

Cavalry Clash in the Sandhills

The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads, North Carolina, 10 March 1865*

The battle at [Monroe's Crossroads](#), fought on March 10, 1865, was one of the largest all-cavalry engagements of the [American Civil War](#). Though not a major battle in terms of its effect on the outcome of the war, it is of interest to historians for the role it played in General William T. Sherman's march through the Carolinas.



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* Staff Ride Study, National Park Service/U.S. Army joint publication, 1997. For more information,

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[More on Monroe's Crossroads](#)





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The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads

North Carolina

10 March 1865

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
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History About
Monroe's
Crossroads

Kenneth Belew

with an Introduction by
Kenneth Belew and Douglas D. Scott



Dedicated to the American Soldier

Prepared for:

United States Army
XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

By:

U.S. Department of the Interior
National Park Service
Midwest Archeological Center
Lincoln, Nebraska
and
Southeast Archeological Center
Tallahassee, Florida

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
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Firearm Type	Represented in Archeological Collection	Represented in Private Collection
.30-caliber (unknown)	--	Yes
.36-caliber (unknown)	--	Yes
.40-caliber (unknown)	Yes	--
Colt .44 revolver	Yes	--
Remington .44 revolver	Yes	--
.44 Henry rifle	--	Yes
12 mm revolver (?)	--	Yes
.50 Smith carbine	Yes	Yes
.51 Hall (?) carbine	Yes	Yes
.52 Sharps	Yes	Yes
.54 Starr carbine	--	Yes
.54 1841 rifle (?)	Yes	Yes
.54 Enfield/Austrian	Yes	Yes
.54 Burnside	Yes	Yes
.56-56 Joslyn	Yes	Yes
.56-56 Spencer	Yes	Yes
.577 Enfield	Yes (bullets)	Yes (musket parts)
.58 Springfield	Yes (bullets)	Yes (musket parts)
.69 muskets	Yes	Yes
Shotguns	Yes	Yes
3-Inch Ordnance Rifle	Yes (case & canister)	Yes (complete shell)
Total	20 firearms types	

Edged Weapons
Bayonet, triangular -- 4th (Provisional) Brigade
Saber -- Mounted units
Pistols
Model 1858 Remington Army revolver .44 inch
Model 1860 Colt Army revolver .44 inch
Rifles and Carbines

Springfield rifled musket .58 inch -- 4th (Provisional) Brigade
Smith carbine .50 inch
Sharps carbine .52 inch
Burnside carbine .54 inch -- 1st Alabama Cavalry Regiment
Spencer carbine .56-56 inch -- 5th Ohio Cavalry Regiment
Artillery
2 X (3-inch) Ordnance Rifle Cannon -- Stetson's Section, 10th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery
Projectiles: 3-Inch Hotchkiss shell and canister

Table 3	
Confederate Weapons at Monroe's Crossroads	
Edged Weapons	
Saber	
Pistols	
Model 1858 Remington Army revolver .44 inch	
Model 1860 Colt Army revolver .44 inch	
Unknown .40 inch	
Rifles, Muskets, and Carbines	
Model 1841 "Mississippi" rifle .54 inch	
Model 1841 South Carolina "Palmetto" rifle .54 inch	
Enfield musket .577 inch	
Rifled musket .58 inch	
Musket .69 inch	
Hall carbine .52 inch	
Smith carbine .50 inch	
Sharps carbine .52 inch	
Burnside carbine .54 inch	
Joslyn carbine .56	
Shotguns	
1, .40, .50, .58, .62 inch and Buck and Ball -- common in the Texas Brigade	

Table 4		
Weapons Capabilities		
Weapon Type	Effective Range	Rate of Fire
Pistols		
Colt revolver, six-shot	20-50 yards	6 rounds in 10 seconds
Remington revolver, six-shot	20-50 yards	6 rounds in 10 seconds
Rifles and Muskets		
U.S. rifled musket, muzzle loaded, .58 Inch	200-300 yards	3 rounds per minute

Enfield rifled musket, muzzle loaded, .577 Inch	200-300 yards	3 rounds per minute
Smooth-bore musket, muzzle loaded, .69 Inch	50-100 yards	3 rounds per minute
Carbines		
Spencer carbine, breech loaded, seven round magazine; the Spencer, "Quick Loader," ammunition box contained 8 magazines	150-200 yards	8 rounds in 20 seconds
Sharps carbine, breech loaded, single shot	150-200 yards	9 rounds per minute
Burnside carbine	150-200 yards	9 rounds per minute
Shotguns		
Single and double barrel	50-100 yards	3 rounds per minute
Artillery		
3-Inch ordnance rifle	1,800 yards	2 rounds per minute

Table 5
Weather and Light Conditions for Early March in the Monroe's Crossroads Area
 (Geis 1996)

Date	Sun Rise	Begin Morning Nautical Twilight	Sun Set	End Evening Nautical Twilight	Moon Rise	Moon Set	% Lunar Illumination
Wednesday March 1	06:45	05:50	18:07	19:02	09:10	22:52	24
Thursday March 2	06:43	05:48	18:08	19:03	09:56	23:57	33
Friday March 3	06:42	05:47	18:09	19:04	10:44	00:04	42
Saturday March 4	06:41	05:46	18:10	19:05	11:34	00:59	52
Sunday March 5	06:39	05:44	18:10	19:05	12:28	01:54	62
Monday March 6	06:38	05:43	18:11	19:06	13:31	02:44	72
Tuesday March 7	06:37	05:42	18:12	19:07	14:15	03:28	80
Wednesday March 8	06:35	05:40	18:13	19:08	15:11	04:08	87
Thursday March 9	06:34	05:39	18:14	19:09	16:06	04:45	94
Friday	06:33	05:38	18:15	19:10	17:00	05:18	97

March 10							
Saturday March 11	06:31	05:36	18:16	19:11	17:54	05:50	98

The prevailing winds in the Monroe's Crossroads area are from the southwest. The average wind speed is highest in the Spring, about nine miles per hour. Throughout March in 1865, the weather in southeastern North Carolina was cool and rainy. The frequent rains indicate that temperatures tended to be above freezing. The nights would have been colder than the days. Roads were wet and muddy. With the creeks and rivers running high, fording points and approaches to bridges were often flooded. Adjacent wetlands stayed at flood stage. The rain ceased before dawn on 10 March at Monroe's Crossroads.

During the night, visibility was poor, with the light from the moon limited because of the cloudy skies and rain. Because of the sparse population in the area, there was little, if any, ambient light from towns or homes. Distant stores of turpentine, tar, and pitch, set ablaze by the Union Army, possibly reflected off the clouds. Campfires lit by Kilpatrick's Cavalry would have revealed the location of the Union camp.

Twilight on 10 March began at 05:38. Sunrise occurred at 06:33. During the Confederate assault, ground fog obscured low areas along Nicholson Creek. The fog probably dissipated completely about an hour after sunrise.



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Acknowledgements

William H. Kern of Fort Bragg, North Carolina developed the proposal for the Monroe's Crossroads staff ride and secured funding through the Legacy Resource Management Program. John H. Jameson, Jr., of the Southeast Archeological Center, National Park Service, Tallahassee, Florida provided us the opportunity to develop this document. Linda Zumpe and Joyce Hawthorne of the Midwest Archeological Center, Lincoln, Nebraska, provided administrative support and managed to iron out several wrinkles to keep us going. Judy Hewett of Southern Pines, North Carolina drew the situation maps. Martin Pate of Newnan, Georgia executed the oil paintings of the battle. Sharyn Kane and Richard Keeton of Marietta, Georgia edited and designed the staff ride.

We owe a debt of gratitude to Wilbur S. Nye (Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired) whose early research into the battle provided a foundation for our work. Stanley M. Dahl (First Sergeant, U.S. Army, Retired) and James Legg collected and preserved relics from the battlefield. They generously shared their research. In addition to various well-known accounts, we searched for long neglected historical sources and integrated them into the narrative. We tried to dispel the myths and apocryphal stories which have grown up about the battle by putting the events described in the appropriate historical context. Finally, we endeavored to take a fresh look at the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads with a view toward training American soldiers in the art of war.



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Introduction

The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads Staff Ride: An Exercise in Leadership Training

Kenneth Belew and Douglas D. Scott

The staff ride concept was pioneered at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in the 1890s. By 1906 the first staff ride had taken place at the Chattanooga battlefield, Tennessee. The concept continues to evolve today. The staff ride concept is meant to expand and supplement [Field Manual \(FM\) 100-5, Operations, June 1993](#), by placing soldiers, well grounded in the theory of battle, on actual battle sites to study and critique the tactics and strategy of that engagement. The staff ride concept is one that takes the study of war and warfare from the theoretical to the practical by using historical examples on the actual terrain where the battle occurred.

The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads was fought on 10 March 1865 by a Union cavalry force consisting of two brigades and one artillery section of the 3rd Cavalry Division under the direct command of Brevet Major General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, U.S.A., and *Hampton's Cavalry Command*, consisting of *Wheeler's Cavalry Corps* and *Butler's Cavalry Division*, under the direct command of *Lieutenant General Wade Hampton, C.S.A.* The action was fought with both mounted and dismounted troops, the Federal troops dismounted and the Confederate troops generally mounted. This staff ride uses the convention of setting Confederate units, ranks, and names in italics.

The Civil War had little more than a month to run in its bloody course when the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads was fought. Confederate armies were depleted and nearly exhausted after four years of bitter fighting while the Union retained major reserves of manpower and material. The Confederates retreated before General Sherman's March to the Sea. On 20 December 1864, they evacuated Savannah, Georgia and later Charleston, South Carolina. Following the fall of the state capitol, Columbia, on 16 February 1865, the Confederates conducted delaying actions across the Carolinas, buying time to concentrate their forces. The Confederate Army intended to force a major battle in North Carolina, hoping to set the stage by defeating Federal columns before they could join together. If this effort proved successful, the Confederate Government still hoped to enter into negotiations with the United States for a cessation of hostilities on favorable terms.

President Lincoln and the Army's commander, General Ulysses S. Grant, U.S.A., intended to crush the rebellion and reunite the Union. The only conclusion to the war they would accept was complete capitulation of the Confederate States of America, with an eventual goal of an entirely reunited United States of America.

SETTING THE STAGE

Monroe's Crossroads was a small Civil War battle involving about 4,000 men. The action was an engagement of mounted Confederate cavalry against dismounted Union cavalry. The fight lasted several hours on the morning of 10 March 1865.

The Confederate assault was a deliberate attack against a poorly guarded and sleeping Union camp. While initially routed, the Federal cavalry recovered and counterattacked, pressuring the Confederates to relinquish the camp.

Anticipating the approach of Federal infantry, the Confederate commanders ordered their troops to disengage from the action. Then *Hampton's Cavalry Command* withdrew in good order toward Fayetteville, North Carolina.

The Confederate attack delayed the Federal Cavalry's movement toward Fayetteville, denying Brevet Major General Kilpatrick the honor of entering the town first.

The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads gained the additional time needed for the Confederate infantry to conduct an organized crossing of the Cape Fear River at Fayetteville unmolested by the advancing Federals. With their troops and equipment east of the Cape Fear, the Confederate Army burned the bridges as the Union forces entered the city.

SMALL ARMS AT MONROE'S CROSSROADS

Immediately prior to the Civil War, a technological revolution, the development of the rifled-musket, overtook tactical doctrine and had immense consequences for the first three years of the war ([Coates and Thomas 1990](#); [Griffith 1989](#); [McKagen and Coleman 1976](#); [Weller 1971](#)). Napoleonic tactics of shoulder-to-shoulder massed infantry assaults resulted in high casualty rates when pitted against the rifled-musket which had an effective range of more than 1,000 yards. Tactics had adapted to the technology by the war's end, and the cavalry were no exception. Prior to the Civil War, an attacking force enjoyed a great advantage. The tactics and firearms in use at the time were not enough to counter the sheer momentum of a well-executed attack.

During the Civil War, the attackers' advantage was diminished. Rifling and conical bullets increased effective ranges and accuracy; percussion caps and fixed rounds increased the rate of fire and reliability of small arms. It was not uncommon in Civil War battles for an attacking force to suffer 40 to 50 percent casualties before closing with a defending foe or being repulsed.

At Monroe's Crossroads an extensive variety of small arms were used ([Scott and Hunt 1998](#)), from the most advanced magazine-fed carbine to earlier model muskets and shotguns.

While a degree of uniformity existed within the Regiments of the Federal Cavalry, the Confederate Cavalry was armed with an extensive assortment of makes and calibers. Being armed with such a variety of weapons created logistical problems for the Confederate Cavalry. The Confederates' deficiency in all classes of supply prompted them to be alert for the opportunity to secure additional food, weapons, ammunition, and mounts. Their necessary habit of acquiring supply by confiscation and battlefield pick-up exacerbated their logistical problems.

Union cavalrymen were well armed and equipped by war's end ([Todd 1974](#); [1977](#); [1978](#)). Each man was generally armed with a six-shot revolving cylinder percussion pistol, a saber, and a carbine. The pistol was generally a .44-caliber Colt or Remington revolver. However, some men preferred the lighter weight .36-caliber Colt Navy revolver to the larger caliber models. Each man carried at least 24 rounds of ammunition for the revolver. The cartridge, carried in a leather pouch hung on the saber belt, was a self-contained linen or nitrated paper cartridge with a black powder propellant charge and a lead conical bullet. Round ball bullet rounds were also used. Each soldier also carried a supply of percussion caps to prime the nipple of his revolver for firing. Archeological evidence from the Monroe's Crossroads battlefield demonstrates that the Colt and Remington .44-caliber revolvers were the favored pistols, although at least one metallic cartridge revolver was also used, a 12mm pinfire pistol. The saber, although rarely used in combat during the

latter years of the war, was nevertheless a standard issue item. Generally, cavalry carried the Model 1859 (also known as the Model 1860) light cavalry saber. Many volunteer regiments armed themselves with a saber of similar style, although foreign-made.

There were numerous types of carbines in many different calibers issued to cavalry units during the latter years of the Civil War. The Union regiments at Monroe's Crossroads were variously armed with single-shot .52-caliber Sharps breechloading carbines (percussion ignition with a nitrated paper or linen cartridge), .54-caliber Burnside breechloading carbines (percussion ignition with a metallic cartridge case), .56-56-caliber Joslyn breechloading carbine (rimfire metallic cartridge), and the magazine-fed repeating seven-shot .56-56-caliber Spencer carbine (rimfire metallic cartridge). In addition, the dismounted 4th Brigade (Provisional) was armed with either the .58-caliber or .577-caliber rifled-musket issued with an 18-inch long triangular bayonet. Each soldier carried his ammunition in a leather pouch, separate from the pistol cartridge pouch, on the leather saber belt. Generally each man was issued 40 rounds of ammunition, which was expected to last the length of almost any battle.

The rifled-musket and various carbines used conical lead bullets. The carbines had a shorter lethal range than the rifled-musket, ranging from 500 to 750 yards. However, most battles were fought at ranges of 200 yards or less, very often at 100 yards or less, and even hand-to-hand. Confederate small arms, by late in the war, were diverse. They were a mixture of Confederate arsenal manufactured weapons, imported firearms, and captured Union weapons. The Confederates were particularly fond of Union breechloading carbines and took them as trophies of war whenever possible. Ammunition had to be captured as well because the Confederate arsenals were unable to produce adequate supplies of ammunition for their own weapons, let alone captured Union weapons of unusual caliber. Some Confederate units at Monroe's Crossroads were armed with single and double barrel shotguns as their primary weapons.

Only one Confederate account provides any specificity to the armament at Monroe's Crossroads. *Colonel Charles C. Jones', C.S.A.* ([Dodson n.d.: 408-420](#)), report of inspection for January and February 1865 notes ammunition itself was in short supply. The men were noted to be carrying from 35 to 40 rounds per man as an average. The report noted *Lieutenant General Joseph Wheeler's, C.S.A.*, ordnance train carried an ammunition reserve of only slightly more than 40 rounds per man. The armament of the men was identified as mixed. Most men carried the Colt Navy or Army revolver, but the shoulder arms were a mixed lot.

As a general rule, there is a great want of uniformity in the armament of this command. The principal weapons in the hands of the men are the long and short Enfield rifle, the Springfield musket, the Austrian rifle, a variety of breech-loading rifles, viz.: the Spencer, the Burnside, Sharp, Maynard, & c., and various kinds of pistols.

Many, if not all, of the breech-loading rifles and pistols are captured arms; for some of them, as the Spencer, there is great difficulty in procuring the requisite amount of ammunition, the supply now in the cartridge boxes of the men, and in the ordnance train, having been obtained exclusively by capture.

With such a variety of calibers, and in view of the fact that the supply is at best but limited and uncertain, for at least some of the guns mentioned, it becomes almost a matter of impossibility to secure at all times the proper amount of ammunition.

There should be a greater uniformity in the armament of the regiments, and if possible brigades ([Dodson n.d.: 408-420](#)).

The best evidence for small arms use at the battle is derived from the archeological record. [Table 1](#) shows there is a true diversity in small arms types and caliber used in the battle, as evidenced in the archeological findings.

Nevertheless, this diversity is typical of most Civil War battles where standardization of arms and ammunition was not a major component of the Quartermaster and Ordnance Departments. They were the branches then in charge of development and procurement of arms.

[Tables 2](#) and [3](#) list additional weapons used at the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads as gathered from various historical sources. Capabilities of the various weapons used in the battle are listed in [Table 4](#).

FIELD ARTILLERY

Prior to and during the Civil War, there were a number of advances in artillery systems. However, their effects were less dramatic than those of small arms. Development of new types of projectiles and fuzes produced more lethal but less reliable artillery ammunition. Rifling of cannon tubes increased ranges, but did little to improve accuracy.

Many Civil War soldiers continued to prefer the older smoothbore cannon. In a desperate fight, a dependable old piece firing solid shot at long range, followed by canister, then double canister, could devastate an approaching enemy battle line. Artillery of the time was always employed in a direct fire mode to augment the fire of the infantry ([Dastrup 1994](#); [Griffith 1989](#); [Naisawald 1960](#); [Ripley 1984](#)).

Although there was experimentation with artillery organization, the traditional technique of providing artillery support by imposing a command relationship between the artillery unit and the supported unit continued. The practice of assigning or attaching artillery to maneuver organizations tended to decrease its effectiveness by precluding the massing of fire on lucrative targets at critical times.

Luckily for Civil War soldiers, the greatest advance in artillery would not come until after the war, with the advent of a recoil mechanism and indirect fire.

A single section of two, wrought-iron 3-Inch Ordnance Rifles (Model 1861) were present at Monroe's Crossroads. The 3-Inch Ordnance Rifle was a muzzle-loading gun served by a crew of eight. It fired elongated projectiles with a lead driving band around the iron shot or shell. It fired shell, case shot, or canister shot. Shell and case shot were exploded by one of three types of nose fuze (a paper or wooden time fuze trimmed to burn for one to five seconds and a percussion fuze). Shell was a hollow, soft iron, elongated projectile filled with black powder. When the projectile burst, it spread large chunks of iron fragments meant for antipersonnel effect. Case shot, used in a similar manner as shell, was an elongated projectile containing a black powder charge and many .69-caliber lead balls.

[Read more about the 3-Inch Ordnance Rifle](#)



Lethal range was up to 3,000 yards. Generally, artillery was employed at much shorter ranges. Canister was usually used at ranges of less than 400 yards. It was a sheet iron can filled with lead balls or .75-inch iron balls. It was used strictly as an antipersonnel round. In extreme cases, the guns could be double charged with canister, a rather desperate maneuver. Archeological evidence from Monroe's Crossroads demonstrates that the shell

and case shot fired during the battle were of the Hotchkiss type (a well-known manufacturer of artillery ammunition during the war).

TACTICS

Tactical Doctrine during the early years of the Civil War was heavily influenced by the Napoleonic Wars and the United States' War with Mexico (1846-1848) ([Griffith 1989](#)). Close-order infantry assaults with bayonets

gleaming, cavalry charges with sabers flashing, and direct fire by artillery in front of the line gave way to more discrete tactics by 1863. Both Union and Confederate commanders saw appalling casualty rates using these tactics against the commonly used rifled-musket. Artillery was no longer able to mass to the front of an infantry line and pound the enemy. The range of the rifled-musket was equal to that of the artillery, allowing the infantryman to pick off gun crews at will. The time-honored cavalry charge to break the infantry line was no longer feasible, again due to the long range and accuracy of the rifled-musket. Again, the infantryman could easily decimate a cavalry charge before it was well underway.

Finally, the infantryman armed with the rifled-musket could destroy a close-order infantry charge well beyond the traditional 100-yard firing range of the old smoothbore musket.

By the last years of the war, tactics had adapted to the effectiveness of modern rifled arms. Infantry tactics were modified to open order skirmish lines, with available cover used whenever possible. Defensive positions were usually fortified with extensive entrenchments. Even short-term camps were usually protected by prepared rifle pits, picket posts, and videttes.

Although used extensively throughout the war, artillery, by 1863, became a defensive weapon rather than the offensive weapon it had been in 1861. Artillery was required to move behind the line of defense to be effective due to the increased range of the rifled-musket. Artillery tactics of the Civil War depended upon direct fire. Indirect fire would not be developed for another 40 years. The direct fire concept relegated the artillery to a defensive role throughout the Civil War and for many years after.

Of the three combat branches, cavalry made the greatest adaptation. In battle, cavalry moved from the close-order charge meant to break or out-flank a line to a mobile unit that could move quickly to the scene of action, then dismount and fight as light infantry. With the advent of breech loading single-shot and repeating carbines, cavalry firepower increased dramatically. This increased firepower and mobility allowed the cavalry to regain a usefulness on the battlefield it had lost with the introduction of the rifled-musket. Cavalry was also used extensively throughout the war as a fast and efficient scouting and intelligence gathering arm. Its mobility allowed units to range far and wide around the main army to protect the marching columns and scout the opponents' movements. Kilpatrick's Division was involved in this type of protection screen and scouting endeavor when he halted to camp at Monroe's Crossroads on the night of 9 March 1865. *Lieutenant General Hampton's* Confederate Cavalry force was providing a mobile rear-guard function for the retiring Confederate Army of *General Joseph E. Johnston, C.S.A.* *Lieutenant General Hampton's* Cavalry also scouted and provided intelligence on Union movements and at Monroe's Crossroads took the opportunity to raid a sleeping, unprepared Union camp with the intention of delaying their movement toward Fayetteville.

Introduction (continued)

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THE BATTLE STAFF RIDE EXERCISE

The goal of the staff ride exercise ([Robertson 1987](#)) at Monroe's Crossroads is to assess the action based on an analysis of the historical narrative and on-site observation against the principles of war as outlined in [FM 100-5 \(Operations\)](#). The principles of war were not set down in a training regulation until 1921. However, many of these concepts were developed during the Civil War. Most senior Union and Confederate commanders were graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. They were well versed in the art of war, as then practiced.

Technological innovations, such as the rifled-musket, required changes in tactics to meet the new situations. Dogmatic commanders tended to be replaced by those able to adapt to field conditions during the latter years of the war. Those present at Monroe's Crossroads had learned their lessons well, but tired, saddle-weary, rain-soaked, combat-hardened veterans did make mistakes during the battle. These mistakes were paid for by their soldiers. The lessons of Monroe's Crossroads, relative to the principles of war, require a careful assessment of the movements of the commands, deployment of troops, offensive action, defensive action, unit cohesion, and unit disintegration.

THE TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS ([FM 100-5](#))

Whenever Army forces are called to fight, they fight to win. Army forces in combat seek to impose their will on the enemy. Victory is the objective, no matter what the mission. Nothing short of victory is acceptable. The fundamental tenets of Army operations doctrine describe the characteristics of successful operations. In and of themselves they do not guarantee victory, but their absence makes winning difficult and costly to achieve.

The tenets are:

Initiative:

The ability to set or to change the terms of battle. In the attack, initiative implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack. In the defense, initiative implies quickly turning the tables on the attacker. In battle, initiative requires the decentralization of decision authority to the lowest practical level.

Agility:

The ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy. A mental and physical quality, it is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. The accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties, and confusion of battle creates friction that impedes both sides.

Depth:

The extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. Operations are conducted throughout the depth of the battlefield with the aim of defeating the enemy more rapidly by denying freedom of action and disrupting or destroying the coherence and tempo of its operations.

Synchronization:

The ability to focus resources and activities in time and space to provide maximum relative combat power at the decisive point.

Versatility:

The ability of units to meet diverse challenges, shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently.

THE DYNAMICS OF COMBAT POWER (FM 100-5)

Four primary elements combine to create combat power - the ability to fight.

The elements are:

Maneuver:

The movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver either direct or indirect fire upon the enemy. Maneuver is the means of positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effects, and moral dominance.

Firepower:

The destructive force essential to defeating the enemy's ability and will to fight. It is the amount of fire that may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system.

Protection:

Conserving the fighting potential of a force so that commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place. Protection has four components: operational security, conservation of soldiers' health, morale, and equipment readiness, safety, and avoidance of fratricide.

Leadership:

The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and confident leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR (FM 100-5)

Objective:

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy armed forces and the enemy's will to fight.

Offensive:

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.

Mass:

Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. To mass is to hit the enemy with a closed fist, not poke at him with the fingers of an open hand. Mass seeks to smash the enemy, not sting him.

Economy of Force:

Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose.

Maneuver:

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through flexible application of combat power.

Unity of Command:

For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all forces are under one responsible commander.

Security:

Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces.

Surprise:

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power.

Simplicity:

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult.

STAFF RIDE PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES

(Robertson 1987)

The staff ride is a versatile educational tool. In a general sense, its sole purpose is to further the professional development of U.S. Army leaders. Specifically, it may be designed to achieve one or more objectives, depending upon the needs of the students and the circumstances under which the staff ride is conducted. Some of these specific objectives are:

- To expose students to the dynamics of battle, especially those factors which interact to produce victory and defeat;
- To expose students to the "face of battle", the timeless human dimensions of warfare;
- To provide case studies in the application of the principles of war;
- To provide case studies in the operational art;
- To provide case studies in combined arms operations or in the operations of a single arm or branch;
- To provide case studies in the relationship between technology and doctrine;
- To provide case studies in leadership at any level desired;
- To provide case studies in unit cohesion;
- To provide case studies in how logistical considerations affect operations;
- To show the effects of terrain upon plans and their implementation;
- To provide an analytical framework for the systematic study of campaigns and battles;
- To encourage officers and NCOs to study their profession through the use of military history;
- To kindle or reinforce an interest in the heritage of the U.S. Army.

A carefully designed and implemented staff ride can attain simultaneously all of these objectives and more.

CONDUCTING A STAFF RIDE

The Instructor Team

The Instructor Team members are the central figures in the design and conduct of a successful staff ride. Although National Park Service rangers, licensed guides, and local historians may assist materially, they cannot be expected either to understand the particular educational focus of the exercise or to design a program with the U.S. Army's needs in mind.

Instructor Team Requirements

- Be thoroughly conversant with sources, both primary and secondary;
- Understand the operational, organizational, doctrinal, and technological context in which the battle took place;
- Be conversant with biographical information on commanders and key individuals;
- Know the order of battle, unit strengths, and weapon capabilities;
- Be thoroughly conversant concerning movements and operations and be able to distinguish those events chronologically;
- Be able to analyze the battle and determine factors significant to the historical outcome;
- Know the ground;
- Be able to interpret the events of the battle in terms of current U.S. Army doctrine and assist students in deriving usable lessons from the comparison;
- Work to refine and improve the staff ride by developing new sources, new field study routes, more effective training aids, and greater subject-matter expertise;
- Ensure a range request, Fort Bragg Form 1528, is submitted to Range Control six weeks prior to the field study phase. The battlefield is located in Training Area Z1.

STAFF RIDE PHASES

PHASE I - Preliminary Study

If the student has not been well prepared about the purpose of the exercise, the organizational and operational setting of the battle, and the significant events of the action, and if the student has not become intellectually involved in the process of study, then the exercise becomes more of a historical battlefield tour. The preliminary study phase is critical to the success of the field study phase.

The preliminary study phase may take various forms, depending on time available and student needs. The possible forms include formal classroom instruction, individual study or a combination of both.

The optimum preliminary study phase combines lecture, individual study, and group discussion. To get students more actively involved, instructors may assign specific subjects to be researched by small groups or individuals. These mini-experts are then available to brief, answer questions, and provide input during the field study phase. This is an excellent technique for ensuring student participation and group discussion. Various factors will affect subject assignments. However, appropriate subjects could include key personalities, specific units, critical events or a battlefield operating system.

In any form, the preliminary study phase must accomplish the following:

First: Ensure the students clearly understand the purpose and objectives of the exercise;

Second: Ensure the students become actively involved;

Third: Provide the basic knowledge to a general understanding of the battle to include:

- Order of battle, strength, and doctrine of the opposing forces;
- Biographical information on significant individuals;
- The tactical situation and mission of the opposing forces;
- Equipment and weapons' characteristics;
- Terrain and weather considerations;

- General outline and chronology of significant events;
- Bibliography or read-ahead packet;
- Map.

Students must develop an intellectual perception of the battle that will be either reinforced or modified during the field study phase.

PHASE II - Field Study

The field study phase readily distinguishes the staff ride from other forms of systematic historical study. It culminates all previous efforts by instructors and students to understand selected historical events, to analyze the significance of those events, and to derive relevant lessons for professional development. If the preliminary study phase has been systematic and thorough, the field phase reinforces ideas already generated. The field study phase is the most effective way to stimulate the students' intellectual involvement and ensure any conclusions reached during the staff ride process are retained.

Design

- The field study phase should be designed to visit all significant sites associated with the battle. If only a portion of the field can be visited, the instructor must summarize what occurred elsewhere.
- The route should be designed to visit sites in chronological order. Avoid backtracking.
- Plan stops or stands along the way for historical significance, visual impact, vignette suitability, or logistical necessity.
- The route schedule should be flexible, allowing for unplanned stops to address issues raised by the students.
- Ease of access should be considered during route selection. However, this should not override other considerations such as chronological development and site significance.
- The instructor team should traverse the route to discover timing or other problems that might interfere with successful completion of the field study phase.

Conduct

- The instructor team should make every effort to maintain intense student involvement by removing distractions and keeping attention focused on the exercise.
- The instructor team must ensure that students are correctly oriented both chronologically and spatially. A partial solution is to have all students carry compasses and maps, along with their documentary material.
- A simple technique to enhance both involvement and orientation is the use of first-person accounts or vignettes at specific stops on the route. These personal accounts are essential to battle analysis because they provide important information on the attitudes, perspectives, and mental state of the participants, the vital human dimension of battle.
- Training aids can orient students, clarify complex maneuvers, and create immediacy. Such aids may include situation maps, overlays, sand tables, and diagrams.
- The size of the student party and the instructor to student ratio will help determine the quality of the field study phase. In most cases, 35 to 40 students are the most a single instructor can lead and still retain any degree of personal interchange. A much more effective ratio is one instructor for every 15 to 20 students.

PHASE III - The Integration Phase

No matter how detailed the preliminary study or how carefully crafted the field study, a truly successful staff ride requires a third and final phase. This integration phase is a formal or informal opportunity for the students to reflect on their experience.

Several positive effects stem from the integration phase. First, it requires students to analyze the previous phases and integrate what they learned in each into a coherent overall view. Second, it provides a mechanism through which students may organize and articulate their impressions of both the battle and the lessons they derived from its study. Third, students may gain additional insights from sharing these impressions with their peers. Finally, the instructor team may use the integration phase to solicit student comments on its performance and suggestions for improvement.

The integration phase may be conducted on the battlefield immediately following the field study phase or back in your unit area. However, the integration phase is most successful when it follows field study as closely as circumstances permit.

An instructor should moderate discussion. He should allot enough time for all who wish to speak and for a complete discussion of any issues raised.

Sources of Information

Primary sources are documents produced by participants or eyewitnesses. Included among primary sources are official documents such as after- action reports, orders, messages, strength reports, unit journals, letters, maps, diaries, and reminiscences.

Secondary sources are accounts of events produced by nonparticipants. Secondary sources are most often narrative in form and analytical in nature. Valuable as they are, secondary sources should not be the sole materials furnished to staff ride students.

Secondary Benefits

Although professional military education is sufficient reason for devoting time and resources to a staff ride, certain secondary benefits may accrue as well. These benefits spring from the fact that, for many participants, a visit to a battlefield is an emotional experience that may reinforce their feelings for their profession, their units, and one another. If participants belong to the same unit, their shared experiences during the exercise may strengthen the camaraderie and *esprit* so necessary for unit cohesion. If promotions or individual achievement awards are due to be conferred at the time of the staff ride, there can be no better setting for the ceremony than a site hallowed by earlier deeds of sacrifice and valor.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The design and conduct of a staff ride is not a simple task. A staff ride requires subject matter expertise, intelligently applied in a systematic way, to guide professional soldiers through the most complex of intellectual exercises - the analysis of battle in all its dimensions.

If a terrain exercise is all that is required, a Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) can be constructed on any convenient piece of ground. Such terrain exercises are useful, but they are not a staff ride. If soldiers are to be taken to a battlefield of the past but there is little or no time for preliminary study, a historical battlefield tour is all that is required. Such tours also have their place, but they are not staff rides.

A staff ride yields far broader results than a TEWT or a battlefield tour, but is more

difficult to devise. Those who want to conduct a staff ride must be aware of these difficulties. Carefully designed and intelligently executed, a staff ride is one of the most powerful instruments available for the professional development of the U.S. Army's leaders.



[The Battle](#)

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The Battle

SITUATION

After four years of war, the Southern Confederacy was nearing collapse. Among most Southern leaders, the hope of defeating the North had vanished. However, they knew to secure an equitable peace Southern soldiers had to stand firm on the battlefield. The need for a Confederate victory to force negotiation was obvious to both Southern leaders and soldiers.

The Confederacy was isolated and starving. The loss of the Mississippi River in 1863 and an increasingly effective naval blockade had slowed Southern import and export to a trickle. Manufacturing had virtually ceased, and the Confederacy's reserves of manpower and materiel were exhausted.

At Petersburg, Virginia, *General Robert E. Lee's, C.S.A., Army of Northern Virginia*, much reduced by attrition, faced a vastly superior Federal force. As the strength of the Federal Army continued to increase, *General Lee's* ability to maneuver diminished. A static situation had developed, compelling both sides to entrench and await opportunity.

Further South, General William T. Sherman's, U.S.A., hard-marching Federal force had captured Atlanta, Georgia in September 1864. General Sherman followed his successful Atlanta campaign with his much heralded "March to the Sea."

General Sherman's intent was to cut a path of destruction through the South, bringing the horror of war home to the Southern people. The destruction General Sherman's men wrought went beyond the usual militarily significant targets. Because the Federal Army had abandoned its supply line when departing Atlanta, it was necessary for Federal soldiers to live off the land. Once Sherman's Army passed through an area, little was left for civilian use or to support the Confederate Army.

By demonstrating the North's ability to march through the very heart of Dixie, General Sherman thought he could undermine support for continued resistance. His threat to Southern homes did increase desertions among Confederate soldiers in the field ([Barrett 1956](#)).

General Sherman's force enjoyed minimal resistance on the march. *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* Confederate Cavalry attacked Federal foraging parties and elements that strayed too far from the main body, but *Lieutenant General Wheeler* could do little else other than monitor General Sherman's progress. The culmination of the march was the capture and occupation of Savannah, Georgia on December 21, 1864.

During several weeks of rest and refitting in Savannah, General Sherman contemplated his next move. The course of action he favored was to continue the march northward through the Carolinas and link up with General Grant in



Virginia. General Grant, who initially wanted to extract General Sherman's force by sea for transport to Virginia, acquiesced to General Sherman's plan.

On January 19, 1865, General Sherman moved into South Carolina, exacting the same punishment on South Carolina that he had on Georgia. Attempting to impede General Sherman's progress, the Confederate Cavalry maintained contact with the Federal force. Firefights became a daily occurrence. Skirmishing with Confederate Cavalry, General Sherman's men entered Columbia, South Carolina on the 17th of February. During a night of destruction, the city caught fire and by morning was a smoldering ruin.

In North Carolina, the citizenry listened to the stories of refugees and read newspaper accounts of events occurring in South Carolina. Rumors were rampant as Sherman's Army continued toward the state line. Reports of the burning of Columbia prompted calls on the Confederate Government to do something. Assurances that the invaders would be repelled did little to lessen citizen foreboding. North Carolina newspapers ran patriotic articles; rallies occurred, with many participants taking oaths to fight to the end.

On the 25th of February, Confederate **General Joseph E. Johnston**, C.S.A., assumed command of the *Army of Tennessee* and the *Departments of Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida*. It was *General Johnston's* responsibility to stop General Sherman.

General Johnston established his headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina. With General Sherman moving north, threatening the midsection of the state, it was probable Charlotte would be his objective. *General Johnston's* problem was his lack of troops.

In route to join *General Johnston* were elements of the Confederate *Army of Tennessee* and **Lieutenant General William J. Hardee's**, C.S.A., *Corps*. *Lieutenant General Hardee* had abandoned Savannah to General Sherman in December. After leaving Savannah, *Lieutenant General Hardee* had moved northward through South Carolina and was nearing the North Carolina state line. However, elements of the *Army of Tennessee* were still some days away.

As a result of continued harassment from the Federal base at New Bern, North Carolina and the attack on Fort Fisher on the 13th of January, Confederate forces within the state had been drawn to the coast. With Federal Major General A.H. Terry's, U.S.A., capture of Fort Fisher on January 15th, the threat of a two-pronged Federal invasion from the coast was great. This threat made it necessary for large numbers of Confederate troops to remain

in eastern North Carolina to repel any inland incursions by Federal forces.

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MISSION

General Sherman considered two options for the impending campaign in North Carolina: to continue north through Charlotte, Salisbury, and Greensboro, and invade western Virginia or to feint in the direction of Charlotte while turning his main body eastward toward Fayetteville, North Carolina ([Barrett 1956](#); [Cox 1882](#); [Oates 1981](#)).

Federal successes along the coast, General Sherman's need for resupply, and the less restrictive ground to the east made the latter more attractive.

The course of action selected was to turn eastward and march on the intermediate objective, Fayetteville. The maneuver would threaten both Raleigh and Goldsboro and be conducted in cooperation with thrusts inland by Federal forces from the coast. From Fayetteville, General Sherman would move northeastward toward his main objective, Goldsboro, and link up with Federal forces moving in from the east and southeast.

Fayetteville, located at the highest navigable point of the Cape Fear River, would allow resupply from and communication with Federal forces in Wilmington.

Also, a large number of Confederate troops were west of the Cape Fear River awaiting an indication of General Sherman's intentions. If Federal deceptions worked, General Sherman could beat the Confederates to Fayetteville, seize the bridges over the Cape Fear River, and trap the Confederates on the western side. If the Federal force didn't reach Fayetteville first, they could still arrive in time to catch the Confederates in the vulnerable position of crossing the river.

From the coast, Federal forces under the command of Major General John M. Schofield, U.S.A., would move inland from their respective bases toward Goldsboro. Moving northward from Wilmington were Major General Terry and the X Corps; pushing westward from New Bern were Major General Jacob D. Cox, U.S.A., and the XXIII Corps.

To deceive the Confederates, General Sherman continued northward with his four Corps toward Charlotte. General Sherman's force was organized in two wings; the left consisted of the XIV and XX corps and the right the XV and XVII Corps. Sherman's Cavalry Division, commanded by Brevet Major General Kilpatrick, operated well forward, as if scouting a route to Charlotte. Once this demonstration had its effect, General Sherman planned to turn abruptly eastward, drawing his cavalry back in to screen his left flank.

At Fayetteville, General Sherman intended to raze the Federal arsenal and rendezvous with supply laden gunboats sent up the Cape Fear River from Wilmington.

The New Times March 1865:



It is quite evident that SHERMAN'S route into North Carolina was by far the best. At Columbia, two paths lay before him, each promising certain advantages. The one which his previous course had indicated as probable leads directly up the railroad to Charlotte, thence to Salisbury, thence to Greensboro.

Could this have been successfully pursued, its results would have been astonishing. First, it would have secured the three great railroad junctions already named and insured the destruction of hundreds of miles of the chief railway left to the Confederacy. Next, the slightest easterly advance from Greensboro would have forced the evacuation and capture of Raleigh. Finally, his columns would have threatened Lynchburg from the west, and would have cut off LEE'S retreat from Richmond, by interposing an army on his front and flank. But it was too dangerous an experiment. It involved the traversing of distances too enormous even for that strategy which has struck the world with astonishment by its boldness during the latter year of the war. It exposed SHERMAN'S army to the certainty of a series of battles. If successful, they would have cost him all his ammunition, and he would have been forced to drop his conquests, and retreat from his victories. If unsuccessful, they would have left him hundreds of miles from succor, and with a Moscow retreat to the coast as his only alternative.

The lower route was judiciously chosen. It has proved to be attended by advantages greater than those of the other, and by none of its perils. By moving from Columbia to Cheraw, and from Cheraw across toward Fayetteville, SHERMAN has outgeneraled JOHNSTON again, marching past his flank, and forcing him to follow at a rapid pace if he wishes to fight. Being compelled himself to march, he forces that necessity also upon his opponent. He takes away the enemy's hope of successful concentration far up in the mountainous region, where defeat to SHERMAN would be destruction. JOHNSTON, who had watched to see whether unparalleled success would turn the head of his adversary, again baffled and disappointed.

This move, also, puts SHERMAN in direct cooperation with SCHOFIELD. He can get supplies and ammunition from the latter by way of the Cape Fear River, in case of needing them. He has a base to fall back upon in case of disaster. He is now traversing a region which no army has trod. It is high, fertile, and full of supplies. The roads are excellent, and now in good condition. The marshes which stretch away to the southeast, toward the coast, do not reach so high as SHERMAN'S present position. The people are well-to-do and, better than all, as loyal as in any part of the South. If anywhere in North Carolina supplies are to be had, it is precisely in the country SHERMAN is now traversing. The present movement, also, directly aids SCHOFIELD'S task, by forcing the enemy to withdraw from his front, to avoid being flanked. Even Raleigh is quite as directly threatened by this route as by the other, and Goldsboro still more so. But the taking of Raleigh will produce the evacuation of Goldsboro. Neither point is likely to be given up without a struggle, for the loss will signify too surely the loss of Richmond.

Such, then, are the moves by which the forces of the Union have been marshaled into position on the North Carolina field. The genius of the preparation is the best augury of success.

General Johnston had few options. *Lieutenant General Hardee's* 6,000 man Corps was in close proximity to General Sherman's 60,000 man force and could delay it for a short time, but could be expected to do little else against such overwhelming odds.

Besides, with Confederate troops in short supply, the possible loss of *Hardee's Corps* was unacceptable. Elements of the *Army of Tennessee* were moving into the state, but even these additions left the Confederate force greatly inferior. When all expected forces were present, *General Johnston* could expect his men to number no more than 30,000.

General Johnston's hope for success was to concentrate as much force as he could muster against one wing of Sherman's Army. Compelled by terrain or the execution of a feint, General Sherman's wings were at times beyond immediate supporting distance of one another. If *General Johnston* could predict this occurrence, he could attack one wing and destroy it, thus evening the odds.

Using the cavalry of *Lieutenant General Wheeler* and *Major General Matthew C. Butler, C.S.A.*, *General Johnston* planned to delay Sherman while he organized his forces.

With the Confederate Cavalry delaying and providing information on General Sherman's movement, *General Johnston* should have enough time to put his plan into action.

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EXECUTION

1 March 1865 (Click for [Table 5](#) showing weather conditions for March 1 through March 11)

Lieutenant General Hardee's Corps reached Cheraw, South Carolina, 10 miles south of the North Carolina state line.

2 March 1865

The vanguard of General Sherman's XX Corps entered Chesterfield, South Carolina, skirmishing with *Major General Butler's Cavalry*.

Federal Cavalry Commander Brevet Major General Kilpatrick was ordered to keep well on the left flank of the XIV Army Corps. Much to his satisfaction, he was also given permission to occupy Fayetteville first.

3 March 1865

Evening

Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's 1st Cavalry Brigade entered North Carolina on the Wadesborough Road, encamping four miles from the state line. Having crossed into Anson County, North Carolina, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's 3rd Brigade went into camp.

The Confederate Cavalry wasted little time in making their presence and displeasure known.

Colonel George E. Spencer, U.S.A., 1st Alabama (U.S.) Cavalry, Commanding, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division ([OR 1885](#)):

On the morning of the 3rd of March we resumed our line of march, on the left, through a clay country with horrible roads and traveled a distance of 10 miles, when we went into camp in Anson County, N.C., about three miles from the state line.

We had hardly placed our pickets out when they were driven in by General Hampton's Cavalry. The command was quickly thrown into position and we awaited attack. A small force of the enemy attempted to charge the extreme right of our line, when a few shells from Lieutenant Stetson's section quickly scattered them. We remained in position, expecting an attack, till next morning, when we again resumed our line of march.

The 4th Cavalry Brigade, consisting of dismounted men, had accompanied the 3rd Brigade on the march. The 4th Brigade (dismounted) took up position on the Hornsborough Road in the center of the 3rd Brigade and was immediately attacked.

Lieutenant Colonel William B. Way, U.S.A., Commanding, 4th Cavalry Brigade (dismounted), 3rd Cavalry Division ([OR 1885](#)):

We had but just got into position, with a strong picket, well barricaded, when the enemy charged my picket, but was handsomely repulsed, with loss upon our side of one man wounded.

2300

The 4th Brigade (dismounted) took charge of the Division trains and artillery, moving them some five miles to Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's headquarters. Heavy rains were falling, and the roads were made almost impassable.

Lieutenant Colonel Way ([OR 1885](#)):

We were seven hours marching the five miles, and several times had to draw the artillery out of the mud by hand.

4 March 1865

0700

The troopers of the 1st Brigade, having encamped on the Wadesborough Road the previous evening, were awakened by gunfire. A small force of Confederate cavalrymen had crept in between the 1st Brigade and its picket line. The pickets were surprised from behind, and a sharp firefight ensued. The Confederate infiltrators apparently were probing for the 1st Brigade's main line. On the sounds of contact, as if to dissuade the Federal troops from continuing their northeastward course, appeared a formidable Confederate skirmish line.

Lieutenant Colonel D.H.Kimmel, U.S.A., 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Brigade ([OR 1885](#)):

On the morning of the 4th instant my pickets were attacked at 7 a.m. in rear; they offered strong resistance and repulsed the charge of the enemy, who immediately deployed a line of skirmishers which, from its extent, indicated a heavy force.

Having identified the Federal position, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* decided to press the Federal Cavalrymen.

Lieutenant General Wheeler ([OR 1885](#)):

Struck the enemy's flank at Hornsborough; had a warm fight and captured 50 prisoners.

1200

With an aggressive force of unknown size in his front and his lead Brigade's unfortified position being pressured, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick decided to develop a more tenable situation. By his order the 1st Brigade withdrew, passing through the 2nd Brigade and occupying a position two miles to the rear, which they quickly barricaded. The 2nd Brigade was then withdrawn, passing through the 1st Brigade, leaving the 1st Brigade's hastily prepared defensive position as the front. Brevet Major General Kilpatrick, anticipating a general engagement, brought up the rest of his command and placed his artillery. The Confederates quickly closed on the new position, charging it several times without success. Unable to carry the Federals' new position, and in order to fix Brevet Major General Kilpatrick in position until sufficient force could be brought up, the Confederates demonstrated in front.



Lieutenant Colonel Way, Commanding, 4th Cavalry Brigade (dismounted) ([OR 1885](#)):

The enemy formed all along our front and seemed to be preparing for an attack, when the artillery of the 1st Brigade opened, which with a brisk fire from the line, caused him to withdraw his main force, though he kept a skirmish line in our front.

1430

Lieutenant General Wheeler, observing the strengthening Federal position, sent a message to *Lieutenant General Hardee* requesting reinforcement.

Lieutenant General Wheeler ([OR 1885](#)):

We find artillery here, and have but two small Regiments. Can you not send more forces up? The enemy have retired from four lines of works. Each line of works was for about 100 men.

1530

With the Federal Cavalry becoming more aggressive, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* sent a situation report to *Lieutenant General Hardee*.

Lieutenant General Wheeler ([OR 1885](#)):

Having run against some artillery, and not having sufficient force to drive the enemy from his position, I have taken up a position and will await your order. The enemy were driven from four lines of works by flanking him, but when we came upon artillery he showed himself rather bold. He advanced upon us, but only a short distance.

1900 - Dusk

As daylight and the chance to rout Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's men slipped away, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* made one last attempt.

Lieutenant Charles Blanford, U.S.A., Howitzer Battery, 1st Brigade ([OR 1885](#)):

About dark the enemy came charging upon our front, mounted, when I was ordered by Colonel Jordan to open fire on them; after firing a few rounds the enemy drew off, and did not molest us again during the night.

2100

Darkness and fatigue compelled the Confederates to retire to their camp a few hundred yards in front of the Federal position.

During the day, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick had received orders from General Sherman instructing him to proceed to Fayetteville via New Gilead, then to Solemn Grove; his mission was to protect the left flank of the Army and not embroil himself in battle with the Confederate Cavalry. Men and horses were to be saved for expected battles along the Virginia border.

5 March 1865

0600

Fully expecting an early morning attack, the Federal cavalrymen were pleased to see the Confederates had decamped and moved on during the night.

[Brevet Brigadier General Thomas J. Jordan's](#), U.S.A., 1st Brigade marched by Morven's Post Office to the Pee Dee River, crossing one mile south of the North Carolina line. *Lieutenant General Wheeler*, anxious to identify the route *Lieutenant General Hardee* was taking to Fayetteville, swam the Pee Dee River accompanied by *Privates McKnight* and *Nance*. The river was then in extraordinary flood. "The oldest river men had never seen higher water nor a more angry current" ([Du Bose 1912b](#)).

Reports of Federal troop movements indicated that General Sherman's objective was Fayetteville. It was necessary for *Lieutenant General Wheeler* to communicate this to

Lieutenant General Hardee, lest *Hardee* continue moving toward Charlotte.

6 March 1865

Confederate *General Johnston* is given command of the *Department of North Carolina*.

7 March 1865

0700

Brevet Brigadier General Jordan's 1st Brigade, halted to feed, were joined by Brevet Major General Kilpatrick and his staff. Brevet Major General Kilpatrick accompanied the 1st Brigade on the march to Rockingham.

1000

The 1st Brigade reached Rockingham. As they entered the town, the Brigade's advance guard, the 9th Pennsylvania and the 3rd Kentucky (U.S.), were attacked by *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* and *Major General Butler's* Cavalry. After heavy skirmishing, the 1st Brigade succeeded in driving the Confederates off.

Lieutenant General Wheeler ([OR 1885](#)):

With 20 men of Shannon's Scouts I attacked and killed or captured 35 of the enemy near Rockingham, NC.

[Execution \(continued\)](#)

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CONFEDERATE RECONNAISSANCE

Lieutenant General Wheeler briefed *Captain Shannon*, his Chief of Scouts, on the details of the plan ([Dodson n.d.](#)). Pointing south, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* told *Captain Shannon* to take his men and conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the ground west of the swamp and learn as much about the camp as possible. *Lieutenant General Wheeler* stressed an interest in knowing Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's location within the camp.

Captain Shannon briefed his men on their mission. With his hand-picked soldiers following, he started into the woods. The group followed a ridge, parallel to the west side of the swamp. Aided by a few small fires in the camp and lanterns within the house, the scouts rode the length of the camp, observing it over the growth in the swamp. Some 500 yards into the journey, a group of men were seen ahead. Without a word, the scouts rushed forward, surrounding them. Quietly, the men were given notice of their capture and quickly led away. Their attention had been directed elsewhere, allowing their capture before they could sound the alarm.



The entire west side of the camp was now open to *Captain Shannon* and his men. Riding back north toward the road, *Captain Shannon* stopped across the swamp from the farmhouse. He needed to learn more about the camp to determine Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's location. He also wanted to know the location of Confederate prisoners, his friend *Lieutenant Reynolds* being one of them. The camp appeared fast asleep, with no pickets and no camp guard.

The swamp extended to the edge of the camp, providing excellent concealment. *Captain Shannon*, famous for his daring, decided on a bold plan: he would allow volunteers to approach the camp from the swamp and enter it if afforded the opportunity. He presented his plan to his men, who responded with approval. To assure success, only the most stealthy among them were chosen to go. Those who were not going would hold the horses and keep watch.

The men split into small groups, some moving to the right, some to the left, to be able to enter from different directions. *Captain Shannon* moved to higher ground to observe.

Lieutenant General Wheeler, anxious to find out what *Captain Shannon* had learned, rode into the woods to locate him. After traveling a short distance along the ridge, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* encountered two of *Captain Shannon's* men.

A.F. Hardie, Shannon's Special Scouts, Wheeler's Corps ([Brooks 1911](#)):


While sitting on our horses and keeping a strict watch for any movement, we heard someone coming from the direction of our command on horseback. We sat alert, with pistols cocked, waiting for him to ride up, as we were too close to the enemy to challenge him. When he rode up, we discovered that it was General Wheeler; and as he knew each member of the scouts by

name, I said: 'This is Hardie, General.' He asked: 'Where are the enemy?' Pointing to them, I said: 'There they are, General.' 'What, that near and all asleep?' he said. 'Won't we have a picnic at daylight?' 'What brigade is in front, General?' I asked. 'The Alabama Brigade,' he answered. I said: 'I wish it was the Texas Brigade because they are armed with six-shooters.' 'The Texas Brigade is just behind the Alabama and will charge on the right,' he replied.

Lieutenant General Wheeler questioned the whereabouts of *Captain Shannon* ([Brooks 1911](#)). The men told him *Captain Shannon* was further down the ridge. *Lieutenant General Wheeler* continued along the ridge and found *Captain Shannon* waiting. As *Lieutenant General Wheeler* approached, *Captain Shannon* rose in his saddle, indicating someone approaching from the swamp. *Scouts Joe Rogers* and *B. Peebles* were returning from their foray in the camp. Both were leading several horses. The two panting and smiling troopers recognized the *Lieutenant General* and approached to show off their prizes.

Lieutenant General Wheeler was astonished that they could bring the horses out of the Federal camp without being noticed. He asked them about the location of Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's headquarters and the Confederate prisoners. To the two scouts it appeared Brevet Major General Kilpatrick was in the house and the Confederate prisoners were behind it. *Lieutenant General Wheeler* complimented the two men on their new mounts. Turning to *Captain Shannon*, he instructed him "to place his scouts in close as if they were pickets."

Lieutenant General Wheeler rode out of the woods and down the Morganton Road to where his units were gathering. A large portion of his command was now present. Without a picket to alert the camp, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* started moving his right, *Harrison's Texas Brigade*, into position.



The regiments were led into the woods and told to stay on the opposite side of the ridge from the camp. In the process of moving into position, several soldiers availed themselves of the opportunity to acquire fresh mounts.

Natt Holman, 8th Texas Cavalry, "Terry Texas Rangers" ([Holman 1911a](#)):

General Wheeler called for four men from my regiment to go on foot, as horseback was considered too risky, to spy out the situation of the enemy, telling the volunteers to meet at a designated place. The command was then ordered to close in quietly on Kilpatrick's camp and wait the return of the scouts that had been sent forward. After several hours, the men returned, riding bareback, and each led a horse that he confiscated for his trouble. The Terry Texas boys had much aversion to walking. They reported the condition to their commander as they viewed the darkness. Everything was put in order for the charge to be made at daylight.

Brigadier General Humes' Division's proposed position was on the extreme right. His Division was to locate on the southern end of a north/south ridge line that paralleled the swamp. The swamp would be to their immediate front and would have to be crossed during the attack. This section was narrow. However, the



swamp was quite deep because of heavy rains. Having traversed much more formidable flows over the last weeks, this crossing was anticipated to be no more than an inconvenience.

In total darkness, *Brigadier General Humes'* men moved into the woods south of Morganton Road. Coming upon men from *Allen's Division* at the base of the ridge, they went right. Using the ridge to conceal them from the Federal camp, *Brigadier General Humes'* men felt their way along its base for several hundred yards to the south. The column soon came to a halt. The lead regiment had encountered much thicker vegetation and ever deeper standing water. Apparently, the regiment had drifted too far left and ridden into the swamp. A correcting turn to the right quickly had the command back on higher ground. *Brigadier*

General Humes' men continued along the west edge of the swamp for several hundred additional yards, placing them an appropriate distance south of *Allen's Division*. Facing east with a swamp to their front, *Brigadier General Humes'* men organized themselves along the southern end of a north south ridge line.

The swampy area the lead regiment had ridden into had been the head of another stream feeding the swamp along Nicholson Creek. Turning right and moving less than 20 yards had taken the command out of the swamp. As a consequence of this seemingly insignificant navigational error, an additional 200 yards of swamp stood between *Brigadier General Humes'* men and the Federal camp.

0300

Throughout the night additional units arrived and moved into position. Some of these units were provided very little information concerning the task ahead. This lack of information caused exaggerated estimates of the Federals' strength.

Joseph A. Jones, Company K, 51st Alabama, Partisan Rangers (Jones 1911):

We marched all day long on March 9 in a drizzling rain, resting occasionally, as though there was no occasion to hurry. At 3 A.M. March 10 we halted, ordered to dismount, and be as quiet as possible. In this position we remained until the appearance of day, when we mounted and as quietly as possible we moved to the top of a hill in front of us. Upon reaching the top we beheld the sleeping camp of eight thousand of Kilpatrick's Cavalry, all well armed and mounted. I saw but one Federal soldier stirring. It was a complete surprise.

0500

While [awaiting morning](#) and the arrival of additional units, several plans to capture Brevet Major General Kilpatrick developed.

If he was in the house, his vulnerability was obvious. He was between the Federal main camp and the positions from which the Confederates intended to attack. The Confederate charge would reach him before it struck the Federal main camp.

Recognizing the opportunity, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* instructed *Captain Shannon* to

head for the house once the attack was underway and capture Brevet Major General Kilpatrick.

Major General Butler, also appreciative of the chance, chose a detail from *Young's Brigade*, commanded by *Colonel Gilbert J. Wright, C.S.A.*, to accomplish the task.

Major General Butler, Commanding, Butler's Cavalry Division ([Butler 1909a](#)):

I sent for Col. Wright, informed him of our plans and directed him to select a prudent, but bold, captain to lead the advance squadron in the attack, and that he should follow close on the attacking squadron and throw a regiment at a time into the camp, and that I would be in striking distance, with Law in command of my old brigade.

Col. Wright selected Capt. Bostick and ordered him to report to me for instructions. After describing the location of the house in which Kilpatrick was stopping, I ordered him, on entering his camp at daylight, to rush straight for the house, surround and hold his position until we could come to his assistance; that I wished to take Kilpatrick prisoner.

Arriving during the early morning hours, *Brigadier General William Wirt Allen, C.S.A.*, commanding a Division of *Wheeler's Cavalry*, quickly recognized Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's precarious position and organized his own party to capture him.

Posey Hamilton, Hagan's Alabama Brigade, Allen's Division ([Hamilton 1921](#)):

Just before day we were halted, and in a few minutes we were moved out of the road into a thick, scrubby growth of timber with orders not to speak above a whisper.

In a few minutes we came into an open place where the small growth had been cut out, nothing left but large pine timber, where we halted for a short time, and a detail of twenty picked men reported to Lieutenant Tom Stewart.

Ed Knight and I were the only ones sent from our company. The objective was to ride up quietly to Kilpatrick's tent and capture the General and others with him. What we took for Kilpatrick's tent was a large one located on a round knob in the pine timber about three hundred yards from where we waited to make the advance guard.

0530

The rain stopped, replaced by a heavy fog that hung low over the swamp, obscuring the Federal camp. Delayed by bad roads and heavy rains, *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* entire complement had yet to arrive. But with morning fast approaching and the possibility of detection increasing, the time to act had come.

[Dawn Attack](#)

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DAWN ATTACK

Anticipating the command to attack, *Brigadier General Allen* instructed his detail to move out on their mission to capture Brevet Major General Kilpatrick. Mistakenly, the objective of their infiltration was a large headquarters type tent near the artillery. Apparently, *Brigadier General Allen's* men were not privy to information obtained from earlier reconnaissance. This suggests plans to capture Brevet Major General Kilpatrick were individual initiatives and not done at the direction of *Lieutenant General Hampton*.

Posey Hamilton ([Hamilton 1921](#)):

Our advance was following Lieutenant Stewart in silence and going directly toward General Kilpatrick's headquarters, using a dim road or path. We soon came up to where the Yankees were lying under good blankets fast asleep, and while we were passing by we said nothing and did not intend to molest them. Our objective point was the big tent, and thus far we were moving in fine order and thinking we were going to make a good haul. We knew we were being led by a cool, brave officer, and that we could depend upon him. Lieutenant Stewart knew that he had twenty men following him that he could depend upon to stand by him in a desperate undertaking.

Lieutenant General Wheeler gave the order to mount. His regiments quickly formed. *Major General Butler* moved *Young's Brigade* to the front. With fog screening them from the camp, *Young's Brigade* crossed to the north side of Morganton Road. Staying within the tree line, they moved parallel to the road for several hundred yards.

As they neared the crossroads, they halted and faced to the right. Following *Young's Brigade* was the rest of *Butler's Division*; when *Young's Brigade* halted, the rest of the Division fell in behind them. *Major General Butler* was ready. West of Nicholson Creek, formed in attacking columns, were the two Divisions of *Wheeler's Corps*. Concealed by a ridge that parallels the creek, they moved forward, adjusting their line. To the far right was *Humes' Division*, with *Harrison's Texas Brigade* leading. In the center was *Allen's Division*, with *Hagan's Alabama Brigade* its vanguard. Leading his Corps from the center was *Lieutenant General Wheeler*, followed by his escort and *Shannon's Scouts*. The Confederate left was *Butler's Division*, north of Morganton Road.

Lieutenant General Wheeler had positioned his reserve, *Dibrell's Brigade*, south of Morganton at the head of Nicholson Creek. This position allowed *Brigadier General George G. Dibrell, C.S.A.*, to enter the fight quickly if needed and also to guide in additional regiments as they arrived. Late arriving units were added to *Dibrell's Command*. *Major General Butler* had instructed *Brigadier General Law* to remain with his brigade near the crossroads. *Brigadier General Law's* position would serve as the Prisoner of War (POW) collection point. Also, he was to be prepared to enter the fight, on order.

Lieutenant General Wheeler rode quickly to *Dibrell's Brigade*, where *Lieutenant General Hampton* was located, for any final instructions. With the Federal camp so near and because he anticipated the advantage of complete surprise, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* suggested to *Lieutenant General Hampton* a dismounted attack might be in order.

Private J.A. Jones, C.S.A. ([Jones 1911](#)):

When all was ready for action, General Wheeler dashed up to General Hampton and, saluting, said: 'General Hampton, with your permission I will give the order to dismount, so as to make the capture of the entire camp sure.' General Hampton with quiet dignity replied: 'General Wheeler, as cavalrymen I prefer making this capture on horseback.'

Lieutenant General Hampton, having been in command just two days and unfamiliar with the *Army of Tennessee* horsemen, which made up two-thirds of his command, was uneasy. While he had commanded his fellow South Carolinian, *Major General Butler*, in the *Army of Northern Virginia*, this was his first action with *Lieutenant General Wheeler* and his men.



Also, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* had previously outranked *Lieutenant General Hampton* and had Corps command before him. *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* men did not perceive *Lieutenant General Hampton* as superior to *Lieutenant General Wheeler*, and some took his assignment as an insult.

Lieutenant General Hampton, sensitive to the situation, turned to *Lieutenant General Wheeler* and said, "I wish you would take command of your own and *Butler's* troops on the field, and make the fight as we have arranged, while I remain here with *Dibrell's* reserve; should you need help send to me for it." *Lieutenant General Wheeler* replied: "Thank you, General," and in a moment, mounted his white charger, and with pistol raised rode to the head of the column ([Du Bose 1912b](#)).

0600

To the west, Jordan's 1st Brigade departed Bethesda Church and proceeded southwest, striking Chicken Road, west of Blue's Mountain.

Atkins' 2nd Brigade, having extricated themselves from the swamps of Piney Bottom Creek, marched east on Chicken Road.

Lieutenant General Wheeler ([Du Bose 1912b](#)) gave the command, "Forward!" The command was relayed right and left. The Corps moved up the ridge. *Major General Butler's* eyes, fixed on the left of *Allen's Division*, observed the movement. *Major General Butler* turned to his *Chief Scout*, *Hugh Scott*, C.S.A., and said, "Scott, you have been trying for some time to get stripes on your collar. Now if you will bring Kilpatrick out and deliver him to me, I will promote you on the battlefield." *Scott* galloped forward and joined *Colonel Gib Wright*, C.S.A., who was leading the charge. *Butler's Division* started forward.

Lieutenant General Wheeler commanded, "The Walk!" The Corps crested the ridge, the men's eyes widened with anticipation as the camp came into view. The main house and camp appeared floating on a lake of fog.

"The Trot!" The cavalrymen crossed the crest of the ridge and advanced down its slope.

"The Gallop!" They surged forward into the fog.

Before morning, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick and Marie Boozer had returned to the

main house. Brevet Major General Kilpatrick, concerned that his horses would be fed, chose this moment to step out onto the porch of the main house. Expecting to be out only a moment, he was dressed only in his shirt and drawers. In the yard several soldiers had awakened and were rolling their blankets; the headquarters bugler was preparing to sound reveille.

Lieutenant General Wheeler and his escort broke through the fog. *Lieutenant General Wheeler* brought his raised pistol forward. Riding by the General's side, *Pelote*, his bugler, sounded the charge. Coming out of the fog, simultaneously breaking the morning silence, was a penetrating howling cheer and the sound of breaking brush.

Lieutenant Stewart and his detail were nearing their objective, the big tent, anticipating a clean capture and getaway.

Posey Hamilton ([Hamilton 1921](#)):

Up to this time everything was going on fine; we were not troubling them nor they us. Day was just breaking as we got to within fifty yards of the General's big tent, with about twenty-five fine horses hitched around it, and things looked mighty good for a big haul. Just then the report of a gun came from our men left two hundred yards behind us, then another and another, and here they came in a desperate charge.

Alert from having been exposed to the weather throughout the night, Confederate prisoners around the house immediately recognized their comrades and realized an attack was underway. Fearing for their lives, Federal guards wasted no time in abandoning their Confederate wards.

A.F. Hardie, Shannon's Scouts ([Brooks 1909](#)):

As soon as our men who were prisoners heard the shots they told the guards: 'That is Wheeler charging; you better save yourselves.' The guard dashed away and the prisoners began to help themselves to arms, horses, and whatever they wanted.

Stunned by the sounds of the thundering horsemen and the realization of what was occurring, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick stood motionless on the porch. Looking forward, Confederate cavalymen were pouring out of the fog. A glance to the left for an evasion route provided only another view of attacking Confederates. As the cavalry assault bore down on him, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick was resigned to the apparent hopelessness of the situation, thinking to himself, "Here is four years' hard fighting for a major general's commission gone up with a surprise."

Deserted by their guards, Confederate prisoners ran toward their comrades shouting encouragement. Unfortunately, before they could be recognized several were killed by their own men.

C.M. Calhoun ([Calhoun 1912](#)):

Butler's Brigade, to which I belonged, charged in on the prison side of the enemy's camp, when several hundred Confederates they had as prisoners broke their guard and came, meeting us on the first sound of the rebel yell. This somewhat disconcerted some of our men at first, and, sad to say, one overjoyous fellow was shot with his arms around the neck of one of our trooper's horse.

Confederates just coming on the field were confused by the rush of escaping Confederate prisoners. Many thought the preceding regiments had been repulsed.

Major General Butler ([Butler 1909a](#)):

I had not advanced far into the camp when I was astonished to meet a hundred and thirty or forty Confederates rushing wildly toward us. At first I thought Wright had been repulsed, but it turned out they were prisoners whom Kilpatrick had taken, and whom Wright's vigorous and unexpected onslaught had released from their guards, and they were making good their escape.

Brevet Major General Kilpatrick stood motionless as the first riders reached the house and raced by, the firing dramatically increasing as they entered the main camp.

A squad led by a young Confederate Captain charged directly up to Brevet Major General Kilpatrick. Reining in his horse while pointing a pistol, the Captain demanded, "[Where is General Kilpatrick?](#)" Brevet Major General Kilpatrick was astonished. Remembering his own scant attire, he recognized his chance.

Quickly looking toward Blue's Rosin Road, the destination of most who were abandoning the house, he saw a Federal officer mounting a trotting horse in an attempt to escape. Pointing toward the officer, he replied, "There he goes on that horse" ([Nye n.d.; 1961](#))!

The fleeing officer lashed his mount to a gallop. Fearing his quarry was about to escape, *Captain Bostick* and his men galloped off in hot pursuit.


Startled into action by his good luck, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick, barefoot, leapt the porch rail and headed southwest toward the safety of the swamp, making good his second escape in twenty-four hours.

From the north and northwest, the grey horsemen in column of regiments bore down on the awakening Federals. Surprise was complete. They swept past the house and into the camp, firing pistols and slashing with sabers. The attack so surprised the Federal soldiers that many could do little more than get out of the way.

The ferocity of the attack, with little resistance to slow its momentum, had served to carry the lead Confederate Regiments through and beyond the main camp. Down the south slope of the ridge they continued. Realizing the only thing now in front of them was empty woods, they wheeled round and started back up the slope, running head on into the fleeing Federals.

Posey Hamilton ([Hamilton 1921](#)):

The Yankees' camp looked like a cyclone had struck it all at once. Their blankets were flying in the air, and the men were running about in every direction in their nightclothes, while the men from the big tent were legging and heeling it down the hill to beat the band. If this was not a stampede on foot, then I never saw one. Our advance guard had to get out of the way of bullets



fired by our own men, as we were directly between them and the big tent. Right here the duty of our guard ended. We could do no more, and we had to look out for ourselves.

Major George H. Rader, U.S.A., 5th Ohio Cavalry, 3rd Brigade ([OR 1885](#)):

My command was taken completely by surprise, the enemy being in force in every part of my camp. The officers and men were completely bewildered for a short time.

Confusion reigned in the Federal camp as Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's men sought cover. Soldiers nearest the front, overrun before they could get out of their shelters, surrendered. Others fled southward, dogged by the Confederate cavalymen. Some, having been by-passed, and unwilling to surrender, engaged the mounted Confederates. Individual duels and hand to hand fighting were common.

Major General Butler ([Butler 1909a: 406](#)):

You can imagine my surprise, then, when I discovered a mounted man approaching us and showing fight. About the same time I noticed a Confederate moving out to meet him, who, I supposed, was a member of the Cobb Legion. His back was turned to me and I could not identify him in the early dawn. However, I said to myself, 'They are about matched; I will see it out without interfering.' They got within about ten paces of each other, when the Federal fired first, followed in an instant by a shot from the Confederate's revolver.

The Federal fired a second time and the Confederate fired almost simultaneously, and, I discovered, hit his antagonist, but the Federal managed to fire a third shot and with the report of the Confederate's third fire the Federal tumbled from his horse, mortally wounded.

I dismissed the matter from my mind and was surprised afterwards to learn the Confederate was my brother, Capt. James Butler. It was the gamest fight I ever saw, and there I was, a silent spectator, without suspecting that my own brother was one of the parties to a duel a l'outrance.

Surrounded, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's staff, Colonel Spencer and Lieutenant Colonel Way, were virtual prisoners in the Monroe House. Appreciating the displeasure of her fellow countrymen at the presence of Yankee cavalry and sensitive to her own compromising situation, Marie Boozer decided to leave ([Du Bose 1912b](#)). She appeared on the porch, gazing forlornly at her Victoria carriage. Expecting her to be shot down any second, a young Confederate officer galloped up to the porch. Dismounting quickly, he escorted her through a shower of clapboard splinters erupting from the exterior walls of the house. The couple made their way to the safety of a ditch beside Blue's Rosin Road. Somewhat protected in their position behind the house, the 4th Brigade (dismounted) had not felt the full force of the Confederate attack. With Lieutenant Colonel Way trapped in the house, Lieutenant Colonel William Stough, U.S.A., Commanding the 2nd Regiment, 4th Brigade (dismounted), took charge. Lieutenant Colonel Stough commanded the Brigade to form ([Starr 1985](#)). Temporarily, the thought of joining their fleeing comrades vanished, as the men rushed to fall in line shoulder to shoulder.

The command, equipped with rifled muskets, fell in. Lieutenant Colonel Stough's command, "Fix bayonets!", followed by the precise execution of the command, attracted the attention of the Confederates and a withering fire. The concentrated fire at close range quickly threatened to cut the Brigade to pieces.

Lieutenant Colonel Way, 9th Michigan Cavalry, Commanding, 4th (Provisional) Brigade (dismounted) ([OR 1885](#)):

At daybreak the camp of the 3rd Brigade and my camp were charged simultaneously by three divisions of rebel cavalry, one division led by General Hampton in person. So sudden and unexpected was the charge that for a time all was confusion. The officers did all it was possible to do under the circumstances, calling upon the men to secure their arms and fall in, but being in an open field it was impossible to form, and we were obliged to fall back to some woods about 500 yards distant.

Under intense pressure, the 4th Brigade's (dismounted) gallant stand quickly collapsed, but not before Confederate Regiments just coming on the field were afforded the sobering view of a forming Federal battleline equipped with rifled musket and bayonet. On seeing the gleaming bayonets, the cry was raised, "Infantry!" Thus alarmed, the Confederate front ranks reined in their horses, throwing their columns into confusion. As the 4th Brigade's (dismounted) stand collapsed and its soldiers joined their fleeing comrades, the Confederates charged them.

Major Christopher T. Cheek, U.S.A., 5th Kentucky Cavalry (U.S.), 3rd Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division ([OR 1885](#)):

To the right of our camp we could see the dismounted brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Way, 9th Michigan Cavalry, who had encamped in our rear, flying in every direction, the rebel cavalry in hot pursuit.

On the sound of *Pelote's* bugle, the Confederate right, *Humes' Division* led by *Harrison's Texans*, had spurred their horses and charged into the fog, immediately encountering an almost impenetrable thicket. The sounds of cursing soldiers, breaking brush, and an occasional yelp from some unlucky fellow being unseated by the low hanging limbs, echoed in the fog. Additional Regiments piled in, mixing with the Texans. Men in the rear shouted to those in front, encouraging them to push on. Realizing they could only add to the problem, commanders began halting their men before they could enter the swamp. Stymied by this natural barrier, the assault ground to a halt. The *Texas Brigade*, committed to the crossing, pressed on. Some dismounted and led their mounts through the neck-deep waters of the flooded creek. Others, bent over the necks of their mounts, held on as the frightened animals fought through. Some horses, panicked from the excitement of the attack and the claustrophobic effect of the swamp, bucked and kicked, throwing their riders. Loose horses ran wildly in search of higher ground.

Directly across the swamp was the camp of the 1st Alabama (U.S.) Cavalry. The Alabamians had pitched their camp well down the hill and near the swamp. Their choice had saved them from the initial Confederate onslaught. As their presence was recognized, the right of *Allen's Division* attempted to drive them off.

Major Sanford Tramel, U.S.A., 1st Alabama (U.S.) Cavalry, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division ([OR 1885](#)):

At the sounding of reveille on the morning of the 10th instant, we were aroused from sleep by the whistling of bullets and the fiendish yelling of the enemy, who were charging into our camp. Then followed a most bloody hand to hand conflict, our men forming behind trees and stumps and the enemy endeavoring to charge us, mounted, with saber.

Troopers from the *Texas Brigade* who had negotiated the swamp began to appear to the left of the Alabamians. As the Texans realized their predicament, the Alabamians changed direction and opened on them with their Burnside carbines. The Texans, most armed with shotguns and pistols, quickly returned fire and fell back into the swamp.



On the west side of the swamp, soldiers ducked as the Alabamians' fire tore through the bushes in their direction. With a portion of his command now pinned down in the swamp, *Brigadier General Humes* ordered his commanders to pull back. Once they were assembled, he moved his men north along the swamp in search of an easier crossing.

The Federal Alabama Regiment, assaulted on the right by *Major General Allen's* men, were now also threatened by the Texans on their left. The Alabamians, isolated and pinned down, concentrated in their camp and resisted ferociously.

The majority of the Federal cavalrymen from the main camp followed the path of least resistance down the south slope of the ridge.

The Confederate attack was an overwhelming success, the enemy routed in most quarters and the Confederates in possession of the field. The Confederates pursued the fleeing Federals for a distance, but the apparent intention of the Federals to continue their flight for some time, and the prospect of much loot in the camp, convinced them to break off their pursuit. With the half-naked Federal men disappearing into the thicket at the bottom of the ridge, the Confederate cavalrymen halted, fired off a few rounds for encouragement, turned and headed back to the main camp.

[The Swamp Stops the Federal Rout](#)

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THE SWAMP STOPS THE FEDERAL ROUT

The Federal soldiers charged through the underbrush. In a short distance they reached the swollen artery of the swamp, Nicholson Creek. Many immediately waded into the flood waters. Quickly they were neck deep and stumbling in the tangle of vines and trees just below the surface. Soldiers on the bank, keeping watch for the expected arrival of their pursuers, called for their comrades to return.

The veterans, determined not to be shot down while floundering in the water or, worse yet, drowned, turned and rushed back to a small rise they had crossed at the edge of the swamp. Prone, and covered behind the small elevated sliver of earth, men examined and prepared the weapons they had instinctively grabbed at the outset of the attack. All their senses were riveted to the front, anticipating the Confederates' arrival, but instead, there were only shouts and shots coming from the camp where the pillaging Confederates were destroying any of the Federals' horses they could not lead away. Soon the Federal soldiers realized the Confederates were not coming; opportunity was offered and accepted as word was passed to abandon this precarious position. The line of men formed by encountering the creek moved forward at a crouch. Familiar voices were recognized, as instructions were given to keep the men together. As they neared the edge of the swamp the vegetation thinned, providing them with a view of the Confederates helping themselves to the spoils of their premature victory. The Federal soldiers' blood rose, followed by their carbines.

As the Confederates searched the camp, they had to contend with small groups of resisters. The camp was a veritable treasure trove to the hungry Confederates. Everywhere were things the Confederates so greatly lacked. Unable to resist, the hungry soldiers scurried about grabbing what they could. *Private W.S. Redderick, C.S.A., Company D, 5th Tennessee Cavalry*, was one of the first to reach Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's Headquarters. "The General left his sword, uniform, and boots, also a woman, presumably his wife" ([cf Inzer 1904](#)).

Observing only Confederate soldiers around the house, Colonel Spencer, Lieutenant Colonel Way, and members of Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's staff barricaded themselves on the second floor of the farmhouse.

Order was becoming impossible to maintain as Confederate Regiments intermingled in the confined area of the camp. Soldiers, enticed away from their Regiments by the treasures of the camp and the arrival of additional Regiments, added to a growing sense of chaos.

Lieutenant General Wheeler, separated from his staff, recognized some of his men and ordered them to cease their plundering, harness some animals, and begin pulling away the Federal artillery and wagons.

In the open field, Confederates, intent on resupply from the abandoned camp, were startled by the report of gunfire coming from the direction of the swamp.

As their attention was drawn toward the swamp, the treeline that bounds it erupted with muzzle flashes. Their desire for the armloads of booty they carried quickly diminished as bullets ripped through the canvas shelters around them. The Confederates reacted, dropping their armloads, seizing their weapons, and cowering down behind whatever might afford protection.

The rapid firing Spencer carbines of the 5th Ohio Cavalry soon made the south end of the camp too hot for the Confederate cavalymen. At a crouch and leading their horses, the

Confederates headed for the top of the ridge and safety.



In the initial assault, a number of Federal cavalymen had managed to escape across the Nicholson Creek. Those mounted fled to the Blue's Rosin Road crossing, while others on foot took their chances and forded the swamp. The shaken fugitives continued south, hoping to reach the safety of the Federal XIV Army Corps.

Captain Northrop and his scouts, who had gone into camp south of Nicholson Creek the previous day, were awakened by a band of refugees from the 3rd Brigade and 4th Brigade (dismounted) stumbling through their camp. The excited half-dressed lot, some on foot and some mounted and riding two and three to a horse, quickly informed the Captain of the events that led to their arrival in his camp.

Captain Northrop, Chief of Scouts, 3rd Cavalry Division ([Northrop 1912; 1913](#)):

They told us General Kilpatrick and the 3d Brigade had all been captured, and they seemed to think they alone had escaped. We mounted and started for the camp, hoping that we might recapture some of the prisoners; but we soon heard the fighting and knew by that that all hadn't been captured.

Reacting to the commencement of firing by their comrades on the edge of the swamp, additional Federal troopers rallied to them. Individuals began enforcing order on the impromptu organization maturing at the edge of the swamp. Soon the mass of men, muddy, sweaty, and drenched with rain, bore a faint resemblance to a Federal battleline. Firing from the line began to be directed and controlled, with increasingly effective results.

With the exception of those pinned down, the Confederates continued abandoning the main camp as they came under ever increasing Federal fire. Unwilling to abandon the field entirely, they congregated at the north edge of the main camp, firing back sporadically.

Quickly recognizing the threat posed by the rapidly reorganizing Federals, Confederate commanders set about regaining the initiative. *Lieutenant General Wheeler* rode up to *Lieutenant Reynolds*, who until the attack was a prisoner of Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's, saying: "Come with me. I have neither staff nor escort." *Lieutenant Reynolds* remarked: "General, we are between our line and the enemy's, and both are shooting this way." "Never mind that; we must keep our men advancing," said *Lieutenant General Wheeler*.

At this critical moment, the Confederate command was suffering an effect of its own success. So fast and overwhelming was the initial assault that it had served to scatter the Confederate Regiments. So complete appeared the rout that the confident Confederate riders had turned their backs to the enemy. Now enthusiasm and indiscretion demanded a price, reorganizing under fire or calling on the reserve.

Following his near capture at the farmhouse, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick had run southwest into the swamp. Hearing the firing to his right, he worked his way along the edge of the swamp and joined his men. Desperate to regain the camp and heartened by the

effect their fire was having, he made his presence known by encouraging his men to move forward. A cheer went up as the mud-covered veterans rose and started up the slope.

On the field, *Major General Butler* watched *Colonel Wright* striving to restore order to his command. The growing threat from the Federals along the swamp made it crucial that the Confederates reassemble.

Major General Butler had positioned his Division Reserve, *Law's Brigade*, just off the field to serve as a collection point for prisoners and to facilitate the Brigade's admittance to the fight if needed. Sensing the opportunity to complete the capture of the camp slipping away, he called for his reserve.

Major General Butler, Commanding, Butler's Cavalry Division ([Butler 1909a](#)):

I halted Law near the entrance to the camp to take care of prisoners, etc. Wright had gone clear through the camp, and, of course, his command was much scattered. I, therefore, halted in the midst of the camp and sent back word for Law to move in, complete the capture and take possession.

The organization of *Allen's Division* had disintegrated upon entering the camp. With the Division hopelessly dispersed across the field and intermingled with various other Confederate units, it was impossible to reassemble.

Lieutenant General Wheeler, advised of *Brigadier General Humes'* inability to cross the swamp, sent word for him to ride around the head of the swamp and enter the fight from the north.

No longer under pressure, but for a few Texans firing on them from the swamp, the 1st Alabama (U.S.) Cavalry, fell back, thus joining the Federal line and anchoring it on the swamp.

Lieutenant Stewart and his men, fired on continually by both sides, searched for a safe route off the field. With the departure of the 1st Alabama (U.S.) Cavalry, they saw their opportunity to escape. Heading toward the swamp they encountered *Harrison's Texans*.

Posey Hamilton ([Hamilton 1921](#)):

The big tent was on our left and a big black piney woods slough on our right. My friend and I rode down about two-hundred and fifty yards to find a crossing where some men and horses had crossed, but when we got to it nothing could go through. We saw horses all covered in mud except their heads and necks, and their riders trying to save themselves by clinging to tufts. Knight and I looked at that black mud hole and decided at once that we would not attempt to cross, so we turned back and retraced our steps, finding that we were completely hemmed in.

The rider, sent earlier by *Major General Butler* to *Brigadier General Law* to tell him to bring on the reserve and continue the attack, returned, stating the *Reserve Brigade* had moved and could not be found. *Major General Butler's* hope now was for the tardy Confederate right, *Humes' Division*, to appear and carry the day.

Well aware that *Brigadier General Humes'* circuitous route around the swamp might have his Division arriving too late to regain the offensive, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* went in search of *Major General Butler*.

Located near the Federal artillery, *Major General Butler* sat, hoping for the arrival of the rest of *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* command. *Major General Butler* was surprised by the

approach of *Lieutenant General Wheeler* himself, riding toward him at a gallop.

Major General Butler ([Butler 1909a](#)):

He came through himself with a few of his staff and escort. He rode up and inquired about my command. I replied, 'scattered like the devil; where is yours?' He said he had encountered a bog through which his division could not pass, and that he had ordered it to make a circuit to the left, and come around on my track. This, of course, took time, and in the meantime Kilpatrick's 1,500 dismounted men recovered from the shock of our first attack and gathered themselves behind pine trees, and with their rapid-firing spencer carbines, attacked us savagely.

The Federal cavalymen had continued a [slow advance](#) up the ridge. They had regained possession of the south end of the main camp, their concave line conforming to the contour of the ridge.

In the minds of the Confederate commanders, the issue was in grave doubt. Having declined to do so until all other options were exhausted, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* sent couriers to inform *Brigadier General Dibrell* to bring the reserve forward at once.

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KILPATRICK'S SCOUTS ARRIVE

Shouts of encouragement announced the arrival of Captain Northrop and his scouts. On the way to the camp the scouts had encountered many men from the 3rd Brigade and 4th Brigade (dismounted), who had been added to the ranks of the Scout Company.

Crossing Nicholson Creek at the Blue's Rosin Road ford at a gallop, the 200 mounted Federals charged up the ridge in an attempt to reach the house. As they crested the ridge they collided with the Confederates. Faced with a camp full of Confederates, they quickly halted.

From the crest of the ridge a cloud of blue smoke billowed upward as the scouts and Confederates opened fire simultaneously. Heartened by the sight of reinforcements passing through them in a charge, the Federal line responded by surging up the hill.

Captain Northrop, Kilpatrick's Chief of Scouts
([Northrop 1912](#)):



We were followed by from one hundred fifty to two hundred mounted men who had escaped from this captured camp. We had to pass through the men who had been driven from the camp to the swamp, where they had made a stand and at this time were fighting on the defensive. We dashed through them. They thought it was the arrival of 1st Brigade, and they sang out, 'Here comes the 1st Brigade!' and, led by General Kilpatrick, they followed us in a charge.

Separated from *Lieutenant Stewart* and the detail and trying to escape the battle, *Posey Hamilton* and his friend *Ed Knight* recrossed the battlefield. As they neared the crest of the ridge, they encountered Captain Northrop and his scouts.

Posey Hamilton ([Hamilton 1921](#)):

A Yankee company had moved in and formed in line, all mounted on good horses, well dressed and armed with pistols, between us and the big tent. We were coming back toward them for two hundred yards, and they were firing at us with pistols at a rapid rate. A few men were following us, and some of them were wounded and dropped out. We kept going toward them until to within about sixty yards, when we turned a little east and passed in about forty yards of the cavalry company. They had almost ceased firing at us at that time. Neither of us or our horses was hit.

It was a very narrow escape. While we were maneuvering in front of that Yankee cavalry company General Wheeler's men were over the hill west of the big tent fighting like the mischief. After Knight and I had passed by the cavalry company and reached the top of the hill, we met Gen. W.W. Allen, our division commander, who was riding a big slick black horse he had captured at the big tent, his horse having been killed in the charge.

Couriers sent by *Lieutenant General Wheeler* to *Brigadier General Dibrell* and *Lieutenant General Hampton* returned, reporting *Dibrell's Brigade* could not be found and *Lieutenant General Hampton* was believed to be on the field. *Lieutenant General Hampton* had brought both *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* and *Major General Butler's* reserves onto the field, thus denying their use by either commander. The situation grew increasingly

desperate. The dismounted Federals had reached the crest of the ridge, prompting hand-to-hand fighting as the mounted Confederates waded into them.

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LT. STETSON REACHES HIS GUNS



In the confusion, First Lieutenant Ebenezer Stetson, U.S.A., commanding the artillery section, raced toward his guns. On reaching one of them, he unlimbered and loaded. Returning quickly to the rear of the piece, he planted a friction primer in the touch hole. A **quick jerk** to the rear and the piece jumped back from the explosion.

Soldiers fighting around the previously dormant artillery piece recoiled from the blast. In the side yard of the farmhouse, directly in front of the gun, a large opening appeared in the mass of Confederate men and horses. In the center of the opening, men were blown back as if struck by a tornadic wind, leaving many prone and motionless. On the fringe of the blasted opening, men dropped to their knees clutching themselves, while others sat down dazed, not knowing the extent of their injuries. Men dismounted quickly as their horses sank to the ground.

A second's lull in the melee resulted, as the attention of both the Federals and Confederates was drawn to the guns in an attempt to determine responsibility for the blast. Visible at the rear of the piece was a lone Federal lieutenant, lanyard dangling at his side. Inspired, the dismounted Federals surged forward.

Major Cheek, 5th Kentucky (U.S.) Cavalry ([OR 1885](#)):

Lt. Stetson quickly fired a round of grape and canister into the rebel ranks, which greatly encouraged my men, and demoralized and discouraged the rebels to an equal extent.

A quick assessment was made by First Lieutenant Stetson of the effect, then he grabbed up another projectile and vaulted back to the front of the piece to reload and fire again.

Sergeant John Swartz, U.S.A., the artillery Chief of Section, immediately recognized the blast as the report of one of his 3-Inch Ordnance Rifles. Instantly he rushed toward them, followed by several other men. Arriving at the piece, the artillerymen went into action, joining First Lieutenant Stetson in serving the already operational gun and unlimbering to place the other into action ([More Information](#)).

The Confederates were completely surprised by the initial discharge of canister into their ranks. Fired from a distance of thirty paces, the shotgun-like blast had devastating effect. It was further disheartening to the Confederate men because just minutes before they had possessed the guns.

This new hazard had to be eliminated quickly or all was lost. Recovering from the initial shock, the Confederates reacted.

Elements of *Humes' Division*, having recently completed their trip around the head of the swamp, moved forward, firing on the Wisconsin Section. *Major General Butler's* men, along with men from *Colonel Hagan's Brigade of Wheeler's Corps*, attempted to rush the guns on foot. "*Lieutenant {John} DeVaux, Captain Humphries and Glenn Davis, of Butler's command, charged the piece and were shot down*" ([Howard 1901](#)).

Orderly Sergeant N.A. Hood, C.S.A., 51st Alabama, Partisan Rangers ([Hood 1906](#)):

Orders came to cut down the artillery. I held the horse for my Lieutenant while he aided in cutting it down, which was under heavy fire. The 4th Tennessee was formed, mounted near the edge of the woods and near the camp, and I think the 4th did the most gallant fighting that I ever saw men do standing in line on horses.

The concentrated fire from *Brigadier General Humes'* men had a telling effect on the exposed gunners, eliminating all but one serving the piece. Several Confederates charged forward, "while the Federal was attempting to reload he was killed by a pistol shot."

[Confederates Counterattack](#)

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CONFEDERATES COUNTERATTACK

In hope of regaining the artillery and the camp, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* hurriedly gathered together elements of *Allen's Division*. He knew that if the left of the Federal line could be breached or driven back the Federals would be forced to abandon the camp.

As *Major General Allen's* men were falling into line, *Pelote*, for the second time that morning, sounded the charge. With *Lieutenant General Wheeler* leading, the Confederates furiously charged forward. Incensed at the audacious attempt to drive them out of their camp once again, the Federals responded with a withering fire from their rapid-firing carbines. The Confederates struck hard, forcing the dismounted Federal men to seek cover behind the thick-trunked pine trees dotting the west slope of the ridge. From behind these sturdy giants they continued to deliver devastating fire. Storming in among the Federal men, the Confederate cavalymen resorted to the saber. Circling the trees, they slashed away at their stubborn foes. Mounted and exposed to the Federal's fire, Confederate casualties quickly mounted.

Viewing the carnage and recognizing the attack had lost momentum, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* ordered the attack broken off. Obediently the Confederate riders ceased their violent efforts and pulled back. Many, having lost their mounts in the melee, trotted out on foot; some accepted the offers of the outstretched arms of their comrades and were whisked up and onto the backs of their rescuers' mounts. On the left, *Major General Butler*, witnessing *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* repulse, began assembling *Young's Brigade*.

On seeing *Lieutenant General Wheeler* waving his hat in a rallying signal, the returning Confederates broke into a gallop. Determined to drive the Federals off, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* urged his men to return quickly and to form for another attempt. From other parts of the field additional men came forward to join the effort. Not wishing to give the Federals time to recover from the previous assault, the mounted men hurriedly jockeyed into position.

The blast of *Pelote's* bugle was followed by a shrill, desperate yell as *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* men once again charged forward, the yell being taken up by other Confederates engaged along the ridge. This time the Federal men were ready and waiting for the Confederate charge. As the frenzied Confederates neared their prey, they were met by a veritable hailstorm of lead, unseating most riders in the front ranks instantly. Horses shot dead while at a run plowed forward into the ground, stumbling those behind them. The volume of fire dispensed from the bores of the Federal carbines quickly checked the Confederate attack.



A cloud of gunsmoke quickly developed. Held close to the ground by the damp air, the smoke cloud obscured the combatants. As the firing slackened, the smoke dissipated, revealing the high cost of the latest Confederate assault. *Colonel James Hagan, C.S.A.*, commanding the *Alabama Brigade*, lay wounded on the ground, surrounded by many of his

officers and men also wounded or dead.

Brigadier General Humes, wounded and slumped over the neck of his horse, directed his men to withdraw.

On the left, *Major General Butler* had assembled elements of *Young's Brigade* under the command of *Colonel Wright*. As *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* men were withdrawing on the right, *Major General Butler* gave the command to charge. *Lieutenant General Wheeler*, on seeing *Major General Butler's* men charge forward, rode toward them, encouraging them on, "hat raised as they charged by." The Federals, having recently remanned the artillery, opened fire with canister. *Major General Butler's* men were cut down in groups by the lead-belching ordnance rifles. "It was at the head of this charge that *Lieutenant Colonel King* of the *Cobb Legion* was killed." The tide of Confederate attackers broke before reaching the Federal line ([Howard 1901](#); [Butler 1909](#); [Brooks 1909](#); [Du Bose 1912b](#)).

Wanting to continue the attack, but under intense fire, the Confederates hesitated in front of the Federal line. Unable to withstand the onslaught of shot, and with casualties quickly mounting, *Major General Butler's* men were compelled to withdraw.

Major General Butler ([Butler 1909a](#)):

They had got to their artillery and, with their carbines, made it so hot for the handful of us we had to retire. In fact I lost sixty-two men there in about five minutes' time.

The Confederates galloped back a short distance, turned, and faced the Federals again. Hoping to convince the Confederates to continue their withdrawal, the Federals kept up their fire. The mounted Confederates responded, firing pistols and carbines across the short intervening space. Having been repulsed, Confederate tempers ran high. Attempting to antagonize the Federals, groups of Confederate cavalymen made spontaneous charges toward them. The dismounted Federals held their ground and traded blow for blow with the Confederate cavalymen. With both sides stubbornly refusing to give, casualties mounted, as insults and lead were exchanged at close quarters.

Several miles southwest on Chicken Road, Brigadier General Atkins and the men of the 2nd Brigade heard heavy firing to the north. The 2nd Brigade soon encountered a band of wild-eyed refugees from the 3rd Brigade and 4th Brigade (dismounted). The shaken men reported to Brigadier General Atkins that "Kilpatrick's command had been surprised and badly used up" ([OR 1885](#)). Brigadier General Atkins immediately turned his command in the direction of the battle.



Five miles south of Monroe's Crossroads, marching east on Plank Road, the 2nd Division, XIV Army Corps, heard the sounds of battle to the north. As they neared the 18 mile-post, a courier rode past the infantrymen at a gallop. At the head of the column the courier reached the Division Commander, Brigadier General James D. Morgan, U.S.A.

Soon the command halted and the Division's 2nd Brigade was ordered off the road. The 2nd Brigade Commander, Brigadier General John Mitchell, U.S.A., informed his men that the cavalry had been attacked in camp and that the Brigade was marching to their assistance.

Major Aaron B. Robinson, U.S.A., 121st Ohio, 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, XIV Army Corps ([OR 1885](#)):

Heavy firing was heard on our left, and in a short time our Brigade was ordered to the relief of General Kilpatrick, who had been attacked in his camp.

Contemplating what to do next, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* assessed the situation.

Brigadier Generals Humes and Harrison, Colonels Hagan and Roberts and Major Farish had been badly wounded. The Alabama Brigade had lost its' commander and every field grade officer. Brigadier General Allen's and Colonel Ashby's horses had been shot.

With so many key leaders lost, it would be extremely difficult to mount another effort to retake the camp.

Having departed Bethesda Church at dawn, Brigadier General Jordan's 1st Brigade had reached Plank Road and was moving east. As the Brigade continued eastward, the faint sounds of gunfire to the north grew louder. In the vicinity of Sandy Grove Church, Brigadier General Jordan turned north to investigate.

[The Confederates Retire](#)

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
THE CONFEDERATES RETIRE

On the battlefield, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* was involved in organizing his men and trying to retrieve his wounded when he was approached by *Lieutenant General Hampton*, accompanied by *Dibrell's Brigade*. A quick discussion of available options by the two commanders resulted in the opinion that nothing more could be gained by continuing. *Lieutenant General Hampton* decided "that in view of the probability that Federal infantry would soon be on the scene" ([Dodson n.d.](#)), withdrawal was the prudent course of action.

0930

A rider was sent to inform *Major General Butler* of the decision to withdraw. *Lieutenant General Wheeler* took command of *Dibrell's Brigade* and directed *Brigadier General Dibrell* to position his brigade south of the Crossroads to cover the withdrawal. *Pelote* sounded recall as he and *Lieutenant General Wheeler* rode toward the Crossroads. Orders were shouted to the scattered units to fall back to the Morganton Road.

Individually and in small groups the riders began to pull out of line and make their way to the road. As they fell back, the firing slackened. *Dibrell's Brigade* deployed to resist if the Federals tried to pursue. Many of the Federal troopers instinctively moved forward to close on the withdrawing Confederates. But exhausted, out of ammunition, and receiving no encouragement from their commanders, the Federals did not continue the pursuit.



The Confederates quietly formed into a column on the road. Wagons and prisoners were moved to the front. Soon hoarse commands were issued, and the weary Confederate cavalrymen moved forward on Morganton Road, disappearing into the piney woods. Under the command of *Lieutenant General Wheeler*, the Confederate rearguard remained, allowing the Confederate main body time to move a safe distance from the battlefield. Several moments passed as the Southern cavalrymen sat stoically facing their northern counterparts. Then, with a few quick shots, the Confederate rear guard wheeled round and followed the main body. The muffled thud of the rear guard and the distant rumble of wagons slowly receded. The only remaining sounds were occasional moans from the wounded who were already being moved toward the main house.

The dazed Federal cavalrymen were grateful to hear the sounds of the Confederate column disappear to the east. Colonel Spencer and Lieutenant Colonel Way, free of their barricaded position on the second floor of the house, appeared on the porch. Colonel Spencer viewed the melancholy scene of the many wounded slowly making their way toward the house. Quickly the commanders began issuing orders to assist the wounded and convert the house into a field hospital.

Brevet Major General Kilpatrick soon joined the Brigade commanders. Brevet Major General Kilpatrick, somewhat shaken, expressed the urgency of departing the area as soon as the wounded were tended.

1000

Brigadier General Mitchell's Brigade, dispatched from XIV Corps to the relief of the camp, approached the battlefield. The firing had ceased while the Brigade was still in route. With no sound of battle to indicate the camp's location, the infantrymen arrived still in column. Brigadier General Mitchell halted his command. The infantrymen, hunched over their muskets for support, eyed the camp cautiously. Sweat stinging his eyes from the exertion of the rapid cross-country march, Brigadier General Mitchell scanned the camp to determine the situation. He directed an aide to go into the camp and inquire of the cavalrymen's needs. Adrenaline gave way to soreness as it became apparent to the infantrymen that *Lieutenant General Hampton* and his men had left.

Major Aaron B. Robinson, 121st Ohio Volunteer Infantry ([OR 1885](#)):

We marched briskly and in little over an hour reached the scene of the action, but found the enemy had been repulsed with severe loss, and our cavalry in quiet possession of the field.

Brigadier General Mitchell's infantrymen were detailed to assist the cavalrymen in preparing the wounded for movement and burying the dead. The dead were taken to several locations near the house where shallow pits had been prepared. With little ceremony, the dead were placed in the pits and covered with sand.

As Brevet Major General Kilpatrick paced the porch, the Division Surgeon and his assistants worked feverishly on the mangled bodies of the wounded.

The possibility of the Confederates returning, perhaps with infantry, put a sense of urgency into the efforts of the Federal cavalrymen.

The arrival of Brigadier Generals Atkins and Jordan relieved some of Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's anxiety. He ordered them to position their Brigades to defend against the possible return of the Confederates, while Colonel Spencer and Lieutenant Colonel



Way prepared to move. Brigadier General Mitchell and his infantry were released to return to XIV Corps.

All the seriously injured were treated by the surgeon and his staff. Those with minor wounds would have to wait to see the surgeon until the Division arrived at its next position. After treatment, the wounded unable to walk or sit a horse were placed in wagons.

As the last casualty requiring immediate treatment was released by the surgeon, Colonel Spencer sent word to Brevet Major General Kilpatrick that he was ready to move. Brevet Major General Kilpatrick mounted a borrowed horse, his string of valuable horses having been taken by the Confederates. As he started toward the Blue's Rosin Road, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick and his staff passed through the assembled regiments, issuing commands to fall in behind and follow.

The reunited Cavalry Division proceeded south, leaving behind the debris-strewn field they had known but a few hours, but that many would be able to recall vividly decades later.

Moving south, Kilpatrick's Division soon struck Chicken Road and turned east. Also on the road marching east were elements of the XIV Corps. On this occasion, the spirited ribbing that commonly occurred when the horsemen encountered the foot soldiers did not happen. The infantry stepped aside and allowed the cavalry to pass silently.



The 3rd Cavalry Division continued on for some eight miles. As the command approached the crossing of Little Rockfish Creek, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick instructed his men to cross over and establish camp on the far side.

Soon the sound of axes being enthusiastically used against the pine trees echoed through the woods as a breastwork perimeter was erected.

Care for the wounded continued, with the most seriously injured taken to the nearby home of William Shaw. Three of the men died in the house and were buried in the yard. A Sergeant John W. Swartz was one of them.

The Confederates' early morning surprise had made an impression on Brevet Major General Kilpatrick. His move south from Monroe's Crossroads took the 3rd Cavalry Division off the flank of the Army and into the safer vicinity of the Federal Infantry. His selection and fortification of his next position demonstrate a dramatically more cautious man.

On retiring from Monroe's Crossroads, the Confederate Cavalry proceeded down Morganton Road toward Fayetteville. For the sake of the wounded, the long grey column moved slowly. Out of necessity, the Confederate dead had been left on the battlefield.

Near dusk the cavalymen passed through the line of Confederate Infantry thrown out to the west of Fayetteville by *Lieutenant General Hardee*. As they passed by the Old Federal Arsenal, some regiments fell out to make camp on its grounds. The wagons bearing the wounded continued toward town and medical assistance. From the hill that commands the western approach to the town, the cavalymen could see the Cape Fear River to the east.

Below lay Fayetteville. Coming from hundreds of campfires, a large, dark cloud hung low over the town, attesting to the presence of *Lieutenant General Hardee's* main camp and suggesting the mood of the town.

1900

The wagons full of wounded and the file of Federal prisoners were escorted downward into the town.

Josephine Bryan Worth, A Fayetteville schoolgirl ([Oates 1981](#)):

It was on this day that a skirmish was fought at Longstreet, twelve miles from Fayetteville. Toward the close of the day the melancholy line of ambulances came in bearing the wounded, and, to me the still more melancholy file of prisoners. I would have liberated them all if I could. I had not made the acquaintance of Mr. Sherman's bummers then.

2100

Mrs. James Kyle, volunteer matron in one of Fayetteville's hospitals ([Oates 1981](#)):

About 9 o'clock they sent for me to come to the hospital, and the horrible scene I witnessed there I shall never forget. The wounded had been brought in from Longstreet, where a portion of Hardee's men had an engagement with Sherman's men. I stayed with them until just before daylight and did all I could to relieve their wants. Even then I did not hear a single murmur. Such

fortitude has no parallel in history.

11 March 1865

0600

In the early morning hours, General O.O. Howard, U.S.A., sent his available mounted men to scout Fayetteville. The Confederate forces concentrated in Fayetteville used the old arsenal as a rallying ground. Many units were ordered across the Cape Fear River, and the town was strategically evacuated ([Barrett 1956](#); [Bowman and Irwin 1865](#); [Butler 1909b](#); [Cox 1882](#); [McLauchlin n.d.](#); [OR 1885](#)).

The Federal cavalry scouts entered the town by a secondary road which the Confederates had neglected to picket. They nearly surprised *Lieutenant General Hampton*, but *Scout Hugh Scott* rallied a total of seven men and charged the Yankees on one of Fayetteville's side streets. The Federals were caught by surprise and attempted to withdraw, but unit disintegration set in and eleven were killed and twelve captured.

This little action nearly embarrassed *Major General Butler* and an aide who were sound asleep in a private home nearby. They were without clothes as well because their uniforms were being laundered by a household servant in the backyard. *Major General Butler* and his aide hurriedly dressed in boots and overcoats, mounted their horses, and headed away from the skirmish.

Cavalry from the XIV Corps and a mixture of other troops followed the Federal scouts into Fayetteville where they took possession of the arsenal grounds. By late morning the Confederates had retired across the Cape Fear River bridge in good order, leaving only a few cavalry to defend the bridge's approach.

The Confederates were able to position a section of artillery across the river to defend the bridge and fire on the Federal skirmishers attempting to take the bridge intact.

1200

Major General G.A. Smith, U.S.A., led his brigade into the city and moved toward the bridge. A point of high irony occurred as the Federals deployed to capture the Cape Fear River bridge. Major General Smith's adjutant's horse shied and bolted toward the bridge.

The Union soldiers, thinking a general attack was ordered, followed the out-of-control horse and its rider. The few remaining Confederate skirmishers raced across the bridge, which the Confederates had piled high with rosin logs in anticipation of destroying it.

As the last of the Confederates crossed the bridge, their comrades set it afire. By the time the would-be Union charge reached the structure, it was fully engulfed in flames. The bridge was ruined. The Federal pursuit of Confederate forces across the Cape Fear would have to wait.



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Appendix A

Union Order of Battle

Federal Forces

MG William T. Sherman

Left Wing

MG Henry W. Slocum

XIV Corps

BVT MG Jefferson C. Davis

XX Corps

BVT MG Alpheus S. Williams

Wing Strength

INF CAV ARTY Total
25,673 0 949 = 26,622

Right Wing

MG Oliver O. Howard

XV Corps

MG John A. Logan

XVII Corps

MG Frank P. Blair

Wing Strength

INF CAV ARTY Total
25,925 60 633 = 26,618

3rd Cavalry Division

BVT MG Hugh J. Kilpatrick
Division Strength — 4,438 men

1st Brigade

BVT BG Thomas J. Jordan

3rd Indiana Battalion
8th Indiana Regiment
2nd Kentucky Regiment
3rd Kentucky Regiment
9th Pennsylvania Regiment

3rd Brigade

COL George E. Spencer

1st Alabama Regiment
MAJ Francis L. Cramer (WIA, POW)

5th Kentucky Regiment
MAJ Christopher T. Cheek

5th Ohio Regiment
MAJ George H. Rader

Brigade Strength

Approximately 1,500 men

2nd Brigade

BVT BG Smith D. Atkins

92nd Illinois Regiment
9th Michigan Regiment
9th Ohio Regiment
10th Ohio Regiment
McLaughlin's Squadron

4th Brigade (Provisional, Dismounted)

LTC William B. Way

1st Regiment
MAJ Charles A. Appel (POW)

2nd Regiment
LTC William Stough

3rd Regiment
CPT John B. Riggs


Brigade Strength

Approximately 400 men
4th Brigade consisted of dismounted men from
throughout the Division. Soldier assignments
correspond to the Brigades.
For example: 2nd Brigade men were assigned to the
2d Regiment.

10th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery

A two-gun section accompanied each mounted brigade.

CPT Yates V. Beebe
Battery Strength — 94 men



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Appendix B

Confederate Order of Battle

Confederate Forces

GEN Joseph E. Johnston

In early March 1865 General Joseph E. Johnston's force had yet to assemble. Many units, including portions of the Army of Tennessee, were still in route. The only organized Confederate forces in the area of operations were Hardee's Infantry Corps, and Wheeler's and Butler's Cavalry. By order of the Confederate government, LTG Wade Hampton was to assume command of Wheeler's Corps and Butler's Division. On the 8th of March, Wheeler's and Butler's Cavalry united and "Hampton's Cavalry Command" was established.

Hardee's Corps

Strength — Approximately 8,000 men

Taliaferro's Division

BG William B. Taliaferro

McLaws' Division

MG LaFayette McLaws

Hampton's Cavalry Command

LTG Wade Hampton

Wheeler's Corps

LTG Joseph Wheeler

Strength — Approximately 4,600 men

Humes' Division

BG W.Y.C. Humes (WIA)

Allen's Division

BG William W. Allen (*)

Harrison's Texas Brigade

BG Thomas Harrison (WIA)

Hagan's Alabama Brigade

COL James Hagan (WIA)

8th Texas Regiment

1st Alabama Regiment
COL David T. Blakely

11th Texas Regiment

3rd Alabama Regiment
MAJ John D. Farish (WIA)

3rd Arkansas Regiment

MAJ William H. Blackwell

9th Alabama Regiment
COL John C. Malone, Jr.

4th/8th Tennessee Regiment

LTC Paul F. Anderson

12th Alabama Regiment
COL Wren S. Reese

51st Alabama Regiment (Partisan Rangers)
COL Milton L. Kirkpatrick

53rd Alabama Regiment (Partisan Rangers)
COL Moses W. Hannon (WIA)

10th Confederate (GA., ALA. Companies)
COL William J. Vason

Ashby's Brigade

COL Henry M. Ashby (*)

Anderson's Brigade

BG Robert H. Anderson

1st/6th Tennessee Regiment

COL Jacob B. Biffle

3rd Georgia Regiment

2nd Tennessee Regiment

COL John H. Kuhn

5th Georgia Regiment

5th Tennessee Regiment
COL George W. McKenzie

6th Georgia Regiment
COL Edward Bird

8th Confederate
(ALA., MISS. Companies)
LTC John S. Prather

Dibrell's Brigade

BG George G. Dibrell

Allison's Squadron (Hamilton's Battalion &
Shaw's Battalion)
COL Robert D. Allison

Shannon's Special Scouts

CPT A.M. Shannon

(Shannon's Scouts numbered 30 to 40 hand-picked
men from throughout the Corps.)

13th Tennessee Regiment
COL Mounce L. Gore
(Serving as Corps reserve, Dibrell also collected
late arriving units.)

Butler's Division

MG Matthew C. Butler

Strength — Approximately 1,200 men

Butler's Brigade

BG E.M. Law

1st South Carolina Regiment

4th South Carolina Regiment

5th South Carolina Regiment

6th South Carolina Regiment

19th South Carolina Battalion

Young's Brigade

COL Gilbert J. Wright

Phillips' Georgia Legion
MAJ W.W. Thomas

Cobb's Georgia Legion
LTC J.S. King (KIA)

Jeff Davis Mississippi Legion
(MISS., GA., ALA. Companies)
MAJ Ivey F. Lewis (WIA)

20th Georgia Battalion

2nd Kentucky Regiment

Reacting to rapidly changing circumstances, the Confederate Cavalry task organized often. The units contained in the order of battle participated in the battle. The following units may have participated, been on other missions, or arrived late.

Cavalry

1st Georgia Regiment

2nd Alabama Regiment

1st Kentucky Regiment

2nd Georgia Regiment

24th Alabama Battalion

3rd Kentucky Regiment

4th Georgia Regiment

9th Tennessee Battalion

9th Kentucky Regiment

10th Georgia Regiment

56th Alabama Regiment (Partisan
Rangers)

20th Georgia Regiment

Artillery

Baxter's Tennessee Battery; 2 X 12 LB. Howitzer, 2 X 6 LB. Smoothbores, Clarke County Arkansas
Battery; 2 X 12 LB. Howitzer, 2 X 6 LB. Smoothbores, Hartis, South Carolina Battery

* = Horse or horses shot from under him during the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads



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Appendix C

Biographies of Union Commanders

Major General William Tecumseh Sherman ([Warner 1964](#))
Commanding, Army of the West

Age: 45

Born: Ohio

Education: United States Military Academy, graduated 6th in the class of 1840

Branch: Artillery

Occupations: Professional soldier, banker, lawyer, military academy superintendent, head of a streetcar company

Service Record:

Served in California during the Mexican War, brevetted

1853, Resigned at the rank of Captain

1859, Military academy superintendent, (academy is now known as Louisiana State University)

14 May 1861, Volunteered for the Union Army, appointed Colonel 13th Infantry

June 1861, Commanding 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, Army of Northeastern Virginia

7 August 1861, Promoted to Brigadier General, U.S.V.

17 August 1861, Commanding Brigade, Division of the Potomac

28 August 1861, Second in Command, Department of the Cumberland

8 October 1861, Commanding, Department of the Cumberland

14 February 1862, Commanding, District of Cairo, Department of the Missouri

1 March 1862, Commanding, 5th Division, Army of the Tennessee

1 May 1862, Promoted to Major General, U.S.V.

21 July 1862, Commanding, 5th Division, District of Memphis, Army of the Tennessee

24 September 1862, Commanding, 1st Division, District of Memphis, Army of the Tennessee

24 October 1862, Commanding, District of Memphis, 13th Corps, Army of the Tennessee

18 December 1862, Commanding, Yazoo Expedition, Army of the Tennessee

4 January 1863, Commanding, 2nd Corps, Army of the Mississippi

12 January 1863, Commanding, 15th Corps, Army of the Tennessee

4 July 1863, Promoted to Brigadier General, U.S.A.

24 October 1863, Commanding, Army and Department of the Tennessee

18 March 1864, Commanding, Military Division of the Mississippi

12 August 1864, Promoted to Major General, U.S.A.

Battles and Campaigns:

Bull Run, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, Shiloh (WIA), Corinth, Vicksburg Campaign, Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge, Knoxville, Meridian Expedition, Atlanta Campaign, March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

General William Sherman's varied professional pursuits suggest a restless man in search of a meaningful endeavor for himself. His search took him many places, including extensive travel in the South. He was attracted to the South and its people, becoming very familiar with Southern geography and the Southern lifestyle. Eventually, he settled in Alexandria, Louisiana, becoming a respected instructor at the local military academy and a valued member of the community. A staunch Unionist, as Louisiana approached secession, he was compelled to resign his position at the academy.

After an emotional departure ceremony staged by the academy's cadets, he traveled north, arriving in Washington in early March. Initially expressing his desire to have no part in the expected hostilities, he turned down appointment as Brigadier General. Eventually he recognized the impossibility of not becoming involved and accepted commissioning as Colonel, 13th Infantry. His inclination to speak his mind without an appreciation for possible repercussions became fodder for the press. After making several controversial comments, it was suggested in some papers he might actually be insane. Disgusted with the press, disappointed with his superiors, and mistrustful of politicians, it seemed his career might end prematurely. However, he was encouraged by

friends, especially his good friend General Ulysses S. Grant, to disregard the criticisms and continue his valuable service. General Sherman once came to the aid of General Grant when he was being criticized publicly. General Sherman remarked: "General Grant is a great general, I know him well. He stood by me when I was crazy and I stood by him when he was drunk; and now, sir, we stand by each other always" ([Warner 1964](#)).

It wasn't long before General Sherman's aptitude for soldiering was recognized. His actions at Shiloh in April 1862, restored his confidence and started his ascent through the ranks. In 1863, his star continued to rise, and in March 1864 at Chattanooga, Tennessee he was placed in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Waiting just across the Georgia line was *General Joseph E. Johnston* and the *Confederate Army of Tennessee*. General Sherman's plan was to strike south into Georgia, engage *Johnston's Army* and "break it up" ([Warner 1964](#)). Once *General Johnston* was eliminated, his intent was to continue south, destroying the war resources of the region.

By early May General Sherman and his force were in motion toward Dalton, Georgia. The battles that occurred over the next three months as the Union general pushed ever deeper into Georgia are testament to the skills of both Generals Sherman and *Johnston*. Both executed campaigns of maneuver. General Sherman's superior force would engage *General Johnston's* men, feint then flank. *General Johnston* conducted a superb delaying action. He picked good ground, would hold until near disaster, then fall back to previously prepared positions. In July, as the *Confederate Army of Tennessee* was forced into the fortifications of Atlanta, *General Johnston* was replaced by *General John Bell Hood*. In September, after several costly attacks by *General Hood*, Atlanta fell.

Attempting to draw General Sherman out of Georgia, *General Hood* and the *Army of Tennessee* moved north, threatening General Sherman's supply line. Not taking the bait, General Sherman dispatched a force to follow *General Hood*, but with his main body, broke away from his supply line and moved southeast toward the coast. General Sherman's men laid waste to the area that fell within their 50-mile wide axis of advance. With little opposition, his force moved quickly enough to offer the Georgia coastal city of Savannah to President Lincoln as a Christmas present. Having made "Georgia howl," General Sherman then turned his attention toward the last leg of his march, the Carolinas ([Warner 1964](#)).

Brevet Major General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick ([Warner 1964](#)) Commanding, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps

Age: 29

Born: Deckertown, New Jersey

Education: United States Military Academy, class of 1861

Branch: Artillery

Occupation: Professional soldier

Service Record:

6 May 1861, 2nd Lieutenant, 1st Artillery, U.S.A.

9 May 1861, Captain, 5th New York Infantry, U.S.V.

14 May 1861, 1st Lieutenant, 1st Artillery, U.S.A.

25 September 1861, Lieutenant Colonel, 2nd New York Cavalry

29 January 1862, Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp

6 December 1862, Colonel, 2nd New York Cavalry

16 February 1863, Commanding 1st Brigade, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac

13 June 1863, Promoted to Brigadier General, U.S.V.

14 June 1863, Commanding, 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac

28 June 1863, Commanding, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac

26 April 1864, Commanding, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Cumberland

29 October 1864, Commanding, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi

30 November 1864, Promoted to Captain, 1st Artillery, U.S.A.

Battles and Campaigns:

Big Bethel (WIA), 2nd Bull Run, Chancellorsville Campaign, Gettysburg Campaign, Brandy Station, Raid on Richmond, Atlanta Campaign (WIA at Resaca), March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Brevet Major General Kilpatrick was the first regular Army officer to be wounded in action in the Civil War. In

February 1864, he launched the ill-fated raid on Richmond, which resulted in fiasco and the death of Colonel Ulric Dahlgren. He neither drank nor played cards but was a notorious ladies' man. He was vain and tended to exaggerate his accomplishments. In November 1864, Sherman asserted, "I know Kilpatrick is a hell of a damned fool, but I want just that sort of man to command my cavalry on this expedition" ([Warner 1964](#)).

Brevet Brigadier General Thomas Jefferson Jordan ([National Archives](#))

Commanding, 1st Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division

Age: 44

Born: Walnut Hill, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania

Education: Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Occupation: Lawyer, lumber merchant

Service Record:

17 April 1861, Mustered in as Major, U.S.V.

22 October 1861, Major, 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry

28 February 1862, 3rd Battalion, 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry

13 June 1862, Taken prisoner

13 January 1863, Promoted to Colonel, U.S.V.

March 1863, Paroled

October 1864, Commanding, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Department of the Cumberland

November 1864, Commanding, 1st Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division, Army of Georgia

December 1864, Commanding, 1st Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division, Military Division of the Mississippi

December 1864, Commanding, 1st Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division, Army of Georgia, Military Division of the Mississippi

January 1865, Commanding, 1st Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division, Department of North Carolina

25 February 1865, Brevetted Brigadier General. U.S.V.

Battles and Campaigns:

Unionville, Kentucky, Middleton, Kentucky, Shelbyville, Kentucky, Bacon Creek, Kentucky, Gallatin, Kentucky, Tompkinsville, Kentucky (POW), Atlanta Campaign, March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Brevet Brigadier General Thomas J. Jordan was an able field commander. He was well thought of by his superiors and respected by his men. With the exception of his time as a prisoner of war, he was constantly in the field with the 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Often suffering from ill health, at times he was compelled to accompany his command in an ambulance.

Brevet Brigadier General Smith Dykins Atkins ([Sifakis 1988](#))

Commanding, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division

Age: 29

Born: New York

Occupation: Illinois lawyer

Service Record:

30 April 1861, Captain, 11th Illinois

21 March 1862, Major, 11th Illinois

4 September 1862, Colonel, 92nd Illinois

February 1863, Commanding, 2nd Brigade, Baird's Division, Army of Kentucky, Department of the Cumberland

8 June 1863, Commanding, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, Reserve Corps, Army of the Cumberland

22 July 1863, Colonel, 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry

28 January 1864, Commanding, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Cumberland

13 May 1864, Commanding, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Cumberland

5 November 1864, Commanding, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi

Battles and Campaigns:

Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Tullahoma Campaign, Chickamauga, Atlanta Campaign, March to the

Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Early in the war, Brevet Brigadier General Atkins commanded a Regiment in Wilder's Lightning Brigade. This famous Brigade pioneered the use of mounted infantry in the Civil War. His earlier experience with the Lightning Division made him a valuable asset to Brevet Major General Kilpatrick and the 3rd Cavalry Division.

Colonel George Eliphaz Spencer (National Archives)
Commanding, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division

Age: 29

Born: New York

Occupation: Iowa attorney, represented Alabama in the U.S. Senate

Service Record:

24 October 1862, Captain, U.S.V.

11 September 1863, Colonel, 1st Alabama (U.S.) Cavalry

January 1865, Commanding, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi

Battles and Campaigns:

Shiloh, Atlanta Campaign, March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Early in the war Colonel Spencer served as a volunteer aid to John M. Thayer. Later he was appointed Assistant Adjutant General to Grenville M. Dodge. Prior to the Atlanta Campaign he took command of a Regiment of loyal Alabamians. Having demonstrated his abilities in the Atlanta Campaign and General Sherman's March to the Sea, he was given command of 3rd Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division.

Lieutenant Colonel William B. Way (National Archives)
Commanding, 4th Brigade (dismounted), 3rd Cavalry Division

Age: 30

Born: Rochester, New York; raised in Michigan

Service Record:

4 September 1861, Mustered in as 1st Lieutenant, Fisher's Company, 1st Regiment Michigan Cavalry

November 1861, Commanding, Company C, 1st Regiment Michigan Cavalry

11 October 1862, Promoted to Captain, U.S.V.

12 November 1862, Mustered out of service

30 April 1863, Mustered in with the rank of Major, 9th Michigan Cavalry

30 November 1863, Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.V.

Battles and Campaigns:

Shenandoah Valley, Pope's Virginia Campaign, McClellan's Maryland Campaign, Antietam, Blue Springs Kentucky, Carter's Station Tennessee, Atlanta Campaign, March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Major Way particularly distinguished himself in the Cavalry operations pursuing the rebel *General Morgan* during July 1863, and which ended with the capture of that rebel guerrilla General on July 26, 1863. Major Way, at the head of about 200 men, chased a larger force of the enemy and captured more than 300 rebel Cavalrymen, besides killing and wounding a very large number. His gallantry contributed greatly to the success of the operations which ended in the capture of nearly all of *General Morgan's* party, including the General.



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Appendix D

Biographies of Confederate Commanders

General Joseph Eggleston Johnston ([Warner 1959](#))

Commanding, *Army of Tennessee*, Departments of Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, and North Carolina

Age: 58

Born: Virginia

Education: United States Military Academy, class of 1829

Branch: Artillery

Occupation: Professional soldier

Service Record:

1830, Artillery

1838, Topographical Engineers

Seminole War, Brevetted

Mexican War, Brevetted twice

Cerro Gordo, Wounded

Chapultepec, Wounded

28 June 1860, Appointed Quartermaster General, U.S.A.

1861, Remained on duty until Virginia seceded

April 1861, Appointed Major General, Virginia Volunteers

14 May 1861, Appointed Brigadier General, C.S.A.

30 June 1861, Commanding, Army of the Shenandoah

20 July 1861, Commanding, Army of the Potomac

31 August 1861, Promoted to General, C.S.A.

22 October 1861, Commanding, Department of Northern Virginia

4 December 1862, Commanding, Department of the West

27 December 1863, Commanding, Army of Tennessee

18 July 1864, Relieved of command

25 February 1865, Commanding, Army of Tennessee and the Departments of Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina and Florida

16 March 1865, Department of North Carolina added to command

Battles and Campaigns:

Harper's Ferry, First Manassas, Peninsula Campaign, Williamsburg, Chickahominy River, Seven Pines, Fair Oaks (WIA), Relief of Vicksburg, Jackson, Atlanta Campaign (until 18 July 1864), Defense of North Carolina

Profile:

General Johnston was the highest ranking officer to resign from the United States Army and join the Confederacy. He was rated by many as more capable than *General Robert E. Lee*. Disagreements early in the war caused bad blood between *General Johnston* and Confederate *President Jefferson Davis*. *General Johnston* was eventually relieved after fighting what many consider a brilliant delaying action against a superior force from Chattanooga to Atlanta. In 1865, with General Sherman moving virtually unopposed through the Carolinas, the Confederate Congress convinced *President Davis* to reinstate *General Johnston* to command. While under the command of *General John Bell Hood*, *General Johnston's* old command, the *Army of Tennessee*, had been virtually destroyed at the battles of Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville. In late February 1865, the remnants of the *Army of Tennessee* and *Lieutenant General William J. Hardee's Corps* moved rapidly into North Carolina to join their old commander, *General Johnston*. With some concern, he had been placed in command to serve as a scapegoat for failure, *General Johnston* again prepared to meet his old adversary, General Sherman.

Lieutenant General Wade Hampton (Warner 1959)

Commanding, Cavalry, *Johnston's Command*

Age: 47

Born: Charleston, South Carolina

Education: South Carolina College, class of 1836

Occupation: Plantation owner, state legislator

Service Record:

Organized, equipped and offered for service a legion of infantry, cavalry, and artillery

July 1861, Colonel, Hampton's (S.C.) Legion

Fall 1861, Commanding, Brigade, Whiting's-Smith's Division, Department of Northern Virginia

23 May 1862, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.

28 June 1862, Commanding, 3rd Brigade, Jackson's Division, Jackson's Command, Army of Northern Virginia

28 July 1862, Commanding, Brigade, Cavalry Division, Army of Northern Virginia

3 August 1863, Promoted to Major General, C.S.A.

December 1863, Commanding Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia

11 August 1864, Commanding, Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia

February 1865, Commanding, Cavalry, Johnston's Command

15 February 1865, Promoted to Lieutenant General, C.S.A.

Battles and Campaigns:

First Manassas (WIA), Seven Pines (WIA), Antietam, Stuart's Ride around McClellan, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg (WIA), The Wilderness, Trevilian Station, Petersburg,

Profile:

Lieutenant General Hampton was owner of one of the largest plantations in the South. In 1861, he organized and equipped, at his own expense, the *Hampton Legion*. Without any formal military training, he proved to be an excellent field commander. As a result of the death of *Major General J.E.B. Stuart* at Yellow Tavern, *Lieutenant General Hampton* assumed command of the *Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia*. He was one of three "civilians" to attain the rank of Lieutenant General in the Confederate Army.

Lieutenant General Joseph Wheeler (Warner 1959)

Commanding, *Wheeler's Cavalry Corps*

Age: 29

Born: Georgia

Education: United States Military Academy, class of 1859

Branch: Cavalry

Occupation: Professional soldier

Service Record:

22 April 1861, Resigned as 2nd Lieutenant, Mounted Rifles, U.S.A.

1861, Appointed 1st Lieutenant, Artillery, C.S.A.

4 September 1861, Colonel, 19th Alabama

14 September 1862, Commanding, Cavalry Brigade, Left Wing, Army of the Mississippi

30 October 1862, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.

20 November 1862, Commanding, Cavalry Brigade, Polk's Corps, Army of Tennessee

22 November 1862, Commanding, Cavalry Brigade, Hardee's Corps, Army of Tennessee

December 1862, Commanding, Cavalry Division, Army of Tennessee

30 January 1863, Promoted to Major General, C.S.A.

16 March 1863, Commanding, Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

Fall 1864, Commanding, Cavalry Corps, Departments of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida

28 February 1865, Promoted to Lieutenant General, C.S.A.

March 1865, Commanding, Corps, Hampton's Cavalry Command, Army of Tennessee

Battles and Campaigns:

Shiloh, Corinth, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta Campaign, March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Twenty-one months after resigning from the United States Army as 2nd Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, he was Confederate *Major General 'Fightin' Joe' Wheeler*, commanding a Corps of Cavalry. On appointment by *General Braxton Bragg* in July 1862 as *Chief of Cavalry, Army of Mississippi*, he was in nearly constant combat until the end of the war. Known for his bravery in battle, he was wounded three times. Thirty-six staff officers fell by his side and 16 horses were shot under him. Operating independently, he opposed General Sherman's March to the Sea. During this period and during operations in South Carolina, the command began to be criticized for lack of discipline. Their ragged appearance, a result of having operated some 18 months without refitting or resupply, probably contributed to this opinion. *Lieutenant General Wheeler* became one of two former Confederate generals to hold the rank of general in the U.S. Army after the Civil War. He rejoined the Army in 1898 during the War with Spain, and served in Cuba, commanding a division of regular and volunteer cavalry during the Santiago Campaign.

Brigadier General William Young Conn Humes (Warner 1959)

Commanding, *Hume's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps*

Age: 35

Born: Abingdon, Virginia

Education: Virginia Military Institute, graduated 2nd in the class of 1851

Occupation: Tennessee lawyer

Service Record:

April 1861, Lieutenant, Artillery

13 May 1861, Lieutenant, Bankhead's Tennessee Battery

June 1861, Captain, Artillery

March 1863, Chief of Artillery, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

16 November 1863, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.

November 1863, Commanding, Brigade, Armstrong's Division, Martin's Detachment, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Department of East Tennessee

January 1864, Commanding, Brigade, Kelly's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

5 March 1864, Commanding, Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

Late 1864, Commanding, Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida

Spring 1865, Commanding, Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

Battles and Campaigns:

New Madrid, Island #10 (POW), Chickamauga, Knoxville, Atlanta Campaign, March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile

After his capture at Island #10 and exchange, he became *Wheeler's Chief of Artillery*. *Lieutenant General Wheeler*, impressed with *Brigadier General Humes'* abilities, gave him command of a mounted brigade.

Brigadier General Thomas Harrison (Warner 1959)

Commanding, *Harrison's Texas Brigade, Humes' Division*

Age: 42

Born: Jefferson County Alabama, raised in Monroe County Mississippi, moved to Texas in 1843

Education: Studied law in Brazoria County, Texas

Occupation: Texas lawyer, state legislator

Service Record:

Mexican War, 1st Mississippi Rifles

1861, Captain, 8th Texas Cavalry

1862, Major, 8th Texas Cavalry

18 November 1862, Colonel, 8th Texas Cavalry
July 1863, Commanding, Brigade, Wharton's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee
November 1863, Commanding, Brigade, Wharton's Division, Martin's Detachment of Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Department of East Tennessee
February 1864, Commanding, Brigade, Humes' Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee
Fall 1864, Commanding, Brigade, Humes' Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida
14 January 1865, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.

Battles and Campaigns:

Shiloh, Corinth, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Tullahoma Campaign, Chickamauga, Knoxville, Atlanta Campaign, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Brigadier General Harrison entered Confederate service as a Company Commander, 8th Texas Cavalry, "Terry's Texas Rangers".

Colonel Henry M. Ashby ([Hood 1906](#); [McDowell et al. 1906](#))

Commanding, *Ashby's Brigade, Humes' Division*

Age: 24

Born: Knox County, Tennessee

Service Record:

Spring 1861, Assisted in raising a Cavalry Company from Knox County, elected Captain, C.S.V.
Summer 1861, Commanding, Squadron, 3rd Battalion, Tennessee Cavalry
May 1862, elected Colonel
May 1862, Commanding, 2nd Regiment, Tennessee Cavalry
December 1862, Commanding, 2nd Regiment, under General Braxton Bragg
Spring–Summer 1863, Commanding, 2nd Regiment, under E. Kirby-Smith
Autumn 1863, Commanding, 2nd Regiment, Army of Tennessee
Winter 1863, Commanding, 2nd Regiment, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee
May 1864, Commanding, Brigade, Humes' Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

Battles and Campaigns:

East Tennessee and Kentucky, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, participated in three raids into Kentucky (WIA, right heel bone shot away), Atlanta Campaign, March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

"From the first to the last of his service *Col. Ashby* was on the front, always in the face of the enemy; and his ability, vigilance, and efficiency are attested by the fact that at no time during the four years of service was any body of troops, large or small, under his command surprised by the enemy. No officer of any rank was more devotedly loved or implicitly trusted by his troops. Whether in camp, on the march, or in battle, *Henry M. Ashby* was a born soldier" ([Hood 1906](#); [McDowell et al. 1906](#)).

— *1st Lt. James P. Coffin*
Acting Assistant Adjutant General
Ashby's Brigade

Major General William Wirt Allen ([Warner 1959](#))

Commanding, *Allen's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps*

Age: 30

Born: New York, raised in Montgomery County, Alabama

Education: Princeton, class of 1854

Occupation: Alabama planter

Service Record:

1861, 1st Lieutenant, Company A, Montgomery Mounted Rifles
18 March 1862, Major, 1st Alabama Cavalry
11 July 1862, Colonel, 1st Alabama Cavalry
26 February 1864, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.
Spring 1864, Commanding, Brigade, Kelly's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee
May 1864, Commanding, Morgan's Brigade, Martin's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee
5 December 1864, Commanding, Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee
4 March 1865, Appointed Major General, C.S.A. (Temporary)

Battles and Campaigns:

Shiloh, Corinth Siege, Perryville (WIA), Murfreesboro (WIA)
Atlanta Campaign, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Despite being schooled in law at Princeton, he chose the life of a Southern planter. An efficient commander, he rose rapidly through the ranks. Wounds received at Murfreesboro compelled him to sit out 1863. Returning to service in 1864, he was promoted to Brigadier General and given command of a Brigade under *Lieutenant General Joseph Wheeler*. He quickly gained *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* confidence. He was appointed to Major General by *President Jefferson Davis*, 4 March 1865. Appointment, though temporary, usually resulted in promotion to full rank.

***Colonel James Hagan* (Allardice 1995)**

Commanding, *Hagan's Alabama Brigade, Allen's Division*

Age: Unknown
Born: Ireland
Education: Pennsylvania
Branch: Infantry
Occupation: Mobile, Alabama businessman

Service Record:

5 March 1847, Captain, Regular Army
31 July 1848, Mustered out of service
1861, Captain, C.S.A.
1861, Commanding, Company, Mobile Cavalry
1863, Colonel, C.S.A.
1864, Commanding, 3rd Alabama Cavalry

Battles and Campaigns:

Mexican War, Atlanta Campaign, March to the Sea, Carolinas Campaign

***Brigadier General Robert Houstoun Anderson* (Warner 1959)**

Commanding, *Anderson's Brigade, Allen's Division*

Age: 30
Born: Savannah, Georgia
Education: United States Military Academy, class of 1857
Branch: Infantry
Occupation: Professional soldier

Service Record:

1 July 1857, Second Lieutenant of Infantry, U.S.A.
Served in the Pacific Northwest with the 9th Infantry, U.S.A.
17 May 1861, Resigned from the United States Army
6 March 1861, Appointed First Lieutenant of Artillery, C.S.A.
September 1861, Major, Assistant Adjutant General
20 June 1862, Major, 1st Georgia Sharpshooters Battalion

20 January 1863, Colonel, 5th Georgia Cavalry
May 1864, Commanding, Allen's Brigade, Kelly's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee
20 July 1864, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.
January 1865, Commanding, Brigade, Allen's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

Battles and Campaigns:

Atlanta Campaign, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

An examination of *Brigadier General Anderson's* service record indicates in his haste to join the Confederacy that he failed to resign the United States Army. His early service was as a staff officer stationed on the coast of Georgia. Apparently preferring to be on the line, he transferred to the Sharpshooters. The Sharpshooter Battalion he joined continued service along the coast. Eventually he joined the *5th Georgia Cavalry*, which in January 1863 was ordered to the *Army of Tennessee*.

***Brigadier General George Gibbs Dibrell* (Warner 1959)**

Commanding, *Dibrell's Brigade, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps*

Age: 43

Born: Sparta, Tennessee

Education: Scant

Occupation: Tennessee farmer and merchant

Service Record:

10 August 1861, Lieutenant, 25th Tennessee

September 1862, Colonel, 13th/8th Tennessee

August 1863, Commanding, Brigade, Forrest's Cavalry Division, Army of Tennessee

September 1863, Commanding, Brigade, Armstrong's Division, Forrest's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

October 1863, Commanding, Brigade, Armstrong's Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

November 1863, Commanding, Brigade, Armstrong's Division, Martin's Detachment of Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Department of East Tennessee

February 1864, Commanding, Division, Cavalry, Department of East Tennessee

April 1864, Commanding, Brigade, Kelly's-Humes' Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

Late 1864, Commanding, Brigade, Humes' Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida

28 January 1865, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.

March 1865, Commanding, Brigade, Humes' Division, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee

Battles and Campaigns:

Mill Springs, *General Nathan Bedford Forrest's* Raid into Western Tennessee, Chickamauga, Knoxville, Atlanta Campaign, Saltville, VA, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

In 1861, *Brigadier General Dibrell* was a Union Delegate to the Tennessee state convention. After the majority of Tennesseans voted for secession, he joined the Confederate Army as a Private. In 1862, he organized the *8th Tennessee Cavalry*.

***Captain Alexander May Shannon* (Sifakis 1988)**

Commanding, *Shannon's Special Scouts, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps*

Age: Unknown

Born: Texas

Service Record:

Date Unknown, Captain, Company C, 8th Texas Cavalry

Fall 1864 thru Winter 1865, Commanding Shannon's Scouts, Operated independently of higher command

February 1865, Commanding, Shannon's Special Scouts, Wheeler's Cavalry Corps

Battles and Campaigns:

Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Atlanta, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Captain Shannon and his men were well known for their daring adventures behind enemy lines. Often dressed in Federal uniforms, they shadowed Sherman's Army, gathering information on its movement. They also enjoyed attacking General Sherman's foraging parties and were a terror to Federal stragglers.

***Major General Matthew Calbraith Butler* (Warner 1959)**

Commanding, *Butler's Cavalry Division*

Age: 29

Born: Greenville, South Carolina

Education: South Carolina College

Occupation: South Carolina lawyer, state legislator

Service Record:

Early 1861, Captain, Hampton's (S.C.) Legion

21 July 1861, Major, Hampton's Legion

August 1862, Colonel, 2nd South Carolina Cavalry

1 September 1863, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.

Spring 1864, Commanding, Brigade, Hampton's Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia

Summer 1864, Commanding, Hampton's Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia

19 September 1864, Promoted to Major General, C.S.A.

January 1865, Commanding, Cavalry Division, Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida

March 1865, Commanding, Division, Hampton's Cavalry Command, Army of Tennessee

Battles and Campaigns:

First Bull Run, Peninsula Campaign, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Brandy Station (WIA, right foot amputated), Overland Campaign, Petersburg, Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Major General Butler was son-in-law to *South Carolina Governor Pickens*. He resigned as a member of the *South Carolina Legislature* to accept a Captain's commission in the *Hampton Legion*. Throughout the war, he remained close to *Lieutenant General Wade Hampton*.

***Brigadier General Evander McIvor Law* (Warner 1959)**

Commanding, *Butler's Brigade, Butler's Division*

Age: 29

Born: Darlington, South Carolina

Education: South Carolina Military Academy, class of 1856

Occupation: Associated with several military academies in South Carolina and Alabama

Service Record:

Spring 1861, Captain, Company B, 4th Alabama

May 1861, Lieutenant Colonel, 4th Alabama

28 October 1861, Colonel, 4th Alabama

May 1862, Commanding, Whiting's Brigade, Smith-Whiting's Division

26 July 1862, Commanding Brigade, Whiting's Division, 2nd Corps, Army of Northern Virginia

July 1862, Commanding Brigade, Whiting's-Hood's-Field's Division, 1st Corps, Army of Northern Virginia

3 October 1862, Promoted to Brigadier General, C.S.A.

25 February 1863, Commanding, Hood's Division, 1st Corps, Department of Virginia and North Carolina

2 July 1863, Commanding, Hood's Division, Longstreet's Corps, Army of Northern Virginia

September 1863, Commanding, Brigade, Hood's Division, Longstreet's Corps, Army of Tennessee

20 September 1863, Temporarily commanding, Division

5 November 1863, Commanding, Hood's-Field's Division, Department of East Tennessee

March 1865, Commanding, Brigade, Butler's Division, Hampton's Cavalry Command, Johnston's Army

Battles and Campaigns:

First Manassas (WIA), Seven Pines, The Seven Days, Second Manassas, Sharpsburg/Antietam, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, East Tennessee Campaign, The Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor (WIA), Carolinas Campaign

Profile:

Brigadier General Law proved himself a gallant and able field commander and a sometimes difficult subordinate. His 4th Alabama Infantry distinguished itself at Gettysburg and Chickamauga. After the wounding of *General Hood* at Gettysburg, *Brigadier General Law* assumed command of *Hood's Division*, successfully leading it through the remainder of the campaign. After being accused of a lack of cooperation in the East Tennessee Campaign, *Brigadier General Law* submitted his letter of resignation to *Lieutenant General James Longstreet*. At some point, having taken the letter back from *Lieutenant General Longstreet*, he took it personally to Richmond where he was talked out of resigning. However, *Lieutenant General Longstreet* filed charges against him for stealing the letter. Eventually he was reinstated and went on to serve faithfully.



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
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The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads North Carolina

10 March 1865




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The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads North Carolina

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


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
Prepared for
United States Army
XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

by
Department of the Interior
National Park Service
Midwest Archeological Center
Lincoln, Nebraska
and
Southeast Archeological Center
Tallahassee, Florida

1997



Dedicated to
the American Soldier



This publication should be cited as follows:

Belew, Kenneth, with an introduction by Kenneth Belew and Douglas D. Scott, *Cavalry Clash in the Sandhills The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads, North Carolina*, a battle staff ride study prepared for the U.S. Army, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina by the U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Midwest Archeological Center, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1997 and the Southeast Archeological Center, Tallahassee, Florida.

First printing, 1997

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Douglas D. Scott is a native of Bethany, Missouri. He is an archeologist with the Midwest Archeological Center, National Park Service. He has directed extensive research in the area of military archeology, with many of his investigations focusing on Civil War and Indian War sites in the West. These include Fort Leavenworth, Kansas old post, and the Battles of the Little Bighorn and Big Hole, Montana, and Washita and Honey Springs, Oklahoma. Doug lives in Lincoln, Nebraska.

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Acknowledgements

William H. Kern of Fort Bragg, North Carolina developed the proposal for the Monroe's Crossroads staff ride and secured funding through the Legacy Resource Management Program. John H. Jameson, Jr., of the Southeast Archeological Center, National Park Service, Tallahassee, Florida provided us the opportunity to develop this document. Linda Zumpe and Joyce Hawthorne of the Midwest Archeological Center, Lincoln, Nebraska, provided administrative support and managed to iron out several wrinkles to keep us going. Judy Hewett of Southern Pines, North Carolina drew the situation maps. Martin Pate of Newnan, Georgia executed the oil paintings of the battle. Sharyn Kane and Richard Keeton of Marietta, Georgia edited and designed the staff ride.

We owe a debt of gratitude to Wilbur S. Nye (Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired) whose early research into the battle provided a foundation for our work. Stanley M. Dahl (First Sergeant, U.S. Army, Retired) and James Legg collected and preserved relics from the battlefield. They generously shared their research. In addition to various well-known accounts, we searched for long neglected historical sources and integrated them into the narrative. We tried to dispel the myths and apocryphal stories which have grown up about the battle by putting the events described in the appropriate historical context. Finally, we endeavored to take a fresh look at the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads with a view toward training American soldiers in the art of war.

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Introduction

The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads Staff Ride An Exercise in Leadership Training

The staff ride concept was pioneered at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in the 1890s. By 1906 the first staff ride had taken place at the Chattanooga battlefield, Tennessee. The concept continues to evolve today. The staff ride concept is meant to expand and supplement Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, June 1993, by placing soldiers, well grounded in the theory of battle, on actual battle sites to study and critique the tactics and strategy of that engagement. The staff ride concept is one that takes the study of war and warfare from the theoretical to the practical by using historical examples on the actual terrain where the battle occurred.

The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads was fought on 10 March 1865 by a Union cavalry force consisting of two brigades and one artillery section of the 3rd Cavalry Division under the direct command of Brevet Major General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, U.S.A., and *Hampton's Cavalry Command*, consisting of *Wheeler's Cavalry Corps* and *Butler's Cavalry Division*, under the direct command of *Lieutenant General Wade Hampton, C.S.A.* The action was fought with both mounted and dismounted troops, the Federal troops dismounted and the Confederate troops generally mounted. This staff ride uses the convention of setting Confederate units, ranks, and names in italics.

The Civil War had little more than a month to run in its bloody course when the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads was fought. Confederate armies were depleted and nearly exhausted after four years of bitter fighting while the Union retained major reserves of manpower and materiel. The Confederates retreated before General Sherman's March to the Sea. On 20 December 1864, they evacuated Savannah, Georgia and later Charleston, South Carolina. Following the fall of the state capitol, Columbia, on 16 February 1865, the Confederates conducted delaying actions across the Carolinas, buying time to concentrate their forces. The

Confederate Army intended to force a major battle in North Carolina, hoping to set the stage by defeating Federal columns before they could join together. If this effort proved successful, the Confederate Government still hoped to enter into negotiations with the United States for a cessation of hostilities on favorable terms.

President Lincoln and the Army's commander, General Ulysses S. Grant, U.S.A., intended to crush the rebellion and reunite the Union. The only conclusion to the war they would accept was complete capitulation of the Confederate States of America, with an eventual goal of an entirely reunited United States of America.

SETTING THE STAGE

Monroe's Crossroads was a small Civil War battle involving about 4,000 men. The action was an engagement of mounted Confederate cavalry against dismounted Union cavalry. The fight lasted several hours on the morning of 10 March 1865.

The Confederate assault was a deliberate attack against a poorly guarded and sleeping Union camp. While initially routed, the Federal cavalry recovered and counterattacked, pressuring the Confederates to relinquish the camp.

Anticipating the approach of Federal infantry, the Confederate commanders ordered their troops to disengage from the action. Then *Hampton's Cavalry Command* withdrew in good order toward Fayetteville, North Carolina.

The Confederate attack delayed the Federal Cavalry's movement toward Fayetteville, denying Brevet Major General Kilpatrick the honor of entering the town first.

The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads gained the additional time needed for the Confederate infantry to conduct an organized crossing of the Cape Fear River at Fayetteville unmolested by the advancing Federals. With their troops and equipment east of the

Cape Fear, the Confederate Army burned the bridges as the Union forces entered the city.

SMALL ARMS AT MONROE'S CROSSROADS

Immediately prior to the Civil War, a technological revolution, the development of the rifled-musket, overtook tactical doctrine and had immense consequences for the first three years of the war¹. Napoleonic tactics of shoulder-to-shoulder massed infantry assaults resulted in high casualty rates when pitted against the rifled-musket which had an effective range of more than 1,000 yards. Tactics had adapted to the technology by the war's end, and the cavalry were no exception. Prior to the Civil War, an attacking force enjoyed a great advantage. The tactics and firearms in use at the time were not enough to counter the sheer momentum of a well-executed attack.

During the Civil War, the attackers' advantage was diminished. Rifling and conical bullets increased effective ranges and accuracy; percussion caps and fixed rounds increased the rate of fire and reliability of small arms. It was not uncommon in Civil War battles for an attacking force to suffer 40 to 50 percent casualties before closing with a defending foe or being repulsed.

At Monroe's Crossroads an extensive variety of small arms were used², from the most advanced magazine-fed carbine to earlier model muskets and shotguns.

While a degree of uniformity existed within the Regiments of the Federal Cavalry, the Confederate Cavalry was armed with an extensive assortment of makes and calibers. Being armed with such a variety of weapons created logistical problems for the Confederate Cavalry. The Confederates' deficiency in all classes of supply prompted them to be alert for the opportunity to secure additional food, weapons, ammunition, and mounts. Their necessary habit of acquiring supply by confiscation and battlefield pick-up exacerbated their logistical problems.

Union cavalymen were well armed and equipped by war's end³. Each man was generally armed with a six-shot revolving cylinder percussion pistol, a saber, and a carbine. The pistol was generally a .44-caliber Colt or Remington revolver. However, some men preferred the lighter weight .36-caliber Colt Navy revolver to the larger caliber models. Each man carried at least 24 rounds of ammunition for the

revolver. The cartridge, carried in a leather pouch hung on the saber belt, was a self-contained linen or nitrated paper cartridge with a black powder propellant charge and a lead conical bullet. Round ball bullet rounds were also used. Each soldier also carried a supply of percussion caps to prime the nipple of his revolver for firing. Archeological evidence from the Monroe's Crossroads battlefield demonstrates that the Colt and Remington .44-caliber revolvers were the favored pistols, although at least one metallic cartridge revolver was also used, a 12mm pinfire pistol. The saber, although rarely used in combat during the latter years of the war, was nevertheless a standard issue item. Generally, cavalry carried the Model 1859 (also known as the Model 1860) light cavalry saber. Many volunteer regiments armed themselves with a saber of similar style, although foreign-made.

There were numerous types of carbines in many different calibers issued to cavalry units during the latter years of the Civil War. The Union regiments at Monroe's Crossroads were variously armed with single-shot .52-caliber Sharps breechloading carbines (percussion ignition with a nitrated paper or linen cartridge), .54-caliber Burnside breechloading carbines (percussion ignition with a metallic cartridge case), .56-56-caliber Joslyn breechloading carbine (rimfire metallic cartridge), and the magazine-fed repeating seven-shot .56-56-caliber Spencer carbine (rimfire metallic cartridge). In addition, the dismounted 4th Brigade (Provisional) was armed with either the .58-caliber or .577-caliber rifled-musket issued with an 18-inch long triangular bayonet. Each soldier carried his ammunition in a leather pouch, separate from the pistol cartridge pouch, on the leather saber belt. Generally each man was issued 40 rounds of ammunition, which was expected to last the length of almost any battle.

The rifled-musket and various carbines used conical lead bullets. The carbines had a shorter lethal range than the rifled-musket, ranging from 500 to 750 yards. However, most battles were fought at ranges of 200 yards or less, very often at 100 yards or less, and even hand-to-hand. Confederate small arms, by late in the war, were diverse. They were a mixture of Confederate arsenal manufactured weapons, imported firearms, and captured Union weapons. The Confederates were particularly fond of Union breechloading carbines and took them as trophies of war whenever possible. Ammunition had

**Table 1
Archeological Evidence of Firearms Types at Monroe's Crossroads⁴**

Firearm Type	Represented in Archeological Collection	Represented in Private Collection
.30-caliber (unknown)	—	Yes
.36-caliber (unknown)	—	Yes
.40-caliber (unknown)	Yes	—
Colt .44 revolver	Yes	—
Remington .44 revolver	Yes	—
.44 Henry rifle	—	Yes
12 mm revolver (?)	—	Yes
.50 Smith carbine	Yes	Yes
.51 Hall (?) carbine	Yes	Yes
.52 Sharps	Yes	Yes
.54 Starr carbine	—	Yes
.54 1841 rifle (?)	Yes	Yes
.54 Enfield/Austrian	Yes	Yes
.54 Burnside	Yes	Yes
.56-56 Joslyn	Yes	Yes
56-56 Spencer	Yes	Yes
.577 Enfield	Yes (bullets)	Yes (musket parts)
.58 Springfield	Yes (bullets)	Yes (musket parts)
.69 muskets	Yes	Yes
Shotguns	Yes	Yes
3-Inch Ordnance Rifle	Yes (case & canister)	Yes (complete shell)
Total	20 firearms types	

to be captured as well because the Confederate arsenals were unable to produce adequate supplies of ammunition for their own weapons, let alone captured Union weapons of unusual caliber. Some Confederate units at Monroe's Crossroads were armed with single and double barrel shotguns as their primary weapons.

Only one Confederate account provides any specificity to the armament at Monroe's Crossroads. *Colonel Charles C. Jones', C.S.A.*⁵, report of inspection for January and February 1865 notes ammunition itself was in short supply. The men

were noted to be carrying from 35 to 40 rounds per man as an average. The report noted *Lieutenant General Joseph Wheeler's, C.S.A.*, ordnance train carried an ammunition reserve of only slightly more than 40 rounds per man. The armament of the men was identified as mixed. Most men carried the Colt Navy or Army revolver, but the shoulder arms were a mixed lot.

As a general rule, there is a great want of uniformity in the armament of this command. The principal weapons in the hands of the

Table 2
Federal Weapons at Monroe's Crossroads⁶

Edged Weapons	
	Bayonet, triangular — 4th (Provisional) Brigade
	Saber — Mounted units
Pistols	
	Model 1858 Remington Army revolver .44 inch
	Model 1860 Colt Army revolver .44 inch
Rifles and Carbines	
	Springfield rifled musket .58 inch—4th (Provisional) Brigade
	Smith carbine .50 inch
	Sharps carbine .52 inch
	Burnside carbine .54 inch—1st Alabama Cavalry Regiment
	Spencer carbine .56–56 inch—5th Ohio Cavalry Regiment
Artillery	
	2 X (3–Inch) Ordnance Rifle Cannon—Stetson's Section, 10th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery
	Projectiles: 3–Inch Hotchkiss shell and canister

men are the long and short Enfield rifle, the Springfield musket, the Austrian rifle, a variety of breech-loading rifles, viz.: the Spencer, the Burnside, Sharp, Maynard, & c., and various kinds of pistols.

Many, if not all, of the breech-loading rifles and pistols are captured arms; for some of them, as the Spencer, there is great difficulty in procuring the requisite amount of ammunition, the supply now in the cartridge boxes of the men, and in the ordnance train, having been obtained exclusively by capture.

With such a variety of calibers, and in view of the fact that the supply is at best but limited and uncertain, for at least some of the guns mentioned, it becomes almost a matter of impossibility to secure at all times the proper amount of ammunition.

There should be a greater uniformity in the armament of the regiments, and if possible brigades.

The best evidence for small arms use at the battle is derived from the archeological record. Table 1

shows there is a true diversity in small arms types and caliber used in the battle, as evidenced in the archeological findings.

Nevertheless, this diversity is typical of most Civil War battles where standardization of arms and ammunition was not a major component of the Quartermaster and Ordnance Departments. They were the branches then in charge of development and procurement of arms.

Tables 2 and 3 list additional weapons used at the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads as gathered from various historical sources. Capabilities of the various weapons used in the battle are listed in Table 4.

FIELD ARTILLERY

Prior to and during the Civil War, there were a number of advances in artillery systems. However, their effects were less dramatic than those of small arms. Development of new types of projectiles and fuzes produced more lethal but less reliable artillery ammunition. Rifling of cannon tubes increased ranges, but did little to improve accuracy.

Many Civil War soldiers continued to prefer the

**Table 3
Confederate Weapons at Monroe's Crossroads⁸**

Edged Weapons	
	Saber
Pistols	
	Model 1858 Remington Army revolver .44 inch
	Model 1860 Colt Army revolver .44 inch
	Unknown .40 inch
Rifles, Muskets, and Carbines	
	Model 1841 "Mississippi" rifle .54 inch
	Model 1841 South Carolina "Palmetto" rifle .54 inch
	Enfield musket .577 inch
	Rifled musket .58 inch
	Musket .69 inch
	Hall carbine .52 inch
	Smith carbine .50 inch
	Sharps carbine .52 inch
	Burnside carbine .54 inch
	Joslyn carbine .56 inch
Shotguns	
	1., .40, .50, .58, .62 inch and Buck and Ball—common in the Texas Brigade

older smoothbore cannon. In a desperate fight, a dependable old piece firing solid shot at long range, followed by canister, then double canister, could devastate an approaching enemy battle line. Artillery of the time was always employed in a direct fire mode to augment the fire of the infantry⁹.

Although there was experimentation with artillery organization, the traditional technique of providing artillery support by imposing a command relationship between the artillery unit and the supported unit continued. The practice of assigning or attaching artillery to maneuver organizations tended to decrease its effectiveness by precluding the massing of fire on lucrative targets at critical times.

Luckily for Civil War soldiers, the greatest advance in artillery would not come until after the war, with the advent of a recoil mechanism and indirect fire.

A single section of two, wrought-iron 3-Inch

Ordnance Rifles (Model 1861) were present at Monroe's Crossroads. The 3-Inch Ordnance Rifle was a muzzle-loading gun served by a crew of eight. It fired elongated projectiles with a lead driving band around the iron shot or shell. It fired shell, case shot, or canister shot. Shell and case shot were exploded by one of three types of nose fuze (a paper or wooden time fuze trimmed to burn for one to five seconds and a percussion fuze). Shell was a hollow, soft iron, elongated projectile filled with black powder. When the projectile burst, it spread large chunks of iron fragments meant for antipersonnel effect. Case shot, used in a similar manner as shell, was an elongated projectile containing a black powder charge and many .69-caliber lead balls.

Lethal range was up to 3,000 yards. Generally, artillery was employed at much shorter ranges. Canister was usually used at ranges of less than 400 yards. It was a sheet iron can filled with lead balls

Table 4
Weapons Capabilities¹⁰

Weapon Type	Effective Range	Rate of Fire
Pistols		
Colt revolver, six-shot	20—50 yards	6 rounds in 10 seconds
Remington revolver, six-shot	20—50 yards	6 rounds in 10 seconds
Rifles and Muskets		
U.S. rifled musket, muzzle loaded, .58 Inch	200—300 yards	3 rounds per minute
Enfield rifled musket, muzzle loaded, .577 Inch	200—300 yards	3 rounds per minute
Smooth-bore musket, muzzle loaded, .69 Inch	50—100 yards	3 rounds per minute
Carbines		
Spencer carbine, breech loaded, seven round magazine; the Spencer, "Quick Loader," ammunition box contained 8 magazines	150—200 yards	8 rounds in 20 seconds
Sharps carbine, breech loaded, single shot	150—200 yards	9 rounds per minute
Burnside carbine	150—200 yards	9 rounds per minute
Shotguns		
Single and double barrel	50—100 yards	3 rounds per minute
Artillery		
3-Inch ordnance rifle	1,800 yards	2 rounds per minute

or .75-inch iron balls. It was used strictly as an antipersonnel round. In extreme cases, the guns could be double charged with canister, a rather desperate maneuver. Archeological evidence from Monroe's Crossroads demonstrates that the shell and case shot fired during the battle were of the Hotchkiss type (a well-known manufacturer of artillery ammunition during the war).

TACTICS

Tactical Doctrine during the early years of the Civil War was heavily influenced by the Napoleonic Wars and the United States' War with Mexico (1846-1848)¹¹. Close-order infantry assaults with bayonets gleaming, cavalry charges with sabers flashing, and

direct fire by artillery in front of the line gave way to more discrete tactics by 1863. Both Union and Confederate commanders saw appalling casualty rates using these tactics against the commonly used rifled-musket. Artillery was no longer able to mass to the front of an infantry line and pound the enemy. The range of the rifled-musket was equal to that of the artillery, allowing the infantryman to pick off gun crews at will. The time-honored cavalry charge to break the infantry line was no longer feasible, again due to the long range and accuracy of the rifled-musket. Again, the infantryman could easily decimate a cavalry charge before it was well underway.

Finally, the infantryman armed with the rifled-musket could destroy a close-order infantry charge

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3-Inch Ordnance Rifle

The 3-Inch Ordnance Rifle was also known as the ordnance rifle, the ordnance gun, the Griffen gun, and was sometimes erroneously referred to as the Rodman rifle (Goode, 1990). The gun was invented by John Griffen of New York. Griffen developed a process whereby strips of wrought iron $\frac{3}{4}$ inches thick and $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide were wrapped around an iron core by a lathe. The tube was then heated and rolled to a length of seven feet before trunnions were welded on. Finally, the bore was reamed out. This process made the 3-Inch Ordnance Rifle the lightest gun in field artillery service during the Civil War. Despite its light weight, the process of wrapping the wrought iron bands around the core made it the strongest, most durable gun in the field. The gun was deployed in support of infantry to repulse enemy assaults, often positioned behind the lines and fired over the heads of friendly troops. Range made the piece excellent for long-range shelling. It was most effective in open spaces. Its use was limited by wooded areas, such as existed at Monroe's Crossroads. Typical rifling was lands .5 inch and grooves .84 inch.

Specifications:

bore diameter	3 inches
tube composition	wrought iron
length	73 inches
length of tube	69 inches
weight of tube	816 pounds
weight of projectile	9.5 pounds
powder charge	1 pound
range, 5 degrees elevation	1,830 yards
muzzle velocity	1,215 feet per second
shell type	Hotchkiss

well beyond the traditional 100-yard firing range of the old smoothbore musket.

By the last years of the war, tactics had adapted to the effectiveness of modern rifled arms. Infantry tactics were modified to open order skirmish lines, with available cover used whenever possible. Defensive positions were usually fortified with extensive entrenchments. Even short-term camps were usually protected by prepared rifle pits, picket posts, and videttes.

Although used extensively throughout the war, artillery, by 1863, became a defensive weapon rather than the offensive weapon it had been in 1861. Artillery was required to move behind the line of defense to be effective due to the increased range of the rifled-musket. Artillery tactics of the Civil War depended upon direct fire. Indirect fire would not be developed for another 40 years. The direct fire concept relegated the artillery to a defensive role

throughout the Civil War and for many years after.

Of the three combat branches, cavalry made the greatest adaptation. In battle, cavalry moved from the close-order charge meant to break or out-flank a line to a mobile unit that could move quickly to the scene of action, then dismount and fight as light infantry. With the advent of breech loading single-shot and repeating carbines, cavalry firepower increased dramatically. This increased firepower and mobility allowed the cavalry to regain a usefulness on the battlefield it had lost with the introduction of the rifled-musket. Cavalry was also used extensively throughout the war as a fast and efficient scouting and intelligence gathering arm. Its mobility allowed units to range far and wide around the main army to protect the marching columns and scout the opponents' movements. Kilpatrick's Division was involved in this type of protection screen and scouting endeavor when he halted to camp at Monroe's Crossroads on the night of 9 March 1865. *Lieutenant General Hampton's* Confederate Cavalry force was providing a mobile rear-guard function for the retiring Confederate Army of *General Joseph E. Johnston, C.S.A.* *Lieutenant General Hampton's* Cavalry also scouted and provided intelligence on Union movements and at Monroe's Crossroads took the opportunity to raid a sleeping, unprepared Union camp with the intention of delaying their movement toward Fayetteville.

THE BATTLE STAFF RIDE EXERCISE

The goal of the staff ride exercise¹² at Monroe's Crossroads is to assess the action based on an analysis of the historical narrative and on-site observation against the principles of war as outlined in FM 100-5 (*Operations*). The principles of war were not set down in a training regulation until 1921. However, many of these concepts were developed during the Civil War. Most senior Union and Confederate commanders were graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. They were well versed in the art of war, as then practiced.

Technological innovations, such as the rifled-musket, required changes in tactics to meet the new situations. Dogmatic commanders tended to be replaced by those able to adapt to field conditions during the latter years of the war. Those present at Monroe's Crossroads had learned their lessons well,

but tired, saddle-weary, rain-soaked, combat-hardened veterans did make mistakes during the battle. These mistakes were paid for by their soldiers. The lessons of Monroe's Crossroads, relative to the principles of war, require a careful assessment of the movements of the commands, deployment of troops, offensive action, defensive action, unit cohesion, and unit disintegration.

THE TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS (FM 100-5)

Whenever Army forces are called to fight, they fight to win. Army forces in combat seek to impose their will on the enemy. Victory is the objective, no matter what the mission. Nothing short of victory is acceptable. The fundamental tenets of Army operations doctrine describe the characteristics of successful operations. In and of themselves they do not guarantee victory, but their absence makes winning difficult and costly to achieve.

The tenets are:

Initiative:

The ability to set or to change the terms of battle. In the attack, initiative implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack. In the defense, initiative implies quickly turning the tables on the attacker. In battle, initiative requires the decentralization of decision authority to the lowest practical level.

Agility:

The ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy. A mental and physical quality, it is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. The accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties, and confusion of battle creates friction that impedes both sides.

Depth:

The extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. Operations are conducted throughout the depth of the battlefield with the aim of defeating the enemy more rapidly by denying freedom of action and disrupting or destroying the coherence and tempo of its operations.

Synchronization:

The ability to focus resources and activities in

time and space to provide maximum relative combat power at the decisive point.

Versatility:

The ability of units to meet diverse challenges, shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently.

THE DYNAMICS OF COMBAT POWER (FM 100-5)

Four primary elements combine to create combat power — the ability to fight.

The elements are:

Maneuver:

The movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver either direct or indirect fire upon the enemy. Maneuver is the means of positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effects, and moral dominance.

Firepower:

The destructive force essential to defeating the enemy's ability and will to fight. It is the amount of fire that may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system.

Protection:

Conserving the fighting potential of a force so that commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place. Protection has four components: operational security, conservation of soldiers' health, morale, and equipment readiness, safety, and avoidance of fratricide.

Leadership:

The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and confident leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR (FM 100-5)

Objective:

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy armed forces and the enemy's will to fight.

Offensive:

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.

Mass:

Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. To mass is to hit the enemy with a closed fist, not poke at him with the fingers of an open hand. Mass seeks to smash the enemy, not sting him.

Economy of Force:

Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose.

Maneuver:

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through flexible application of combat power.

Unity of Command:

For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all forces are under one responsible commander.

Security:

Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces.

Surprise:

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power.

Simplicity:

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult.

STAFF RIDE PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES¹³

The staff ride is a versatile educational tool. In a

general sense, its sole purpose is to further the professional development of U.S. Army leaders. Specifically, it may be designed to achieve one or more objectives, depending upon the needs of the students and the circumstances under which the staff ride is conducted. Some of these specific objectives are:

- To expose students to the dynamics of battle, especially those factors which interact to produce victory and defeat;
- To expose students to the “face of battle”, the timeless human dimensions of warfare;
- To provide case studies in the application of the principles of war;
- To provide case studies in the operational art;
- To provide case studies in combined arms operations or in the operations of a single arm or branch;
- To provide case studies in the relationship between technology and doctrine;
- To provide case studies in leadership at any level desired;
- To provide case studies in unit cohesion;
- To provide case studies in how logistical considerations affect operations;
- To show the effects of terrain upon plans and their implementation;
- To provide an analytical framework for the systematic study of campaigns and battles;
- To encourage officers and NCOs to study their profession through the use of military history;
- To kindle or reinforce an interest in the heritage of the U.S. Army.

A carefully designed and implemented staff ride can attain simultaneously all of these objectives and more.

CONDUCTING A STAFF RIDE**The Instructor Team**

The Instructor Team members are the central figures in the design and conduct of a successful staff ride. Although National Park Service rangers, licensed guides, and local historians may assist materially, they cannot be expected either to understand the particular educational focus of the exercise or to design a program with the U.S. Army’s needs in mind.

Instructor Team Requirements

- Be thoroughly conversant with sources, both primary and secondary;
- Understand the operational, organizational, doctrinal, and technological context in which the battle took place;
- Be conversant with biographical information on commanders and key individuals;
- Know the order of battle, unit strengths, and weapon capabilities;
- Be thoroughly conversant concerning movements and operations and be able to distinguish those events chronologically;
- Be able to analyze the battle and determine factors significant to the historical outcome;
- Know the ground;
- Be able to interpret the events of the battle in terms of current U.S. Army doctrine and assist students in deriving usable lessons from the comparison;
- Work to refine and improve the staff ride by developing new sources, new field study routes, more effective training aids, and greater subject-matter expertise;
- Ensure a range request, Fort Bragg Form 1528, is submitted to Range Control six weeks prior to the field study phase. The battlefield is located in Training Area Z1.

STAFF RIDE PHASES

Phase I – Preliminary Study

If the student has not been well prepared about the purpose of the exercise, the organizational and operational setting of the battle, and the significant events of the action, and if the student has not become intellectually involved in the process of study, then the exercise becomes more of a historical battlefield tour. The preliminary study phase is critical to the success of the field study phase.

The preliminary study phase may take various forms, depending on time available and student needs. The possible forms include formal classroom instruction, individual study or a combination of both.

The optimum preliminary study phase combines lecture, individual study, and group discussion. To get students more actively involved, instructors may assign specific subjects to be researched by small groups or individuals. These mini-experts are then

available to brief, answer questions, and provide input during the field study phase. This is an excellent technique for ensuring student participation and group discussion. Various factors will affect subject assignments. However, appropriate subjects could include key personalities, specific units, critical events or a battlefield operating system.

In any form, the preliminary study phase must accomplish the following:

First: Ensure the students clearly understand the purpose and objectives of the exercise;

Second: Ensure the students become actively involved;

Third: Provide the basic knowledge to a general understanding of the battle to include:

- Order of battle, strength, and doctrine of the opposing forces;
- Biographical information on significant individuals;
- The tactical situation and mission of the opposing forces;
- Equipment and weapons' characteristics;
- Terrain and weather considerations;
- General outline and chronology of significant events;
- Bibliography or read-ahead packet;
- Map.

Students must develop an intellectual perception of the battle that will be either reinforced or modified during the field study phase.

Phase II – Field Study

The field study phase readily distinguishes the staff ride from other forms of systematic historical study. It culminates all previous efforts by instructors and students to understand selected historical events, to analyze the significance of those events, and to derive relevant lessons for professional development.

If the preliminary study phase has been systematic and thorough, the field phase reinforces ideas already generated. The field study phase is the most effective way to stimulate the students' intellectual involvement and ensure any conclusions reached during the staff ride process are retained.

Design

- The field study phase should be designed to visit all significant sites associated with the battle. If only a portion of the field can be visited, the

instructor must summarize what occurred elsewhere.

- The route should be designed to visit sites in chronological order. Avoid backtracking.
- Plan stops or stands along the way for historical significance, visual impact, vignette suitability, or logistical necessity.
- The route schedule should be flexible, allowing for unplanned stops to address issues raised by the students.
- Ease of access should be considered during route selection. However, this should not override other considerations such as chronological development and site significance.
- The instructor team should traverse the route to discover timing or other problems that might interfere with successful completion of the field study phase.

Conduct

- The instructor team should make every effort to maintain intense student involvement by removing distractions and keeping attention focused on the exercise.
- The instructor team must ensure that students are correctly oriented both chronologically and spatially. A partial solution is to have all students carry compasses and maps, along with their documentary material.
- A simple technique to enhance both involvement and orientation is the use of first-person accounts or vignettes at specific stops on the route. These personal accounts are essential to battle analysis because they provide important information on the attitudes, perspectives, and mental state of the participants, the vital human dimension of battle.
- Training aids can orient students, clarify complex maneuvers, and create immediacy. Such aids may include situation maps, overlays, sand tables, and diagrams.
- The size of the student party and the instructor to student ratio will help determine the quality of the field study phase. In most cases, 35 to 40 students are the most a single instructor can lead and still retain any degree of personal interchange. A much more effective ratio is one instructor for every 15 to 20 students.

Phase III — The Integration Phase

No matter how detailed the preliminary study or

how carefully crafted the field study, a truly successful staff ride requires a third and final phase. This integration phase is a formal or informal opportunity for the students to reflect on their experience.

Several positive effects stem from the integration phase. First, it requires students to analyze the previous phases and integrate what they learned in each into a coherent overall view. Second, it provides a mechanism through which students may organize and articulate their impressions of both the battle and the lessons they derived from its study. Third, students may gain additional insights from sharing these impressions with their peers. Finally, the instructor team may use the integration phase to solicit student comments on its performance and suggestions for improvement.

The integration phase may be conducted on the battlefield immediately following the field study phase or back in your unit area. However, the integration phase is most successful when it follows field study as closely as circumstances permit.

An instructor should moderate discussion. He should allot enough time for all who wish to speak and for a complete discussion of any issues raised.

Sources of Information

Primary sources are documents produced by participants or eyewitnesses. Included among primary sources are official documents such as after-action reports, orders, messages, strength reports, unit journals, letters, maps, diaries, and reminiscences.

Secondary sources are accounts of events produced by nonparticipants. Secondary sources are most often narrative in form and analytical in nature. Valuable as they are, secondary sources should not be the sole materials furnished to staff ride students.

Secondary Benefits

Although professional military education is sufficient reason for devoting time and resources to a staff ride, certain secondary benefits may accrue as well. These benefits spring from the fact that, for many participants, a visit to a battlefield is an emotional experience that may reinforce their feelings for their profession, their units, and one another. If participants belong to the same unit, their shared experiences during the exercise may strengthen the camaraderie and *esprit* so necessary

for unit cohesion. If promotions or individual achievement awards are due to be conferred at the time of the staff ride, there can be no better setting for the ceremony than a site hallowed by earlier deeds of sacrifice and valor.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The design and conduct of a staff ride is not a simple task. A staff ride requires subject matter expertise, intelligently applied in a systematic way, to guide professional soldiers through the most complex of intellectual exercises — the analysis of battle in all its dimensions.

If a terrain exercise is all that is required, a

Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) can be constructed on any convenient piece of ground. Such terrain exercises are useful, but they are not a staff ride. If soldiers are to be taken to a battlefield of the past but there is little or no time for preliminary study, a historical battlefield tour is all that is required. Such tours also have their place, but they are not staff rides.

A staff ride yields far broader results than a TEWT or a battlefield tour, but is more difficult to devise. Those who want to conduct a staff ride must be aware of these difficulties. Carefully designed and intelligently executed, a staff ride is one of the most powerful instruments available for the professional development of the U.S. Army's leaders.



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Figure 1 — The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads occurred in rainy March weather after Confederate soldiers tracked the Union forces to their campsite (Pate, 1997).



Figure 2 — Confederate forces assembled before dawn, waiting to launch their surprise attack on the sleeping Federal camp (Pate, 1997).

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The Battle

SITUATION

After four years of war, the Southern Confederacy was nearing collapse. Among most Southern leaders, the hope of defeating the North had vanished. However, they knew to secure an equitable peace Southern soldiers had to stand firm on the battlefield. The need for a Confederate victory to force negotiation was obvious to both Southern leaders and soldiers.

The Confederacy was isolated and starving. The loss of the Mississippi River in 1863 and an increasingly effective naval blockade had slowed Southern import and export to a trickle. Manufacturing had virtually ceased, and the Confederacy's reserves of manpower and materiel were exhausted.

At Petersburg, Virginia, *General Robert E. Lee's, C.S.A., Army of Northern Virginia*, much reduced by attrition, faced a vastly superior Federal force. As the strength of the Federal Army continued to increase, *General Lee's* ability to maneuver diminished. A static situation had developed, compelling both sides to entrench and await opportunity.

Further South, General William T. Sherman's, U.S.A., hard-marching Federal force had captured Atlanta, Georgia in September 1864. General Sherman followed his successful Atlanta campaign with his much heralded "March to the Sea."

General Sherman's intent was to cut a path of destruction through the South, bringing the horror of war home to the Southern people. The destruction General Sherman's men wrought went beyond the usual militarily significant targets. Because the Federal Army had abandoned its supply line when departing Atlanta, it was necessary for Federal soldiers to live off the land. Once Sherman's Army passed through an area, little was left for civilian use or to support the Confederate Army.

By demonstrating the North's ability to march through the very heart of Dixie, General Sherman thought he could undermine support for continued resistance. His threat to Southern homes did increase desertions among Confederate soldiers in the field¹⁴.

General Sherman's force enjoyed minimal resistance on the march. *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* Confederate Cavalry attacked Federal

foraging parties and elements that strayed too far from the main body, but *Lieutenant General Wheeler* could do little else other than monitor General Sherman's progress. The culmination of the march was the capture and occupation of Savannah, Georgia on December 21, 1864.



Figure 7 — General William T. Sherman, U.S.A. (U.S. Army)

During several weeks of rest and refitting in Savannah, General Sherman contemplated his next move. The course of action he favored was to continue the march northward through the Carolinas and link up with General Grant in Virginia. General Grant, who initially wanted to extract General Sherman's force by sea for transport to Virginia, acquiesced to General Sherman's plan.

On January 19, 1865, General Sherman moved into South Carolina, exacting the same punishment on South Carolina that he had on Georgia. Attempting to impede General Sherman's progress, the Confederate Cavalry maintained contact with the Federal force. Firefights became a daily occurrence. Skirmishing with Confederate Cavalry, General Sherman's men entered Columbia, South Carolina on

the 17th of February. During a night of destruction, the city caught fire and by morning was a smoldering ruin.

In North Carolina, the citizenry listened to the stories of refugees and read newspaper accounts of events occurring in South Carolina. Rumors were rampant as Sherman's Army continued toward the state line. Reports of the burning of Columbia prompted calls on the Confederate Government to do something. Assurances that the invaders would be repelled did little to lessen citizen foreboding. North Carolina newspapers ran patriotic articles; rallies occurred, with many participants taking oaths to fight to the end.

On the 25th of February, Confederate *General Joseph E. Johnston, C.S.A.*, assumed command of the *Army of Tennessee* and the *Departments of Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida*. It was *General Johnston's* responsibility to stop General Sherman.

General Johnston established his headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina. With General Sherman moving north, threatening the midsection of the state, it was probable Charlotte would be his objective. *General Johnston's* problem was his lack of troops.

In route to join *General Johnston* were elements of the Confederate *Army of Tennessee* and *Lieutenant General William J. Hardee's, C.S.A., Corps*. *Lieutenant General Hardee* had abandoned Savannah to General Sherman in December. After leaving Savannah, *Lieutenant General Hardee* had moved northward through South Carolina and was nearing the North Carolina state line. However, elements of the *Army of Tennessee* were still some days away.

As a result of continued harassment from the Federal base at New Bern, North Carolina and the attack on Fort Fisher on the 13th of January, Confederate forces within the state had been drawn to the coast. With Federal Major General A.H. Terry's, U.S.A., capture of Fort Fisher on January 15th, the threat of a two-pronged Federal invasion from the coast was great. This threat made it necessary for large numbers of Confederate troops to remain in eastern North Carolina to repel any inland incursions by Federal forces.

MISSION

General Sherman considered two options for the impending campaign in North Carolina: to continue

north through Charlotte, Salisbury, and Greensboro, and invade western Virginia or to feint in the direction of Charlotte while turning his main body eastward toward Fayetteville, North Carolina¹⁵.

Federal successes along the coast, General Sherman's need for resupply, and the less restrictive ground to the east made the latter more attractive.




Figure 8 — *Lieutenant General Joseph Wheeler, C.S.A. (U.S. Army)*

The course of action selected was to turn eastward and march on the intermediate objective, Fayetteville. The maneuver would threaten both Raleigh and Goldsboro and be conducted in cooperation with thrusts inland by Federal forces from the coast. From Fayetteville, General Sherman would move northeastward toward his main objective, Goldsboro, and link up with Federal forces moving in from the east and southeast.

Fayetteville, located at the highest navigable point of the Cape Fear River, would allow resupply from and communication with Federal forces in Wilmington.

Also, a large number of Confederate troops were west of the Cape Fear River awaiting an indication of General Sherman's intentions. If Federal deceptions worked, General Sherman could beat the Confederates to Fayetteville, seize the bridges over the Cape Fear River, and trap the Confederates on the western side. If the Federal force didn't reach Fayetteville first, they could still arrive in time to catch the Confederates in the vulnerable position of crossing the river.

From the coast, Federal forces under the command of Major General John M. Schofield, U.S.A., would move inland from their respective bases toward Goldsboro. Moving northward from Wilmington were Major General Terry and the X Corps; pushing westward from New Bern were Major General Jacob D. Cox, U.S.A., and the XXIII Corps.

To deceive the Confederates, General Sherman continued northward with his four Corps toward Charlotte. General Sherman's force was organized in two wings; the left consisted of the XIV and XX corps and the right the XV and XVII Corps. Sherman's Cavalry Division, commanded by Brevet Major General Kilpatrick, operated well forward, as if scouting a route to Charlotte. Once this demonstration had its effect, General Sherman planned to turn abruptly eastward, drawing his cavalry back in to screen his left flank.

At Fayetteville, General Sherman intended to raze the Federal arsenal and rendezvous with supply laden gunboats sent up the Cape Fear River from Wilmington.

The New Times March 1865:

It is quite evident that SHERMAN'S route into North Carolina was by far the best. At Columbia, two paths lay before him, each promising certain advantages. The one which his previous course had indicated as probable leads directly up the railroad to Charlotte, thence to Salisbury, thence to Greensboro.

Could this have been successfully pursued, its results would have been astonishing. First, it would have secured the three great railroad junctions already named and insured the destruction of hundreds of miles of the chief railway left to the Confederacy. Next, the slightest easterly advance from Greensboro would have forced the evacuation and capture of Raleigh. Finally, his columns would have threatened Lynchburg from the west, and would have cut off LEE'S retreat from Richmond, by interposing an army on his front and flank. But it was too dangerous an experiment. It involved the traversing of distances too enormous even for that strategy which has struck the world with astonishment by its

boldness during the latter year of the war. It exposed SHERMAN'S army to the certainty of a series of battles. If successful, they would have cost him all his ammunition, and he would have been forced to drop his conquests, and retreat from his victories. If unsuccessful, they would have left him hundreds of miles from succor, and with a Moscow retreat to the coast as his only alternative.

The lower route was judiciously chosen. It has proved to be attended by advantages greater than those of the other, and by none of its perils. By moving from Columbia to Cheraw, and from Cheraw across toward Fayetteville, SHERMAN has outgeneraled JOHNSTON again, marching past his flank, and forcing him to follow at a rapid pace if he wishes to fight. Being compelled himself to march, he forces that necessity also upon his opponent. He takes away the enemy's hope of successful concentration far up in the mountainous region, where defeat to SHERMAN would be destruction. JOHNSTON, who had watched to see whether unparalleled success would turn the head of his adversary, again baffled and disappointed.

This move, also, puts SHERMAN in direct cooperation with SCHOFIELD. He can get supplies and ammunition from the latter by way of the Cape Fear River, in case of needing them. He has a base to fall back upon in case of disaster. He is now traversing a region which no army has trod. It is high, fertile, and full of supplies. The roads are excellent, and now in good condition. The marshes which stretch away to the southeast, toward the coast, do not reach so high as SHERMAN'S present position. The people are well-to-do and, better than all, as loyal as in any part of the South. If anywhere in North Carolina supplies are to be had, it is precisely in the country SHERMAN is now traversing. The present movement, also, directly aids SCHOFIELD'S task, by forcing the enemy to withdraw from his front, to avoid being flanked. Even Raleigh is quite as directly threatened by this route as by the other, and

Table 5
Weather and Light Conditions for Early March in the Monroe's Crossroads Area¹⁶

Date	Sun Rise	Begin Morning Nautical Twilight	Sun Set	End Evening Nautical Twilight	Moon Rise	Moon Set	% Lunar Illumination
Wednesday March 1	06:45	05:50	18:07	19:02	9:10	22:52	24%
Thursday March 2	06:43	05:48	18:08	19:03	9:56	23:57	33%
Friday March 3	06:42	05:47	18:09	19:04	10:44	00:04	42%
Saturday March 4	06:41	05:46	18:10	19:05	11:34	00:59	52%
Sunday March 5	06:39	05:44	18:10	19:05	12:28	01:54	62%
Monday March 6	06:38	05:43	18:11	19:06	13:31	02:44	72%
Tuesday March 7	06:37	05:42	18:12	19:07	14:15	03:28	80%
Wednesday March 8	06:35	05:40	18:13	19:08	15:11	04:08	87%
Thursday March 9	06:34	05:39	18:14	19:09	16:06	04:45	94%
Friday March 10	06:33	05:38	18:15	19:10	17:00	05:18	97%
Saturday March 11	06:31	05:36	18:16	19:11	17:54	05:50	98%

The prevailing winds in the Monroe's Crossroads area are from the southwest. The average wind speed is highest in the Spring, about nine miles per hour. Throughout March in 1865, the weather in southeastern North Carolina was cool and rainy. The frequent rains indicate that temperatures tended to be above freezing. The nights would have been colder than the days. Roads were wet and muddy. With the creeks and rivers running high, fording points and approaches to bridges were often flooded. Adjacent wetlands stayed at flood stage. The rain ceased before dawn on 10 March at Monroe's Crossroads.

During the night, visibility was poor, with the light from the moon limited because of the cloudy skies and rain. Because of the sparse population in the area, there was little, if any, ambient light from towns or homes. Distant stores of turpentine, tar, and pitch, set ablaze by the Union Army, possibly reflected off the clouds. Campfires lit by Kilpatrick's Cavalry would have revealed the location of the Union camp.

Twilight on 10 March began at 05:38. Sunrise occurred at 06:33. During the Confederate assault, ground fog obscured low areas along Nicholson Creek. The fog probably dissipated completely about an hour after sunrise.

Goldsboro still more so. But the taking of Raleigh will produce the evacuation of Goldsboro. Neither point is likely to be given up without a struggle, for the loss will signify too surely the loss of Richmond.

Such, then, are the moves by which the

forces of the Union have been marshaled into position on the North Carolina field. The genius of the preparation is the best augury of success.

General Johnston had few options. *Lieutenant*

General Hardee's 6,000 man Corps was in close proximity to General Sherman's 60,000 man force and could delay it for a short time, but could be expected to do little else against such overwhelming odds.

Besides, with Confederate troops in short supply, the possible loss of *Hardee's Corps* was unacceptable. Elements of the *Army of Tennessee* were moving into the state, but even these additions left the Confederate force greatly inferior. When all expected forces were present, *General Johnston* could expect his men to number no more than 30,000.

General Johnston's hope for success was to concentrate as much force as he could muster against one wing of Sherman's Army. Compelled by terrain or the execution of a feint, General Sherman's wings were at times beyond immediate supporting distance of one another. If *General Johnston* could predict this occurrence, he could attack one wing and destroy it, thus evening the odds.

Using the cavalry of *Lieutenant General Wheeler* and *Major General Matthew C. Butler, C.S.A.*, *General Johnston* planned to delay Sherman while he organized his forces.

With the Confederate Cavalry delaying and providing information on General Sherman's movement, *General Johnston* should have enough time to put his plan into action.

EXECUTION

1 March 1865

Lieutenant General Hardee's Corps reached Cheraw, South Carolina, 10 miles south of the North Carolina state line.

2 March 1865

The vanguard of General Sherman's XX Corps entered Chesterfield, South Carolina, skirmishing with *Major General Butler's* Cavalry.

Federal Cavalry Commander Brevet Major General Kilpatrick was ordered to keep well on the left flank of the XIV Army Corps. Much to his satisfaction, he was also given permission to occupy Fayetteville first.

3 March 1865

Evening

Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's 1st Cavalry

Brigade entered North Carolina on the Wadesborough Road, encamping four miles from the state line. Having crossed into Anson County, North Carolina, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's 3rd Brigade went into camp.

The Confederate Cavalry wasted little time in making their presence and displeasure known.

Colonel George E. Spencer, U.S.A., 1st Alabama (U.S.) Cavalry, Commanding, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division¹⁷:

On the morning of the 3rd of March we resumed our line of march, on the left, through a clay country with horrible roads and traveled a distance of 10 miles, when we went into camp in Anson County, N.C., about three miles from the state line.

We had hardly placed our pickets out when they were driven in by General Hampton's Cavalry. The command was quickly thrown into position and we awaited attack. A small force of the enemy attempted to charge the extreme right of our line, when a few shells from Lieutenant Stetson's section quickly scattered them. We remained in position, expecting an attack, till next morning, when we again resumed our line of march.

The 4th Cavalry Brigade, consisting of dismounted men, had accompanied the 3rd Brigade on the march. The 4th Brigade (dismounted) took up position on the Hornsborough Road in the center of the 3rd Brigade and was immediately attacked.

Lieutenant Colonel William B. Way, U.S.A., Commanding, 4th Cavalry Brigade (dismounted), 3rd Cavalry Division¹⁸:

We had but just got into position, with a strong picket, well barricaded, when the enemy charged my picket, but was handsomely repulsed, with loss upon our side of one man wounded.

2300

The 4th Brigade (dismounted) took charge of the Division trains and artillery, moving them some five miles to Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's headquarters. Heavy rains were falling, and the roads were made almost impassable.

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

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Figure 4 — The Confederate cavalry charge unleashed chaos in the startled Union camp that was just beginning to stir awake (Pate, 1997)

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VIRGINIA

TENNESSEE

SOUTH CAROLINA

•Greensboro

•Durham Station

•Raleigh

•Smithfield

Yadkin River

Salisbury

•Troy

Carthage

•Goldsboro

Charlo

XXXX

Johnston

Solemn Grove

Longstreet

•Kinston

Bethesda

Argyle

•Fayetteville

New Bern

Wadesboro

•Rockingham

Laurel Hill

Laurinburg

•Lumberton

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Wheeler

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CAV

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Butler

Hardes

Charaw

Cape Fear River

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Schofield

Wilmington

Ft. Fisher



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Army of Tennessee

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



Sherman






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







Legend for Monroe's Crossroads Battle Maps

FM 100-5, Operations

BASIC SYMBOLS	
Geometric figures form the basic symbol used to represent units, installations, and activities.	
Description	Symbol
Unit	
Headquarters	
Logistical, medical, or administrative installation	
Observation post	
UNIT ROLE INDICATOR	
Description	Symbol
Cavalry or reconnaissance	
Field artillery	
Infantry	
Prisoners of war	

MANEUVER SYMBOLS	
Attack General symbol for main attack—double arrowhead	
General symbol for other than main attack—single arrowhead	
Double arrowhead for direction of main attack and axis of advance for the main attack	
Single arrowhead for supporting direction of attack and supporting axis of advance	
EQUIPMENT INDICATOR	
Weapon	
	
	(gun)

UNIT SIZE	
The size of units and installations is shown by placing the appropriate size indicator directly above the basic symbol.	
US Description	Symbol
Squad/crew	
Section or unit larger than a squad but smaller than a platoon	
Platoon or detachment	
Company, battery, or troop	
Battalion or squadron	
Group or regiment	
Brigade	
Division	
Corps	
Army	

Lieutenant Colonel Way¹⁹:

We were seven hours marching the five miles, and several times had to draw the artillery out of the mud by hand.

4 March 1865

0700

The troopers of the 1st Brigade, having encamped on the Wadesborough Road the previous evening, were awakened by gunfire. A small force of Confederate cavalymen had crept in between the 1st Brigade and its picket line. The pickets were surprised from behind, and a sharp firefight ensued. The Confederate infiltrators apparently were probing for the 1st Brigade's main line. On the sounds of contact, as if to dissuade the Federal troops from continuing their northeastward course, appeared a formidable Confederate skirmish line.

Lieutenant Colonel D.H.Kimmel, U.S.A., 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Brigade²⁰:

On the morning of the 4th instant my pickets were attacked at 7 a.m. in rear; they offered strong resistance and repulsed the charge of the enemy, who immediately deployed a line of skirmishers which, from its extent, indicated a heavy force.

Having identified the Federal position, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* decided to press the Federal Cavalrymen.

*Lieutenant General Wheeler*²¹:

Struck the enemy's flank at Hornsborough; had a warm fight and captured 50 prisoners.

1200

With an aggressive force of unknown size in his front and his lead Brigade's unfortified position being pressured, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick decided to develop a more tenable situation. By his order the 1st Brigade withdrew, passing through the 2nd Brigade and occupying a position two miles to the rear, which they quickly barricaded. The 2nd Brigade was then withdrawn, passing through the 1st Brigade, leaving the 1st Brigade's hastily prepared defensive position as the front. Brevet Major General Kilpatrick, anticipating a general engagement, brought up the rest of his command and placed his



Figure 9 — Brevet Major General Hugh J. Kilpatrick, U.S.A. (U.S. Army)

artillery. The Confederates quickly closed on the new position, charging it several times without success. Unable to carry the Federals' new position, and in order to fix Brevet Major General Kilpatrick in position until sufficient force could be brought up, the Confederates demonstrated in front.

Lieutenant Colonel Way, Commanding, 4th Cavalry Brigade (dismounted)²²:

The enemy formed all along our front and seemed to be preparing for an attack, when the artillery of the 1st Brigade opened, which with a brisk fire from the line, caused him to withdraw his main force, though he kept a skirmish line in our front.

1430

Lieutenant General Wheeler, observing the strengthening Federal position, sent a message to *Lieutenant General Hardee* requesting reinforcement.

*Lieutenant General Wheeler*²³:

We find artillery here, and have but two

small Regiments. Can you not send more forces up? The enemy have retired from four lines of works. Each line of works was for about 100 men.

1530

With the Federal Cavalry becoming more aggressive, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* sent a situation report to *Lieutenant General Hardee*.

*Lieutenant General Wheeler*²⁴:

Having run against some artillery, and not having sufficient force to drive the enemy from his position, I have taken up a position and will await your order. The enemy were driven from four lines of works by flanking him, but when we came upon artillery he showed himself rather bold. He advanced upon us, but only a short distance.

1900 — Dusk

As daylight and the chance to rout Brevet Major General Kilpatrick's men slipped away, *Lieutenant General Wheeler* made one last attempt.

Lieutenant Charles Blanford, U.S.A., Howitzer Battery, 1st Brigade²⁵:

About dark the enemy came charging upon our front, mounted, when I was ordered by Colonel Jordan to open fire on them; after firing a few rounds the enemy drew off, and did not molest us again during the night.

2100

Darkness and fatigue compelled the Confederates to retire to their camp a few hundred yards in front of the Federal position.

During the day, Brevet Major General Kilpatrick had received orders from General Sherman instructing him to proceed to Fayetteville via New Gilead, then to Solemn Grove; his mission was to protect the left flank of the Army and not embroil himself in battle with the Confederate Cavalry. Men and horses were to be saved for expected battles along the Virginia border.

5 March 1865

0600

Fully expecting an early morning attack, the Federal cavalymen were pleased to see the

Confederates had decamped and moved on during the night.

Brevet Brigadier General Thomas J. Jordan's, U.S.A., 1st Brigade marched by Morven's Post Office to the Pee Dee River, crossing one mile south of the North Carolina line. *Lieutenant General Wheeler*, anxious to identify the route *Lieutenant General Hardee* was taking to Fayetteville, swam the Pee Dee River accompanied by *Privates McKnight* and *Nance*. The river was then in extraordinary flood. "The oldest river men had never seen higher water nor a more angry current."²⁶

Reports of Federal troop movements indicated that General Sherman's objective was Fayetteville. It was necessary for *Lieutenant General Wheeler* to communicate this to *Lieutenant General Hardee*, lest *Hardee* continue moving toward Charlotte.

6 March 1865

Confederate *General Johnston* is given command of the *Department of North Carolina*.

7 March 1865

0700

Brevet Brigadier General Jordan's 1st Brigade, halted to feed, were joined by Brevet Major General Kilpatrick and his staff. Brevet Major General Kilpatrick accompanied the 1st Brigade on the march to Rockingham.

1000

The 1st Brigade reached Rockingham. As they entered the town, the Brigade's advance guard, the 9th Pennsylvania and the 3rd Kentucky (U.S.), were attacked by *Lieutenant General Wheeler's* and *Major General Butler's* Cavalry. After heavy skirmishing, the 1st Brigade succeeded in driving the Confederates off.

*Lieutenant General Wheeler*²⁷:

With 20 men of Shannon's Scouts I attacked and killed or captured 35 of the enemy near Rockingham, NC.


8 March 1865

All of Sherman's Army was now in North Carolina. General Sherman, traveling with his XV Army Corps, encamped at Laurel Hill Presbyterian Church. In eastern North Carolina, the forces of Confederate *General Braxton Bragg*, C.S.A., and

VIRGINIA

TENNESSEE

SOUTH CAROLINA



6 & 7 March
1865

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Appendix A

Union Order of Battle

Federal Forces MG William T. Sherman

Left Wing
MG Henry W. Slocum

XIV Corps
BVT MG Jefferson C. Davis

XX Corps
BVT MG Alpheus S. Williams

Wing Strength
INF CAV ARTY Total
25,673 0 949 = 26,622

Right Wing
MG Oliver O. Howard

XV Corps
MG John A. Logan

XVII Corps
MG Frank P. Blair

Wing Strength
INF CAV ARTY Total
25,925 60 633 = 26,618

3rd Cavalry Division
BVT MG Hugh J. Kilpatrick
Division Strength — 4,438 men

1st Brigade
BVT BG Thomas J. Jordan

3rd Indiana Battalion
8th Indiana Regiment
2nd Kentucky Regiment
3rd Kentucky Regiment
9th Pennsylvania Regiment

3rd Brigade
COL George E. Spencer

1st Alabama Regiment
MAJ Francis L. Cramer (WIA, POW)

5th Kentucky Regiment
MAJ Christopher T. Cheek

5th Ohio Regiment
MAJ George H. Rader

Brigade Strength
Approximately 1,500 men

2nd Brigade
BVT BG Smith D. Atkins

92nd Illinois Regiment
9th Michigan Regiment
9th Ohio Regiment
10th Ohio Regiment
McLaughlin's Squadron

4th Brigade (Provisional, Dismounted)
LTC William B. Way

1st Regiment
MAJ Charles A. Appel (POW)

2nd Regiment
LTC William Stough

3rd Regiment
CPT John B. Riggs

Brigade Strength
Approximately 400 men

4th Brigade consisted of dismounted men from throughout the Division. Soldier assignments correspond to the Brigades. For example: 2nd Brigade men were assigned to the 2d Regiment.

10th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery
A two-gun section accompanied each mounted brigade.
CPT Yates V. Beebe
Battery Strength — 94 men

Appendix B

Confederate Order of Battle

Confederate Forces

GEN Joseph E. Johnston

In early March 1865 General Joseph E. Johnston's force had yet to assemble. Many units, including portions of the Army of Tennessee, were still in route. The only organized Confederate forces in the area of operations were Hardee's Infantry Corps, and Wheeler's and Butler's Cavalry. By order of the Confederate government, LTG Wade Hampton was to assume command of Wheeler's Corps and Butler's Division. On the 8th of March, Wheeler's and Butler's Cavalry united and "Hampton's Cavalry Command" was established.

Hardee's Corps

Strength — Approximately 8,000 men

Taliaferro's Division

BG William B. Taliaferro

McLaws' Division

MG LaFayette McLaws

Hampton's Cavalry Command

LTG Wade Hampton

Wheeler's Corps

LTG Joseph Wheeler

Strength — Approximately 4,600 men

Humes' Division

BG W.Y.C. Humes (WIA)

Allen's Division

BG William W. Allen (*)

Harrison's Texas Brigade

BG Thomas Harrison (WIA)

Hagan's Alabama Brigade

COL James Hagan (WIA)

8th Texas Regiment

1st Alabama Regiment

COL David T. Blakely

11th Texas Regiment

3rd Alabama Regiment

MAJ John D. Farish (WIA)

3rd Arkansas Regiment

MAJ William H. Blackwell

9th Alabama Regiment

COL John C. Malone, Jr.

4th/8th Tennessee Regiment

LTC Paul F. Anderson

12th Alabama Regiment

COL Wren S. Reese

51st Alabama Regiment (Partisan Rangers)

COL Milton L. Kirkpatrick

53rd Alabama Regiment (Partisan Rangers)

COL Moses W. Hannon (WIA)

10th Confederate (GA., ALA. Companies)

COL William J. Vason

Ashby's Brigade
COL Henry M. Ashby (*)

1st/6th Tennessee Regiment
COL Jacob B. Biffle

2nd Tennessee Regiment
COL John H. Kuhn

5th Tennessee Regiment
COL George W. McKenzie

Anderson's Brigade
BG Robert H. Anderson

3rd Georgia Regiment

5th Georgia Regiment

6th Georgia Regiment
COL Edward Bird

8th Confederate
(ALA., MISS. Companies)
LTC John S. Prather

Dibrell's Brigade
BG George G. Dibrell

Allison's Squadron (Hamilton's Battalion & Shaw's Battalion)
COL Robert D. Allison

13th Tennessee Regiment
COL Mounce L. Gore
(Serving as Corps reserve, Dibrell also collected late arriving units.)

Shannon's Special Scouts
CPT A.M. Shannon
(Shannon's Scouts numbered
30 to 40 hand-picked men
from throughout the Corps.)

Butler's Division
MG Matthew C. Butler
Strength — Approximately 1,200 men

Butler's Brigade
BG E.M. Law

1st South Carolina Regiment

4th South Carolina Regiment

5th South Carolina Regiment

6th South Carolina Regiment

19th South Carolina Battalion

Young's Brigade
COL Gilbert J. Wright

Phillips' Georgia Legion
MAJ W.W. Thomas

Cobb's Georgia Legion
LTC J.S. King (KIA)

Jeff Davis Mississippi Legion
(MISS., GA., ALA. Companies)
MAJ Ivey F. Lewis (WIA)

20th Georgia Battalion

2nd Kentucky Regiment

Reacting to rapidly changing circumstances, the Confederate Cavalry task organized often. The units contained in the order of battle participated in the battle. The following units may have participated, been on other missions, or arrived late.

Cavalry

1st Georgia Regiment
2nd Georgia Regiment
4th Georgia Regiment
10th Georgia Regiment
20th Georgia Regiment

2nd Alabama Regiment
24th Alabama Battalion
9th Tennessee Battalion
56th Alabama Regiment (Partisan Rangers)

1st Kentucky Regiment
3rd Kentucky Regiment
9th Kentucky Regiment

Artillery

Baxter's Tennessee Battery; 2 X 12 LB. Howitzer, 2 X 6 LB. Smoothbores, Clarke County Arkansas Battery; 2 X 12 LB. Howitzer, 2 X 6 LB. Smoothbores, Hartis, South Carolina Battery

* = Horse or horses shot from under him during the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads

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