop and set up the belay.

Witness 1
(b) (6), (b)
(7) (c)



PHOTO#IMG0907

Description: This photo shows [REDACTED] belaying Stephen up the short climb.



PHOTO#IMG0921

Description: This photo shows Stephen watching as ^{Witness 1} (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) gets set up for rappel. ^{Witness 1} (b) (6), (b) (7) (c) is standing below the anchor where he described as a safe place to stand to get set up for the rappel.




Case# NP18136608

Photo log: by Cavendish

Photos sent to  during the trip before the rappel.

PHOTO# 0644

Description: This photo shows Stephen, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] at the summit. Note, all are wearing helmets.



PHOTO#0645

Description: Similar photo to #0644.



PHOTO#0646

Description: This photo is a photo of Steven.
This is the same one from the photos sent by
(b) from Stephen's phone.
(6)



PHOTO# 0647

Description: This photo shows Stephen standing in the summit area.



CHITTING FRODO B (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

10/20/18
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MAIL - [EXTERNAL] Fwd: just checking in

Cavendish, Tabatha -tabatha_cavendish@nps.gov

[EXTERNAL] Forwarded from [REDACTED]
2 messages

To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@nps.gov>
Mon Aug 27, 2018 at 9:00 AM

Not sure if she shared this with you but apparently this was messaging between Stephen and his boss the week before he died

2 attachments

IMG_0790.JPG
51K

ATT00001
1K

Cavendish, Tabatha -tabatha_cavendish@nps.gov
Mon Aug 27, 2018 at 1:19 PM

To: [REDACTED]
Climbing Field 5

On Mon Aug 27, 2018 at 10:00 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:
Just saw it she shared this with you via "Google". Her with [REDACTED] between [REDACTED] and his boss the week before he died

Tabatha Cavendish
U. S. Park Ranger
MS, Ranger NP

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@nps.gov>
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2018, 1:19 PM
Subject: [REDACTED]

10/20/18
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MAIL - [EXTERNAL] Forwarded from [REDACTED]

Cavendish, Tabatha -tabatha_cavendish@nps.gov

[EXTERNAL] Revised: Anchor Evaluation Final.docx
1 message

To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@nps.gov>
Mon Aug 27, 2018 at 9:45 AM

Thanks for revised documents

2 attachments

Anchor Evaluation Final.docx
260K

ATT00001
1K

10/20/18
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MAIL - [EXTERNAL] Fwd: just checking in

Cavendish, Tabatha -tabatha_cavendish@nps.gov

[EXTERNAL] Fwd: just checking in
1 message

To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@nps.gov>
Sat Aug 25, 2018 at 11 PM

Waiting with Dan and Jason today was wonderful. Thank you all for everything you've done

I shared the below email with Dan he wanted me to share it with you. It speaks to how [REDACTED] representing himself in all of this

In an effort to consolidate emails I am transferring to [REDACTED] (my). Please update your contact information to reflect this. Thank you

Begin forwarded message:

From: [REDACTED]
Date: August 24, 2018 at 12:03:44 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

Check the last paragraph
I mean
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]
Date: Aug 24, 2018 at 9:47:41 AM EDT
To: [REDACTED]

I don't think anything puts a smile on my face as much as people like you checking in. It's just this unexpected gift of recognition that friends care

Internal code: [REDACTED]

10/20/18
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MAIL - [EXTERNAL] Fwd: just checking in

Cavendish, Tabatha -tabatha_cavendish@nps.gov

I've just been texting with [REDACTED]. We are going to Stephen's family's memorial today, as I'm sure you know. Are you coming? It seems strange that I'm coming but I'm honored to be included.

[REDACTED] had a hard day yesterday. I haven't heard much from her. She's experiencing more physical impacts than I am. She has some health history that makes her perhaps more vulnerable.

For myself, I'm recognizing what a gift is emergency can be. I've been cracked open in ways I haven't experienced for years. It's allowing me to deal with many things that I now have the maturity to address in a healthier way. I'm learning to ask for help, and I'm benefiting from remarkable relationships like yours.

I was interviewed for 3 hours by armed NPS investigators day before yesterday. It was totally very healing. The investigator is a wonderful person and perfectly qualified in both investigation and climbing. She had all the photos, most of which I had never seen. I had Stephen take pictures of all my anchors so she had every detail. It was like taking an intense examination as she asked my thinking over every detail of the planning, calculation, decision making, personality assessments, minute details of climbing setups, and pulled details from the moments of the tragedy. But she was compassionate and a knowledgeable peer. In the end, having gone through that level of professional scrutiny, I'm very confident that I did nothing wrong and that Stephen had a 100% of consciousness event of some sort. The examiner told me directly that my anchor was appropriately designed and built. I'm sure you appreciate how that helps.

On Fri, Aug 24, 2018 at 11:29 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:
Hi, my friend. How are you going to [REDACTED]?

10/20/18
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MAIL - [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Dewey Peak August 14th 2018

Cavendish, Tabatha -tabatha_cavendish@nps.gov

[EXTERNAL] Fwd: Dewey Peak August 14th 2018
2 messages

To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@nps.gov>
Sun Aug 19, 2018 at 9:55 PM

Forwarded message

From: [REDACTED]
Date: Sun Aug 19, 2018 at 9:42 PM
Subject: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] shared OneDrive files with you. To view them, click the links below.

IMG_0990.jpg	IMG_0991.jpg	IMG_0992.jpg	IMG_0993.jpg	IMG_0994.jpg	IMG_0995.jpg
IMG_0996.jpg	IMG_0997.jpg	IMG_0998.jpg	IMG_0999.jpg	IMG_1000.jpg	IMG_1002.jpg
IMG_1003.jpg	IMG_1004.jpg	IMG_1005.jpg	IMG_1006.jpg	IMG_1007.jpg	IMG_1008.jpg
IMG_1009.jpg	IMG_1010.jpg	IMG_1011.jpg	IMG_1012.jpg	IMG_1013.jpg	IMG_1014.jpg
IMG_1015.jpg	IMG_1016.jpg	IMG_0999.jpg			

Please update your contact information to our team changes per all email addresses from [REDACTED]

Caution: This email and any attachments are UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). Do not disseminate this information outside of the NPS system.

Thank you, [REDACTED]

These photos came through line

Web final photo: [REDACTED]

10/20/18
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MAIL - [EXTERNAL] Fwd: just checking in

Cavendish, Tabatha -tabatha_cavendish@nps.gov

Tabatha Cavendish
U. S. Park Ranger
MS, Ranger NP
253.732.8845 (cell)



Text Message
Fri, Aug 17, 14:51

(b) (6), (b) (7) (C)

iMessage

That is [redacted] best friend and
my equivalent in Seattle



tabbatha_cavendish@nos.g
ov

Sent, let me know if not
received or if it doesn't
allow you to open them, in
which case I'll try something
else

Mon, Aug 20, 12:03

(b) (6), (b) (7) (C)
(b) (6), (b) (7) (C)

Thank you

Thu, Aug 23, 20:20

Any word on Saturday?

Thu, Aug 23, 22:03



Thu, Aug 23, 22:03

Sorry, I just found my work
phone (I lost it in my work
car for the better part of the
day)!!


Dan thought the idea of
both teams going on
Saturday is perfect. We did
not discuss how the times
could work.

Ok awesome. I'll let [redacted]
know and if we don't get
direction from you, we will
just plan for ourselves and
probably see Dan there.
Feel free to share contact
info with him. I may bow out
if my energy is still low



Those are what I have that
they took at the summit
before the rappel

Let's just keep things as
planned for tomorrow. I will
contact [redacted] to correspond



we haven't [redacted] Dan,
if you have contact info for
us let me know, otherwise
we will just head out and
see if we see him

Sun, Aug 26, 12:26

Sorry for misdial, was trying
to message that working
with [redacted] was great and he
asked us to send you some
of what we have, which will
be happening soon. Thank
you for everything

Mon, Aug 27, 08:26

I'm glad everything worked
out.

Delivered



Let's just keep things as
planned for tomorrow. I will
contact [redacted] to correspond
with [redacted] regarding photos
and medical history.

Ok sounds good

Sun, Aug 19, 21:49

Hi, [redacted] accessed the phone
a little while ago and sent
me the photos from the day
of the incident. I need an
email address to forward
them to. Thanks!

Great, thank you!

tabbatha_cavendish@nos.g
ov



Witness2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)

Witness2 (b) (6), (b) (7) (c)



[EXTERNAL] Dewey photos

1. *Staphylococcus aureus*

Witness2 (b) (6).

Thu, Aug 24, 2016 at 7:00 PM

16. Tattva

Thank you all so much for your efforts.

I am going to send you 3 emails. One one w/ photos of the several patterns, and 2 more about playing around French. I really hope they can be useful.

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Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd



<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmb.2018.07.014>



<https://doi.org/10.1002/ajb.135079> - 2006-12-29



<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmb.2019.04.001>



doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141001.g001



40

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

421

vi



08:29

you for
It's OK to send
you think
evant. I did
the medical

This is a conversation between him and manager

(b)

I'm sure it's
unhealthy fo
have emotion
have no idea
process. He
this to me. I





D'amelio, Anthony <anthony_damelio@nps.gov>

Climber recovered from Dewey Peak

1 message

Kevin Bacher <kevin_bacher@nps.gov>

Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 11:27 AM

To: NPS MORA All Employees <mora_all_employees@nps.gov>

Release Date: August 16, 2018

Contact: Kevin Bacher, 360-569-6567

Climber Recovered From Dewey Peak

The body of a climber was successfully recovered Wednesday from the base of Dewey Peak in Mount Rainier National Park.

The climber, Stephen Kornbluth, 35, of Seattle, Washington, fell while descending from the peak on Tuesday, August 14. He and his two companions were attempting a technical ascent of the peak's west face, which is located on the east side of the park about 3½ miles south of Chinook Pass.

After the fall, the two surviving climbers reported the accident by 911 cell phone call, then descended to their fallen companion but were not able to revive him. Rangers from Mount Rainier National Park responded, in cooperation with Yakima County Sheriff's Office and Greenwater Fire Department. Rangers were unable to reach the site that evening due to the difficult terrain and late hour. On Wednesday morning, they conducted a short-haul recovery of Kornbluth's body using the park's helicopter. The body has been released to the Pierce County Medical Examiner.

-NPS-

Kevin Bacher

Volunteer and Outreach Program Manager

360-569-6567

EXPERIENCE YOUR AMERICA

The National Park Service cares for special places saved by the American people so that all may experience our heritage.

PACK INVENTORY

- 1) Nikon DX (SD Card cleared for relevant photos)
- 2) Wallet: License, B of A Visa Debit Card, Varco Credit Card
(brown wallet) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) & other cards
- 3) Black Diamond Trekking Poles
- 4) Bull Cap "Higher Living" & Brown Carhart beanie
- 5) Thermo Rest seat
- 6) Black/Gm Osprey Pack ^{making} + Rain cover + Blacklin
- 7) Mt Rainier Nat Geo Topo map
- 8) BD Headlamp + batteries
- 9) Emergency Kit & Sam Splint
- 10) Burton Compass
- 11) Gobi Gear Stuff Sack (blue)
- 12) Cloths: T-shirt, Champion LS. shirt (Red/Black), Arctics Rec SS shirt
- 13) Patagonia Rain Pant (black)
- 14) OR Rain Shell (blue)
- 15) REI Blue Synthetic Puffy
- 16) REI Pack Towel (red)
- 17) Adventure Med Kits - Day Tripper
- 18) Wool Socks; Arctics Undershorts, gloves
- 19) Big Agnes Stuff Sacks
- 20) Sol Bivy / Re-stuffed E-Bivy in Ziplock
- 21) Vancos personal items: Sunscreen / toilet Kit
- 22) Car Keys: Honda Key / FOB Bike lock Key, Chin Ros Key, Nyberg AAT9.
- 23) Vancos Food ^{Portion} Word Card, #K243/4 Key, Smiths Key, QPC card, Vertica
- 24) GPS holder on pack (No GPS found)
- 25) Sun-Glasses case (No glasses found)
- 26) Pete harners Sack (Harners on Subject)
- 27) > Obtained from me on 8/16
- 28) iPhone

Received by

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date

8/18/18

Gvalley
8/18/18



NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION



News Headlines

- [Month In Review - July 2018](#)

Additional Headlines

Hazardous Weather Conditions

- [Air Quality Alert](#)

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Current conditions at Bumping Reservoir (RBUM)

Lat: 46.8686°N Lon: 121.2989°W Elev: 3400ft.

NA
71°F
22°C

Humidity NA
Wind Speed NA
Barometer NA
Dewpoint N/A
Visibility NA
Last update 16 Aug 11:00 am PDT

Extended Forecast for 2 Miles ESE Chinook Pass WA


This
Afternoon



Isolated
T-storms

High: 73 °F

Tonight



Mostly Clear

Low: 49 °F


Friday



Sunny

High: 69 °F

Friday
Night



Mostly Clear

Low: 48 °F

Saturday



Sunny

High: 74 °F

Saturday
Night



Mostly Clear

Low: 50 °F

Sunday



Sunny

High: 72 °F

Sunday
Night



Mostly Clear

Low: 53 °F

Monday



Sunny

High: 75 °F

Detailed Forecast

This Afternoon

10:00 PM - 11:00 PM - 10:00 PM - 11:00 PM - 10:00 PM - 11:00 PM - 10:00 PM - 11:00 PM

11:00 PM

04/0/2018
Isolated showers and thunderstorms. Sunny, with a high near 73. West wind around 8 mph. Chance of precipitation is 20%.

Tonight

Mostly clear, with a low around 49. Northwest wind around 8 mph.

Friday

Sunny, with a high near 69. Northwest wind 7 to 10 mph.

Friday Night

Mostly clear, with a low around 48. Northwest wind 8 to 10 mph.

Saturday

Sunny, with a high near 74. Northwest wind around 6 mph.

Saturday Night

Mostly clear, with a low around 50.

Sunday

Sunny, with a high near 72.

Sunday Night

Mostly clear, with a low around 53.

Monday

Sunny, with a high near 75.

Monday Night

Mostly clear, with a low around 54.

Tuesday

Sunny, with a high near 76.

Tuesday Night

Mostly clear, with a low around 53.

Wednesday

Sunny, with a high near 72.



 Forecast Area

Point Forecast:

2 Miles ESE Chinook Pass WA
46.86°N 121.5°W (Elev. 5295 ft)

Last Update:


11:48 am PDT Aug 16, 2018

Forecast Valid:


12pm PDT Aug 16, 2018-6pm PDT Aug 22, 2018

Additional Resources

Radar & Satellite Image



Hourly Weather Forecast



[< SEARCH](#) routes & places

Dewey Peak

Dewey Peak is a class 3 climb.



[Log in and send us updates, images and resources](#)

DRIVING DIRECTIONS

Drive SR 410 to near Chinook Pass.

APPROACH

Take either branch of Naches Loop Trail. If starting at Tipsoo, intersect with Pacific Crest Trail (PCT) south/southeast of Naches Peak and follow PCT down 900 ft to Dewey Lake. There is a permit station shortly when leaving Mount Rainier National Park.

When first arriving at Dewey Lake, there is a trail branch which heads to your left (east) through a camping area on north end of lake and on to west side of lake. PCT continues straight, skirting southwest side of Dewey Lake.

From the south end of the small lake lying to west of Dewey Lake, look for an unmaintained footpath heading west/southwest around west side of this small lake. This footpath leaves PCT to your right when first arriving at Dewey Lake elevation (in same vicinity as previously described fork heading off to your left). If you miss this footpath continue down PCT a short way and bear to your right on another unmaintained footpath (staying on a south bearing) to get to South end of the small lake.

Once at the south end of the small lake go east a bit looking for climbers' trails/game trails heading uphill (due south) toward Dewey Peak – You cannot head uphill directly from the south end of lake as it is buttressed with small cornices and cliffs. Just east of the buttressed zone is a small drainage valley which you should also avoid as it which turns into a ravine as you ascend. You need to head east enough to be on the east side of this gully/drainage. It is bushwhacking for the first 700 ft of ascent finding the path of least resistance but generally staying on a 180° true bearing heading uphill.

At about 5,800 ft you will break the tree line and be in a relatively flat/gentle rocky bowl. Stay on a southerly bearing to ascend to the ridgeline leading to the summit. If you bear to far left (southeast) you will end up at a cliff underneath summit block. So if you err, err to your right a bit. Ascend to this ridgeline leading to Dewey where you will find a climbers trail following ridge to the summit block.

As you near the summit block, you must cross a steep rocky gully/cirque near the summit. After crossing this gulley face a bit further you will be just below the summit block. Scramble up a few ft of loose rock debris to the base of the summit block.

ASCENT ROUTE

You should be at the west/southwest side of summit block which looks pretty imposing. Rotate counterclockwise (toward northwest), gaining a little elevation, around base of summit block to the top of a rock filled gully (previously crossed below). This face is generally used for the scramble type climbs to the summit. It is about 25 m to summit from this point so if you plan to rappel off, It would be good to have a 60 m rope.

The rock here is generally unreliable. As you get higher on the face you will encounter rock embedded in dirt! Be sure to test all holds. The easiest route starts at the top of the gully (which is also a small saddle) and traverses right upward across the face, then a couple vertical moves (which are the crux) before gentling out a bit on broken rock and dirt traversing back left to the summit. Problem is the further right you traverse the more exposure encountered!

Slightly more challenging rock climbing is encountered by not traversing so far to the right and lessening the exposure. Reliable Belay anchors on the summit are hard to come by and a few feet away from the route.

The summit is plenty large enough for a party of five to eight people.

DESCENT ROUTE

Reliable rappel anchors on the summit are difficult to find. Descending a few feet down the route from the summit were a couple horns which we used for a rappel anchor (one backed up by another). As indicated the rappel was about 75 ft from this point.

NOTES

There is an excellent lunch spot with great views and a large rock pedestal to sit on just down from summit block before crossing the face of the rocky gully on descent. Drop your packs here when going up.

Suitable Activities: Climbing

Climbing Category: Basic Alpine

Seasons: May, June, July, August, September, October

Weather: [View weather forecast.](#)

Difficulty: Basic Alpine Climb

Length: 7.5 mi

Elevation Gain: 3,100 ft

High Point: 6,710 ft

Land Manager: [Mount Rainier National Park](#)

William O Douglas Wilderness

Parking Permit Required: National Park Entrance Fee

Recommended Party Size: 12

Maximum Party Size: 12

Map

Recommended Maps:

USGS Cougar Lake





Activities



Trip Reports



Resources



Tags: [Climbing](#)

Helping people explore, conserve, learn about, and enjoy the lands and waters of the Pacific Northwest and beyond.

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