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THE UNION ARTILLERY AND BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK - (Research Project #2) -

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THE UNION ARTILLERY AND BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK

Chapter I

THE YANKEE'S OCCUPY A DANGEROUS POSITION - THE REBELS PREPARE
TO COUNTER-ATTACK

Once the terrible fighting of the 31st had drawn to a close Brigadier General Horatio P. Van Cleve found that the slight wound which he had received earlier in the day had become unbearably painful. Therefore the general found it necessary to turn over the command of his division to his ranking brigade commander - Brigadier General Samuel Beatty.¹

At 3 a.m. on the 1st a courier galloped up to Beatty's headquarters, on a sweat lathered horse, with an important message. On scanning the dispatch Beatty discovered that it was from his corps commander - Major General Thomas L. Crittenden. Upon digesting the letter's contents, Beatty found that Crittenden wished him to cross Stones River with his division, and occupy the commanding ground lying to the east of the river. The colonel immediately relayed the contents of Crittenden's message to his three brigade commanders - Colonels Benjamin C. Grider, James P. Fyffe, and Samuel W. Price.²

By daybreak Price's brigade which had slept in line of battle on the ridge overlooking McFadden's Ford had finished breakfast. Once the troops had been fallen in and mustered - the brigade moved forward. Proceeded by a strong skirmish line, drawn from the 51st Ohio, the brigade forded Stones River. Several hundred yards east of the river,

the skirmishers established contact with a line of Rebel outposts, manned by troopers drawn from Brigadier General John Pegram's brigade. Following a brief, but spirited clash the greyclads beat a hasty retreat. Price not wishing to bring on a general engagement ordered the 51st Ohio not to pursue the retreating cavalrymen.³

His troops having gained the stipulated high ground, which lay about one-half mile southeast of McFadden's Ford, Price indicated to his regiment commanders where he wished them to deploy their respective units. When formed Price's brigade was massed in double line of battle. From right to left the initial line consisted of the 51st Ohio, 8th Kentucky, and 35th Indiana; while the second had the 21st Kentucky on the right and the 99th Ohio on the left. The line of battle as formed lay perpendicular to the river, with the right flank of the 51st Ohio anchored on Stones River. The troops were sheltered in a wooded area with a large open field (over one-fourth mile across), to their immediate front. In this field the corn stalks from last year's crops were still standing. Once he had covered his main line of resistance with a strong force of skirmishers, Price permitted his men to lay down and take it easy.⁴

Beatty's two other brigades - Fyffe's and Grider's - had been heavily engaged on the Army of the Cumberland's right, near where the Asbury and Nashville pikes intersected, on the previous afternoon. Therefore on the morning of the 1st these two brigades had a considerable distance to march before reaching McFadden's Ford. Wading across the

cold river Fyffe's troops took position in double line of battle on the left of Price's brigade - the 44th Indiana and 13th Ohio in advance, the 59th Ohio and 86th Indiana in reserve. Fyffe unlike Price deployed his brigade in the cornfield. There was a gap, of at least a regimental front, between the left flank of Price's brigade and the right of Fyffe's. Furthermore Fyffe's two left flank units (the 13th and 59th Ohio), which prolonged the division's main line of resistance to a country lane, were unsupported and dangerously exposed to any Confederate attack having its point of origin to the northeast of McFadden's Ford. Like Price, Fyffe covered his main line of resistance with a strong force of skirmishers. Once this had been carried out the regimental commanders directed their men to assume the prone position.⁵

Two of Colonel Grider's regiments (the 79th Indiana and 11th Kentucky) forded Stones River in the wake of Fyffe's brigade. After reaching the river's right bank these two units took position in the hollow between the Hoover house and the ford. Grider's two other regiments (the 9th Kentucky and 19th Ohio), in accordance with Beatty's orders, were deployed in support of the six guns of the 3d Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery, on the high ground west of McFadden's Ford.⁶

On making a routine inspection of his front, Price noted that the Rebels were busy emplacing a battery (probably Huwald's) some 1200 yards in advance of his main line of resistance. The brigade commander immediately relayed this important information to General Beatty. And Beatty in his turn forwarded Price's dispatch to General Crittenden.

In reply Beatty, about 10 a.m., received permission from his corps commander to send a battery across the river.

Accordingly, the 3d Wisconsin Battery forded the river, and took position in the hollow south of the Hoover house. (The Federal surgeons had now turned the house into a hospital.) Beatty now received reports from Price and Fyffe indicating that the mounted Rebel patrols (Pegram's troopers), which were in contact with their skirmishers had been reinforced by infantry (detachments drawn from Colonel Joseph B. Palmer's brigade).

The general now directed the commander of the 3d Wisconsin Battery, Lieutenant Cortland Livingston to move his unit to the front. Thundering forward the Badgers unlimbered four of their guns in the interval between the 8th Kentucky and the 35th Indiana, while Lieutenant Hiram F. Hubbard's section was emplaced on the bluff, where the 51st Ohio's right flank rested adjacent to the river. Once their six guns had been placed in battery, the Union artillerists opened fire. At first the cannoneers concentrated on the Confederate infantry, which had debouched from the woods into the cornfield to Price's immediate front. Several shells proved sufficient, and the Rebel infantry quickly faded back into the woods from whence they had come. The infantry dispersed, the Badgers shifted targets. They proceeded to concentrate their fire on Pegram's troopers. Within a few moments the Confederate cavalry had likewise been scattered. Livingston then ordered his gunners to cease firing. Throughout the remainder of the afternoon the artillerists kept a sharp

watch to their front for further signs of Confederate activity. And each time that a greyclad patrol ventured out of the woods into the cornfield, the guns roared into action. The Southerners were only interested in harassing the bluecoats, and not wishing to bring on a general engagement, they would quickly fall back into the woods. This cat and mouse game, between the Union artillery and the butternut patrols, continued throughout the entire afternoon.⁷

Some three hours after the 3d Wisconsin Battery had forded the river, Beatty learned that the left flank of Colonel Fyffe's brigade was resting in the air and therefore dangerously exposed. In hopes of rectifying this situation the general ordered the two regiments of Colonel Grider's brigade, which had remained west of the river to cross. Upon fording the river the 9th Kentucky and 19th Ohio reported to Grider for orders. The colonel used the two units to extend his flank to a point some distance north of the Hoover house.⁸

Throughout the early afternoon Beatty continued to receive disturbing messages from the front. These reports seemed to indicate that the Rebels appeared to be massing troops for a thrust against Fyffe's exposed left flank. Beatty kept both General Crittenden and Brigadier General John M. Palmer advised of this development. Finally Crittenden directed Palmer to reinforce the troops holding the bridgehead, with a brigade drawn from his division. Without hesitating a moment Palmer ordered Colonel William Grose to cross the river with his brigade.

Grose's battered brigade, which had participated in the defense

of Round Forest on the 31st, had been held in reserve on the 1st. Quickly mustering his brigade, Grose led his unit across the river. Upon reaching the east bank Grose's troops took position north of the Hoover house, relieving two of Grider's units - 9th Kentucky and 19th Ohio. Upon being relieved the two regiments rejoined their parent unit in the hollow adjacent to the ford. Beatty then directed Colonel Grider to hold his brigade well in hand, ready to move to the point of danger on a moment's notice.⁹

Beyond some slight skirmishing between the Union outposts and Confederate reconnaissance patrols, nothing of importance transpired during the daylight hours along the perimeter guarding the approaches to the Union bridgehead. Before dark Beatty became convinced that the Rebels did not contemplate an immediate attack on the bridgehead. Therefore the general permitted the 3d Wisconsin Battery and Grose's brigade to recross Stones River. Upon fording the stream these two units bivouacked for the night on the ridge lying to the west of McFadden's Ford. Only one division - Beatty's with two brigades (Price's and Fyffe's) deployed in line of battle, and one (Grider's) in reserve would be responsible for the bridgehead's defense on the night of the 1st.¹⁰

All was quiet east of the river until about midnight. At that time a Confederate patrol launched a sharp attack on one of Price's outposts. After a rather brisk fire fight, the blueclads forced the Rebels to retire. In repulsing this raid the Federals had one man killed - a private in the 35th Indiana, and two wounded. When they heard the firing

on the picket line Beatty's brigade commanders, fearing a night attack, quickly aroused their men. Since the troops constituting Price's and Fyffe's brigade had bivouacked in line of battle, they were ready for battle on a moment's notice. Once the greyclads had fallen back all the Yankees, except for those manning the line of outposts, again dropped off to sleep. Rebuffed in their efforts to surprise the foe - the Southerners made no further attacks on the Union picket line, and the rest of the night passed quietly into history.¹¹

On New Year's Eve, General Braxton Bragg anticipating that the Federals would again send a force across Stones River at McFadden's Ford, summoned Major General John C. Breckinridge to his GHQ. At this meeting Bragg told his subordinate of his fears. Breckinridge was directed to take one of his brigades and recross the river. Once the Kentuckian had gained the east bank of the river, he would hold himself ready to counter this move on the Yankees' part. Returning to his headquarters Breckinridge called for Colonel Joseph B. Palmer, and told him to muster his hard-fighting brigade. Once Palmer had assembled his command, the order to march was given. Moving off into the darkness the troops of Palmer's brigade had all forded the river by 1 a.m. By daybreak Palmer's men had reoccupied the position they had held up until noon on the previous day, on the right of Brigadier General Roger W. Hanson's crack "Orphan" brigade.¹²

During the day Palmer sent forth several strong combat patrols. These groups moved forward in support of Pegram's troopers, who had established contact with Beatty's bluecoats. These patrols upon being

exposed to the fire of the guns of the 3d Wisconsin Battery beat a hasty retreat. Outside of these individuals and Pegram's cavalrmen, the Rebel troops stationed on the east bank of Stones River, kept a respectable distance between them and the Union soldiers holding the bridgehead on the 1st. In general Hanson's and Palmer's troops, when not engaged in drawing ammunition or cooking rations, relaxed and took it easy.¹³

On the morning of the 2d Breckinridge decided that it might be a good idea, to ascertain the strength of the Union force holding the bridgehead which covered McFadden's Ford. The general placed a member of his staff - Lieutenant Colonel John A. Buckner in charge of a strong combat patrol. Buckner's instructions were to move forward and engage the enemy. Buckner's combat patrol consisted entirely of artillery (Eyrne's Kentucky Battery [4 guns] and the 5th Company of the Washington Artillery [4 guns]). The colonel was authorized by Breckinridge, to call upon the officers commanding the various Confederate outposts for infantry support. While Buckner's group felt the Union left the general, accompanied by several staff officers, would reconnoiter the foe's right.¹⁴

Before reaching the line of Rebel outposts Buckner's combat patrol was joined by a battalion drawn from the 18th Tennessee. This infantry force was led by Captain William H. Joyner. Passing through the picket line, held by the men of the 45th Tennessee, Buckner's patrol emerged from the woods and entered no-man's-land. Upon debouching into the cornfield the butternuts were fired upon by Union skirmishers. While

the men of the 18th Tennessee deployed, the cannoneers of the Washington Artillery and Bryne's Battery quickly unlimbered their eight guns. Once the field pieces had been unlimbered the artillerists would manhandle them forward.¹⁵

Meanwhile Breckirridge's patrol had ridden cautiously forward. About 500 yards northwest of Wayne's Hill the general reached Hanson's advance line of outposts. These were manned by detachments drawn from the 4th and 9th Kentucky. Captains Christopher Boshe and Thomas Steele, the officers in charge of the pickets, reported to the general. The captains told Breckirridge, that since the area to their immediate front had been infiltrated by Union snipers, it would be dangerous for him to proceed any further. Breckinridge discovering that he was unable to get a good view of the Union positions, told the two captains to take their men and drive in these pesky enemy skirmishers.¹⁶

After the Kentuckians had carried out this assignment, the general was able to gain a vantage point from where he could readily examine the Federal bridgehead. Breckinridge was able to observe that the blue-clad infantry, supported by artillery, had taken up a strong position. The Yankees' main line of resistance rested on the crest of a gentle slope, which was partially covered with timber. The general noted that the foe's line of battle which lay about 1600 yards northwest of the grey-clad's position at Wayne's Hill, had been formed at nearly right angles to his division's front. However, before the general was able to ascertain the strength of the force holding the bridgehead, or if the terrain to the west of the river commanded that to the east, one of

Bragg's staff officers galloped up. The aide told Breckinridge that Bragg wished to confer with him immediately. Retracing his steps Breckinridge hastened to Bragg's GHQ, then located on the west side of the river.¹⁷

Earlier in the day Bragg had received disturbing reports from several members of his staff. These reports seemed to indicate that unless the Yankees were dislodged from their bridgehead there would be serious trouble. The staff officers told the general, that if the Federals should succeed in emplacing their artillery on the high ground east of the river, they would be able to enfilade the right flank of Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk's corps. At this time Polk's extreme right rested on the river near Round Forrest. It was apparent to the combative Bragg, that he would either have to smash the Union bridgehead or withdraw Polk's right flank. It was not difficult for a man of Bragg's temperament to decide what to do - He would attack!¹⁸

Orders were immediately drafted by Bragg alerting Brigadier General William Preston and Colonel Randall L. Gibson to muster their brigades, preparatory to reporting to General Breckinridge on the east side of the river. Captain Felix H. Robertson was directed to report to Breckinridge with his own six gun battery and two sections of Semple's Alabama Battery - ten guns in all. Wright's Tennessee Battery was ordered to move to the Nashville Ford, which was adjacent to Bragg's GHQ. A staff officer was sent to tell Brigadier Generals John A. Wharton and Pegram, to hold their cavalry brigades ready to co-operate with the attacking

infantry. Simultaneously an aide was sent across the river with instructions for General Breckinridge to report to Bragg's headquarters.¹⁹

When Breckinridge arrived at his GHQ, Bragg told him that he was to form his division into double line of battle, and attack the Federal bridgehead. Once he had crushed the Union force stationed on the right bank of Stones River, Breckinridge was to see that his artillery was brought forward. The Confederate cannoneers would then emplace their pieces on the high ground from which the blueclads had just been driven. This would give Breckinridge's artillery an excellent position from where they could enfilade the Army of the Cumberland's left flank. As the next item on his agenda Bragg informed Breckinridge that he had directed Preston's and Gibson's infantry brigades and Robertson's, Semple's, and Wright's batteries to report to him. At this very moment all of these units were in the process of crossing to the east side of Stones River. Furthermore Bragg continued, the Confederate cavalry (Wharton's and Pegram's brigades) then operating east of the river, had been alerted to screen the right flank of Breckinridge's attacking legions. Bragg then proceeded to discuss Polk's role in the impending attack. The general informed Breckinridge that Polk's artillery, which was concentrated northwest of the ruins of the Cowan house, would begin to bombard the enemy's lines, at the same time that Breckinridge's troops drove forward. Bragg believed such an activity on the part of Polk's artillery, would help divert the Yankees' attention from Breckinridge's attacking legions. When Breckinridge was ready to advance, he would let Bragg know. One of

Polk's guns would then be discharged, and this would be the signal for Breckinridge's attack to commence. As Breckinridge started to leave, Bragg expressed the wish that the attack "should be made with the least possible delay." Upon riding away from Bragg's headquarters, Breckinridge glanced at his watch - the hands indicated that the hour was 2:30 a.m.²⁰

By 2 p.m. Preston and Gibson had received Bragg's orders, directing them to report to General Breckinridge on the opposite side of the river. The two officers immediately relayed these instructions to their subordinates. Once the two brigades had been relieved, they were withdrawn from the cedars north of the Wilkinson pike. Moving rapidly cross-country Preston's and Gibson's troops crossed Stones River at the Nashville Ford. A short distance beyond the ford the two brigades commanders were hailed by General Breckinridge, and directed to form their units for battle.²¹

The batteries which had been ordered by Bragg to cross to the east side of Stones River had already reported to Breckinridge. Robertson's Battery, reinforced by two sections drawn from Semple's battery, had arrived first, followed soon afterwards by Wright's Tennessee Battery.²²

Shortly after daybreak on the 2d the 3d Wisconsin Battery had again crossed Stones River. Moving to the front the Badgers again emplaced four of their guns in the interval between the 8th Kentucky and 35th Indiana, and their other two pieces on the bluff near the

51st Ohio's right flank. Hardly had the Union artillerists unlimbered their pieces, before they drew the fire of Cobb's Kentucky Battery. The Confederate guns being posted on Wayne's Hill, about one mile to the southeast. Since the Rebels' fire was most inaccurate and inflicted no damage, Lieutenant Livingston instructed his men not to reply.²³

During the morning General Beatty decided to plug the gap in his line that existed between Price's left and Fyffe's right. Accordingly, Beatty ordered Colonel Grider to send one of his regiments to the front. The 79th Indiana, the unit designated for this duty by Colonel Grider, was advanced and took position, with the 35th Indiana (of Price's brigade) on its right and the 44th Indiana (Fyffe's brigade) on its left.²⁴

From daybreak until about noon, when Buckner's combat team attacked and drove in the Union outposts, there was very little activity along the Union picket line. For the Federals the situation took a decided turn for the worse, when they observed that the enemy's infantry was supported by artillery. The cannoneers of the Washington Artillery and Byrne's Kentucky Battery could be distinctly seen, as they wheeled their eight guns into position at the edge of the woods, on the opposite side of the cornfield. Once they had emplaced their field pieces, the Rebel artillerists opened fire on the bluecoats with shot and shell. At first the greyclads concentrated their fire on the 3d Wisconsin's six guns.

Lieutenant Livingston realized that besides being out-gunned, his battery was exposed to a dangerous flanking fire. Therefore he sent a

messenger to acquaint General Beatty with the situation. The division commander, upon being appraised of the situation, authorized Livingston to withdraw his battery. Upon retiring from their forward position the Badgers would place their six guns in battery on the high ground near the Hoover house. Limbering up their pieces the men of the 3d Wisconsin Battery displaced their guns to the rear as directed.²⁵

As was to be expected the Union infantrymen manning Beatty's main line of resistance, were not very happy to see the artillery depart. For now the Confederate cannoneers would be able to focus their undivided attention on them. The commander of the 21st Kentucky noted bitterly:

About 1 p.m. the rebel artillery commenced throwing shells among us, greatly to our annoyance. At this time our artillery was withdrawn...to the astonishment of all. It seems that our little brigade [Price's] had been forgotten, or was left there all alone to be sacrificed, in order to draw the enemy on....²⁶

Once their artillery had softened up the Yankees' position, the men of the 18th Tennessee moved out into the cornfield. Pressing resolutely forward the Tennesseans forced a patrol drawn from the 51st Ohio to evacuate several buildings, in front of the right flank of Price's main line of resistance. Fearful lest these structures provide cover for Confederate sharpshooters Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. McClain, of the 51st Ohio, determine to commit other elements from his regiment. Bolstered by reinforcements drawn from the 51st Ohio, the patrol launched a vigorous little counter-attack. Driven from the buildings the Tennesseans were forced to retire upon their supporting artillery. After his men had set fire to the structures Colonel McClain,

satisfied with this local success, recalled them. In this spirited clash the Rebels had suffered 13 casualties - 2 killed and 11 wounded, while the bluecoats made no report of their losses.²⁷

During the early afternoon Beatty's scouts spotted a powerful force of Rebel infantry (estimated to contain 15 regiments) moving from right to left across their immediate front. This strong column, it was noted, was accompanied by both artillery and cavalry. News concerning this interesting and important development was immediately relayed to brigade, division, and corps headquarters. Shortly thereafter the troops occupying the right flank of Beatty's main line of resistance were also able to catch a fleeting glimpse, through the trees, of the Rebel movement toward their left.²⁸

General Crittenden responded to the news of the Rebels' activity with alacrity. He immediately ordered General Palmer to reinforce the troops holding the bridgehead with Grose's brigade. Once his brigade had forded the river, Colonel Grose reported to Beatty for further instructions. Beatty directed Grose to deploy his command so that it would be prepared to cover the left flank of his division. Grose was told that his men must stand ready to repel all attacks.²⁹

In order to carry out the mission assigned to him by Beatty, Grose formed his brigade as follows: The 23d Kentucky took position on the brigade's right, its right flank resting on the country lane 200 yards in rear and to the left of Fyffe's brigade; the 24th Ohio was formed into line of battle 300 yards in rear of the 23d Kentucky. Both these

regiments faced toward the east. The 36th Indiana was stationed to the left and rear of the 24th Ohio, its front being diagonal to the Ohio regiment's left flank. Furthermore there was a gap of about 150 yards between the Hoosiers' right flank and the Buckeyes' left. In the event of an attack Grose admonished the commanders of these three regiments they would change "front as the exigencies of the case might require." Grose's two other regiments (the 84th Illinois and 6th Ohio) were deployed about 150 yards in rear of the 36th Indiana's left flank. These two units were formed in single line of battle facing east. The right flank of the 84th Illinois was anchored on the bluff adjacent to the river, its left resting near the Hoover house. The six guns belonging to the 3d Wisconsin Battery were emplaced immediately in front of the 84th's left flank, and to the right of the 6th Ohio. After his men had been posted Grose had them throw up temporary breastworks, composed of fence rails and rocks.³⁰

On the left bank of the river, in immediate support of the troops holding the bridgehead, were a number of other units. The commanding ground to the west of McFadden's Ford was held by the hard-fighting brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Charles Cruft. Cruft's brigade had taken position on the military crest overlooking the strategic ford on the previous afternoon. The troops of Cruft's brigade spent the morning of the 2d erecting crude fence rail and rock barricades. Throughout the morning Cruft's men were subjected to an occasional shelling by the Rebel guns posted near the ruins of the Cowan house. About 11 a.m.

the butternuts suddenly altered their tactics. For the better part of the next hour the Confederate gunners hammered the sector held by Cruft's brigade with a heavy concentration of shot and shell. During this fierce bombardment the Yankees took cover behind their breastworks.³¹

Up until mid-afternoon on the 2d there were six batteries (24 guns) posted on the ridge overlooking McFadden's Ford. On the morning of the 1st Crittenden's able Chief of Artillery - Captain John Mendenhall had ordered the 7th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery to take position covering McFadden's Ford. Hastening to the area adjacent to the ford the Hoosiers unlimbered their six guns (four 10-pounder Parrott rifles and two 12-pounder Napoleons). These field pieces were emplaced on the commanding ground west of the river. Once the Indianians had put their guns into position on the highest point of the ridge, Cruft's infantry moved forward to their support. Except for the excitement engendered by an occasional shelling by the Confederates' artillery, the battery commander Captain George R. Swallow noted: "Nothing worthy of note transpired during the day [the 1st], and the morning of the 2d found us occupying the same position."³²

About noon on the 2d the three under strength batteries assigned to the division, commanded by Brigadier General James S. Negley, were ordered to take position on the ridge overlooking McFadden's Ford. Moving forward the cannoneers of Negley's division unlimbered their six guns to the left of the ground occupied by the 7th Indiana Battery. Lieutenant Alexander Marshall had the men assigned to his unit - Battery

G, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, emplace their two pieces (one 12-pounder howitzer and a 6-pounder Wiard rifle) immediately on the Hoosiers' left. The three guns belonging to Battery M, 1st Ohio Light Artillery - Captain Frederick Schultz commanding - were placed in battery on the left of Marshall's unit. At this time the 2d Battery, Kentucky Light Artillery had only one servicable piece left - a 10-pounder Parrott rifle. The Kentuckians, working under the direct supervision of their commanding officer Lieutenant Alban A. Ellsworth, emplaced their single piece on the left of Battery M's three guns. Having emplaced their six guns the cannoneers attached to these three batteries, eagerly awaited for someone to assign them a firing mission.³³

When Crittenden was informed of the increased Rebel activities in the vicinity of the bridgehead he called for Captain Mendenhall. The corps commander informed Mendenhall, that it might be well to mass some additional artillery on the ridge west of McFadden's Ford. Accordingly, Mendenhall issued instructions for the commanders of Batteries H and M, 4th U. S. Artillery and Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery to put their guns into position on the designated ridge. When the orders to move to the front arrived the regular battery was being held in reserve near the Nashville pike. Moving into position at the gallop, Lieutenant Charles C. Parsons had his men (Batteries H and M) unlimber their eight guns (four 12-pounder Napoleons and four 3-inch rifles) to the right of the 7th Indiana Battery's six guns.³⁴ The cannoneers of Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery emplaced their four guns about 100 yards to

the right of Parsons' battery. Before taking position on the ridge overlooking McFadden's ford, the Buckeye battery had been in action near the railroad.³⁵

At 1 p.m. on the 2d General Negley received instructions from General Rosecrans, to use his division to reinforce Crittenden's corps. At the time that this order reached Negley his unit was deployed in support of Major General Alexander McD. McCook's corps on the extreme Union right. Marching to the left Negley's division took position immediately in rear of Cruft's brigade, and the artillery which was massed on the ridge overlooking McFadden's Ford. Negley deployed Colonel John F. Miller's brigade on the right, and Colonel Timothy R. Stanley's on the left.³⁶

The three-quarters of a mile of front extending in a southwesterly direction from McFadden's Ford to the Nashville pike was held by four brigades. From left to right these units were commanded by - Colonels William B. Hazen, George D. Wagner, Charles G. Harker, and George P. Buell. On the morning of the 2d these four units were supported by four batteries. The 8th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery was on the extreme right, its six guns (two 12-pounder howitzers and four 6-pounder guns) emplaced adjacent to the Nashville pike. On a small eminence near the railroad were the six pieces (four 10-pounder Parrotts and two 12-pounder Napoleons) manned by the men of the 6th Battery, Ohio Light Artillery. The 6th Ohio Battery was supported by Harker's brigade. To the Buckeyes' left, north of the railroad, were emplaced the six

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guns (two James rifles and four 6-pounder guns). These six pieces were served by the men of the 26th Battery, Pennsylvania Light Artillery. Some 250 yards in rear of the 6th Ohio Battery, the cannoneers assigned to the Chicago Board of Trade Battery had unlimbered their six pieces (two James rifles and four 6-pounder guns).³⁷

Daybreak on the 2d found the six guns (two 6-pounders and four James rifles) of Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, emplaced on the ridge south of the Nashville pike. Here on the 31st the Board of Trade Battery and the 26th Pennsylvania Battery, supported by the Pioneer brigade had checked Ector's onslaught. In the late afternoon three of Battery B's guns would be ordered to the ridge overlooking McFadden's Ford.³⁸

Under the cover of darkness in the early morning hours of the 2d the Rebels had massed and masked 22 pieces of artillery northwest of the ruins of the Cowan house. Twelve guns manned by the men of Carnes', Stanford's, and Smith's batteries were emplaced north of the railroad adjacent to the river. At the same time the cannoneers assigned to Robertson's and Scott's batteries had unlimbered their 10 guns (the former south of the pike near the ruins and the latter between the Nashville pike and the railroad). A brigade drawn from Major General Jones M. Withers' division, commanded by Colonel Thomas W. White, was thrown forward to support the cannoneers. White's infantry occupied the crest of the ridge immediately in the artillery's rear.³⁹

At dawn a strong force of skirmishers drawn from White's brigade moved forward. These rugged individuals proceeded to drive the Union

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pickets from Round Forest. A combat patrol composed of volunteers from the 51st Indiana, of Harker's brigade, launched a vigorous counter-attack. In the face of this fierce thrust the buttermuts in turn were forced to evacuate Round Forest, leaving ten of their dead behind.

In the highly successful effort to check this Union advance the massed Rebel artillery roared into action. After sending the bluecoated infantry scampering for cover, the Southern artillerists shifted targets. They now commenced to hammer away at the Union artillery.⁴⁰

Initially the cannoneers manning the guns of Scott's and Robertson's batteries concentrated their attention on the 8th Indiana Battery. The Rebels' marksmanship was exceptional. So "terribly effective" was the Confederates' fire, that Lieutenant George Estep decided he had best withdraw his battery from its dangerously exposed position. But by this time a number of the battery's horses had been killed, wounded, or stampeded. As a direct result of this shortage of horseflesh, the Indianians found that they were unable to remove two of their guns. Subsequently the division commander charged with the defense of this sector of the front - Brigadier General Milo S. Hascall sent forward a detachment of infantry. With the aid of prolonged ropes the dough-feet succeeded in pulling the two abandoned pieces to the rear. Even before the infantry had recovered the two guns, Estep had secured teams to pull them. He had been able to accomplish this by utilizing the horses formerly used to pull the battery's caissons and forge. However, by this time the barrage had ceased. Estep then ordered his

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men to take it easy while awaiting a fresh assignment.⁴¹

After having forced the 8th Indiana Battery to pull back, the men of Robertson's and Scott's batteries shifted targets. They now concentrated their fire on Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery. After a loss of one man and five horses - killed - the Buckeyes were forced to withdraw three of their guns to a less exposed position.⁴²

While Scott's and Robertson's batteries pounded away at the 8th Indiana and Battery B; Carnes', Stanford's, and Smith's hammered away at the 6th Ohio, 26th Pennsylvania, and Board of Trade batteries. But since the 6th Ohio's guns occupied the most exposed position, the post of danger, the greyclads devoted most of their attention to them. In his "After Action Report" Colonel Harker tersely described this artillery duel, as the most fearful he had "yet had the experience to witness. The enemy, having our range quite perfectly, poured upon us a most destructive fire, causing the battery [the 8th Indiana] on our right to be abandoned...." Even after the Board of Trade Battery, emplaced to their rear, had sprayed their position with canister, wounding several men, the hard-bitten artillerymen of the 6th Ohio Battery continued to hold their ground. It seems that several of the Board of Trade Battery's gun captains had become trigger-happy. Therefore they had opened fire without waiting for orders from the battery commander - Captain James H. Stokes. And before Stokes could put a stop to this promiscuous firing the damage had been done. After about an hour the Confederate guns fell silent. Only then did Captain Cullen

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Bradley permit his men to cease firing. During the bombardment the 6th Ohio had expended 177 rounds of ammunition, and suffered five casualties - all wounded.⁴³

The battery to the Buckeyes' right - the 26th Pennsylvania - suffered very little during the shelling, as did the Board of Trade Battery. Due to the intervening woods and the configuration of the terrain, the Pennsylvanians were unable to get a good view of the Rebels' massed artillery. Therefore the battery held its fire throughout the morning.⁴⁴

It seems that the Rebel artillerists more than held their own in this fierce duel. Only one of the five batteries engaged - Scott's reported any casualties. So rapidly and efficiently did the cannoneers in grey serve their pieces, that after about 20 minutes firing the limbers had to be ordered forward, to enable the gun crews to replenish their ammunition chests. This difficult but necessary operation was carried out under a scathing fire without loss by the butternuts.

When the word to cease fire was finally given, the three batteries emplaced north of the railroad (being partially in defilade) held their ground. However, Scott's battery was in an exposed position. Therefore when the firing had ceased the battery retired about 50 yards and took cover in a shallow ravine. Robertson's battery retained its position near the ruins of the Cowan house until early in the afternoon. At that time the unit was ordered to cross the river, to furnish fire support for Breckinridge's attack on the Union bridgehead.⁴⁵

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THE UNION ARTILLERY AND BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK

Chapter I

THE YANKEES OCCUPY A DANGEROUS POSITION - THE REBELS PREPARE TO COUNTER-ATTACK

1 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, p. 575.

(cited hereafter as Q. R.) A native of New Jersey, Van Cleve had graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in July 1831, as a brevet 2d lieutenant in the 5th Infantry. Van Cleve resigned from the U. S. Army in September 1836. On July 22, 1861 Van Cleve re-entered Federal service as the colonel of the 2d Minnesota Infantry. Eight months later Van Cleve was advanced to the rank of brigadier general. Samuel Beatty, a native of Pennsylvania, initially entered Federal service as a 1st lieutenant in the 3d Ohio Infantry in June 1846. Following the Mexican War, Beatty was honorably mustered out of the army. Beatty again entered Federal service as a captain in the 19th Ohio Infantry in April 1861. One month later Beatty assumed command of the regiment, with the rank of colonel. On November 29, 1862 Beatty was promoted to brigadier general. After turning over his command to Beatty, Van Cleve proceeded to Nashville.

2 Ibid. Thomas L. Crittenden, a native of Kentucky, had served in the Army during the Mexican War, as a lieutenant colonel in the 3d Kentucky Infantry. After Kentucky had decided to cast its lot with the Union, Crittenden (on September 27) was commissioned a brigadier

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general in the Union Army. On July 17, 1862 Crittenden was promoted to the rank of major general. Samuel W. Price, a native of Kentucky, had originally entered the Federal service as the colonel of the 21st Kentucky Infantry on February 26, 1862.

3 Ibid., 608, 610, 612-614. Pegram's brigade was composed of the following cavalry units: 1st Georgia, 1st Louisiana, and 1st Tennessee regiments, 16th Tennessee battalion, supported by Hwald's Tennessee Battery. John Pegram, a native of Virginia, was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1854. Commissioned a brevet 2d Lieutenant in the dragoons, Pegram served on the western frontier until 1858. In that year Pegram, now a 1st lieutenant in the 2d Dragoons, received a two years' leave of absence to enable him to make a tour of Europe. On his return from Europe, Pegram remained in the U. S. Army until May 10, 1861 when he resigned. Entering Confederate service, Pegram was advanced rapidly in rank, and participated in the Western Virginia Campaign in the summer of 1861, where he was forced to surrender his command to Rosecrans at Rich Mountain. Exchanged in the summer of 1862, Pegram was assigned to Bragg's staff. Subsequently Pegram became Kirby Smith's chief of staff. In November, Pegram was promoted to brigadier general and placed in charge of a cavalry brigade.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 598, 601-602, 604-605.

6 Ibid., 575, 587, 589. The 3d Wisconsin Battery was equipped with six guns (four 10-pounder Parrotts rifles and two 12-pounder howitzers).

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7 Ibid., 575-576, 582, 608, 615. Huwald's Tennessee Battery was armed with four guns.

8 Ibid., 576.

9 Ibid., 561, 576. John M. Palmer, a native of Kentucky, was residing in Illinois when the Civil War commenced. Palmer initially entered Federal service as the colonel of the 14th Illinois. On December 20, 1861 Palmer was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. William Grose, a native of Ohio, and a resident of Indiana, had originally entered the Union army as colonel of the 36th Indiana Infantry.

10 Ibid., 576.

11 Ibid., 576, 587, 598, 608, 610.

12 Ibid., 784, 805. The 5th Company, Washington Light Artillery had accompanied Palmer's brigade when it had recrossed the river. Three of the battery's six guns were emplaced near the right of Hanson's brigade, while the unit's remaining pieces were unlimbered on the right of Palmer's brigade. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Joseph B. Palmer was a prominent Murfreesboro lawyer, and was strongly opposed to secession. But like the majority of Southern men of pro-Union proclivities Palmer believed his first allegiance was due to his state. Therefore when Tennessee decided in favor of leaving the Union, he obeyed her voice and raised a company. When the 18th Tennessee was mustered into Confederate service Captain Palmer was unanimously elected colonel. Palmer, along with his regiment, was captured at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862. Upon his release from Fort Warren, in August 1862, Palmer rejoined his

regiment, which was reorganized at Jackson, Mississippi. Palmer accompanied Breckinridge when the former vice president was transferred from central Mississippi to Middle Tennessee. John C. Breckinridge was born near Lexington, Kentucky, in January 1821. The future Vice President of the United States entered the legal profession, establishing his office in Lexington. During the Mexican War, Breckinridge served as a major in the 3d Kentucky. In 1849 Breckinridge was first elected to the state legislature. Two years later he was elected to the U. S. Congress from the Ashland district. In 1853 he was re-elected. Three years later Breckinridge was chosen Vice President of the United States, the youngest man to ever hold that high office. The Kentuckian was the choice of the Southern Democrats for the Presidency in 1860. On October 8, 1861 Breckinridge issued an address from Bowling Green, Kentucky, resigning from the U. S. Senate, to which he had been recently elected, and proclaiming his devotion to the Confederate cause. Within four weeks Breckinridge had received his commission as a brigadier general in the Rebel army. Following the battle of Shiloh, Breckinridge was promoted to the rank of major general. Roger W. Hanson was another Kentuckian who cast his lot with the South. Hanson entered Confederate service as colonel of the 2d Kentucky Regiment. Like Palmer, Hanson was captured at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862. Following his exchange Hanson was promoted to the rank of brigadier general on December 13, 1862.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 784-785. A lack of ammunition for their two rifled guns forced the men of the Washington Artillery to leave these two pieces behind. Byrne's Kentucky Battery had reached Murfreesboro that very morning.

15 Ibid., 785, 803, 805.

16 Ibid., 785.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 667-668.

19 Ibid., 668, 758-759, 823, 910. Both Robertson's and Semple's batteries were equipped with 12-pounder Napoleons. Wright's Tennessee Battery was armed with four smoothbore field pieces. John A. Wharton entered the Confederate service as a captain in the 8th Texas Cavalry (Terry's Rangers). In the regiment's first brush with the foe at Woodsonville, Kentucky, on December 17, 1861, Colonel B. F. Terry was slain. Shortly thereafter Terry's successor Colonel Thomas S. Lubbock died. The regiment was then reorganized, and Wharton was elected its colonel. Wharton participated in both the battle of Shiloh and the Kentucky Campaign. Following his return from Kentucky, Wharton was promoted to brigadier general on November 18, 1862. William Preston was born near Louisville, Kentucky, on October 16, 1806. The future general received his early education at a Jesuit school located at Bradstown. In 1836 Preston graduated from the Harvard Law School. Following his graduation Preston, in addition to his law practice, entered actively into politics. During the Mexican War, Preston entered Federal service as lieutenant colonel of the 4th Kentucky. With the

termination of that conflict Preston returned to civil life. Until the outbreak of the Civil War, Preston divided his time between his law practice and public service. During Buchanan's administration Preston served as minister to Spain. Casting his lot with the Confederacy, Preston was appointed to serve on the staff of his brother-in-law, General A. S. Johnston, with the rank of colonel. On April 14, 1862 Preston was commissioned a brigadier general. Randall L. Gibson was born at Spring Hill, Kentucky, on September 10, 1832. Gibson spent his youth at Lexington, Kentucky, and on his father's plantation at Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana. In 1853 Gibson graduated from Yale, after which he read law. Gibson entered Confederate service in March 1861, as captain in the 1st Louisiana Artillery. On August 13, 1861 Gibson was commissioned colonel of the 13th Louisiana Infantry.

20 Ibid., 668, 785.

21 Ibid., 796, 812.

22 Ibid., 758-759, 823, 910.

23 Ibid., 576, 582. Cobb's Kentucky Battery was armed with six guns.

24 Ibid., 576, 589-590.

25 Ibid., 576, 582, 803.

26 Ibid., 613, 615.

27 Ibid., 615, 805.

28 Ibid., 576, 615.

29 Ibid., 561.

30 Ibid., 561-562.

31 Ibid., 528, 534, 536, 541. The 90th Ohio was posted on the extreme right of Cruft's battle line, while the 1st Kentucky anchored the brigade's left flank on the river. Charles Cruft, a native of Indiana, had entered Federal service on September 20, 1861 as colonel of the 31st Indiana. Cruft had been promoted to the rank of brigadier general on July 16, 1862.

32 Ibid., 579. John Mendenhall, a native of Indiana, was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy on July 1, 1851. Commissioned a brevet 2d lieutenant in the 1st Dragoons, Mendenhall transferred to the 4th artillery on February 20, 1852. Rising slowly in rank Mendenhall was promoted to captain on July 3, 1861.

33 Ibid., 412, 415. In the terrible fighting on the 31st, Battery G had lost four guns, Battery M, one gun, while one of the 2d Kentucky Battery's guns had been captured and another disabled. Battery M, had carried into action on the 31st two James Rifles and two 12-pounder howitzers.

34 Ibid., 455, 524-525. Parsons, a native of Ohio, had graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in July, 1857. Upon leaving West Point, Parsons was commissioned a 2d lieutenant in the 4th Artillery. Four years later Parsons was advanced to the rank of 1st lieutenant.

35 Ibid., 455, 522-523. Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery had opened the battle of Stones River with six guns - two 12-pounder howitzers and four James Rifles. But in the fighting on the 31st two of the battery's guns had been put out of action. Therefore on the 2d the

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battery had only four servicable guns.

36 Ibid., 408, 434. Negley, a native of Pennsylvania, had served in the Mexican War as a private in the 1st Pennsylvania Infantry. Following President Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers in April 1861, Negley was commissioned a brigadier general in the Pennsylvania Volunteers. In October, Negley was made a brigadier general in the Federal Army. John F. Miller, a Hoosier, had entered Federal service as the colonel of the 29th Indiana Infantry on August 27, 1861. T. R. Stanley, a native of Connecticut and a resident of Ohio at the outbreak of the Civil War, had entered Federal service as colonel of the 18th Ohio.

37 Ibid., 471, 476, 479, 504, 581.

38 Ibid., 455, 521. Battery B was equipped with four James Rifles and two 6-pounder guns.

39 Ibid., 722, 732, 742, 751, 756-757. The following units constituted White's brigade; 7th, 9th, 10th, 41st and 44th Mississippi Infantry Regiments, and 9th Mississippi Sharpshooter Battalion. The Confederate batteries were armed as follows: Carnes' - two bronze 6-pounders and two 12-pounder howitzer; Stanford's - four 3-inch rifles; Smith's - four 12-pounder Napoleons; Robertson's - six 12-pounder Napoleons; Scott's two bronze 6-pounders and two 12-pounder howitzers.

40 Ibid., 757.

41 Ibid., 471, 477.

42 Ibid., 521.

43 Ibid., 479, 504. In addition the 6th Ohio Battery lost 8 horses - five killed and three wounded. On the morning of the 2d Harker's brigade

was deployed as follows: the 64th and 65th Ohio regiments were posted behind a small clump of trees on the 6th Ohio Battery's right; on the battery's left, lying in a skirt of woods, was the 51st Indiana; while the 13th Michigan and 73d Indiana were held in reserve.

44 Ibid., 581.

45 Ibid., 722, 732, 742, 751-753. The casualty in Scott's battery was - Sergeant A. L. Townsend, who was killed.

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THE UNION ARTILLERY AND BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK

Chapter II

BRECKINRIDGE'S ASSAULT

Recrossing Stones River, following his conference with General Bragg, Breckinridge hastened to his headquarters. There the general was joined by Brigadier General Gideon J. Pillow. The newcomer informed Breckinridge, that he had arrived in Murfreesboro earlier in the day. Upon reporting to Bragg, Pillow told Breckinridge, he had been directed to take charge of the hard-fighting brigade, led by Colonel Palmer. With Pillow in command of the brigade, the able Palmer would resume the leadership of his own regiment - the 18th Tennessee. This administrative matter taken care of, Breckinridge turned his attention to regrouping and deploying his division, preparatory for his attack on the Union bridgehead.¹

In accordance with Bragg's directive, Breckinridge proceeded to form his division into double line of battle. The initial line, its approach march partially screened by a dense woods, took position in the timber near the edge of the cornfield. One-half mile away, on the opposite side of the field, the formidable defense line which was occupied by Beatty's bluecoats could readily be distinguished by Breckinridge's rugged skirmishers.

Breckinridge's initial battle line was composed of two brigades - Hanson's on the left, Pillow's on the right.² The Rebels' second line of battle, massed in the woods some 200 yards in rear of the first,

consisting of Gibson's and Preston's brigade. The former officer's unit would support Hanson's brigade, while the latter's bolstered Pillow's.³ Three of the four batteries which were organic to the division (the Washington Artillery, Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion, and Wright's Battery) would participate in the attack. Accordingly, these three units took position immediately in rear of Gibson's and Preston's brigades. The two attached batteries - Robertson's and Semple's (two sections) - were posted in rear of the division artillery. In the projected attack on the Union bridgehead these five batteries would leave their caissons behind. When the advance commenced the cannoners would move forward, taking only their guns and limbers with them. One regiment (the 9th Kentucky) and the division's fourth attached battery (Cobb's) would be left behind to hold strategic Wayne's Hill, when the division moved to the attack. In addition two other attached artillery units - Byrne's Kentucky Battery and a section of Lumsden's Alabama Battery - would be left behind, and not accompany the division during its assault on the Union bridgehead.⁴

While the Confederate units were in the process of moving into their jumping off places Breckinridge and Captain Felix H. Robertson, the officer in charge of the supporting artillery, engaged in an animated discussion. The topic of the two officers' conversation was - What was to be the artillery's role in the projected attack? Breckinridge told the captain, that he thought the attack on the Union bridgehead should be carried out simultaneously by the infantry and artillery.

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Robertson countered with the statement; that he believed it to be Bragg's wish, that the artillery should only move forward after the infantry had crushed the bridgehead. Breckinridge then informed the captain that he desired him to form his "batteries in the space between his two lines of infantry and advance." This Robertson refused to do. The captain observed that undue confusion and loss would be the result of "such an arrangement." Rebuffed the Kentuckian asked the artillerist, if he would consent to advance his batteries in rear of Gibson's and Preston's battle line. In reply Robertson repeated for Breckinridge's benefit the instructions he had received from Bragg, "to wait until the infantry had crowned the crest, and then to rush up and occupy it." Knowing full well the disposition of the infantry commanders to promiscuously use artillery, Robertson proceeded to protest "against crowding a field so contracted as the one in which we were to operate with small guns." The captain emphasized his point by pointing out "that, in case of a repulse, we would inevitably loose some [of the guns] if they were carried on the field." However, Breckinridge thought differently. Therefore the general formed the three batteries, which were permanently assigned to his division, immediately in the rear of his second line of battle. When the order to advance should be given these three batteries would move forward simultaneously with the infantry.⁵

Furthermore, Robertson was deeply perturbed by another development. The captain's ire had been aroused when the artillery, which had accompanied

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Buckner's combat patrol, had opened fire on the Yankees. Robertson felt, with considerable justification, that this shelling had served to direct the Yankees' attention to the sector where the attack was to be made. The artillery officer was afraid that when the Confederates moved forward, they would find the ground across which they would be called upon to advance covered by the Union batteries. Subsequent events were to vindicate Robertson's judgment. As a direct result of this premature bombardment the Federals had emplaced another 18 guns, on the commanding ground lying to the west of McFadden's Ford.⁶

Before launching his attack (which was scheduled for 4 p.m.) Breckinridge, having heard nothing from Wharton and Pegram, and feeling anxious about his right, sent two members of his staff to acquaint the cavalry officers with the situation. The aides soon returned to Breckinridge's headquarters, with the information that they had been unable to contact either Wharton or Pegram. Unable to delay his attack any longer, while seeking to establish liaison with the cavalry, Breckinridge ordered his brigade commanders to alert their men to be ready to move forward on a moment's notice.⁷

At 4 p.m. the signal gun was discharged. And Breckinridge's 4500 combat-ready veterans moved forward at the quick step. The initial assault wave consisting of Hanson's and Pillow's brigades moved to the attack, with their pieces loaded and bayonets fixed. In accordance with Breckinridge's instructions, the troops were prepared to fire one volley and then give the Federals the bayonet. Debouching from the woods the

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butternuts emerged into the cornfield, which fronted Beatty's main line of resistance. Driving the Union skirmishers before them the determined Rebels pressed resolutely forward.⁸

Pillow's troops, on the right of the attacking line, drove to within 300 yards of the bluecoats' main line of resistance before drawing any fire. But when they did Pillow's daughty Tennesseans were somewhat disconcerted to discover, that Beatty's line of battle over lapped their right to a considerable distance. The crack 18th Tennessee - Pillow's right flank unit - was opposed by one regiment (the 35th Indiana) to its immediate front. While at the same time - a second regiment (the 79th Indiana) made a desperate bid to turn the Tennesseans' right. In a successful effort to cope with this potentially dangerous situation Pillow called for artillery support. In response to the general's request, Lieutenant R. W. Anderson brought the four guns of Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion forward at the gallop. Quickly unlimbering their pieces the Georgians commenced to hammer the bluecoats with canister and shell. Hardly had the Rebel guns gone into action before they drew the fire of the 3d Wisconsin Battery's six field pieces. At this time the Badgers' guns were emplaced near the Hoover house.⁹

Breckinridge had also taken cognizance of the situation. The general was quite distressed to note that the Federals' main line of resistance overlapped his line of battle. Therefore he ordered his chief of artillery - Major Rice E. Graves - to send a battery to Pillow's

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support. Graves immediately issued instructions for Captain E. Eldridge Wright, to bolster Pillow's attack with his four gun Tennessee battery. Immediately after the battery emerged from the woods, a projectile struck the lead horse on one of the 6-pounder gun teams in the head, killing the beast. Before the driver could stop the team, the carriage crashed against the dead horse and the pole was broken. Due to this accident the cannoneers of Wright's battery were only able to put three guns into action, until after repairs to the 6-pounder were effected. Unlimbering their three remaining pieces adjacent to the 14th Georgia's guns, Wright's men opened fire. The Tennesseans' divided their attention between the guns of the 3d Wisconsin Battery and the Union infantry.¹⁰

When his men drove forward into the cornfield General Hanson observed that a possible dangerous situation was developing. The general was distressed to note that as a result of the configuration of the terrain and enthusiasm of his troops; that his right flank regiments and Pillow's left flank units had become intermingled. So restricted and confined was the ground over which the "Orphan" brigade attacked, that on Hanson's left the 2d Kentucky was crowded out of position. Major James W. Hewitt, the 2d Kentucky's commander, quickly took account of this development. He immediately formed his regiment into a column of fours. The regiment then pushed forward, moving closely in rear of the 6th Kentucky.¹¹

The lay of the land enabled the "Orphan" brigade to close to within 150 yards of the right flank of Price's line of battle, which was posted

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behind a rail fence, before the men were exposed to the foe's small-arms fire. In accordance with Breckinridge's instructions, the officers of the "Orphan" brigade ordered their men to halt. The troops then brought their weapons to the shoulder, and sent one volley crashing into the bluecoats' massed ranks. Once they had discharged their pieces the butternuts let loose with a terrible yell, and surged toward the Yankees - their bayonets flashing in the cold winter's air.¹²

Breckinridge's second line of battle had moved forward, some 200 yards in rear of the first. As soon as Preston's brigade (on the extreme right) had debouched into the cornfield, the troops came under the foe's artillery fire. In addition to the sporadic fire of the 3d Wisconsin Battery, Preston's troops felt the effect of the projectiles discharged by the six batteries, emplaced on the commanding ground west of McFadden's Ford. Then to make matters worse, the Union infantry commenced to rip Pillow's line of battle with musketry. In hopes of partially nullifying the effect of the small-arms fire Preston ordered his men to lie down. For the next several minutes the troops hugged the ground, while the minie balls whistled around them "thick and loud."¹³

On Preston's left, Gibson's initial battle line (the two consolidated Louisiana regiments) drove forward in support of Hanson's command. When the "Orphan" brigade suddenly halted, preparatory to delivering its volley, Gibson ordered his men to hit the ground. This the Louisianians readily did. The troops seeking cover where ever the configuration of the ground would permit. Already the brigade was exposed

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to a scathing fire from the Union batteries emplaced on the west side of the river. Then to make matters worse, Union sharpshooters, posted in the woods on the opposite side of Stones River, began to snipe at the Louisianians. But unlike the artillery the sharpshooters were within easy range of the Louisianians' deadly rifled-muskets. Opening fire Gibson's men quickly scattered the Federal marksmen.

While this sharp little fire fight was taking place, Gibson rode forward to consult with General Hanson. The Louisianian wished to find out from Hanson, if he was ready for him to commit his unit.

Two of Gibson's units - the 32d Alabama Regiment and the 14th Louisiana Battalion had not accompanied the brigade when it took up the advance. These two organizations, along with Eyrne's Kentucky Battery and a section of Lumsden's unit, would constitute the division's strategic reserve.¹⁴

Even before the Confederates had closed with Beatty's main line of resistance, Breckinridge had been forced to call for artillery support. Accordingly, Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery and Wright's Tennessee Battery had been sent to bolster Pillow's attack. Only one of the three batteries - the Washington Artillery - which was organic to Breckinridge's division still remained uncommitted.¹⁵

Upon debouching into the cornfield Robertson halted the reserve artillery. Robertson decided not to advance his ten guns a yard farther, until after the greyclad infantry had caved in Beatty's main line of resistance. Only after the foot soldiers had cleared the foe

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from the commanding ground east of the ford, would Robertson commit the reserve artillery.¹⁶

Breckinridge's assaulting infantry also received artillery support from a number of other Confederate batteries. These units belonging to Polk's corps had taken position on the west side of Stones River. At 4 p.m. the four batteries (Carnes', Scott's, Stanford's and Smith's) that were emplaced northwest of the ruins of the Cowan house opened fire. The Rebel cannoneers divided their attention between Beatty's main line of resistance and the six Union batteries, which were concentrated on the ridge to the west of McFadden's Ford. The extreme range which separated the smoothbored Rebel field pieces from their targets, served to limit the bombardment's effectiveness to a marked degree. Observing that their rounds were consistently falling short, the cannoneers of Scott's Battery (the most distant of the Rebel units) ceased firing. Counter-battery fire from the Federals' long-ranged rifled artillery, soon helped to neutralize the fire of the other three Confederate batteries.¹⁷

When Breckinridge's troops emerged from the woods into the cornfield, they immediately made contact with Price's outposts. Unable to even slow, let alone delay the powerful Rebel battle line, the Union skirmishers quickly took to their heels. On sighting the on rushing enemy the commanders of the 51st Ohio, 8th Kentucky, 35th and 79th Indiana Regiments, ordered their men to lie down and fix bayonets. The troops were admonished not to fire until the regimental commanders gave the word. As the gasping and panting skirmishers came dashing up the

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hill, they fell into line with their respective regiments. All this time the Federal infantrymen were being hammered unmercifully, by the Rebel artillery emplaced to the northwest of the Cowan house ruins.¹⁸

The 51st Ohio and 8th Kentucky, the two units holding the right of Price's battle line, were partially sheltered by a slight depression in the ground. When Hanson's greyclads had approached to within 150 yards of the Buckeyes and Kentuckians, they were seen to halt. After firing one volley the men of the "Orphan" brigade let loose what Colonel McClain, of the 51st Ohio, long remembered as "a most hideous yell, and charged upon us in two lines of battle, closed in mass, while their skirmishers rallied to their left." Not until Hanson's men had driven to within 60 yards did the Union officers give "the command to rise and fire." As far as halting Hanson's onslaught, the Yankees' volley proved about as effective as stopping a herd of bull elephants with pea-shooters. Before the bluecoats could reload, the grim-soldiers of the "Orphan" brigade were upon them. A short but desperate hand-to-hand struggle ensued. From this engagement the hard-fighting men of the "Orphan" brigade emerged victorious. The men of the 51st Ohio and 8th Kentucky were seen to bolt for the rear, with Hanson's eager veterans in hot pursuit.¹⁹

While the troops of the 51st Ohio and 8th Kentucky met the men of the "Orphan" brigade in bloody combat on the right of Price's line, Pillow's rugged Tennesseans closed in on the sector of the Union line held by the 35th Indiana. Shouting fiercely Pillow's soldiers moved

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rapidly forward, their rifles at the trail. Colonel Bernard F. Mullen, of the 35th Indiana, deemed it best to permit the foe to close to within 30 or 40 paces of his line, before giving his men the word to open fire! Colonel Frederick Knefler, of the 79th Indiana, the unit holding the sector of the Union line on the 35th Indiana's left, concurred in Mullen's decision and so informed his men. Observing that the 79th Indiana's battle line overlapping the 18th Tennessee's right flank, Pillow had called for artillery support. While the cannoneers of Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery and Wright's Tennessee Battery raked the 79th Indiana's ranks with canister and shell, Pillow's brigade moved against the 35th Indiana.²⁰

When Pillow's Tennesseers had closed to within less than 100 yards, Colonel Mullen bellowed out the order "to rise and fire." With a deafening cheer the men of the 35th Indiana gallantly carried out the colonel's order. A deadly plunging volley served to stagger Pillow's brigade. Before the Rebels could recover their poise, the men of the 35th Indiana had reloaded their pieces and commenced a well-aimed and telling "file fire."

In an effort to break the back of the 35th Indiana's stubborn resistance, Pillow found it necessary to call for artillery support. Accordingly, the crews manning several of the guns assigned to Battery G and Wright's battery shifted targets. The Georgia and Tennessee artillerists immediately commenced to rake the 35th Indiana's lines with canister and shell. Due to their close proximity to their targets

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the Confederate gunners were forced to concentrate their fire on the Hoosiers' left flank and rear. After about 10 minutes of murderous combat with Pillow's Tennesseans, Colonel Mullen noted that the regiments to his right (the 8th Kentucky and 51st Ohio), and the unit to his left (the 79th Indiana) had commenced to fade away. Therefore Mullen sent an aide scurrying to the rear. The messenger's mission was to urge the men of the 99th Ohio to come to the fighting Hoosiers' support. This the Ohioans refused to do. Apparently undaunted by this refusal Mullen made a second request for help. The second runner soon returned with the news that the 99th Ohio had departed "from the field."²¹

By the time that the second courier had reported back to Colonel Mullen, the 8th Kentucky and 51st Ohio had been overwhelmed by the "Orphan" brigade. Fearful that this Rebel breakthrough on his right would doom his regiment to capture en masse if it remained where it was, Mullen gave the order to retire. It seems that even then many of the hard-fighting Hoosiers were reluctant to break contact with the foe. Therefore the colonel was obliged to repeat the order. Even then many of the Indianians refused to retire, and these men were left behind to be slain or captured.²²

Upon the retreat of Colonel Mullen's regiment, the 79th Indiana's right flank was left resting in the air. Previously the regiment had held its own in the face of both artillery and small-arms fire. The Hoosiers had exchanged volley after volley with the rugged infantrymen, of Colonel Palmer's 18th Tennessee. But with the collapse of the units

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on its right, the men of the regiment were confronted with two rather unpleasant alternatives. Either they could remain where they were and face annihilation or they could seek safety in flight. Choosing the latter the Hoosiers headed for the rear, with the victorious Tennesseans in hot pursuit.²³

It had been Colonel Price's intention to use the 21st Kentucky and 99th Ohio to either shore up or cover the retreat of his initial line of battle. When Price observed that the 51st Ohio and 8th Kentucky had started to give way, he ordered the commanders of his two reserve regiments to cover their retreat. But the ranks of the 21st Kentucky and 99th Ohio were quickly thrown into confusion, when the fleeing soldiers passed through them. After getting off only a few scattered and poorly aimed volleys the two reserve regiments gave way.²⁴

The officers of Grider's brigade, which constituted Beatty's reserve and was posted in the hollow east of McFadden's Ford, felt as the day grew to a close, that the Rebels had undoubtedly decided to postpone their attack until daybreak on the 3d. Thus when the attack finally came it took both the rank and file of Grider's unit somewhat by surprise. But the troops were veterans, therefore the officers experienced little difficulty in getting them to take arms (the arms had previously been stacked). The brigade was then hastily formed into line of battle - the 19th Ohio on the right, the 9th Kentucky in the center, and the 11th Kentucky on the left.²⁵

General Beatty, learning that Price's brigade had started to

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give way, called for a member of his staff-Lieutenant T. F. Murdock. The lieutenant was sent galloping forward with instructions for Grider's brigade to move to the attack. Grider immediately prepared to implement his division commander's order. This the colonel did even though "it was almost manifest, from the character of the fire in front, that the force we had on ground, unassisted as we at the moment were by artillery, could not check the enemy's advance." Apparently undaunted by the desperate situation Grider's troops, led on by their officers, moved resolutely forward.²⁶

On the right the men of the 19th Ohio, as they advanced up a gradual slope, encountered Price's panic stricken men making for the ford as rapidly as their legs would carry them. The regiment's officers shouted encouragement to their men as the fugitives broke through their ranks. This served to steady the Buckeyes. Close on the heels of the fleeing bluecoats came the victorious men of the "Ophan" brigade. Once Price's retreating troops had passed through their ranks, the Buckeyes opened fire on the on rushing Rebels.

The men of the 9th Kentucky, the unit on the Ohioans' left, had to work their way through a dense growth of briars and underbrush in order to reach the crest of the ridge. These natural hazards served to greatly disorganize and throw into confusion the regiment's battle line. On reaching the crest of the ridge the Kentuckians likewise encountered Price's "troops retreating in great confusion." The regiment's commander - Lieutenant Colonel George H. Cram noted: "Nothing could

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be more discouraging to my men than the aspect of affairs at that time, but they never faltered. I allowed the retreating mass to pass through my lines, the enemy all the time pouring into us a destructive fire, both infantry and artillery." After the refugees had passed through their formation, the officers had the Kentucky infantrymen dress their lines. By the time that the blueclads had closed their ranks, Pillow's hard-charging Tennesseans were upon them. The bluecoats and Rebels immediately commenced to exchange volleys.

Like their comrades-in-arms in the two units on their right, the men of the 11th Kentucky had moved eagerly forward. Taking position on the ridge's crest the Kentuckians opened fire on the advancing Rebels.²⁷

Colonel Grider established his command post in the interval between the 19th Ohio and 9th Kentucky. The colonel was encouraged to observe that the volleys delivered by his brigade seemed to have materially slowed the pace of the Confederates' advance. Grider, in a jubilant frame of mind, remarked to Beatty, who had just joined him, "Colonel, we have them checked; give us artillery and we will whip them." Beatty replied, "You shall have it."²⁸

Having crushed the two regiments (the 51st Ohio and 8th Kentucky) charged with the mission of defending the right flank of Price's main line of resistance, the "Orphan" brigade drove resolutely forward. Price's two reserve units (the 21st Kentucky and 99th Ohio) were easily brushed aside by Hanson's hardy infantrymen. After the brigade had dealt with Price's bluecoats Colonel Joseph H. Lewis, of the 6th Kentucky, discovered that his regiment (like the 2d Kentucky) had been

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squeezed out of position. The combative colonel realized that this left but two courses of action open to him. He could either follow along closely in the brigade's wake, or he could move his unit by the right flank along the river bank. Lewis unhesitatingly decided in favor of the second of these alternatives. Trailed by a detachment of the 2d Kentucky, Lewis' regiment fell in and moved forward in column of fours.²⁹

Meanwhile the remainder of the "Orphan" brigade (the 4th Kentucky, 41st Alabama, and a detachment of the 2d Kentucky) had collided head on with the 19th Ohio. The Buckeyes proved a tough nut for the reduced brigade to crack. Their well aimed volleys checked, for the moment at least, the "Orphan" brigade's surge toward the ford. In the fierce fighting which ensued General Hanson was mortally wounded. However, by this time the units constituting the "Orphan" brigade had become badly intermingled. Therefore considerable valuable time was lost before the ranking regimental commander - Colonel Robert P. Trabue could be located.³⁰

Just before Hanson had been struck down, Colonel Gibson reached the front. Gibson had come forward with the intention of conferring with Hanson. The colonel desired to obtain the general's opinion as to when he should commit his brigade. But before Hanson could express himself on the subject, he had received his death wound. Gibson noted that the Yankees (of the 19th Ohio) seemed to be more than holding their own against the "Orphan" brigade. The Louisiana colonel decided that

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it might be for the best if he committed his two regiments. Accordingly, the 13th and 20th Louisiana Consolidated, commanded by Major Emile P. Guillet, came forward on the double. The Louisianians moved to the front in column of fours. Reaching the area where the "Orphan" brigade and the 19th Ohio were locked in bloody combat, Guillet deployed his brigade into line of battle. Pressing eagerly forward the Louisianians moved to the attack. During its advance Guillet's regiment had suffered severely from the fire of the Union artillery posted on the west side of the river.³¹

Colonel Gibson had originally intended for the 16th and 25th Louisiana Consolidated to also reinforce the "Orphan" brigade. A staff officer was sent to relay this order to Major Francis C. Zacharie, the regiment's commander. Either the aide or Zacharie did not correctly interpret Gibson's order. For instead of advancing in support of Guillet's unit, Zacharie's regiment moved forward along the river bank, close on the heels of Lewis' combat team.³²

Following the collapse of the 35th and 79th Indiana, Pillow's brigade swept forward. Colonel Palmer, of the 18th Tennessee, described the pursuit in succinct terms: "The Federals fled in utter confusion and disorder, leaving an immense number of their dead and wounded in their rear.... In the rout hundreds of them fell (reversing the position of the poet) with their faces (not their backs) upon the field." The 3d Wisconsin Battery having been forced to retire - Wright's Tennessee Battery and Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battery limbered up their pieces. The cannoneers accompanied Pillow's infantry when it

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resume the advance. However, the brigade's forward progress quickly ground to an almost halt. The reason being that the greyclads had sighted two of Grider's regiments (the 9th and 11th Kentucky) massed directly across their line of advance. A savage fire fight between the opposing battle lines in blue and grey immediately erupted.³³

Preston's brigade now moved forward to take up the attack. In accordance with instructions from Preston, the regimental commanders bellowed out the order, "Up and to the charge." The soldiers responded to this order most heartily. After crossing the cornfield the brigade entered the woods. The dense underbrush and timber served to break the brigade's battle line into fragments. To enable his subordinates to better control their organizations, Preston permitted them to move their individual units forward by the right flank. Upon coming up with Pillow's brigade Preston found that the Tennesseans had been stalled by the stubborn resistance being offered by the 9th and 11th Kentucky. Once he had made a hurried estimate of the situation, Preston directed his regimental commanders to again deploy their men into line of battle. The brigade then moved forward to bolster Pillow's badly used up command.³⁴

Long before Beatty could make good on his promise to send artillery to reinforce Grider's hard-fighting troops, the situation had changed drastically for the worse. Almost immediately after the division commander had made his promise, Grider noticed that his right flank regiment - the 19th Ohio had commenced to melt away. Not only were the

Buckeyes being hard pressed in front by the "Orphan" brigade, reinforced by the 13th and 20th Louisiana Consolidated, but Lewis' combat team had suddenly turned their right flank. Exposed to a terrible flanking fire from Lewis' men, the 19th Ohio's right flank had eroded away file by file. Galloping up on a sweat lathered horse, Grider called to the 19th's commander Major Charles F. Manderson, "Major, the 9th [Kentucky] is still standing; let us rally the 19th and sustain her." Manderson replied, "We are flanked on our right; we had better fall back and rally at the foot of the hill, if we can." Grider immediately gave his sanction to the major's urgent request. The colonel then hastened to the left. Grider's mission being to inform the commanders of the 9th and 11th Kentucky that they should give their men the word to fall back.³⁵

Until the collapse of the 19th Ohio, the 9th and 11th Kentucky regiments had held their own in the face of determined attacks by Pillow's and Preston's brigades. It was reported by the bluecoats that one of the attacking Rebel units had lost three color bearers. However, the retreat of the 19th Ohio permitted the men of the "Orphan" brigade and Guillet's unit to turn the 9th Kentucky's right flank. Taking cognizance of this dangerous situation Colonel Cram bellowed out instructions for his men to retreat. When the 9th Kentucky commenced to retire the 11th Kentucky likewise gave way. These two regiments had started to retire prior to Grider's arrival on the scene.³⁶

Closely pressed by the Rebels, Grider's troops retired from the

field. Several times during the course of the retreat they halted to fire an occasional volley at their pursurers. Once or twice during their fighting retreat the Federal units came dangerously close to panicking. But each time the Union officers succeeded in rallying their men. Covered by Grider's holding action most of the survivors of Price's shattered brigade succeeded in escaping across the river at McFadden's Ford. Once Grider's troops had reached the ford, they crossed to the west side of the river. After Grider's and Price's troops had reached the river's west bank, they took position on the ridge immediately behind Cruft's brigade. Here their officers finally succeeded in rallying and reorganizing their units.³⁷

The attack of Buckner's combat patrol on Price's outposts had served to alarm Colonel Fyffe, whose brigade held the left flank of Beatty's main line of resistance. Upon ascertaining that Buckner's patrol was strongly supported by artillery, Fyffe decided it might be wise to order up his two reserve regiments - the 58th Ohio and 86th Indiana. The latter unit took position behind a rail fence, on the opposite side of the lane from the other units of the brigade. Company A, 59th Ohio, was deployed as skirmishers on the Hoosiers' left. This company connected the left flank of Fyffe's brigade with Grose's right. The remainder of the 59th Ohio was deployed as skirmishers, and thrown forward to cover Fyffe's line of battle.³⁸

General Beatty on visiting the front gave his stamp of approval to Fyffe's dispositions. The division commander told Fyffe that, "in

case we were compelled to fall back, we should do so through the low ground [located near the Hoover house]." Leaving Lieutenant Colonel William Howard, his ranking regimental commander in charge of the brigade, Fyffe accompanied Beatty to the rear. The colonel's purpose being to examine the proposed line of retreat. Near the ford the two officers were joined by General Rosecrans. While the three officers were engaged in discussing the tactical situation, a messenger galloped up and reported "a large force [of Rebels] was being massed in front of our lines." The meeting abruptly adjourned and the three officers headed for their respective headquarters.

Before he was able to reach the front Fyffe encountered the 59th Ohio's adjutant. The staff officer excitedly told the brigade commander "the enemy were in motion, advancing on our front. Sixteen regimental flags had been counted in one column." Sending an aide to report these facts to General Rosecrans, Fyffe rode on ahead. Enroute to the front the colonel passed along the front held by Company A, 59th Ohio, and the 86th Indiana. As he did so, the colonel directed these two units to strengthen their position with fence rails.³⁹

By the time that Fyffe had reached his brigade Hanson's and Pillow's Rebels had closed with Price's brigade. Only Fyffe's right flank regiment - the 44th Indiana - was close enough to give fire support to Price's hard-pressed men. When Pillow's greyclads moved against the 79th and 35th Indiana, the soldiers of the 44th Indiana opened an oblique fire on the Tennesseans' right flank. Once the two Indiana regiments had given way the 44th's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Simeon

C. Aldrich, fearful that the Rebels would move against him, refused his right flank. In their new position the men of the 44th Indiana were partially sheltered by a rail fence.⁴⁰

When the Confederates' initial battle line (Pillow's and Hanson's brigades) had passed beyond his right flank, Fyffe directed his regimental commanders to wheel their units to the right. The Union brigade commander planned to take the Southerners in their exposed right flank. However, before the bluecoats could carry out this plan - Preston's and Gibson's brigades had moved to the attack. By this time Price's second line (the 21st Kentucky and 99th Ohio) had collapsed. Fyffe was forced to make a revised estimate of the situation. The colonel was disconcerted to note that his right flank was resting in the air, and, furthermore, the foe was closer to McFadden's Ford than his brigade. Accordingly, Fyffe gave the order to retreat. Falling back "through the low ground" the brigade began to rapidly fall to pieces. By the time the unit reached the high ground near the Hoover house, it was in a highly disorganized condition.

During the course of the retreat Fyffe was disabled, when he was thrown from his horse. Once the men had reached the Hoover house, where Grose's brigade had taken position, the officers commenced to rally and reorganize their respective units. Colonel Howard assumed command of the brigade pending Fyffe's recovery.⁴¹

Since Grose's brigade was charged with the defense of the left flank of the Union bridgehead, it completely escaped the initial shock

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of the Rebel attack. Up until the retreat of Fyffe's brigade, Grose's troops were exposed to nothing worse than the sporadic shelling of the greyclads' artillery. But with the collapse of Price's brigade, and the retreat of Fyffe's unit, a portion of Grose's line was rendered untenable.

Evidently at least one of Fyffe's regiments had panicked during the retreat. When the 59th Ohio started for the rear, the officers quickly lost control of their men. The frightened Buckeyes came pouring through the 23d Kentucky's ranks. A number of the Ohioans even running over some of the Kentuckians, who were lying behind a rail fence. Colonel Grose now arrived on the scene. The colonel quickly observed that Fyffe's retreat had left the flanks of his two advance regiments (the 23d Kentucky and 24th Ohio) hanging in the air. Therefore the able brigade commander ordered these two units to pivot to the right. Hardly had the two regiments taken this new position facing south; than they were exposed to a raking fire delivered by the gunners of Wright's Tennessee Battery and Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery.⁴²

Following the retreat of Grider's brigade - the crack 20th Tennessee, of Preston's brigade, swung to the right. The Tennesseans objective - to crush the 23d Kentucky and 24th Ohio. The Rebels were able to catch the 23d Kentucky in a deadly cross-fire. Major Thomas H. Hamrich sought to withdraw his regiment before it was too late. Just as the Kentuckians started to move to the rear, the cry went up, "We are surrounded." With these words the regiment degenerated into little

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more than an armed mob. Not until the Kentuckians had reached the area in rear of the Hoover house, did the officers succeed in restoring some semblance of order to the panic-stricken unit. When Hamrick finally rallied his regiment it took position in the woods north of the Hoover house. The 24th Ohio, its commanding officer slain, was also forced to give way in confusion before the 20th Tennessee's advance. Like the Kentuckians the Ohioans sought shelter west of the Hoover house.⁴³

A third regiment drawn from Grose's brigade - the 36th Indiana - occupied the ground on the 24th Ohio's left. However, Grose succeeded in withdrawing the 36th Indiana before the Rebels' onslaught. The Hoosiers were immediately put into position on the 6th Ohio's left. From left to right Grose's reformed main line of resistance was held by the 36th Indiana, 6th Ohio, and 84th Illinois. Only these three sturdy regiments stood between the victorious Rebels and the disorganized units consisting of Fyffe's brigade and the 23d Kentucky and 24th Ohio. Covered by these three regiments the officers of the routed regiments sought to rally and regroup their badly shaken units.⁴⁴

When the Rebel battle line first hove into view, the cannoneers manning the six guns of the 3d Wisconsin Battery had opened fire. In spite of the vigorous counter-battery fire delivered by Wright's and Anderson's gunners, the Badgers grimly held their ground. When Lieutenant Livingston observed that Price's brigade had fallen to pieces, he sent his caissons across the river. Shortly thereafter when it became apparent that the Federals would not be able to stop the Rebel drive

short of the river, Livingston sent one section at a time across the river. The cannoneers continued to work the pieces that remained east of the stream until the final two guns were withdrawn. Just as the last section reached the ford, Lewis' combat team came dashing forward. Approaching to within 100 yards of the retreating artillerymen, the greyclads halted and delivered one galling volley. Many of the horses used to pull the two pieces were cut down. But the gunners responded to the emergency. They quickly cut the dead and injured beasts from the traces. Covered by the fire of Cruft's supporting infantry, the determined artillerymen succeeded in reaching the river's west bank, with the section's two pieces. Once his six guns had gained the commanding ground on the opposite side of the river, Livingston ordered his gunners to again open fire on the advancing buttermuts.⁴⁵

Immediately after they had forced Grider's brigade to give way, the Confederates found themselves exposed to a murderous fire from the Union artillery massed on the ridge west of McFadden's Ford. To make matters worse the foe's artillery was supported by a swarm of blueclad infantry (Cruft's and Negley's troops). Since the buttermuts were well within range of the Yankees' rifled-muskets, they suffered considerably from the enemy's small-arms fire. In addition two six gun Union batteries (the 6th Ohio and 26th Pennsylvania) emplaced near the railroad, had opened a deadly enfilade fire on the attacking buttermuts' left flank. Furthermore, there were still two Union brigades (Grose's and Fyffe's) holed up east of the river. The Rebel brass now determined

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to concentrate their attention on these two units. At the same time patrols would be sent out to mop up the scattered remnants of Price's and Grider's commands, which had been unable to escape across the river.

It required practically no effort at all on the Confederates' part to secure the retreat of Fyffe's brigade. Immediately after the Rebels had bludgeoned their way through Price's brigade, Fyffe's troops had commenced to pull back. However, the retreat quickly degenerated into a rout. By the time that Fyffe's brigade reached the Hoover house the troops' combat efficiency had been sapped to a very marked degree. However, Grose's two advanced regiments - the 23d Kentucky and 24th Ohio - were made of a sterner stuff. It required a sharp little thrust on the part of the 20th Tennessee to dislodge these two units. Mission accomplished - the Southerners prepared to move against the three regiments, of Grose's brigade, which were formed into line of battle near the Hoover house.

On the Rebels' extreme left Lewis' combat team (the 6th Kentucky and a detachment of the 2d Kentucky), closely followed by the 16th Louisiana Consolidated, reached McFadden's Ford. So rapid was Lewis' advance that his men reached the ford close on the heels of the retreating Yankees. Before Lewis could stop them a number of the men belonging to his combat team, accompanied by the Louisianians, had surged across the river. Taking position behind a picket fence on the river's left bank these butternuts blasted away at the retreating blue-coats. Lewis, accompanied by the remainder of his combat team, had

remained on the east side of the river. Lewis found his position most difficult. For his force was exposed to the small-arms fire of friend and foe alike. Fortunately, however, Lewis' combat patrol and the Louisianians were partially in defilade. Therefore they suffered very little from the terrible fire which belched forth from the massed Union artillery. Lewis' first task, which he carried out in the face of considerable difficulty, was to get his comrades-in-arms, who were posted on the ridge east of the ford, to cease firing on his men. Once this had been accomplished Lewis sighted a number of bluecoats. These unhappy individuals had sought shelter behind the river bank. Lewis noted that these bluecoats were waving their handkerchiefs in token of surrender. The colonel, after ordering his men to cease firing, sent a patrol creeping forward to bring in the Yankees. After the patrol had rounded up the Unionists - the 100 odd beragglled prisoners were escorted to the rear. While this operation was being carried out Lewis observed, much to his consternation, that the Federals were massing their forces. The hard-bitten colonel realized that this could mean but one thing - a counter-attack would soon be coming his way.⁴⁶

Once they had driven the 19th Ohio from its position on the crest of the ridge east of the ford, the men of the "Orphan" brigade and the 13th Louisiana Consolidated found themselves in a highly unpleasant situation. For they were exposed to the full fury of the fire delivered by the Union artillery massed on the commanding ground west of the river. In addition the Rebels suffered severely from the small-arms

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fire of Cruft's and Negley's infantry. These two units being deployed in support of the artillery concentration. The long-ranged fire delivered by the two Union batteries emplaced near the railroad also swept through the ranks of Tarbue's and Gibson's battered commands. Unable to advance any further in the face of this terrible fire, most of the troops laid down. These men then opened fire on their tormentors. Thus the two brigades forward progress had been checked. The troops had been effectively pinned down, by the terrific fire power displayed by the Army of the Cumberland.⁴⁶ Besides the men being struck down by this storm of metal, the Confederate ranks were further reduced, as a number of the feint-hearted commenced to slip to the rear.⁴⁷

In the mopping up operations, which followed the retreat of the 9th and 11th Kentucky, the men of the 28th Tennessee captured the colors belonging to the former regiment. One of Pillow's regimental commanders tersely described the situation at this stage of the attack:

It is proper to remark that the entire Federal Force on the right bank of the river were completely routed and driven by our division either across or down the stream; but they had massed a force of many thousands on the opposite (left) bank, where they had a large quantity of artillery, so located and arranged as that both their small-arms and batteries could be brought to bear upon and most dreadfully rake all the western portion of the field over which their troops had been driven.

The men of Pillow's brigade quickly discovered that it was all but suicidal to attempt to cross this beaten zone.⁴⁸

When Preston's brigade had moved to Pillow's support, the Kentuckian's

right flank regiment - the 20th Tennessee - found itself exposed to a "heavy and well-directed fire." This musketry originated with the men of the 23d Kentucky and 24th Ohio. At the time that they came under this attack, the Tennesseesans were passing through an open field. Seeing that there was no cover readily available the regimental commander-Colonel Thomas B. Smith - bellowed out the command, to charge! At this order from their able colonel, the men of the 20th Tennessee surged eagerly forward, their bayonets flashing in the cold winter air. In the savage onslaught which ensued, Colonel Smith was badly wounded. Undaunted by the loss of the popular colonel, the Tennesseesans drove their attack home. In the fierce contest which quickly developed the two Union units were routed - leaving some 200 prisoners in the Tennesseesans' hands. The Union officers were unable to stop their panic-stricken men until they had passed beyond the Hoover house.⁴⁹

Following the 20th Tennessee's spectacular success, Preston's brigade prepared to move against the three regiments of Grose's brigade, which covered the Union position at the Hoover house. General Preston tersely described the tactical situation at this time:

The enemy then rapidly concentrated large numbers of fresh troops on the other side of the river, and poured upon our dense ranks a withering fire of musketry and artillery. Our lines, originally very close in the order of advance, were commingled near the river, and this new fire from an overwhelming force from the opposite banks of the stream threw them into disorder.⁵⁰

Once his infantry had evicted Grider's brigade from the crest of the ridge, Breckinridge ordered his artillery into action. The

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general hoped that his cannoneers would be able to neutralize the fire of the Union guns, which were massed on the opposite side of the river. Putting the spurs to their horses the artillerists of the crack Washington Artillery came forward at the gallop. Reaching the crest of the ridge the gunners quickly unlimbered their four pieces. They then opened a fierce fire on the foe. . Wright's Tennessee Battery and Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion had already moved forward, close on the heels of Pillow's and Preston's advancing infantry. Under the ever watchful eye of Major Rice E. Graves, Breckinridge's Chief of Artillery, the cannoneers assigned to these two batteries put their eight guns into action to the right of the Washington Artillery's pieces. After several minutes of heavy firing Graves shifted Wright's battery further to the right.⁵¹

Captain Robertson now deemed that the time was ripe to commit a portion of the reserve artillery. Robertson called for Lieutenant E. J. Fitzpatrick. He directed the lieutenant to take the four 12-pounder Napoleons belonging to Semple's Battery, and move to the infantry's support. At a word from Fitzpatrick the battery started forward. Gaining the crest of the ridge the Alabamans unlimbered their pieces. Once their guns had been placed in battery Semple's men commenced to hammer away at the Federal pieces emplaced on the other side of the river. Robertson next sent a section of Napoleons, manned by the men of his battery, to the front. However, before Robertson was able to commit the reserve artillery's remaining four pieces, the tide of battle

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had turned sharply against the Confederates.⁵²

Having received no intelligence of the projected attack, Breckinridge's onslaught took the cavalry officers completely by surprise. However, the combative Wharton quickly collected a small force with which to support the attacking infantry. Accompanied by three companies of the 8th Texas Cavalry and Huwald's Tennessee Battery, Wharton and Pegram hurried to the front. Wharton reached the front shortly after Breckinridge's greyclads had sent Grider's brigade fleeing across the river. Huwald's battery was hurriedly emplaced on a commanding knoll, 500 yards east of the Hoover house. Learning that Pegram had forbidden the cannoneers to open fire, for fear that they would hit their own men, Wharton took personal command of the battery. Opening fire on Grose's line of battle, the artillerists quickly cut down a color bearer, and threw the Union battle line into some confusion.⁵³

When Breckinridge's attack commenced, General Crittenden and Captain Mendenhall were riding along the Nashville pike. Harking to the roar of battle the two officers instantly wheeled their horse about. And followed by Crittenden's staff, they headed for the commanding ground overlooking McFadden's Ford at a full gallop. Upon reaching the ridge a quick glance enabled the two officers to make an estimate of the situation. For it was all too apparent that Beatty's troops had already started to give way before the on rushing Confederates. Turning to his chief of artillery, Crittenden said, "Now, Mendenhall, you must cover my men with your cannon." Up until this time only one

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of the six battery (the 7th Indiana) massed to the west of the ford had gone into action.⁵⁴

Accordingly, Mendenhall rode a few yards to his right. At that point the gunners of Batteries H and K, 4th U. S. Artillery had emplaced their eight guns. Summoning Lieutenant Parsons to his side, Mendenhall told him, "to move a little forward and open with his guns." Having given the reliable Parsons this order the captain hastened toward the railroad. Mendenhall's purpose - to order the 8th Indiana Battery up from the reserve. While engaged in carrying out this mission Mendenhall encountered the Pioneer Brigade moving forward on the double.⁵⁵

When the Rebel attack had jumped off the Pioneer Brigade, along with its attached artillery (the Chicago Board of Trade Battery), was being held in reserve north of the railroad. Shortly thereafter General Rosecrans rode up. Approaching Brigadier General James S. Morton, the brigade commander, the general directed him, to reinforce the troops holding the army's left near McFadden's Ford. Upon encountering Mendenhall, Morton asked the artillery officer for additional information concerning the tactical situation. Mendenhall told Morton "to move briskly forward with his brigade, and send his battery to the crest of the hill, near the batteries already engaged." The two officers then parted company, each eagerly intent on carrying out his assignment.⁵⁶

While hurrying to the front the Pioneers found that their forward progress was hampered considerably by the frightened men of Price's and

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Grider's brigades, who had fled across the river. Upon reaching the commanding ground west of the ford, the brigade took position on the left of Negley's division. The Pioneer Brigade anchored its left flank on the river. General Morton ordered the Board of Trade Battery to take position on the military crest of the ridge, a short distance to the left of the 2d Kentucky Battery.⁵⁷

Upon reaching the staging area occupied by the 8th Indiana Battery, Mendenhall directed Lieutenant Estep to move his battery to the left. Limbering up their six pieces the Hoosiers hit the road. Arriving in the vicinity of the ford the Indianians emplaced their six guns on the right of the terrain, occupied by the four guns of Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery.⁵⁸

Once the 8th Indiana Battery had gone into action, the omnipresent Mendenhall determined to see what the 26th Pennsylvania and 6th Ohio Batteries were doing.

The captain thought that it might be a good idea if those two units shifted targets, and concentrated their fire on Breckinridge's attacking legions. When the captain rode up to the 26th Pennsylvania Battery, which was emplaced in the open field north of the railroad, the unit was trading shots with the Rebel guns emplaced northwest of the Cowan house. After ascertaining that the number of rounds delivered by these Confederate batteries was rapidly diminishing, Mendenhall determined to alter the 26th Pennsylvania's fire mission. Therefore Mendenhall directed the battery commander, Lieutenant Alanson J. Stevens to wheel his guns to the left. Once they had carried out this directive, the

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Pennsylvanians commenced to rake the left flank of Breckinridge's assaulting force with shot and shell.

Mendenhall then dropped in on the 6th Ohio Battery. The Buckeyes had continued to hold their position on the small rise south of the railroad. Mendenhall was delighted to discover that the able Captain Bradley had already wheeled his guns to the left. And at this very moment the Ohioans were hammering away at the attacking Rebels. Before returning to his temporary command post west of the ford, Mendenhall ordered Captain William E. Standart, of Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, to move to the left with three of his guns. Upon reaching the high ground west of the ford Standart had his cannoneers emplace their three field pieces. Standart's gunners probably unlimbered their pieces to the right of the six guns belonging to Negley's division.

All told Mendenhall had succeeded in marshalling 57 guns with which to pound Breckinridge's hard-charging greyclads. However, 12 of these guns (those manned by the men of the 26th Pennsylvania and 6th Ohio Batteries) were located almost a mile southwest of McFadden's Ford. Before the Rebels onslaught had commenced there had been six batteries (24 guns) emplaced on the commanding ground west of the river. After the attack had started Mendenhall succeeded in moving up three batteries (15 guns) from the reserve. These three units put their pieces into action along side the six batteries that had occupied the ridge, before the Confederates had moved to the attack. When the

3d Wisconsin Battery (6 guns) was forced to retire across the river, the Badgers also took position on the ridge west lying to the west of Stones River. All told Mendenhall had succeeded in massing 45 guns on the commanding ground west of McFadden's Ford.

Two infantry units (Gibson's brigade and Davis' division) were also ordered to the left, by Rosecrans, immediately after Breckinridge's assault had started. During the morning the infantry brigade, commanded by Colonel William H. Gibson, had been pulled out of the line on the Federal right. Gibson's organization had then been placed in reserve in rear of the Army of the Cumberland's center. At the time that Breckinridge's onslaught had reached its apogee, Gibson's brigade received instructions from Rosecrans to move to the support of Crittenden's hard-pressed left wing.⁶⁰ At the same time the general had issued orders, charging Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis to move his division to the left wing's support. Evacuating its sector on the army's extreme right Davis' division, with Colonel William E. Woodruff's brigade in the van, moved off on the double.⁶¹

The commanders of the six batteries massed on the ridge west of the ford, had been alerted that the Rebels were preparing to attack Beatty's main line of resistance, a short time before the powerful greyclad lines of battle hove into view. Therefore the Union cannoneers had several minutes in which to complete last minute preparations. The respective battery commanders hoped that these would enable their units to give the butternuts a hot reception.. When the Confederate infantry

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finally popped into view, the Yankee gunners had their pieces aimed and shotted. At an order from their battery commanders the men opened fire on the oncoming Southerners. First the artillerists used shot and shell in their pieces. However, as the hard charging Confederates drove closer, some of the batteries switched to canister. To the 7th Indiana Battery probably belongs the distinction of getting off the first rounds. But within a matter of moments the cannoneers manning the guns assigned to the other five batteries also had their pieces in action.⁶²

On the Union's left the three batteries attached to Megley's division hurled their messages of death and destruction at the approaching Rebels. With their single 10-pounder Parrott rifle the men of the 2d Kentucky Battery had opened fire on the rapidly advancing Rebels with shell. On the Kentuckians' right, the Buckeyes of Battery G and M, 1st Ohio Light Artillery had commenced to hammer away at greyclad masses.

Not until the Southerners had driven Grider's brigade from the commanding ground east of the river, did the Union artillerists receive any counter-battery fire. However, once the butternuts had gained possession of that strategic ridge they quickly put their artillery in position. Catching the Union guns in a deadly cross-fire, the Confederates forced four of the six Union batteries to give ground. On the extreme left the men of the 2d Kentucky battery were compelled to retire their 10-pounder Parrott some 40 yards. Upon doing so they found that they had all but exhausted the supply of ammunition in their limber. Like the Kentuckians, the Ohioans of Batteries G and M found

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that they were unable to hold their advance position in the face of the Confederates' terrible fire. The battery commanders ordered their men to attach prolonge^d ropes to their pieces. With the aid of these ropes the bluecoats proceeded to slowly withdraw their five guns. Reaching a less exposed point about 40 yards west of their initial position, the Buckeyes again manned their pieces. They then resumed their duel with the Rebel artillery. Shortly thereafter a shell from one of the Confederate guns exploded near one of Battery G's guns - killing one man and three horses.⁶³

Like Negley's gunners on their left, the men of the 7th Indiana Battery found it difficult to hold their ground in the face of a galling fire from three Rebel batteries (the Washington Artillery, Wright's Battery, and Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery). The Hoosiers' position became even more precarious, when the three batteries from Negley's division fell back. Glancing to his right, Captain Swallow observed that the regular battery had also commenced to give ground. Realizing that it would be suicidal for his men to remain where they were, Swallow ordered "the battery to fix prolonge, to fire retiring." About this time one of the battery's six guns was accidentally spiked. The reason being that the vent had become "filled with friction primers." Without bothering to inform Captain Swallow the gun captain, in hopes of effecting repairs, decided to take his piece to the rear. The other gun captains, seeing that this piece was being withdrawn, supposed the order had been given to retire. Therefore they immediately started their

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pieces for the rear. Before Captain Swallow was able to halt this unauthorized movement, the pieces had been moved half a hundred yards. The irate captain immediately ordered the gun captains to return their pieces to their original positions. Accordingly, one gun was moved by hand to its initial emplacement; the rest, except for the piece which had been accidentally spiked, were then limbered up and moved forward. Once the five guns had been returned to their original positions, the Hoosiers again opened fire on the foe.⁶⁴

When the Confederate attack started Lieutenant Parsons advanced his four 3-inch rifles, holding his four Napoleons in reserve. Parsons felt that it would not be good tactics to put his gun howitzers into action, until the hard-charging greyclads had moved into closer range. After his rifles had been in action for a short time, Parsons noticed that Negley's three batteries had fallen back. Learning from his section chiefs that most of the rifled ammunition stored in the limbers had been expended, Parsons ordered his caissons to the front. It was only then that Parsons was advised by one of his men "that some scoundrel had led off my caissons." The lieutenant's response to this emergency was an order for the men manning the four Napoleons to bring their pieces forward. By the time that the four smoothbores had roared into action, the rifles had exhausted their units' of fire. Parsons not wishing to unnecessarily expose the now silent rifles (and their crews) ordered them withdrawn.⁶⁵

On the regulars' right, the men of Battery F, 1st Ohio Battery

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had opened fire on the hard-charging Rebel infantry with their four guns. Evidently the Ohioans, at first did not have too good a field of fire, for one of Rosencrans' aides soon put in an appearance. The staff officer directed Lieutenant Osburn to move his four pieces into the open field to his left. This order was promptly carried out by the Buckeyes.⁶⁶

During the first part of this savage artillery duel, the 22 Confederate guns had more than held their own with the 24 Union cannons. Three Federal batteries (the 2d Kentucky Battery and Batteries G and M, 1st Ohio Light Artillery) had been forced to grudgingly give ground. A shortage of ammunition had forced half of Parsons' guns to cease firing. One of the 7th Indiana's pieces had been accidentally spiked and sent to the rear. Furthermore an unhappy misunderstanding connected with this gun's removal, had caused the Hoosier battery to cease firing completely for a few vital moments. But just when the situation seemed to be darkest (for the Federal cause) desperately needed reinforcements arrived. It was at this most opportune moment that the artillery units, which Captain Mendenhall had ordered to the front, commenced to arrive on the commanding ground west of McFadden's Ford. In addition the 6th Ohio and 26th Pennsylvania had now opened a highly effective enfilading fire on the Confederates.

First came the 8th Indiana Battery. Thundering forward the Hoosiers wheeled into position, and unlimbered their six guns immediately on the right of Battery F's four field pieces. Shortly thereafter the Board of

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Trade Battery arrived on the scene. The Chicagoans put their six guns into action on the left and forward of Negley's three batteries. Next Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery put in an appearance. The Buckeyes quickly wheeled their three guns into position. Furthermore, the men of the 3d Wisconsin Battery, after fording the river, had succeeded in emplacing their six guns on the ridge's military crest. The position occupied by the Badgers was slightly in advance of the other batteries.⁶⁷

While the men of the Board of Trade Battery unlimbered their six pieces they were exposed to a heavy fire from the Rebel guns emplaced on the opposite ridge. Once the Illinoisans had emplaced their guns they opened fire. In accordance with Captain Stokes' instructions the gunners served their weapons with shell - the fuses cut to explode in 5-seconds. During the course of this artillery duel, the men of the Board of Trade Battery concentrated their attention on Wright's Tennessee Battery.⁶⁸

By the time that the men of Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery had reached the ridge with their three guns, the Rebel attack had commenced to falter. Unlimbering their three pieces the Buckeyes hammered the retiring greyclads with shot and shell.⁶⁹

Once the Board of Trade Battery had put their guns into action, the crews manning the six guns attached to Negley's division prepared to advance their pieces. Manhandling their guns forward the cannoneers of the 2d Kentucky Battery, and Batteries F and M, 1st Ohio Light Artillery succeeded in emplacing their weapons on the ground, from which they had been driven earlier by the Confederates' furious fire. The lost

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position recovered the artillerists commenced to pound away at the greyclads with shell, reserving their canister for use in case the foe should launch a second attack.⁷⁰

After resuming their original position the cannoneers of the 7th Indiana Battery directed the fire of their five guns on both the Rebel infantry and artillery. The Hoosiers guns only fell silent, after the greyclads had started to give way. In repulsing the foe's desperate attack, Captain Swallow's gunners found that they had expended all their ammunition, except for a few rounds of canister. During the course of the artillery duel the battery had suffered the following casualties - one killed and two wounded.⁷¹

On the Hoosiers' right the regulars of Parsons' battery continued to rip the Rebels with shot and shell from their four Napoleons. However, the regulars did not emerge unscathed from the contest. For a projectile from one of the Rebels' guns dismounted one of their Napoleons. The battery only ceased firing when their last shot had been fired.⁷²

The men manning the ten field pieces assigned to Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery and the 8th Indiana Battery, the two units emplaced on the regular battery's right, also blasted away at the Rebels. The Hoosiers at first centered their attention on a strong force of enemy infantry. These butternuts had taken cover in the woods about 700 yards northeast of the Indianians guns. After the battery had expended 123 rounds (all the projectiles that were stored in the limbers) it retired

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to replenish its supply of ammunition. Once this mission had been successfully accomplished, the battery returned to the front. Taking position a little closer to the ford, the Hoosiers now selected as their target a Confederate battery. These Rebel guns were emplaced on a ridge 900 yards away. In the ensuing duel the Yankees, after firing 86 rounds, forced the butternut artillerymen to limber up their pieces, and beat a hurried retreat.⁷³

After crossing to the west side of Stones River, the men of the 3d Wisconsin Battery found that all of the better artillery positions had been occupied. Therefore the Badgers were forced to make several shifts, before Lieutenant Livingston found what he considered a suitable emplacement. All told the Badgers put their guns into action from three different positions after fording the river.⁷⁴

And to make matters worse for the Confederates, the 12 Union guns emplaced on either side of the railroad continued to rake the ridge. Both the 26th Pennsylvania and the 6th Ohio Batteries were able to enfilade the left flank of Breckinridge's assaulting force. From a range of 3000 yards the Ohioans fired 35 rounds, with what Captain Bradley described as "good effect" into the attacking Confederate masses. Both the 26th Pennsylvanian and 6th Ohio Batteries continued to pound the Rebels until after the start of the Union counter-attack. But once the bluecoated infantry had recrossed the river Bradley and Stevens, fearing that an errant projectile from one of their pieces might fall astray and injure some of their comrades-in-arms, ordered their men to cease firing.⁷⁵

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As previously noted from the "After Action Reports" submitted by the Confederate officers, the Union infantry which was stationed on the commanding ground to the west of McFadden's Ford also played a prominent part in smashing Breckinridge's attack. Cruft's brigade, which was posted in support of Mendenhall's massed artillery, was partially sheltered by crude breastworks. Even though they were exposed to a fierce cross-fire from both the foe's artillery and infantry, Cruft's hard-bitten blueclads clung stubbornly to their improvised rifle pits. General Cruft in his "After Action Report" noted:

A higher scene of cool moral courage, perhaps, has not been evinced during the war than that exhibited by my brigade on this memorable day. The line lay still and quiet behind the frail works we had been able to construct, with the shot and shell of the enemy coming from three directions and bursting above, in front of it, and all around it, while our own massed batteries were belching out their contents in front of and over it. The roar of the artillery was terrific. The smoke from our own pieces and the bursting shell of the enemy at times obscured the line from view. By some wonderful Providence but three men of the brigade were killed here by the enemy's shells.⁷⁶

Negley's troops, who were massed in a cornfield immediately in the rear of Cruft's brigade, had reached the ridge too late in the afternoon for them to throw up any breastworks. In a successful effort to partially nullify the effect of the Confederates' savage fire, Negley's two brigade commanders-Colonels Stanley and Miller directed their men to lay down. Upon taking cover the bluecoats were cheered to discover that the ridge's topographic crest served to screen them to some extent from the worst of the Rebels' fire. The men of this combat-tested division, though exposed to the foe's artillery, held their fire until

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the Rebel infantry had closed to within 300 yards. Just before their officers gave the word to commence firing, a number of panic-stricken men from Price's and Grider's brigade, many of them without arms, descended upon Miller's and Stanley's troops. Once the fugitives had passed through their ranks Negley's infantrymen leaped to their feet, and commenced to blaze away at the on rushing greyclads. The fire of Negley's and Craft's troops, in conjunction with that of Mendenhall's artillery, served to break the back of Breckinridge's powerful assault.⁷⁷

Fortunately for the Yankees the cannoneers manning the four guns of the Washington Artillery had exhausted their ammunition. Unluckily for the Southerners this occurred at about the time that the Federal batteries had been forced to give ground. Responding to the emergency with alacrity, Lieutenant Vaught sent the limbers racing to the rear to be refilled. Long before the limbers could be returned to the front, the Yankee artillerists had been reinforced by three fresh batteries (the Board of Trade Battery, 8th Indiana Battery, and Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery). This increment to their strength enabled the bluecoats to smother the greyclad gunners under a storm of shot and shell. The Union batteries which had been forced to give ground were again advanced. Glancing to his right Lieutenant Vaught noted, that the crew serving one of the guns belonging to Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion had been forced to abandon their piece. The Georgians could be seen hugging the ground near the deserted gun. Immediately thereafter it became apparent to the men of the Washington

Artillery that the Federals, having thoroughly beaten down the Rebel artillery, were preparing to counter-attack. To make matters even worse the ammunition detail had not yet returned.⁷⁸

On the Louisianians' right the artillerists of Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion and Wright's Tennessee Battery found it extremely difficult to hold their position in the face of the Yankees' terrible fire. The situation became even more critical when the ammunition shortage forced the Washington Artillery to suddenly cease firing. Then to make matters worse the Northerners succeeded in registering several direct hits, which overturned two of the Georgians' guns. In accordance with Major Graves' instructions Wright's men had shifted their four pieces further to the right. But before the Tennesseans could unlimber their pieces, the bluecoated infantry had commenced its powerful counter-thrust.⁷⁹

The Alabamans of Semple's battery and the Floridians of Robertson's had barely put their six Napoleons into action, when the tide of battle turned abruptly against the butternuts. Captain Robertson, taking cognizance of the situation, prepared to order the reserve artillery's four remaining Napoleons into action. But before he was able to do so, the captain observed that Breckinridge's infantry had commenced to waver. Catching sight of a staff officer - Colonel G. St. Leger Grenfell, Robertson hailed him. The captain approached Grenfell, and requested him to carry a message to General Bragg. Grenfell was asked to inform the army commander that Robertson "was satisfied the infantry would be unable to hold their position."

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Therefore the captain had decided to alter his plan. Robertson now proposed "to bring the guns of Robertson's battery to bear on the enemy." Accordingly, the captain issued instructions for his men to put their remaining four Napoleons into action alongside the Alabamans' guns. But before the Floridians were able to reach the ridge the Rebel infantry collapsed.⁸⁰

Meanwhile on the Confederates' extreme right, the men of Huwald's battery continued to hammer away at Grose's line of battle with shot and shell. Not until after the gunners of the Board of Trade Battery had unlimbered their six pieces, did Huwald's cannoners receive any counter-battery fire. Shortly thereafter General Wharton, who was directing the battery's fire, had his horse shot from under him. By the time the general had procured another mount, the Confederate attack had commenced to ebb. And to make matters worse the general discovered, that during his brief absence Huwald's men had limbered up their four pieces and skedaddled. In his "After Action Report" the general noted bitterly: "I was thrown..., and when I succeeded in getting another horse the battery [Huwald's] had been run off without any occasion whatever."⁸¹ Thus at a most critical time, just as the Federals commenced their counter-attack, the Confederates' artillery strength on the ridge east of the ford had been reduced by one-half (from 22 to 11 guns).

THE UNION ARTILLERY AND BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK

Chapter II

BRECKINRIDGE'S ASSAULT

Notes

1 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, p. 785, 807. Gideon J. Pillow was born in Williamson County, Tennessee in 1806. A lawyer in Columbia, Tennessee, he attended the National Democratic Convention in 1844, and materially aided his neighbor James K. Polk, in obtaining the nomination. Shortly after the outbreak of the Mexican War, Pillow was appointed a brigadier general by his friend - the President. On April 13, 1847 Pillow was promoted to major general and participated in Scott's Mexico City Campaign. Returning to civilian life following the Mexican War, Pillow resumed his law practice. On May 9, 1861 Governor Harris appointed Pillow a major general in the provisional army of the State of Tennessee. Two months later Pillow was made a brigadier general in the provisional Confederate army.

2 Ibid., 785, 807-808, 826. From left to right Hanson's brigade was deployed as follows: 6th and 2d Kentucky, 41st Alabama, and 4th Kentucky. In Pillow's line of battle the position of one unit can be definitely pinpointed - the 18th Tennessee. That hard-fighting unit anchored the extreme right of Pillow's battle line.

3 Ibid., 785, 796-797, 812. Gibson had formed his brigade in double line of battle. From left to right his initial line consisted of the 16th and 25th Louisiana Consolidated and 13th and 20th Louisiana

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Consolidated. The two Louisiana regiments were supported by the 32d Alabama Regiment and 14th Louisiana Battalion. The Alabamans on the left and the Louisianians on the right. From left to right Preston's brigade was deployed as follows: 1st and 3d Florida Consolidated, 4th Florida, 60th North Carolina, and 20th Tennessee.

4 Ibid., 758, 785, 803, 823. This section of Lumsden's Battery was equipped with two 10-pounder Parrott rifles.

5 Ibid., 759-760.

6 Ibid., 760. These 18 guns belonged to Negley's division and Batteries H and M, 4th U. S. Artillery, and Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery.

7 Ibid., 785-786, 969.

8 Ibid., 786.

9 Ibid., 806-808.

10 Ibid., 823

11 Ibid., 827, 833.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 812, 818.

14 Ibid., 796-798.

15 Ibid., 803. The Washington Artillery had unlimbered their pieces near the buildings, which the men of the 51st Ohio had burned earlier in the day. However, no targets presented themselves and the Louisianians did not go into action at this time.

16 Ibid., 758-760.

17 Ibid., 722, 733, 742, 752. The Rebel artillery received counter-

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battery fire from two sources. The Union guns emplaced near the railroad and those in position west of McFadden's Ford.

18 Ibid., 590, 608, 610, 615. Immediately before the attack commenced General Beatty had sent a staff officer to the front. His mission was to tell Price to withdraw his brigade, and take position behind the ridge's topographic crest. But before the aide was able to reach Price, Breckinridge had launched his attack.

19 Ibid., 615, 827, 833.

20 Ibid., 590, 608, 610-611, 806-808.

21 Ibid., 611.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 590, 806.

24 Ibid., 609.

25 Ibid., 587, 593.

26 Ibid., 587, 595.

27 Ibid., 587, 591, 593, 595.

28 Ibid., 587.

29 Ibid., 827.

30 Ibid., 827, 833.

31 Ibid., 797-798. During the course of the approach march Gibson's horse was wounded.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., 806, 808.

34 Ibid., 812, 815, 818.

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- 35 Ibid., 587-588, 595-596.
- 36 Ibid., 588, 591, 593.
- 37 Ibid., 588, 609.
- 38 Ibid., 598.
- 39 Ibid., 598-599.
- 40 Ibid., 601, 602-606. The men of the 13th Ohio while not exposed to the fire of the Rebel infantry, suffered some losses when the foe's artillery opened fire on them with shell and canister.
- 41 Ibid., 599, 601, 605-606.
- 42 Ibid., 562, 569, 573.
- 43 Ibid., 569, 573. The commanding officer of the 24th Ohio at this time was Captain Enoch Weller.
- 44 Ibid., 566, 567-568, 571.
- 45 Ibid., 482-583. Just before the 3d Wisconsin Battery initially went into action General Rosecrans put in an appearance, and ordered Livingston to shift his position slightly. This caused the battery to open fire a little later than the lieutenant had originally intended.
- 46 Ibid., 797-701, 833. At least two bluecoats succeeded in escaping across the river ahead of Lewis' patrol. In his "After Action Report" Colonel Price noted:

Corpl. E. C. Hockensmith, of the color-guard of the 21st Kentucky Regiment, and who carried the colors that day, was confronted by a rebel in the retreat, and was ordered, while on the bank of the river, to surrender, to which he replied, "Myself I will surrender, but my colors never," at the same moment throwing them into the river. Sergt. J. T. Gunn, Company E, of the same regiment, seized them and carried them safely through the battle. Corporal Hockensmith escaped and is safe. Ibid., 609.

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47 Ibid., 797-800, 827.

48 Ibid., 806, 808.

49 Ibid., 821, 822. Upon being wounded Colonel Smith was borne to the rear by several of his devoted men.

50 Ibid., 813.

51 Ibid., 803, 823-824. By this time the men of Wright's battery had repaired the damaged 6-pounder.

52 Ibid., 759-761.

53 Ibid., 969. All told the Confederates succeeded in putting 22 guns into position on the ridge east of McFadden's Ford.

54 Ibid., 451, 455-456.

55 Ibid., 456.

56 Ibid., 244, 456. Morton, a Pennsylvanian, upon his graduation from the U. S. Military Academy in July 1851, had been commissioned a brevet 2d Lieutenant in the engineers. Morton was promoted to brigadier general on November 29, 1862.

57 Ibid., 244, 251.

58 Ibid., 456.

59 Ibid., 456, 479, 521, 581.

60 Ibid., 306-307.

61 Ibid., 264, 289.

62 Ibid., 456, 579.

63 Ibid., 412-415.

64 Ibid., 579.

65 Ibid., 525.

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66 Ibid., 523.

67 Ibid., 251, 456, 476, 521, 582.

68 Ibid., 244, 257.

69 Ibid., 521.

70 Ibid., 412, 415.

71 Ibid., 579. The Hoosiers were unable to get the gun, which had been accidentally spiked, back into action until after the Rebels had retreated.

72 Ibid., 456, 525.

73 Ibid., 476, 523.

74 Ibid., 583.

75 Ibid., 479, 581.

76 Ibid., 528-529.

77 Ibid., 408, 421-422, 427, 433-434.

78 Ibid., 803.

79 Ibid., 760, 824.

80 Ibid., 760.

81 Ibid., 969.

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THE UNION ARTILLERY AND BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK

Chapter III

THE UNION COUNTER-ATTACK

The hour was now half-past four. Just thirty minutes had elapsed since Breckinridge had confidently launched his powerful attack on the Union bridgehead. It was now apparent to the Union troops, ensconced on the commanding ground lying to the west of McFadden's Ford, that the butternuts' strength was rapidly ebbing. Between them the combined fire power of Mendenhall's artillery and Cruft's and Negley's infantry, had brought the greyclads' advance to an abrupt halt. Furthermore, the Union cannoners in addition to forcing Huwald's battery to displace to the rear, had dismounted several of the foe's guns. And to make matters worse for Breckinridge's troops the Yankees had been heavily reinforced. First Morton's pioneers and then Gibson's infantry had arrived on the scene. These two comparatively fresh units were quickly deployed in support of Negley's division. If the Federals should suddenly seize the initiative, Breckinridge's assault might possibly be turned into a major Confederate disaster. But if the Yankees' were to go over to the attack, the decision to do so must be made promptly, for the hour was already late. At the moment, the best that the Union brass could hope for, would be a maximum of another hour of daylight.

Even though Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden, Negley, and Palmer were present on the ridge overlooking McFadden's Ford, it seems that

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apparently these high ranking officers failed to grasp the urgency of the situation. It was one of Negley's brigade commanders--Colonel Miller--who first sensed that the time was ripe for the Federals to launch their counter-attack. Once the colonel had observed that the Rebels had commenced to give way, he waved his eager men forward. This Miller did on his own initiative without waiting for orders from General Negley. As the brigade moved out in line of battle, it was deployed from left to right as follows: the 21st and 74th Ohio, 37th Indiana, and 78th Pennsylvania.¹ Immediately after Miller's troops had started forward Generals Rosecrans and Negley rode up, and directed Colonel Stanley to commit his brigade. Cheering wildly Stanley's men also moved to the attack. Closing in on Miller's brigade Stanley's troops, the 11th Michigan on the extreme right, were partially formed in the intervals between the various units of Miller's command. The 18th Ohio took position between the 37th Indiana and 78th Pennsylvania.² Colonel Stanley did not move forward with his brigade. But in accordance with instructions from Negley, he remained on the river's left bank. Stanley's task would be to supervise the movement of reinforcements to the front.

Passing through Cruft's brigade Negley's troops, with Miller at their head, surged forward, and took position behind a rail fence which skirted the river's west bank. From the cover afforded by the fence the blue-clads blazed away at Breckinridge's Confederates on the opposite ridge. Colonel Miller, observing that large numbers of the greyclads had commenced to filter to the rear, decided to send his men across the river.

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Accordingly, the colonel ordered the advance resumed. Plunging into the icy water the troops, in the face of a galling fire directed against their front and right flank, waded the stream. The colors of the 78th Pennsylvania and 19th Illinois were the first to reach the river's east bank.³

While Negley's troops were in the process of storming across the river, General Palmer noted that a number of Confederates (the 16th and 25th Louisiana, and detachments drawn from the 2d and 6th Kentucky) had forded the river southeast of McFadden's Ford. The general correctly estimated that this Rebel force consisted of three small regiments. When these greyclads took position in a clump of trees near the river, Palmer expressed alarm lest they be able to enfilade the right flank of Negley's division, as it pushed forward. He was correct in this deduction. For already the butternuts had begun to harass the right flank of Miller's attacking battle line. Therefore Palmer determined to dislodge the pesky butternuts.

Hastening forward the general hailed Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Given, of the 18th Ohio. At this moment only a part of Given's regiment had forded the river. The general immediately placed Given in charge of a combat patrol. Given's patrol was composed of detachments from the 18th Ohio, 37th Indiana, and 78th Pennsylvania, which had not yet forded the river. With this force Given was directed to drive the Confederates from the woods, to the west of the river, in which they had ensconced themselves.⁴

While Negley's troops were fording the river, a staff officer dashed

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up to Colonel Miller. The aide proceeded to inform the Colonel "that it was General Palmer's order that the troops should not cross." Miller, upon taking stock of the situation (the enemy's retreat and the fact that many of his men had already reached the stream's right bank), determined to ignore Palmer's message.

Once the hard-fighting infantry of Negley's division had carved out a bridgehead, they again took cover behind a rail fence. From the shelter afforded by the fence they opened a scathing fire on the retreating greyclads. On Miller's left the men of the 21st Ohio soon abandoned the cover afforded by the fence and scaled the ridge. Upon gaining its crest the Buckeyes disappeared into the woods.⁵

Meanwhile Given had deployed his combat patrol as skirmishers. Pressing eagerly forward Given's troops forced Major Zacharie's command to give ground. (In addition to his own regiment, the 16th and 25th Louisiana Consolidated, Zacharie had assumed charge of detachments of the 2d and 6th Kentucky which had crossed the river.) Reaching the crest of the ridge, on the opposite side of the river from the one occupied by the Confederate artillery, Given was somewhat disconcerted to discover that the remainder of Negley's division (which was then operating east of the river) had failed to keep pace with his advance. Fearful lest his small unit be isolated and destroyed, the colonel caused his bugler to sound retreat. Just as the combat patrol had commenced to retire, one of the infantrymen on the extreme right shouted: "They are flanking us from the woods on the right." This distressing news caused a number of the

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Federals to bolt for the rear. Dashing to his right Given reached the edge of a cornfield, which lay to the southeast of McFadden's Ford. A hasty glance served to convince the colonel that the soldier, who had initially reported a Confederate advance, was in serious error. For the only greyclads then visible to the colonel were a few of Zacharie's men. And these individuals, instead of moving to the attack, had taken up strong defensive positions to his immediate front. Quickly rallying the shaken members of his combat patrol, Given posted them in the edge of the woods. Stalemated the two commands--Zacharie's and Given's--faced each other on opposite sides of the cornfield.⁶

About this time Miller received a second message from Palmer. On reading the order the colonel found that Palmer wished his command "to recross the river and support the line on the hill." Having no inclinations to turn back Miller decided to ignore Palmer's instructions. Instead the hard-hitting colonel resolved to press on.⁷

When the bluecoats had forded the river, the troops comprising the various units had become somewhat scrambled. But the men were veterans, and the officers, with relative ease, were able to regroup their respective organizations. From left to right Miller's battle line, as it lay behind the rail fence, consisted of the 74th and 69th Ohio, 19th Illinois, 78th Pennsylvania, and 11th Michigan. At a word from Miller, the Union troops sprang up from behind the fence and started forward shouting wildly. As the Yankees rapidly ascended the steep ridge, they were exposed to a brisk fire from Wright's and Semple's guns. These batteries which were covering

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the Confederate retreat, were emplaced on an eminence in the northwestern corner of the cornfield. Evidently the butternut cannoneers were overshooting their targets. For their projectiles failed to inflict very many casualties on the rapidly advancing bluecoats. In scaling the hill the men of the 19th Illinois lost their commanding officer--Colonel Joseph R. Scott. Before it had reached the crest of the ridge, the Federals' battle line was strengthened when the 21st Ohio suddenly reappeared, and took position on the 74th Ohio's left. By the time the Yankees had driven to within 150 yards of the eight canister belching Rebel guns, the last of the foe's supporting infantry broke for the rear. Colonel Miller now ordered the 78th Pennsylvania to charge the guns! 8

Without doubt the first Union troops to ford the river in the wake of Miller's grim infantrymen, were the remnants of Grider's and Price's shattered commands. After their units had been driven across the river, the two brigade commanders, ably assisted by their more resolute subordinates, rallied the hard-core elements of their respective organizations. These consisted of the soldiers, who instead of scattering had remained in the area. As soon as the Rebels commenced to give way, the reorganized fragments of Price's and Grider's broken brigades moved to the attack. In his "After Action Report" Grider tersely recalled:

...I, with the flags of the Nineteenth Ohio and Ninth Kentucky, recrossed the river, followed closely by Lieutenant Colonel Cram, Majors [Erasmus L] Mottley and Manderson, men and officers from the Nineteenth Ohio, Ninth and Eleventh Kentucky, Lieut. Philip Reefy holding the colors of the Nineteenth, and Private Moses Rourk those of the Ninth Kentucky.

Observing that the men would follow and stand by their colors, I here took the flag of my own regiment (the Ninth Kentucky), and, riding forward, called on the troops to advance, to which they gallantly responded....

Pushing rapidly forward these reorganized fragments of Grider's and Price's brigades forced Lewis' combat team to grudgingly give ground. Taking position to the right of Miller's advancing battle line the troops began to ascend the hill, down which they had fled but a few minutes before.⁹

On Miller's left, near the Hoover house, three hard-fighting units (the 84th Illinois, 36th Indiana, and 6th Ohio) had grimly held their position in the face of slashing attacks by Pillow's and Preston's Rebel brigades. Shielded by their comrades-in-arms resolute stand, the officers of the five regiments which had sought shelter north and west of the Hoover house rallied and regrouped their respective units. By the time Negley's troops had crossed the river, the officers had succeeded in restoring a semblance of order to their commands. Colonels Grose and Howard, observing that the greyclads had started to melt away in the face of Miller's counter-thrust, issued orders for their men to take up the attack. Howard's re-formed brigade (less the 13th Ohio) took position on the right of Grose's battle line. The 23d Kentucky and 24th Ohio on being rallied, had formed on the 36th Indiana's right. Immediately before these two brigades took up the advance, Hazen's unit which had crossed the river, commenced to take position in rear of Grose's battle line.¹⁰

At the time that the Confederates had launched their smashing attack on the Union bridgehead, Hazen's brigade occupied the ground to

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the right of the massed Union batteries. Even before the rout of Beatty's division, Hazen had received his marching orders from General Palmer. The hard-hitting colonel was directed by the general, to move to the support of the troops holding the bridgehead. But by the time the head of Hazen's column had reached McFadden's Ford, Price's and Grider's troops had fled across the river. As Hazen's troops pushed rapidly toward the ford, they encountered the broken fragments of these two shattered brigades. Throwing away their arms many of these panic-stricken individuals broke through Hazen's ranks shouting, "All is lost." Undaunted by this disheartening scene Hazen's men pushed steadily on, "every man and officer doing his duty." But before Hazen could form his brigade, the massed fire of the Union artillery and infantry had broken the back of the Confederate assault. Forging the river in column of fours in the wake of Grider's and Price's troops, Hazen's brigade moved to the right. On reaching the Hoover house Hazen deployed his brigade immediately in the rear of Grose's line of battle.¹¹

After his division, led by Colonel Miller, had stormed across the river, General Negley approached General Morton. The division commander opened his conversation with a request, that Morton use his brigade to support Miller's attack. This task was cheerfully accepted by the combative Morton. Quickly mustering the three battalions which constituted his brigade, Morton led them forward on the double. However, by the time the Pioneer brigade had forded the river and deployed, Miller's attacking bluecoats had swept the buttermits from the high ground east

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of the river.¹²

Colonel Gibson's brigade reached the commanding ground west of McFadden's Ford, immediately after Negley's troops had stormed across the river. In accordance with instructions from Rosecrans' headquarters, Gibson quickly deployed his brigade in the cornfield. This field had been occupied by Negley's division, before it had moved to the attack. Here the unit would be in close supporting distance of both Mendenhall's artillery and Cruft's brigade.¹³

Davis' hard-marching division reached the area adjacent to McFadden's Ford, close on the heels of Gibson's men. By this time the bluecoated infantry was in the process of sweeping the last-ditch defenders from the opposite ridge. Despite the imminent approach of darkness the Federal brass, still had designs of converting the Confederate repulse into a major disaster. Accordingly, Davis' division was directed to cross the river. Spearheaded by Woodruff's battle-hardened brigade, the division moved forward in column of fours. At this time McFadden's Ford was being utilized by the Pioneer brigade. Therefore Davis was directed to see that his division crossed the river at a lower ford. This ford lay a short distance to the southwest of the Hoover house. However, by the time Woodruff's troops had waded the river, the tactical situation had changed. McFadden's Ford was now declared open for traffic. Davis was directed to use that ford. Woodruff's thoroughly confused troops were recalled. The division then moved to the McFadden's Ford. And Woodruff's chilled and disgusted men were sent wading into the icy water for a third time. The brigades, commanded by Colonels P. Sidney Post

and William P. Carlin, followed Woodruff's across the river.¹⁴

When Miller's grim infantrymen had reached the river's right bank, the portion of Lewis' combat team which had remained on the east side of the river was threatened with isolation and possible destruction. Responding to the emergency with alacrity Lewis ordered his men to fall back. Once Lewis' retreat had uncovered McFadden's Ford, the reorganized portions of Grider's and Price's brigade crossed the river.¹⁵

Even before the Yankees had launched their powerful counter-attack, the troops of the "Orphan" brigade had found it most difficult to cling to their hard won foot-hold, on the ridge east of the ford. For not only was the brigade exposed to a terrible fire from the Union infantry and artillery to its immediate front, but its right flank was being pounded unmercifully by the two Federal batteries (the 26th Pennsylvania and 6th Ohio) emplaced near the railroad. Colonel Tarbue was badly shaken by his men's desperate plight. Accordingly, he determined to withdraw. In communicating this order to his men the colonel was confronted by several difficulties. For in addition to being pinned down by the Federals' fire, the "Orphan" brigade had become badly intermingled with the 13th and 20th Louisiana Consolidated. Therefore when the "Orphan" brigade commenced to retire, it constituted anything but a well-organized and cohesive unit.¹⁶

The initial intelligence which Colonel Gibson received pertaining to the Union counter-offensive, was when he saw Lewis' combat team suddenly break for the rear. To make matters worse Tarbue, immediately

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thereafter, withdrew the "Orphan" brigade. Gibson's lone regiment--the 13th and 20th Louisiana-- then found itself alone, and all but isolated on the left flank of Breckinridge's division.

Following closely on the "Orphan" brigade's retreat, a strong skirmish line, composed of the reorganized portions of Grider's and Price's brigades, moved against Gibson's position. Fighting with grim-determination the Louisianians quickly checked the Yankees' advance. On glancing to his right Gibson was shocked to note that a powerful blueclad line of battle (Miller's command), was rapidly closing in on Pillow's and Preston's brigades. The situation became increasingly grave when Pillow's troops suddenly abandoned their position. This Union success exposed the Louisiana regiment's right flank. Dashing to his left Gibson saw that a strong Union force (Hazen's brigade) had started to ford the river. Confronted by a strong skirmish line to his immediate front, and with his flanks threatened with envelopment, Gibson ordered his regiment to retire.¹⁷

On Gibson's right, Pillow's Tennesseans had been unable to check Negley's troops as they stormed across the river. Once they had reached the stream's right bank, the Yankees quickly carved out a bridgehead. While the majority of the bluecoats were seen to take cover behind a rail fence, near the river, one regiment--the 21st Ohio-- was observed to push resolutely up the hill beyond. What especially troubled Pillow about this development, was that the Buckeyes made directly for the gap which existed in his brigade's battle line. As the result of a configuration

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in the terrain, a space that was at least a regimental front in length, separated the 18th Tennessee on Pillow's right from the remainder of the brigade. As the Buckeyes scaled the ridge, their advance was covered by the fire of the massed Union artillery posted on the opposite ridge. In addition the volleys discharged by Miller's infantry, which was ensconced behind the fence, helped to keep the butternuts pinned down. Confronted by this grave threat to his right flank, Pillow was left with but one alternative--to retire. In his "After Action Report" Pillow recalled: "It [his brigade] retired in some confusion, but with as little as could have been expected when suddenly surprised by movements of the enemy's fresh forces [Negley's division], which could not have been foreseen, and which we had not the means of meeting." The cannoneers of Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion covered the brigade's retreat with their four guns.¹⁸

The crack 18th Tennessee had taken up a very strong position, which was partially sheltered from the foe's fire. Colonel Palmer felt confident, that his men could hold their position indefinitely. But when the colonel observed that the other units of Pillow's brigade, deployed to his right had commenced to retire, he "ordered... [his] regiment to withdraw, to avoid a flank movement in that direction [his right]." As the 18th Tennessee commenced to pull back, the officers of Grose's and Howard's brigade were clearly visible, to the men from the Volunteer state, as they sought to rally and re-form their troops. But, unfortunately for the Southerners, these disorganized units were effectively

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screened by the three regiments of Grose's brigade, sheltered behind the improvised barricades which they had erected adjacent to the Hoover house.

Upon the retreat of Pillow's Tennesseans, Preston's brigade was left to maintain the contest on Breckinridge's right. Negley's division, led by the hard-fighting Colonel Miller, soon left the shelter afforded by the fence rails and moved to the attack. On his right Miller was sustained by the reorganized fragments of Price's and Grider's commands, while on his left Grose's and Howard's units took up the advance. Preston's greyclads, supported on the left by Gibson's lone Louisiana regiment, blazed away at the oncoming Yankees as they ascended the ridge. Within a few minutes three of Preston's regiments (the 1st and 3d Florida Consolidated, 60th North Carolina, and 20th Tennessee) were forced to give way. However, the hard-fighting men of the 4th Florida grimly clung to their position. Colonel William L. L. Bowen succinctly described the ensuing conflict:

...but at length the line began to yield on our left and then on our right, and I mean to detract nothing from other gallant regiments by saying that I soon found the Fourth Florida almost entirely abandoned by the rest of the line. The men still continued to fire with that deliberate accuracy that characterizes the Florida woodsman... The accidents of the ground which my command occupied afforded a partial protection, and I determined to hold it as long as practicable, that, if possible, we might form a nucleus upon which to rally the broken line, but obstinate valor had to yield to superior force. It was not, however, until the men began to announce their 40 rounds expended that I gave the command to cease firing and fall back. Upon gaining a little eminence, I discovered that... [Miller] had smartly turned our left flank... [and Grose and Howard] were advancing upon our right, subjecting us to a most concentrated and destructive fire.

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Debouching from the woods the Floridians emerged into the large cornfield, across which Breckinridge's division had so confidently advanced a bare 45 minutes before. Near the upper end of the cornfield Colonel Bowen spied Wright's Tennessee Battery. The hard-pressed gunners had their four pieces emplaced, and were blasting away at Miller's hard-charging bluecoats.²⁰

Besides the infantrymen of the 4th Florida and the Consolidated Louisiana regiment all the Confederate batteries, except Hwald's, held their ground until the last possible moment. On the Rebel left the ammunition detail sent to the rear by Lieutenant Vaught, returned to the front. Fortunately for the butternuts this occurred just before the 13th and 20th Louisiana Consolidated was forced to give way. An eagerly awaited, but limited supply of shell and canister, was quickly distributed to the crews serving the Washington Artillery's four guns. Once they had received the ammunition, the gunners commenced to blast away at the rapidly advancing bluecoats. Grimly holding on to their position the men of the Washington Artillery ripped Price's and Grider's onrushing troops with canister and shell. Covered by the battery's resolute stand, the Consolidated regiment succeeded in effecting its escape. Vaught held his men to their guns, until the Yankees had closed to within 50 yards. Satisfied that the Louisiana infantry had made good their retreat, Vaught ordered his men to withdraw. In spite of the galling volleys being poured into them by the Union infantry, the cannoneers succeeded in limbering up their four pieces. The cannoneers of the Washington Artillery fell

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back in good order. After crossing the cornfield the gunners unlimbered their four pieces in the edge of the woods on its far side, and to the left of Robertson's six Napoleons.²¹

Shortly before the Union battle line closed in on them; the men of Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion, had succeeded in remounting the two pieces, which had been upset during the artillery duel. In accordance with Pillow's instructions the Georgians covered the Tennessee brigade's retirement. Halting to fire an occasional round at the advancing Federals, the battery retired across the cornfield. On reaching the woods on the opposite side, the artillerists unlimbered their four guns.²²

The gunners manning the eight guns belonging to Wright's Tennessee and Semple's Alabama batteries, were not so fortunate as those assigned to Battery G and the Washington Artillery. During the course of these two units fighting retreat across the cornfield, three guns were lost.

In a futile effort to check Miller's hard-driving bluecoats, the gunners assigned to Wright's Tennessee Battery had grimly held their ground. Round after round of spherical case and canister were fired by the rugged Tennesseans into the oncoming Union battle line. The cannoneers continued to serve their four pieces, until the foe had closed to within 75 yards. It was then, that Captain Wright was cut down by a minie ball, mortally wounded. The captain expired within a few minutes. And his body was carried to the rear by three of his devoted men. Immediately

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after Wright had been struck down, Major Graves bellowed out the order "limber to the rear." Just as the four pieces were being limbered up, Graves spotted the 4th Florida hastening to the battery's aide. This caused the major to change his mind. He barked out instructions, for the cannoneers "to unlimber and fire double charges of canister." The crew serving each of the battery's four brass guns obeyed this order "by firing about one round to the piece." When this failed to check the foe, Graves again roared out the command "limber to the rear." But it was too late. For the Yankees were upon them, and the Tennesseans found that it was impossible to limber up two of their four pieces. And these two treasured guns fell into the victorious Yankees' hands. Covered by the infantrymen of the 4th Florida, the cannoneers of Wright's battery succeeded in escaping with their two other pieces.²³

The four Napoleons, manned by the men of Semple's Alabama Battery, were emplaced in the cornfield to the right of Wright's guns. Under the ever watchful eye of Major Graves the Alabamans continued to serve their guns, until the Union infantry had closed to within 100-yards. It was only then that Graves gave Lieutenant Fitzpatrick permission to displace his guns to the rear. But by this time the battery had suffered terrible casualties. Out of the 45 officers and men taken into battle, the unit had lost 20 men. In one gun crew alone all the cannoneers, but two, and two of the drivers had been shot down. Furthermore, three of the same gun's horses, including both wheel horses had been killed. As a result of these heavy losses and the Federals' close proximity, the Alabamans

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were unable to remove one of their Napoleons. This piece was sorrowfully abandoned, when the battery retired.²⁴

The section of Robertson's battery, which had been thrown forward in support of the attacking infantry, fell back a short time before Wright's and Semple's batteries had been forced to retire. During the relative short period in which the Floridians' two guns had been engaged, they had lost six men and one-half dozen horses.²⁵

From its vantage point atop Wayne's Hill, Cobb's battery opened fire on the advancing Federals. In return the battery received the fire of four or five Union pieces, emplaced to the north and west of the commanding hill. After a brief and harmless contest the Confederate gunners ceased firing, and immediately thereafter the Federal artillery shifted targets.²⁶

As rapidly as the badly battered Rebel units reached the woods, where they had been marshaled before moving against the Union bridgehead, their officers sought to rally them. The Rebel brass hoped to establish their reorganized main line of resistance in the verge of the woods. Here with the cornfield to their immediate front the officers felt, they had a possibility of checking the mighty Union onslaught. Breckinridge, advised that Major Graves had been badly wounded in the course of the precipitant retreat, told Captain Robertson to supervise the artillery's emplacement.

When it became apparent to Robertson that the greyclad infantry had commenced to retire, he ordered the two sections of his battery which had not been committed, to take position in the edge of the woods. There

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the two sections were quickly joined by the battery's two other Napoleons, which had just been withdrawn from a more advanced position. The four guns of Byrne's Kentucky Battery and the two rifles served by the men of Lumsden's Alabama Battery were brought up from the strategic reserve. These six pieces were emplaced near the Floridians' six Napoleons. As rapidly as the cannoneers from the other units (Battery G, Semple's, Wright's, and the Washington Artillery), which had participated in the attack entered the woods, Robertson had them unlimber their pieces. On making a hasty inspection Robertson learned that these four batteries had all but exhausted the limited stock of ammunition transported in the limbers. Therefore the captain was compelled to send them to the rear to replenish their chests from the caissons. Once this necessary operation had been completed, the batteries returned to the front. After the last of the Confederate stragglers had entered the woods, Robertson ordered his gunners to open fire. On going into action the Rebel cannoneers concentrated their attention on the foe's infantry. At this time the Federals were massing their troops in the cornfield to the cannoneers immediate front.²⁷

Robertson's artillery concentration was supported on the right by the hard-riding cavalymen of Wharton's brigade, and on the left by the two units of Gibson's brigade--the 32d Alabama and 14th Louisiana Battalion--, which had not participated in the assault on the Union bridgehead. On discovering that the Confederate infantry had started to give way General Wharton immediately hailed a staff officer. The

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general sent the aide flying to the rear with orders for Colonel Thomas Harrison, to hold the general's brigade ready to cover Breckinridge's retreat. Upon receipt of these instructions, Harrison dismounted and deployed the brigade in the edge of the woods, in support of Robertson's artillery concentration. Wharton soon rejoined the brigade, and placed his stamp of approval to Harrison's dispositions. The cannoneers of White's battery were instructed to be ready to open fire on the oncoming blueclads.²⁸

General Preston now galloped up. He advised Wharton to have the battery hold its fire, "as he might fire on some of our men." This Wharton did. Preston then succeeded in re-forming the remnants of his brigade, alongside Wharton's rugged troopers.²⁹

The cavalry brigade, commanded by General Pegram, remained in the saddle. Pegram's unit was given the mission of picketing the country side between Wharton's right and the Lebanon pike.³⁰

Covered by the Confederate artillery, and its supporting cavalry and infantry, the badly shattered units constituting Pillow's, Tarbue's, and Gibson's brigades, fell back into the woods. Here the officers vainly sought to rally and reorganize their respective commands. Fortunately for the Rebel leaders, the Federals, taking account of the late hour and the rapid approach of darkness, refrained from launching an all out attack on Breckinridge's hasty improvised defense line.³¹

Of the Confederate officers submitting "After Action Reports", the only one who admitted that the retreat degenerated into a rout was

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- the outspoken Captain Robertson. The remainder of the Rebel leaders making reports, merely stated that some confusion accompanied the withdrawal. However, Robertson pulled no punches. In grim words the captain described the situation;

The contagion of flight had spread to the artillery, and it was with great difficulty that several pieces of artillery were brought away, owing to the drivers being frightened. In more than one instance I found it necessary to cock my revolver and level it in order to bring men to a realizing sense of their duty. I am clearly of the opinion that if there had been no artillery on that field the enemy would have gone into Murfreesborough easily that evening. There was no organization that I could see or hear of until after the enemy had been checked, save in the artillery. I have never seen troops so completely broken in my military experience. I tried myself, and saw many others try, to rally them; but they seemed actuated only by a desire for safety and beyond the reach of other sentiments. I saw the colors of many regiments pass, and though repeated calls were made for men of the different regiments, no attention was paid to them.³²

When Colonel Miller bellowed out the order to charge the batteries!, the men of the 78th Pennsylvania surged forward on the double. Not wishing to permit the boys from the east coast to get ahead of them, the troops of the 19th Illinois, 11th Michigan, and 69th Ohio also sprinted toward the guns. Off to Colonel Miller's left, the 21st Ohio likewise sprang to the attack. Breasting a storm of canister and spherical case the determined bluecoats, their bayonets fixed, closed in on the eight death dealing Confederate guns. When it became apparent that they would be unable to check the onslaught, the grim cannoneers, belonging to Semple's and Wright's batteries, commenced to limber up their pieces. But before they could escape, the Federals were upon

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them. In the ensuing struggle the men of Negley's division captured three of the eight guns. During the struggle for the guns, the hard-bitten infantry of the 68th Pennsylvania captured the colors of the 26th Tennessee.

While Miller's Yankees were engaged in the dirty, but highly necessary, task of mopping up the isolated pockets of resistance left by their rapid advance, they were subjected to a desultory bombardment. These guns which were firing on the bluecoats, were those which Robertson had massed. From their position in the edge of the woods, on the opposite side of the cornfield, the Southern artillerists sought to prevent Miller from reorganizing his command, preparatory to a resumption of the attack. Fortunately for the Federals the Rebels were using canister. And since they were beyond the maximum effective range, for that type of projectile, the Northerners suffered very little from this shelling.

Miller, observing that the rapid pursuit and excitement engendered by the capture of the three Rebel guns had thrown his command into considerable disorder, decided to halt and regroup. The regimental commanders on mustering their men, learned that they had all but exhausted their units of fire. In an effort to cope with this dangerous situation Miller sent an aide racing to the rear. The staff officer was instructed to urge General Negley to send reinforcements and ammunition to the front. If the requested men and ammunition arrived in the few minutes that remained before darkness set in, Miller

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proposed to hurl his command against the Rebel troops that had taken position on the other side of the cornfield. While the officers were busy re-forming their units, Colonel Stanley reached the scene. Following his arrival the colonel resumed command of his brigade.³³

Fighting their way up the hill the reorganized portions of Grider's and Price's commands, drove the men of the Consolidated Louisiana regiment and Lewis' combat team before them. The crest of the ridge from which Grider's troops had been previously driven recovered, the bluecoats pushed rapidly on. Reaching the edge of the cornfield, where Price's line of battle had originally formed, the revenged minded Federals sighted the eight Confederate guns. Obliquing sharply to the left, Grider's and Price's troops prepared to charge the cannon. Moving forward on the double the troops raced eagerly ahead, in hopes that they might reach the guns ahead of Miller's onrushing men. However, it appears that Miller's troops bested Grider's and Price's soldiers in the race for the guns--Though this is disputed by Colonel Grider. In his "After Action Report" the colonel recalled:

...rushing upon the enemy, [we] drove them with great slaughter from and past the ground which...[we] had occupied before the attack, the Eleventh Kentucky taking a stand of colors, and the three regiments [9th and 11th Kentucky, and 19th Ohio] capturing four of the enemy's guns (the Washington Artillery), the colors of the Nineteenth Ohio and the Ninth Kentucky Volunteers being first to reach them. Lieutenant-Colonel Cram, of the Ninth, and Major Mottley, of the Eleventh Kentucky, with myself, were the first mounted officers at these guns.³⁴

On several points in his account Grider is in error. According to the Confederate reports they lost only three guns (not four), and

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these pieces belonged to Wright's and Semple's batteries (not the Washington Artillery). In addition neither Grider's division commander (Beatty), nor his corps commander (Crittenden) specifically credited his brigade with the capture of the Confederate guns, in their "After Action Reports."³⁵ Whereas Rosecrans, Thomas, and Negley all credit Miller's attacking force with the capture of the Rebel field pieces.³⁶

The guns captured and the Confederates in full retreat, Grider's and Price's men paused for a few moments to catch their second wind. The unit commanders took this opportunity to reorganize their respective organizations. Like their comrades-in-arms in Negley's division the troops, found on examining their cartridge boxes, that they had all but exhausted their supply of ammunition. Under the confusion and strain engendered by the rapid advance, Union logistics had completely broken down. The army's ordnance officers found that it was utterly impossible to get the ammunition wagons to the front. Like Negley's troops, Grider's and Price's were forced to halt their advance, while vainly awaiting the arrival of the ordnance wagons.³⁷

Even before all of Hazen's brigade had reached the Hoover house, Grose's and Howard's troops had gone over to the attack. Moving resolutely forward these bluecoats easily brushed aside the hand-core elements of Preston's brigade, which covered Breckinridge's retreat. On his arrival at the Hoover house, Hazen reported that a most singular situation prevailed. Hazen noted in his "After Action Reports": "It was difficult to say which was running away the more rapidly, the

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division of... [Beatty's] to the rear, or the enemy in the opposite direction."³⁸ Before pushing on, after Grose's and Howard's rapidly advancing legions, Hazen ordered three of his regiments to take position at the Hoover house. These units would constitute a strategic reserve in case of a Union repulse. The brigade commander, accompanied by the 41st Ohio, then proceeded to the front. Upon overtaking Grose and Howard, Hazen, as ranking officer, took command of the attacking force.

Reaching the edge of the cornfield Hazen's troops, found Miller's men in possession of the three captured field pieces. A number of his units (those belonging to Grose's and Howard's brigades) having exhausted their ammunition, Hazen deployed his command. In general Hazen's troops occupied the ground held by Fyffe's brigade prior to the Confederate attack. During the course of their victorious sweep, Hazen's troops were somewhat disconcerted, when several of the Union batteries posted west of the river opened fire on them. Hazen immediately sent an aide to advise the battery commanders to correct their aim. Learning of their mistake the Union artillerists shifted targets. While the Northerners were taking position, they were fired on by some of Robertson's guns emplaced in the woods on the opposite side of the cornfield. When the 41st Ohio fired one volley in the direction of the masked Confederate guns, they fell silent.³⁹

On crossing the river Morton's pioneers pushed rapidly forward in the wake of Miller's attacking bluecoats. As they ascended the

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slope, lying to the east of the stream, the pioneers came under the fire of the Rebel batteries. But by the time Morton's troops had reached the cornfield, Miller's troops had forced the Confederate artillerists to flee. Observing that the Union officers were having considerable difficulty in regrouping their units, Morton deployed his brigade. The pioneers took position to the right of Hazen's command, a short distance in front of the line occupied by Price's brigade, immediately before the butternuts' attack.⁴⁰

After fording the river Davis' division moved rapidly to the front. But by the time Davis' panting infantry had reached the cornfield, darkness was rapidly descending. It was now too late for the Federals to exploit their success. Therefore the Union brass decided to recall the troops which had heretofore borne the brunt of the counter-offensive. Davis' division, reinforced by the pioneer brigade, was assigned the responsibility of holding the perimeter, which the Federal brass proposed to establish covering the approaches to the bridgehead.⁴¹

West of the river the Federals prepared to move against the Confederate troops, that had forced their way across the river. Palmer, upon being advised that Given's combat patrol had been unable to drive the greyclads across the river, decided to commit a stronger force. The general called upon General Cruft to send him two regiments. In response to his superior's request, the brigade commander rushed him the 31st Indiana and 90th Ohio. Once these two regiments reported to him, the general led them forward on the double. Reaching the edge of

the woods fronting the cornfield, where Given's combat patrol was deployed, Palmer roared out the command to fix bayonets!⁴²

While the regimental commanders were engaged in forming their men, preparatory to attacking, a third regiment reported to General Palmer. Previously Palmer had sent a staff officer to advise Colonel Gibson, that he was preparing to launch an attack on the Confederates. The aide was instructed to tell Gibson, that Palmer might need some assistance. Gibson, on being advised of this, sent the 32d Indiana to reinforce the general. Furthermore, with the Confederates (on the opposite side of the river in full retreat) Cruft found that he was now free to move to his division commander's support. Cruft immediately moved forward, accompanied by the 1st and 2d Kentucky regiments. However, before Cruft could reach the point of departure, Palmer had launched his attack.⁴³

Led by the general, the men of the 31st and 32d Indiana and 90th Ohio charged out of the woods and into the cornfield. Zacharie's Louisianians and Kentuckians, posted in the woods on the other side of the field, had only sufficient time to get off one volley, before the bluecoats had closed in upon them. Not wishing to cross bayonets with the Federals, the out numbered Rebels scattered. As it was beginning to get extremely dark, most of the buttermuts were able to escape. Filtering through the woods most of Zacharie's men succeeded in making their way to the ford, which lay to the west of Wayne's Hill. Crossing the river the greyclads rejoined their respective brigades.⁴⁴

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Cruft, accompanied by his two regiments, arrived on the scene shortly after Palmer's successful attack. At this time Palmer's men were industriously engaged in mopping up operations. Palmer, apprehensive lest the strong Rebel force posted east of Round Forest, attack his three regiments; directed Cruft to take position on his right.

After he had deployed his two regiments, Cruft ordered them to push cautiously forward. Having previously ascertained the position of a masked Confederate battery (About dusk the cannoneers assigned to Carnes' battery, had shifted their two 12-pounder howitzers farther to the right) emplaced northwest of the Cowan house ruins, Cruft directed his men to "cheer loudly" as they advanced into the rapidly gathering darkness. The shouting had the desired effect. For immediately after the "last cheer died away," Carnes' Tennesseans, unable to restrain themselves, opened fire. Hitting the ground the bluecoats took cover behind a small ridge's topographic crest. Here the Federals remained for the next half hour, while the Rebel cannoneers continued to spray the area with shrapnel. Once the buttermuts' guns fell silent, the Federal officers mustered their respective commands. Rolls were called, and it was found that only one man had been killed during the bombardment.⁴⁵

Once they had been relieved by Davis' troops, Negley's infantrymen recrossed the river. After drawing ammunition the division was again deployed in support of Mendenhall's artillery concentration. Upon moving into position the men of this hard-fighting division bivouacked for the night. The troops slept in line of battle.⁴⁶

Upon being withdrawn from the front the three brigades constituting Beatty's division (Grider's, Fyffe's, and Price's), bivouacked in the hollow south of the Hoover house. Here the "summer soldiers", who had scattered after fleeing across the river in the face of Breckinridge's attacking legions, rejoined their respective commands. When the ordnance wagons finally put in a belated appearance, the troops refilled their empty cartridge boxes.⁴⁷

Grose's regiment, on being relieved by Davis' men, reoccupied the positions they had held before the Confederate onslaught. As before Grose's brigade was given the task of guarding the approaches to the bridgehead's left flank.⁴⁸ The 41st Ohio, of Hazen's brigade, was pulled out of the line at the same time as Grose's troops. The Buckeyes then rejoined their parent unit. Hazen's brigade, which camped for the night near the Hoover house, would constitute a mobile reserve. Hazen being directed to hold his command ready to move to any threatened point on the perimeter, on a moment's notice.⁴⁹

Before any of these troops drawn from Negley's, Beatty's and Palmer's divisions were permitted to move to the rear, Davis had established and manned his main line of resistance. Davis deployed his division as follows: Woodruff's brigade on the left; Carlin's in the center; and Post's on the right. The right flank of Post's brigade rested near the river. The line occupied by Davis' command was near the middle of the cornfield. And about 300 yards in advance of the position held by Price's and Fyffe's brigades immediately before the Confederate attack.

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On occupying the designated ground, the brigade commanders covered their respective front's with a strong force of skirmishers. Working parties were organized, and put to work erecting breastworks. Logs, stones, and rails furnished the materials, from which these barricades were constructed. The three batteries which were organic to the division (the 5th and 8th Wisconsin, and 2d Minnesota) quickly took position, and unlimbered their guns.

While the troops were taking position they were exposed to a harassing fire from one of Robertson's batteries. A combat patrol drawn from the 35th Illinois was immediately thrown forward by Colonel Woodruff. Advancing on the double the bluecoats pushed to within easy musket range of the battery. Here Lieutenant Colonel William P. Chandler halted his command. The Yankees then opened fire on the battery. And after a number of volleys they succeeded in silencing it. When they returned from their successful sortie, the Illinoisans brought with them, as prisoners; the adjutant of the 41st Alabama, and 12 enlisted men.⁵⁰

Morton, in accordance with the instructions he had received from Davis, formed his brigade in close support of the Union main line of resistance. The 1st battalion anchored its right flank on the river, with the 3d battalion on its left. The 2d battalion constituted the reserve, and took position in rear of the 1st battalion. The Board of Trade Battery having crossed the river, was emplaced on a knoll in the interval which separated the 1st and 3d battalions. Morton's pioneers remained in position until about 9 p.m., when they recrossed

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the river. The Board of Trade Battery remained in position, and did not accompany the brigade, when it returned to the west side of the river.⁵¹

Two other batteries--the 8th Indiana and 3d Wisconsin--had also forded the river late on the afternoon of the 2d. The latter unit was held in reserve, while the former took position in support of Davis' division. On unlimbering their six guns, the Badgers found the ground which they now occupied, was in advance of where they had emplaced their pieces prior to the Confederates' attack.⁵²

One other Union unit was destined to reinforce the bridgehead on the evening of the 2d. Late in the afternoon General Hascall had received his marching orders from General Crittenden. According to the wing commander's instructions Hascall's division was to cross the river at McFadden's Ford. By the time Hascall's troops had commenced to ford the river, dusk had fallen. As the Union infantrymen waded the stream, they were subjected to a harassing fire, from the Rebel guns emplaced on Wayne's Hill. A combination of factors--the reduced visibility and extreme range--rendered the Southerners' shelling most inaccurate. And the division sustained no losses in crossing Stones River. By the time all the division's elements had reached the east bank, it was quite dark. Furthermore, by this time the sounds of battle to the east had all but abated.

On reaching the front Hascall's division took position on Davis' left. Hascall deployed his division as follows: Harker's brigade on

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the right; Colonel George D. Wagner's on the left. The brigade, commanded by Colonel George P. Buell, was held in reserve. The right flank of Harker's brigade abutted on Woodruff's left. At the same time Wagner partially refused his left flank, to prevent it from being turned. Once Hascall's men had gone into position, fatigue parties were organized, and put to work erecting barricades.⁵³

Following the arrival of Hascall's division and the departure of Morton's pioneers from the bridgehead, the Federal brass (ceased for the night) its frantic shifting of troops back and forth across the river. Except for the members of the hospital corps, who were searching for and succoring the wounded (both friend and foe); and the troops manning the picket lines and erecting breastworks; the soldiers occupying the perimeter slept in line of battle upon their arms. During the night it commenced to rain. This "Act of God" caused considerable suffering among the troops, who were already thoroughly chilled and damp from fording the river.

It had been Breckinridge's initial intention to rally his command, and stabilize his position in the edge of the woods, fronting the cornfield where Davis had deployed his division. But with the advent of darkness Captain Robertson became concerned over the infantry officers apparent inability to re-form and reorganize their shattered commands. Fearing a night sortie on the Federal's part Robertson decided to withdraw the artillery, from its close proximity to the Yankees' lines. It appears that the foray by the 36th Illinois had served to greatly

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disconcert and alarm Robertson. Therefore under the cover of darkness, Robertson had his guns displaced to the rear. The pieces were again unlimbered along another skirt of timber. Here Robertson was joined by some of Breckinridge's troops. Being unable to locate General Breckinridge, Robertson carried on the best he could. The guns were emplaced, and the stragglers organized and deployed in support. When Breckinridge finally put in an appearance, he approved Robertson's dispositions.⁵⁴

Shortly thereafter Brigadier General Patton Anderson's hard-fighting Mississippi brigade reached the front, and took position to the right of Robertson's guns. Early on the morning of the 2d Anderson's brigade had taken position in the rifle pits, which crowned the ridge which lay to the southeast of Round Forest. Not long after his troops had settled into their new position, Anderson received a message from General Bragg, directing him to cross the river and reinforce Breckinridge's division. The brigade moved off in column of fours. By the time the two leading regiments had crossed the river at the Nashville Ford, Anderson received a second message from Bragg. This dispatch countermanding the first. The brigade then retraced its steps and re-occupied the rifle pits. During the afternoon the 24th Mississippi infantry was thrown forward. The regiment's mission to bolster Scott's battery, which was emplaced northwest of the Cowan house ruins.

About the time that Breckinridge's troops surged forward in their all out assault on the Union bridgehead, Anderson received fresh instructions from Bragg. He was directed "to hasten with...[his] brigade to

"the support of General Breckinridge...." Since Anderson was not familiar with the terrain in that area, to which he had been ordered, the general sent a member of his staff-Lieutenant Colonel George W. Brent--to guide him.

Fording the river the troops moved forward on the double. After advancing about a mile Anderson's troops reached the woods, near where Breckinridge's officers were endeavoring to reorganize their shattered units. But by this time darkness had blanketed the area. Anderson's troops were then placed in position to the left of Robertson's guns, and skirmishers were thrown forward.⁵⁵

Fortunately for the Confederates the Federals did not choose to make a night attack. For the Confederate front, until an early hour on the morning of the 3d, was very weakly held. On the ~~right~~^{left} the Rebels' main line of resistance continued to rest on Wayne's Hill. As before the strategic hill was held by Hunt's combat team (the 9th Kentucky and Cobb's battery). Between the hill and Anderson's left flank was a gap of about 800 yards. This broad opening was covered by Robertson's artillery. The countryside to Anderson's right was patrolled by the cavalymen of Wharton's and Pegram's brigades. It was almost daybreak before Pillow's, Preston's, and Gibson's reorganized brigades again moved to the front. On doing so these three badly chewed up units went into position on Anderson's right.⁵⁶

Bragg was greatly disappointed by the failure of Breckinridge's onslaught. In his "After Action Report" he stated:

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The contest was short and severe; the enemy was driven back and the eminence gained, but the movement as a whole was a failure, and the position was again yielded. Our forces were moved, unfortunately, so far to the left as to throw a portion of them into and over...[Stones] River, where they encountered heavy masses of the enemy, while those against whom they were intended to operate on our side of the river had a destructive enfilade on our whole line. Our second line was so close to the front as to receive the enemy's fire, and returning it, took their friends in rear. The cavalry force was left [almost] entirely out of action.⁵⁹

Breckinridge, feeling that the army commander had cast aspersion on his leadership, replied:

And in regard to the action of Friday, the 2d of January, upon which the commanding general heaps so much criticism, I have to say, with the utmost confidence, that the failure of my troops to hold the position which they carried on that occasion was due to no fault of theirs or of mine, but to the fact that we were commanded to do an impossible thing. My force was about 4,500 men. Of these 1,700 heroic spirits stretched upon that bloody field, in an unequal struggle against three divisions, a brigade, and an overwhelming concentration of artillery, attested our efforts to obey the order.

In conclusion Breckinridge requested a court of inquiry.⁵⁸

In regard to the powerful artillery concentration which helped to smash Breckinridge's attack, there are a number of popular misconceptions. First, the number of guns employed by the Federals in repulsing the Rebels' attack was 57 not 58. The source for the latter number is found in Captain Mendenhall's report:

During this terrible encounter of little more than an hour in duration, forty-three [actually 45] pieces of artillery, belonging to the left wing, the Board of Trade Battery of six guns, and the batteries of General Negley's division, about nine guns [actually six], making a total of about fifty-eight pieces, opened fire upon the enemy. (italics added) ⁵⁹

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But a careful examination of the composition of the batteries involved indicates that the bluecoats employed 57 not 58 guns. Furthermore, the Federals did not emplace all the batteries employed against the attacking Confederates, on the commanding ground to the west of McFadden's Ford. Two six gun batteries (the 6th Ohio and 26th Pennsylvania) were emplaced a considerable distance to the southwest of the ford. Finally, six of the ten batteries (the three from Negley's division, the regular battery, 7th Indiana Battery, and Battery F, 1st Ohio) were in position on the ridge west of the ford, before Breckinridge launched his attack. After the greyclads had started to move forward, the Yankees succeeded in moving four additional batteries into position on the ridge (the Board of Trade, 8th Indiana, 3d Wisconsin, and Battery B, 1st Ohio).

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THE UNION ARTILLERY AND BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK

Chapter III

THE UNION COUNTER-ATTACK

Notes

- 1 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 434.
- 2 Ibid., 421-422, 424, 434.
- 3 Ibid., 434. Negley's troops crossed the river on a comparative broad front - extending from McFadden's Ford on the south, to the ford lying southwest of the Hoover house on the north.
- 4 Ibid., 429, 434, 518.
- 5 Ibid., 429, 434.
- 6 Ibid., 429, 434, 799, 801.
- 7 Ibid., 434.
- 8 Ibid., 425, 434.
- 9 Ibid., 588. It appears that three of the nine regiments which composed these two brigades (the 35th and 79th Indiana, and the 99th Ohio) had been scattered so badly, that their officers found it impossible to reform them in time to participate in the counter-attack.
- 10 Ibid., 562, 566, 568, 569-570, 571, 573, 599, 601, 606. The five units milling around northwest of the Hoover house were: the 23d Kentucky, and 24th Ohio, of Grose's brigade; the 44th and 86th Indiana, and 59th Ohio regiments, of Howard's brigade. The 13th Ohio, of Fyffe's brigade, had retreated across the river. Colonel Howard was in temporary command of Fyffe's brigade.

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- 11 Ibid., 547, 557-558.
- 12 Ibid., 244, 247, 248, 250.
- 13 Ibid., 307, 311, 315. The heavy losses suffered by the 49th Ohio and 39th Indiana (on the 31st) had forced Colonel Gibson to consolidate these two regiments.
- 14 Ibid., 265, 271, 282, 289.
- 15 Ibid., 833-834.
- 16 Ibid., 827.
- 17 Ibid., 797, 798-799.
- 18 Ibid., 808.
- 19 Ibid., 806. During the course of Confederate attack, the gallant Colonel Palmer had received three wounds. But the Colonel refused to relinquish the command of his unit until the conflict had ceased.
- 20 Ibid., 813, 815, 817, 820, 822.
- 21 Ibid., 588, 803.
- 22 Ibid., 808.
- 23 Ibid., 817, 824. Lieutenant John W. Mebane,, who subsequently assumed charge of the battery, tersely described the loss of the guns:

The gunner and two of the men of one of the lost pieces had gone to the rear with the captain's body, another one had been shot, and the others in the general panic had gone to the rear. This left not one to raise the trail except Sergeant [L. E.] Wright, who was unable to do it. Two horses of the limber of the other lost gun were shot down while moving the limber to the trail, and the men would have been captured had they remained to cut them out, so close had the enemy charged to them. Had our battery gone to the rear when the other batteries of the division did, we would have saved our guns; but being under the immediate supervision of the chief of artillery [Major Graves], we did not move without orders from him. Ibid., 824.

- 24 Ibid., 909-911.
- 25 Ibid., 759.
- 26 Ibid., 836-838.
- 27 Ibid., 759, 761.
- 28 Ibid., 969. When Wharton had ridden forward after the beginning of Breckinridge's attack, the general left Colonel Harrison in charge of his brigade.
- 29 Ibid., 813, 969.
- 30 Ibid., 969.
- 31 Ibid., 787, 799, 808, 827.
- 32 Ibid., 761.
- 33 Ibid., 408, 422, 427, 434-435.
- 34 Ibid., 588.
- 35 Ibid., 451, 577.
- 36 Ibid., 195, 374, 408.
- 37 Ibid., 588, 609, 615.
- 38 Ibid., 548.
- 39 Ibid., 548, 559, 562, 566, 568-570, 571, 573, 601, 603, 606. In reference to deploying his command Hazen noted:

I here formed the best line circumstances would admit of, the Forty-first Ohio Volunteers being the only regiment wholly in hand. The others /Grose's and Howard's regiments/ were badly broken; the only idea of their officers seeming to be to push on pell-mell, which, if carried beyond the point occupied, might have resulted disastrously.

- 40 Ibid., 244, 247-248, 250, 408.

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- 41 Ibid.,
- 42 Ibid., 519, 529.
- 43 Ibid., 307, 519, 529.
- 44 Ibid., 307, 519, 529, 797, 799.
- 45 Ibid., 529.
- 46 Ibid., 422, 435.
- 47 Ibid., 577, 588, 599-600, 609. Colonel Fyffe having recovered from his injuries on being thrown from his horse, had resumed command of his brigade.
- 48 Ibid., 562, 566, 568, 570-571, 573.
- 49 Ibid., 548, 557.
- 50 Ibid., 265, 272, 282, 289, 294. The 8th Wisconsin Battery was emplaced in the interval between Woodruff's and Carlin's brigades.
- 51 Ibid., 244, 247-251. On recrossing the river the pioneers were put to work on engineering projects - The 1st battalion building a bridge across Stones River, and the 2d and 3d battalions throwing up earthworks.
- 52 Ibid., 476, 583.
- 53 Ibid., 472, 481, 494, 504.
- 54 Ibid., 761.
- 55 Ibid., 765.
- 56 Ibid., 766.
- 57 Ibid., 668.
- 58 Ibid., 791.
- 59 Ibid., 456.

UNION ARTILLERY UNITS WHICH PARTICIPATED
IN THE REPULSE OF
BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK

Battery	Command	No. of Guns	Type of Guns	Rounds Expended	Casual- ties	Division Assignment	Corps Assignment
Chicago Board of Trade Battery	Captain James H. Stokes	6	Two James Rifles Four 6-pounder Guns			Pioneer Brigade	Crittenden's <i>25</i>
33th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery	Lt. George Estep	6	Two 12-pounder Howitzers Four 6-pounder Guns	209		Haskell's	Crittenden's
66th Battery, Ohio Light Artillery	Captain Cullen Bradley	6	Four 10-pounder Parrotts Two Napoleons	35		Haskell's	Crittenden's
Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery	Captain W. E. Standard	3	***			Falmer's	Crittenden's
Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery	Lt. Norval Osburn	4	***			Falmer's	Crittenden's
Batteries H and M, 4th U. S. Light Artillery	Lt. Charles C. Parsons	8	Four Napoleons * <i>4</i> 12 ^{pd} Howitzers Four 3-inch Rifles			Falmer's	Crittenden's
7th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery	Captain Geo. R. Swallow	6	Two Napoleons Four 10-pounder Parrotts		1 killed 2 wounded	Bentley's	Crittenden's
26th Battery, Pennsylvania Light Artillery	Lt. Alanson J. Stevens	6	Two James Rifles Four 6-pounder Guns			Bentley's	Crittenden's
3d Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery	Lt. Cortland Livingston	6	Four 10-pounder Parrotts Two 12-pounder Howitzers	300	2 wounded	Bentley's	Crittenden's

Battery	Commander	No. of Guns	Type of Guns	Rounds Expended	Casualties	Division Assignment	Corps Assignments
2d Battery, Kentucky Light Artillery	Lt. Alban A. Ellsworth	1	one 10-pounder Parrott	42		Negley's	Thomas's
Battery G, 1st Ohio Light Artillery	Lt. Alexander Marshall	2	one 12-pounder Howitzer one 6-pounder Wiard		1 killed	Negley's	Thomas's
Battery M, 1st Ohio Light Artillery	Capt. Frederick Schultz	3	****			Negley's	Thomas's

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- * One Napoleon dismantled during the engagement.
- ** Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery equipped with - four James rifles and two 6-pounder guns.
- *** Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery equipped with four James rifles and two 12-pounder Howitzers.
- **** Battery M, 1st Ohio Light Artillery equipped with two James Rifles and two 12-pounder Howitzers.

APPENDIX

BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

ORDER OF BATTLE BRECKINRIDGE'S ASSAULT

January 2, 1863

	K	W	M
Ereckinridge's Division - Major General John C. Ereckinridge			
1st Brigade - Colonel Randall L. Gibson		2	
32d Alabama Infantry - Lt. Col. H. Maury			
13th and 20th Louisiana Consolidated - Major C. Guillet	26	79	24
16th and 25th Louisiana Consolidated - Major F. C. Zacharie	4	17	4
14th Louisiana Infantry Battalion - Major J. E. Austin			
5th Battery, Washington Artillery (4 guns) - Lt. W. C. D. Vaught	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>28</u>
	31	100	28
2d Brigade - Brigadier General Gideon J. Pillow			
18th Tennessee Infantry - (Col. J. B. Palmer (W) (Lt. Col. W. R. Butler	17	107	8
26th Tennessee Infantry - Col. J. M. Lillard	9	78	17
28th Tennessee Infantry - Col. P. D. Cunningham (k)	11	56	9
45th Tennessee Infantry - Col. A. Searcy	12	79	17
Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery - Battalion (4 guns) - Lt. R. W. Anderson	<u>49</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>51</u>
	49	324	51
3d Brigade - Brigadier General William Preston			
1st and 3d Florida Consolidated - Col. W. Miller (w)	5	73	41
4th Florida Infantry - Col. W. L. L. Bowen	28	79	30
60th North Carolina Infantry - Col. J. A. McDowell	2	29	10
20th Tennessee Infantry - (Col. T. B. Smith (w) (Lt. Col. F. M. Lavender (Maj. F. Claybrooke	2	56	7
Wright's Tennessee Battery (4 guns) - Capt. E. E. Wright (K) Lt. J. W. Mebane	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>
	41	245	90

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	K	W	M
4th Brigade - Brigadier General R. W. Hanson (M W) Colonel Robert P. Trabue			
41st Alabama Infantry - Lt. Col. M. L. Stansel	16	94	38
2d Kentucky Infantry - Maj. J. W. Hewitt	13	70	21
4th Kentucky Infantry - (Col. Trabue (Capt. T. W. Thompson	6	49	69
6th Kentucky Infantry - Col. J. H. Lewis	2	29	14
*9th Kentucky Infantry - Col. T. H. Hunt			
*Cobb's Kentucky Battery (6 guns) - Capt. R. Cobb			
	<u>37</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>81</u>

* Remained on Wayne's Hill and did not participate in the attack.

Attached Artillery - Captain Felix H. Robertson

Robertson's Florida Battery (6 guns)		6	
Two Sections Semple's Alabama Battery (4 guns)			
Lt. E. J. Fitzpatrick	<u>1</u>	<u>19</u>	<u> </u>
	1	25	

Cavalry - Brigadier General John A. Wharton
Companies D and K, 8th Texas Cavalry
Anderson's Company, 4th Tennessee Cavalry
Huwald's Tennessee Battery (4 guns) -
Capt. G. A. Huwald

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APPENDIX

BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE VARIOUS UNION UNITS THAT PARTICIPATED

IN BRECKINRIDGE'S REPULSE

K W M

Pioneer Brigade - Brigadier General James S. Morton

1st Battalion - Capt. L. Bridges
2d Battalion - Capt. C. Hood
3d Battalion - Capt. R. Clements
Chicago Board of Trade Battery (6 guns) -
Capt. J. H. Stones

Right Wing

First Division - Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis
Company B, 36th Illinois Cavalry - Capt. S. B. Sherer
Company G, 2d Kentucky Cavalry - Lt. H. S. Parks

1st Brigade - Colonel P. Sidney Post
59th Illinois Infantry - Capt. H. E. Paine
74th Illinois Infantry - Col. J. Marsh
75th Illinois Infantry - Lt. Col. J. E. Bennett
22d Indiana Infantry - Col. M. Gooding

2d Brigade - Colonel William P. Carlin
21st Illinois Infantry - Col. J. W. S. Alexander
38th Illinois Infantry - Lt. Col. D. H. Gilmer
101st Ohio Infantry - Maj. I. M. Kirby
15th Wisconsin Infantry - Col. H. C. Heg

3rd Brigade - Col. William E. Woodruff
25th Illinois Infantry - Capt. W. Taggart
35th Illinois Infantry - Lt. Col. W. P. Chandler
81st Indiana Infantry - Lt. Col. J. Timberlake

Artillery

2d Battery, Minnesota Light Artillery (6 guns)
Capt. W. A. Hotchkiss
5th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery (5 guns)
Lt. C. B. Humphrey
8th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery (4 guns)
Lt. H. E. Stiles

Second Division

4th Brigade - Colonel William H. Gibson
89th Illinois Infantry - Lt. Col. C. T. Hotchkiss
32d Indiana Infantry - Lt. Col. F. Erdelmeyer
39th Indiana Infantry - Lt. Col. F. A. Jones
15th Ohio Infantry - Col. W. Wallace
49th Ohio Infantry - Capt. S. F. Gray

Center

Second Division - Brigadier General James S. Negley
2d Brigade - Colonel Timothy R. Stanley
19th Illinois Infantry - (Col. J. R. Scott (w)
(Lt. Col. A. W. Raffin
11th Michigan Infantry - Col. W. L. Stoughton
18th Ohio Infantry - Lt. Col. J. Givin
69th Ohio Infantry - Lt. Col. G. F. Elliott

3d Brigade - Colonel John F. Miller

37th Indiana Infantry - Lt. Col. W. D. Ward
21st Ohio Infantry - Lt. Col. J. M. Neibling
74th Ohio Infantry - Col. G. Moody
78th Pennsylvania Infantry - Col. W. Sirwell

Artillery

2d Battery, Kentucky Light Artillery (1 gun) -
Lt. A. A. Ellsworth
Battery G, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (2 guns) -
Lt. A. Marshall
Battery M, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (3 guns)
Capt. F. Schultz

Left Wing - Major General Thomas L. Crittenden
First Division - Brigadier General Milo S. Hascall

Artillery - Major Seymour Race

8th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery (6 guns) -
Lt. G. Estep
6th Battery, Ohio Light Artillery (6 guns) -
Capt. C. Bradley

Second Division - Brigadier General John M. Palmer

1st Brigade - Brigadier General Charles Cruft
31st Indiana Infantry - Col. J. Osborn
1st Kentucky Infantry - Col. D. A. Eryart
2d Kentucky Infantry - Col. T. D. Sedgewick
90th Ohio Infantry - Col. I. N. Ross

2d Brigade - Colonel William B. Hazen
 110th Illinois Infantry - Colonel T. S. Casey
 9th Indiana Infantry - Col. W. H. Blake
 6th Kentucky Infantry - Col. W. C. Whitaker
 41st Ohio Infantry - Lt. Col. A. Wiley

3d Brigade - Colonel William Grose
 84th Illinois Infantry - Col. L. H. Waters
 36th Indiana Infantry - Capt. P. Woodward
 23d Kentucky Infantry - Maj. T. H. Hamrick
 6th Ohio Infantry - Col. N. L. Anderson
 24th Ohio Infantry - (Capt. E. Weller (K)
 (Capt. A. T. M. Cockerill

Artillery - Captain William E. Standart
 Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (3 guns) -
 Capt. Standart
 Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (4 guns) -
 Lt. N. Osburn
 Batteries H and M, 4th U. S. Light Artillery (8 guns)
 Lt. C. C. Parsons

Third Division - Brigadier General Samuel Beatty
 1st Brigade - Colonel Benjamin C. Grider
 79th Indiana Infantry - Col. F. Knefler
 9th Kentucky Infantry - Lt. Col. G. H. Cram
 11th Kentucky Infantry - Maj. E. L. Mottley
 19th Ohio Infantry - Maj. C. F. Manderson

2d Brigade - Colonel James P. Fyffe
 44th Indiana Infantry - Lt. Col. S. C. Aldrich
 86th Indiana Infantry - Lt. Col. G. F. Dick
 13th Ohio Infantry - Maj. D. Jarvis
 59th Ohio Infantry - Lt. Col. W. Howard

3d Brigade - Colonel Samuel W. Price			
35th Indiana Infantry - Col. B. F. Mullen	22	82	33
8th Kentucky Infantry - (Lt. Col. R. May (W) (Maj. G. B. Broaddus	9	75	27
21st Kentucky Infantry - Lt. Col. J. C. Evans	12	36	9
51st Ohio Infantry - Lt. Col. R. W. McClain	24	122	44
99th Ohio Infantry - (Col. P. T. Swaine (W) (Lt. Col. J. E. Cummins	12	36	30
	<u>79</u>	<u>361</u>	<u>143</u>

Artillery - Captain George R. Swallow
 7th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery (6 guns)
 Capt. G. R. Swallow
 26th Battery, Pennsylvania Light Artillery (6 guns)
 Lt. A. J. Stevens
 3d Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery (6 guns) - Lt. C. Livingston

STATISTICAL REPORT OF ARTILLERY ASSIGNED TO BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION

<u>Batteries</u>	<u>Names of Officers</u>	<u>When</u>		<u>Whence</u>	<u>With what Rank</u>
		<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Discharged</u>		
Cobb's	Capt. Robert Cobb	July 16, 1861		Iyon County, Ky.	1st Lieutenant
	1st Lt. R. B. Matthews	July 16, 1861		do	Private
	2d Lt. B. A. James	July 16, 1861		do	Orderly Sergeant
5th Company, Washington Artillery	1st Lt. W.C.D. Vaught	Mar. 6, 1862		New Orleans	1st Lieutenant
	1st Lt. J. A. Chalaron	March 6, 1862		do	2d Lieutenant
	2d Lt. A. J. Leverich	March 6, 1862		do	Sergeant
Wright's	Capt. E. E. Wright	May 28, 1861		Fayette Co. Tenn.	Captain
	1st Lt. J. W. Mebane	Oct. 15, 1861		do	2d Lieutenant
	1st Lt. J. W. Phillips	June 3, 1861		do	Orderly Sergeant
	2d Lt. J. C. Grant			do	Private
Battery G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion	1st Lt. R. W. Anderson	April 1, 1862		Georgia	Lieutenant
	2d Lt. W. G. Allen	April 1, 1862		Georgia	Private

ORGANIZED

<u>Name</u>	<u>Where</u>	<u>When</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
Cobb's	Bowling Green, Ky.	Sept. 20, 1861	Capt. H. B. Iyon
5th Company, Washington Artillery	New Orleans, La. Jackson, Tenn.	Feb. 22, 1832 Oct. 15, 1861	----- Capt. J. W. Eldridge
Wright's	Georgia	April, 1862	Capt. Dawson

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LOSSES

<u>Batteries</u>		Shiloh	Farmington	Corinth	Vicksburg	Baton Rouge	Perryville	Stones River
Cobb's	Men Killed	12						2
	Men wounded	29			1	2		9
	Men missing							
	Total	<u>41</u>			<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>11</u>
	Pieces	2						
	Caissons	6						
	Horses killed	68			-			6
	Horses wounded	<u>10</u>				<u>2</u>		<u>2</u>
	Total	78				2		13
	Ammunition expended (rounds)	487				1,125	51	
5th Company, Washington Artillery	Men killed	6					1	3
	Men wounded	20	1				5	3
	Men Missing	—	—				—	—
	Total	26	1				6	6
	Horses killed	30	1				10	8
	Horses wounded	—	—				—	—
	Total	30	1				10	8
Pieces and Caissons								
Ammunition Ex- pended (rounds)	723	80					758	638
Wright's	Men Killed							6
	Men wounded							14
	Men missing							<u>2</u>
	Total							22
	Pieces							2
Horses killed							12	

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STATISTICAL REPORT OF ARTILLERY ATTACHED TO OR IN SUPPORT OF BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION

DURING ASSAULT ON JANUARY 2, 1863

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<u>Batteries</u>	<u>Names of Officers</u>	<u>When Enlisted</u>	<u>Whence</u>	<u>With what Rank</u>
Byrne's Kentucky Btry.	NO DATA			
Lumsden's	Lt. H. H. Gibbs Lt. E. Tarrant	Nov. 29, 1861 Nov. 29, 1861	Alabama Alabama	-- --
Robertson's	Capt. F. H. Robertson 1st Lt. H. H. Richardson 1st Lt. W. T. Stockton Lt. S. J. Benton	Mar. 1861 Feb. 8, 1861 Apr. 4, 1861 #	Texas Mississippi Florida --	2d Lieutenant Private Sergeant --
Sample's	Capt. H. C. Sample 1st Lt. E. J. Fitzpatrick 1st Lt. R. W. Goldthwaite 2d Lt. J. Pollard	Mar. 1862 do do do	Alabama do do do	Captain -- 2d Lieutenant --

ORGANIZED

<u>Name</u>	<u>Where</u>	<u>When</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
Byrne's	Kentucky	--	Capt. E. P. Byrne
Lumsden's	Alabama	Nov. 1861	Capt. C. L. Lumsden
Robertson's	Florida	Dec. 21, 1861	Capt. F. H. Robertson
Sample's	Alabama	March, 1862	Capt. Sample

LOSSES

Batteries	Shiloh	Farmington	Corinth	Vicksburg	Baton Rouge	Perryville	Stones River	
Byrne's								
							NO DATA	
Lumsden's		x	x			x	x	
		Lumsden's Battery lost men and horses at the battle of Farmington, Perryville and Stones River						
Robertson's	Men killed	2					2	
	Men wounded	17	1				23	
	Men missing	—	—				—	
	Total	19	1				25	
	Horses killed	23	3				26	
	Horses wounded	—	—				—	
	Total	23	3				26	
	Caissons lost						1	
Semple's	Men killed					2	1	
	Men wounded						19	
	Men missing					—	—	
						2	20	

Semple's battery lost one gun at Stones River.

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THE BATTERIES FROM POLK'S CORPS WHICH SUPPORTED BRECKINRIDGE'S
ATTACK

<u>Batteries</u>	<u>Names of Officers</u>	<u>When enlisted</u>	<u>Whence</u>	<u>With What Rank</u>
Carnes'	Capt. W. W. Carnes	June, 1861	Tennessee	Lieutenant
	1st Lt. L. G. Marshall	June, 1861	Tennessee	Private
	1st Lt. J. M. Cockrill	May, 1861	Tennessee	Private
Stanford's	Capt. T. J. Stanford	May 17, 1861	Grenada, Miss.	Captain
	1st Lt. H. R. McSyrine	do	do	1st Lieutenant
	2d Lt. J. S. McCall	do	do	Private
Scott's	Capt. W. L. Scott	-	-	-
	Lt. W. M. Polk	-	-	-
Smith's	1st Lt. W. B. Turner	July, 1861	Mississippi	Lieutenant
	1st Lt. C. S. Smith	Oct. 1861	Mississippi	do
	2d Lt. W. W. Henry	July, 1861	Mississippi	do
	2d Lt. B. T. Harmon	March, 1862	Mississippi	do

ORGANIZED

<u>Name</u>	<u>Where</u>	<u>When</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
Carnes'	Tennessee	1861	Capt. W. H. Jackson
Stanford's	Grenada, Miss.	May 17, 1861	Capt. T. J. Stanford
Scott's	Mississippi	NO DATA	Capt. M. Smith
Smith's	Mississippi	May, 1861	

LOSSES

Batteries	Belmont	Shiloh	Farmington	Corinth	Vicksburg	Baton Rouge	Perryville	Stones River
Carnes'							2	2
								5
							—	—
							2	7
							7	4

During the battle of Stones River the Battery fired from 300-350 rounds.

Stanford's This battery was engaged at Shiloh, Perryville, and Stones River. In the latter engagement the battery suffered a total of ten casualties -- 3 killed and 7 wounded. The unit also had 7 horses killed.

Scott's This battery had 1 killed and 2 wounded at Stones River.

Smith's	Men killed	2		1
	Men wounded	—	—	4
	Total	2		5
	Horses killed	40	1	8