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ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW
OF
ROBERT UTLEY

INTERVIEWED BY S. HERBERT EVISON

May 17, 1973

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ROBERT UTLEY - 1929

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(Tape #194)

FINAL

TYPED BY: Beverley A. Foltz

February 8, 1980

EVISON: This is May 17, 1973. I am Herbert Evison. This afternoon I am in the penthouse studio on top of the Interior Building in Washington, D. C., and with me is Robert Utley, who I think is called Director of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation.

As I told you, I want to start off by getting a sort of skelton biography on here. First, when and where you were born; and tell me something about the family you were born into.

UTLEY: I was born on Hallowe'en, October 31, 1929, which was about two days before the big crash, (in fact, I think it was Black Thursday or some such) in Bauxite, Arkansas. My father was a chemist with the Aluminum Company of America, and Bauxite is where they mine the stuff from which aluminum is made. I was the first of two children. I have a sister who is four years younger than I. But I spent the first six years of my life in Bauxite, Arkansas, before my father was transferred by Alcoa to New Kensington, Pennsylvania, where

the chemical laboratories of the company are located. I guess I put in the second and third grades in New Kensington. About the time World War II broke out, Alcoa built a new plant in Lafayette, Indiana, and so we were transferred there, and I have ever since regarded Indiana really as my principal home, though my parents don't live there now either. But that is where I went to grade school, and where I went to high school - a little town by the name of Dayton, about eight miles out of Lafayette.

EVISON: You were cheek-by-jowl with Purdue University.

UTLEY: And that probably explains how I went to Purdue for four years. It was a lot cheaper to do that. Though when I was a junior my parents were again transferred this time to the Alcoa works in East Saint Louis, and so they moved on to Lebanon, Illinois, and I stayed on in Lafayette to finish at Purdue. I graduated from Purdue with a B. S. degree in 1951, and the following autumn I went down to Indiana University to continue my education in history. Actually, I planned to be a lawyer. My grandfather was a rather prominent judge and political figure in Arkansas, and taking him as a model I was embarking on a legal career.

EVISON: But history was your undergraduate major, too?

UTLEY: Well, it turned out to be. Actually, what I intended to do was a three-three program - three years at Purdue in pre-law and then three years at Indiana in law, and then you graduate as a lawyer. I suppose this is where the National Park Service comes in, if you want to enter that subject right now.

When I was a kid, I went to see a movie called "They Died With Their Boots On." You remember that, with Errol Flynn playing the part of General Custer. And I became fascinated with the whole story of Custer and the battle of the Little Bighorn, and went down to the local library and got all the books on it and read them all avidly, and became one of that really world-wide fraternity of Custer nuts that spend a lot of time and energy trying to figure out what nobody will ever be able to figure out, - what happened at the Little Bighorn.

I worked in Witmer's drug store in Dayton, Indiana, jerking sodas when I was going to high school, and I saved up enough money. I think that was the summer of 1946; that I bought a bus ticket and went out to Custer Battlefield. Of course, then, as now, there is no real transportation up to Custer.

At the time, Custer Battlefield was presided over by Major Luce. Do you remember him?

EVISON: Yes. A worshiper of Custer.

UTLEY: Very much so, and, of course, himself a veteran of the 7th Cavalry back around the turn of the century. So I had written to him in advance, and he wrote back and said if I let him know when I was coming, he would meet me at the train. So he did. He went down every morning to meet the mail train, and I got off the train and he took me in tow and took me up to the battlefield.

EVISON: That would have been at what railroad stop?

UTLEY: Crow Agency. That is 3½ miles from Custer Hill. So he took me up to the hill and turned me loose. They took me in for lunch and fed me, because there was no place up there to eat, and really kind of gathered unto themselves this young fellow. I was between my junior and senior years of high school, 16 years old, and so, of course, that experience made a real Custer nut out of me.

When I got home that winter I was reading this little leaflet they pass out up there, and it said in the summer months they hire guides to talk to people about the Custer battle.

So in my naivete I wrote to him and said I would like to be one of them. And he wrote back and said, "Well, you are only 16 years old and you have got to be 21 before the Park Service can hire you." So that dashed that hope.

But the following spring, right before I was due to graduate from high school, I got a letter from him saying, "We can't find anyone else. Are you still interested in coming up?" I was by now 17. He said, "If you are, we will see what we can do." So, of course, I fell all over myself saying I was. That was when Yellowstone was the coordinating superintendency, so, of course, it was under the old Region II, working out of Omaha, and Edmund Rogers was superintendent. But he wouldn't have any part of hiring a 17-year-old. And Laurence Merriam was the Regional Director, and he wouldn't either. They were both of them hidebound bureaucrats.

But he couldn't find anyone else, so finally they said, "Well, if you will take personal responsibility for hiring a kid that young, go ahead and do it." So it came through, and with great joy I went to Custer Battlefield in the summers of '47, '48, '49, '50 and '51.

So, during those years, what had started out to be an exercise

in pre-law turned into an interest in history. And when it came time to leave Purdue to go to Indiana University, I was so immersed in history that I decided to stay the fourth year, and by that time I was hooked. So I went to Indiana to do graduate work in history. I did my master's degree there under Oscar Wenter, and in frontier American history. I was there for two semesters and I got my master's degree the first spring of '52, and I went to Custer Battlefield that summer.

Of course, Korea had broken loose then. I had been avoiding the draft for a good many years on an educational deferment, so I decided to get my army service out of the way before going on to get my doctorate in history. So that summer I spent at Custer Battlefield, and had my draft papers transferred out to Montana. During September, the Luces went away for a month's vacation. I was a GS 3 acting superintendent for one month. I started out as SP 2. You remember it, the SP series, don't you - \$1700 per annum?

EVISON: Sub-Professional.

UTLEY: In October '52, they drafted me, and sent me to Butte, to be inducted and I had some faint hope that the doctors would find something wrong with me, but they didn't. So I

went on to Fort Lewis, Washington, and then on down to Camp Roberts, California, and I very quickly discovered that the life of a private in the army is not one that a gentleman should have to lead. So, therefore, I would become an officer.

Unfortunately, it took them two years to get around sending me to Officer Candidate School in Fort Benning, Georgia. And, of course, by that time the end of my term of service as a draftee for two years was near. But in order to become an officer I had to sign up for another two years, which I did. So I had four years in the army.

They kept me at Fort Benning after I graduated, as an Infantry Second Lieutenant. I was one of three distinguished graduates of that course, and distinguished graduates were coming under a great pressure to stay there, and become a part of the tactical force training other candidates. So I remained at Officers Candidate School as a tactical officer.

But I soon discovered that that was no life for a gentleman either, because just as when you were a candidate, you have got to get up in the morning and run five miles with them before breakfast, and so forth. And so back to the Park Service again. Because Major Luce, if you will remember

was terribly impressed with all things military and the higher the rank the more impressed he was. During the time at Custer Battlefield, among our friends and frequent visitors were Colonel Boyce Custer, who was the colonel's great-grand nephew, who in fact had just come from Japan where he had commanded the 7th Cavalry, which of course was the great-uncle's regiment; and Colonel "Wild Bill" Harris, who commanded the 7th Cavalry in Korea, was among our friends, also. By the time I got out of Officer Candidate School he was a general, and Luce sicked him onto me to get him to try to persuade me to stay in the Army and make a career out of it, which he did. At the time I was drafted Luce wrote to another army officer whose name you will recognize, Roy Appleman. He was a Lieutenant Colonel on leave from the Park Service, with the Army, and he had just come back from Korea, where he was a combat historian and, as you know, he subsequently wrote the Army's official history of that first year of the Korean War.

EVISON: He is one of my great admirations, I might say.

UTLEY: He was my principal deputy for several years, so I have great admiration for him also.

That was a switch too, it was he who played a very

instrumental part in my coming back to the Park Service, because Luce wrote to him when I got drafted, knowing he was in the Army, and having great respect for those two silver oak leaves, and said, "Utley would make a good military historian," and why didn't he, Appleman, get him in to Washington to work in the Army's history apparatus. So during that summer when I was running with the candidates at Fort Benning, Roy Appleman, by this time, was back on active duty here in Washington writing his history of the Korean War.

He made a great effort to find a place for me in the office of the Chief of Military History, but that came to naught. But one day he was over at the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, and they have a historical division over there, too. Over there they had had for years several field grade positions, Lieutenant Colonel in the Army and Commander in the Navy, to which they assigned officers to serve as historians. But to the career officer, that is a dead end; so they were getting a lot of dead beats in there who didn't know anything about history; so they decided they would fill those high ranking positions with junior officers who had been trained in history. I came along just at that time.

So Roy managed through his contacts at the Joint Chiefs of Staff to interest them in me. I remember I drove up to Atlanta to be interviewed by Bell Wiley who is one of the foremost American historians today and then, the author of Johnny Reb and Billy Yank, those books about the Civil War. And he was also a consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He interviewed me and told them I would probably do all right. And so the orders were cut.

I remember very distinctly that the Officers Candidate School has a reputation of being sort of a graveyard for officers; once they get you over there you don't get out, because they swing enough clout that anyone they want to keep, they can keep. But here one day came the set of orders transferring Second Lieutenant Robert M. Utley from Fort Benning to the Pentagon Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it was signed by Matthew B. Ridgeway, General, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff. The executive officer at Officer Candidate School called me in. He was a light colonel, and he shook hands and he says, "Lt. Utley, I want to wish you the best of success in Washington. But there is just one thing I would like to know: how in the hell did you do it?"

So as a Second Lieutenant I came to Washington in the Joint

Staff. You know, that is a restricted area in the Pentagon. You have got to have special credentials to get in there, so I was the only Second Lieutenant in an organization composed of 250 officers of general and flag rank, and caused considerable curiosity in those restricted corridors, so much so that every time those generals would see me at the end of the corridor, they would laugh and wave at the spectacle of a Second Lieutenant in those hallowed halls of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But, I got there in September of '54 and the historical section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had spent the last 6 or 7 years writing the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, and Admiral Arthur Radford was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and really none of the Joint Chiefs or officers on the Joint Staff cared very much about their role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II at that time, and it had just dawned on them that just maybe the historians might have something to contribute to what they were doing then and there.

And what they were doing then and there was flapping around about something called Indo-China, because three months earlier had been the battle of Dien Bhen Phou and the French

expulsion from Indo-China, and the United States was flowing into the vacuum. So I got there just as Admiral Radford said to the historians, "Give me a documented history, within four months, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's involvement in the whole Indo-China business from the beginning." So this then is what I did for most of my assignment with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

EVISON: Which lasted how long?

UTLEY: Well, that particular project lasted four months, but I was involved in it thereafter, and I was with the Joint Chiefs of Staff from September '54 until when I got out of the Army in September '56 and was immediately hired as a civilian historian, because they were in the process of civilianizing at that time.

I had planned to go back to Indiana and get my Ph. D. in history as soon as I got out of the Army.

That was in September '56, but then in May of '56 I got married, to Lucille Dorsey. her maiden name before she hooked up with me. I met her here in Washington at the wedding of one of my classmates from Fort Benning who was marrying a Washington girl who was my prospective wife's roommate at

Penn State University. And Lucille comes from Greensburg, Pennsylvania, which is just east of Pittsburgh. We met in June of '55 and I started courting her during the following winter; and I quickly concluded that trying to court a woman over the Pennsylvania Turnpike in mid-winter was absolutely out of the question; if you have ever had the experience of driving on the Turnpike, you will know what I mean. So we decided to get married, which we did in May '56.

At that point we still planned to go back to Indiana University, but obviously there are financial implications now that didn't exist before I got married. And meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division was in the process of civilianizing; they were putting a good deal of pressure on me to stay there as a civilian, and they said they would give me a GS 9, which was a little more at that time than someone with my education could qualify for. That wasn't enough, really.

I still was going to go back to school, but finally they said, "Well, we will engage in an exercise in writing, as we all know how to do in personnel papers, to make your experience plus your education equal a GS 11, if you will stay.

And, boy! that was pretty good pay at that time for a young fellow just out of school, so I said, "All right, if you can hire me as an 11 I will stay," and by golly, they did it. So I remained for another year as a civilian. But meanwhile, to get back to the Park Service again.

You are familiar with the Westerners Club all around, lots of cities have corrals of Westerners Clubs, which are just local business men and others who are interested in western history, who get together once a month, have a drink and dinner and talk about western history. Washington didn't have a corral, and a few people got together in December of 1954 to form one, up at the Cosmos Club here. And among the founding members were Roy Appleman, who had returned to the Park Service, and Ronnie Lee, who was then Chief of the Division of Interpretation, and Herb Kahler, who was Chief Historian; and Lon Garrison was in on that, and two or three others from the Park Service, including Jack Dodd. I wasn't at that December '54 meeting, but January '55 was the very first meeting which we convened up there at the Cosmos Club and listened to General U. S. Grant, III tell about his grandfather's experiences in California before the Civil War. Well, the Westerners Club got off to a real good start

there, and we met every month at the Cosmos Club during the winter months. The following December I gave a speech on Custer to a very well attended meeting. At that time Connie Wirth was attending all the Westerners Club meetings for this reason. He had a pet scheme of his that he was trying to promote, that he called Mission 66, and he had it all packaged up and what he was trying to do was to get an opportunity to present this to President Eisenhower.

One of our regular members attending Westerners Club was Bradley Patterson, who was the special assistant to Eisenhower. He is now special assistant to President Nixon and is still in the White House. And so Connie was trying this route. And that worked. It was largely through Brad Patterson, if you remember, that Connie got the opportunity to present Mission 66 to Ike. But for that reason he was very regular in his attendance during that year at the Westerners Club, and he heard me speak on Custer. He had met me before, out at the Custer Battlefield, but didn't remember me. But after the meeting was over he told Herb Kahler on the way out, "You ought to get him back into the Park Service." Of course, Connie managed to sell Mission 66.

As a part of Mission 66 they reactivated the Historic Sites

Survey. So in the summer of 1957 (I guess it was actually in the spring), while I was a civilian historian at Joint Chiefs of Staff, Herb and Ronnie and Roy all made overtures to me to come back to the Park Service with the Historic Sites Survey. They said they would give me the Philadelphia assignment - that was Region Five then - and I said I was very happy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and anticipated a good career there, but my first love was still western history and the West, and if they would give me Santa Fe instead of Philadelphia I would come back to the Park Service. They had already put Pete Shedd on the list for Santa Fe, but they persuaded him to go to Philadelphia, and I went to Santa Fe to handle Region Three. Bill Everhardt went to San Francisco to handle Region Four, and Frank Sarles went to Richmond to handle Region One, and Ray Mattison was in Omaha on the Missouri Basin, so he handled Region Two.

My interest, however, wasn't really so much the Historic Site Survey. What I really thought I wanted to do with my career - and I didn't have any objective beyond that - was to be Regional Historian in Region Three, and that was the only Region that did not have a Regional Historian.

EVISON: It had a Regional Archaeologist, Erik Reed.

UTLEY: That is right. When I went there, Charley Steen had become the Regional Archaeologist, after that reorganization in 1954 in which Erik Reed moved up to Chief of Interpretation. But all the other Regions had Regional Historians. Santa Fe hadn't had one since Aubrey Neasham and Bill Hogan, I guess, right before World War II. They never got one after the war. John Littleton had been out there in the early 50's as part of that Arkansas-White-Red-River business.

So my aspirations - this was just a stepping stone, and Roy and Herb both thought it could be parlayed into a position of Regional Historian, which ultimately it was. I went there in September '57 and conducted the Historic Sites Survey for that Region, under Hugh Miller, first, then Tom Allen until 1962, when we finally got authority for the position of Regional Historian in Santa Fe. I believe by then they were calling it the Southwest Region.

EVISON: Yes, I think they probably were by then.

UTLEY: So then I became Regional Historian under Tom Allen and then Dan Beard came along. Actually, with the Historic Sites Survey I functioned pretty much as Regional Historian anyway; and my principal interests were more in the existing units in the System and the ones we had proposed. Southwest

Region had a laundry list of areas in the historical area category that we wanted to get into the System, and they just weren't making any headway. We got Fort Union right before I got there - Fort Union, New Mexico. And there were a number that we wanted - had wanted for years: Fort Davis was one of them; Fort Bowie was another one. Fort Bowie was my first assignment to do the historical work on that when I first went to Santa Fe. Hubbell Trading Post was another one. The Golden Spike Area in Utah was still another one. Old Pecos, over near Santa Fe, was still another one. So my real interest was in promoting these and doing the historical studies.

Then we began to get working with WODC on the interpretive and master planning phases of it, so I worked on all of those. I did all of the historical studies for Fort Bowie, for Fort Davis, and for Hubbell Trading Post, and for Golden Spike, and finally for the Chamizal proposal. And I was an influential participant in the planning for Fort Bowie and the Golden Spike and Hubbell Trading Post, but principally Fort Davis. This was one area in which I was there from the beginning practically to the developed area stage, and of all areas the one closest to my affections.

EVISON: What strikes me is the variety of those things you were concerned with, and also the fact that you were concerned directly with so many areas that actually became parts of the System.

UTLEY: That is in part a reflection of Connie's expansionism, and it was an interesting situation, because Hugh Miller was very dedicated to getting Fort Bowie; he really wanted that; but beyond that he didn't have any particular interest in getting the others. Under Tom Allen - of course, he was a real conservative, and I don't believe that Tom really thought the National Park Service ought to have to concern itself with historical areas, but since it did, and that was part of his job, he would do it. But he wasn't about to go out of his way to get any new historical areas.

And so everybody was frightened at the prospect of Tom Allen coming in there, and me especially, because Roy Appleman - my mentor - had been Tom Allen's Regional Historian in Richmond, and those two, really the sparks flew, you know. But Roy told me, "You don't have anything to worry about it," he said. "Tom is a hard-nosed old bastard, but he is fair and he will respect your opinions if you stand up and tell him what your opinions are. He may knock you down, but you stand up and tell him what you think." So that is the way

I found that Tom had a higher regard for Roy Appleman than he did for most people in the Park Service. So Tom and I hit it off real well.

You know, he was deaf in one ear, and I am hard of hearing in one ear; and so when I had to go to his office, we would sit with our good ears to each other and shout at each other.

EVISON: Just as you and I are today.

UTLEY: But Tom was against all of these areas. He was against Fort Bowie; he was against Fort Davis; he was against Hubbell Trading Post; he was against Golden Spike. But Connie was for all of them; Connie would take anything he could get. And to his everlasting credit, Tom Allen never surpressed any of my recommendations. My work, he always sent on to Washington. He would say, "I am against this; I don't believe we ought to do it, but here is what the historian says." And, of course, when it got to Washington Connie would take what the historian said, because it would lead to another unit in the Park System. But I have a very fond memory of Tom Allen and the highest regard for him; even though a lot of people around the System don't remember him with great affection, I do. So when I came to Washington

Tom wrote me a very fine letter, which I still treasure, advising me how to get along in the Washington scene.

EVISON: He had been an Assistant Director in here before.

UTLEY: He had been everything. He had been superintendent of all the big parks; he had been Regional Director of at least three regions; he had been Assistant Director in Washington. There were very few jobs of any importance that Tom hadn't filled.

So, in '64, as Hartzog came onto the scene, of course, he started building his own staff. Hartzog and I had had no particular association before I came in here. I had met him at a party at Tom Allen's house one night early in '64, right after he came back into the Park Service as an Assistant Director and really heir presumptive, I guess you would say. But that wasn't enough for him to form any particular impression of me. But as Herb Kahler's retirement approached, of course, the question of a successor came into the scene, and I expect Herb and Ronnie probably were the ones primarily responsible for recommending me to George as Herb's replacement. At that time the History Division, as you well remember, was pretty much staffed by long-term veterans - Charley Porter, Roy Appleman, Rogers Young,

and Harold Peterson and Walter Coleman. And for one reason or another, none of them really, I guess, seemed quite the right choice for the Chief Historian's position.

And so I was summoned in in May of '64 while they looked me over and the recommendation was made. However, it got hung up upstairs. You would not suppose that an Assistant Secretary would concern himself very deeply with a bureau selection of a Division Chief down at that low level, but Assistant Secretary John Carver remembered the name of "Utley" and he remembered it unfavorably, but he couldn't remember why he remembered it unfavorably, and so he sat on my papers through June, through July, and into August.

Actually, what he was trying to remember but couldn't went back to '61 when I was at Santa Fe and I was one of a handful of western historians who assembled the Santa Fe Conference on the History of Western America, in 1961, as a first step toward the formation of an association of like-minded historians that had since become the Western History Association. But that was born at Santa Fe in 1961, and living there, I was very instrumental in the local arrangements for it. We had secured Secretary Udall's commitment to be our banquet speaker, but at the last minute he was unable to

come, so Carver came and gave the speech instead of Udall. Carver gave a very fine speech; he had written it himself, I am sure, because I wrote a draft that he threw out, and Roy wrote a draft that he threw out. So he gave an excellent speech, but it was a highly political one, you know, comparing Kennedy's new frontier to Frederick Jackson Turner's Frontier, and linking Turner, who is the patron saint of western historians, to Kennedy, and so forth. But it was just right for a banquet speech. I then was one of several editors who assembled the scholarly papers that were delivered at the Santa Fe Conference into a book that was published. We didn't put his banquet speech, which was political and not in the same category as the scholarly papers, into the book. And he got my name connected with purging his speech from that book, but he couldn't remember in his mind - except that he knew he had something against me. And he sat on those papers until Herb Kahler went upstairs and he said, "If you can't tell me what is the matter with him, then it is not right for you to go on keeping us all dangling like this." Because Herb, as you know, was on the verge of retiring. So Carver allowed as how that was right, and since he couldn't prefer any charges he would let the papers go, and so therefore - even though I wasn't all

that anxious to come back; I had been enjoying myself as Regional Historian - but at the same time I had kind of an inkling that the old order was going to change in ways that perhaps were not foreseeable, and that maybe the job I had known might not remain as such. And, of course, that turned out to be an accurate prediction, because the new regime wiped out the whole old system of Regional Historians. So it was a good move that I made.

EVISON: I didn't realize that at that time Regional Historians jobs were eliminated.

UTLEY: Well, it came along very shortly thereafter. I served George Hartzog pretty loyally for many years, and I had a very high regard and respect and personal affection for him, but still there are things that he did that I never did and never will agree with, and one of them was to take the professional people out of the Regional Offices. That is what he did in one of those first of the interminable series of reorganizations. The old institution as we knew it, of Regional Historians, was eliminated. He saw the error of his ways; well, I don't know whether he admitted it to himself, but at least the last reorganization before he left restored the professional people to Regional Offices.

Well, at that time there was a whole series of reorganizations. But at that time the Leopold Committee - wasn't it the one that first really hit us hard on the inadequacy of research in the National Park Service? -

EVISON: Yes, it was.

UTLEY: - had just rendered its report, and of course the thrust of their criticism really had to do with natural sciences, and that still really is the problem, when you talk about research.

When our critics talk about research, they are thinking in terms of natural sciences research: What is the carrying capacity of Yellowstone for elk? But history and archaeology has always suffered from the fact that we do research, too and every time the Park Service does something about research it is on the basis of needs in natural sciences, but it sucks archaeology and history along with it.

And so, responding to these criticisms, one of those first reorganizations created an Assistant Director for Resource Studies, and, if you will recall, transformed the old History Division and that portion of it that was Archaeology, transformed it into a separate division and bracketed it with the

old Natural Sciences Division into an Assistant Directorate for Resource Studies.

Well, this proceeded from a fundamental misapprehension that those divisions were really concerned in any very direct way with research and research only. Those divisions had always been staff divisions concerned with the whole spectrum of National Park Service involvement in history, all the way from interpretation to Congressional relations to new areas, to historic site surveys, and to research. But research, of course, had been pretty much a catch-as-catch-can proposition, on the park level, and the Washington Office had never been concerned with a research program. And now the requirement was to have a research program.

But all those other responsibilities didn't just go away, you see. So what was expected of that Resource Studies Office - Ben Thompson was sent in there to head it up - this was right after the big fight with B.O.R. and Ben was being got out of the relationship between the National Park Service and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation.

The purposes were never accomplished, simply because they could not have been, because by definition the Washington

Office has to have a Division of History to take care of all historical concerns, and the research end of it turned out to be simply a massive paper-shuffling operation that never came to anything.

And Ben then retired, as you may remember, probably about 1965, and Howard Stagner, who was his deputy assistant director, acted for a long time and then became Assistant Director for Resource Studies.

But I will always remember, I was attending a convention of the American Historical Association over at the Shoreham Hotel - I guess that would have been right after Christmas of 1965 - and I had a message delivered to me saying, "Hartzog wants to see you." So I rushed out and got a cab and went back to the office and up to Hartzog's office, and there were two or three others there. John Littleton was there, and maybe Charley Porter was there. George's style of course was always one of keeping the opposition off balance. He managed to keep everybody off balance all the time. So he said, "All right. What is the research program?"

I was almost without words, because we had no research program. What I really should have said, and would have if I had known him better, was "there isn't any." But I hemmed

and hawed all over the place, because the History Division had gone on doing what it had always done, simply because that had to be done. He very quickly perceived, if he didn't already know, that there really wasn't anything more than a paper shuffling exercise. And he said, "All right. What do you need to do in order to have a research program that you can take responsibility for?" I said, "I can't take responsibility - I cannot be responsible to you for a research program that depends upon the interest and concern and activity of the Regional Directors, because they aren't all that concerned with it, and what we had up to that time was simply the superintendents sending papers to the Regions, and the Regions sending it to the Washington Office, and it getting filed. And what happened after that?"

So he said, "All right. You go out and design a research program that you can be responsible to me for." So I did, in connection then with probably the next reorganization. But I identified throughout the parks those people on the Park and Regional staffs who were doing nothing but research, and who therefore if research was no longer a regional responsibility could be surrendered. And there turned out to be 12 or 14 or something like that. So I took my plan back up to him and said, "You let me transfer

all those people in here and put them into the Division of History, and I will do the research." He said, "Okeh," and so we did.

We assembled a cadre here I think of 12 to 15 research historians among the best in the Service, and we set up a series of teams: a Civil War Team, a Colonial and a Federal Team, and one on Westward Expansion; two men in each one.

We couldn't get space for all those people in the Interior Building here. They were then setting up that Service Center over in Rosslyn, you know. This was just when Rosslyn was being renewed, and all those buildings were going up - 1966 - so the whole Division of History moved over to Rosslyn into the Service Center, even though I continued to report to Howard Stagner as Assistant Director for Resources Studies.

And, of course, the Historic Sites Survey got mixed up into this, because it had been overtaken by inflation, and as salaries went up, the appropriations did not go up, so there were no longer enough Historic Sites Survey historians for each Region, so obviously something had to be done there too. So we centralized the Historic Sites Survey at the same time that we centralized Research, and brought all these

people into the Washington Office also, and conducted the nation-wide Survey right out of the Division of History.

EVISON: Well, it strikes me that there is such an awfully strong relationship there between the two that it was a very sensible bit of arrangement.

UTLEY: Very much so. In fact, when I took over it was so interlocked that it could hardly be pulled apart. Subsequently it has evolved more, so that it is more separate from the other historical concerns.

EVISON: I am curious about one thing: I don't remember just who all were in the Branch of History at that time, but then or earlier, any way, you had had researchers like Charley Porter -

UTLEY: Well, they weren't researchers. They were staff historians.

EVISON: Well, Rogers Young's career was very heavily research, certainly in his earlier years.

UTLEY: In his earlier years, yes.

EVISON: And Roy Appleman's also. But they were just staff historians?

UTLEY: By the 1950's they were the ones who were preparing the Secretarial correspondence and supporting the legislative program, and what I called management history is what these people were doing.

Charley Porter retired in 1965. He was my principal deputy when I became Chief Historian. And I must say, to Charley's credit, that it took an awful lot, I am sure, for him to swallow a young kid of 34, or whatever I was, coming in as Chief Historian over a man of his credentials and service, who really was older than my father. But he did it, and he helped me sincerely and whole-heartedly to adjust to the Washington aspect of life.

Rogers did the same thing, and I am sure it was hard for Rogers, too. Both of those people were not men without egos, you know. They both had a good opinion of themselves, so that made it even harder, I know.

By this time Roy had been moved into Interpretation, in one of the reorganizations, so he wasn't there. And Harold Peterson had moved into the Museum operation. Walter Coleman retired right before I came in. So the ones I inherited then were Rogers Young, Charley Porter, and Joe Cullen was here; he is in Richmond now. Then Charley retired, and that

left Rogers, and Rogers then, in the reorganization of 1966 when we assembled all of those researchers, became the Chief of the Branch of Park History Studies, - my principal deputy and the one who was concerned or charged with organizing and conducting a nation-wide in-park historical research program. John Littleton then was heading the Historic Sites Survey, and he retired very shortly after we moved to Rosslyn, in the spring of 1966, and Dr. Sydney Bradford became the Chief of the Historic Sites Survey. Syd now heads the grant-in-aid program in my office over in the National Register. Then subsequently Syd left the Park Service and went over to the National Endowment for the Humanities. And when that happened, about 1967, Horace Sheeley became Chief of the Historic Sites Survey, and still is.

So we operated out of Rosslyn then through 1966 and 1967. But meanwhile, the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 came along (that was enacted in October), which, as you know, gave the National Park Service major new responsibilities in the field of historic preservation. It commanded us to expand this relatively small corps of National Historic Landmarks into a great National Register of Historic Places that lists everything in the nation worthy of preservation, clear down to the level of community significance, and authorizes

us to conduct a grant-in-aid program to the States and to the National Trust for Historic Preservation to help them identify what places ought to go onto the Register, and then to help them preserve them thereafter.

So this represented a major advance in the over-all national historic preservation policies and programs, and a major new responsibility charged to the National Park Service.

And, by the way, George Hartzog was extremely influential and I believe decisive in the legislative maneuverings that led finally to the enactment of this law. Without detracting from the significant role others played, I believe he intervened at a couple of decisive points that would have lost it for us if he hadn't been there. There was a lot of pulling and hauling, especially between Interior and HUD (Housing and Urban Development) over who was going to get that program. So we got it. Obviously this new law and new money and new programs had some serious implications for organization again.

EVISON: As though there weren't enough without it!

UTLEY: That's right. And I am sure Dr. Conally this morning probably gave you some of the story of how that came about.

The Director, I think primarily through the inspiration of Ronnie Lee, who played a very key role all through this period after his retirement, in pointing Hartzog in the right direction on historic preservation and standing in there when George might have been inclined to yield to some of the management types.

EVISON: It was a very wonderful thing that George had the confidence in Ronnie Lee that enabled Ronnie to wield that influence, too.

UTLEY: That is true. And it is curious too, because as a Regional Director Ronnie didn't have much influence with George, and there was more friction than there was harmony between them. And of course at that time, right before his retirement, Ronnie was not in good health; in fact, he was in severe pain almost continuously. So in my view he played a much more influential role in the direction the National Park Service went, after he retired, than he did in these years he was Director of the Northeast Region.

EVISON: Of course, his great previous influence was during the time that he was in here.

UTLEY: Oh, absolutely. In the early years after the Historic

Sites Act of 1935 was enacted, he was a key figure, and then he became a key figure again after his retirement, in the implementation of the 1966 Act.

As you know, he and Joe Brew, the archaeologist of Harvard University, and Ernest Conally, of the University of Illinois as an architectural historian, were convened as a special committee by Hartzog to recommend to him how the National Park Service ought to organize itself to carry out the new law. Now, that committee was meeting before the law was enacted, and their report may have come along at about the same time or immediately after the passage of the law. But most of the work was done in anticipation of the law, rather than as a result of it.

Well, that committee recommended to him what the historians had been saying ever since 1935: You have got to recognize the difference in principles and techniques and management requirements between historical areas, historic preservation, and nature preservation. This is an issue the Park Service had never been willing to face up to, and hasn't yet. But the burden of the report from that special committee was: "Face up to it."

"Face up to it. Jay Thomas Schneider told you this in 1935

when he prepared a special report for Ickes. You ignored it then. We are telling you now. Don't ignore it this time."

And what they recommended of course was that history and archaeology be separated out from natural sciences; - they oughtn't to be together; they are two wholly different things, - and made responsive to their own professional direction and not with the intervention of any other management level of the Park Service. That is what Schneider said in 1935, that the dominant orientation of the management of the National Park Service has always been, always will be, and perforce must be, of a different complexion than needed for historic preservation. I mean it is going to be the managers of natural and scenic areas that run the Park Service, and history is a wholly different business.

EVISON: If I remember rightly, this Conservation Foundation conducted a report that was made public last summer, recommending a natural physical separation of the historical group into a separate bureau, didn't it?

UTLEY: This is a digression, and I want to come back to that 1966 Special Committee report.

But I believe that the burden of the Conservation Foundation report has less to do with where the historical areas ought to go than a conviction on the part of the people who are conceptualizing the Department of Natural Resources that the historical areas don't belong there.

In other words, I am changing the emphasis a little. I don't believe the Conservation Foundation or the people who are attempting to conceive a department of Natural Resources really care where the historical areas go. I think what they see is that they don't belong in a Department of Natural Resources. And I believe that is what was being said.

I don't believe that the Historical Areas ought to go to the Smithsonian or the National Trust or the Endowment for the Arts, at all. But where they ought to go is a question that has plagued people involved in this business ever since 1935, because the Schneider report said the way they do this in Europe is to have a separate bureau for the preservation of their historic monuments. We ought to do that here. This is Schneider talking to Ickes. But for reasons that had already been set forth, an existing bureau, Schneider says it can be done by your existing National Park Service.

And by the time he had written his report, Ickes had already decided to do it that way.

But Schneider said: "If you decide to do it that way, let the National Park Service run it, - you have to organize yourself in such a way that it recognizes the fundamental distinction between running Yellowstone and running Yorktown Battlefield. And this means that there be a separate history branch (they called them branches in those days, instead of divisions), run by professionals in the business, reporting directly to the Director without the intervention of any other management level. And he had organization charts to illustrate it.

The Park Service did not then, nor has it ever since, been able to bring itself to do that.

EVISON: When Ronnie Lee first came in as the first Chief Historian in what way did the set-up differ? Was he answerable to anybody except direct to the Director?

UTLEY: I don't remember the details of that. If he was not, I am sure he reported to somebody other than the Director. There must have been an Assistant Director. Of course, this was mixed up in those relief programs too, and so some of

History was over with the Bond Building crowd and some elsewhere, I think. Of course, I wasn't there at the time and I can't speak from personal knowledge, but the fact was that the historical areas continued to be managed in the same way that natural areas were, by managers who rotated between the two, who were answerable to a Regional Director after about 1939, in the same way that the natural and scenic area superintendents were, so that it was all mixed up together, and there was not the identification of personnel to specialize in running historical areas which Schneider felt was necessary, and that the Europeans have done as a matter of practice for years, and that most of us in the business of historic preservation in the Park Service have long felt should be the case.

This doesn't mean that everything has been a disaster. This simply reflects a feeling that the historical areas have not been run as well as they could have been and should have been and should be.

But the current proposals including the Conservation Foundation report I think stem less from a concern over the proper management of the historical areas than from a concern over the purity of the natural area.

In other words, they see history as an interference with and a burden on natural preservation. And this whole question has been brought into very sharp focus by the accumulation of responsibilities in the field of historic preservation beyond the park boundary, that has come about in the last decade or less, beginning with the 1966 Act - well, beginning with the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960 and the Archaeological Salvage program.

The Historic Sites Survey had always been there. HABS was reactivated - had always been there - the Historic American Buildings Survey. Then came the 1966 Act in which we got into the National Register, the grants-in-aid program. Then came the 1969 Environmental Protection Act in which we get into the business of writing environmental impact statements and reviewing everybody else's from the standpoint of historic preservation.

Then came the President's Executive Order of 1971 on preservation and enhancement of the cultural environment.

All of these have amounted to almost the tail wagging the dog.

I administer a 20-million-dollar program now, that is

completely beyond the boundaries of the Parks; it has nothing to do with the National Parks. And there is a very distinct feeling growing that these are in fact interfering with more basic concerns of the National Park Service, at the same time that they are being penalized and rendered less effective by the dominant concern of this Bureau for its basic mission, you see.

So there is a feeling that is growing that all of that external accumulation of programs probably ought to be broken off, if not altogether from the Park Service, at least made into an organizational entity of its own.

Talking about the proper composition of the National Park System and expansionism and the philosophy of one-of-a-kind: This has been a very real concern in the historical area category as we have come along, and my own conviction in that regard, my own belief is that the National Park Service ought to be prepared to take on any proposed historic area that had been found to possess national significance under the criteria that we have used in the Historic Sites Survey, since the Historic Sites Act, and that meets tests of suitability and feasibility. This, of course, is directly contrary to the one-of-a-kind approach.

I see no reason why we should limit ourselves only to Fort Laramie if Fort Larned and Fort Davis and Fort Union and Fort Bowie are all nationally significant, all suitable and feasible, and in danger of loss. Now, if somebody else is taking good care of them, then let them go on doing it, but let us be ready, if the Mount Vernon Ladies Association folds, to open our arms and take it over, and not reject it because we have the Washington Monument.

EVISON: Or Monticello.

UTLEY: That is right. And this came to a head beginning in 1969, because George Hartzog was having monumental problems with the Budget Bureau on "Where does it all end? Where are you going to stop expanding the National Park System?" And to say that you have criteria of national significance and feasibility and suitability and are prepared to support any that meet these tests simply wouldn't cut it with the Budget Bureau.

So Hartzog summoned some of us up one day and he said, "We have got to have a plan." Of course, we had been spending hundreds of thousands of dollars for years trying to come up with a National Park System plan, but it always broke down on the very question of: Do you put Mount Vernon in it or

not? If you put it in, then you upset all the ladies, because they think you are after Mount Vernon; and if you leave it out, then they say, "But Mount Vernon is the most significant property in the United States."

But Hartzog wanted a system of quantification, of measuring where were the gaps in the National Park System and what it would take to fill them. And I said, "I am fundamentally opposed to that kind of approach. You cannot ^{possibly} ~~qualify~~ historical values and segregate them as to historical theme," which is what he wanted. He wanted us to take the themes of the Historic Sites Survey and assign areas to those themes and ascertain where the gaps were and what could be supported to fill those gaps. I said, "We are going to paint ourselves into the corner on this, because how many sites do you have associated with Abraham Lincoln? You have got Ford's Theatre, the house where Lincoln died, you have got Lincoln's boyhood home in Indiana, and you have got the Lincoln birthplace in Kentucky."

EVISON: And the Lincoln Memorial.

UTLEY: And the Lincoln Memorial. But you don't have THE prime Lincoln site, which is his home in Illinois from which he embarked on the presidency. So you go through this kind of

quantification business and it is going to show that Abraham Lincoln is over-represented in the National Park System, so when you want Lincoln's home you aren't going to be able to get it," which, of course, is exactly what happened, and yet we got it. But anyway, he had to have a system like this. So we gave it to him. I said, "Now you have got to have one area - one area can represent only one theme. Well, this is crazy. Where do you put the Jefferson Expansion Memorial? Here is the Fur Trade, Overland Migrations, the Santa Fe Trail, Lewis and Clark. Which one of these do you put it in?"

We had to make a whole series of arbitrary judgments as to where park areas should go, and we worked out the most fantastic elaborate system. You may have seen it.

EVISON: No.

UTLEY: And the naturalists were doing the same thing at the same time. And really, I must say that it was a remarkable exercise in intellectual legerdemain. We all gathered down at Everglades one winter after all of this had been done. Frank Masland had been put in charge of this on behalf of the Advisory Board, and he was down there fishing off the Everglades, you know. So we took our whole Committee down

there and we got holed up in the motel, at the Inn, and we decided the system would work, at least for Hartzog's purposes, so long as we put enough qualifications on it. One of the qualifications was that so long as THE prime site associated with a given theme or person is not in the System, a gap exists, so that you could have Lincoln sites all over, as long as you didn't have the Lincoln home in Springfield, there was a gap. But the whole thing was designed to show statistically and by a graph that almost every theme in the Park System had a gap, and that was really how we structured it to come out, so that almost anything you wanted would fill a gap somewhere.

The title of this study was "Historical Representation in the National Park System," and I think it is one of the most revealing illustrations of the way George's mind worked and the brilliance of his bureaucratic thought, that the only change he made in that was to cross out the title "Historical Representation in the National Park System" and to substitute the title "The National Park System Plan." For years and years and years this Department had been struggling with trying to get a National Park System Plan, and never came up with one; and by the stroke of a pen he converted a "Study" into a "Plan."

He published it in 5,000 copies which are floating all over the country today and are supposedly the framework within which we assess what ought to be added to the System.

But I guess that the point of my remarks is that this study proceeded from a premise that I disagree with: the premise being that the National Park System should present a complete and balanced representation of our natural and historical heritage.

Now I said that is not my belief. My belief is that the National Park System ought to include everything of national importance, national significance, that nobody else is taking care of. You see, that is the other end of the spectrum. But for reasons that had to do with the trouble with the Budget Bureau - well, and I believe that it was his basic conviction too - that that was the objective of the National Parks System.

EVISON: Do you feel that the existence of those volumes and of that plan has in any significant way been a handicap?

UTLEY: No, it hasn't yet. In fact it has been a great asset, and I cheerfully acknowledge the wisdom of his judgment in that matter, even though I still disagree with that basic premise of what a park system ought to be. It has been an

enormously useful tool not only in terms of persuading the Budget analysts and the members of Congress with whom we deal that we have a plan, that we have some system, that we have some rationale about where we are going and when we might be likely to get there and how much it might cost along the way, which is what we didn't have before. What we had before was simply an open-ended series of criteria that could take us nowhere that we could describe.

So in that sense, in a very pragmatic sense, it has been useful and we have had all kinds of good publicity over it, and it has earned us a great deal of praise. So I have acknowledged to George that I was wrong in my resistance to what he wanted to do there. And the fact of the matter is that just yesterday we have concluded arrangements to send a team to Greece to do exactly the same things for the Greeks, the same kind of approach. In fact, the man who headed our historical team here - Frank Sarles - is going to be the one who goes to Greece to do this for the Greeks. So things often turn out differently than they were expected.

I wanted to get back, though, to that Special Committee in 1966. It consisted of Joe Brew and Ernest Connally and Ronnie Lee. They came around and they talked with everyone

to try to decide how the Park Service ought to organize itself to take on that new responsibility, and they came up with the concept of an Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation. In fact, they agonized long hours over the name. But they couldn't find a name that comprehended all of the disciplines involved and one that at the same time was succinct and not cumbersome. The name they came up with rather takes in all of the disciplines but it is as cumbersome as hell. I mean, when somebody asks me my title I have lost their interest by the time I have finished telling them.

And it was their conception that this Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation in fact be the American equivalent of the traditional European Monuments Office, in which you had all of the research, all of the archival work, and all of the construction development work. We had existing divisions of history and archaeology at that time. They recommended that a third Division to comprehend the third basic discipline of Historic Architecture be created from existing personnel in the two Design and Construction Offices who were working with historic preservation, and that these be the three basic professional divisions - History, Architecture, and Archaeology - and then that there be a fourth Division -

a National Register of Historic Places - that would take care of this new external program, but each of the three basic professional divisions would have two basic components which we refer to, facetiously, as our "in-house" and "out-house" components.

So, in History, the Historic Sites Survey would continue as the "out-house" responsibility, while there would be a Branch of Park History. We would drop Park History Studies from the old research unit that Rogers Young used to head, and call it Park History - still doing research, all the research the Park Service needed, but also acknowledging that there is staff work there also. And the Division of History would be headed by the Chief Historian, who is not only the Chief of the Division of History in the Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation but also the Chief Historian of the National Park Service, you see.

Similarly, with Historic Architecture, which would have an in-Park Branch - the Branch of Restorations - and then the out-house component, the Historic American Buildings Survey under the Chief Historical Architect. And then the Division of Archaeology, a little different from the others, but concerned basically with out-house and in-house, the

out-house being the archaeological salvage program, this then under the Chief Archaeologist.

And it was acknowledged that the Branch of Restorations in the Division of Historic Architecture would be a little D&C, a little Design and Construction that would handle all work related to historic structures that D&C had been handling. That is, they would do the architectural research in the fabric of the building, following the historians' research in the documents, and the archaeologists' research sub-surface. The architects would go into the fabric of the building, and on the basis of their findings from the documents, sub-surface, and the fabric of the building, would do the working drawings and specifications, and then actually provide the construction supervision - contracting and construction supervision. And that unit would take our Restoration from beginning to end, and this would relieve D&C to work on new visitor centers and stuff like that.

About this time, parenthetically, Rogers Young suddenly had to retire for health reasons. He came in one Monday afternoon after a doctor's appointment and said, "The doctor says I have to retire this week." And bing! he was gone, just like that.

At that time Roy Appleman was still over in Interpretation and very unhappy there. I caught Hartzog getting off the elevator one day and I said, "I want Roy Appleman to take Rogers Young's place." He started arguing that Roy wasn't the man for that, and Roy wasn't too diplomatic, you know, and "Roy shouldn't be a supervisor." I said, "It is all right will Bill Everhardt if it is all right with you." And he said, "Aw, all right, go on and do it," just as the door closed and the elevator went down.

So I was able to bring Roy back as my principal deputy, which is a real irony, since Roy was the one who got me into the Park Service to begin with. Roy was absolutely invaluable for the balance of his years with the Park Service. He retired, as you know, two or three years ago.

I think one of the most revealing stories I have heard of Roy, and one that sums up Roy's absolute honesty of expression, is the one they tell about the time the group went to Gettysburg to decide where they were going to put the visitor center. That had been a much debated question, where to put the new visitor center. So they argued around up there at some length, and finally Connie Wirth said, "We are going to put it HERE." You know, just like Andy Jackson slapping his cane down over there where the Treasury

was built, you know, "We are going to build it HERE." Now that I have made my decision I want to hear from Roy Appleman why we shouldn't put it here." And Roy told him why they shouldn't put it there, and Roy of course was absolutely right, and I think Connie quite frequently realized that - well, in fact I believe at that time Connie acknowledged that Roy's reasons were usually right, but they weren't always the ones that prevailed, for good and sufficient pragmatic reasons. But he really was a great guy, and he could always be depended on to tell you the absolute truth and there was absolutely no yield in his thinking. When you had to do something because of expediency, he would simply disassociate himself from it and he would tell you what was wrong with it.

The recommendations of that Lee-Brew-Connally Committee, as might be expected, encountered resistance in the top echelons of the Park Service.

For one thing, it meant that Howard Stagner would be out of a job as Associate Director, and I must say that Howard's attitude throughout was most exemplary and he sacrificed his self-interest for the greater good, which I think he came to see. But Howard Baker I think had great reservations

about letting the preservation people have that much organizational identity and authority, and Ed Hummel may have also. No, Ed Hummel wasn't in here then; he was still in San Francisco. But there was a great deal of pressure brought on George not to go all that direction but to compromise and accept a watered-down version of what that Committee had recommended. And George agreed to that less-than-ideal organization, and Ronnie Lee, bless his heart, came back at George and made it absolutely clear that that just wasn't going to get it.

"If you are going to have a national preservation program you have to organize yourself to do it, and no more of these half-measures will do."

So George's backbone was stiffened up and he stood up to Baker and Company and approved the organization as it had been recommended by that Committee. And then, of course, came the question of who should head it up. It was immediately organized on paper in December 1967, and I was appointed Acting Director.

By that time I believe Ernest Connally had consented to become the Chief (it was called then) in the Chief of OAHP. That had been the farthest thing from his mind during all of

these Committee hearings, but he thought he saw the opportunity really to set up the American equivalent of a European Monuments Office and do it like they did it overseas. Little did he know that things don't happen that way in the bureaucracy.

In the first place, Hartzog's rule was a very personal one, and part of it rested on keeping people off balance, so that you never get all your due. And while Ernest thought he was going to run a national preservation program, he was not really permitted to do so. He found himself accountable in more detailed aspects of the job to others than he thought he would be. He found himself hampered and hamstrung by the prerogatives of field management so far as the National Park System was concerned, and by a mentality in field management basically unsympathetic to the principles of historic preservation as they are practiced in Europe and as he intended to inaugurate them here.

And finally he found himself hampered and hamstrung by George Hartzog's constitutional inability to keep his hands off the organization once it has been reorganized, because no sooner than we had got set up on paper than he started picking around at us, trying to figure out how it ought to be done

differently.

And the next reorganization that came along was the one that eventuated in a Western and an Eastern Service Center. And our office simply contradicted the management philosophy that the Washington Office is the office that writes policy, and the field carries it out. And the philosophy that was part and parcel of that reorganization - that the Service Center does all of the servicing of the parks and the Regions in professional services.

Well, here you had all the engineers and the landscape architects and the master planners in these two Service Centers, but there were the damned historians sitting off there exclusively to themselves, doing their own thing. And that contradicted the new organizational philosophy.

And so after great trauma George took our production people away from us; all of the research historians that I had assembled in History in 1968, and the very few (I don't recall more than one or two) architects that we had managed to get on board in this new little D&C for Historic Preservation, suddenly found themselves in the Service Center, Eastern and Western Service Center, and they were gone from our coop.

So immediately we no longer can be a production unit, that is so far as the parks go, but you see we still remained - and still remain to this day - a production operational unit so far as all of these external programs go, which is a constant irritant to the management, because we are still contradicting the management philosophy that you don't pay any operating programs in the Washington Office. But they simply can't be transferred to the Regions, because you break them up into six parts, you don't have anything left. And the Regions don't know anything about it any way. So there is that irritant; but it makes us constantly vulnerable if in every reorganization and every flap about the size of the Washington Office we get into this: "Well, Utley's shops have 125 people in it; you know that is bigger than a Regional Office."

EVISON: Is that a fact?

UTLEY: That is a fact.

And, of course, we are going through this right now again in connection with the new Director's look at things. So immediately he lost a good deal of what he thought he was coming in here to do. That, coupled with the fact that the funding for the new program was a long time getting off the

ground - and again this raises the question of whether this is the right place for that kind of program, because here is historic preservation having to compete for budget allocations with the basic concerns, first of Interior - oil, gas, water power - and secondly the Parks - Yellowstone, Grand Teton - for grants-in-aid for historic preservation.

When the Director has a planning allowance to plan against, which is coming first - Yellowstone or grants-in-aid for historic preservation? There is no question about it. So you see the problem is always going to be with us; that that activity is enough different from the central concerns of the Service and this Department that there will always be an element of unfair competition.

But as we went on down the pike and established our relationships with the States and the network of State preservation officers, and the Congress began to feel the effects of the interest nationwide in historic preservation; as the administrations - first of Johnson and then of Nixon - gave increasing emphasis to historic preservation in environmental terms, not strictly associative terms, like "George Washington slept here," but in environmental terms, like "this old building is a pleasing part of the cityscape and it still

has years of good use left in it, so therefore you ought to save it" - that kind of thinking has gained more and more currency, and as personnel limitations on the Department and on the Park Service continued rigidly, while the budgetary possibilities expanded, - which meant we could get more money if we promised not to hire more people - then our fortunes began to take on some cause for optimism.

At this point our grants-in-aid program is at 7.5 million dollars a year, and we are in for 1974 for 15.5 million for grants-in-aid. So once it is built into the budget base you are off and running. So the program has a good lease on life. Actually it is a whole series of interlocking programs that go clear across the spectrum of cultural property, be they below ground, on the surface, or above ground.

EVISON: I take it that you feel that conditions are right for the sound expenditure of that much money on this program.

UTLEY: Oh, there is no question about that. Conditions are right for the expenditure of far more than that. This is a matching program, and a measure of the potential of the program is the amount of dollars that are out there waiting to match federal dollars for historic preservation purposes. And we have got 7.5 million dollars in fiscal '73 for

matching grants-in-aid. But out there now in hard cash is 32.5 million dollars to match federal funds. I mean, that is money that the States have now ready to match us if we have the 32.5 million to give them, you see. So the need is there, the willingness is there. A central purpose of any grants program is to prime the pump, and the pump is flowing, but the handle is not working like it ought to now.

EVISON: That is an extraordinary situation.

UTLEY: And for fiscal 1974 there will be 42 million out there awaiting to be matched. And beyond that there are estimates (they are not as firm as what we have for this year and next) there are estimates that go as high as 75 million dollars within the next five years.

So it is a fine program, and really it has grown to a place where I feel that it is an interference - it has nothing to do with running Yellowstone, nothing at all, and it is a burden to that, and the fact that this organization is run by people who were hired because they knew how to run Yellowstone is a penalty on that program. It was digestible in earlier years, but I liken it now to the infant that has grown up and the parent doesn't realize it and is still treating it as a child.

I feel these stresses in the most personal way, right on my desk. There is a basic incompatibility between my responsibilities for the external programs and my responsibilities as a member or an official of the traditional National Park Service, because on the one hand my external people, who are charged with helping and, where necessary, if not forcing, at least tightening the screws on all federal agencies to comply with the law and the President's Executive Order on preservation of historic properties. All agencies have to comply with this law and this Executive Order, and the National Park Service is one of them. Those people in my external program are telling the National Park Service, along with every other agency, "You have to obey the law," and they are telling the Park Service, through me, on the other hand, the Park Service has one of the most dismal records of any agency, surprisingly, in complying with the law and the Executive Order; simply because they feel they are experts in this field and that they are above the law.

So here I am, representing the National Park Service to these external people, explaining to them why the National Park Service is not performing like it should. On the one hand I have to justify the actions of my external people to a bunch of Regional Directors who don't understand the program;

and on the other hand, I have to justify the attitudes and the actions of the Regional Directors to a bunch of historic preservationists who don't understand the National Park Service.

And there is a basic incompatibility there that has become dramatic in the last two or three years, especially since the President's Executive Order on the protection and the enhancement of the cultural environment.

What the President said, in effect, is it is implicit in the 1966 Act that no longer is the Park Service the only agency concerned with historic preservation. Now every agency is concerned with it. What was implicit in that Act the President made explicit. He said, "Every government agency will examine its land holdings and identify what meets the criteria for the National Register, and nominate those properties to the National Register, and then will adopt plans which the Secretary of Interior will approve, for the preservation and care of those cultural properties year by year, so the Department of Defense has to decide what is historic at - Fort Sill, - put it in the National Register and tell us how they are going to preserve it. But the National Park Service has to also. All of the historical areas

are already in the Register, so there is no real problem there. But what about Fort Yellowstone, at Yellowstone Park? That is an historic property that meets the criteria, because we are talking about historic properties clear down to the level of community significance, everything that ought to be preserved in this country for its historical value.

Now, when Jack Anderson puts Fort Yellowstone in the Register, if I can ever get him to do it, he is registering a historic property, which to him is his headquarters and his residential area.

Now doubtless - and I use Jack Anderson simply as an example, because this problem exists in other parks; all the natural and recreational areas have this problem - it is only human on their part, you know, if this means that everything I want to do within the boundaries of Fort Yellowstone has to be cleared with the President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation under Section 106 of the Act, which it does - I will be damned if I am going to put it in. So here we have the President of the United States telling every agency to put everything in the Register that meets the criteria, and the Park Service is hanging back because it doesn't want

to be burdened with the obligations inherent in that.

And the President of the United States and the Regional Directors come together right on my desk. So I personally feel that the time has come to make an organizational separation of all of that external responsibility if not beyond the Park Service at least within the Park Service, so that there can be an adversary relationship and one official doesn't have to argue with himself, which is the position I am in now. So this is all under very serious consideration right now.

As you may know, the Advisory Board's comment delivered just last month on the Conservation Foundation's report recommended to the Secretary exactly that, that this whole external business be cut loose and put somewhere outside the Park Service.

EVISON: The Advisory Board went along with that?

UTLEY: The Advisory Board went along with that. Now, as you know, none of this could even be talked about in this kind of language under either George Hartzog or Connie, because it would have been a matter that I felt very strongly of my loyalty to what I knew George Hartzog to feel, and he would

have regarded that as treason. I have felt this for years, and I am on record. I have got memoranda going back to 1964, in which I have said these things, but never could you say them quite so publicly as now, because I believe this Director comes to us without any preconceptions or loyalties or attachments to the institution that enable him to view objectively the proper allocation of responsibility.

I don't know what Secretary Morton feels, but I rather suspect that he might be quite averse personally to turning loose any of these responsibilities, because this is an area in which he is personally deeply interested - in historic preservation - and he has exerted his influence personally to the extent of reaching right down into my office personally on projects in which he has interest.

So we are very fortunate to have someone who understands historic preservation the way he does, and who is interested in it to the extent that he is. But the next Secretary, you know, might very well be an oil and gas man who couldn't care less.

So my feeling at this point - and I am assuming that this won't be broadcast over the radio some time - is that there ought at this point be a distinct organizational separation

made within the National Park Service between our in-park historical programs and our external programs, and the external so organized that at such propitious time in the future that it seems desirable, that could be floated out of the Park Service and put in a more appropriate place. And I feel that the Park Service would be more comfortable with that also.

EVISON: Yes, I imagine that is so.

You raised so many ideas here, Bob. I remember the place of the historian in the administration of historic areas. You know, when the Park Service first really began to get into this business up to its knees or its hips, it was routine to make a historian a superintendent.

UTLEY: That is right, and they do now occasionally, too.

EVISON: I always questioned the basic logic of that, and yet I have been repeatedly astonished at what damned good administrators a lot of historians made.

UTLEY: Some of them are pretty damned bad, too, but a lot of rangers make bad administrators also.

My concern is not so much to make historians superintendents, or to put every historical area under a historian superintendent

as it is to shape an organization in which there will be accountability by the field manager to any intermediate levels for the proper management of those areas according to the policies and standards for historical areas. We do not have that now.

The policies and standards are being repeatedly violated now. The run-of-the-mill field management on both the Regional and Park level simply doesn't have the right kind of knowledge and appreciation and sensitivity to the policies and standards for the historical areas. And the differences between those policies and standards and the ones that are applicable in the natural and scenic and recreational areas. And there simply must be if the Park Service is to keep these historical areas a system that is along the lines that Schneider recommended back in 1935. The Canadians have it.

The Canadians have it. They have a National Park and Historic Sites Service. They have a National Historic Sites Service within their over-all National Park Bureau. And until such time as the lines of authority and accountability can run from a historical area superintendent to - if not to a separate echelon, at least to a Regional Office whose

Regional Director has a powerful right hand who knows what the business is, and to Washington, where the same thing exists.

Ernest Connally and I played around with this four or five years ago when we were fighting with Hartzog over the proper organization. Of course, Hartzog's whole organizational purpose was to keep these things so locked together that none of them could be pulled out and put somewhere else. He saw B.O.R. trying to grab the recreational areas, and he saw the Smithsonian having imperial designs on the historical areas; so he would never go for anything where there was any sense of discreetness in these three kinds of areas.

But when Udall published his policy pronouncement of 1964, which George wrote, dividing the National Park System into three categories of areas - historical, natural, and recreational - that fairly screamed for an organization that reflected those three categories.

Ernest and I once designed an organizational chart which was three-dimensional, and it contemplated the Director on top, and around him a ring below him three Associate Directors - one for historical areas, one for natural areas, and one for recreational areas. All of the functional people like

administration, etc., - cooperative activities - they could be off here to one side servicing these three basic organizational components. Then, down on the Regional level you would have the Director, with the same thing: an Associate Director for each of these three; and the Associate Director for Historical Areas-he is the kingpin. He says how they are going to be administered. And those superintendents, while theoretically accountable to the Regional Director, it is that Associate Director for their category of area who is calling the shots. With that kind of a control system you would establish the kind of accountability that we lack now.

We sit up here and write the historical area policies, as we did, and then we wrote the standards in rather explicit detail by which those policies are to be carried out. But you go out to the park now - pick any at random - and ask around there about the historical areas policies or standards, and nine times out of ten they won't even know what they are, nor ever have read them.

Time and time again we learn by accident in this office of the more egregious violations of fundamental standards and policies by the field management of the Park Service. It is

understandable, given the range of concerns that a Regional Director and a superintendent have, but the point is that if the Park Service is going to be entrusted with this responsibility, it damned well better organize itself to carry it out, or somebody else will grab it.

EVISON: This is just immensely interesting. This is some of the most fascinating stuff I have listened to in a long time, Bob.

UTLEY: Well, I figure I am talking to someone thirty years from now, so they can't quote me now. These views that I have been espousing probably will prove unpopular to many in the Park Service now, and I am pretty sure if I had articulated them to Hartzog he would have taken very great exception to them and he might even have felt it necessary to find someone with views a little more in keeping with his own.

If that had been his feeling, he would have been wrong, because though I have held these views, I have always considered it to be the responsibility of the responsible civil service servant to reflect and carry out the policies and wishes of line management. Once management has made up its mind, it is up to the staff and subordinate management to carry out those views, whether they agree with them or not. And I did so loyally and to the best of my ability, and I

believe George would be the first to concede that in every possible way I was a loyal member of his staff and carried out what he wanted done as well as I was able.

And during especially the last two or three years of his administration I believe that he and I had a very good working relationship, and one of mutual trust. He gave me quite a series of sensitive assignments that involved political situations and meeting in the field with proponents of proposals that maybe were more political than they were anything. In fact, in the last years most of my time has been kind of trouble-shooting assignments for the Director of this sort, so I have a great affection still for George.

EVISON: Yes, me too. You were saying a little bit ago that we have a set of standards applicable to the development and management of historic and prehistoric areas, but go to almost any one of them and you find not little violations but even major violations of those principles. I wonder if, whether you would name the area or not, - you wouldn't get on here something about what the character of those violations is.

UTLEY: Well, sure. I remember how outraged I was when the Midwest Region slapped a parking lot down on top of Reno Hill,

right on the battle line of Reno Hill, in Custer Battlefield. We paved the Cumberland Road through Cumberland Gap. A superintendent did it one time.

Right now I am carrying on warfare with one of the Regions which wants to adaptively restore a historic house of the first order of significance as a residence. Now this particular house was added to the area because it is one of very few - almost a handful - of 17th century houses still extant in the United States, and we acquired it - the Congress authorized it - because of that character. Our policy says that historic buildings of the first order of significance shall NOT be adaptively restored. The Region and the Park has every intention of restoring it as a residence, The policy is there, the standard is there, the legislative history is there. The Congress said, "This is the reason we are going to give it to you, so you can preserve it as a 17th century house."

This is the kind of thing we face, and we do not have the muscle here organizationally to enforce this kind of thing, except through the Director. There is no means by which we automatically will know of it. When we discover these things it is purely by chance.

EVISON: And I would suppose often too late.

UTLEY: Often too late, that is right. Right now our historical area policies very clearly and specifically set forth the conditions under which we will program reconstruction - that is, building from the ground up something that was there once that has vanished altogether.

In the program right now for the Bicentennial there is ten million dollars worth of reconstructions, and I don't expect more than one million of that could be justified under those criteria. And it is especially lamentable when the surviving historic structures and resources of the System are falling down around our ears; when the cupola on the Hampton House up here near Baltimore is being held up by nothing more than accumulated layers of paint - two centuries of paint is holding up the cupola. The wood has rotted away from it. And yet we are reconstructing earthworks at Saratoga and Yorktown. The Augustus Saint Gaudens Home - Augustus Saint Gaudens, the sculptor - which was brought into the Park Service in 1964 or thereabouts, is literally rotting down around us, so much so that the Foundation that had custody of it and from which we obtained it, was so alarmed at the inaction of the National Park Service at

responding to this crisis that it put up the money to do the necessary repairs, and they hired a competent architect, who then got sick but the work went on and it was improperly done. And Saint Gaudens is administered by the same superintendent who is programming millions of dollars of reconstruction for Saratoga Battlefield.

EVISON: And wanting to do something with the Schyuler House that he shouldn't, by any chance?

UTLEY: I can't cite that now. It has been done for some time now. But this is the kind of thing that is happening all too frequently, around the Park System, and it is indicative of the need for a basic scrutiny and soul-searching examination: Number one - of whether this agency wants to have the responsibility of administering the historical areas, and two, if so, what it has to do in order properly to carry out those responsibilities.

But the Service has never, never been willing to make the commitment in terms of proportionate resources in personnel and money, budget authority, and so forth, proportionate to the total that are demanded by the historical areas.

Two thirds of the units of the National Park System are in

the historical area category - 180. There are 299 areas in the National Park System. That is a pretty large share of the responsibility of the National Park Service, especially if you add on top all of this external responsibility.

It simply has been a judgment that needed making for the last forty years, but the Park Service has never been able to come to grips with it. It did better in the late 30's than ever. Demaray adhered to the counsel of his historical advisors, and in violation or defiance of most management precepts, permitted a connection between the Washington Office Historical Branch and the Park Historian. We couldn't begin now to communicate with the Park Historian from this office. We have got to go through the Regional Director and the superintendent before we can get to him. But they had monthly reports then; the historian wrote to the Chief Historian, - the Park Historian - so they knew what was going on and when something was going on that shouldn't, and they were able to bring about a correction.

Of course, it was a smaller Park System then.

EVISON: I would suppose that even if you got this separation and adequate set-up for it, and were able to get away from having the work go through the kind of Regional Director and

Regional Office that you do now, you would probably still have your Regional Offices?

UTLEY: Oh, yes, and I am not advocating that kind of direct relationship but what I am advocating is that there be a strong Assistant Directorate for History here; that there be a strong one in the Region, with a management official, an Associate Director, - sitting right by the Regional Director for this function, leading down to the parks to make it responsible and accountable and to insure that the standards and policies are enforced.

EVISON: One thing that occurs to me immediately. You were talking a while ago about the Fort Yellowstone situation. Now, there is a case where you don't have a historical area but a very important historical feature in what is predominantly a natural area. So whatever kind of organization you had would always have to be cutting across lines.

UTLEY: I would not, if we were to do this properly, use the terminology, really, of an Associate Director for National Historical Areas. I would say, "An Associate Director for Historic Resources."

The red book - the policy - the administrative policy now is

for Historical Areas. We are going to make that the Administrative Policy for Historical Resources. And the way, you see, we have rationalized this thing now the President has said to every agency, "You put on the National Register and take care of everything that meets the National Register criteria."

If the Commandant at Fort Sill has got to do that, the superintendent at Yellowstone damn sure does too, whether he runs a natural area or not. The Commandant at Fort Sill can say, "I am running a training installation program for soldiers." But the President has said I have got to take care of Fort Sill. The President has said that Jack Anderson has got to take care of Fort Yellowstone. This is unfair to Jack Anderson, because he is putting Fort Yellowstone on the National Register but there are others we are arguing with him about and other superintendents we are arguing with.

But here is how the connection should go: "The land classification plan in the master plan, Class 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6: Class 6 is Historical and Cultural, and everything in a park that meets the criteria of the National Register needs - Number 1 to go into the National Register and Number 2 to go

into the Class 6 category in the Master Plan. Everything in the National Register is subject to the protective features of the National Historic Preservation Act, but everything that is Class 6 by Internal National Park Service fiat is supposed to be administered according to those historical area policies, so this makes a lot of sense to connect our internal system with the external system. But you see the crucial step in this is to make the superintendents nominate those properties into the National Register, because they can't be either until you get them into the Register. And all too many are simply substituting a management decision that they don't want to put a given property into the Register for a determination of what meets the criteria.

We are not the only agency doing this kind of thing. It is only natural for a manager concerned with other things not to want to trouble himself with considerations that seem beyond his immediate job.

EVISON: Suppose you, as chief historian, know that there is a Fort Yellowstone which the superintendent is not recommending for historical area status (both speaking: not understandable) - because he doesn't do it?

UTLEY: This is the adversary relationship with myself that I was talking to you about a while ago. I am not Chief Historian any more. I preside over this whole office now, and my people in the Register here who are concerned with the National Register - we have got one-half million dollars in my office to carry out the provisions of that Executive Order. So I have got people there who are figuratively cracking the whip on other government agencies. These people are talking to me about the failure of the National Park Service to get these things on the Register. I am turning around and trying, without the authority to do so, to make Len Volz and Jack Anderson do what they are supposed to do, at the same time that as their representative in effect I am trying to explain to these external affairs people why it isn't being done properly, you see. And there ought to be someone over there arguing with me, if I am going to defend the Regional Directors and superintendents, or I ought to be over there arguing with someone over here who is defending the Regional Directors and superintendents.

EVISON: You need two chairs and two hats, don't you?

UTLEY: That is right, and they don't both fit at the same time. It is interesting, and I think the problem is increasingly

recognized, at least on this level. I must say I don't see any great insight in the Regional Offices on this problem or on the problem I have outlined of the proper management of the historic resources of the System.

It is becoming ever more serious, because Secretary Morton has become personally concerned over the historic structures of the National Park System, and he has wagged his finger in Ernest Connally's face and Director Walker's face, and said: "As you go along with all of these frothy Bicentennial programs are you neglecting other resources that don't happen to have that Bicentennial label on them? What are the structural resources of the National Park System?"

Well, we have had authorized and required ever since these historical area policies were published in 1968, an instrument that we call "The List of Classified Structures." This is supposed to be an inventory of every historic structure in the National Park System and what is supposed to be done to it - preservation, restoration, adaptive restoration, what have you, and how much it will cost. But the building of that instrument depends upon the field, depends upon the Regions making the parks do it, and getting the material to us. We have hooked that process to the National Register process, that the Regional Directors in the field are respon-

responsible for nominations, and at the same time they nominate to the Register they tell us what is on the list of classified structures. But the Secretary of the Interior wants to know what are your historic structures and what it will cost to put them in proper shape.

You would think that is something that the National Park Service ought to be able to tell him, just by looking at the records. We don't know what the Historic Structures of the National Park Service are, still less do we know the magnitude of the job to get them into proper shape. We have been in this business since 1935. Wouldn't you suppose that after almost forty years we would be able to say what are the historic structures of the System and how much it will cost to put them in a maintenance condition?

EVISON: Also, I would suppose some priorities there.

UTLEY: That is right. That is what the Secretary is saying.

He is saying, "I am not sure that your priorities are in the right shape." Just what I said to you a while ago: If you are reconstructing the battle lines at Saratoga, and you are letting Hampton fall down because there is no wood left in the cupola, it is all right.

So you see this just comes back to what feelings have been running through my remarks; that the Service has either got to let it go or else it has got to take it seriously.

EVISON: Fish or cut bait.

UTLEY: That is right. And I am willing to go either way.

And I should emphasize that I have been with the National Park Service for a long time. I have roots that go back in it to your time, and most of the top management of the Service now cannot say that. There are not very many of us in Washington who can claim service that goes back so far as I can, and I have a loyalty and a real regard and an affection for this Service that not all of them up here have, and so what I have been saying should not be taken as in any way an expression of disloyalty to what is really one of the very finest Federal agencies, as we all recognize.

EVISON: I couldn't help thinking as I listened to you; here the Park Service has a brand new Director with a whole set of impressions still to be made on his intellect, and I think one of the healthiest things he could do would be either to listen to these tapes or take an evening to read this transcription. And I am strongly minded when I send this up to

Harpers Ferry to say, "Give this priority," because I think you have possibly done a very great service to the Service by coming up here and talking - taking your back hair down this way.

UTLEY: I have had some opportunities to talk with the new Director too, not at such length; and I agree with you. I would like to have him hear these words, and I have no objection to his hearing them.

EVISON: Then you don't object to my making a move in that direction?

UTLEY: No, go right ahead. There is nothing in there that hasn't been communicated to him one way or another. You know, it gets lost - I am sure, in all the other perceptions he is picking up and trying to absorb at one time. But even though I may have seemed critical of some of our field people, this doesn't mean that I don't hold them in great affection. I have worked with them for many years. They simply have an orientation that is different from mine; but institutionally there is nothing in there that I have not advocated for years, or at least felt for years and don't believe that the Park Service should address itself to.

And I think it can all be summed up as you just did: It is time for the Service to fish or cut bait. And I will go in either direction.

EVISON: Well, Bob, we have a little more tape left here, but we are close to the end of what to me has been one of the most fascinating and most constructive interviews that I have made, and I am talking about more than three hundred of them.

UTLEY: Well, I am delighted that it has been worth your time.

EVISON: But maybe this is a good time to call it an afternoon.

UTLEY: Well, we had better, because I can tell you that my in-box down there fills up to overflowing in an hour's time, and we have been at it for two-and-a-half hours.

EVISON: A perfectly wonderful two-and-a-half hours, and I am immensely obligated to you for it.

UTLEY: You are very welcome. I am delighted to have talked to you.

(End of interview)