CO-MANAGEMENT OF VANDALIZED SITES: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS

  John H. Jameson, Jr.

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Abstract

Introduction

When asked to write on the topic of co-management, and specifically on co-management of vandalized sites, I agreed with the intention of drawing on my own limited experiences, and also soliciting comments from my colleagues and co-workers in government. It should not be difficult, I surmised, to formulate a few generalizations on the topic since some common denominators in the decision-making processes and compliance processes do exist among many government agencies, at least at federal and state levels. What I have discovered, however, is that while there are many similarities among agencies within the legally mandated fabric of government compliance (i.e., similar laws and regulations among various federal and state agencies), there are infinite variations on how this fabric is cut and tailored to fit the local circumstances. The ramifications of this variability have created a broad spectrum of political backdrops for the many differing scenarios of co-management.

Although my illustrations and photos are restricted to depictions of management problems and vandalism in Georgia, much of my discussion of co-management is relevant to the broader topic of site management or site protection at regional and national levels.

Definition of Co-Management

The term "co-management" as used here is a bit of bureaucratic jargon that refers to the involvement of two separate land managing agencies that have agreed, in writing by interagency cooperative agreement, to allow or permit certain prescribed and mutually beneficial land use activities. The term is sometimes used in the United States among land management agencies that have parallel public land management missions.

The spelling of the term "co-management" implies a joint management venture with a comparable or equal commitment by the participating agencies. The term is perhaps a misnomer, since rarely are the commitments of time and resources by the participating agencies on a truly equal footing.

Examples of Co-Management

A common illustration of co-management in the Southeast, and I suspect in many regions of the U.S., is the cooperative co-management relationships that exist between land managing agencies at federal and state levels. This occurs most often among agencies with similar or overlapping mandates for the management of recreational, wildlife, or cultural resources. Examples from the state of Georgia would include the co-management agreements regularly established between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for joint management of a defined geographic area. In Georgia, there are two major co-management circumstances: management of Wildlife Management Areas and management of state parks.

After conducting some informal canvassing of various agencies at the federal and state levels in several southeastern states, I have observed that, in most current co-management situations between federal and state authorities, the most common mechanism for co-management has been the leasing or licensing of federal lands by the states for specific resource management purposes. From my brief conversations with federal and state agency personnel, I have discerned three general political scenarios that exist in co-management situations and affect decision making within land managing agencies.

In the first scenario, which pertains to the political situation in only a small number of states, recent efforts to co-manage archeological resources have been, for the most part, very effective. In these states, represented in my canvassing by situations in North Carolina and Florida, a relatively strong and enforceable state statute comparable to ARPA has been enacted for the protection and enhancement of the state's cultural resources. In these states, which are not without their own problems in protecting certain sites, considerable resources and manpower are concentrated on enforcement of the statute, i.e., adequately trained and motivated law enforcement personnel with the power of arrest are available to confront the looters.

In North Carolina, for example, lands administered by the COE are often leased and actively managed by the state for a variety of purposes. On these public lands, when site looting or other management problems occur, the Corps can generally count on state law enforcement personnel to step in and take corrective action. Officials in North Carolina have also apparently been successful in achieving site protection through leasing and licensing of private lands. Also, private non-profit organizations have, on occasion, donated or leased properties to the state for the purpose of protecting historic and prehistoric sites. In North Carolina, once a state "interest" in the property is established (by lease, easement, or some other land-use instrument), the state can and usually does step in and enforce the state statute.

In the second political scenario, represented by the situation in the state of Texas, a fairly strong historic preservation statute is in place, but enforcement of the law is less rigorously pursued. In circumstances of federal/state co-management, federal officials apparently cannot typically rely on the state for help in protecting sites or discouraging vandalism, even when the state interest has been established through leasing or licensing of the property.

A third political scenario appears, unfortunately, to reflect the condition of the majority of states and is represented by the situation in the states of Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. Here, where the legal mandate for the protection of cultural resources is weak or nonexistent, the effective co-management of archeological sites is most difficult to achieve.

In all three political scenarios, canvassed officials have been quick to point out that the success of any site protection program has depended ultimately on the attitude of the local field office, be it state or federal. The importance of the willingness of local officials to invest the appropriate levels of funding and staff time to enforce site protection statutes or to enforce protection stipulations within leasing or licensing agreements cannot be overemphasized.

Vandalism at the Anthony Shoals Site

A case in point for the third scenario is the co-management situation at the Anthony Shoals Archeological Site (state site number 9WS51). Situated within the Corps-administered Broad River Wildlife Management Area in southeast Georgia, the site is located on J. Strom Thurmond Lake (formerly Clarks Hill Lake). Here, the COE has granted a 47-year lease to the Georgia DNR, Game and Fish Division, primarily for fish and wildlife management purposes. The lease is a blanket agreement that covers five separate wildlife management areas on the lake.

For the wildlife management areas leased to the state, it is my impression that the COE has assumed that the state is the active land manager (or lead agency), and that the Corps' role is (or should be) a passive one. (Examples can no doubt be cited from other areas and states where these roles are reversed.) At Anthony Shoals, the Corps has assumed that the lease conditions are incident to the privileges for land use granted by the lease agreement. This assumption applies to the management of cultural as well as natural resources. In fact, specific language contained in the terms of the lease includes a condition that calls for the protection of known and newly discovered cultural resource sites. To the continuing lament of the Corps, the Game and Fish Division has done little more than "shrug their shoulders" when confronted by the reality of rampant vandalism at the site (Figures 1, 2 and 3).

The site is a large, multi-component prehistoric occupation that has been subjected to severe unauthorized digging and removal of artifacts. It is located on a river bottom which is subject to periodic flooding. Easily accessed from a county maintained dirt road (Figure 4), the site, on the south bank of Broad River, can also be reached by water.

Through a Corps-sponsored contract with Southeastern Archeological Services of Athens, Georgia, a program of testing and evaluation of the site was performed in 1987. A report of findings (Wood and Smith 1988) described the nature, limits, and extent of vandalism. Results of this work verified that the site occupies an area of at least 2.4 hectares (6 acres), and that surface and subsurface looting to a one-meter depth and greater has destroyed about 30 percent of the site (Figures 5 and 6).

Exposed artifacts and features included lithic tools and projectile points, flakes, fire-effected rock, fire pits, storage pits, shells, and pottery. Some observed artifacts, especially pottery, indicate that certain components at the site date from the Late Archaic Period (c. 2000 b.c.) to Late Mississippian times (a.d. 1500 and later) (Figures 7, 8 and 9).

Co-Management at Anthony Shoals

Let us focus on the federal/state co-management relationships at the Anthony Shoals site and on what actions have actually been taken there.

It was stipulated in the testing and evaluation contract that the recommendations for protection of the site should take into account the distinctive co-management roles of the COE and the Georgia DNR. The report (Wood and Smith 1988) has recommended a three-pronged approach to the long-range management of the site: stepped up site monitoring, data recovery in a small portion of the site that is exposed on the surface, and restoration of looted areas to their original contours. Though the report specifies that the monitoring should be a joint cooperative effort between the Corps and the Game and Fish Division, it does not specify or recommend who should pay for or perform the data recovery and restoration, leaving the most difficult questions of management responsibilities largely unanswered.

Efforts by the Corps to curb the rate of vandalism have included the closing of access roads, signing, and some increased monitoring of the site by Corps rangers (Figure 10). These efforts have had limited success because the area remains accessible by boat, and the determined pothunter will not likely be thwarted by mere roadblocks. Nonetheless, at least the rate of destruction at the site seems to have been abated in recent months.

As previously mentioned, the Georgia Game and Fish Division has taken no appreciable action to protect the site and has continued to "shrug its shoulders" when confronted with the wording of the lease condition alluded to above. Although I have been assured by certain state officials that the upper echelons in the Georgia DNR are genuinely interested in cooperating to protect the site, the failure of the local DNR field office to take action is, I contend, symptomatic and perhaps typical of the general attitude of local supervisors and public land managers in Georgia.

Another example of co-management in the area is the situation at Bobby Brown State Park, also on Thurmond Lake, where the site of a significant early 19th-century town and trade depot, Petersburg, is located (Figures 11 and 12).

Again, the state, in this case the Parks Department, has a long-term lease on the property. The site is being severely eroded and cases of unauthorized removal of artifacts have been reported to the Corps. The establishment of a hiking trail leading to the site has increased the potential for vandalism. Though no looting on the scale noted at Anthony Shoals is known to have occurred, the COE may once again find itself the only active manager for the site.

In both sites at Thurmond Lake, the primary activities allowed by the lease agreement (i.e., wildlife management at Anthony Shoals and recreation at the Petersburg site) may actually be causing or contributing to the vandalism of materials. At Anthony Shoals, the "casual use" by recreationalists and hunters was documented in the testing and evaluation report as another major cause of damage to the resource.

It seems reasonable to assume that once an area such as the wildlife management area at Anthony Shoals is opened up and made accessible to the public under the conditions and purposes of the lease, it is the lessee's responsibility, in exercising its governmental functions and privileges granted by the lease agreement, to monitor the area and to enforce the conditions of the co-management contract. In this case, it is incumbent upon the state to take a more active role.

Observations and Conclusions

What has our information canvassed from several states and the experience at Anthony Shoals taught us? I think we can identify at least three basic criteria or factors concerning co-management and the prospects for success in preserving archeological sites and combating vandalism.

In all cases, the active manager or lead agency (whoever in reality that turns out to be, be it federal or state, owner/administrator, or lessee) must:

(1) be provided a strong, enforceable protection statute at the state level that is a counterpart to and consistent with the federal ARPA in order to ensure local and legal credibility-ARPA isn't enough, especially on state-controlled or leased lands or in states such as Georgia with a weak or nonexistent statute; local magistrates will be more likely to enforce ARPA if there is a state counterpart;

(2) have adequate numbers of trained and motivated law enforcement personnel in the local field offices of both state and federal agencies available to arrest violators and assist in the monitoring and patrolling of threatened sites; and

(3) ensure that local field supervisors and staff, at both federal and state levels, are "on board" in their awareness, appreciation, and motivation to protect the resource.

When one or more of these three factors is missing from the co-management scenario, the business of effectively managing and protecting a threatened archeological site becomes very difficult. In the case at Anthony Shoals, the absence of all three factors has created a management nightmare, at least from the perspective of the COE.

In states such as North Carolina and Florida, where the first criterion-an effective state statute-and the second criterion-trained law enforcement personnel-are in place, the task of effective management is much easier, but still may not be effective if the third criterion-a cadre of trained and cooperative local officials-is not also present.

In summary, it appears that regardless of how strong the legal mandate at federal and state levels, or how great the effort in enforcing these mandates, little is accomplished in discouraging or correcting the problem of looting without local cooperation and support.

Read
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