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THE ROLE OF THE INDIAN IN NATIONAL EXPANSION

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FIELD CURATOR, MUSEUM DIVISION
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

PART I
THE BACKGROUND OF ABORIGINAL AMERICA

PART II
REMOVING THE INDIAN BARRIER

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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

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FOREWORD

We may view the role of the Indian in the story of our national expansion from two significant angles:

First, we may observe the cultures of the North Americans, as they were at the time of first white contact, in an effort to discern the peculiar traits of these aboriginal cultures (uses of materials, habits of thought and action, etc.) which later helped to influence the course of national expansion.

Second, we may observe the actual contacts between the Indians and whites during the historic period (trading, missions, treaties, wars, etc.) in an effort to discern the part these contacts played in the expansion story.

Following this two-fold division, our outline of the role of the Indian in the expansion story will be treated in two sections: Part I, The Background of Aboriginal America. Part II, Removing the Indian Barrier.

THE ROLE OF THE INDIAN IN NATIONAL EXPANSION

PART I

THE BACKGROUND OF ABORIGINAL AMERICA

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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THE ROLE OF THE INDIAN IN THE EXPANSION STORY

PART I

THE BACKGROUND OF ABORIGINAL AMERICA

Introduction

The word "Indian". This word seems first to have been applied to the aborigines of the New World by Columbus, in a letter dated February 1493, in which he wrote of the "Indios" he had with him. It was the general belief of the day that Columbus, in his fateful voyage of 1492, had reached India. The term, in spite of its misleading connotation, has been taken over and preserved in the languages of the civilized world. The term has been perpetuated and sanctified through use. In spite of periodic efforts of sticklers for terminology to substitute a less ambiguous term, their proposals have never received wide recognition. Today the word "Indian" is as commonly employed as ever. Usually it is qualified to distinguish these people from natives of India through the use of the term "American Indian", and, for those native peoples North of Mexico, "North American Indian".

The Origin and Antiquity of the Indian. We need not concern ourselves with the details of the controversy that has been waged by white men for centuries over the origin and antiquity of the Indian. It is sufficient to state that today the theory of Asiatic origin of the Indian is quite generally held by leading anthropologists, as is the hypothesis that these people reached the New World via Alaska and/or the Eleuthian Islands through movements of relatively small, already culturally diverse, groups of Stone Age hunting peoples. There is no general agreement as to the date when this movement began, although a number of conservative students are wont to allow as much as 20,000 years for the antiquity of the Indian in the New World. It is significant, from our viewpoint, that the Indian was no newcomer to the western hemisphere, that he had dwelt in and perfected his adaptation to the New World environment for thousands of years before the time of Columbus.

The Unity of the Indian Race. Despite marked differences among the Indians in physiognomy, color, stature, head form and other details of physique and general behavior, the physical anthropologist considers the American Indians, from the Arctic to Cape Horn, as members of one race, a race more closely related to the yellow peoples of Asia than to the whites of Europe.

The Diversity of Indian Language and Culture. More significant, from our point of view, than the racial unity of the Indians, was the great diversity of language and culture that existed in the New World when it was discovered by white men. The Indians possessed no common language, no universal, standardized method of making a living. The diversity of language, probably of pre-American origin, was further accentuated by centuries of development of local groups in relative isolation. The wide range of geographical environment, in the New World, with its areas of forests, mountains, plains and deserts, its unevenly distributed types of

plant and animal life, its wide range in temperature, was an important factor in the development of diverse cultures. Each type of environment presented its peculiar problems to the Indians who sought a solution of the problem of making a living there. Isolated from the Old World, and in many instances relatively isolated from others of their own race, the Indians exercised their native ingenuity in the solution of these problems. As a result, there developed in the New World varieties of ways of making a living, which were peculiarly adapted to the varied environmental conditions of the western hemisphere and which differed essentially from the cultures of the Old World.

When the white man arrived in the New World he discovered there cultures which were characteristically American. In the years that followed he found that Indian ingenuity had devised many solutions to the problem of living in America which he could profitably borrow for his own use. Some of the traits borrowed from the Indians were only of temporary value to the white man, useful only during the period in which he gained a foothold in the New World and explored its vast area. Others have been of permanent value to American civilization as we know it today.

At the same time the white man found certain elements lacking in the cultures of the Indians which were present in contemporary European culture. His possession of these elements aided him to secure the friendship of the aboriginal occupants of the coveted lands of the New World, to combat any resistance on their part, and eventually to gain possession of the whole of North America.

Thus we see that an understanding of the nature of aboriginal North America is of value as a background for the study of national expansion. The following outline is an attempt to present those aspects of the aboriginal cultures which seem to be of most significance to the expansion story.

The Population of Aboriginal America

The most reliable data available on aboriginal population are based upon careful estimates of Indian population during the early period of white contact with each tribe, and presumably before the native population had suffered from interracial warfare and the white man's diseases:

The Aboriginal Population of the New World: It has been estimated that the aboriginal population of the entire New World may have reached 50,000,000 by the year 1200 A. D. (Spinden, 1928). The estimator assumed that there was a rapid decline in population after this date. The population of the New World prior to white contact has been roughly estimated at 8,400,000, with an added explanatory statement to the effect that this means somewhere between seven and ten million. (Kroeber, 1934).

The Aboriginal Population North of Mexico: Roughly 7/8 of the population of the New World prior to white contact was located south of the present United States, the greater part of this number being within the

areas of the so-called "high cultures" extending from Mexico southward through Peru. The aboriginal population North of Mexico has been estimated at 1,152,950 (Mooney, 1928). It has been assumed by many students that this estimate is somewhat too high. A reduction of this number to a total of 1,025,950 (based largely upon the adaptation of a lower figure for the population of the California tribes) has been suggested. (Kroeber, 1934).

The Aboriginal Population of the United States and Alaska: Mooney estimated the population of the area now included in the United States at 849,000. (Mooney, 1928). Kroeber's suggested reduction of Mooney's estimates would reduce this total to about 700,000. Mooney estimated the aboriginal population of Alaska at 73,000.

The Density of Population North of Mexico: The average density of population North of Mexico has been reckoned at 5.35 persons per 100 km. (Kroeber, 1934). This is roughly 5 persons per township (36 square miles), or one person per 4,500 acres. The population, however, was not equally distributed throughout the area. The greatest density (75.7 per km.) appeared in the limited Pueblo areas of the Southwest; next greatest was in California (43.3 per 100 km.). The agricultural area from the Mississippi Valley eastward, had approximately 9 persons; or 2 families per township. With a few exceptions the coastal populations in general were much greater than those of the interior. (Note: see map of relative population density North of Mexico in Kroeber, 1934, page 5).

Significance: The Indian population of North America, and of the United States in particular, when the white men arrived on our shores was much smaller than people commonly imagine it to have been. Actually the number of whites eclipsed that of Indians in the Colonies of the eastern seaboard sometimes between 1660 and 1700. Even before 1750 there were more whites in the Colonies than there had been Indians in the whole of the area of the present United States before the white man arrived. From the time of white settlement Indian population continued to decrease, largely as the result of losses through warfare and from diseases. By 1860 the Indian population represented less than 1% of the total population of the United States.

In the light of these figures the futility of Indian opposition to white expansion in the United States, after the period of the colonial wars, appears obvious. At best this opposition could but temporarily retard the westward movement.

It is significant, also, that the areas first penetrated by the European explorers and settlers were those of relatively dense Indian population -- the Pueblos, the Eastern coast, and the Pacific coast.

Aboriginal Languages of North America

The Great Number of Languages Spoken: Early efforts to classify the languages of the Indians North of Mexico resulted in the distinction of some

56 native linguistic stocks. (Note: see Powell's map in the back cover of Hodge, Pt. I). More recently linguists have suggested the reduction of this number to some 6 or more primary stocks (Sapir, 1929). Significant as these facts may be from the view point of the history of language, it is more significant from the point of view of practical communication to point out that approximately 600 native dialects were spoken by the Indians of this region, and that these dialectic differences within the various stocks made it impossible for many groups using the same basic language to understand one another. Thus, for instance, though a majority of the tribes of the central Plains spoke dialects of the Siouan language, many of the tribes were unable to converse freely with one another. The Teton Dakota and the Crow, occupying geographically contiguous areas, could not understand one another's language.

Significance: Differences in language were obstacles to intertribal friendship and cooperation in aboriginal America, and helped to encourage misunderstanding and enmity. Communication between peoples of different tongues was somewhat facilitated by the use of signs, especially in the Plains where an elaborate sign language was employed. Again the adoption of one of their languages as a sort of "court language" by a group of geographically contiguous tribes was another solution of this difficulty.

To the invading white man, the fact that Indian languages all differed essentially from European ones, and that they differed among themselves, was a great handicap to securing friendship with the Indians, and obtaining a knowledge of the new country. Language difficulties were the cause of frequent errors on the part of explorers. The trader attempted to overcome these difficulties by gaining a knowledge of the sign language or the development of strange trade languages, which were compromises between Indian and European languages, such as the Chinook jargon of the north Pacific slope and the Mobilian trade language of the Southeast.

Our Language Heritage from the Indian: Many Indian words were taken over by white settlers and have been retained in the English language to this day. The Indian's contribution to our geographical terminology is evident in all sections of the country. Twenty-eight states, numerous smaller political units, towns, rivers, lakes, mountain ranges, individual summits, and other landmarks still retain names of Indian origin. In addition, it has been estimated that at least 300 other words (names of plants, animals, foods and other materials, etc.) have been contributed to our American English by the various Indian languages spoken North of Mexico. (Chamberlain, 1904).

The Unit of Settlement in Aboriginal North America

Early white writers were accustomed to speak of the "Nations of Indians" in America, but strictly speaking, there were no nations among the Indians living North of Mexico.

The Village and the Tribe: The unit of settlement among the Indians North of Mexico was the village community. These communities were rarely large, usually having less than 50 adults each. These villages were either politically independent, or loosely joined with other communities of similar language as a tribe. When organized as a tribe the total number of persons rarely reached as many as 2,000. A conservative guess of the number of tribes in Canada and the United States might be 1,200. The communities would number several times that many. (Wissler, 1933).

Significance: This lack of political unity among the Indians North of Mexico was a great handicap to the Indians in dealing with the invading white man. It prevented the presentation of a united front against the advance of white settlement. The lack of traditions of unified action made even the efforts of such leaders as Pontiac, Tecumseh, and Red Cloud ineffectual over extended periods of time.

The Location of Tribes and Villages North of Mexico

The impact of white settlement upon the Indian tribes resulted in many changes of location on the part of village and tribal groups. The majority of maps showing the location of Indian tribes North of Mexico portray the situation after a considerable number of these changes had been made. However, the Indian settlements were not static under aboriginal conditions. Not only the relatively nomadic hunting peoples but also some of the agriculturalists moved their settlements to more favorable locations in response to the pressure of more powerful tribes during the period of early white contact. These movements make it difficult to show the location of the many tribes and communities at an early date. Perhaps the nearest approximation to a map showing the location of the principal tribes in pre-white times, is the map appearing in Charles O. Paullin, Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States, Plate 33, entitled "Indian Tribes and Linguistic Stocks, 1650". As a rule the location of the individual tribes at various times within the historic period can best be ascertained by reference to the articles in the Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico.

Aboriginal Agriculture

Certainly one of the greatest contributions of the American Indian to world civilization was his successful domestication of a large number of economically valuable plants, nearly all of which were unknown to the Old World prior to the discovery of America. Some of these plants were so early taken to the Old World that their true American origin is not recognized by the average man. Now plants of American origin may be found under cultivation in many parts of the Old World. In the New World itself a number of plants grown under aboriginal conditions outside the limits of the present United States (i. e. in Mexico, Central and/or South America) are now cultivated in this country. It has been estimated that four-sevenths of the total agricultural production of the United States, measured in farm values consists of economic plants, domesticated by the Indians and taken over by the white man. (Spinden, 1917).

The Distribution of Agriculture in Aboriginal North America: Agriculture in American North of Mexico was mainly confined to two large areas (1) from the Mississippi Valley eastward to the Atlantic Coast, from Florida to the 50th parallel of north latitude (2) in the Southwest, in the present States of Arizona and New Mexico and adjacent areas. It was practised also by the village tribes living along the river valleys of the Plains. In North America the distribution of agriculture was almost the same as the distribution of the aboriginal cultivation of maize. (Note: See maps figs. 1 and 3, in Wissler, 1938).

The Area Under Cultivation: In aboriginal North America the cultivation of limited areas was the rule. It has been estimated that the total area cultivated by the Indians of the eastern agricultural region under aboriginal conditions was one-third of a million acres, an area equal to less than half that of our smallest State, Rhode Island. Fully 99% of the area suitable for agriculture was not cultivated. In the Southwest the Indians cultivated a total of approximately one or two hundred square miles in an area of two or three hundred thousand square miles. The ratio of cultivated to uncultivated land was about the same as in the East, but in the Southwest most of the uncultivated area was not farmable. (Kroeber, 1934).

Maize -- Its Significance: The cultivated crop of most economic value to the aborigines, and of most importance in the later history of our country is maize, or Indian corn. This plant was so thoroughly domesticated by the Indians that it will not propagate in its wild state. It was grown in moist climates by hilling up the soil, in arid places by deep planting. A number of varieties of maize were developed to suit varied conditions of cultivation. In the Southwest the growth of maize was facilitated by irrigation.

The entire material complex of maize culture developed by the Indians was taken over by white settlers. The white man's one important contribution was the substitution of the mill for the mortar in preparation of food from maize. The importance of maize to the early white settlers is reflected in Cyrus Thomas' belief that without maize the white settlement of America would have been delayed a century. Today the distribution of maize cultivation in the United States is about the same as it was in prehistoric times. Corn is still the most important crop in the United States. It is grown by more farmers, occupies more acres, and has a greater total value than any other farm crop. About two-thirds of the farmers grew corn in 1925. But, whereas maize was grown by the Indians principally as food for human beings, less than 10% of the modern crop is eaten by humans.

Other plants cultivated for food: In addition to maize, the principal plants cultivated for food by the Indians North of Mexico were beans, squashes, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, and the sunflower. Other food plants cultivated by the American Indians before white contact were: Potatoes ("Irish"), tomatoes, lima beans, peppers, cacao, pineapples, nispero, Barbados cherry, strawberries, persimmons, papaws, guava, arracacha, peanuts, oca, cashew nut, jocote, star apples, Paraquary tea, alligator pear, chirimayo, sour sop, sweet sop, custard apple and cassava. Most of these, however, were not cultivated by the Indians living North of Mexico.

(Spinden, 1928). (Note: for specific references to the various cultivated plants of the Indians North of Mexico see Yanovski, 1936).

Tobacco -- Its Significance: Of the other cultivated plants, the one nearest to maize in the wideness of its range, and in economic importance to the white man is tobacco. Several varieties of tobacco were cultivated by the Indians North of Mexico, in different localities. The various uses to which tobacco is now put by white men were all known to the Indians -- smoking (in pipes, cigars, or cigarettes), chewing and snuffing, although North of Mexico smoking in pipes was most wide spread, and the use of the cigarette and customs of chewing and snuffing tobacco had more limited distributions. Cigar smoking was not practised in North America. (Note: See map fig. 3, Wissler, 1938. For a comprehensive study of the cultivation and use of tobacco among the Indians see West, 1934).

In the case of tobacco, as in that of maize, the whites took over from the Indians the essential parts of the complex. From America the "tobacco habit" spread round the world. At an early date tobacco became one of the most important products of the Southern Colonies. Today tobacco is one of the seven most valuable crops raised in the United States. In 1917 tobacco products manufactured in this country were valued at nearly a half billion dollars.

Cotton -- Its Significance: Cotton was grown in the New World before the time of Columbus, but was also known in the Old World at that time. In America the greater part of the cotton grown by the Indians was raised outside the mainland of North America. North of Mexico its cultivation was probably confined to the Southwest. It was probably not grown in the area we now know as the great "cotton belt."

Thus, cotton was not a native plant, but an introduced one in the Southeast. The growth of cotton in the Colonies was of little economic importance for nearly two centuries after white settlers began to grow corn and tobacco. No cotton was shipped to England until late in the eighteenth century. The beginning of the modern history of cotton in the United States dates from the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, during the first decade of our national existence. The development of cotton cultivation in the Gulf States, the heart of our present cotton belt, did not take place until several decades later.

Aboriginal Use of Wild Plants

Wild Plants as Food: In the agricultural areas of aboriginal North America wild plant foods were used to supplement foods prepared from cultivated plants in the Indian diet. In the nonagricultural areas wild plant foods were of even greater importance. A large variety of fruits, nuts, seeds and roots were gathered. (Note: see Yanovski, 1936 or list of food plants and their uses by the Indians of the different localities). The areas in which wild plant foods were of greatest importance in the diet

were (1) California, where wild seeds, especially the acorn were extensively used (2) the western Great Lakes where wild rice was an important part of the diet (3) the Northwestern Plateau where roots (especially the camas) and berries were important foods. On the North Pacific Coast and in the interior of what is now Canada berries were extensively used to augment a diet of fish and animal foods.

It is significant that early white explorers and settlers first contacted the Indians of agricultural areas. Thus wild foods played a minor part in their diet. But explorers and traders in other areas quickly learned to adapt the Indian wild foods to their own use.

Maple Sugar -- Its Significance: In some of the eastern States and parts of Canada the Indians developed a thriving industry in the production of maple sugar and sirup. The methods of production were developed under aboriginal conditions. White settlers in the region were not long to adopt Indian methods of maple sugar manufacture. In Colonial North America this sugar was of genuine importance as a sweetening.

Medicinal Use of Wild Plants: The Indians made extensive use of the roots, twigs, leaves or bark of plants as medicines -- as cathartics and emetics, or in some cases as diaphoretics, diuretics, cough medicines, etc. Some of these plant "medicines" were mere superstitions but others were remarkably effective remedies.

The Indian discovered the medicinal properties of such plants as tobacco, cinchona (quinine), cascara sagrada, cocaine, ipecac, and sarsaparilla, all of which have been taken over by the white man. Indian remedies were popular among the early white settlers, and certain remedies had a wide acceptance among the colonists. Even today the Indian medicine man is able to make a living among the less sophisticated whites, and his primitive concoctions form the basis for a thriving trade in patent medicines.

Aboriginal Hunting and Fishing

In aboriginal North America all the tribes were to more or less extent hunting peoples. Even among the agricultural peoples animal foods formed an important and necessary part of the diet. Fishing was of varying importance in the different sections of the country. In general animal foods were of greater importance in the northern part of the continent; vegetable foods were more important in the southern portion.

Hunting -- Its Significance: Game was abundant in aboriginal North America. The principal animals taken for food were the buffalo (the staple of the Plains tribes), the caribou (of great importance in the Canadian interior), the deer (throughout its wide range), moose (in northeastern United States and Canada), and the rabbit (principally in the Great Basin). This by no means exhausts the list of animals secured in the chase. The principal weapon used in the hunt at the beginning of the historic period was the bow

and arrow, though the lance and rabbit stick were also employed. Through careful observation of the habits of the various animals the Indian learned valuable tricks in stalking and securing game. He developed the use of snares, traps and pitfalls, of the drive, the burning of grass, and other methods of communal hunting.

The early white explorers, trappers, and settlers learned much from the Indian in the stalking of game. The Indian profited through the acquisition of the white man's firearms, his steel trap and horse. The Indian's success as a hunter made the fur trade a profitable business, and the white man continued to rely upon the Indian for the greater part of his beaver, fox, sea otter or buffalo pelts.

Fishing -- Its Significance: Fish were abundant in many sections of North America in pre-white times. Sea food was an important element in the diet of the natives of both the Atlantic and the Pacific Coasts, and of the sub-arctic regions. In the Plains and the Southwest fish were scarce and either served as a minor factor in the native diet or were not eaten at all. In both areas there were tribes who considered the eating of fish taboo. Most dependant upon fish for their subsistence were the tribes of the North Pacific Coast for whom the salmon was the principal food. Among the Eskimo fish and sea animals were relied upon for a major part of their food supply. On the North Atlantic Coast the cod was of importance to the Indians, but fishing did not assume quite the importance there that it did on the North Pacific Coast. The number of varieties of fish eaten by the Indians was great. An early writer listed 200 kinds of fish to be caught off the New England shores alone. Fish were caught with the hook and line, the harpoon, or net most commonly, but other methods were also employed.

It is of significance to the expansion story that fishing was the first important commercial enterprise of Europeans in North America. Operations off Newfoundland were begun before 1500 and the extension of these operations up the St. Lawrence and along the coast resulted in many significant discoveries. However, the methods used were of European, not Indian origin. The profitable technique of "dry fishing" has been credited to the Dutch.

On the frontier in later years the whites sometimes adopted Indian methods of fishing in streams and rivers. On the North Pacific Coast the commercial possibilities of the salmon fisheries were long neglected by the whites. In general it may be said that the Indian fisherman did not influence the white man's activities as significantly as did the native hunter.

Aboriginal Clothing in North America

The exact form of clothing worn by the Indians as well as the type of ornaments, hairdress, etc., differed greatly in detail according to conditions of climate, available materials, tribal preferences, etc.

The three Basic Varieties of Clothing: Three basic types of clothing prevailed (1) tailored clothing made of skins (2) clothing of textiles

(cotton), and (3) clothing characterized by the use of an outer robe of unshaped animal hide -- buffalo, deer or moose. (Note: see map fig. 19 of Wissler, 1938). In the area of the present United States the third type of clothing was most widely used. In this area tanned deerskin was most commonly employed for under clothing. The most widely used man's costume consisted of a breechcloth, leggings, and moccasins all of skin, with a skin shirt sometimes added. Over these in cold weather a skin robe was worn with the hair side in. The most widely used woman's clothing consisted of moccasins and either a long shirt of deerskin or a skirt of the same material. The most widespread articles of clothing worn by both sexes were the outer robe, and moccasins (which were of several different sub-types.) (See map. fig. 20, Wissler, 1938).

White Man's Employment of the Deerskin Costume: The one type of Indian costume that strongly influenced white men's dress during the period of expansion was the deerskin outfit consisting of a shirt, leggings, moccasins and breechcloth. It was taken over by the white trapper and trader, and the early settler of the trans-Allegheny frontier, with little or no alteration of the basic Indian pattern, because it was most admirably adapted to the conditions of wilderness life. Washington even recommended a modified form of this costume as uniform equipment for the Revolutionary soldier. Of this costume Warwick wrote, "It is the supreme example of dress being shaped by the conditions from which it sprang, and it is the one type of costume truly and uniquely American."

Indian Love of Adornment -- Its Significance: The Indian had almost a passion for the adornment of his clothes and person with ornaments. The kinds of ornaments used were many and varied in detail from section to section and tribe to tribe. Widespread was the painting of articles of clothing -- especially the skin robe or the cotton blanket. The decoration of clothing with porcupine quills was common east of the Rockies within the range of this animal. Other widespread forms of personal ornament were the painting or tattooing of the face and/or body, the wearing of shell beads, and pendants of various materials. Rare or striking ornaments were much in demand, and there is evidence that even before the advent of the white man trade in these coveted luxuries was carried on among the Indians.

It is only in the light of this background that the willingness with which the Indians parted with their furs, or entered into agreements with the colonists regarding land, etc., is understandable. The trinkets the whites offered in exchange -- glass beads, bits of colorful cloth, medals, articles of clothing, etc., had a real attraction to the Indian out of all proportion to their actual value. The value of these articles was enhanced by their initial rareness. As they became more common among the Indians their value declined rapidly.

Houses of the North America Indians

Variety of House Types -- Significance: Climate, available materials, food habits, family type, political organization and state of peace all served to influence the type of house used by the Indians. In aboriginal

America varying combinations of these factors encouraged the development of a wide variety of house types. Most widespread was the house of pole foundation covered with bark, mats, thatch or skins. In shape it was sometimes conical, sometimes dome shaped, rectangular or oval. The wigwam of the Eastern Algonkians, the long house of the Iroquois, the tipi of the typical Plains tribes, and the wickiup of the desert Paiute were all built on a pole foundation. However, there were numerous other types of habitation peculiarly adapted to their localities -- the plank house of the North Pacific Coast; the seasonal snow-house of the Eskimo; the earth lodge of varied forms used by certain Missouri Valley tribes, by the Navaho, and certain California and Interior Plateau tribes; the wattle-walled house of the Southeast, the pile dwelling of the Florida swamps, and the adobe Pueblo of the Southwest, etc. Many of the villages from the Mississippi Valley eastward in the forested area were fortified by palisades. Despite the wide variety of structures in use, however, the true log cabin was nowhere employed. Chimneys were not used, and the arch was unknown.

Of the forms of Indian architecture which most strongly influenced the white man three may be especially mentioned: (1) the adobe Pueblo, which has left its mark on the Spanish and American architecture of the Southwest and adjacent areas; (2) the bark or thatch covered wigwam, the main principals of which were commonly adopted by the first settlers of New England for their early, temporary dwellings; (3) the palisaded Indian village, an adaptation to the problem of defense against attack in the eastern forest areas, which was commonly employed by the white frontiersman for his primitive settlements and wilderness posts. The white man's improvement was the addition of the block-house. The sod house later used by the early settlers of the Plains has points in common with the Indian earth lodge, though the extent to which the whites may have been influenced by the primitive Indian dwelling in the adaptation of the sod house is difficult to ascertain. It is significant, however, that the most typical American frontier dwelling, the log cabin, was not of Indian but of Scandinavian origin.

Aboriginal Domestication of Animals

Limited Progress in this Direction: In the domestication of animals the North American Indians attained but little success prior to the appearance of the white man. Only the dog was domesticated throughout the whole continental area. The Pueblo Indians domesticated the turkey, and there is some evidence that fowl of various kinds were raised by some of the peoples of the Atlantic Coast. However, the large and important animals used for food -- the buffalo, deer, moose, caribou, and even rabbit, continued to run wild. They were nowhere domesticated.

Thus, the white man had little to learn from the North American Indian in the matter of the domestication of animals. The horse, pig, ass, goat, sheep, and cattle had long been domesticated in the Old World. Their introduction into the New World profoundly altered the way of life of many Indian tribes. In addition it made the reliance of the settlers on wild game less necessary.

Aboriginal Transportation and Travel in North America

Land Transportation -- Its Significance: Lacking both an animal he could ride, and a knowledge of the wheel the North American Indian traveled on land in most sections of the continent by foot and carried his burdens himself, usually on his back, with the aid of the tumpline. In the sub-artic the dog was used to pull burdens packed on the sledge; in the wooded portions of the Canadian interior the toboggan was used, drawn either by the dog or the Indian himself. In the Plains the travois was attached to the dog for the conveyance of burdens of no great weight. The snowshoe was useful in winter travel on foot. Thus, before the appearance of the white man travel by land was slow and laborious.

In the light of this background the eagerness with which the Indians took to the horse, especially in the Plains where transportation had been largely by foot, is understandable. The acquisition of the horse made these Indians more mobile, more able hunters and more fearful warriors. It is significant that the horse complex was taken over by the Indians with very minor alterations, and that the Indians soon became the equals if not the superiors of white horsemen.

In the exploration of North America by whites the horse was of great value from the time of Coronado and De Soto until recent times. It was most used in the exploration of the Southeast, the Plains, the Rockies (south of Canada), the Southwest, the Great Basin and much of California. In the early exploration of the northeastern United States and Canada, of the interior north of the Canadian border and of the North Pacific and Alaskan regions water transportation was more commonly employed.

Water Transportation -- Its Significance: In general, wherever water transportation was practicable in North America the Indians preferred it to land transportation. The Indians fashioned their boats from the best materials available, and developed several ingenious types of water craft that were admirably suited to geographical conditions in the areas in which they were used. Of these the Eskimo skin covered kayak and woman's boat, the birch bark canoe of the Canadian Interior and Great Lakes Region, and the dug-out, widely used on the Pacific Coast south of the Eskimo, and in the East below the area of birch bark, were most valuable. The skin covered bull-boat of the Plains and the California rush balsa are of less historic significance. Everywhere the paddle was the means of propulsion.

In the exploration and fur trade of practically all of Canada, of the Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley the birch bark canoe was an important factor. Its lightness made portages possible and its strength permitted the carrying of numbers of people and considerable equipment. For the early French fur traders operating from Montreal the canoe was the method of transportation; this was also true to a large extent of the later great companies -- the Hudson Bay Company and the North West Company. It is of interest to note that Alexander Mackenzie made the first recorded crossing of the continent in 1793 by canoe.

Routes of Travel

Through personal observation and the statements of his fellow tribesman or visitors from a distance the native Indian obtained a practical knowledge of the geography of the region surrounding his village that was of use to him in hunting and fishing, in warfare or in trade. The shortest or most practical routes between settlements were known, and such short cuts as might be afforded by mountain passes, fording places, portages, etc., were employed in Indian travel.

The fact that the Indian was acquainted with the geography of his section was of great importance to early white explorers, traders, and settlers. It made the use of Indian guides a common occurrence. Some of these Indians traveled with the whites for great distances -- Iroquois, for instance, accompanied the fur traders as far as northwestern Canada.

Two types of routes of travel developed by the Indians prior to white contact are of peculiar interest:

The Trail - Its Significance: The forested area east of the Mississippi and especially south of the Great Lakes was honeycombed with Indian trails connecting villages, and leading to quarries, salt licks, etc. In the forest areas these trails were narrow defiles through which travelers proceeded afoot "Indian file." On the plains they became wide roads beaten down by the passage of travois poles and large parties.

These Indian trails first followed by the explorer, the trapper and trader, were later used by the missionary, the hunter, the soldier and the colonist. Many of those in eastern United States have evolved from Indian trail to pack trail, to wagon road, to modern highway.

The Portage Path -- Its Significance: In the region where the light birch bark canoe was used the Indians were able to extend their water travels over vast areas by the use of periodic portages, or short land connections between lakes, rivers, and streams.

Indian knowledge of these portages was a great aid to early exploration and trade in Canada, in the Great Lakes country and the Mississippi Valley. (For a map of principal portages, see Hulbert, 1905).

Trade Among the North American Indians

The Extent of Trade in Aboriginal North America: The fact that useful natural resources were not evenly distributed over the continent but occurred in localized geographical regions encouraged trade in those materials for which there was a widespread demand. There is archeological evidence that such materials as copper, obsidian, mica, flint, red pipestone, galena, various sea shells, etc., were traded over broad areas in aboriginal America. Indeed, some of these materials have been found more than a thousand miles from their nearest possible sources of origin. During the period of early white contact the Indians also traded more perishable articles -- food,

cotton, materials for basket making, animal pelts, etc., among themselves. It is reasonable to suppose such trade was carried on under aboriginal conditions. Thus, the Indians were accustomed to the exchange of materials between groups long before the whites arrived. The whites found among them many shrewd and experienced traders, and a general willingness to barter the wealth of their country for the novelties offered by Europeans.

Media of Exchange -- Its Significance: Trade was conducted by barter. However, in the various sections some specific articles seem to have been employed as standards of value which, to a degree, took the place of money. Two standards of value known to aboriginal America which retained most importance in the historic period were (1) shell beads, used as standards of value on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. These beads, carried on strings, and known as wampum to the colonists of New England and the Middle Colonies, and as roanoke farther south, had definite values, and (2) the pelts of wild animals taken in the chase -- beaver, deer, fox, otter, buffalo, etc.

In New England and New York wampum was used as legal tender in the 17th century until the market became glutted with inferior beads made by the whites. However, wampum survived as legal tender in Massachusetts until 1661 and in New York it was employed as late as 1693. The concept of the pelt as a standard of value was a fortunate one for the white fur trader. Pelts of the beaver remained as standards of value on the frontier until the mid-19th century. In the Southeast the deer skin was the standard of value, on the Pacific Coast the sea-otter pelt, and on the Plains, especially after the decline in the beaver trade, the buffalo hide. After the introduction of the horse this animal was commonly considered the standard measure of value among the Indians of the Plains.

Aboriginal North American Industry

It is customary to classify the industrial progress of peoples according to the degree of advancement made in the use of basic materials for tools, weapons and utensils. In such a classification the Indians of North America would find a place as:

A Stone Age People: Among the North American Indians both chipping and polishing were in simultaneous use in the manufacture of stone implements. Thus, though they were familiar with so-called Neolithic stone technique, they still retained the elements of a Palaeolithic industry. Most typical stone implements made by the Indians were: arrow-heads, lance-heads, knives, scrapers, drills. The stone axe and stone pipe were widely used. A great variety of stone materials of various degrees of hardness were employed. Extensive quarrying operations were carried on at many sites in different parts of the continent. Some of the best known quarries are those at Washington, D. C.; Flint Ridge, Ohio; Mill Creek, Illinois; Hot Springs, Arkansas; Pipestone, Minnesota; and the so-called "Spanish Diggings" of southeastern Wyoming. At these quarries stone was obtained by the most primitive of methods.

Limited Use of Metal: Copper from the Lake Superior region was mined under aboriginal conditions, and hammered into shape for tools and ornaments. These copper objects were traded widely, especially in the region east of the Mississippi. However, the casting of metals was not practised in America North of Mexico. The vast resources of the continent in iron and precious metals remained virtually untapped by the Indians.

Significance: The appearance of Europeans in North America was the initial contact of the Indians with an iron using people, but it did not take the natives long to realize the superiority of iron tools and weapons over their stone ones. The universal demand of the Indians for iron, especially in the form of such practical implements as knives, war clubs, arrow-heads and firearms, served as a great stimulus to trade. At the same time it discouraged the continuance of the native lithic industry and the Indians, unable to make iron themselves, became more and more dependent upon the whites for their important implements.

The failure of early explorers, especially in the Southwest, to find knowledge of the use of precious metals among the natives was a bitter disappointment to them. It was not until three and a half centuries after the discovery of America that the rich mines of western North America were exploited. On the other hand, Indian knowledge of and use of the lead and copper mines of the middle west served as incentives for white miners. It is significant to note that the lead mines of the Mississippi Valley continued to be worked, to a large extent, by Indians during the colonial period.

Aboriginal Arts and Crafts

Relative Insignificance in the Expansion Story: The native North American Indian has achieved wide recognition among civilized peoples as an accomplished artist and craftsman. White men found pottery making (Note: see map, fig. 22 of Wissler, 1938), basket making (See map, fig. 14, Wissler, 1938), and various forms of primitive weaving (See map, fig. 17, Wissler, 1938) widespread in North America. However, these practical arts were of little significance in the expansion story. The collection of pots and baskets and other examples of native Indian arts and crafts has been a relatively recent interest among whites. Of more significance has been the native demand for glass beads which stimulated trade in the north-east and the Plains region, and the demand for sheep among the Navaho in the Southwest, during the historic period.

Skin Dressing -- Its Significance: Indian women possessed skill in the tanning of hides which served them well during the period of the fur trade in preparing the large number of deer skins and hides of the buffalo and other animals furnished by the Indians to white fur traders.

Warfare in Aboriginal America

Intertribal Warfare -- Its Significance: In aboriginal North America war commonly took the form of tribal feuds of more or less long standing,

but it was generally prosecuted by independent man-hunting and raiding parties rather than by organized expeditions.

The antagonisms which kept the Indian tribes hostile to each other prevented their effective alliance in opposition to the invading white man. If the Indians had been able to forget their differences and band together against a common enemy the white conquest of North America would undoubtedly have been delayed for many years, perhaps for several centuries. As it was the old tribal feuds not only were kept alive into the historic period but new ones sprang up to further divide the Indians. The whites, by taking sides in the Indian conflicts were able to use the Indian hostilities to their own advantage. This policy, while it hastened the white conquest of North America, also hastened the elimination of those European powers who were less successful in the choice of their Indian allies. Thus, the French, ignorant of the power of the various native tribes along the St. Lawrence, allied themselves with the Algonquian tribes against the powerful Iroquois, permitting the Dutch and later the English to gain the friendship and aid of the Iroquois. The matter of Indian alliances played an important part in the history of the frontier from the time of the earliest explorers until the end of the Indian Wars on the Plains.

Weapons -- Their Significance: The chief offensive weapons of the North American Indians were the bow and arrow, and the club or axe. The fire-hardened, buffalo hide shield was used for defense purposes by the tribes of the open country of the Plains and Southwest. Armor was used on the North Pacific Coast. It was made of thick skins or wooden slats. In that region the club seems to have been more commonly used than the bow and arrow. On the eastern seaboard the bow and arrow and the war club (called "tomahawk" by the Algonquian peoples) were the principal weapons.

At the time of the discovery of America the peoples of Europe had not yet developed the use of firearms beyond the first crude stages represented by the wheellock and the primitive matchlock. The early Spanish explorers still wore heavy armor, and made use of the primitive halbard and the arquebus. The possession of the matchlock by the early English colonists was not an unmixed blessing. The difficulty of loading and reloading often placed the colonist at the mercy of the Indian whose bow and arrow permitted rapid fire. Thus, the possession of hand firearms by Europeans in the early days was not a great advantage. Of more value perhaps was the cannon. Again, firearms soon came into the hand of Indians through trade, and the Indian continued to benefit from the white man's improvements in firearms. The white man's initial advantage thus became minimized. Indeed, by the period of the Indian Wars on the Plains the Indian's firearms were frequently of more improved type than the arms of the soldiers used against him, and in the hands of the Indian firearms were more effective.

Indian Methods of Fighting -- Their Significance: The Indian's methods of fighting were adapted to the conditions of the country over which he fought. In the forested East he fought in small scattered war parties, falling upon his enemy suddenly by surprise, shooting from ambush with deadly effectiveness. He made use of the same silent approach that he found so effective in hunting wild animals.

The white frontiersman soon learned that the Indian's methods were admirably adapted to forest warfare, and he abandoned the massed formations which had been used in European warfare. He soon became a master of "Indian fighting" himself, and he found these methods of great assistance to him in his Colonial Wars, as well as in the Revolution and the War of 1812.

The taking of scalps, a practice which originally was limited to the tribes of eastern United States and St. Lawrence Valley regions, was adopted by the whites and, largely through their offers of scalp bounties, spread among the Indian tribes.

Other Factors of Significance to the Expansion Story

Indian Attitude Toward Land -- Its Significance: In aboriginal North America land was held by occupancy and use. A tribe held its fields, its hunting grounds and fishing places so long as it was able to use and protect them against encroachment from neighboring peoples. In some tribes clans or individuals held portions of agricultural land, but they kept them only so long as they continued to cultivate them. The concept of individual title to land, and the ideas that land could be sold or could be held without occupancy were entirely foreign to native thinking.

Thus the treaties which the Indians made with the whites regarding land were subjects of much misunderstanding. The white man with his legal attitude toward land could not understand the Indian's attitude toward it. The Indian lacking this legal attitude believed he was but agreeing to a joint occupation of his land with the whites, not that he was turning over absolute ownership of it to an alien people. This mutual misunderstanding remained a fruitful source of trouble and bloodshed throughout the period of frontier expansion.

Indian Attitude Toward the Chief -- Its Significance: In the native government the chief was usually considered to be a man who through his ability was qualified for leadership of the group. He occupied his position through the will of his people, and he was peculiarly sensitive to the desires of his people. There remained a large element of democracy within the tribe.

The disposition of Europeans to look upon the chief as an absolute despot and supreme ruler of his people, with a vested right to make treaties in the name of his tribe, thus resulted in further misunderstanding, repudiation of treaties, ill feeling and frequently war. In the eyes of the tribe it was impossible for a chief to sell or give away to aliens any part of the tribal domain.

Indian Religion - Its Significance: It is difficult to generalize on the subject of Indian religion. It is significant to note, however, that the belief in one, all-powerful deity as the moral ruler of the universe was foreign to Indian thinking. Thus the Indian was properly looked upon by the Christian peoples of Europe as a "pagan."

Primitive North America, therefore, became a fertile field for the missionary of all the European denominations. In his desire to save the heathen Indian the missionary became one of the first Europeans to penetrate the wilderness, to establish missions, and schools and to prepare the way for the expansion of Europe in America.

SUMMARY

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ABORIGINAL BACKGROUND TO THE EXPANSION STORY

1. Permanent Contributions of the American Indians to American Culture.

Geographical terms and other words of Indian origin.
 Cultivated food plants (esp. maize).
 Wild food plants (esp. maple sugar).
 Tobacco (its cultivation and various uses).
 Other medicinal plants.

2. Factors in the Cultures of the North American Indians which served to Condition Life on the Frontier in the Expansion Period:

A. Indian traits adopted by the white man to his advantages:

Agricultural methods.
 Methods of hunting wild game.
 The "buckskin" costume.
 The wigwam, adobe structure, and palisaded settlement.
 The bark canoe.
 Knowledge of the geography of the country.
 Trails and portages.
 Furs as media of exchange.
 Beads as media of exchange.
 Methods of dressing skins.
 "Indian fighting."
 The taking of scalps.

B. Factors in the Aboriginal Background which encouraged peaceful contacts between the races:

Acquaintance with the fur trade.
 Desire for objects of adornment.
 Desire for iron tools and implements previously unknown.
 Desire for domesticated animals of Europe unknown to America.
 Lack of knowledge of Christianity.

C. Factors which formed bases for interracial misunderstanding.

Diversity of native languages.
 Different attitudes of the races toward land.
 Different attitudes of the races toward the chief.

D. Factors which made Indian opposition to white invasion difficult:

Small, scattered native population.
Diversity of languages.
Lack of political unity.
Intertribal conflicts.

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Attitude toward the chief: See the following articles in the Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico: Chiefs; Government; Popular fallacies; Tribe.

Religion: See the following articles in the Handbook of American Indians North Of Mexico: Religion; Shamans and priests; Popular fallacies; Totem.

THE ROLE OF THE INDIAN IN NATIONAL EXPANSION

PART II

REMOVING THE INDIAN BARRIER

"Before the land could be settled it had
to be won."

-- Theodore Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MARCH 9, 1939



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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and activities. It emphasizes the need for transparency and accountability in financial reporting.

2. The second part of the document outlines the various methods and techniques used to collect and analyze data. It highlights the importance of using reliable sources and ensuring the integrity of the data collection process.

3. The third part of the document focuses on the analysis and interpretation of the collected data. It discusses the various statistical and analytical tools used to identify trends and patterns in the data.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the implications of the findings and the potential impact of the research. It highlights the need for further research and the importance of sharing the results with the relevant stakeholders.



INTRODUCTION:

"Every frontier has two sides. Its movement forward or backward is the consequence of two sets of forces. To understand fully why one side advances we must know something of why the other side retreats."

- William Christie Macleod

On the other side of the white man's frontier in this country was the American Indian. It was he who held the New World in its entirety when it was first discovered by Europeans. It was he who resisted white penetration and settlement for four hundred years after the discovery.

For both the white man and the red these were years of ceaseless struggle. On the one side, the aggressive, land-hungry European or American strove to dispossess the Indian of the land he coveted. On the other side, the Indian endeavored to stem the relentless tide of white settlers which threatened to engulf his beloved hunting grounds.

The story of that part of the struggle which took place between the years 1763-1890, comprises an important part of the story of national expansion. Indian resistance throughout that period constituted the most difficult barrier to expansion.

Two aspects of this struggle are of most significance in the story of national expansion: (1) Indian resistance to white expansion -- the "Indian war," (2) Indian submission to white expansion -- the "Indian treaty." These aspects will be emphasized in this paper.

The information here presented is taken from a large number of published sources. No adequate general history of the subject has yet been written. No adequate, published bibliography is available. Few writers on the subject have presented dispassionate views. Both the Indian-hater and the sentimentalist have written voluminously. We shall strive neither to praise nor blame the participants in actions of the past. We shall be satisfied if we can gain a fair understanding of what took place on the Indian Frontier during the expansion period.

The Foundation of Our Indian Land Policy.

England based her claims to land in North America on discovery. In early New England and Virginia no Indian title to land was recognized. Land titles were derived ultimately from the British Crown, transferred to individual settlers through colonial authority. By 1633 the Dutch idea of land purchase from the Indians was beginning to spread to the English colonies. Individuals seized upon the purchase as a means of acquiring tracts without consulting the colonial governments. To invalidate such claims Maryland (1649) and Virginia (1655) passed laws requiring that all land titles must come from the colony. When the English succeeded to Dutch possession of New York (1664) a new practice was introduced. The colony bought the Indian land wholesale, and granted it in smaller tracts to settlers. This policy was followed by Penn in Pennsylvania and Oglethorpe in Georgia. It soon became the most common colonial procedure for obtaining and disposing of Indian land. This general policy was adopted by the British Crown in 1754, when it took over control of Indian affairs in America from the individual colonies. It later formed the basis of the Indian land policy of the United States. Thus was evolved, over a period of years prior to 1763, a method of acquiring land from the Indians that was followed by the British and United States governments throughout the great period of national expansion.

Indian Slavery Proves a Failure.

The English colonies too took a fling at enslaving the Indian. Most of the slaves were held in the New England and Southern Colonies, especially in Carolina where slave trading expeditions into the interior were for some years important economic ventures. But experience showed in the English colonies as it had in the Spanish and French, that free Indians made poor slaves. Slaveholders preferred negro workers, and the added availability of indentured servants further decreased the demand for Indian slaves. By 1763 Indian slavery had not disappeared, but it was definitely on its way out. Thus enslavement as a practical solution to the Indian problem had been tried and found wanting before the beginning of the great period of national expansion.⁵

Destruction of the East Coast Tribes.

"The woods were almost cleared of those pernicious creatures, to make room for a better growth." Thus the noted Puritan divine, Cotton Mather, referred to the fact that the eastern shore of Massachusetts had been depopulated by a plague shortly before the arrival of the first English Colonists.⁶ Virginia Colonists, however, landed in a region held by the Indians. Peace there was maintained by negotiations with the powerful Powhatan, and the diplomatic marriage of John Rolfe with Powhatan's daughter,

Pocahontas. Powhatan kept his people at peace with the whites, but after his death (1618), the hostile Opechancanough, who had been ill-treated by the whites, came into power. Secretly he plotted the destruction of the colonists. Swiftly his force fell upon the settlements at Jamestown (March 22, 1622), and in an hour massacred 347 men, women and children. Later 100 others were slain. Thus began the struggle to the death between the Indians and white settlers in the English Colonies. The first terrible blow was struck by the Indians. Twelve years of war of extermination followed in Virginia. The 4,000 colonists of 1622 were reduced to 1,253. The Indians retained but a remnant of their former number when a peace was arranged in 1634.

Three years later New England settlers were plunged into their first Indian war -- with the Pequot who disputed English right to the Connecticut Valley. Fort Mystic, the Pequot stronghold, was surprised (May 26, 1637) and some 600 men, women and children were massacred by the irate Puritan fathers. With the scattering of the remaining Pequot among neighboring tribes, the war ended. The Pequot tribe was no more. In 1643 the United Colonies of New England were formed in response to the need for a common defense against the Indians, Dutch and French. By careful judgement another Indian War in this region was averted until 1675.

The Dutch too had their Indian struggles. From 1641 to 1644 they warred with the lower river Algonkians, killing about 1,000 of them during the period, including the massacre of some 500 Indians near Stamford, Connecticut, which virtually ended the struggle.

New England's most serious Indian War, the so-called King Phillip's War, (1675-1676) was the second and last great effort of the Indians of southern New England to halt the movement of the white frontier into Indian hunting grounds. The effort was futile. But the war did not end until approximately one-eleventh of the adult male white population had been killed, and one-half the hostile Indians of southern New England had perished in battle, massacre, from exposure or starvation.

By the year 1677 the Indians of southern New England, of Virginia, the Susquehannocks of Maryland, and the coastal tribes of Georgia and Florida had been destroyed, save for small and scattered remnants of once proud and populous tribes.

By the middle of the 18th century the power of all the once numerous tribes east of the Alleghenies, with the exceptions of the Iroquois in the north and the Creeks in the south, was broken. In the Carolinas, the Tuscarora, 4,000 strong, had warred on the settlements in 1711. By March 1713, the settlers of Carolina with the aid of Virginia, destroyed

the last fortified Tuscarora town. Badly beaten, some of the Tuscarora chose to remain on a small reserve in North Carolina. But the majority moved north to accept the invitation of their kinsmen to admittance in the Iroquois League as the sixth of the Six Nations. In 1715, the Yamasee of South Carolina turned upon the traders among them and murdered 90 of the 100 total. After several battles with the whites they were defeated by Gov. Craven at Salkehuh and fled into Florida. In 1742, Pennsylvania secured the aid of the Iroquois in removing the Delaware Indians from the Lehigh to the center of the state. Thus the Indians were removed from New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania.

Thus several decades before the beginning of the great period of national expansion (1763-1890) the Indian barrier to white settlement east of the Alleghenies had been (except for the Iroquois and Creeks) removed. This had been accomplished only after periods of bitter fighting all along the line from New England to Georgia. Here and there broken remnants of tribes remained, but, for the most part the Indians had either been exterminated or had retreated before the steady march of the white man from the coast into the interior. Frederick J. Turner has estimated that, "Roughly speaking, it took a century of Indian fighting and forest felling for the colonial settlements to expand into the interior to a distance of about a hundred miles from the coast."⁸ It is hardly likely that the "forest felling" would have taken so long had it not been for the "Indian fighting."

Beginnings of the Reservation Idea.

Not all the Indians of the coastal region were exterminated during the Indian wars. Small remnants of many tribes remained, so reduced in number and broken in spirit as to be of little or no danger to white settlers. To take care of these groups the colonies set aside small tracts of land. In 1649 Connecticut gave a small surviving Pegout band title to a tract within the boundaries of the colony. In 1651, Massachusetts assigned land and gave title to Indians who had been christianized by the missionary Eliot. In 1656 Virginia assigned land to various tribes and their chiefs were made agents of the colony. In 1704, Maryland gave the Nanticoke a reserve. Pennsylvania in 1717 assigned land to the Conestoga Indians on the proprietor's own manor. Assignments of land were made in the Carolinas to broken remnants of tribes formerly inhabiting that region. Thus, during the period prior to 1763, the ground was broken for a reservation system in this country. The several colonies established their own Indian reservations in the midst of larger areas of white settlement. Some of these little reservations are still in existence, under state control.⁹

Fighting the White Man's Battles.

In the three-cornered contest waged by Spain, France and England for the possession of North America the Indians early became more than a passive factor. Through their alliances with the whites of one nation Indians saw active service in the colonial wars against the other nations and their red allies. As early as 1680 English slave raiders from the Carolinas, with the aid of Indian allies, attacked the Spanish missions in Georgia. By 1688 the Spaniards were forced to transport the remnants of the coast missions to St. Augustine. In the series of conflicts between the English and French, which were but the clashes on a colonial front of the great struggle that was being waged in Europe between these powers -- King William's War (1689-97), Queen Anne's War (1702-13) and King George's War (1739-48), Indian allies fought on both sides, and often with deadly effect, especially in the north, on the frontiers of New York and New England. The massacres at Schenectady in 1690 and at Deerfield in 1704 were examples of the havoc Indians could wreck once their fury was roused in behalf of an European ally.

In the last great struggle between France and England in America, the so-called French and Indian War (1754-1763), stemming from the conflict over the control of the fur trade in the Ohio Valley, Indians saw service on both sides. Powerful pressure was brought by both sides on the various Indian tribes to encourage them to become partisans. The Iroquois, most powerful of the northern Indians, delicately situated between the two contending powers, chose to remain neutral, although many Iroquois (largely Mohawks) under old Hendrick joined the English. The French were successful in obtaining the aid of a large number of the northern and western tribes -- the Ojibway, Ottawa, Abenaki, Caughnawaga Mission Iroquois, Wyandot, Shawnee, and Delaware. Among the southern Indians the Choctaw were divided in their allegiance, the eastern villages siding with the English, the western ones with the French; the Chickasaw remained neutral; the Cherokee entered the war on the English side but changed their allegiance in 1759; whereupon their old enemies, the Creeks, previously neutral, joined the conflict on the side of the English. Both sides offered scalp bounties. In the most disastrous battle of the war in the west, Braddock's defeat near Fort Pitt in 1758, the victorious French force was nearly three-fourths Indian. This fight was influential in showing the British the impracticality of European military tactics (as employed by Braddock) in combatting Indians in the forests of America.¹⁰ As the war progressed the English succeeded in winning from the French some of their valuable red allies. In 1757 Sir William Johnson won over part of the Delaware to the British. In the next year, Christian Post, a Moravian missionary, on an important journey to the Ohio Valley negotiated a peace with the Shawnee and Delaware for the remainder of the war. Thus, as her western Indian allies began to leave her, French strength began to fail. Driven back into Canada, Montcalm's army was defeated at Quebec September 13, 1759. With this defeat all hope for a great French empire in America was gone.

The defeat of the French (as later events will prove) was a bitter blow to the Indians as well. In the peace negotiated in 1763, England gained possession of all of North America east of the Mississippi with the exception of the Floridas. Thus, deprived of French aid, the Indians were left alone to face the relentless westward march of white settlers into their domain.

The British Crown Takes Over Indian Affairs.

In 1754, to better handle relations with the Indians, the British Crown took over from the individual colonies the power of dealing with the Indians. Two superintendencies were created in 1756. One superintendent was to handle relations with the northern tribes, the other, relations with the tribes of the south. These positions were "probably made to correspond to the military divisions, because the problem of defense and Indian affairs were closely allied."¹¹ Until the close of the French and Indian War these positions were subordinate to the military command. It was the duty of these superintendents to observe the trend of events, negotiate treaties and agreements, and endeavor to adjust such difficulties as arose between the Indians and the border settlers. They were essentially ambassadors to the Indians, rather than rulers of them.¹²

The British Crown in its now uniform colonial Indian policy continued to regard (1) the Indian tribes as independent nations under the protection of the Crown (2) Indian lands as their own until voluntarily transferred in whole or in part to the Crown (3) all attempts on the part of an individual subject of the Crown, or a foreign state to receive lands from the Indians as illegal.¹³

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BEYOND THE PAPER FRONTIER:

The Colonial -- Indian Frontier, 1763-1776.

"We..declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure ..to referve under Our Sovereignty, Protection and Dominion, for the Ufe of the..Indians..all the Lands and Territories lying to the Westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea from the West and North West."

-- Proclamation of Oct. 7, 1763.

The thirteen years that intervened between the Treaty of Paris and the outbreak of the American Revolution were indeed unlucky ones of the Indians on the frontier. These years witnessed the first crossing of the mountains by white settlers and the erection of their forts and cabins on land reserved to the Indians. Nor could the combined efforts of the British Crown and the Indian warriors hold back this rising tide of westward moving white-skinned humanity.

Pontiac Carries On.

By 1760 the French had given up the struggle with England for the possession of eastern North America. Her western posts were taken over by the English. But, though her armies were no longer in the field, French influence survived in the person of loyal French traders who strove to keep hatred for the English alive in the hearts of the Indians, and to convince the natives that the French cause in America was not lost. Other influences too, roused the Indians against the English: (1) the rapacity and arrogance of English traders, (2) the contemptuous attitude of the English soldiers and their confiscation of Indian land, (3) the failure of the English to ply them with presents as lavishly as had the French. Even more to be feared was the steady westward advance of white settlement. The Indians of the region north of the Ohio were thus in a state of unrest when, in 1761, there appeared among the Delaware a prophet who called upon them to unite and drive out the hated English.

The situation was ripe for the emergence of a strong and magnetic leader who would bring the tribes together in an effective attack on the whites. Out of the multitude of discontented red men emerged Pontiac, the Ottawa. Secretly he went about the task of uniting the northwestern tribes under his leadership, biding his time until his force was strong

enough to carry on a major war. In 1761 he won over the Ottawa, Ojibway and Potawatomi. Next year the Seneca, Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Miami, and Kickapoo pledged their aid. Even though he failed to shake the Sauk and Fox, Menominee and Winnebago from their neutrality, and the Illinois hesitated in their allegiance, Pontiac succeeded in organizing the most extensive Indian alliance against the whites the country had yet known. By 1763 he was ready to act. His plan called first for a simultaneous attack on all British posts north of the Ohio. After these were taken the settlements would be attacked and the English driven into the sea.

During the months of May and June 1763 all the British posts west of Niagara were surprised and taken by the Indians -- save two -- Detroit and Fort Pitt. Pontiac himself led the attack on Detroit. But the defenders were forewarned, and Pontiac was forced to settle down to a siege which lasted six months -- the longest Indian siege in the history of the Indian-white warfare in this country. Fort Pitt was attacked three times during the summer, but the stubborn garrison held the fort. Meanwhile Delaware and Shawnee warriors destroyed the Pennsylvania settlements west of Carlisle. Some 20,000 settlers fled eastward to Carlisle and Shippensburg to save their lives.

The situation was a desperate one for the colonies, especially so for Pennsylvania. Gen. Amherst, military commander and confirmed Indian hater, who at one time had suggested that blankets inoculated with small-pox be circulated among the Indians to "extirpate this execrable race," and who favored the idea of hunting them down with dogs, hastily organized two expeditions into the Indian country. Bradstreet with a large force was sent toward Detroit. Bouquet, who has been termed the most able Indian fighter of the colonial period, left Carlisle in July, to the relief of Fort Pitt. At Bushy Run, 25 miles east of that fort and not far from the site of Braddock's defeat, Bouquet met and defeated a larger force of Indians who had left the vicinity of Fort Pitt to head him off. This was the most important engagement of the war. In it Bouquet reversed the decision of the Braddock fiasco, and demonstrated that Europeans had learned the art of Indian warfare. Slowly he moved his little army on to Fort Pitt.

After six months of failure to take Detroit, disillusioned by the refusal of the French governors in the Illinois country and at New Orleans to aid him, Pontiac abandoned the siege of Detroit. But his allies engaged in a second series of attacks on Pennsylvania's frontier settlements in the winter of 1763-64. Nevertheless, the tide was turning against the Indians. Bradstreet's campaign in the north disheartened the Indians. And in October 1764 Bouquet penetrated the Muskingum Valley (Ohio) and made peace with the Delaware and Shawnee, securing the return of white

prisoners. In 1765, George Croghan, deputy Indian agent for the Ohio Valley tribes, journeyed westward to make formal peace. At Fort Pitt he conciliated the Delaware and Shawnee, at Fort Ouatanon in May he obtained Pontiac's willingness to make peace, and at Detroit late in the summer he made a general peace with all the western tribes. To seal the agreement, Croghan, next year, distributed presents valued at 3,000 pounds to the chiefs and warriors gathered at a grand council at Kaskaskia. More than twenty tribes were represented, and an Indian-English alliance was negotiated.


At Cahokia in 1769, Pontiac was murdered by a Kaskaskia Indian believed to have been bribed by an English trader. News of this deed roused the lake tribes to a war of extermination against the Illinois. In a few years, reduced to a mere handful, the Illinois took refuge among the friendly French at Kaskaskia, while the Sauk, Fox, Kickapoo and Potawatomi took over their former lands.

Such was the fate of Pontiac, the first great leader in the Indian defense against the advance of the white man following the French and Indian War. Whether he should be termed a great patriot or simply a dupe of scheming French traders is of far less importance than the fact that Indians, organized under his leadership, were able to prevent the English from occupying the territory they had gained north of the Ohio and west of the mountains for two years after the Treaty of Paris.





The
PR^OCLAMATION LINE
of 1763



One other attempt was made to place a British force in the Illinois country prior to 1765. Major Arthur Loftus, with 351 men, was sent up the Mississippi from New Orleans in February 1764. But they did not get far before a hostile Tunica Indian force attacked the flotilla, and forced it to turn back.

The Proclamation of 1763.

The policy of the British Crown toward the Indians west of the Alleghenies had not been formulated carefully at the time of the outbreak under Pontiac. The crisis brought on by Pontiac, together with the uneasiness of the southern Indians, caused the British Crown to issue a Royal Proclamation on Oct. 7, 1763, which would serve to satisfy the Indians of England's good intentions toward them. This proclamation prohibited white settlements on Indian land west of the crest of the Alleghenies. It created a virtual Indian reservation of the land claimed by England between the southern boundary of Quebec, the watershed of the Appalachian mountains, the northern boundary of the two Floridas, and the Mississippi.¹

It is probable that even in England this proclamation was regarded simply as an expedient for keeping peace with the Indians at a difficult time, and not as any final solution to the western problem. In America the colonists realized its impracticality as a long term policy. George Washington, already speculating in lands beyond the defined line, wrote in 1767, "I can no longer look upon that proclamation in any other light... than a temporary expedient to quiet the minds of the Indians. It must fall, of course, in a few years, especially when those Indians consent to our occupying the lands." His sentiments, expressed privately, seem to have been those of the rank and file of Americans.

So far as land policy is concerned the proclamation set an important precedent. It did recognize the Indian claims to land west of the line, except in the case of that previously patented, as valid. And it declared that these claims were only extinguishable by treaty made under the authority of the central government. This policy continued in force in the United States until 1871.²

Along the Paper Frontier.


The Proclamation of 1763 attempted to set up a paper frontier between the Indians and white settlers. On the east of this line were the aggressive, land-hungry borderers. To the west of the line were the determined Indians. Let us look at these two forces as they existed about the time of the close of Pontiac's rebellion. First let us observe:





*The White Settlements of the Cherokee Country
1763-1775*

- Original Cherokee Claims
- Proclamation Line of 1763
- Pope's Line 1767
- Line of Treaty of Hard Labor 1768
- Line of Treaty of Lochaber 1770
- Donelson's Line 1771
- Pennsylvania Purchase 1775
- Mingo & Grant's Purchase 1777-1778



The Indian Side of the Line.

It was the custom in colonial times to reckon the strength of the Indian tribes in terms of the number of their warriors. An estimate of the number of warriors belonging to the numerous tribes east of the Mississippi at about this time places their strength at about 35,000.³ This would include, of course, some tribes living considerably to the westward of the proclamation line out of contact with white settlers. Of the tribes along the line the most powerful were:

1. The Iroquois, or Six Nations.

In 1768 the number of Iroquois warriors was estimated at 2,000, more than half of them Seneca.³ As early as 1618 the Iroquois had made an alliance with the Dutch. This alliance the English inherited when they took over New York in 1664. It enabled them to use the Iroquois as a buffer state to successfully block French penetration from the north. The best the French could ever do with the Iroquois was to arrange brief periods of neutrality. This strong English-Iroquois alliance, which persisted throughout the colonial period, has been enthusiastically termed "the most important fact in American history prior to 1763." After obtaining firearms from the Dutch, the Iroquois embarked on a period of conquest unprecedented in Indian history. By the mid-eighteenth century they claimed by right of conquest the territory reaching from Lake Superior to the Tennessee River and from the mountains to the Mississippi. But this claim was bought at a terrible price. Iroquois loss of life in war had been tremendous. By 1754, Iroquois power was on the decline. They declared neutrality in the French and Indian War but were unable to prevent the tribes to the westward, which they had previously conquered, from taking part. In 1763, Sir William Johnson was English Indian Superintendent in the North. He lived among the Iroquois and had a strong influence over them. Still the friendly Iroquois presented a strong barrier to westward movement of white settlement in New York and Pennsylvania, and they still claimed title to land south of the Ohio in the present Kentucky.

2. The Cherokee.

These "Mountaineers of Aboriginal America," were the second strongest Indian force along the frontier line. They were reckoned at between 3,000 and 4,000 warriors in 1776.⁴ They originally claimed a great tract of land south of the Ohio and east of the northward flowing Tennessee River, including nearly all of the present Kentucky and Tennessee, and portions of northern Alabama and Georgia, and western South and North Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. They were able, intelligent people, imbued with an intense love of their mountain homeland, proud, and quick to revenge a murder of

one of their number. Prior to 1759, the Cherokee had been friendly with the English who carried on a profitable trade with them. They entered the French and Indian War on the English side and served effectively with Gen. Forbes in the capture of Fort Duquesne. Returning homeward after this campaign the Cherokee warriors, having lost their horses and being low on rations, helped themselves from the horses and supplies of the German settlers of western Virginia. Whereupon the German settlers, forgetting their debt to the Cherokee, fell upon them in a night attack, killed 40 and took many prisoners, then sold the scalps to the government as those of French Indians to obtain scalp bounties. Infuriated by this action, the entire Cherokee Confederacy turned against the English. Throughout 1759-60 they devastated the frontier settlements of the Carolinas, and massacred the British force at Fort Loudon in the heart of their country. In 1760 and again in 1761 large forces of British troops invaded the Cherokee Country and destroyed their settlements, until in September 1761 the Cherokee begged for peace. It was concluded at a price -- the frontier moved 70 miles westward in that region. When the Cherokee were invited to join in Pontiac's conspiracy in 1763, they declined. They were not yet ready to renew their warfare with the settlers. But they looked with little less favor than Pontiac himself upon the advancing white frontier.

3. The Shawnee and Delaware

occupied the Indian side of the line between the Iroquois and Cherokee. Shawnee warriors in 1768 were reckoned at 300; Delaware at about 600.⁵ Then living on the Upper Ohio in present western Pennsylvania, West Virginia, eastern Ohio and Kentucky, part of the Shawnee and the Delaware had had long and bitter experience with the land-hungry white settlers who had aided in driving them westward. In the French and Indian War the Shawnee and Delaware had fought valiantly with the French. Again, with Pontiac they joined in the attack on the British posts and it was these tribes that had been largely responsible for the devastating attacks on the Pennsylvania frontier in 1763-64. Croghan had succeeded in conciliating the Shawnee and Delaware in 1765, but in their hearts still remained a rankling hatred of the English -- especially the settlers.

Behind the Shawnee and Delaware in the Ohio Country and around the shores of the lakes lived the many tribes of varying strengths who had aided Pontiac in 1763-64 -- the Wyandot, Miami, Ottawa, Ojibway, Potawatomi, and Kickapoo. All were now nominally allied with the English, but harbored deep hatred for the white man and fear of his westward moving settlements.

4. The Creek Confederacy

held the territory on the west side of the Indian line in Georgia. Their scattered villages in the present states of Georgia and Alabama contained perhaps 4,000 warriors. The Creeks allied with the English in the wars with the Spanish Indians in 1703-08, and continued to maintain treaty alliances with South Carolina and Georgia, and while maintaining their vast territories and preventing the white frontier from advancing very far from the sea coast in Georgia. When their old enemies, the Cherokee turned against the English, the Creeks, previously neutral entered the French and Indian War on the side of the English. In 1765, they were still considered friendly.

The Settler's Side of the Line.

In the period roughly defined as between 1676 and 1763, the area between the early coastal settlements of the colonies, and the Alleghenies -- including the Mohawk Valley, the Great Valley of Pennsylvania, the Shenandoah Valley and the Southern Piedmont, had been largely settled by whites. A major part of these settlers were immigrants from Europe, largely Scotch-Irish and Germans. On the frontier they developed a way of life and a philosophy quite distinct and frequently opposed to those of the people of the older coastal settlements. These frontiersmen of the Old West liked to call themselves

The Borderers.

Early in the eighteenth century the people of the coastal settlements recognized the value of building between them and the Indians on the frontier a barrier of white settlements as a protection against the red men. Accordingly they welcomed the dissatisfied and persecuted peoples of Europe who would be satisfied with land in the colonies beyond the settlements. In the Scotch-Irish and the Germans the colonists found the answer to this demand. In the second decade of the century the Scotch-Irish began to come to New England in large numbers and to take up land on the frontiers of Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Lechnere wrote of them in 1718: "They are generally.... come over hither for no other reason but upon encouragement sent from hence upon notice given that they should have so many acres of land given them gratis to settle our frontiers as a barrier against the Indians."⁶ About 1720 the Scotch-Irish began to take up homes on the Pennsylvania frontier with the encouragement of James Logan, Penn's representative.⁷ In 1737 the Scotch-Irish migration to the Carolinas began, and in the next year a large tract, including the Cherry Valley on the New York

frontier was granted them.⁸ Finding the mountains a barrier, the Scotch-Irish, who had come in such large numbers to Pennsylvania, turned southward about 1740 into the Shenandoah Valley and on to the Carolina back country. With them went the Germans.

Fearless and aggressive, these people had already roused the ire of colonial authorities by their propensity for building homes wherever there was open land. In 1730 they had squatted on Penn's Conestoga Manor. When asked to leave they countered that "it was against the laws of God and nature that so much land should lie idle while so many Christians wanted it to labor on and raise their bread."⁹ Of them it has been said that "they kept the sabbath and everything else they could lay their hands on." They took their Calvinism and their whisky straight. They were proud of being the spearhead of the white man's civilization in America.

As early as 1729, Logan reported that "the Indians themselves are alarmed at the swarms of strangers and we are afraid of a breach between them, for the Irish are very rough with them."¹⁰ By 1750, sixty-two Scotch-Irish had already planted a settlement west of the mountains, and their presence so provoked the Indians that the provincial authorities were compelled to remove them and to destroy their dwellings.¹¹ Toward the undeveloped land of Indian hunting grounds they had much the same attitude as they had expressed toward Penn's Manor. Unmindful of treaties, they squatted upon it and marked out their "tomahawk claims," built their cabins and palisaded forts, and prepared to defend themselves against all Indian reprisals. Critics of the borderers have called them savage, relentless, trouble-seeking, and "a wild lot." But they were also deeply religious, great believers in fundamental spelling-book education, imbued with an unquenchable devotion to liberty, splendid courage, and democratic ideals.

Typical of the spirit of the Scotch-Irish borders was that of Parson Cummings who preached to two congregations on the frontier, and was a fiery Indian fighter. Of him it is said that he never went into battle without first taking off his coat, praying like time, and then fighting like hell! "It was his custom on Sundays to array himself in his clerical vestments, and with a shot-pouch slung about his neck and a rifle thrown over his shoulder, to enter his church, and, thus armed ascend the pulpit. Then, laying his pouch on the cushion before him, and standing his rifle in a corner, he would begin religious services to a congregation armed in much the same manner."¹²

It was men of this stamp -- strong, aggressive, courageous, secure in the belief that God added his blessing to their actions -- that the Indians faced across the frontier line in 1763.

The Lure of Forbidden Fruit.

The Proclamation of 1763 made white settlement beyond the mountains illegal. But for five more years the exact boundary between the Indians and whites on the west was not clearly determined. In 1767 Gov. Tryon settled the boundary back of South Carolina. By the treaty of Hard Labor with the Cherokee, October 14, 1768, the line back of North Carolina and Virginia was established. One month later (November 5) Sir William Johnson in a treaty with the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix, set the boundary farther north. It should be noted that in the treaties of 1768, land cessions involving areas west of the "Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea" were made. The Cherokee boundary was pushed westward to the Kanawha River. The Iroquois at Fort Stanwix had relinquished all claim to land south of the Ohio west of the mountains. Thus even in official relations with the Indians the letter of the Proclamation of 1763 was being ignored.

For the rapidly growing population of the back country, continually demanding -- "More Land," the King's routine decree had still less power of restraint. "Like pent up waters that can no longer be contained in the reservoir designed to hold them, the white men overflowed the mountains."¹³

1. Onto the lands of the Upper Ohio

in the present West Virginia and southwestern Pennsylvania moved the settlers. Some had set up their cabins as early as 1763, but the number grew rapidly after the close of the war with Pontiac. On September 29, 1767, Washington's field agent, Crawford, wrote him that "the chief part of the good land" between the Youghiogheny and the Monongahela Rivers had already been taken, giving him to understand that they should have to make haste if they wished to acquire land in the present Pennsylvania south of the Ohio.¹⁴ The spread of white settlement into the trans-montane region of the Upper Ohio seems to have been recognized in running the line of the Treaty of Hard Labor through Chiswell's Mine on the Kanawha and the mouth of that River rather than farther east. But that treaty was with the Cherokee.

The Shawnee and Delaware, with a more valid claim to the invaded territory, had not been appeased. The lawless element of the white settlers, with their cheating and murdering of the Indians further incensed these tribes. Gates wrote to Johnson May 5, 1766, "I am really vexed at the behavior of the lawless banditti upon the borders; and what aggravates the more is the difficulty to bring them to punishment."¹⁵ The frontiersmen were taking matters into their own hands. In February 1765, settlers, who had protested in vain against the activity of traders

in supplying Indians with fire arms, attacked a pack train carrying supplies for Indian treaties to Fort Pitt, drove off the traders, destroyed the supplies. Each year brought renewed outrages in this region with loss of life among both Indians and white settlers.

Meanwhile the Cherokee continued to give ground in the region south of the Ohio, through the treaties of Lochaber in 1770, and the running of Donelson's line in 1771 which pushed the Cherokee boundary west to the Kentucky River.

The Shawnee and Delaware remained hostile and continued to fight in defense of their invaded hunting grounds, in desultory forays of small parties on isolated cabins. Whites retaliated, or took the aggressive. Sporadic conflict was the rule, but there was no general war in the region until 1774. When that war came it brought a smaller loss of life than had prevailed during the decade of nominal peace preceding it.

2. Into Eastern Tennessee

from Virginia in the summer of 1768, moved William Bean and his family. On reaching the Watauga Valley he built a log cabin, near which he planted corn and turned his cattle out to graze. Boone's party to Kentucky in 1769 found the little, isolated Bean settlement -- the first white settlement across the mountains in the present Tennessee. James Robertson, of the Boone party, staid over with Bean. In 1771 Robertson brought his wife and a small band of settlers from the east to begin the enlargement of the Watauga settlements, which in succeeding years spread out over the valleys of north-eastern Tennessee. In 1772, John Sevier, who was to play an important part in the later history of the settlement, came to Watauga. That summer Alexander Cameron, resident British agent among the Cherokee, appeared at Watauga to inform the settlers that they had trespassed on Cherokee land beyond the boundary line, and must move or be moved by British soldiers. Not to be driven out of their new homes so easily the shrewd Wataugans called a council with the Cherokee, and in return for some five or six thousand dollars value in goods obtained from the Indians a ten-year lease on their settled region. (Since purchase was forbidden by the Proclamation of 1763). In the celebration following the amicable agreement, a Cherokee was purposely killed by a visiting Virginian. The celebration broke up. Robertson went to the Cherokee towns to conciliate them. Meanwhile Sevier built a fort and prepared the settlements for defense. War with the Cherokee was successfully avoided, however, until after the opening of the American Revolution. Meanwhile in 1775, the Wataugans, encouraged by Henderson's illegal, but successful purchase of Kentucky, bought from the Cherokee, title to the land leased in 1772.16

3. The region we know as Kentucky

was regarded by the Indians as a particularly fine hunting ground rather than a section for the location of towns and villages. Three strong groups claimed it -- the Iroquois through conquest, and the Shawnee and Cherokee through use. Other tribes from the north of the Ohio visited Kentucky to hunt. But so far as Indian occupancy was concerned it still remained a veritable no-man's-land when white explorers entered the region in 1750. Kentucky's fame as a hunting ground soon became known east of the mountains, and in the sixties hardy back country hunters penetrated the area in search of game. These "Long Hunters" as they were called because their expeditions sometimes took them away from the settlements for several seasons, contested with the Indians the right to kill game in Kentucky. It was a desperate business. Many hunters were killed, others captured. An idea of the Indian dangers may be obtained from the fact that of the six men associated with Daniel Boone, most famous of the Long Hunters, in his expedition to Kentucky 1769-71, four were killed by Indians. Only Daniel Boone and his brother Squire returned to the Yadkin settlements alive. And they had many harrowing experiences to relate, and no furs to show for their labors. For, on their return through the Cumberland Gap, a band of Indians had pounced upon them and taken their rich supply of pelts. They were lucky to escape with their own skins.

But Boone saw more than furs in Kentucky, he perceived in its fertile valleys an ideal place for settlement. His enthusiasm aided him to gather a small party of about 50 persons and set out for Kentucky, with their goods on pack horses, in September 1773. As they approached the mountains a party of Cherokee fell upon their rear guard and killed six of their number including Boone's eldest son. This incident so discouraged the other members of the party that, in spite of Boone's urging, they refused to go on. Many returned to the settlements. Boone and his family took up a little cabin on the Clinch River. Next spring war broke out on the border, and Boone was sent by Gov. Dunmore of Virginia, hurrying to Kentucky to warn all white men of the danger from hostile Indians. In Kentucky he found Col. James Harrod and some 30 companions laying out lots for the future Harrodsburg, the first white settlement in Kentucky. On receiving Boone's warning of Indian danger, they abandoned their settlement and joined the Virginia forces in the border war. Thus the fear of the Indians delayed the settlement of Kentucky for another year. Meanwhile there was a war to be fought, and Boone took his place with the others in the conflict.

The Land Speculator's War.

Lord Dunmore's War, grew out of the desperate situation in which the Shawnee and Delaware found themselves in the face of the rapid settlement of their territory on the Upper Ohio. In the two years prior to the

outbreak a total of at least 58 peaceful Indians had been murdered by whites in the region between Bull Town and Wheeling of the present West Virginia.¹⁷ These murderous propensities and brutality on the part of English traders, squatters, and prospectors for land speculators culminated in the brutal murder at Yellow Creek of a party of Indians by the ruffian trader Greathouse in late April 1774. Included among the murdered were the women and children of Logan, powerful Indian leader. This act made peace impossible on the frontier of western Virginia. Logan, heretofore a friend of the whites and a potent force for peace among the Indians, now bereft of his entire family, went on the warpath, killing no less than 30 people before the white authorities began to act. Death by torture was the lot of all white men who fell into the hands of the Indians.

There was panic among the whites on the Upper Ohio. About May 1, 1774 one thousand refugees crossed the Monongahela, en route eastward, in a single day. Ambitious plans for the planting of new settlements along the Ohio and the Great Kanawha were abandoned.¹⁸

Virginia, claiming the territory under dispute, was most interested in the outbreak and saw in it an opportunity to once and for all conquer the Indians and drive them out. Accordingly Gov. Dunmore planned a potent offensive. Two armies of "Long Knives," as the Virginia frontiersmen were called by the Indians, were organized. One, under Andrew Lewis, was directed to march to the mouth of the Great Kanawha. The other, under Gov. Dunmore, was to advance to Fort Pitt. The two armies were to unite on the Ohio and together attack the Shawnee villages in the Scioto Valley. But Cornstalk, a Shawnee leader, had different plans. On October 10, 1774, he attacked Lewis' force at Point Pleasant. There followed the most bitter battle in the warfare of the Ohio Valley. The forces were about even, about 1,100 on each side. It ended with the Americans in control of the field, with a loss of 75 killed and some 140 wounded. It was the one important conflict of the war. The Indians, though not decisively beaten, were broken in spirit, and began to sue for peace. But Logan, defiant, refused to take part in the treaty. From his village he sent the message to Dunmore now known as "Logan's Address," perhaps the finest bit of savage oratory ever recorded, ending in the plaintive -- "Who is there to mourn for Logan. Not one."¹⁹

Negotiations for the final termination of the war were held at Pittsburgh in the autumn of 1775, and resulted in a treaty concluded jointly by representatives of Virginia and of the Continental Congress. It was a strictly American treaty. Great Britain was not represented.²⁰

Thus ended Lord Dunmore's War. It was brief, no large numbers of combatants were employed, but it was a struggle of great significance in the history of national expansion. It was the first sizeable conflict fought by Indians west of the mountains against the English in which the Indians were not backed by the French. It was the last warfare of the colonists as subjects of Great Britain. As result of it the white man brought the area of the present West Virginia under his control and opened it to settlers. Furthermore it brought on a state of peace with the Ohio Valley tribes that made possible the relatively peaceful settlement of Kentucky, and permitted the settlements of the region to be free from organized Indian attack during the first two years of the Revolution. The Shawnee, the Delaware, Wyandot, and the Miami did not again attack white settlements until the Revolution was well under way.

The Settlement of Kentucky.

Kentucky's settlement was made possible by three significant actions: (1) the treaty of Fort Stanwix with the Iroquois in 1768 in which they relinquished all claims to land south of the Ohio, (2) the conquest of the Shawnee in Lord Dunmore's War, and (3) the purchase of Cherokee title to the region by Richard Henderson for the Transylvania Land Company, at Sycamore Shoals, March 17, 1775. For the huge tract bounded by the Kentucky, Holston, Cumberland and Ohio Rivers, Henderson paid a price variously estimated at from ten wagon loads of whisky to as high as the equivalent of 10,000 pounds of sterling in trade goods.²¹ Yet, even before this treaty, Col. Harrod, with 50 men, had returned to his Kentucky settlement, abandoned on the eve of Lord Dunmore's War. His party had arrived by March 15.²²

Meanwhile, Daniel Boone, who had broken the ice with the Cherokee and paved the way for Henderson's successful purchase, had set out in late February or early March with a force of about 40 men, to blaze a trail for white settlers from Fort Watauga to Kentucky. This trail, through the Cumberland Gap, became the famous Wilderness Road. It was rough, often narrow and never intended as a wagon road, but in spite of its difficulties it became the preferred route of the majority of migrants to Kentucky. For more than a decade the other great route westward to Kentucky -- the Ohio River -- was considered unsafe by most emigrants, largely because of the danger of Indian attack. A considerable part of the trail blazed by Boone followed old Indian trails.²³

On March 25, near Silver Creek, Kentucky, Indians attacked Boone's party, killed two and wounded one. Hearing of this renewed Indian hostility, a great majority of the more than 100 white men then scattered in small companies through the region of the upper waters of Kentucky River, fled eastward to the comparative safety of Watauga and western Virginia. On April 1, Boone sent a letter to Henderson asking him to send more settlers to hold the region from the Indians. In the meantime his party

would build a fort for protection. Henderson was already on his way when he received Boone's message. At the news, some of the more timid of his party turned back. But the majority pushed on, passing on the way numerous small parties of fugitives from Kentucky fleeing eastward in fear of Indians. On April 20, 1775 the Henderson party arrived at Boone's Fort (Boonesborough). The first white women to reach Kentucky were Boone's wife and daughters in June 1775. The little settlement at Boonesborough was now firmly rooted.²⁴

But already things were happening on the eastern seaboard that bided ill for the well being of the courageous settlers in far off Kentucky. Just one day before the arrival of Henderson's party, had occurred the Battle of Lexington, the opening conflict in the Revolutionary War.

Indian Relations in the Movement Toward Revolution.

Dealings with the Indians served as important factors leading toward the American Revolution in two ways:

(1). The necessity for united action in dealing with the powerful Indian tribes or confederacies brought the colonies closer together. First evidence of this is found in the organization of the United Colonies of New England in 1643, partially as a means of defense against Indians. The several important conferences with the Iroquois at Albany were forces in bringing together for the first time colonies outside New England for collective action. The first of these conferences was held in 1684, with representatives from New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Virginia. Pennsylvania later joined in the conferences, and the Carolinas also in 1722. Such conferences helped to draw the colonies together, and probably aided in implanting the germ of the idea of a national union in the minds of those who took part.

(2). British failure to aid the people of the west to satisfy their desire for more land beyond the mountains, and failure to protect their outlying settlements from Indian depredations served to turn the frontiersmen of the back country and the new over-mountain settlements against the Crown. The Proclamation of 1763, forbidding as it did, further advance into the Indian country was galling to the westerners, and the futile attempts to enforce it in such instances as Virginia's refusal to recognize the legality of Henderson's purchase, added flames to the fire. The virile Scotch-Irish, long accustomed to opposition from the English, saw in England's Indian policy one more attempt to stifle their ambitions. Before the outbreak of the Revolution, the Scotch-Irish, aided by the Germans, had succeeded in overthrowing Quaker control of the Pennsylvania colonial government. It was natural that they should look favorably upon a move for independence from Britain. On the Indian frontier in the other

colonics white settlers were equally irked by what seemed to them to be England's obstructive Indian policy. Everywhere, along the frontier there was a dislike and distrust of the power across the sea which would neither help the settlers to advance into the Indian country nor protect them, in their frontier homes, from hostile Indians.

Thus it was that the people of the frontier joined with those in the more densely settled East in the struggle for independence. When the Declaration of Independence was read aloud from the Virginia Gazette to the little gathering of backwoodsmen in the Kentucky wilderness, at Boonesborough, in the summer of 1776, it was greeted with wild huzzas by the frontiersmen.²⁵ Possibly they did not fully realize what was in store for them in consequence of their opposition to the Crown.

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ON THE REVOLUTION'S WESTERN FRONT:

Border Warfare of the Revolution, 1776-1783.

"The Indians hung like the sythe of death
on the rear of our settlements."

- De Witt Clinton.

One of the grievances of the Colonists against the British king set forth in the Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) was that "he has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions." At the time this was written the Colonists were already engaged in a war in which Indians aided, encouraged and not infrequently led by British officers, were to perpetrate some of the most savage and murderous attacks on frontier settlements in the history of our country. While the forces along the eastern front were fighting a war with Great Britain to gain our independence, the rear-guard of the Revolution was waging a desperate struggle along a western front extending all the way from New York to Georgia. That these valiant frontiersmen were not only able to defend the thin line of settlements, but were also able to extend the settlements further into the country of the hostile Indians, and to wrest from Great Britain the control of the Illinois Country during the course of the war, is a tribute to the tremendous courage and virility of the American people of those days.

The Employment of Indians in the Revolution.

In both England and the Colonies the Revolution was viewed as a white man's war. At first efforts were made to keep the Indians neutral. The Continental Congress (July 12-13, 1775) created three departments of Indian affairs on a geographical basis -- Northern (extending as far south as to include the Iroquois); Southern (extending as far north as to include the Cherokee); and Middle (including the region between the other two). Commissioners were appointed to treat with the Indians in order to keep their peace and friendship.¹ England's agents were also busy among the western Indians.

By the spring of 1776 all pretense of keeping the Indians out of the struggle was abandoned. Both sides began to openly seek Indian assistance. Massachusetts had already secured the aid of the Stockbridge Indians when May 25, 1776 the Continental Congress resolved that "it was highly expedient to engage the Indians in the service of the United Colonies" and offered to employ 2,000 Indians with a reward of \$100 for every British officer and \$30 for each soldier taken prisoner.²

But in the contest to gain Indian allies the Americans were greatly handicapped. The cause of the Colonics, suffering from the defeats of 1776, was not one to inspire confidence in the Indians who always preferred to fight on the winning side. The Americans had few effective agents among the tribes, and they were unable to furnish the Indians with the liberal supplies of presents and provisions demanded by the Indians. The British, on the other hand, had been initially successful, and had influential agents among the tribes who were able to supply them with goods. Britain's trump card, however, was the advantage of being able to assume the role of protector of the tribal lands against the aggression of American settlers. Her agents could point to Britain's efforts to protect the Indians in the past (Proclamation of 1763), and hold out to the Indians the probable disastrous results to them should the land-hungry Colonists win the war.³

Thus the British were more successful in gaining Indian allies along the western frontier. Indians were not slow to realize that the British were aiding them to fight their own battle against the advancing white frontier. It is estimated that there were at one time or another more than 12,000 Indians in arms in the pay of Great Britain.⁴ The damage which these Indians did to American settlements and settlers was tremendous. Campbell stated that 400 Seneca warriors in 3 years on the border took more than 1,000 scalps, 290 of them having belonged to women and 28 to children.⁵ Encouraged by scalp bounties, the Shawnee and other Ohio Valley tribes, as well as the southern Indians were urged on to ruthless warfare on the settlements. British officers were unable to control the blood-thirst of her Indian allies once they had been loosed upon outlying settlements. As the war wore on the news of the outrages of the British Indians reached Europe and served as a factor in turning other European powers against Great Britain. Finally, realizing that it was no longer expedient to employ Indians in the war, the British began to abandon them and to ignore every obligation even to protect them.⁶ Yet the Indians fought on, realizing the penalty that would be exacted of them should the Revolutionists succeed. The Colonics, also, were not innocent in the matter of offering scalp bounties during the war. Several of them offered bounties to the frontiersmen for Indian scalps taken. But Congress did not sanction this, and Continental officers, where they were used, refused to recognize such offers.⁷

The War on the Border.

The border warfare of the Colonists during the Revolution was fought for the most part by frontier settlers rather than by trained soldiers. All the men from the west who could possibly be spared went east to serve with the Continental forces. Thus, drained of much of its strength, the Rear-Guard of the Revolution faced the hostile Indians on the western frontier. For ease in understanding the struggle that ensued we shall

consider the border warfare of the Revolution under three geographical heads: (1) On the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania, (2) On the frontiers of the Dark and Bloody Ground of Kentucky and the Northwest, (3) On the Southern frontier. Let us look at the activity along the third one first. In that region border warfare got under way at an early date:

1. On the Southern Frontier.

In the Revolution all four southern confederacies -- Cherokee, Creeks, Chickasaw, and Choctaw were with the British cause. The Cherokee were most active, and the worst sufferers. While the Creeks ineffectively raided the Georgia and Carolina settlements,⁸ the Cherokee turned their attention to the thriving little settlements of Watauga, which at the beginning of the Revolution had a total population of about 600.⁹ In the summer of 1776 the Cherokee received fifty horse-loads of ammunition from the British.¹⁰ Forewarned of an attack on their settlements the Wataugans were ready with their two forts Patrick Henry (held by 170 men) and Lee (by 40 men). The men of Patrick Henry left the fort to meet the Indians, engaged a force of over 300 Cherokee July 20, 1776, and killed 40 without the loss of a man. Thus began the defense of Watauga which, prior to this time, had been free of Indian attack. Sevier, at Fort Lee, heard of the success and declared it was "a great day's work in the woods." Next day the Cherokee attacked Fort Lee, but were repulsed. After twenty days they withdrew with their two prisoners. One, a young man, was burned at the stake. The other, Mrs. Bean, wife of the first white settler, was saved from burning by Nancy Ward, the Cherokee seer, and friend of the whites.¹¹ Watauga's steadfast defense served to keep the Wilderness Road to Kentucky open. Meanwhile other Cherokee warriors made depredations on the North Carolina and Georgia frontier.

White retribution was swift and terrible. In the same year, 1776, four southern colonies devised a united attack on the Cherokee. From Georgia an expedition destroyed their towns on the headwaters of the Tugaloo and Chatahoochie Rivers; while an expedition from South Carolina destroyed their villages on the Savannah River; another from North Carolina brought destruction to the Cherokee on the headwaters of the Little Tennessee and the Hiwassee; and a fourth expedition from Virginia completed the work of destruction among the Overhill towns on the Little Tennessee. In all 50 towns were burned, their crops ruined, horses and cattle driven off. Many Indians were killed, died of starvation, sold into slavery or forced to flee to the Creeks or Florida for safety. This campaign has been called "the most successful Indian war of the Revolution."¹² In a swift, united stroke the four Colonies had broken the power of the Cherokee, and forced them to sue for peace. At De Witt's Corner (May 20, 1777) South Carolina made a treaty with the Cherokee by which the Indians ceded their land on

the Savannah River and all lands east of the Blue Ridge Mountains and the disputed territory on the Watauga, Nolichucky, Upper Holston, and New Rivers. These treaties were the first entered into by the new State governments after independence from Great Britain had been declared.¹³ On the very day of the second treaty, James Robertson of Watauga was commissioned North Carolina agent among the Cherokee, to live with them and oppose the British agents among them. For a year he lived with the Indians, successfully thwarting British plans among them.¹⁴

For the remainder of the Revolution after 1776 there was no organized Cherokee warfare against the settlers. But isolated bands harried the frontier, and one faction of the Cherokee, under Dragging Canoe, refused to come to terms with the Americans and retired down the Tennessee to Chickamauga Creek.

The successful campaign against the Cherokee in 1776 had taught the frontiersman a lesson -- the effectiveness in Indian warfare of carrying the war into the Indian country. This technique was used with devastating effect by Evan Shelby, John Sevier and James Robertson in the future wars of the Tennessee frontier.

For nearly three years after the Cherokee defeat in 1776 Watauga was free from Indian fighting. Then, late in 1778, the British, in an attempt to enlist the western Indians in a great move on the rear of the Colonies in which Hamilton and his northern Indians would come south, meet the Cherokee and other southern tribes at the mouth of the Tennessee and together lay waste the frontier, the British transported large supplies of ammunition to Dragging Canoe. While Hamilton was delayed in the north by George Rogers Clark, Dragging Canoe, impatient, began a series of attacks on the settlements. To combat this renewed hostility, an expedition of 750 settlers from Watauga and other communities of the west, under Evan Shelby, made a surprise attack on Dragging Canoe's village early on the morning of April 13, 1779, killed 40 warriors, put the rest to flight, captured the great store of British powder, burned the village, and on captured horses returned to Watauga. They had made certain that Dragging Canoe would be powerless for at least a year to come.¹⁵

This bold stroke made possible the extension of the white frontier into central Tennessee by the founding of the Cumberland settlements by James Robertson in the winter of 1779-80. The region on the Cumberland, then known as French Lick, had for some years been recognized as a fine game country with soil fertile for agriculture. It was now proposed to plant settlements there. Accordingly Robertson with an advance party of men went overland in 1779, to locate the best place for a settlement and put in a crop of corn. They arrived Christmas day and began the construction of a fort at the present Nashville. Meanwhile John Donelson was to bring the families by water. Leaving Fort Patrick Henry December 22, 1779, the party of 120 women and children with 40 men to handle the boats

and fight Indians, traveled down the Holston to the Tennessee, down the Tennessee to the Ohio, up the Ohio to the Cumberland, and up the Cumberland to the site selected by Robertson. The distance traveled was 985 miles, through hostile Indian country. Several Indian ambushes were encountered along the way which took their toll of whites. At one time (March 8, 1780) Stuart, his family and friends, who followed behind the others because they had smallpox, were attacked by Indians. All were killed or captured -- to the number of 28. On April 24, 1780 the journey ended at Robertson's fort. This trip was "a project as audacious as any of its kind in history."¹⁶

For defense the new settlements on the Cumberland were grouped around eight "stations" spread out over 40 miles. At first the Indians were content to stay out of range of the forts, to steal cattle and shoot individuals who ventured away from their cabins. Out of the 256 men, 39, one by one, were killed in the short period of 60 days. In the entire first year of the settlement only one settler died a natural death. The hostile Indians were Chickasaw and Choctaw. Some time between mid-January and spring of 1781 Robertson managed to make peace with these tribes.¹⁷ Then, April 2, 1781, the Cherokee opened attack on the Cumberland settlements, and in the following two years nearly one-half the whole population perished by violence -- one was killed, on the average, every six days. During the third winter (1781-82) there was no loss of life from the Indians. Next march the first addition to the settlements came in the form of 20 Tory riflemen who sought shelter, and after some debate were taken in on probation. In the summer of 1782, North Carolina veterans with bounty land warrants came with their families to add new strength to the sadly depleted population. In 1783 only 21 settlers were killed by Indians.¹⁸ Thus, under fire of hostile Indians, began the settlement of central Tennessee -- while the Colonies were still engaged in their war for independence.

In 1780 Cornwallis urged Thomas Brown, superintendent of the Eastern Tribes, to bring on a Cherokee attack on the settlements of Watauga, Nolichucky, Holston and in Kentucky, in an attempt to withdraw the southern frontiersmen from the American armies. But Sevier, returning from the successful Battle of King's Mountain with the British, heard of the plan and set out in his usual aggressive style of carrying the war into the Indian country. In three campaigns, in three successive years he smashed the opposition, laid waste their villages, destroyed their crops and cattle. In 1780 he led his men against the Overhill Cherokee, and completed the destruction of more than 50 towns of these people and their Creek allies with the loss of but one of his men.¹⁹ In 1781, with a force of 130, he stormed the Cherokee strongholds in the Great Smoky Mountains with stunning effect. In 29 days he and his men were home again without the loss of a single man.²⁰ In 1782, with 200 men, he went against the Chickamauga towns and defeated an army of some 500 mixed Tories and Indians in a thrilling

battle on Lookout Mountain.²¹ The Cherokee had met more than their match in John Sevier. In these three brilliant campaigns, he showed those qualities of leadership -- celerity of movement, impetuosity of attack -- that made him probably the most successful Indian fighter in American history. During his twenty years of Indian fighting this able Frenchman, affectionately known to his men as "Nolichucky Jack" engaged in thirty-four battles -- large and small, with a total loss of six men killed.²² Every battle was a victory!

The other southern tribes were little more successful than the Cherokee in aiding the English. The Spaniards had strong influence over the Choctaw and some of the Creeks. The Indian alliance did, however, serve to prevent an American attack on Mobile, and their constant threats against the frontiers of the southern colonies served to weaken the American armies fighting near the coast. In Georgia the Choctaw and Creeks aided the English in the struggle for Savannah.²³ Yet in 1783 Georgia forced the Creeks and Cherokee to cede a large tract of land situated about the sources of the Oconee River and owned jointly by them. Next year the counties Washington and Franklin were created from these ceded lands, and the region was settled by whites -- largely Scotch-Irish from the Carolinas.²⁴

The British southern Indian department did not officially come to an end until December 24, 1783, when the salaries of these officers were abolished.²⁵

2. Border Warfare of Kentucky and the Northwest.

Indians who had contended for the privilege of hunting in Kentucky for a prolonged period before the white man laid eyes on the region had known it as "a dark and bloody ground."²⁶ In some such works Draggins Canoe had described Kentucky to the frontiersmen. At Sycamore Shoals in the spring of 1775, a wise chieftain had sagely remarked to the prospective settlers, "it is a fine land we sell you, but I fear you will find it hard to hold."²⁷ The years of the Revolution proved that Indian to be an able prophet.

Widespread Indian depredations on the Kentucky frontier began in July 1776. Settlers were murdered, horses and cattle stolen, cabins burned. Whites in outlying areas and the smaller settlements fled to the larger stations for protection. Many of them, in dread panic, left Kentucky for the security of their old homes east of the mountains. Yet, in the midst of this demoralization, the Indians seemed content to burn abandoned settlements and murder isolated families. They made no attacks on the white strongholds in 1776.²⁸ Meanwhile, George Rogers Clark, then only 24 years of age, was trying to get the Virginia Council to acknowledge Virginia's claim to Kentucky by aiding in its defense against the Indians. After their initial refusal Clark bluntly told them, "a country which is not worth defending is not worth claiming."

Whereupon the Council reversed its decision, and gave Clark an order for five hundred pounds of gunpowder to be conveyed to Pittsburgh and delivered on his order for the use of the inhabitants of Kentucky. Late in 1776 Clark and a companion procured the powder at Pittsburgh and set out in a small boat down the Ohio, hotly pursued by Indians. It was early 1777 before the precious, much needed ammunition was safely delivered to the Kentucky settlements.²⁹

In the early spring of '77 Clark took regular military charge of the defense of the Kentucky settlements. He arranged for the employment of six spies, detailed in turn, two each week, to range up and down the Ohio and about the deserted stations on the look out for Indians. They added much to the security of Kentucky until the great Indian invasions began with the advance of spring.³⁰

At the beginning of 1777 -- the terrible year of the three sevens, the bloody year in Kentucky, there were some five or six hundred pioneers, huddled together in the stockaded forts of the region.³¹ While in far off Detroit, Henry Hamilton, the British Lieutenant Governor was making presents and promises to the Indians north of the Ohio in return for their assistance in projected attacks on the Kentucky frontier. Toward the end of February he had decided on a crushing blow to smash the settlements of Boonesborough, Harrodsburg and Logan's Fort. Thus he would (1) put an end to Kentucky colonization (2) make Virginia again a frontier accessible to Indian attack (3) conciliate the Indians by restoring to them their beloved hunting grounds south of the Ohio and (4) hold in the west colonial forces which might profitably be used in the east.³²

Some 200 of Hamilton's Indians under British officers crossed the Ohio in March. Harrodsburg was the first settlement attacked (March 7). Forewarned, the settlers successfully held off the Indians, until April 15, they switched their attack to Boonesborough. After two futile days this attack also was abandoned. On May 20, a sudden attack was made on Logan's Station by about 100 Indians. Numbering but 34 people (only 12 men), and short of powder (Logan himself made a ten-day journey to the Holston settlements while the fort was under fire to secure more), the Indian "siege" was repulsed until Col. Bowman's force of 100 men brought relief from Virginia. Hamilton's campaign thus failed to accomplish its object. But it did check the progress of settlement in Kentucky. All travel in and out of the country, either by the Wilderness Road or the Ohio River, was practically stopped. Before the year was over Harrodsburg had been besieged three times and Boonesborough twice. Though less than 50 miles apart these stations were frequently isolated from one another by Indians. Hamilton reported to Secretary Germain July 27, 1777 that he had sent out 15 war parties composed of 289 Indians with 30 British officers and rangers. These parties were generally small, numbering about 15 to 35 men, with occasionally a larger one.³³ Among the people of Kentucky it was generally believed that Hamilton had offered the Indians scalp bounties. Contemptuously they referred to him as the "Hair-buyer General."

The Kentuckians in their defense of 1777 had demonstrated that they could "take it." In the next year they showed that they could "give it" as well, by successfully carrying the war into enemy country.

By January 1778, Kentucky was deserted save for the three forts that had successfully weathered the Indian attacks of the year before, whose combined garrisons, exclusive of occasional militia bands sent out by Virginia, numbered only one hundred fighting men, and whose total population, men, women, and children did not exceed 200 persons.³⁴

In the fall of '77, George Rogers Clark journeyed to Virginia to spread before Patrick Henry an ambitious plan for carrying the war into the Illinois Country where the British posts were lightly held, surrounded by lukewarm French settlers and traders. As originally conceived this expedition was regarded as an aggressive defense of Kentucky from British and Indian attacks. As it worked out it had a much more important bearing on the history of the nation.³⁵

With the blessings and encouragement of leading Virginians, and armed with a secret set of instructions from Patrick Henry, Clark proceeded to organize, at Redstone on the Monongahela, the following May, a volunteer force of something over 200 men and floated down the Ohio. Clark's daring and successful capture of the British strongholds at Vincennes and Kaskaskia 1778 are not part of our Indian story. Of greatest importance were the councils which he held with the Indians, chiefly at Vincennes, during which he dramatically and boldly presented his arguments for war or peace and offered the assembled chiefs and warriors from the tribes of the lakes and the Illinois Country their choice. He gave them a day to think it over. They returned to join in a treaty of peace, which was of vital importance to the success of Clark's campaign in the northwest. Had the Indians opposed him, Clark's little army would probably have been cut to pieces.³⁶ Another important accomplishment of the expedition was the capture of Hamilton, who on December 17, 1778 had retaken Vincennes with the aid of a large force of Indians, whom he thereafter dismissed for the winter. He held the post with but 80 white men when Clark, after his memorable sixteen-day march through the swamps, reached Vincennes and forced Hamilton's surrender. It is notable that Clark himself refused to use his loyal Piankashaw Indians against Vincennes, fearing their fury once aroused. As a captive Hamilton was conducted to the settlements. Thus ended the career of the "Hair-Buyer General" in the Revolution.

From Vincennes Clark wished to go on to Detroit to take that important center from which Indian raiding parties went out to Kentucky. But the size and condition of his command did not permit of his making this bold stroke.

Meanwhile Boonesborough was again under fire. In June 1778, Daniel Boone returned from a series of harrowing experiences north of the Ohio to warn the settlers that an Indian attack on Boonesborough was soon to come. August 8, the enemy arrived -- more than 400 Indians and a dozen Frenchmen, led by Capt. Duquesne. The stout hearted defenders, 75 men in all, refused to surrender, and gamely resisted the siege, until Duquesne gave up trying on August 20, and withdrew his force. This was the last siege of Boonesborough. It was no more successful than the two of 1777.

Beginning in 1778, new settlers began to arrive in Kentucky from the east. Two new settlements in addition to Clark's little garrison on Corn Island were founded in 1778. Fourteen more were started in the next year. And in 1780 immigration further increased. During the first months of that spring three hundred large family boats arrived at Louisville with 3,000 persons aboard. Other portions of Kentucky saw a similar growth in population.³⁷

In June 1780, Col. William Byrd, a Tory officer, at the head of some 800 Indians, with a detachment of soldiers and some artillery, crossed the Ohio, and in quick succession captured Ruddles' and Martin's Stations. Had this strong and well equipped force been held together it might easily have wiped out the Kentucky settlements. But sated with two easy victories, with many scalps, a goodly pile of plunder, and a large number of prisoners, the Indians declined to go farther, and retired across the Ohio.³⁸ Thus, again, as it had in 1776, Indian satisfaction with easy victory saved Kentucky from annihilation.

Clark promptly assembled 1,000 volunteers for a counter invasion, crossed the Ohio, and in four weeks demolished three Indian villages (including Chillicothe and Piqua) and returned to Kentucky. The Indians were left destitute to face a hard winter. This timely expedition so subdued the Indians that no great body of them entered Kentucky for almost two years, although small parties continued to burn and kill. Col. John Floyd wrote to Jefferson in April of 1781: "We are obliged to live in forts in this country and notwithstanding all the caution we use, forty-seven inhabitants have been killed and taken prisoners by the savages, besides a number wounded since January last."³⁹

In the spring of 1782 Indian attacks began on all sections of Kentucky with terrible effect. Massacres were common. Then suddenly, about the beginning of August, the attacks abruptly ceased. But the settlers were not deceived. They had learned to lie low and await a renewed and fiercer attack. It came at daybreak August 15, in the form of an attack on Bryant's Station, by a force of some 400 Indians led by Capt. William Caldwell, and roused to a fury against the settlers by Simon Girty, arch-villain of the Revolution in the Ohio Valley. The siege was ineffectual. Augmented by reinforcements, the Kentucky frontiersmen followed the retreating enemy, attacked them at the Blue Licks, and were beaten back with great loss. Of the 182 Kentuckians in the battle 67 were killed, and seven others captured (four of whom were later tortured to death). It was the "most disastrous defeat of pioneer times" in Kentucky.⁴⁰

Again George Rogers Clark organized an expedition of over 1,000 men to cross the Ohio, and to revenge the defeat at Blue Licks. Again they were successful in devastating Indian villages, and in addition, destroyed the British trading post at the head of the Miami. Then, finding all attempts to force a pitched battle fruitless, and with winter coming on, Clark led his force back to Kentucky.⁴¹ Clark's punitive campaign took the heart out of the Shawnee and their allies. They never again invaded Kentucky in large force, although they continued their desultory raids for more than a decade.⁴²

Thus, fully a year after Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown ended hostilities in the east, the Revolution came to a close on the Ohio Valley front. For the Indians it had been a war of lost opportunities. Once in 1776 and again in 1780, they had had the Kentucky settlements at their mercy, but they refused to deliver the knockout punch. Through this refusal they lost their opportunity to regain Kentucky. For the frontiersmen the war had been a constant nightmare, a succession of terrible Indian attacks, and fights for their lives behind their tall stockades. When they took the aggressive, and marched into the Indian country the Kentuckians, led by the daring and cunning Clark, had been uniformly successful. Their stout defense and courageous offense had held Kentucky. The influx of new settlers after 1777 had strengthened it. By the close of the Revolution Kentucky was beginning to emerge from a frontier outpost to the status of a settled community. The 70,000 settlers who came to Kentucky in less than eight years following the catastrophe at Blue Licks brought new vitality to the region, and rapidly changed the appearance of the area. In 1790, Boonesborough, leading outpost of Kentucky in the Revolution, was not even mentioned in the enumeration of towns in the census of that year.⁴³

3. On the Frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania.

Although southwestern Pennsylvania was virtually settled by the outbreak of the Revolution, the frontier of Pennsylvania in the northwest had progressed no farther than the Wyoming Valley in the northeastern portion of the present state. And the Mohawk Valley was still the western frontier of New York. Much of the border warfare in these colonies, therefore, was fought east of the mountains and at no great distance from the fighting of the Americans and British on the eastern front. North and west of the Wyoming and Mohawk Valley settlements were the Iroquois, no longer the great power they had been before the middle of the century, but still strong enough to prevent the deep penetration of their country by settlers, and strong enough to be feared in battle.

Thus Pennsylvania and New York, at the outbreak of war, bent their efforts to keep the Iroquois neutral. But England had more powerful agents working for her. The intelligent, educated Mohawk chief, Joseph Brant, had been in England during the winter of 1775-76. There he secured the promise of Lord Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, that the land grievances of the Iroquois against the colonists would be redressed. He returned to America determined to throw his weight forcefully on the side of the British. On May 31, 1776 the Iroquois entered into an agreement to permit each tribe of the confederacy to exercise its own discretion in taking sides in the conflict. It was not long, therefore, before British agents with the aid of Brant won over all the Iroquois except the Oneida and about half of the Tuscarora to the British side.⁴⁴

At Fort Pitt, in the fall of 1775, the Americans were more successful. A treaty was made with the Wyandot, Delaware, Mingo and a portion of the Seneca, by which these groups agreed to remain neutral in the coming struggle. Although this agreement was broken mid-way in the war it was effective during the early years, at a time when the frontier of western Pennsylvania was comparatively defenseless and lacking in powder and supplies to carry on an Indian war. It also made possible the sending of men from the frontier to strengthen the Continental armies.⁴⁵

Frontier warfare began in New York in 1776, but the first battle of importance was the bloody one of Oriskany in August 1777, in which many Iroquois, allies of the English in the army of St. Leger, were killed. Later, near Fort Stanwix, St. Leger's Indians heard of the advance of a large force of Americans and fled. St. Leger could not control them.

Meanwhile, in later May 1777, Guy Carlton had directed Hamilton at Detroit to make a diversion and alarm the frontier of western Pennsylvania. By the first of April, the settlers of that region were in panic. Most of them fled to the posts or across the mountains.⁴⁶ But the little group of settlers who gathered at Fort Henry at the mouth of Wheeling Creek (in the present West Virginia) resolutely faced a threatened Indian attack. On September 1, Simon Girty, at the head of over 350 Indians (Mingo, Shawnee and Wyandot) attacked the fort. The defenders were reduced from 42 men to 13 after two desperate sorties into the open. But the 13, with the active assistance of their women folk (some of whom handled guns at the port-holes), stood firm until reinforcements arrived next day. Whereupon, Girty's men set fire to all the nearby cabins, killed nearly 300 head of cattle and withdrew. Considering the weakness of the defending force, and the number of the opposition this defense was one of the most remarkable in the border warfare of the Revolution.⁴⁷

The year 1778 was a bloody one for the New York and Pennsylvania frontiers east of the mountains. The Tory, Col. John Butler, roused the Iroquois to aid in a raid on the Wyoming Valley settlements of Pennsylvania, at a time when a large proportion of the able bodied white men of that region were away in the service of the Continental Army. In May, settlers observed enemy scouting parties in the Valley and began to flee to the forts. The British-Indian force, numbering about 400 whites and 700 Indians (mostly Seneca), invaded the Valley in June. Butler's demand for the surrender of Fort Wyoming was refused. The inexperienced army of defenders, not realizing the strength of the enemy, marched out to give battle, July 3. Mercilessly the Indians and British pounced on them in what has since been known as the "Wyoming Massacre." Butler reported that 227 scalps were taken in this struggle.⁴⁸ There followed "the Great Runaway" -- the hurried abandonment of the frontier by the settlers of northern Pennsylvania. Following the action of July 3, Butler's force devastated the beautiful Wyoming Valley. In all about 300 settlers were killed. Butler claimed that on this expedition he had "taken eight palisades, six forts, and burned about one thousand dwelling-houses, all their mills, etc."⁴⁹ It was one of the most complete jobs of destruction of white settlements in the history of the American frontier.

Meanwhile Brant was harrying the New York frontier. On May 30, he attacked Cobleskill, and on June 18, Springfield. In the fall a force of some 200 Tory Rangers and 500 Indians led by Walter Butler and Joseph Brant fell upon the New York frontier settlements. This raid culminated in the attack and massacre at the village of Cherry Valley, November 11. The settlement was unprepared for a sudden attack. Forty-three persons were killed and about 40 taken captive. All the houses and outbuildings were burned.⁵⁰

The havoc wrought by the Indians in the frontier raids of 1778 was well known to the Continental Congress, when in February 1779 it directed General Washington "to take effectual measures for the protection of the inhabitants and chastisement of the savages" in the region devastated. Washington chose General John Sullivan to head a punitive expedition for "the total destruction and devastation of the Indian settlements, and capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible." Detained until supplies could be obtained, Sullivan left Wyoming, July 31, began the devastation of Indian villages August 12 (Chemung), was joined by a force under Clinton August 22. The combined force, now numbering 5,000, advanced into the Indian country. At Newtown a force of some 500 Indians and 200 Loyalists attempted to halt Sullivan's march -- in vain. Sullivan went on to the Genesee country, burning Indian villages and destroying their crops as he advanced. On September 7, his men completely ruined Ganundasaga, the chief town of the Seneca. Continuing their march of destruction the force returned to Wyoming September 20. Meanwhile Col. Brodhead, in command at Fort Pitt, had at Washington's order, made

an effective attack on the Iroquois villages of the upper Allegheny, preventing them from joining in the defense against Sullivan. On their campaign Sullivan's men had gone the Indians one better in the way of barbarity. They had mutilated the bodies of the enemy (scalping them and flaying their skin for boot tops). They had destroyed orchards and growing crops -- which the Indians had never done. They had burned cabins in which helpless Indians, promised protection, still remained.⁵¹ To the Indians Sullivan became known as the "town-destroyer," and Washington too was feared for his part in initiating the campaign. Eleven years later Washington was told by a deputation of Iroquois who visited the capitol, "to this day, when your name is heard, our women look behind them and turn pale, and our children cling close to the necks of their mothers."⁵²

After Sullivan's withdrawal the Seneca and Cayuga were left destitute to face the unusually severe winter of 1779-80. Some 2,600 Indians, dependent upon the British for food, spent the winter near Fort Niagara. Only their dependence kept the Cayuga loyal to the British cause.⁵³

Yet, despite the severity of Sullivan's punishment, the Iroquois were not pacified. They rebounded with fresh fury to raid the New York frontier and revenge their losses. Even while Sullivan was organizing his expedition, Brant was leading raiding parties on the exposed settlements in the Goshen region. On the night of July 19, he attacked Minisink and set fire to more than 20 buildings. The settlers, gathering in force, rashly decided to pursue the Indians. On July 22 they came upon a much larger Indian force and were mercilessly beaten. Of the 149 who went out to seek battle, only 30 returned.⁵⁴ Brant was at Niagara in the winter of '79 rallying his discouraged red allies to a new assault. In the spring of 1780, raiding began along the upper Mohawk. Harpersfield and German Flats were burned. That summer, cooperating with Sir John Johnson, Brant fell on the Canajoharie settlement, August 2. Late in that month Brant and Johnson worked together to lay waste the Mohawk Valley. In October the Schoharie Valley was raided, until General Van Rensselaer, in command of militia, drove out the invaders.

Still the Indian attacks on the settlements were not ended. Small bands continued to harry the New York and northern Pennsylvania frontier even after Cornwallis had made his peace with the American armies at Yorktown. After the treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States in 1783, Brant, still retaining his commission as a British officer, and drawing half-pay, found it impossible to remain in the country of the victorious enemy. He accepted land promised him on the Bay of Quinte in Canada. To it he removed with a large portion of his faithful Mohawk followers and some people from the other Iroquois groups. Here he continued to rule over his followers until his death in 1807.

White settlements on the Indian frontier

during the Revolution had been under fire all along the line from New York to Georgia. In Pennsylvania and New York the frontier settlements had been pushed back by the fierce Indian-British attacks. But across the mountains Watauga and Kentucky had stood firm. In Tennessee, in the midst of the struggle, Robertson had moved the frontier westward to the center of the state, declaring, "We are the advance-guard of civilization, and our way is across the continent."⁵⁵ After the Revolution his example was followed by thousands. All along the line the frontier began to move farther into the Indian country.

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33. SLOCUM, C. E.
The Ohio Country, 1783-1815. (1910), pp. 12-14.
34. McELROY, ROBERT McNUTT
Op. cit. (1909), p. 71.
35. Idem. p. 91 states ... "peace with the savage tribes had been the chief incentive for his expedition." In a letter to Clark of January 3, 1778, G. Wythe, G. Mason and Thomas Jefferson recognized the importance of this expedition as a revenge against Indian attacks. (Letter quoted in McElroy, pp. 76-77).
36. BUTLER, MANN
History of Kentucky. 1834 Edition. Chapter IV contains detailed descriptions of Clark's negotiations with the Indians during this period.

37. McELROY, ROBERT McNUTT
Op. cit. (1909), pp. 98-101.
38. Idem. p. 103.
39. Idem. p. 104.
40. Idem. pp. 106-111.

and

BRADY, CYRUS T.

Op. cit. pp. 138-146.

41. McELROY, ROBERT McNUTT
Op. cit. (1909), p. 113.
42. BRUCE, H. ADDINGTON
Op. cit. p. 282.
43. Idem. p. 303.
44. WISE, J. C.
Op. cit. p. 214.
45. MOHR, WALTER
Op. cit. p. 34.
46. SHIMMELL, L. S.
Op. cit. p. 71.
47. DAWSON, HENRY B.

Battles of the United States by Sea and Land. (New York, 1858), pp. 267-272, Vol. I. This defense is full of dramatic exhibit possibilities, not the least of which is Betty Zane's daring run to a cabin outside the fort for powder. The defense is well described by contemporaries.

48. Idem. p. 430.

49. DAWSON, HENRY B.
Op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 430-431.
50. Idem. Vol. I, pp. 469-471 gives contemporary accounts of the Cherry Valley affair.
51. Idem. pp. 533-542.
52. AMBLER, CHARLES H.
George Washington and the West. (Chapel Hill, 1936), p. 166.
53. MOHR, WALTER
Op. cit. p. 81.
54. DAWSON, HENRY B.
Op. cit. pp. 528-532.
55. GILMORE, JAMES R.
Op. cit. (1900), title page.

A NEW NATION FACES THE INDIAN PROBLEM:

The Frontier Moves Toward the Mississippi, 1784-1810.

"It may be taken for a certainty that not a foot of land will ever be taken from the Indians without their consent."

- Thomas Jefferson, 1786.

Of the vast territory secured by the United States from Great Britain at the close of the Revolution not far from two-thirds was unoccupied by white men. It was still Indian country. The first census in 1790 showed that considerably less than one-eighth of the white population of the United States lived west of the mountains.¹ While the Indians continued to hold the greater portion of the country that part was of little more value to the United States than it would have been were it in the control of a foreign power.

Freedom from England removed official restrictions on frontier settlement. But it did not weaken Indian opposition. The process of pushing back the frontier in the Indian country had been legally defined. Indian land could only be obtained by the Federal Government through treaties with the Indians. But the impatient pioneers could not wait until treaties could clear the way for them. They were continually invading the forbidden Indian land and embarrassing the government in costly Indian wars.

The Indians, encouraged by the Spanish in the south and the British in the north, who wished to use them as buffers between the Spanish and British areas and to control their trade, continued to oppose the advance of settlement. Yet despite these obstacles the frontier continued to move westward through alternate periods of warfare and treaty making during the period 1784 to 1810.

Development of the Federal Indian Policy.

The Articles of Confederation, ratified by the states in 1781 provided that "The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states; provided that the legislative right of any state, within its own limits, be not infringed or violated."² But the authority of the Confederation was ignored by both individuals and the states. In 1783, (September 22) the encroachments on Indian land had reached such a stage that Congress found it necessary to issue a proclamation forbidding all persons from making settlements on or

purchasing lands belonging to the Indians.³ Georgia, North Carolina, and New York ignored the Confederation and made separate treaties with the tribes or enacted laws relating to them. Meanwhile during the life of the Confederation eight treaties were made with the Indians by the Federal Government. The Constitution, ratified in 1790, gave Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."⁴ The first Congress under the Constitution, on August 7, 1789, established the War Department, headed by the Secretary of War, upon whom was specifically imposed all duties "relative to Indian affairs."⁵

Since 1789 the Federal Government has exercised the power of treating with the Indians in all the new states created after 1789 as well as with all those who were on the frontier in the original 13 states in 1789 -- i. e. in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and New York.⁶

In a statement issued December 15, 1789 the War Department acknowledged its responsibility for protecting the frontiers against the Indians.⁷ But it was never very successful in protecting the Indian's land from the encroachment of land-hungry frontiersmen. In 1796 an effort was made to define the boundary line between the area opened to settlement and the lands occupied by the Indians beyond which neither surveyors nor settlers nor white hunters nor cattlemen were allowed to penetrate. The mere entering of Indian land south of the Ohio without a passport was declared punishable by fine or imprisonment. Thus the Federal Government declared its good intentions toward the Indians. But although the boundary was defined again in 1799 and once more in 1802 it was never surveyed to any great extent, and white trespass could not be prevented by the meagre force available to the War Department.⁸

For nearly a century after the adoption of the Constitution (until 1871) the Indians were treated as foreign nations residing within the limits of the United States, whose right of occupancy of their tribal lands could only be legally violated by treaty, with agents of the Federal Government, and ratified by the Senate. Thus did the government try to safeguard the Indian's land from the aggressive penetration of its own people.

On the Iroquois Frontier

White settlements had advanced very slowly in the 175 years since the Dutch discovery. Since the establishment of Albany the frontier of settlement had averaged a move of less than one-half mile a year toward the northwest. At the close of the Revolution New York's western frontier was still the Mohawk Valley. But as soon as the Revolution ceased New Englanders began to pour into upstate New York. The Americans began to demand that the Iroquois, who had so long proved a barrier to white settlement in central and western New York, should be expelled because of their hostility in the recent war.

In 1784, agents of the Federal Government met representatives of the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix and negotiated the first Indian land cession following the Revolution. It was an important meeting. Before it had ended the Iroquois had given up their claims to the greater part of central New York, and all their land in Pennsylvania (comprising the northwestern portion -- over one-fourth the total area of the state), with the exception of a few small reservations. Four years later all the Iroquois lands in New York were included in Montgomery County. Finally the treaty with the Seneca in 1797 provided for the cession of the greater part of their large reserve which had comprised nearly all of New York west of Genesee. From that time on the Iroquois have lived on small reservation areas, surrounded by white settlements. By 1820, as a result of the energetic work of large land speculators the 18,000,000 acres ceded from the Iroquois since the Revolution had been largely acquired by white settlers, the great majority of whom were immigrants from New England.⁹

And what of the fate of the Iroquois, once the red conquerors of a large portion of northeastern United States, now reduced to small reservation holdings -- Cornplanter's reserve in Pennsylvania, a few scattered areas in New York and in Canada! Red Jacket, long an active voice in the lost cause of opposing the break-up of Iroquois lands, said shortly before his death in 1832, ... "my heart fails when I think of my people, who are soon to be scattered and forgotten."¹⁰ But several decades before this the reformed Seneca drunkard, Handsome Lake, had devised a formula which was to help the Iroquois to make the difficult transition from a free savagery to a confining civilization. In the Code of Handsome Lake was found the body of moral teachings which was to save the Iroquois from the sad demoralization of the majority of the neighboring Indian groups.¹¹

On the Indian Shore.

Even after the settlement of Kentucky was assured by the Kentuckian's successful defense during the Revolution, the north side of the Ohio was known as "the Indian Shore." At the close of the Revolution the area north of the Ohio was still unsettled Indian country, and the British who flaunted the treaty of 1783, by holding on to the lake posts within the area relinquished to the United States by that treaty, meant to use their influence to keep this region as a buffer state between them and the western settlements of the United States.

But the United States had other ambitions, and began to take steps to open the region north of the Ohio to settlement. At Fort Stanwix the Iroquois had relinquished their claims in the region. At Fort McIntosh (1785) and at Fort Harmar (1789) treaties were made with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomie, and Sauk tribes which ceded their claims to land on the Indian Shore.

In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, setting up the mechanism for the settlement, government and political development of the entire region north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi, a sane and humane procedure for dealing with the Indians was provided.... "The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded on justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them."¹²

At the time of the passage of this Ordinance there were not more than 30,000 whites in the entire Northwest Territory, an area in excess of 275,000 square miles. Nearly all of these people were living in the settlements at the present Cincinnati and Clarksville and other points on the Ohio; at Fort Wayne, South Bend and Vincennes in the present Indiana; at Peoria, Kaskaskia and Cahokia in the present Illinois; at Detroit, Sault Ste. Marie, and Mackinac in the present Michigan, and at Green Bay, Prairie du Chien and La Pointe in Wisconsin. The overwhelming majority of these settlers were French.¹³

The first legal settlement in Ohio was made at Marietta in 1788. But by this time the Muskingum, Scioto and Miami Valleys were practically deserted by redskins. By burning Indian fields and ruining their important springs the whites, largely from across the river in Kentucky, had driven the Indians back -- Indians who since the first settlements in Kentucky had harried the outlying settlements in that region.¹⁴

The treaties at Fort McIntosh and Fort Harmar proved ineffective as means of opening southern Ohio to peaceful settlement. Not included in these treaties were the ever hostile Shawnee, and the Miami, the most powerful tribe of Ohio and Indiana. Both resented white intrusion and refused to make peace. Treaties with the other tribes were of little value so long as these two groups refused to recognize any boundary between them and the settlements that would give the whites land north of the Ohio.

Encouraged by the British who supplied them with equipment for war, and fearful of the growing number of settlers north of the Ohio, the hostile Indians, with renewed fury, unleashed their attacks on the Kentucky settlements, and ambushed flatboat immigrant parties on the Ohio. Sometimes they employed renegade whites to lure the boatmen ashore before the Indians rushed from cover to fall on the unsuspecting whites. In the two years prior to 1790, upward of 1,500 persons were killed and much property destroyed. By September 1790, not only the Shawnee and Miami, but also the Ottawa, Potawatomi, Delaware, Wyandot, Mingo and Chippewa -- treaty signers -- were in open hostility.¹⁵

In June of 1789, Gen. Henry Knox reported to Washington that murders by Indians were being committed on both sides of the Ohio, that the inhabitants were exceedingly alarmed through the extent of 600 or 700 miles, and that "the injuries and murders have been so reciprocal that it would be a point of critical investigation to know on which side they had been the greater."¹⁶

By the summer of 1790, despairing of ever settling the difficulties by peaceful means, a force ordered by Washington to be used in an expedition against the Indians, was gathered at Fort Washington. From western Pennsylvania came 500 raw recruits, as unfit for field service as any that could be found. "So impotent were they that, 'the crowd of discarded, unjust serving men, and revolted tapsters that followed Falstaff to the field of Shrewsbury would have put it to shame.' Instead of soldiers accustomed to bearing arms, came old men tottering on their legs, or beardless youths, nervously fingering their firelocks, half of them 'too ignorant to take off a lock to oil it, or put in a flint so as to be of use.'¹⁷ Augmented by recruits from Kentucky and Ohio, the force then numbered about 1,100 recruits and 320 regulars. At the head of this motley army Gen. Harmar set out on an expedition against the Miami villages in September, burned a number of Miami villages and destroyed their corn, and later sent out small detachments against the Indians, who under the leadership of the Miami chief, Little Turtle, defeated the Americans in scattered encounters. Having lost nearly 200 men, Harmar ingloriously retreated. Meanwhile the American commander at Vincennes, Major Hamtranck led an expedition against the Wabash towns, encountered no resistance; and after burning a few villages and destroying some corn, returned to Vincennes. Thus ended the first military operations of the new nation after the close of the Revolution. Although they had destroyed considerable property they failed to harm the enemy. The Indians, on the strength of their success against Harmar, were encouraged to renewed aggressions. Informed of Harmar's failure, Washington ordered St. Clair to take personal command of another expedition.

Kentucky had little faith in St. Clair, and organized its own expedition of 800 mounted riflemen, under Brig. Gen. Charles Scott. In June 1791, they approached the Wabash towns, and in four days, killed 32 Indian warriors, took 58 prisoners, burned a number of villages and stores and returned to Kentucky without the loss of a man.¹⁸

Unable to secure volunteers from Kentucky, St. Clair drafted 1,000 Kentuckians to help make up his force of some 2,000 volunteers, and 2 small regiments of regulars. October 4, 1791 he led his army north from Fort Washington. On the eastern fork of the Wabash the Indians, again led by Little Turtle, attacked and utterly routed St. Clair's predominantly raw force (now reduced to 1,400 by desertion). Nearly half of St. Clair's men were killed, and less than 500 straggled back to the settlements with no injury. It had been a headlong flight. It was the greatest Indian victory since Braddock's defeat. St. Clair then resigned his military command.¹⁹


From the successive failures of Harmar and St. Clair the Federal Government learned that (1) more care should be taken in selecting officers for important Indian expeditions, and (2) better trained fighting men were needed if these expeditions were to be successful.

In the spring of 1792, encouraged by easterners who had no sympathy for the frontier war, attempts were made to secure peace with the hostile tribes through councils. Two men sent for this purpose to the hostile towns in June were murdered by young warriors. In the fall Rufus Putnam made a treaty with the Wabash and Illinois tribes which served to keep many of the warriors of those tribes out of actual hostilities. In May 1793, three commissioners went to Niagara and received the word of the Iroquois and British authorities that peace was desired, but later at Detroit they were unsuccessful. The Ohio Indians refused to consider any terms that did not acknowledge the Ohio River as the boundary line.²⁰


Failure of peace negotiations left the fate of the northwest in the hands of Anthony Wayne, whom Washington had placed in charge of military operations in the region after St. Clair's resignation. In the summer of 1792, Wayne recruited a force of green men at Pittsburgh and put them through a course of rigorous training, in both marksmanship and maneuvers. By September of the next year he had his army of 2,500 men, known as the "Legion" at Fort Washington. In October he advanced northward, built Ft. Greenville and wintered there, while an advance force built Fort Recovery. By June 1794, with 1,400 mounted Kentucky militia added, Wayne had the largest and best trained force that had ever been turned against the Indians west of the Alleghenies. Late in July he advanced to find the Indian towns deserted, built Ft. Defiance and sent offers of peace to the Indians. Little Turtle counseled peace, but was overruled. The Indians, counting on British aid, returned evasive answers. Wayne then proceeded toward the British Fort Miami on the Maumee.

Near Fort Miami Wayne encountered the Indians in a thick brushwood encumbered with fallen trees, the effect of a hurricane, on the north side of the river. Here the large Indian force, led by Little Turtle, and including warriors from the Chippewa and some Iroquois as well as of the Ohio tribes, awaited battle. There followed the Battle of Fallen Timbers, August 20, 1794, which resulted in a crushing defeat for the Indians. Wayne estimated the number of the enemy at 2,000, of his own troops actually engaged at about 900. After the battle the woods were strewn with the dead bodies of Indians and their British aids, the latter armed with British muskets and bayonets. In Wayne's army had been 120 Chickasaw allies.

Wayne then built Fort Wayne, and his soldiers destroyed Indian crops and villages. In November the army returned to Fort Greenville for winter quarters.







The Indians, no longer counting on British aid, began to sue for peace. General pacification came in the summer of 1795. At Greenville gathered the most impressive group of Indians that had ever come to debate their claims west of the Alleghenias -- Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Miami, Eel River, Wea, Kickapoo, Piankashaw, and Kaskaskia -- all were represented. There were 1,130 Indians from 12 tribes. Speeches were many and long. Finally on July 30, the treaty was signed which gave the whites 25,000 square miles of territory east and south of a boundary line agreed upon, and north of the Ohio. A goodly portion of the treaty dealt with the reservation of small areas north and west of the line for forts, and with provision for the free passage by certain routes to and from these areas by the people of the United States. Little Turtle was the last to sign the treaty, saying as he did so, "I am the last to sign it, and I will be the last to break it."

The Treaty of Greenville marks an important point in the history of the Indian frontier. It put an end to 40 years of warfare in the Ohio Valley, in which it is estimated 5,000 whites had been killed or wounded. For three years these wars had cost a million a year.²¹ At the same time the treaty marked the beginning of fifteen years of peace between Indians and whites in the Old Northwest. It was not until after this treaty that the settlement of the Northwest Territory on a sizeable scale began.

While the Greenville Treaty brought peace with the Indians of the Northwest, Jay's Treaty (November 19, 1794) secured the British promise of withdrawal from their posts in United States territory by mid 1796. Thus the military frontier of our nation moved deeper into the Indian country north of the Ohio. At the close of the Revolution Fort Pitt and Fort McIntosh had been the westernmost United States posts. In 1785 the construction of a line of posts down the Ohio had begun. During the Indian campaigns, 1790-1795, additional posts were built in the interior north of the Ohio. Now, with the acquisition of the lake posts, most of these earlier ones were abandoned. Villages took their places. Far in advance of settlement, the military frontier now reached Fort Mackinac, Detroit, and Forts Miami, Wayne and Knox.²²

The years 1796-1810 were ones of peace in the Old Northwest, during which Ohio passed from an Indian wilderness to statehood, and southern Indiana (as we now know the state) was opened to white settlement.

In 1801 Jefferson inaugurated the policy of concentrating the Indian tribes to make their surplus lands available for settlement. In the next four years 15 separate treaties were made with the Indians to that end.²³

On July 4, 1805, at Fort Industry, the Indian claims to a large area of north central Ohio, northwest of Wayne's Treaty line were ceded to the United States. By 1810, all of the present Ohio save the northwestern portion, and a few, small and scattered reserves elsewhere in the state, had passed into the possession of white men.

William Henry Harrison, who in 1800 had been appointed first governor of Indiana Territory, was given the added powers of Commissioner of Treaties in 1803. In that year he began to make treaties with the Indians of southern Indiana (as we now know it), in an effort to obtain legally the land on which white settlers had already begun to "squat." Bit by bit, through treaties in 1803, 1804, 1805, and 1809 he acquired the desired area. The Treaty of Fort Wayne in September 1809, alone gave the whites three million additional acres. This area included the rich game country of the Wabash Valley, and roused the ire of Tecumseh, of whom we shall hear more. It also marked the last peaceful acquisition of Indian land in the Old Northwest for six years. Meanwhile British influence again helped to turn the northwestern tribes against the United States in open warfare. Only the quelling of this rebellion could permit further advance of settlement in the northwest.

SOUTH OF THE OHIO:

1. In Kentucky.

The Kentucky settlements grew rapidly after the close of the Revolution. Yet the Indian problem was still an important one in this region. Although the larger settlements were free from Indian attack after 1783, Indians continued to fall on outlying cabins with great loss of life and property, and to attack emigrant parties on both the Wilderness Road and the Ohio River until after 1790. If possible travel down the Ohio was in large parties capable of defending themselves against Indian attacks, and travelers journeying either way over the Wilderness Road went in "companies." Typical of the ads run in the Kentucky Gazette for the organization of eastbound companies over the Road is the following which appeared November 1, 1788:

NOTICE

A large company will meet at the Crab-Orchard the 19th of November in order to start the next day through the Wilderness. As it is very dangerous on account of the Indians, it is hoped each person will go well armed.

Judge Innis wrote from Kentucky, July 7, 1790, "from November 1783, to the time of writing, fifteen hundred souls have been killed in the district and emigrating to it, upward of twenty thousand horses have been taken and carried off, and other property to the amount of at least fifteen thousand pounds."²⁴

The Indian danger played an important part in Kentucky's movement for separation from Virginia. In 1784, discovering plans for extensive Indian attacks on Kentucky from both north and south, Col. Logan called a general meeting at Danville, at which it was found that the people of Kentucky had no legal power to conduct aggressive military operations. They, therefore, decided to gain protection for themselves by requesting the Virginia Assembly to pass an act enabling the District of Kentucky to organize as a state and seek entrance into the Union. In an address, "To the Inhabitants of the District of Kentucky," adopted by the Second Assembly, in May 1785, the first point listed in favor of Kentucky's separation was, "We have no power to call out the militia, our sure and only defense, to oppose the wicked machinations of the savages unless in case of actual invasion."²⁵ The separation idea was laid before the Virginia Assembly by Kentucky representatives the following November. Virginia assented to the move, provided it was the will of the Kentucky people as expressed in a convention. Meanwhile James Wilkinson and others were using the arguments of Indian dangers and need for favorable trade through New Orleans as reasons for complete separation of Kentucky from the United States. In the convention Wilkinson was voted down. But a series of delays prevented the admission of Kentucky to statehood until 1792. Isaac Shelby, frontier leader and successful Indian fighter was elected first governor of Kentucky, the first state to be admitted from west of the mountains.

2. South of Kentucky

The American frontiersmen faced a dangerous Spanish Indian alliance from the close of the Revolution until the Pinckney Treaty of 1795. Spain sought to aid the Indians in their struggle against the advancing settlers, and by using the Indians as buffers, to protect her own claims to the disputed territory in the Old Southwest.

Leader of the hostile Indians was the crafty half-breed Creek chief, Alexander McGillivray, who June 1, 1784, entered into a treaty with the Spanish at Pensacola, whereby the Spaniards were to supply the Indians with arms and ammunition with which to attack the Watauga, Cumberland and Georgia frontier settlements. Under McGillivray's leadership were 6,000 Creeks, 2,000 Seminole and 2,000 Chickamauga. But the remaining 3,000 Cherokee and the 7,000 Choctaw and Chickasaw refused to join him.²⁶

A. The Cumberland Settlements.

With but half his desired force McGillivray sagely decided not to attack Sevier's Watauga settlements, preferring the smaller, weaker Cumberland ones, whose able bodied men at this time numbered only 600.²⁷ Had the Indians attacked these settlements in great force they might have wiped out the whites on the Cumberland. But they preferred to lie in wait in small numbers and pick off those who dared travel any distance from the stockades. As result, the Cumberland settlements suffered from no massacres, but their strength was gradually taken by continued losses of individuals. For the first fifteen years of their existence (1780-95) the Cumberland people lost an average of one life every ten days to the Indians.²⁸

Aided by the friendly Chickasaw, Robertson and his men held on until the summer of 1787, when hearing of a concerted attack planned by the Creeks, Robertson sought help from North Carolina -- to no avail; from Kentucky -- where aid was promised after the fall crops were harvested. Fearing this would be too late Robertson, in desperation, wrote to his old friend Sevier: "We hope our brethren will not suffer us to be massacred by the savages, without giving us any assistance; and I candidly assure you there never was a time in which I imagined ourselves in more danger."²⁹ Sevier quickly responded, sending over 200 "tall Watauga boys" with an abundance of ammunition on to Cumberland. Then he led a force of 400 to the mouth of Elk Creek to hold back the invaders. But the anticipated general attack did not occur.³⁰

Still fearful of a general Indian attack, Robertson vainly sought to negotiate with the Spanish officials and with McGillivray himself. He even began to make overtures for a Spanish alliance, writing to Miro in September 1789: "We cannot but wish for a more interesting connection. The United States afford us no protection."³¹

Yet, in spite of continued Indian dangers, the Cumberland settlements grew in size and population. Between 1784 and 1790 the population doubled. The settlements in 1790 extended up and down the Cumberland River about 85 miles, and from extreme north and south some 25 miles -- an extreme frontier of at least 200 miles. But they still lived in or near fortified stations -- numbering not less than 35 in 1790.³² Life went on under the tremendous nervous strain of the constant threat of Indian attack. "A man did not go for a bucket of water without his gun, and tobacco was hoed under guard within sight of Nashville's courthouse on the bluff."³³

In 1790, McGillivray journeyed to New York, made a treaty with the United States, and was himself made a brigadier-general in the United States Army. Playing both sides, this "Creek scoundrel," as Robertson termed him, returned south to obtain increased pay from Spain and ample supplies to continue his attacks on the frontier settlements of the United States.

Cumberland was relatively free from Indian depredations from 1790 to the spring of 1792. Meanwhile Federal aid came in the form of a force of 190 soldiers, and supplies for the friendly Chickasaw.³⁴ For two more years after 1792 there were frequent Indian attacks on the outlying settlements. The Knoxville Gazette devoted a column regularly to disasters on the Cumberland. By 1793 less than a score of the 256 original settlers on the Cumberland in 1780 were still alive.³⁵ Robertson was forbidden to carry the war into the enemy country, as it would hinder United States negotiations with Spain. He had to be content with fighting defensively.³⁶

In the fall of 1794 an expedition under Major Ore fell on the Chickamauga stronghold, killed 70 Indians, and burned two towns. The hostiles sued for peace in November.³⁷ This campaign finally put an end to Cherokee attacks on the Cumberland.³⁸ The next year Cumberland aided the friendly Chickasaw in their successful war against the hostile Creeks.³⁹ In the same year the Pinckney Treaty was signed. Cumberland, at last, was free to live in peace.

B. East Tennessee.

In 1784 North Carolina ceded to the United States its land west of the mountains, leaving the Wataugans, some 25,000 in number without either State or Federal protection against the Indians. Quickly the Wataugans set up a sovereign state of their own under the Presidency of Sevier. One of his first acts as head of the proposed state of Franklin, was to conclude a treaty with the Cherokee by which the Indians gave up their claim to land south of the French Broad on which some 3,000 white settlers were already settled. But Congress, feeling its treaty-making power invaded, proceeded to make a Federal treaty with the Cherokee at Hopewell November 28, 1785, by which the Cherokee ceded a wide strip south of the Cumberland. But the cessions of Sevier's treaty were negated -- all lands south of the Holston relinquished, and the settlers there declared intruders on Cherokee land. North Carolina issued a proclamation ordering the settlers to remove at once. But the treaty and proclamation were equally ineffective. The Federal and State Governments had promised the Indians too much. Settlers remained on the disputed land and Sevier with his militia kept the Indians in check.⁴⁰ By 1787 the Franklin movement had dissolved. Three years later the Territory South of the River Ohio was formed, with its protection confined to its governor, William Blount, with James Robertson and John Sevier as militia leaders. In July 1791 a land cession from the Cherokee gave the settlers legal right to land south of the French Broad, and also made possible the founding of Knoxville as the seat of Blount's government. Cherokee and Creek raids on East Tennessee settlements continued for two more years during which Sevier also carried the war to the enemy country effectively. His campaign of 1793 was Nolichucky Jack's last Indian warfare -- as usual it was successful.

By 1795 East Tennessee was at peace, and in the next year, in response to the demand of a delegation from the Watauga and Cumberland regions, Tennessee was admitted to the Union as the second state west of the mountains (June 1, 1796). John Sevier, Tennessee's most able Indian fighter, was made its first governor. At this time more than three-quarters of the area of the state was unceded Indian land. It took 39 more years to remove the Indians (Chickasaw and Cherokee) from Tennessee.

C. On the Georgia frontier.

At the close of the Revolution the Indian title to land in the present Georgia had been extinguished only in the area between the Ogeechee River and the South Carolina line and a tract along the coast about 50 miles wide in its northern half and 30 miles wide in its southern half. Nearly four-fifths of the present Georgia was still unceded Indian country.⁴¹ The struggle for land farther west in Georgia was one between Georgia traders and settlers on the one hand, and the Creeks, backed by British fur traders who supplied them with arms and ammunition, on the other. Although sporadic warfare along this frontier was common prior to 1786, the desperate struggle began in April of that year with the murder or expulsion of Georgia traders among the Creeks. This was continued intermittently until 1790. It was concluded by the Creek treaty at New York (August 7, 1790), by which the Creeks ceded a narrow strip of land between the Ogeechee and Oconee Rivers, and recognized the sovereignty of the United States so far as their towns lay within its limits.⁴² Unorganized warfare between Georgians and Creeks, nevertheless, carried on, and the Creeks successfully opposed the running of the boundary provided by the treaty. Relations with the Creeks remained hostile until 1795, when news of Wayne's victory in the north tended to quiet the southern tribes. In 1796 Benjamin Hawkins negotiated a treaty of peace with the Creeks at Colerain, and through his influence as agent, peaceful relations with the Creeks were maintained until the War of 1812.⁴³

The Pinckney Treaty.

The long negotiations with Spain were finally ended (October 27, 1795) by the Treaty of San Ildefonso, negotiated by Thomas Pinckney for the United States. It settled the long standing boundary dispute in the Old Southwest by setting the dividing line at the thirty-first parallel, and opened the Mississippi to American commerce. This treaty was also influential in quieting the southern tribes who had depended on Spain's active assistance in carrying on the war on the American frontier. It had been a costly war for Spain. In a dispatch to the Spanish ministry, February 24, 1794, the Baron de Carondelet stated that the yearly expenditure in presents and pensions to the Indians, had cost \$55,000 -- nearly the entire revenue of Louisiana.⁴⁴

South of Kentucky 1796-1810.

These were years of peace in the Old Southwest during which the four great red confederacies developed rapidly in the arts of civilization. In this region white settlers were fewer in number than in the Old Northwest and the Indians larger in total population. It is probable that the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw and Creeks in the Old Southwest (excluding the Spanish possessions) numbered 100,000 souls shortly after the beginning of the 19th century. Their land holdings were larger than the whole area of New England, New Jersey and Delaware combined.⁴⁵ During the period prior to 1810 only a small military force was stationed in the Old Southwest.

In 1798 Congress established the Mississippi Territory (including all of the present Mississippi and Alabama north of the 31st parallel). But the relinquishment of Indian lands in the new Territory was a slow process. The Natchez region and a narrow horizontal strip westward into the present Alabama were opened to settlement by 1810. Nearly all the remainder of the Territory was still unceded Indian land in 1810. By 1810 the Creeks had relinquished land as far west as the Ocmulgee River in central Georgia. But Indians still held the greater part of the state. All of Tennessee west of the Tennessee River was still Chickasaw territory, and the southeastern portion of the state (together with small adjacent areas in North and South Carolina) belonged to the Cherokee. The Old Southwest in 1810 was still predominantly Indian.

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SMASHING THE BRITISH-INDIAN ALLIANCE:

Tecumseh and the War of 1812.

"What! Sell land! As well sell air and water. The Great Spirit gave them in common to all; the air to breathe, the water to drink, and the land to live upon."

- Tecumseh.

The fifteen years of peace on the Indian Frontier following the Wayne and Pinckney treaties were too favorable to the white advance to continue. During the period the Indians of the Old Northwest saw their choice hunting grounds passing into white possession piecemeal, through successive treaties made by a handful of petty, fearful village chiefs. Intelligent Indians foresaw their ultimate dispossession from all their lands if this procedure continued unchecked. Yet the numerous, relatively small and scattered northwestern tribes could not hope to cope with the whites effectively unless they were united. British assistance also was sorely needed.

The situation again was ripe for the emergency of a magnetic Indian leader -- a greater man than Pontiac had been -- who would bring the tribes together in common cause against the United States.

The Rise of Tecumseh and his Brother the Prophet.

In November 1805 the Shawnee, Tenskwatawa, announced to his tribesmen in Ohio that he had received a revelation from the Master of Life to the effect that the Indians would only find the happiness that was theirs before the coming of the whites by following a way of life distinct from that of the whites -- refusing their firewater, their dress, tools and all customs derived from the whites, ceasing intermarriage with white men, and holding all their lands in common as of old. Great enthusiasm followed his revelation. News of the Prophet's teaching spread to the other western tribes. When, in the summer of 1806, the Prophet correctly predicted an eclipse of the sun, his stature as a great man of supernatural powers was assured. Emissaries spread his doctrines as far as the Seminole of Florida and the Blackfoot of the northern plains.

Stronger than the Prophet was his twin brother, Tecumseh, who had distinguished himself as a warrior in the Ohio Valley wars of the 1790's. Together the twins conceived the idea of a great Indian confederacy of all the western tribes from the Lakes to the Gulf and from the Alleghenies to the Rockies. The union was to consist of the warriors of the tribes, with a warriors' congress as the organ of popular government. Joint ownership of all Indian land was to be assumed by the Confederacy, and the

piecemeal cession of territory by local chiefs under government pressure was to be made impossible. In the big Indian council at Greenville, in 1807 the idea of the league was clearly explained for the first time.¹ In the same year the British in Canada began to actively seek an Indian alliance.² At Tippecanoe on the Wabash the twins established a village in which they attempted to practice the principles of life they had propounded. Industriouslly their people tilled the soil. All white customs were abandoned.

When, in 1809, Harrison gathered a number of timid village leaders at Fort Wayne and secured a valuable land cession from them, Tecumseh's ire was roused. Next year he met Harrison at Vincennes and forcefully warned him not to continue such land deals. It was a picturesque meeting. Both sides, distrusting the other, were armed. No amicable settlement was possible.

By this time Tecumseh's influence on the northwestern Indians was so great that no petty chiefs dared cross him by ceding more land to the whites. Yet Tecumseh did not want war with the whites. The work of organizing the western tribes still required his time and attention.

Early in 1811 Tecumseh journeyed south to win the populous southern tribes over to his confederacy. He secured the aid of the Red Sticks, the warrior towns of the Creeks. But he failed to win over the Chickasaw whose half-breed leader, William Colbert, was an ardent friend of the United States who had fought on the side of the colonists in the Revolution and with the whites in the Ohio Valley wars. He had no ear for Tecumseh's talk. Tecumseh continued south to the Choctaw. In a midnight council on the Tombigbee he debated with Pushmataha before an assembled multitude of Choctaw and Chickasaw the merits of his confederacy. Pushmataha prevailed. As result Tecumseh lost the assistance of some 6,000 to 8,000 Choctaw and Chickasaw warriors.³

The Impatient Prophet.

During Tecumseh's absence in the south his brother the Prophet was in charge at the village at Tippecanoe. Meanwhile the English were generously handing out presents to Indian visitors at Malden. The young warriors of the northwest were restless. Rumors of depredations on the border reached Harrison at Vincennes.

Late in September (1811) Harrison, itching for a military reputation, led out a force of over 900 well-armed men toward Tippecanoe, 175 miles to the northeast. He neared the Prophet's town November 6 and camped. The Indians called for a parley the next day.

At four next morning the Indians attacked. In the hot Battle of Tippecanoe that followed, the Indians were repulsed. Next day Harrison found the Prophet's town deserted. Harrison burned it and returned to Vincennes.

Tippecanoe had been a small battle. But it was very important. Without Tecumseh's sanction the Prophet had gone to war and been beaten. He was now to become discredited as a prophet among his fellows. The battle had given Harrison ample evidence of British aid to the Indians. In a letter to Col. John M. Stuart of Frankfort, Kentucky, December 2, he wrote:

"Within the last three months the whole of the Indians on this frontier have been completely armed and equipped out of the King's stores at Malden... The Indians had moreover, an ample supply of British glazed powder -- some of their guns had been sent to them so short a time before the action, that they were not divested of the list covering in which they are imported."⁴

The news set the frontier aflame with enthusiasm for a war with Great Britain. There is reason for regarding the little skirmish at Tippecanoe as "the real beginning of the War of 1812 in the West."⁵

Before the Outbreak of War.

It was more than seven months from the struggle at Tippecanoe to the American declaration of war against Great Britain. But the frontier of the Old Northwest was the scene of conflicts in the interim. In the spring of 1812 Indian depredations caused panic among the settlers. Two settlers were murdered near Fort Dearborn; an entire family was massacred near Vincennes, etc. May 6, Harrison reported "Most of the citizens of this country have abandoned their farms and taken refuge in such forts as they have been able to construct."⁶ Many others fled to Kentucky and more distant regions.

The well known British encouragement of the hostile Indians was one of the important factors in the declaration of war June 18, 1812.

The War of 1812 in the Northwest.

At the outbreak of war American settlements north of the Ohio scarcely reached back fifty miles from that river in the present states of Indiana and Illinois. Ohio was still but partially settled. The frontier posts far in advance of settlement had to be defended from a base two hundred miles away, joined by a single road, so long and dangerous that every supply train had to be prepared to fight its way through. Our isolated posts on the Great Lakes were inadequately garrisoned and unprepared for war.

As was expected Tecumseh, with 1,500 warriors joined the British in Canada, and became "the real force behind the British campaign in

the West."⁷ On August 14, 1812, Tecumseh met Isaac Brock, the able British commander at Malden. Together they planned the attack on Detroit.

The first year of the war was one of bitter failure for the Americans in the northwest. A large British force took Mackinac before the American commander had been informed that a state of war existed. William Hull, Governor of Michigan Territory, who had the initial responsibility for the conduct of the war in the west, was timid and fearful. He ordered the evacuation of Fort Dearborn -- resulting in the terrible massacre of a large proportion of the garrison as it left the fort, August 15. Two women and a wagon full of children were among the murdered. Thus, Hull's great fear of Indian outrages led to one of the most bloody ones in American history -- the Fort Dearborn Massacre.

While Mackinac and Dearborn fell farther west, Hull was counciling retreat from Detroit. But his subordinates would not hear of it. He still had about 1,000 men in the fort when Brock on the night of August 15, crossed the river and approached the fort with a force which included some 600 Indians. Next day Hull flew a white flag over Detroit, and surrendered his entire force, without any sign of struggle. Hull's fear of Tecumseh's Indians was an important factor in the surrender.

While Hull was still at Detroit the popular William Henry Harrison was organizing a force and gathering supplies to go to his relief. But Detroit fell before his preparations were made. In December Harrison's force was in northern Ohio, while Gen. Winchester pushed on to Frenchtown on the Raisin River, within 18 miles of Malden, where some 5,000 British and Indians under Col. Proctor, Brock's successor in the West, were collected. Early in the morning of January 22, 1813, the British suddenly attacked, with a superior force comprised largely of Indians. Nearly all the American force were killed, wounded or taken prisoners. The terms of surrender included the provision that the survivors would not be subject to Indian attack. While the able bodied prisoners were being taken to Malden, the wounded (numbering some 30) were left at Frenchtown to be later carried to Malden. On the morning of the 23rd some 200 Indians returned to Frenchtown and massacred the helpless sufferers. This massacre made Americans on the western frontier see red. Throughout the remainder of the war, the cry "Remember the Raisin" was all that was needed to stir Americans into battle.

In late April Proctor laid siege to Fort Mies, Harrison's strongest post on the Maumee. On May 5, eight hundred militiamen under Green Clay, crossed the river and drove the British temporarily from the field. The militiamen followed, and were nearly all captured in the counter attack. Some 40 were massacred by the Indians before Tecumseh put an end to the slaughter. Later the Indians tired of the siege and Proctor was forced to return to Malden.

Again in July, Proctor returned to Fort Miesg, and after failing to draw the Americans into an open battle, left his Indians there, while he went on to unsuccessfully attack Fort Stephenson, in August. Again he withdrew his forces.

Perry's capture of the British fleet on Lake Erie on September 10, made it impossible for the British to hold Detroit. General Proctor, and the faithful Tecumseh, each now with fewer than a thousand men, set out in retreat to Niagara. The force was demoralized, encumbered by baggage and refugee families. It moved slowly as Harrison followed in hot pursuit with some 3,500 men, many of whom were mounted. On October 5, Harrison caught up with the British-Indian force, and in a short, decisive action featured by the charge of his Kentucky mounted riflemen, soundly defeated the enemy. In the heat of battle Tecumseh was killed. It was a tragic end to perhaps the most able Indian leader in American history, whom the British had made a brigadier-general, and whom Proctor had called "the King of the Woods."⁸

This was the last important action of the War of 1812 in the northwest. It did not put an end to Indian depredations on the frontier, but it hastened Indian disorganization. Indian depredations in Michigan and Indiana continued into 1814. In that year Indiana offered the last American scalp bounty.⁹

Through the successful war in the northwest Michigan was saved for the United States. On October 29, 1813, Lewis Cass, who had played a prominent part in the military affairs of the war, was made governor of Michigan Territory. In September of the next year he organized a series of expeditions against the Indians who had been taking lives and property of the French settlers along the Raisin River. The Indians were beaten, and the settlers' fears quieted.¹⁰

At the peace negotiations begun at Ghent in August of 1814, the British envoys were instructed to demand among other concessions, that the British be given control of the Great Lakes and that a neutral belt, or buffer state of Indian territory be established in the northwest between the United States and Canada. But the able United States delegates were not only successful in refusing these demands, but also in consummating a treaty, signed Christmas Eve, 1814, that simply provided a cessation of hostilities and a return to pre-war boundaries.¹¹

The War of 1812 in the Old Southwest.

It was fortunate for our country that of all the populous southern tribes, only a part of the Creeks made war on the frontier during the War of 1812. These hostiles were angered by the encroachment of settlers on Indian land in Georgia, encouraged by the personal visit of Tecumseh in 1811, and supplied with materials for war by the British.¹²

News of the fall of Detroit, further encouraged the Red Stick Creeks who began to commit depredations on neighboring peaceful Cherokee villages. By 1813 the Creeks were turning their attention to the white settlements. At Fort Mims on the Alabama River, 553 persons gathered for protection from the Creeks in that vicinity. There were settlers with their families and negro slaves, and some 225 soldiers. Major Beasley, in charge, grew careless after more than a month of having this large body of people cooped up in the little stockade. When a force of some 1,000 Creeks attacked at noon on August 30, the gates were unprotected. In the brutal struggle that followed only twelve whites escaped. The negroes were taken alive for slaves. Between 450 and 500 men, women, and children were massacred. The Creeks themselves may have lost over 400 warriors in the conflict.¹³ It was the most bloody action of the War of 1812 in the west.

Again panic reigned among the frontier settlers of Georgia, Tennessee, and Mississippi Territory. But before long the more 4,000 hostile Creeks discovered they had tipped over a hornets nest. Not only the whites but the Chickasaw, Choctaw, Cherokee, and some friendly Creeks turned against them.

In Tennessee Andrew Jackson took command of an infantry force October 7, and sent spies ahead into the Indian country to learn of the number of the hostiles and the disposition of their force. Faced with difficult problems of obtaining supplies, and of cutting a road across the mountains, it was November before fighting began. On November 3, his subordinate, Gen. Coffee destroyed the town of Tallushatchee, killing 200 hostile warriors. Six days later Jackson defeated the Creeks at Talladega. The hostiles lost another 300 warriors. But Jackson was prevented from following up his advantage for two and one-half months. His men, faced with starvation through lack of supplies, mutinied. The greater portion of his force left him. Jackson himself was so weakened by dysentery he could hardly stand.

Finally in January 800 raw recruits were added. Jackson pushed forward. At Emuckfaw Creek (January 22, 1814) and again at Enotachapco (January 23) the Creeks attacked, but Jackson marched on, his army strengthened by 5,000 men, including regulars.

At Horseshoe Bend the Creeks prepared to make a stand, constructing a log fortification across the bend's neck, the other sides of which they believed were protected by the river. But Jackson surrounded the Creek stronghold, attacked the fortifications with his main body, carried the breastworks, and forced the Indians to fight hand to hand or to risk crossing the river to face the fire of his surrounding force. Five hundred and fifty-seven Indian dead were counted on the ground and 200 more were killed or drowned in the

river. Jackson had allowed the women and children to be carried to safety before attacking. This Battle of Horseshoe Bend, March 27, 1814, was the decisive battle of the campaign. The hostile force of 900 Creeks was "practically exterminated."¹⁴

This action ended the Creek War, in which some 2,000 Creek warriors had been killed. Weatherford, leader of the hostiles, who had not been present at the Horseshoe Bend fight, later came to Jackson at Fort Jackson on the Alabama and dramatically gave himself up.

Then came the demands of the victor -- as terrible as the war itself. In council at Fort Jackson in August, Jackson demanded that the Creeks surrender 23 million acres of their land (an area which now comprises one-fifth of Georgia and three-fifths of Alabama) as indemnity to cover the cost of the war against them. The demand was acknowledged by the treaty of August 9, 1814, signed by 35 friendly Creek chiefs and one who had been hostile.¹⁵

Thus "as Wayne and Harrison had opened the Northwest, so Jackson cleared the way for white advance into Alabama and Mississippi."¹⁶

"The flood-gates of Virginia, the two Carolinas, Tennessee, Kentucky and Georgia, were not hoisted, and mighty streams of emigration poured through them, spreading over the whole territory of Alabama. The axes resounded from side to side, and from corner to corner. The stately and magnificent forests fell. Log cabins sprang, as if by magic, into sight."¹⁷

In 1810 there had been 40,352 people in the old Mississippi Territory. In the succeeding decade the states of Mississippi (1817) and Alabama (1819) were admitted to the Union. By 1820 Alabama alone had over three times the population of the entire Mississippi Territory in 1810.

Yet for a quarter of a century after the War of 1812 a sizeable portion of the Old Southwest remained in the hands of the Indians.

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EXPANSION AMID CONFUSION:

The Indians as a Factor in the Acquisition of Florida.

"For a little war this had vast results."

- Flora W. Seymour.

In the War of 1812 the United States found the solution to the problem of maintaining her northern boundary in the Great Lakes country inviolate. But at the close of that war the boundary problem in the south was still a confusing one. South of the United States Spain still clung to the Floridas. But her hold was weak, so weak that she was unable to control the peoples within her borders. Florida had become a haven for runaway slaves from Georgia. Seminole raiding parties crossed into the United States and then fled to safety back into Florida. Spain, treaty bound to control her Indians, had insufficient military power to do so. Americans hesitated to invade the land of another power to regain their slaves and punish Indians who had caused havoc in their settlements. The international boundary in this section was proving an embarrassment to both powers.

Meanwhile expansionists in the United States, who looked with favor upon the acquisition of Florida to round out our possession of the entire eastern half of the continent south of Canada, were urging the government to make negotiations with Spain for the cession of Florida. Such negotiations were already under way, but were making little headway, when the complexities of a vigorous Indian war hastened their completion.

After the War of 1812 the Seminole and Negroes of Florida continued to raid United States settlements. In 1817, Major General Gaines attacked a party of Seminoles at Fowltown just north of the border. These Indians had refused to vacate lands included in the Creek cession of 1814. The administration had expected trouble with these Indians and was aware that they might "serve as pawns in the larger gamble for Florida. The War Department ordered Gaines to continue his offensive against the Indians, pursuing them into Spanish territory if necessary, but to molest no Spanish military post without further orders."¹

On December 26, 1817, Secretary of War Calhoun ordered General Andrew Jackson to Georgia to supercede Gaines with broad instructions to "Adopt the necessary measures to terminate.. conflict."²

Eleven days after receiving orders Jackson was under way with troops. On the night of March 9, 1818, he reached Fort Scott and took command of 800 regulars and 900 Georgia militia. He lost little time in crossing into Florida to Negro Fort. Then, hearing that the Indians were demanding arms of the Spanish commandant at St. Marks and were probably in possession of that town, Jackson marched to St. Marks, took it without resistance, (the Indians had departed) and lowered the Spanish flag (April 7). Next day he hung Francis the Creek prophet and Homolimicke another hostile Creek leader. The Scotch trader, Arbuthnot, suspected of aiding the Indians was held for trial.

April 9th, he left St. Marks to attack the Indian villages of Suwanee River. He reached the village of Chief Boleck in eight days, only to find it empty. Returning to St. Marks, Jackson gave Arbuthnot and Ambrister (another British subject, suspected of aiding the Indians) a military trial. Both were found guilty of lending assistance to the hostile Indians. Arbuthnot was hanged; Ambrister shot before a firing squad.

May 7, Jackson marched from Fort Gadsden (the renamed Negro Fort) to Pensacola, capital of West Florida. After the Spanish governor had withdrawn to Ft. Barrancas, Jackson bombarded and took the town (May 26). Three days later he siezed the royal archives, appointed one of his colonels military and civil governor and declared the United States revenue laws in force. On May 30th he departed for Tennessee, to leave the solution of the Florida question to the diplomats.

In Washington Jackson's high handed actions in Florida -- putting British subjects to death, and siezing the Spanish capital -- stirred up bitter criticism. His siezure of Pensacola was palpably an act of war. Spain protested but she was in no position to fight. Secretary of State Adams used the occasion as a pretext to demand that Spain control the Florida Indians or sell the colony. Fearful that he could not hold Florida longer, and anxious to save his face, King Ferdinand agreed to sell Florida to the United States on condition that our government assume the claims of American citizens against Spain to the extent of \$5,000,000. The treaty was signed February 22, 1819. Jackson was appointed first governor of the newly acquired region. But delays in ratification of the treaty by both Spain and the United States Senate prevented it from becoming effective until February 22, 1821. March 30, 1822, the Territory of Florida was created, embracing the same area as the present state.

No reference whatsoever to the Indians of Florida was made in the treaty of cession. No guarantees of the pre-existing property rights of the 3,100 Seminoles (owners of some 800 Negro slaves) who then inhabited the region, were made.³

At the time of cession the best lands in Florida were still held by the Seminoles, whose power was not broken until the close of the fierce Indian wars from 1835 to 1842.⁴ While these Indians remained hostile, and in control of a large portion of the land, white settlement progressed slowly. The population of Florida in 1840 was still less than 55,000. Not until three years after the prolonged Indian wars were ended was Florida admitted to statehood (1845).

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THE INDIAN'S WESTWARD HO:

The Removal of the Eastern Indians, 1803-1840.

"From 1820 to 1840 the acquisition of Indian land overshadowed every question of national boundaries and was even viewed with the emotion and ideology of expansionism."

- Albert K. Weinberg

The purchase of Louisiana from France in the month of April 1803, was to prove an event of momentous importance to the Indians on the frontier east of the Mississippi. Three months after the purchase, Thomas Jefferson drafted a constitutional amendment which provided for the exchange of Indian lands east of the Mississippi for land in the newly acquired territory north of the 31st parallel. Thus, although the proposed amendment never received serious consideration, Jefferson may be properly termed the father of the idea of Indian removal.¹

The Louisiana Territorial Act of 1804, empowered the President to negotiate with "any Indian tribes owning lands on the east side of the Mississippi, and residing thereon, for an exchange of lands, the property of the United States, on the west side of the Mississippi, in case the said tribes shall remove and settle thereon." However, the people of Louisiana protested this part of the Act. Their objections may have been determining factors in the temporary abandonment of Jefferson's scheme.

Progress of Indian Removal.

Little progress was made in the removal of the eastern tribes prior to the close of the War of 1812. Some tribes or portions thereof living near the Mississippi had begun to cross it voluntarily. But there was no large scale movement in this direction. It was the acceleration of the westward movement of white population, with consequent demand for cheap land east of the Mississippi, following the conclusion of the War of 1812, that brought increasing pressure on the Government to remove the Indians and make way for white settlements.

In 1816 the period of treaty making with the eastern Indians providing for their removal was begun. In 1825, John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, advocated that the removed Indians be permanently settled on tracts of land on the west side of the State of Missouri and the Territory of Arkansas. This policy was the dominant factor in Indian Affairs

for the next fifteen years, during which the acquisition of Indian lands overshadowed every question of national boundaries. Yet the progress of gaining tribal assent to leave their traditional homeland was slow. Some tribes, especially in the south, refused to move. By the end of the decade 1820-30, more than two-thirds of the area of the present United States was still Indian country.³

In 1830 Congress passed what became known as the Indian Removal Bill after one of the bitterest debates in Congressional history. "It did not itself authorize the enforced removal of the Indians, and did not in terms appear to menace them; but it announced a Federal policy favorable to Indian removal, and placed in the hands of President Jackson the means to initiate steps to secure exchanges of lands with any tribe residing within the limits of the states or otherwise."⁴ Since Jackson himself had grown up on the frontier, and was in hearty sympathy with the white settler's demands for more Indian lands, the passage of this bill was a virtual assurance of what was to be the fate of the eastern tribes -- removal to the west, peacefully if possible, if not by threat or use of force.

In 1833 the title of the Plains Indians to areas now the states of Oklahoma and eastern Kansas and southeastern Nebraska had been purchased by the United States and was in process of being transferred to the eastern tribes being colonized in the west. The Creeks, Cherokee, Seminole, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Yuchi (all from the southeast) were located in what is now Oklahoma. North of them were settled the Sauk, Fox, Shawnee, Delaware, Potawatomi, a group of Seneca and other tribes from the region northwest of the Ohio River.⁵

The estimates of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1837 showed that approximately 51% of the eastern Indians had emigrated; 37% had agreed to emigrate but had not yet done so; and but 12% were resident among the States without having agreed to move westward. By this year the north flank of the new Indian frontier, with small exceptions, was completed. It extended unbroken from the bend of the Missouri to Green Bay along a frontier line beyond the farthest extent of white occupation.

"By 1840 the new Indian frontier was practically complete. In general the boundary ran west from Green Bay to the Mississippi, down that river to the lead-mining region near the mouth of the Wisconsin, in a southwesterly direction into the Territory of Iowa, then south to the Missouri line and west on that line to the Missouri River, down that river and the western boundary of Missouri and Arkansas to the Texas line."⁶

"By the year 1842 only little, negligible islands of reservation Indians remained in the United States east of the Mississippi River."⁷ Thus, exactly 350 years after Columbus' discovery of the New World, the white man had completed his conquest of the present United States east of the Mississippi. It had been a slow and laborious process. But in the next half century the white man was to complete the conquest of a still larger area -- western United States, beyond the frontier line of 1842.

Indian Land in the United States, January 1, 1826.

At the beginning of the year 1826, virtually the chronological midpoint of the great period of national expansion (1763-1890), the Indians still claimed some 61,000,000 acres east of the Mississippi River including:

409,501 acres in Ohio
 7,057,920 acres in Michigan Territory
 10,104,000 acres in Indiana
 5,314,560 acres in Illinois
 9,537,920 acres in Georgia
 7,272,576 acres in Alabama
 1,055,680 acres in Tennessee
 15,705,000 acres in Mississippi
 4,032,640 acres in Florida Territory⁸

West of the Mississippi the Indians claimed a small portion of northern Louisiana, 13,612,560 acres in Arkansas Territory, 2,782,726 acres in the State of Missouri, and virtually all of the remainder of the territory included in the purchase of Louisiana. All of the parts of present Minnesota and North Dakota not included in the Louisiana Purchase was still unceded Indian country.

Thus, though the United States was a thriving country with a population in the vicinity of 11 millions in 1826, over half its territory was still "unsettled" Indian country.

Up until January 1, 1826 the average amount paid by the Government to the Indians for the land they had ceded was 3-147/1000 cents per acre.⁹ Sold to white settlers at some two dollars per acre, Indian lands thus proved a valuable source of revenue to the United States.¹⁰

Removal of Indians from the Old Northwest.

The problem of Indian removal in the Old Northwest was less complicated than in the south. The northwestern tribes were smaller, of more wandering disposition, and better acquainted with the country beyond the Mississippi River than the tribes of the south. They had felt the power of the United States in the War of 1812, in which they had lost their great leader in the opposition to the advancing white frontier -- Tecumseh. Many of the northwestern tribes moved westward voluntarily when they realized that they were obstructing the advance of white settlement. Yet, despite these facts, the removal of the northwestern tribes was a slow process, and it was not to be entirely without bloodshed.

Between the close of the War of 1812 and 1830 the Indian title was extinguished to the northwestern quarter of Ohio (by 1818), and in Indiana and Illinois (with the exception of small areas of prairie land south of Lake Michigan). Yet, when Indiana entered the Union as a state in 1816, the northern and central portions were still unceded. When Illinois became a state in 1818 "less than a third of the area included within the boundaries....was occupied by permanent settlements of white men. North of an east and west line drawn through the mouth of the Illinois River, the vast treeless prairies, interspersed with wooded valleys along the streams, were still the domain of the Indian and the fur trader.... Already extensive cessions of land in the northern part of the state had been secured from the Indians; and although they continued to live and hunt in the ceded as well as the unceded districts, their elimination as a factor in Illinois history was soon to be completed."¹¹ In 1818 the road to St. Louis from Vincennes was just becoming an established route, though it was still dangerous to travel it alone. Only three years earlier this direct route had been considered "not safe from Indian massacre." Travelers were told to detour via Shawneetown and Kaskaskia.¹²

North of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois Indian land cession went more slowly, due to a complication of factors not the least of which was that white demand for land in this region was not as urgent as in the areas farther south. In 1818, Michigan Territory was enlarged to include all the present Wisconsin and part of Minnesota. Lewis Cass, governor of the Territory was also ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the region. By 1820 he had made treaties with the Indians opening up a large part of southern Michigan. But the greater portion of Michigan Territory was still Indian land when the Indian agent Jedediah Morse, sent by the Government to investigate conditions in this region, recommended (1820) that the country now included in Wisconsin, northern Michigan and part of Minnesota should be made an Indian reservation from which white settlement should be excluded, with the idea that the Indian population should be organized at a later date as a state in the Union.¹³ This recommendation was not accepted.

Meanwhile, to control the Indians of this region and to check the British influence over them (the British from Canada were still attempting to control the fur trade of the region) the Military Frontier was advanced northwestward. Fort Armstrong, Fort Edwards and Fort Crawford were built in 1816. The same year Fort Dearborn was reconstructed, and Fort Howard established on the Fox River in the present Wisconsin. At the end of 1817, 1,400 men composed the garrisons of posts extending from Detroit through the Lakes, along the Mississippi and the Missouri to Fort Osage.¹⁴ The Indians at first planned to resist the location of these new forts, but on learning in mid-1816 that the British would not aid them, they abandoned all attempts at organized opposition. For a decade the forts restrained the Indians from a general outbreak. Occasionally a white man was murdered by Indians.¹⁵

In Canada the advance of the Military Frontier was recognized as a move which finally brought the northwestern tribes under the control of the United States. In the convention of 1818 England recognized the firm establishment of United States authority in this region by agreeing to the establishment of the 49th parallel as the boundary between the United States and Canada from the Great Lakes to the Rockies.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the British continued to distribute gifts to some of the Indians south of the boundary in the Lake Country in an effort to control at least a part of their trade. As late as 1839, near the head of Lake Huron, gifts were made to Indians residing in the United States.¹⁷

Despite the peace along the border, there was an area in the Old Northwest where trouble was brewing between whites and Indians -- the valuable lead country of northwestern Illinois and the present southwestern Wisconsin. For years the white advance into this region had disquieted the Indians. In 1827 and again in 1832 it was to be the scene of the only serious Indian resistance to white penetration of the Old Northwest following the War of 1812.

In 1804, at St. Louis, Harrison had succeeded in making an important treaty with the Sauk and Fox by which they ceded to the United States their claims to some 50 million acres comprising the eastern third of Missouri, and the land lying east of the Mississippi between the Wisconsin River on the north, the Fox River on the east and the Illinois River on the southeast, for the paltry annuity of a thousand dollars. A clause in the treaty permitted the Indians to continue to live and hunt on the ceded land until it was disposed of to individual white settlers. But no provision was made for deciding when the necessity for Indian removal should exist. In 1816 the Sauk and Fox reaffirmed the cession of 1804.

Long before the War of 1812 both Indians and whites (French, British, and finally Americans) had been mining in the lead country. But it was not until Col. James Johnson of Kentucky leased the present site of Galena, brought efficient tools, trained men, and a military guard, that the era of large-scale exploitation of the mines began. That was in 1822. In the latter half of that decade Americans began to "rush" to the region in large numbers, and to forcefully dispossess the Indians without government sanction. This, combined with the impecunious treatment of the Winnebago by the white agents William Clark and Lewis Cass in their treaty at Prairie du Chien, roused the resentment of the Winnebago.

In 1827, excited by rumors that two of their warriors imprisoned at Prairie du Chien for minor offenses had been put to death, encouraged by hope of British aid and the movement of the garrison from Fort Crawford northward to Fort Snelling, the Winnebago chief Red Bird went on the war-path. In June, with three other warriors he massacred part of a farmer's family. Later they attacked two keel boats on the Mississippi. Lives were lost on both sides. The whites of the lead country were thrown into panic fearing a general Indian uprising.

From Fort Snelling, Jefferson Barracks, and Fort Howard large forces were sent to the danger zone. The Winnebago were informed that unless Red Bird and his fellow murderer, Wekau were given up the entire tribe would be exterminated. The two Indians came in and surrendered to Major Whistler on September 2. Red Bird died before sentence of hanging could be imposed. Wekau and the other murderers were pardoned by President Adams. Thus an Indian war was averted. Next year (1828) Fort Winnebago was erected at the Fox-Wisconsin portage to keep the restless Winnebago under control.

The fate of Red Bird might have served as a lesson to Black Hawk, the Sauk and Fox, but it didn't. In spite of the fact that the majority of the Sauk and Fox followed their principal chief, Keokuk across the Mississippi, Black Hawk, with a small band of his followers, refused to move from Illinois. In the spring of 1830 he returned from the hunt to find his village site preempted by white squatters. Seeking advice of the British at Malden he was encouraged to rebel. Returning in 1831, Black Hawk ordered the squatters to withdraw. The settlers asked help from Gov. Reynolds who sent a large force of regulars and volunteers to the scene. Black Hawk then paddled his people across the Mississippi. Four days later (June 30) he signed an agreement never to return to the east bank without United States permission.

This agreement Black Hawk did not intend to keep. In April 1832 with some 500 warriors and their families he recrossed the river and ascended Rock River with the intention of raising corn in summer and taking to the warpath in the following winter.

As result of this move the frontier was in panic. Four volunteer regiments were organized, joined by 400 regulars. Black Hawk put to rout Major Stillman's reconnoitering force of 300. Depredations followed. At Wisconsin Heights an army of 4,000 strong caught up with Black Hawk's force and severely defeated it. Black Hawk continued his flight to the Mississippi where his people were caught between the supply steamer "Warrior" on the river and white regulars on land. The Indians were almost annihilated.

Thus ended the Black Hawk War. Of the band of a thousand who entered Illinois in April, not much over 150 survived the brief period of warfare. By the treaty concluding the war the United States exacted 30,000,000 more acres of land from the Indians.

The Black Hawk War served as a temporary check to the movement of white population into Illinois and Michigan Territory. But the quieting of these Indians set in motion a flood of immigration into the fine lands of northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin. The war had been well covered by news writers from the east who, together with the many volunteers and soldiers from a distance enlisted in the war, informed the world of the desirability of these lands for farming.

The Black Hawk War was the "last stand" of the Indians of the Old Northwest. Its utter failure impressed the other tribes of the northwest with the futility of resisting removal. Numerous treaties calling for sizeable land cessions followed. The Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Menominee, Sauk, and Winnebago made extensive cessions in present Michigan and Wisconsin. In 1837 the Eastern Sioux ceded their claims to land east of the Mississippi.

When Michigan became a state in 1837, Indian title to all sizeable areas east of the Escanaba River had already passed into the possession of the United States. Five years later the Chippewa ceded title to the remainder of Michigan west of that river.

Removal continued apace in the '40's. In 1848, Wisconsin was admitted to the Union. In that same year the Menominee ceded the last sizeable area claimed by Indians in Wisconsin, and they moved west to Minnesota.

Thus, fifty-five years after the Northwest Territory was created (1787) the last large Indian holdings in that region (east of Minnesota) passed into the possession of white men. Already Americans had revised their conception of what was "northwest." Two thousand miles to the westward Oregon was fast becoming the new "northwest."

Removal of Indians from the Old Southwest.

At the close of the War of 1812 the greater part of the Old Southwest was still held by Indians -- nearly half of Georgia; all of Tennessee west of the Tennessee River and a large portion of the southeastern part of that state; about half of Alabama; and between two-thirds and three-quarters of the area of Mississippi. Virtually all of Florida, then belonging to Spain, was Indian country. On these Indian lands lived the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creeks, and Seminole -- the so-called "Five Civilized Tribes." Since the close of the Revolution these tribes had made rapid strides in the civilized arts. They had adopted to their use many of the white man's techniques and customs -- his dress, architecture, tools, etc. With the exception of the Seminole they were predominantly agriculturalists. Yet, for the most part, they kept to themselves, mingling but little with the frontier whites. In the face of the aggressive white advance they clung tenaciously to their tribal land.

White pressure on these tribes resulting in their final removal to the present Oklahoma was based on a complex of motives. "The impetus to this movement came not from the Western pioneers but from the Eastern States. It did not arise because of any need of lands... The movement arose because of the desire of Southern States to remove interruptions to their jurisdiction, the avidity of many individuals for cheap but valuable lands, and the belief of many in the North as well as the South that the Indians would be better off in a region where they were spared the evil influences of adjacent white civilization."

Before the passage of the Indian Removal Bill in 1830 these tribes could resist removal effectively by refusing to sign treaties of cession with the Government covering the whole of their claims. After 1830, their resistance took three possible forms (1) legal contest of the right of the United States to obtain their lands against their will (Cherokee); (2) resort to warfare to prevent attempts at removal (Seminole); and (3) running away and hiding in isolated sections of their holdings to prevent forced removal (remnant Cherokee and Seminole). Of the three, only the last method was successful.

The Choctaw were the first to be removed.

The Choctaw were peaceful farmers rather than a warlike people. In the Indian wars with the whites they had never taken an important aggressive part. At the close of the War of 1812 they still held the greater part of their old traditional lands, though they had ceded the southern portion of Mississippi and adjacent areas in western Alabama to the whites by treaties in 1802 and 1805. Until 1816 more than half of Mississippi and a sizable adjacent area in Alabama was still theirs.

In 1816 and again in 1820 they signed treaties ceding portions of their land to the United States. The 1820 treaty provided for Choctaw removal. But only a few bands removed. The majority remained on their land east of the Mississippi.

This remaining Choctaw land proved a source of contention between the Indians and the State of Mississippi. White settlers continued to illegally squat on their unceded land. In 1829 (February 17) Mississippi memorialized Congress to remove the Chickasaw and Choctaw from the state, claiming this would best solve the troubles over illegal white settlement on Indian land. The document further stated "A large part of the most valuable territory within the chartered limits of this state is occupied by savage tribes."²⁰

The Government lost little time in negotiating with the Choctaw after the passage of the Removal Bill in May 1830. On September 15, the commissioners Eaton and Coffee arrived at Dancing Rabbit Creek in the Choctaw Nation and began discussions with the head men of the tribe. On September 27, the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek was signed. By it the Choctaw ceded to the United States the entire country claimed by them east of the Mississippi and agreed to remove to lands in the Indian Territory which the government promised to convey to them in fee simple. They were given three years in which to emigrate.²¹

The treaty had been opposed by the majority of the tribe, but concessions of lands offered the head men had been influential in inducing them to sign. As soon as the treaty was signed white men began moving into the Choctaw country, although the treaty did not become effective until ratified by the Senate, six months later.

In November, 1830 a party of Indians (both Choctaw and Chickasaw) under George S. Gaines traveled westward to explore the country of their new home and see that it was satisfactory. Some of the Choctaw started for the west without assistance before the treaty was ratified. But the large scale migration, under government supervision was not begun until late in 1830. There were then 19,554 Choctaw.²²

Thus -- "The government was launched without compass or rudder into the uncharted sea of Indian removal; for the first time it was about to engage on a large scale in the removal of its aborigines from their homes in which it was bound to collect and feed them, transport them across the great Mississippi River, carry them part way by steamboats and then overland through swamps and across streams, build roads and bridges, cut banks down to the streams, and finally locate these expatriates, men and women, aged and decrepit, little children, and babes in arms, in their new country."²³

There was a large emigration in 1831 and another in 1832, but the movement continued spasmodically until 1849. Some of the Indians (7,000 in number) remained in Mississippi to become citizens of the State as was permitted by their treaty. But from time to time numbers of these removed westward.²⁴

Removal of the Creeks from Georgia and Alabama.

When Georgia ceded her claims to land west of the present state limits in 1802, the Federal commissioners and Georgia agreed that the "United States shall, at their own expense, extinguish for the use of Georgia, as early as the same can be peacefully obtained, on reasonable terms" the Indian title to the area held by them.²⁵ At that time the Creeks still occupied the greater part of the area of the state, and the Cherokee another large portion in the northwest section.

Slowly, far too slowly for the patience of the Georgians who were continually crossing the line and squatting on Indian land, the Creeks were pushed back. In 1804 they ceded a small tract in northeast Georgia, in 1805 a cession brought the boundary west to the Ocmulgee River in central Georgia, in 1814 Jackson forced them to give up nearly all of the southern part of the state; in 1818 two small areas in central Georgia were ceded; in 1821, a large vertical strip was ceded pushing the boundary westward in the central part of the state to the Flint River; in 1826

nearly all the remaining Creek land in the state was ceded. Finally November 15, 1827 the Creeks ceded a small vertical strip on the western border of the state. After 25 years the Georgians had successfully "rid themselves" of the Creeks.

But the Creeks still continued to hold a large area in Alabama just west of the Georgia line. And the presence of these Indians -- people of restless temperament, hostile to white settlers, still bothered Georgia as well as Alabama. In 1829 Alabama joined Mississippi and Georgia in protesting the existence of the Indians within state borders in the Southeast.

The year before about 2,500 Creeks had emigrated to the junction of the Arkansas and Verdigris Rivers with promise of the government to purchase lands for them which had been selected by a delegation from that tribe the year before. Small parties continued to migrate. But after the signing of the Removal Bill in 1830 the Government, desiring to settle the problem of Creek removal, attempted to put a stop to these small scale migrations until the will of the whole tribe was ascertained. The Creeks were invited to send a delegation to Nashville in 1830 to discuss the matter. They did not accept the invitation.

In January 1831 a Lower Creek delegation was sent to Washington to protest the attempt of Alabama to place them under state law, and the continued intrusion of Creek territory by white settlers, which had resulted in clashes between the races, with murders on both sides. The delegation was informed that there was no solution to this problem save removal. On December 13, Eneah Micco sent a list of the 1,500 white intruders (including horse thieves and other criminals) who had squatted on Creek lands.

Finally after a series of conferences failed to offer any solution to the problem other than removal the Creeks signed a treaty March 24, 1832 ceding to the United States all their land east of the Mississippi except their individual selections which they were to occupy for five years unless sooner sold by them. All intruders were to be removed during this five-year period.

A census of the Creeks was taken, revealing that there were 6,557 heads of families, each entitled to reserve a half section of land for the five-year period, under the terms of the treaty. Thus the Creeks were to retain more than two-fifths of their land held at the time of the 1832 treaty for five more years.

The treaty proved no solution to the problem of intruding whites. Alabama resisted Federal attempts to fulfill the obligation of protecting the Indians. Whites drove Indians off their land, burnt and destroyed their houses and corn, and abused the Indians themselves. Still the chiefs of the Creeks refused to migrate. White men who had through intimidation or fraud gained control of portions of their land urged them not to move.

Excited by these intolerable conditions and encouraged by wretched whites who feared an investigation of their fraudulent land deals with the Creeks, some 3,000 Creek warriors, emboldened by the Seminole hostilities in Florida, attacked the border settlers on the Chattahoochie River in May 1836. Houses were burned, settlers killed. Other whites fled to Columbus, Milledgeville and Augusta for protection. General Scott left Florida and organized an expedition against the hostiles, made up largely of poorly equipped militia. Gen. Jesup moved with 2,300 militia and Indian allies from Alabama before Scott started with his force. Jesup's army so impressed the Creeks that they sued for peace about the middle of June. The so-called "Creek War of 1836" thus ended without the necessity for a decisive battle.

Then began the forced removal of the hostile Creeks in July and August. By early November it was reported that 8,000 of them had crossed the Mississippi. Under conditions of great misery and suffering the Creeks moved west. In late winter 1837 some 4,000 friendly Creeks, a number of whom had aided the United States in fighting the Seminoles, started on the long trip westward. By the end of that year the last remnants of the Creeks in the east had been removed.

Removal of the Chickasaw.

The Chickasaw had long been friendly with the whites. They had aided the Cumberland settlers in their wars against the Creeks, Wayne in his northwest campaign, and Jackson in the War of 1812. At the end of that war they still held all of Tennessee and Kentucky west of the Tennessee, northern Mississippi, and claimed a large area in northwestern Alabama and adjacent Tennessee.

By treaties in 1816, and 1818 they ceded their claims to the greater part of this area. The latter treaty opened Tennessee west of that river to white settlement. After 1818 they still owned virtually all of northern Mississippi. Mississippi's memorial to Congress in 1829 sought the removal of the Chickasaw as well as the Choctaw.

A provisional treaty providing for Chickasaw removal was signed September 1, 1830, but was never ratified. Meanwhile whites began to enter the Chickasaw country. On October 22, 1832, at the council house on Pontotoc Creek the Chickasaw signed a treaty ceding all their lands east of the Mississippi to the United States. The lands were to be put up for sale as public lands, and the proceeds to be held by the government for the Indians. The government set about surveying the lands while the Indians were to make preparations for removal. Meanwhile land-hungry whites continued to invade their land.

Chickasaw removal was delayed until satisfactory land could be obtained from the Choctaw in the west to accommodate them. The main body of the Chickasaw removed in 1837, but removal was not completed until a decade later.

Compared with the complications and difficulties of removing the other tribes from the Old Southwest, the Chickasaw removal was a relatively tranquil affair.

Cherokee Removal: "The Trail of Tears."

For a half century prior to the War of 1812 the Cherokee, through a succession of treaties, had been losing their traditional territory piecemeal. At the close of that war their domain still included a large contiguous area in the southeastern Tennessee, northern Georgia and northeastern Alabama. By treaties in 1817 and 1819 this area was somewhat further reduced.

In the 1817 treaty the portions of land ceded in Tennessee and Georgia were exchanged for an equal amount west of Arkansas. Six thousand Cherokee migrated in the next two years. The treaty of 1819, however, acknowledged that "a greater part of the Cherokee Nation have expressed desire to remain." In 1823 unsuccessful efforts were again made to induce the Cherokee to move westward.

The Cherokee were now exercising their admitted right to refuse to cede their land to the Government, in the face of the most difficult pressure on the part of the state of Georgia to have them removed. The Georgians charged that the Cherokee were a savage people who stood in the way of state progress. To meet this attack effectively the Cherokee sent delegates to New Echota in July 1827 to draw up a Constitution for the Cherokee Nation, modeled after that of the United States.

Georgia refused to recognize this document threatened to enforce State Law among the Cherokee if the United States did not extinguish their claims in Georgia immediately.

"The whole difficulty with the Cherokees, Calhoun observed in a Cabinet meeting arose from their progress in civilization. The American commissioners sent to urge removal upon them learned this to their consternation. The Cherokees, who had not only farms but printing presses, schools and churches, gave as the ground of their refusal to remove to the wilderness the fact that they had "unequivocally determined never again to pursue the chase as heretofore."²⁸

In 1828 gold was discovered on Cherokee lands in present Habersham County, extreme northeastern Georgia. A gardener in the Nacooche Valley had turned up a nugget. Soon a swarm of gold seekers was pouring into the section. Considerable quantities of gold were found in the streams. By spring of 1830 there were about 5,000 persons digging in the Cherokee Nation. This white invasion was in definite violation of Cherokee treaty rights.

The gold rush further irritated Georgians. In December 1829 the legislature passed an act appropriating a large area of the Cherokee Nation, extending the laws of Georgia over this section, and declaring all laws of the Cherokee Nation null and void. In June of the next year the governor declared all provisions of the law in force. Meanwhile Congress had passed the Indian Removal Bill, and the President notified the Cherokee that the government was powerless to prevent the State of Georgia from exercising its sovereignty within its own borders, urging them to solve the problem by agreeing to remove.

The Cherokee Nation then turned to the law as a last resort. Hiring the eminent lawyer William Wirt, their case against Georgia was placed before the Supreme Court in the January term, 1831. The Court declared that the Cherokee Nation was a political entity, capable of managing its own affairs, whose rights should be protected. But Georgia ignored the ruling and the President did not enforce it. In that year Georgia forcefully expelled white missionaries to the Cherokee.

Stubbornly the Cherokee stood on what they believed were their rights and refused to remove. Again and again they sought aid from Washington in their struggle against Georgia. Only after friends in Congress had informed them that no aid could be given them, did a small representation of the Cherokee sign a treaty of removal at New Echota December 29, 1835. The Cherokee Council protested the treaty as invalid. Some 13,000 Cherokee refused to move. At the close of the two-year period allowed for removal only 2,000 had emigrated.

Then the forced removal of the Cherokee was ordered by the Federal Government. The Indians had already been disarmed by General Wool. Now General Winfield Scott with a force of 7,000 men was entrusted with the task of rounding up the Cherokee and removing them. Nearly seventeen thousand Indians were gathered into the various stockades preparatory to removal. In June removal began, and about 5,000 started westward. Mortality among these migrants was so great that removal of the remaining twelve thousand was delayed until fall. A period of ten months elapsed between the beginning of the forced westward movement and the arrival of the last company of Cherokee in the West. More than 4,000 Cherokee died on the way, in the doleful march of the Cherokee over the "Trail of Tears" in 1838.

Several hundred Cherokee had succeeded in eluding the soldiers and hiding in the forested mountains of their beloved homeland. They were permitted to remain in the East on a small reservation in North Carolina.

But far to the westward, in the present Oklahoma, the great body of Cherokee, dejected and disillusioned and homesick, faced the problem of maintaining existence in a strange environment. Such was the fate of the most progressive of the Indians in North America.²⁹

Seminole Removal.

The most heterogeneous people of the south were the Seminole of Florida. Originally they were a Muskogean tribe made up of immigrants from the Lower Creek towns who moved down into Florida in the early part of the 18th century. Their numbers were offset by numerous runaway slaves from the north who found a haven in the Seminole villages, and in the course of years became amalgamated with them.

The Seminole, even after Jackson's war against them in 1818, remained a bone of contention to white slave-holders in Georgia and Alabama whose slaves continued to seek freedom in their Florida villages. As the white population in adjoining states increased the number of escaping negroes increased, and more and more raids were made by white people into the Seminole country in attempts to recover their property. The Indians and negroes withdrew farther into the interior to avoid these raids. As a result Seminole control over the fertile lands of northern Florida became weaker.

To obtain this land for whites the United States sent commissioners to the Seminole in 1823 to negotiate a land cession. By a treaty at Fort Moultrie in September of that year the Seminole ceded their claims to most of Florida, with the exception of a large reservation in the center of the State. Most of this area was not worth cultivation. The Seminole agent reported that "The best of the Indian lands are worth but little; nineteen-twentieths of their whole country within the present boundary, is by far the poorest and the most miserable region I ever beheld."³⁰

Seeing little hope of subsistence on the reservation, many Seminole remained on the more fertile ceded land while white settlers moved in. Difficulties arose over land and runaway slaves. Indians were flogged and killed, slaves taken, stock killed and houses burned. In desperation the Seminole retaliated in kind.

To relieve this situation Col. James Gadsden was sent to Florida to negotiate on the part of the United States for the removal of the Indians. He found them in 1832, in a desperate and starving condition, and managed to get them to sign a treaty of removal May 9th, at Payne's Landing, providing for their removal to the west within three years.

A delegation of Indians sent to explore conditions in the west returned with unfavorable impressions of the country that was to be their new home. The majority of the Seminole then refused to move. Government insistence on removal brought on the Second Seminole War.

On December 28, 1835 a company of troops under Major Dade was proceeding from Fort Brooke to Fort King to aid in the enforced removal of the Seminole, when a large force of Indians and negroes ambushed them in an open barren about seven miles north of Withlacoochee River. The hostiles, led by Micanopy, were hidden from view in the tall grass and palmetto as the soldiers marched into the open. Of Dade's command all eight officers and 99 of the 102 men were massacred. The Seminole War was on!

Osceola, forceful young half-breed, was the Seminole leader. Secreting the women, children, and old men in the inaccessible swamps, he carried on a campaign of effective guerilla warfare against troops and settlers, until, he was siezed by General Jesup while seeking a conference under a flag of truce in late October 1837. Osceola was imprisoned at Fort Moultrie, where he died in January 1838.

But the Seminole War dragged on year after year, to the great embarrassment of the War Department and the administration, and the delight of the opposition press and public who were scathing in their criticisms of its management. The Florida Legislature, in desperation, authorized the purchase of Cuban bloodhounds to trail the Seminole to their retreats in the swamps. Instead, the animals sat down on their haunches and howled.³¹ As the war continued reports of peace were frequently made, only to find the Seminole again hostile. One critical paper commented.

"And yet 'tis not an endless war,
As facts will plainly show,
Having been ended forty times
In twenty months or so."³²

After December 1837 the United States employed no large forces. Little camps were formed, and small expeditions of 50 or 100 men penetrated the unhealthy swamps. The summers were so hot and sickly actual white operations were restricted to the winter months. The Indians raised crops in summer without fear of attack. In 1841 summer operations began, and sick report mounted (16,000 cases between June 1841 and February 1842).³³

The war was nearly finished when Giddings of Ohio branded it a slave chase and pointed the finger of shame.³⁴ Yet it carried on into 1842. The last battle was fought in April.

During the course of the war nearly 4,000 Seminole and negroes migrated to the West. In mid-1842 General Worth reported that only a remnant of 300 Seminole remained in Florida, and suggested that they be permitted to stay. The governor of Florida seconded the suggestion, and the War Department capitulated.

In the seven years of fighting the United States had spent twenty million dollars. The lives of 1,500 regular soldiers in addition to volunteers and settlers had been lost, mostly from disease. Such was the cost of Seminole removal.³⁵

The Seminole War was the "last stand" of the Indians east of the Mississippi. With its conclusion in 1842, 220 years after the Jamestown massacre, the white man had at last established himself as the uncontested owner of the United States east of the great river.

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
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The
**CONSOLIDATED
INDIAN FRONTIER**
of 1841



THE DREAM OF A PERMANENT INDIAN FRONTIER:

Indian Relations Beyond the Mississippi, 1803-1840.

"With this uninhabitable region on the west of the Indian territory, they cannot be surrounded by white population. They are on the outside of us, and in a place which will ever remain on the outside."

- Report of Senate Committee on Indians Affairs, 1836.

The Louisiana Purchase not only made the United States the owner of a vast extent of new territory in which it was possible to transplant the populous eastern tribes; it also brought within the boundaries of the United States the majority of the nomadic or semi-sedentary Plains Indians whose total population at that time was probably in excess of 100,000.¹

Two groups of problems had to be faced by the Government and the Indians in this region during the period 1803-1840. One group revolved about the matter of Indian removal. Its many aspects included (1) the cession of Indian land west of Missouri, Iowa, and Arkansas by its aboriginal owners to make room for the location of the eastern tribes (2) the removal of the eastern tribes, not only from the left side of the Mississippi, but also from Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri and Iowa to make room for white settlement, and (3) the maintenance of peaceful relations between the newly located eastern Indians and their new neighbors, the Plains Indians. The other group revolved about the establishment of peaceful relations between the United States and the Plains tribes of the Louisiana Purchase area. Its aspects included (1) the making of treaties with these Indians by which they acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States, and (2) the establishment of the right of citizens to pass through the country of these Indians without molestation for trade or other purposes.

Throughout this period St. Louis was virtually the Indian capital of the United States, with the Indian Agent or Superintendent of Indian Affairs in St. Louis its chief executive. Between 1804 and 1837 a total of thirteen treaties, involving seventeen tribes, and providing for the cession of a large portion of the Indian claims to land in the Mississippi Valley, were made at St. Louis or nearby Castor Hill.²

Indian Removal.

Prior to 1825 the Government policy of removing the eastern tribes had not developed to the extent of defining the exact location of the new Indian frontier beyond the Mississippi. Some of the eastern tribes simply crossed the Mississippi and took up land not far from the river on the west side.

The present Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa and Minnesota thus became havens for tribes pushed westward across the Mississippi. But the Mississippi River proved no barrier to the westward movement of white population. As white settlements on the west side of the river grew these Indians were found to be as irritating a barrier as they had been years before when they lived in the east. Thus Missouri, when admitted to statehood in 1821, protested the presence of these eastern tribal remnants within her boundaries. In May 1824, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs recommended their removal.³

So it was that the problem of dispossessing the Indians from the first tier of states west of the great river (south of Minnesota) became linked with that of removing the eastern tribes. The same solution was used for both.

By 1825 the policy of locating all the Indians of the United States along a strip to the westward of the organized states and territories was announced. In that year William Clark effected treaties with the Great and Little Osage and the Kansas tribes by which they ceded their claims to land in the west, opening up the present Oklahoma and eastern Kansas. In 1833, the Pawnee ceded their land south of the Platte. By these treaties a wide belt of land extending from the Platte to the Texas border was made available for the settlement of the removed tribes. At last, it was felt, the United States would have a "permanent Indian frontier," with all the Indians, save a few scattered and harmless remnants in the east, located in a section beyond which white settlement would have no occasion to move.

The removal of the Indians from Missouri, Iowa, Arkansas, and Louisiana continued to keep pace with the removal of the eastern tribes. In 1832, Missouri became the first trans-Mississippi state to be entirely free from Indians. In 1835 Louisiana and Arkansas Territory were freed from Indians. Next year Arkansas became a state. The Black Hawk Purchase of 1832 marked the real beginning of white settlement of Iowa.⁴ Fourteen years later the last Indian land claims in Iowa were extinguished and Iowa became a state.

Between 1836 and 1840 about 40,000 Indians were removed from east of the Mississippi beyond the new Indian frontier. By 1842 the total number removed was over 80,000. In that year the total Indian population west of the Mississippi was estimated at about 250,000. Between 1830 and 1840 the white population neighboring on the Indian country more than doubled. In Missouri and Arkansas white settlement had advanced to their western borders except south of the Arkansas River.⁵

Among the "Wild Tribes."

Appropriately the Government made a distinction between the civilized or semi-civilized eastern Indians removed to land set aside for them beyond the frontier, and the aboriginal inhabitants of the Louisiana Purchase beyond the first tier of states. The latter were commonly referred to as the "wild tribes."

When Louisiana was purchased in 1803 these tribes were little known to Americans. The expedition of Lewis and Clark to the Pacific (1804-06) resulted in the dissemination of valuable information on the tribes of the Missouri River region, their numbers and characteristics. On his expedition to the southwest in 1805-06, Pike encountered other of the Plains tribes. But prior to the War of 1812 no formal treaty was made with any of these tribes. Their white contacts were largely limited to intercourse with fur traders and trappers -- British from Canada and French and Spanish from the United States.

The British traders exerted a strong influence over the tribes of the Upper Missouri and attempted to use this influence to turn these tribes against the United States in the War of 1812. To counteract their efforts Manuel Lisa, the leading St. Louis fur trader of the period, was appointed sub-agent for the Missouri River tribes by William Clark in the summer of 1814. Through his efforts the tribes were kept loyal to the United States. Treaties were made with some of the most important tribes, including the Teton Dakota (or Western Sioux) in which they acknowledged allegiance to the United States. His work as peacemaker concluded, Lisa resigned his position in 1817.

Following the War of 1812 the Military Frontier was extended west of the Mississippi. Seven posts were built within a decade (1816-1826). Four of these were near or among the "wild tribes" -- Fort Smith (Arkansas, 1817); Fort Atkinson (Nebraska 1819); Fort Towson and Fort Gibson (both in present Oklahoma, 1824). In 1823 United States troops were first used against the Plains Indians in a brief and ineffective campaign against the Arikara under Col. Leavenworth. Two years later the Atkinson-O'Fallon expedition up the Missouri reported that neither rivalry with British traders nor Indian Relations required the erection of a military post on the Upper Missouri. Thirty years passed before the United States established a fort on the Missouri above Council Bluffs.⁶

Meanwhile there was trouble along the important trade route to Santa Fe. This trail passed through the hunting grounds of a number of the "wild tribes" who not infrequently showed their resentment of white intrusion by attacking trading parties, murdering, and destroying valuable property. In 1825, Thomas Benton secured the passage of a bill providing for the appropriation of money to survey and mark the route and to

purchase the right of transit from the Indians. A treaty was effected with the Pawnee and Osage in that year by which they agreed not to interfere with the caravans passing over the trail. But the Comanche, principal objectors to the use of this route, refused to make any promises, and continued to murder and plunder. In 1829, an army escort under Major Riley accompanied the spring caravan to the Mexican boundary. But the army did not favor this practise for two reasons (1) large parties could protect themselves, and it would be impossible to provide escorts for any large number of small parties (2) the most dangerous part of the journey was south of the national boundary in Mexican territory into which the army could not go. There was one more army escort -- in 1834 -- but at all other times prior to 1843 the Santa Fe traders were obliged to pass through the Indian country at their own risk. Indian attacks and murders persisted. Among the American traders to be murdered by the Comanche was Jedediah Smith (1831), possibly the greatest of the western explorers of the 1820's.

In 1825, the Atkinson-O'Fallon expedition up the Missouri made treaties with the Teton Dakota, Yankton, Yanktonais, Arikara, Hidatsa, Mandan, Crow and Pawnee tribes by the terms of which they granted safe conduct through their country to all persons legally authorized by the United States.

One of the important duties of the army on the frontier after 1820 was the protection of the tribes removed to the Indian Country from the east. Peace had to be maintained among the removed tribes, and these tribes had to be protected from the "wild tribes" who resented the location of the new arrivals on portions of their old hunting grounds. Actually the immigrant Indians, supplied with firearms by the government, were able to take care of themselves. In their battles with the Plains Indians they usually beat the "wild tribes" badly.⁷ Even the savage Comanche learned to steer clear of the better armed and more advanced Indians from the East.⁸

To keep the peace by making a show of force among the wild tribes two expeditions of "Rangers" were conducted into the present Oklahoma. These expeditions in 1832 and 1833 failed to have the desired effect. The slow moving, poorly equipped, unmounted forces failed to impress the dashing, well-mounted, Plains Indians. To meet the challenge of the Indians on the broad, open plains where distances were great, infantry proved to be ineffectual. Accordingly on March 2, 1833, Congress established a regiment of dragoons -- men trained to fight on foot or horseback with equal effectiveness. Next year (1834) Col. Dodge, at the head of a large force of dragoons moved from Fort Gibson to Fort Leavenworth (founded 1827) and on to the Pawnee Country. Again, the next year, he led a force of dragoons on a great circle tour from Fort Leavenworth up the Platte to the Rockies and back via a southern route. These marches of large numbers of well disciplined, uniformed horsemen had the desired effect. The Plains Indians were awed and

impressed by the power of the United States. Friendship was established with the Pawnee, Osage, Cheyenne and Kiowa. The campaign of 1835 was the most extensive military campaign yet accomplished by land in the West. Indirectly these movements served to advertise the West to the peoples of the East who read of them in the press.⁹

Another effort was made to keep the "wild tribes" at peace. By "An act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes and to preserve peace on the frontiers," passed June 30, 1834, Congress established the Indian Country, consisting of the area within the United States (as then constituted) west of the Arkansas Territory, Missouri and the Missouri River. Army officers were to participate in enforcement of regulations of the government of the Indian Country. It provided for the issuance of passports to foreigners entering the Indian Country, the removal of squatters on Indian land, and seizure of all persons dangerous to peace in the region. The sale of liquor to the Indians was strictly forbidden.¹⁰

Thus law, combined with an active military force, preserved the peace on the Indian Frontier during the period under discussion. Traders continued to break the prohibition law, and isolated parties of traders or trappers were murdered, but no extensive Indian disturbances took place during the period.

The Work of William Clark.

A great deal of the credit for the successful handling of the "wild tribes" during this early period belongs to William Clark. Clark had gained valuable experience in the handling of difficult Indian problems during the border wars of Kentucky and the Ohio Valley. Returning from his successful expedition with Meriwether Lewis to the Pacific Ocean, Clark was appointed Brigadier-General and Indian Agent for Louisiana at Washington, March 12, 1807. He set out almost immediately to St. Louis to take up his duties.

For a number of years he contended with the problem of combatting British influence among the Indians of Upper Louisiana. With the aid of Lisa he prevented the Upper Missouri tribes from going over the enemy in the War of 1812.


As a treaty maker Clark was most successful, due largely to his known honesty and championship of the cause of the weak and peaceful tribes. Among the most important treaties negotiated by him were those at Prairie des Sioux in 1815 at which some of the most distant tribes acknowledged their allegiance to the United States when danger of British hostility still prevailed; at Prairie du Chien in 1825, when tribal boundaries were established between Indians of the Upper Mississippi Valley; at St. Louis in 1825 when the Osage and Kansas ceded land in the west which not only opened up portions of Arkansas and Missouri to settlement but also granted land for the location of eastern tribes.

Clark helped continually in the work of removing the eastern tribes -- a complex and difficult task at best.


From 1822 until his death in 1838 Clark held the especially created office of Superintendent of Indian Affairs, with headquarters at St. Louis. His home, office and Indian Museum were frequently visited by Indians from afar. To him came the Nez Perce delegation of 1834, so influential in inaugurating the movement which culminated in the settlement of Oregon.

On his death he was mourned by the Indians to whom he had been affectionately known as the "Red Haired Chief."¹¹

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**THE
INDIANS SURROUNDED
1850-1854**

FRONTIER LINE OF 1850 - - - - -

THE INDIANS SURROUNDED:

On the Far Flung Indian Frontier, 1840-1854.

"Our new frontier, after the Mexican War was not a line but an area - and that an area of a million square miles... This area was all dynamite; the constant preoccupation of the Army for the next decade was to keep fire away from the dynamite... The Indians furnished most of the danger."

- Oliver L. Spaulding.

The "permanent Indian frontier" of 1840 was an artificially raised dam to hold back the flood of American settlers from the Indian land of the West. But already forces had been at work which were to break that dam. People from the United States had moved into Texas, overthrown Mexican rule, and set up a Republic; there was growing interest in the far off Pacific Coast. In 1841, immigrant trains began to move westward to Oregon and California, like little rivulets leaking through the dam. Rapidly the breach widened. By 1848 the dam had crumbled.

The four years 1845-1848 were epoch making ones for national expansion. In rapid succession came the annexation of Texas, (1845), the establishment of our claim to Oregon (1846) and the Mexican Cession (1848). An area equal to 2/3 the total area of the country prior to 1845 was added.

By these cessions the number of Indians within the boundaries of the United States was more than doubled.¹ When these new areas were acquired Indians made up their bulk of population and held the greater part of the land.

To keep these Indians at peace, protecting the white immigrants en route to new homes and after these homes had been established, was the difficult task of the army. In 1845 the extreme western Military Frontier consisted of eleven posts -- Forts Jesup (Louisiana), Smith (Arkansas), Towson, Gibson, and Washita (all in present Oklahoma), Scott and Leavenworth (in present Kansas), Des Moines and Atkinson (Iowa), Snelling (Minnesota), and Wilkins (Michigan). When Corpus Christi, Texas, was added late in the year 1845 the line of posts extended from Lake Superior to the Gulf of Mexico. On the Red, Arkansas, and Mississippi Rivers the forts were at the limit of water transportation. Before the posts could be pushed westward an effective freighting system had to be developed.²

By the end of 1849, thirty-two new posts had been established on the western frontier.³ They were usually located with great care at strategic points for the protection of overland commerce and immigration, or for the protection of settlements in the West. Almost invariably the posts were built by the soldiers themselves. In this year about 4/5 of the regiments or companies of the United States Army were stationed on the Indian frontier in the West or in Florida. The whole army numbered but 9,438 non-commissioned officers and men, with an effective force of possibly two-thirds that number. The army was more than 20% smaller than it had been in 1815. Yet it was charged with the protection of at least 10,000 more miles of communication than had existed in 1844.⁴ In 1850 the army was increased to 12,927 with 7,796 of that number stationed in or under orders for the newly acquired areas -- Texas, New Mexico, California and Oregon.⁵

Secretary of War Jefferson Davis reported December 1, 1853, that the frontier had increased in length since 1808 from less than 1,000 miles to more than 3,000 miles, and whereas in the former year there had been no long lines of communication to protect, there were in 1853 more than 4,000 miles of routes through the Indian country requiring constant protection.⁶ In September of that year Davis had written to Governor Bell of Texas that the protection of the frontier was the most difficult problem facing the army.⁷

The rapid settlement of the Far West in the 1840's made possible the organization of the whole region west of the Rockies into States or Territories by the middle of the century. Oregon in 1848 was made a Territory, California became a State in 1850 and in the same year Utah Territory and New Mexico Territory were established. In response to the demand of white settlers for the extinguishment of Indian titles in the west a great period of treaty making was begun in 1853. Between 1853 and 1856 no less than 52 treaties were negotiated, more than in any other similar period in the nation's history. About 174 million acres were thus acquired from the Indians.⁸

In the decade 1840-1850 the situation of the Indians had become entirely changed. In 1840 the Indian Country had been outside the area of white settlement. Now, ten years later, the Indian Country had become surrounded by organized States and Territories on east, south and west. The existence of a large continuous area which was set apart wholly for the occupation of Indians, from which all white men were excluded except missionaries and traders who entered the region only by special permission, could not long withstand the terrific pressure of the movement for the complete organization of the nation. For four years the Indian Country continued to cut the nation in half. Then, in 1854 came the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. All of the Indian country north of the present Oklahoma was organized, into the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska. The remnant of the old Indian country south of Kansas became known as Indian Territory.

On the Texas Frontier.

In the three-cornered struggle for the possession of Texas after 1821 --- between the American settlers, Mexicans and Indians --- the Mexicans were the first to be eliminated. Yet, from the first the Indians were troublesome. During the first three years of the American Colony the Karankawa, a numerically weak but warlike tribe, threatened the peace of the settlers. It is estimated that nine-tenths of the fatal encounters with Indians in this period were with this tribe. In 1824 a treaty was made with the Karankawa. Then Austin's people had more trouble with the Waco and Tawakoni.⁹ Prior to the Texas Revolution in 1836 Austin carefully cultivated the friendship of the Comanche, most dangerous of the Plains tribes on the Texas frontier. White settlers had not yet invaded the Comanche hunting grounds, and these Indians found a profitable trade with the Americans in horses stolen from the Mexican settlements.¹⁰

In conflicts with Indians prior to the Texas Revolution Austin made use of so-called "Rangers;" but the picturesque Texas Rangers were not organized until October 17, 1835. Silas M. Parker was authorized to employ and direct the activities of "twenty-five Rangers whose business shall be to range and guard the frontiers between the Brazos and Trinity rivers."¹¹ Throughout the Revolution the work of the Texas Rangers can be traced. "Their business seems to have been mainly to guard against the incursions of the Indians on the west."¹²

The traditions of the Texas Rangers were thus established --- an irregular body; mounted; furnishing their own horses and arms; with no surgeon, no flag, and none of the paraphernalia of the regular service. They were distinct from both the regular army and the militia.¹³ In the defense of the Texas frontier in the years to follow the Texas Rangers were to play an important part. In the words of one observer "a Texas Ranger could ride like a Mexican, trail like an Indian, shoot like a Tennessean, and fight like a devil."¹⁴

During the Texas Revolution the regular army fought the Mexicans in the war for political freedom while the Rangers guarded the Indian frontier. In May 1836, the Northern Comanche and Kiowa joined in one of the most destructive raids ever made on the Texas frontier. But the summer and autumn passed without depredations of consequence. The Americans had demonstrated their strength at San Jacinto, and Indians hesitated to attack such a power.¹⁵ In the year of the Revolution Major Chouteau estimated the number of the tribes on the Texas frontier --- 4,500 Comanche, 1,500 Kiowa, 300 Kiowa-Apache, and the number of the Wichita, Waco, Tawakoni, Kichai collectively at less than 1,000.¹⁶ The Comanche outnumbered all the other tribes together. For forty years thereafter the Comanche were to remain the most difficult barrier to the advance of settlement in Texas.

In its first two years of existence the Republic of Texas was neither at war or peace with the Comanche. Open warfare was avoided, but irregular conflicts continued.¹⁷ Fearful of the rapidly expanding Texas settlements, and the advance of surveyors who carried the dread instruments that "stole their land," the Comanche (encouraged by Mexicans to the West) came to San Antonio in February 1838, asking for a treaty and a boundary line which would give them "full and undisputed possession of the country north of the Guadalupe Mountains."¹⁸ The Texans refused to establish a boundary. President Houston is said to have remarked, "If I could build a wall from the Red River to the Rio Grande, so high that no Indian could scale it, the white people would go crazy trying to devise means to get beyond it."¹⁹

With vigorous, aggressive, white frontiersmen on the one hand and irresponsible Indian raiders on the other, war with the Comanche could not be avoided in the years that followed. Lamar, who succeeded Houston as President of the Republic in December 1838, favored a policy of Indian expulsion.²⁰

The next four years were ones of bitter conflict. Since 1836 the Mexicans had sought an Indian alliance against the Texans, hoping to set up an Indian buffer state between Mexico and the United States. The Texans uncovered a Cherokee-Mexican plot in 1839, and the Cherokee were driven from Texas by militia (July 15-25). The expulsion of the Cherokee practically ended Indian fighting within the settled portion of Texas. Henceforth Texas' Indian troubles were to be on the western frontier.²¹

Meanwhile the Southern Comanche, less strong than the northern division of that tribe, were active on the western frontier. In December 1838 and January 1839, the Texas Congress adopted definite war measures, providing a system of frontier forts, and authorizing the placing of 1,000 men in the field, and approximately a million dollars for defense. The Comanche proved a formidable enemy, until, in 1840, Texan victories caused the Indians to retreat to safety on the distant plains.²² At this time the Texas frontier was in the timber country, but fast approaching the open plains.²³

On returning to office in December 1841, President Houston called on Texas to return to a peace policy. Yet efforts to get the Comanche to join in a peace conference were unsuccessful until April 1844. At Tehuacana Creek the Comanche and smaller Texas tribes met Houston. His proposal for a boundary was not acceptable to the Comanche, but a peace agreement was made in which the Indians made concessions to the whites in return for presents.²⁴

Meanwhile something was taking place which was to have an important effect on the future of wars with the Indians on the plains. In the early years of their existence the Texas Rangers had used rifles and pistols, and actually fought the Indians on foot. The Indians, who discharged their arrows while mounted, could thus shoot and flee while the Texans were delayed in mounting to give chase. The Rangers felt a real need for a weapon which they could use effectively while on horseback. The answer to this need was found in Colt's invention of the revolver. Colt's first revolver was made for them and called "the Texas." Such revolvers were introduced into Texas before 1840, and dubbed "six shooters" by the Rangers. The "six shooter" was first used in Indian warfare in June 1844, when 14 Rangers surprised a party of Comanche with the use of the new weapons, killed 30 Indians. Thus the deadly "six shooter" was launched on its murderous career in the hands of the Indian fighters, bad men, and officers of the law in the West.²⁵

Before Texas entered the Union in 1845, Secretary of War Marcy, promised that the United States would defend and protect Texas from both foreign invasion and Indian incursions. Nevertheless, Texas retained control of her public lands after annexation. As result, the state was relieved of the responsibility for the Indians, while the United States took over this responsibility without power to locate the Texas tribes on land within the state. Texas law did not acknowledge any Indian right to the soil. White surveyors and settlers continued to aggravate the Indian situation by invading the Indian country. The United States was powerless to stop them.²⁶

Annexation remained a mystery to the Indians. "A contemporary observer said that it was a simple matter to make a treaty with Mexico, draw a line on a map in Washington, and say to the Indian: 'Shinny on your side, Mr. Indian. But,' he continued, 'the Indian, unfortunately, no comprende annexation, no comprende paper treaties, no comprende why his war parties are to hang up their shields and spears and bows. It is all, from beginning to ending, ridiculously absurd to him.'"²⁷

Nevertheless, the United States was successful in securing the friendship and neutrality of the Comanche and neighboring Texas tribes during the Mexican War. At Council Springs on the Brazos a treaty was made, May 15, 1846, by which these Indians placed themselves under sole protection of the United States and agreed to remain at peace.

There was relative peace on the Texas frontier to 1848. The presence of a large number of United States troops on the border, and distribution of presents to the Indians in 1846 and 1847 aided to avert serious difficulties. Yet the Indians continued to ply their favorite trade of horse stealing at the expense of Texan frontiersmen.²⁸

The withdrawal of United States troops from the border brought complaints from Texans in 1849. In that year only 1,000 regular troops were left in Texas -- largely infantry. One Texas editor declared that infantry was as much out of place on the Texas frontier as "a sawmill on the ocean."²⁹ Meanwhile the Texas Rangers, forbidden by the United States to operate against the Indians were "little more than an historical expression." White hatred of the Indians in Texas was high. It was a common Texas belief that "the Comanche should be destroyed and the Rangers employed as executioners."³⁰

In 1849 depredations broke out anew; 171 people were killed, 7 wounded and 25 carried into captivity. Stock valued at \$103,277 was stolen.³¹

Still, until Texas passed a law permitting the establishment of Indian reservations on her public lands no real solution of the problem could be found. This law was not forthcoming until 1854. It inaugurated a new period of Indian relations on the Texas frontier that will be discussed later in this study.³²

Along the Mexican Border.

The original "bad man" of the Southwest was the Apache Indian. The Pueblo Indian was his victim long before the Spaniards came to New Mexico. After the Spaniards took over the Apache continued to make life miserable for them -- raiding their small settlements, stealing horses and cattle.

In 1825, James O. Pattie of Kentucky, was a member of an American party of trappers that met a band of Apache on the Gila River. All efforts at friendly relations failed. The Apache attacked and took the Americans' horses.³³ Ten Apache were killed. This was the beginning of 60 years of Apache hostility to citizens of the United States.

In 1837 the Mexican Government of Chihuahua issued a Proyecto de Guerra offering scalp bounties of some \$100 for each Apache warrior, \$50 for each woman, and \$25 for each child, in an effort to stop Apache raids into Mexico. Sonora had previously passed such a law. James Johnson, an American trapper, determined to get some easy money by inviting a large party of Apache to a feast, and massacring some 400 of them. This vicious act roused the Warm Springs Apache, under Mangus Colorado, a survivor of the massacre, to seek vengeance. Twenty-four American trappers were murdered; pack trains to the Santa Rita Copper Mines were looted, their drivers murdered; the little settlement of Santa Rita (300 or 400 persons) was nearly wiped out. The Apache continued to raid into Mexico.³⁴

In 1846, when the United States took over the Southwest, the Apache "dominated and terrorized northern Sonora, Chihuahau, Arizona, New Mexico, and western Texas -- a territory as extensive as France and Germany combined."³⁵ In the Mexican war the Apache took no sides -- Mexicans and Americans were both enemies to them. However, their first meeting with an American army was friendly. In the autumn of 1846, Lieut. W. H. Emory passed through the Apache country from the Rio Grande westward along the Gila. He secured four Apache guides; found that even then the Apache warriors had firearms.³⁶

The Mexican War marked a milestone in the history of Indian warfare in the United States. It was the first major conflict in which either the British Colonies or the United States had engaged in which the Indians did not take an important part. For the most part the southwestern tribes saw that this war was not their battle. They had little to gain by a victory for either side. So they remained out of it.

On August 19, 1846, Gen. Stephen Kearny took Santa Fe, raised the American flag, and pushed on southward. Charles Bent, a resident of Taos, was left as governor of the new territory. On January 19, 1847, Taos Indians, incited by Mexican conspirators, murdered Bent and several other Americans at Taos. Then they attacked Turley's Mill nearby where all but three Americans were killed. The punishment of the Taos was swift and sure. Sterling Price led an American force from Santa Fe to Taos, February 3-4; attacked the town. The Indians fled at great loss of life. Tomasito, the murderer of Bent, was killed trying to escape execution. Six others were tried, and hanged.³⁷

When the United States took over New Mexico it assured its inhabitants that it would protect them from the Indians. This was a large order. Not only the Apache, but their neighbors the Navaho continued to steal Mexican flocks and herds. The army was employed to bring the Navaho to peace. The Navaho came to terms in September, 1849.

On April 7, 1849 James S. Calhoun was appointed to the position of Indian Agent at Santa Fe. After the Navaho had been pacified (temporarily) he recommended the locating of the hostile Comanche and Apache and other wild tribes of the Southwest on reservations as a practical and economic measure. But no action was taken on his suggestion. On March 29, 1851, Calhoun wrote: "Until the Apaches and Navahoes are completely subdued we cannot have quiet and prosperity in this Territory." Though nominally in a state of peace throughout Calhoun's able administration (1849-1852), isolated Indian depredations continued to keep the Mexican, and American settlers in a state of fear. In June 1852, Calhoun's successor was able to report, "Not a single depredation has been committed by any of the Indians in New Mexico for three months. The oldest inhabitant cannot recollect the time when this could have been said with truth before."³⁸

Relative peace in New Mexico Territory continued to 1854, although from time to time the Apache swept down on a settlement and murdered and/or looted. Under such conditions there could be little security for the people of New Mexico, who had numbered only 61,547 in 1850.

Where Rolls the Oregon.

Oregon was still an Indian Country in 1840. Although the region was claimed and held jointly by the United States and Great Britain its white population was small. The whites in Oregon were nearly all engaged in the fur trade.

From the far off Pacific slope, in 1832, four Nez Perce Indians journeyed to St. Louis to see William Clark, the Indian Superintendent. The true purpose of their visit is not well known. But there is no doubt that their presence in St. Louis inspired a sentimental article in the "Christian Advocate" of March 1, 1833, portraying their journey eastward as a pilgrimage in search of more knowledge of the Bible, "the white man's book of heaven," of which they had heard through white traders in their own country.

To pious churchmen this was "a Macedonian call." In the same periodical on March 22, Wilbur Fisk, president of Wesleyan University, urged the establishment of a mission to the Indians of the Northwest. Next year Jason Lee, with four associates made the long overland trek to Oregon to begin the Methodist Mission in the Willamette Valley. Dr. Marcus Whitman, two years later, with others of the American Board of Missions began work with the Indians at Waiilatpu, near the present Walla Walla. More missionaries arrived and new mission stations set up.

Lee and Whitman carried the flag as well as the cross. To save Oregon from the British became as much their aim as to save the Indians from paganism. In fact, Jason Lee was removed from the superintendency of the Oregon Mission of the Methodists in 1844 because he was showing more interest in the American colonization of Oregon than in ministering to the Indians. Whitman also foresaw the future of Oregon in terms of American settlement: "Although the Indians have made and are making rapid advance in religious knowledge and civilization, yet it cannot be hoped that time will be allowed to mature either the work of Christianization of civilization before the white settlers will demand the soil and seek the removal of both the Indians and the mission... To guide as far as can be done, and direct these tendencies for the best is evidently the part of wisdom."³⁹

Conditions were ripe in the east for the settlement of Oregon by Americans. The panic of 1837 brought hard times which continued for half a decade. Missionaries, travelers and traders had written in glowing terms of the fertile valleys of Oregon. The year 1841 marked the first

movement of farmers over the trail to Oregon. Each year the number of migrants increased -- there had been 45 in 1841; 112 in 1842; 875 in 1843; 1475 in 1844; 3000 in 1845. By the fall of 1847, no less than 11,500 emigrants had passed over the Oregon Trail to Oregon.⁴⁰

Meanwhile things were not going so well for Marcus Whitman. During the first year of his mission to the Indians they had responded eagerly. But the novelty began to wear off, hostile Indians entered the country, interest slackened. The Cayuse were becoming increasingly insolent. Rough white settlers were abusing and even murdering Indians. In 1847, there was a measles epidemic. Dr. Whitman offered his services to both whites and Indians. But unfortunately the whites recovered quickly while the Indians persistently succumbed to the malady. Indians began to think Whitman was unfair to them -- and possibly was intentionally poisoning those who were ill.

This complex situation roused the Indians to hostility. The Cayuse demanded blood vengeance. On November 29, 1847, they attacked the Whitman Mission at Waiilatpu and murdered Dr. and Mrs. Whitman and seven others. A few days later five more were killed. Over 50 men, women and children, mostly immigrants, were held captive.

The Whitman Massacre had an important bearing on the history of Oregon: (1) It precipitated Indian troubles that closed eastern Oregon to white settlement for a period of twelve years.⁴¹ (2) It speeded the movement for the organization of the Oregon Territory. Joseph Meek was sent to Washington with a report of the Whitman Massacre and subsequent Cayuse War, and a memorial calling for a civil government in Oregon to handle such difficult problems, addressed to Congress. In August 1848, Congress passed a law creating the Territory of Oregon, set in operation May 3, 1849.⁴²

When news of the Whitman Massacre reached the settlements of the Willamette Valley, a regiment of volunteers was quickly recruited and sent up the Columbia. Meanwhile Peter Skene Ogden rescued the white prisoners of the Cayuse. In an ensuing campaign the Cayuse were severely punished. But the war taxed the slender resources of the settlers to the utmost.⁴³

Oregon Territory was settled before any provisions were made for extinguishing the Indian title. Not until 1850 did Congress appoint a commission to treat with the Indians for their lands. The Commissioners were instructed to move the Indians west of the Cascades to the east of these mountains. On reaching Oregon in February 1851 they found these orders could not be carried out without the use of force. So they arranged instead to allow the Indians to remain on small reservations west of the Cascades. The first treaties were made in April 1851. By the end of May six treaties had been negotiated. In the following summer Anson Dart, Indian Superintendent for Oregon made treaties with ten Chinook

groups on the west coast, covering the cession of 3,000,000 acres south of Shoalwater Bay. Three more treaties were made in the fall. Yet every one of the 1851 treaties failed of ratification by the Senate. When the year ended Oregon had yet to produce its first legal Indian land cession.⁴⁴ Yet there were over 13,000 whites in the Territory.

News of the gold discovery in California sent Oregon people flocking over the trail southward. Troubles arose with the Indians of southern Oregon in 1850 and continued each year through 1853. Indians attacked the travelers, murdered their men and/or stole their horses and their supplies. The Modoc and the so-called Rogue River Indians (Shasta, Takelma, and Tututni) formed the principal hostiles. In 1852, after the Modoc had massacred the entire force of a wagon party, 33 persons, Ben Wright, at the head of California and Oregon volunteers tricked the Modoc into attending a council in good faith -- shot down 30 of their number. This act broke the power of the Modoc. Never again did they become a serious threat to white settlement. But the Rogue River Indians continued their depredations in 1853.⁴⁵

Thus, prior to 1854 Oregon was embarked on a long and fitful series of Indian wars and minor disturbances that served to check the progress of white settlement over large sections of the Oregon Country. Meanwhile negotiations went on with the Indians west of the Cascades in an effort to get them to cede their lands.

In the California Mines.

Spanish contacts with the Indians of California prior to the Mexican War were largely limited to those along the coast and adjacent regions of the interior. They did not penetrate westward to the Sierra Nevada. In 1769 at San Diego Father Junipero Serra began the establishment of the first of the California Indian missions. Gradually the Spanish mission chain was extended up the coast. Mission buildings were constructed by Indian labor, orchards and vineyards were planted and worked by the natives, crops were raised, large numbers of cattle were introduced. The arts of civilization were taught the mission Indians along with the picturesque rituals of the Catholic religion. By 1834 there were 21 missions, extending in an irregular line for more than 600 miles along the coast, linking together the most fertile valleys of California. There were then 30,650 Indians connected with the missions. They had cattle to the number of 424,000. The sheep, goats and hogs numbered 321,900; their horses and mules, 62,500. They produced 122,500 bushels of wheat and corn. Their product was valued at \$2,000,000.

All this prosperity excited the cupidity of the Mexican Government. In 1833-34 decrees were passed to "secularize" the missions. The mission funds and herds were confiscated. Lands were taken over by political adventurers. Quickly the missions went into decline. By 1842 only 4,450 mission Indians remained. Their cattle were reduced to 28,220; their other holdings reduced proportionately. Many of the Indians fled to the interior. By the time of American occupancy of California in 1846 the decline was complete. The majority of the Indians had moved to ranche-rias in the mountains and districts remote from white settlements.⁴⁵

In the early days of American rule in California the government, characterized as "part military, part civil, and part no government at all," gave little consideration to the Indian problem. Yet, although the Indians indulged now and then in cattle stealing raids, and the whites often paid them back in kind, Indian-white relations prior to the gold rush were in the main peaceful.⁴⁷

The gold rush of 1849, brought excited and avaricious whites into the heart of the California Indian country -- the foothills at the base of the Sierra Nevada. Intent in their search for this precious metal, and viewing any barriers to the pursuit of this occupation as obstacles to be roughly removed, the miners refused to recognize the Indians' rights to the valuable gold country. Quickly they overran the rivers and streams at the western base of the Sierra and penetrated the Humboldt Bay and Klamath River regions of northwestern California.

Most of the Indian tribes of the gold regions were not warlike peoples. Yet they could not remain peaceful in face of this ruthless white penetration of their country. Isolated parties of miners were attacked, animals, supplies stolen. Dan A. Clark, a worker in the Southern Mines, stated that in the winter of 1850-51, the Indians stole everything left outside cabins. It was unsafe to go far from camp alone. Many miners were killed by Indians that winter. But the strong punishments administered the Indians of that region in 1851 quieted them.⁴⁸

In the early months of 1851 Indian commissioners began to make treaties with the California tribes in an effort to remove them from the gold country and settle them on limited reservations. In 1851 and 1852 a total of 18 treaties affecting 139 tribes or bands of Indians in California were negotiated. These treaties were all rejected by the Senate July 8, 1852. Mr. McCorkle, a representative of California in Congress objected for his state that the reservations provided were located in "the most valuable agricultural and mineral land in the State."⁴⁹

There was also a legal barrier to successful treaty-making in California. Neither Spain nor Mexico had recognized the usufructuary right of the Indians to the land. Therefore, it was held that when Mexico ceded the land to the United States, the government obtained an absolute title. There was thus no legal necessity for treaties with the Indians for their land.⁵⁰

While the treaty making was under way miners continued to take matters into their own hands with fatal results to the Indians. Many of their attacks on the Indians were poorly organized, ruthless ones. However, in the Southern Mines, an orderly volunteer, mounted force, was organized. Under the leadership of James Savage this Mariposa Battalion, as it was called, conducted campaigns against the foothill tribes (January-March 1851) chastising them in a number of minor conflicts, and encouraging them to make peace and treat with the commissioners. An interesting sidelight of this outfit's activities, was their expedition to bring in the Yosemite Indians from their mountain fastness -- resulting in the discovery of the magnificent Yosemite Valley, in March 1851.⁵¹

The failure of the Senate to ratify the California treaties resulted in the crowding out of the Indians by white settlers. In order to give these Indians definite homes the Indian Appropriation Bill of March 3, 1853, gave authorization to the President to establish not more than 5 reservations not exceeding 25,000 acres each. By late fall the Tejon or Sebastian reserve was definitely started. In 1854 the Mono Lake Reservation was established.⁵²

Slowly other reservations were set up. But conflicts between whites and Indians continued in northwest California until 1865. The Klamath War of 1855, the war with the Wintoons 1858-1859, and the war with the Hupa and allies, 1863-1865, each ended with the settlement of the former hostiles on reservations. By spring of 1865 "the hostile tribes had been killed or captured, had been flooded by storms and driven by man, had been starved and beaten into absolute and final subjugation." The conflict with the Indians of northwestern California thus came to an end.⁵³

Yet in isolated sections the conflicts between white and red man in California carried on into the 1870's.⁵⁴

Indians and Mormons in Utah.

Like the immigrants to Oregon and the forty-niners in California the Mormons moved into Utah without benefit of prior treaties with the Indians providing for land cessions. The first treaty between the United States and the Ute Indians was one of peace and amity, not a

land cession. And it was made in 1849, three years after the persecuted Mormons began their interesting experiment at Salt Lake. This treaty did provide for the peaceful passage of the white through the country.

Although the Indians objected that the Mormon settlement at Salt Lake had greatly diminished their fishing opportunities in the lake and nearly driven away the game by 1849, and though they resented the spread of Mormons from Salt Lake over the Utah lands, the Mormons faced no sizeable Indian conflict until 1853. The Walker War of this year was caused by Mormon attempt to interfere with the Ute practice of selling Indian women to the Mexicans. Chief Walker objected. The war that followed lasted from July to winter. There were no serious battles. Some dozen Mormons were killed. About \$200,000 were spent in building forts and removing settlers to places of safety.

During 1852-1853 there were Indian troubles along the emigrant road from Salt Lake City westward. Whites were largely to blame. In the latter year Capt. Gunnison, in charge of a Pacific railway survey party was killed by Pahvants. Eight of his fellow members were also murdered. The Indians had been seeking revenge on the whites for the murder of a redskin by members of a previous wagon party.⁵⁵

In 1854 nominal peace with the Indians of Utah existed. Still no land cessions had been made by any Indians of this region.

Trails Across the Plains.

So long as white settlements halted at the bend of the Missouri the Plains Indians were free from the worries that beset Indians in Oregon, California, Utah, Texas, and the Southwest -- worries caused by the occupation of their land by permanent white settlers. Prior to 1854 white men found the Plains north of Texas useful as highways, not homes. The Plains Indians, who had previously known white explorers and fur traders in relatively small numbers, first came in contact with large numbers of Americans as emigrants en route to greener fields beyond the Plains and the Rockies.

Prior to 1841 the two great routes of commerce and travel through the Plains were the Santa Fe Trail and the Missouri River. Somewhat less important were the Arkansas Valley and the Platte Valley. The route up the North Platte, and across Wyoming over the continental divide via South Pass had been growing in popularity as a direct overmountain route for fur traders since the rediscovery of the South Pass in 1824. But prior to 1841 parties using this route were relatively small ones.

In 1841 the first emigrant party passed up the Platte en route to Oregon and California. The party totaled about 80, composed of missionaries and homeseekers, guided by Thomas Fitzpatrick. The emigrants traveled in covered wagons drawn by horses or oxen; the missionaries in Red

River carts drawn by mules hitched tandem. At Soda Springs (in present Idaho) there was a parting of the ways -- about half continuing southwest to California, and half northwest to Oregon.⁵⁶ This first emigrant train up the Platte marked the beginning of a new era for the Plains Indians. It was the beginning of the destruction of buffalo nearby and the frightening of herds away from the region traversed, the destruction of wood and grass in the river bottoms, etc. From then on food became increasingly hard for the Indians of the vicinity -- especially the Teton Dakota (Brule and Oglala groups), Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho -- to procure. They were often hungry.

In 1842 a larger number of emigrants moved westward via the Platte-South Pass route. In July John C. Fremont on his first exploring expedition up the Platte found the Oglala and Cheyenne Indians in the vicinity of Fort Laramie objecting to white emigration through their hunting grounds. He spoke to them in a conference at Fort Laramie on the necessity for keeping the peace. In his Report he recommended the establishment of a military post in the neighborhood of Fort Laramie for the protection of emigrants.⁵⁷

The emigration of 1843 took between 900 and 1,000 whites over the route to Oregon and California. It produced the well marked wagon trail to Oregon which the Indians of the Plains came to know as "The Great Medicine Road of the Whites," and the Shoshoni of the Rockies called "The White-top Wagon Road."⁵⁸ Indians could not comprehend the true significance of such a large-scale migration. One Oglala chief asked, "if there were still any whites remaining there, pointing to the eastward."⁵⁹ Others were certain that the migration of this year had been the white people's "big village" and that they would no longer be troubled with large parties of whites moving up the Platte.⁶⁰

But the increasing numbers of the migrations of succeeding years soon dispelled these naive ideas. Estimates of the numbers of emigrants passing over the Oregon Trail to Oregon, California and Utah are difficult to obtain. One rather complete estimate places the total number 1841-1852, at 157,717. At best this is but a fair minimum. A break-down of this estimate:⁶¹

<u>Year</u>	<u>to California</u>	<u>to Utah</u>	<u>to Oregon</u>	<u>Ft. Laramie Count</u>
1841	32		45	
1842			112	
1843	36		875	
1844	50		1,475	
1845	200		3,000	
1846	500		2,000	
1847	200	1,701	4,000	
1848	200	1,891	1,400	
1849				25,000
1850				55,000
1851				20,000
1852				40,000
Totals -	1,218	3,592	12,907	140,000

These large scale migrations made the Indians of the Plains living along the Oregon Trail increasingly restless. Yet it is remarkable that Indian hostility in this period seldom reached the point of attacking white emigrant parties. Although isolated cases of Indian attack may be found for the portion of the trail east of the present Wyoming, a careful student was unable to find a single reference to the murder of an emigrant at the hands of the Indians while passing through the Wyoming Country during the years 1841-52.⁶² The popular conception of the Indian attack on an emigrant train as a typical aspect of the movement over the Oregon Trail seems to be fallacious -- at least so far as this period is concerned. Far more persons died of illness, fatigue, and accidental discharge of their own firearms than at the hand of painted redskins. Yet all this time the whites were invading an Indian Country illegally, against the treaty-pledged word of the United States to the Indians.

Beginning in 1845 the Army became an important factor in protecting emigrants from possible Indian attacks. Primarily for this purpose, Col. Kearney with a force of five companies, 250 men of the first Dragoons, a train of 19 wagons, 50 head of cattle and 25 head of sheep, was sent out over the trail from Fort Leavenworth May 18, 1845; followed it to South Pass and returned via Bent's Fort and the Arkansas Valley. In 99 days he had covered 2,200 miles. Col. Kearney reported seeing in emigrant caravans on the trail -- 850 men, 475 women, 1,000 children, 7,000 cattle, 400 horses and mules, and 460 wagons. Three years earlier (1842) Fremont had seen only 64 men and 16 or 17 families on the trail.⁶³

In 1846 a bill was passed by Congress creating a regiment of mounted men to defend the route to Oregon.⁶⁴ Although Fremont had recommended the establishment of a series of forts along the trail for the protection of emigrants as early as 1842, Congress was four years in authorizing them. Again there was delay. Not until spring of 1849 was the first military post established on the trail -- Fort Kearney (at present Kearney, Nebraska). A few months later Fort Laramie was purchased by the Army. In the same year Fort Hall was taken over. For nearly a decade thereafter these three widely separated forts held the responsibility for an adequate protection of a trail 2,000 miles long. (Fort Bridger was not used as a military post until 1857).⁶⁵

By the middle of the nineteenth century the Oregon Trail had become the life line of the nation -- this thin passage through the heart of the Indian Country was the thread that held the settled East and the rapidly-being-settled West together by land. It became an important point of Indian policy to keep this line of communication open. Out of this situation grew a plan of grouping the Indian tribes to the north and south of the trail in such manner as to allow a free path up the Platte Valley and on to South Pass which did not bisect the lands claimed by any tribe.⁶⁶

To carry out this policy an important treaty was made at Fort Laramie with the tribes living along the overland route in the fall of 1851. This was the first important treaty with the Plains Indians since the establishment of the so-called permanent Indian frontier in 1840. The treaty provided for (1) establishment and maintenance of intertribal peace (2) Indian recognition of right of United States to establish roads, military and other posts, within their respective territories (3) Indian agreement to make restitution for all wrongs committed after ratification of treaty by any band or individual of their people, on the people of the United States while lawfully residing in or passing through their territories (4) definition of boundaries of tribal lands of each of the signatory tribes. While primarily aimed at establishing peaceful transportation over the trail, the treaty, by defining tribal boundaries took a first important step in the process of dispossessing the Plains Indians. In return for these concessions the United States agreed to pay these Indians a total of \$50,000 a year for 50 years. However, the Senate, before ratifying the treaty, reduced the annuity period to 10 years.⁶⁷

Indians of the southern Plains -- Comanche, Kiowa and Apache -- had been invited to the Fort Laramie conference but refused to attend because it was too far distant, and they feared the Sioux and Crow would steal their horses. Hence it was necessary to negotiate a separate treaty with these tribes. Accordingly at Fort Atkinson, July 27, 1853, a similar treaty was made by which the signatory tribes made concessions to the United States acknowledging the right of the United States to lay out roads and establish posts in their territories. They also agreed to refrain in the future from warlike incursions into Mexico. Annuity goods amounting to \$18,000 for a period of ten years were provided.⁶⁸

With peace thus established with the "wild tribes" north of Texas the United States was free to debate the matter of organizing the Indian Country north of the present Oklahoma into territories. Representative Hall of Missouri on February 10, 1853 had pointed to the large annual migration across the Plains to the Pacific Coast, then numbering fifty to sixty thousand, through wild Indian Country without government aid or protection save that afforded by the small forces at the three scattered forts along the way, as an argument for the organization of this region.⁶⁹

During the winter of 1853-54, while Congress was still debating the organization of Kansas and Nebraska, the Indian department was busy making treaties to extinguish the Indian title to land in the eastern portion of the Indian Country. By June 5, 1854, treaties had been made with the Oto and Missouri, Omaha, Delaware, Shawnee, Iowa, Sauk and Fox, Kickapoo, Kaskaskia, Peoria, Wea, Piankashaw and Miami, ceding the government practically all the territory in eastern Kansas and Nebraska save some large tracts in the Kansas River Valley. Most of the tribes agreed to move south into the present Oklahoma. Others remained for the time being on small reservations within their former territories.⁷⁰ The land ceded aggregated more than 13,000,000 acres.

These cessions opened eastern Kansas Territory and Nebraska Territory (both established May 30, 1854) to white settlement. The Indians remaining in the region were too weak to offer effective resistance to the new flood of settlers. "The Indians of Kansas meekly and tragically submitted to their fate."⁷¹ By 1860 newly opened Kansas had a population of over 107,000, Nebraska nearly 29,000.

To the west of this newly opened territory were the "wild tribes" of the Plains, the powerful Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Comanche, nominally at peace and treaty-bound to maintain that peace. But they were growing more and more restless. They were still "wild." And it was to take several decades of hard fighting to "tame" them.

Whites and Indians in Minnesota.

Minnesota was the last of the present states constituting the first tier of states west of the Mississippi to be settled. The first American settlement was made a little below the falls of St. Croix in 1838. Later other settlements sprang up about the falls of St. Anthony. On March 3, 1849, a bill was passed organizing the Territory of Minnesota, whose boundary on the west extended to the Missouri River. At that time Minnesota was still little more than a wilderness. The west bank of the Mississippi, from the Iowa line to Lake Itasca, was unceded Indian Country. The population of Minnesota in 1850 was but 6,077.

When the territory of Minnesota was organized the portion ceded by the Indians was chiefly east of the Mississippi, bounded on the north by a line extending east from the mouth of the Crow Wing River to the western boundary of Wisconsin. North of this line was still Ojibway country.⁷² To make way for expanding settlements after the establishment of the Territory, it was desirable to secure additional Indian land. In 1850 a great Indian Council was held at Fort Snelling, attended by representatives of Ojibway and Eastern Dakota bands. At the Council Governor Ramsey was able to effect a peace between the Ojibway and Dakota, long traditional enemies. By treaties in 1851 the Eastern Dakota groups ceded all their lands within the boundaries of Minnesota except a comparatively small strip on both sides of the Minnesota River, retained as a reservation.⁷³

White settlers rushed into the newly ceded lands even before the legal date set for its opening. By 1860, Minnesota had a population of more than 172,000, a total equal to some 28 times her population in 1850.

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ROUNDING UP THE WILD TRIBES:

The Changing Indian Policy, 1854-1887.

.. "If our Indian troubles are to be ended by exterminating the race, it is evident that at the present rate of one Indian killed per month, the achievement will be completed at the end of exactly twenty-five thousand years; and if each dead Indian is to cost the same hereafter as heretofore, the precise sum total we will have to expend is \$300,000,000,000 to complete the extermination....the slaying of every Indian costs us the lives of twenty-five whites, so that the extermination process must bring about the slaughter of 7,500,000 of our people."

- Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1868.

At the time of the organization of Kansas and Nebraska Territories (May 30, 1854) the portion of the United States north and west of Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas and the eastern half of Texas was still predominantly Indian country in so far as the actual occupation and use of the land was concerned. In the areas comprising the present states of Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming not a single Indian land cession had been made. The northern half of Minnesota, all of South Dakota west of the Big Sioux River, extreme western Kansas, more than half of Nebraska, the western half of Texas, and nearly all of Oregon were still owned and occupied by Indians. In California, Arizona, and New Mexico the United States had taken over the Indian lands from Mexico without the necessity for land purchases since Mexico had never recognized the Indian title to lands. Nevertheless Indians still occupied the greater part of Arizona and New Mexico and considered their holdings their own.

Yet by 1890 the Indian claim to the greater part of this territory was ceded, and the Indians themselves penned up on restricted areas - reservations. This was not accomplished without a terrific struggle. The number of hostile Indians of the Plains, the Rockies, the Southwest and the Pacific Slope was insignificant compared with the United States population of circa 25,000,000 in 1854. Yet for 36 more years the Indians continued to retard the advance of white settlement in the west. This period was one of the most colorful, most confused, and, for the Indians the most tragic periods in the history of the frontier.

In the fifties and early sixties a veritable war of extermination was carried on against the "wild Indians" throughout the west. No less than twenty-two distinct "wars" were fought during the decade of the "fighting fifties."¹ In the single year (1857) there were "no less than 37 separate expeditions, large and small, involving actual combat, besides an indefinite number which accomplished their purposes without fighting."²

In 1860, the United States Army numbered 14,072 men. Of these 2,808 were in the Dept. of the West, 2,949 in the Dept. of Texas, 3,104 in the Dept. of New Mexico, 328 in the Dept. of Utah, 2,236 in the Dept. of Oregon and 1,218 in the Dept. of California. "This indicates the extraordinary degree to which the Army had been absorbed by the frontier."³

The Civil War was not an Indian's war, although the civilized tribes of the Indian Territory contributed men to both the Union and the Confederacy. Efforts were made to keep the "wild tribes" peaceful during the war without much success. Rumors of Confederate efforts to stir up these tribes against the United States were circulated during the war. But such influences have not been proven, and they are hardly necessary to explain the numerous Indian disturbances that occurred in the West during the war period.⁴

During the period immediately following the Civil War popular sentiment and public policy in Indian relations underwent a drastic change. The pursuit of Indian war was proving exceedingly costly. Wars with the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Navaho alone between 1862-1867 had cost the people of the United States more than \$100,000,000. The Cheyenne War of 1864 had cost \$30,000,000.⁵ It cost \$60,000 for every Indian killed in 1866.⁶

In 1867 the peace policy was inaugurated. A Commission appointed by Congress June 20, was authorized to make treaties with the hostile tribes. "The end in view was threefold: first the removal of the causes of war, second, the security of our frontiers, and the safe building of our western railroads; third the inauguration of some form of plan for the civilization of the Indians."⁷

The Peace Commission found that the principal of allowing Indians to exist as roving tribes within the organized territory of the United States had to be changed. Treaties were made providing for the cession of large portions of Indian lands, the settlement of the Indians on reservations, and the payment of annuities in goods.⁸

In President Grant's first administration more drastic changes were made in our Indian Policy. The Indian Appropriation Act of April 10, 1869 provided for: (1) Appropriation of two million dollars to be used to maintain peace with the Indians. (2) Active cooperation of various religious

bodies in the working out of the Indian policy. (3) Inauguration of the feeding system providing for the gathering of the wilder tribes on reservations and supporting them with government rations until they were taught to earn their own living.⁹ In 1871 the policy of making treaties with the Indians was abandoned. No longer were Indians to be considered separate and distinct nations to be dealt with as foreign powers. They were henceforth to be dealt with through agreements not treaties.¹⁰

Grant's Administration saw the end of widespread Indian wars. After 1869, there were Indian wars but they were localized ones growing out of conditions in specific areas and effecting single tribes, or closely related tribal groups. In his Annual Report of 1874, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated, "such an event as a general Indian war can never again occur in the United States."¹¹

The policy of feeding the "wild tribes" was heralded by the Secretary of the Interior in 1870 as a practical measure... "It will be cheaper to feed every adult Indian now living, even to sleepy surfeiting, during his natural life, while their children are educated to self support by agriculture, than to carry on a general Indian war for a single year."¹² But as time passed and the danger of Indian disturbances became more and more remote it became apparent that the feeding system was pauperizing the Indians.

In an effort to establish the Indians as self-respecting individuals Congress passed the Allotment Act (February 8, 1887). This act, commonly known as the Dawes Act in honor of its sponsor, provided for (1) the allotment of land to individual Indians (2) the eventual conferring of citizenship on all Indians to whom land should be allotted.¹³ Sentimentalists saw in this act a "Magna Carta for the Indians," which freed him at last from white domination. But Senator Dawes himself was less enthusiastic, stating "What is this change? It is not any transformation of the Indian. The law has only enacted an opportunity and nothing more."¹⁴

We shall see in a later chapter something of the working out of this act.

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DEATH ON THE PLAINS:

The Subjugation of the Plains Indians, 1854-1891.

"It was on the Great Plains that the Indians made their most formidable and determined stand against the white race."

- Dan Elbert Clark.

The advance of white settlement into the Great Plains came late for two main reasons: (1) the popular belief that the Great Plains constituted an untillable desert country caused the westward flowing stream of settlement in the midnineteenth century to pass over the Plains to the fertile lands of Oregon and California, and to Utah (2) the Great Plains were the jealously guarded hunting grounds of the most effective redskin warriors in the United States. Before the Great Plains could be settled the more fertile areas farther west had to be largely occupied by white men and the myth of the "Great American Desert" had to be dispelled. Before the Great Plains could be settled the Plains Indians had to be dispossessed of the greater part of their hunting grounds. The real cattle boom on the Plains did not take place until after the Indians had been "corraled" on reservations, and homesteaders did not spread out over the Plains in large numbers until after the menace of hostile Indians had been largely dissipated. These things were accomplished only after a prolonged period of titantic struggle with some of the "wild tribes" of the Great Plains -- a period that witnessed the most exciting, and dramatic action in the history of our Indian wars.

The general motive for the Indian wars on the Plains was the same as it had been for Indian wars elsewhere in the United States -- Indian resentment of aggressive white encroachment on their traditional hunting grounds. But there were a number of more specific contributing factors: (1) the heavy traffic over the trans-Plains commercial and emigrant trails; (2) the destruction of the Indians' staff of life -- the buffalo; (3) the advance of settlement into Kansas and eastern Nebraska after 1854; (4) the illegal rush of miners into the gold country of Colorado (after 1858), of Montana (in the sixties), of the Black Hills of South Dakota (after 1874); (5) the survey and construction of the Pacific Railroads; (6) the changeable, unorganized policy of the government in dealing with the Indians, with authority divided between an Indian Office hampered by many unscrupulous or incompetent officials, and an army which was limited in size, frequently inadequately equipped for campaigning on the Plains, and too often led by vindictive officers. Nor were these factors constant.

They operated with varying intensities at different times in different localities, tending to make warfare sporadic and localized. There was never a general uprising of the Plains Indians. But the wars were spread out over a period of nearly four decades, with alternate periods of hard fighting and relative peace. Still these wars would not have been so prolonged had it not been for the

Effectiveness of Plains Indian Warriors.

On the Plains the white man encountered a warrior whose tactics were very different from those of the Indians of the timbered country. The forest tribes fought on foot, seeking cover behind trees, fighting largely as individuals. But the Plains Indians fought on horseback, moving rapidly over the broad expanse of open land, striking swiftly and escaping quickly. While they usually fought in small raiding parties, they could, when occasion demanded, put in the field forces numbering thousands of warriors with some degree of organization. "The Sioux, when in force depended on the mounted charge in extended order, with bow or rifle, circling rapidly about the enemy and firing as they went, making feints from time to time and charging home when opportunity offered -- the same tactics known to eastern Europe as the Cossack 'lava'. On defense or when awaiting an opportunity for a charge, they used successive extended lines, retiring and advancing by small fractions."¹ Although generally preferring to meet the enemy in considerably smaller numbers than their own force, and using the ambush effectively to secure this advantage, the Plains Indians were not as averse to pitched battle as the forest Indians.

Fighting on horseback, with lance, bow and arrows, and firearms for offense, and the tough fire-hardened, buffalo hide shield for defense these "Red Knights of the Prairie" were far better equipped for warfare in their environment than the whites who came against them. Infantry was never effective against them, until the new Springfield breach-loading rifle was issued to the troops in 1867.² But Indians too began to acquire the breach-loader in this year, and found it admirably adapted to use on horseback. As to marksmanship -- General Crook is authority for the opinion that the mounted Indian warrior, with breach-loader and metallic cartridges was much superior to the soldier used against him -- the mounted Indian could kill a moving wolf while riding at full speed, but the trooper was lucky if he could hit a mounted Indian even though the soldier stood flat on the ground.³

Defensive warfare in opposition to attack by superior force was also adjusted to the Plains environment, which offered no protection in nature. To scatter on attack as did the Indians of the forest, would have been suicide on the Plains -- individuals would only have been ridden down and murdered. Protection could only come through forming in compact circular

bodies. Long before the period of warfare with the whites the Indians of the Plains had adopted this principal in the arrangement of their tipis in the form of the camp circle. White quickly learned the protective value of the wagon circle, etc. (Examples - the Wagon Box Fight (1867); the Beecher Island Fight (1868)).

The Place of War in Plains Indian Culture.

In the Plains Indians the whites encountered a people who had long known war as a major occupation. Boys were carefully reared to be warriors, men advanced to positions of prominence largely through their prowess in war. Complicated systems of war honors were devised, based upon the "counting of coups" rather than the taking of scalps.⁴

Fierce intertribal wars had been the order of the day in the Plains before the beginning of the wars with the whites. The existence of these older animosities prevented the unification of the Plains Indians in the conflicts with the United States. This condition actually worked to the advantage of the whites. When one tribe, or group of tribes became hostile, the government could usually count on their traditional enemies joining in the war against them. Thus the Sioux, Northern Arapaho, and Northern Cheyenne found their old enemies the Pawnee, Crow and Shoshoni allied with the United States in opposition to them. For every tribe of "hostiles" the government could usually count on a tribe or more of "friendly Indians" to combat them. These "friendly Indians" were invaluable aids in the Plains Indian Wars.

Leadership in the Plains Indian Wars.

The intertribal wars had served as veritable training grounds for the development of able, intelligent Indian leaders in the wars with the whites which were to follow. In no other part of the country did such a large number of high caliber, Indian warriors appear to lead their fellow tribesmen in their conflicts with the whites. Such men as Red Cloud, Spotted Tail, Gall, and Crazy Horse among the Teton Dakota; Roman Nose, Dull Knife, and Little Wolf of the Cheyenne; and Quana Parker of the Comanche possessed a military skill and an ability to inspire men under their leadership which at times seemed to approach genius.

The Theatre of War in the Plains.

"The front" during the Plains Indian Wars was not a line but an area -- an area extending more than 1,000 miles north and south and some 500 miles east and west, including southwestern North Dakota, western Nebraska, western Kansas, parts of the Indian Territory, western Texas, eastern Colorado, eastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana.

The leading hostile groups were the Teton Dakota (or Western Sioux) living in the north between the Platte and the Missouri; the Comanche, living on the Texas frontier; and the Cheyenne on the frontier of Kansas and Colorado. The Cheyenne were divided (since 1832) into Northern and Southern groups and though these groups sometimes fought alone, after 1864, the Northern Cheyenne generally cooperated with the Teton Dakota in their wars in the north; while the Southern Cheyenne joined with the Comanche in the south. Some of the Northern Arapaho also took part in the so-called "Sioux Wars;" while the Kiowa, and Kiowa Apache took sides with the Comanche in the south.

In general it is possible to think in terms of two sets of Plains Indian Wars in the period 1854-1891, those on the northern Plain chiefly revolving around the hostility of the Teton Dakota, and those in the southern Plains revolving chiefly about the hostility of the Comanche.

Since the Comanche had long been at war against the whites in the south before 1854, and since their hostility came to an end earlier than that of the Teton Dakota we may well consider first.

The Wars of the Southern Plains.

In February 1854 the Texas legislature passed a law aimed at the solution of the Indian problem, by authorizing the United States Government to select and survey 12 leagues of vacant Texas domain for Indian reservations. In the following summer Capt. R. B. Marcy and Major Neighbors selected two areas -- one on the main fork of the Brazos River, the other on Clear Fork of the Brazos for reservations. In March 1855 the more civilized Texas tribes -- Caddo, Waco, Tawakonie, Andarko, Tonkawa, Keechie, and a few Delaware began to colonize the former, and larger reserve. By September 1858 there were 1,112 Indians on this reservation. Their agricultural efforts were successful. The Clear Fork reserve was set aside for the Southern Comanche. In 1856 there were 557 on this reservation, but the Comanche failed both as farmers and stock raisers, and began to leave the reservation for their old nomadic hunting life. By 1858 only 371 remained.⁵

Meanwhile the Northern Comanche, the larger and more dangerous of the two Comanche groups, continued to roam at large, stealing horses and committing depredations on the white settlements. Texans, who disliked the existence of the Indian reservations within the state, began to accuse the reservation Indians of some of these acts. The Comanche Agent in August 1858 stated that "the Indians on the reserve were daily threatened with extermination" by the whites. In December 1858, and again in May 1859 white men attacked peaceful Indians on the

Texas reservations. A peace commission appointed by the Governor of Texas urged the removal of the Indians from Texas as the solution to the problem. In June, the Indian Office authorized the removal. In August the 1,050 Indians of the Brazos Agency and the 330 of the Comanche Agency crossed the Red River under Army escort. Neighbors likened the movement to the Hebrew crossing of the Red Sea: "I have this day crossed all the Indians out of the heathen land of Texas and am now out of the land of the Philistines."⁶ It was the end of the reservation system in Texas --- a system which had lasted but five years. The Texas reservations had served only as corrals into which the Indians were herded prior to their long drive northward out of the state.⁷

Throughout the decade 1850-1860 Texas had carried on its war with the Northern Comanche, who due to scarcity of game had broken up into small marauding bands. In this period the Texans had sent out military expeditions onto the Plains and taught the Comanche that there was no longer safety in fleeing in that direction. In despair the Comanche huddled their families together near the agency on the Arkansas and sent their young warriors to harrass the settlements. Were it not for the outbreak of Civil War these Indians might soon have been conquered.⁸

The Civil War gave the Indians a breathing spell, by slowing up emigration into and across their country. "It cannot be said that the Indians of the South Plains represented a factor of great consequence during the Civil War. They harrassed the emigrants on the Santa Fe Trail and harried the Texas border. They forced the United States to increase its troops and military expenditures on the Arkansas and New Mexico frontiers, and the Confederacy had to maintain a border regiment or two, to watch them. They were divided first and last in the matter of allegiance, and when they joined one side or the other they were fickle allies. Neither the Confederates nor Federals tried to send these Indians against the enemy, but tried instead to hold them as passive allies and prevent their joining the foe. If either side encouraged them in their marauding operations against the enemy, it was more with the idea of giving them employment for the time and thus to get some temporary relief from their annoyance than with the hope that the savages would accomplish much in beating down the strength of the other side."⁹ The Confederacy made a treaty with the Comanche and neighboring tribes in August 1861. During the first 18 months of the war Indian raids on the Texas frontier were not numerous. But beginning in 1863 and until the last few months of the war, when Comanche attention was turned northward, these Indians continued their raids on the Confederate settlements of Texas.¹⁰ In 1864 the Kiowa and Comanche were troublesome in Federal territory along the Santa Fe Trail. Kit Carson, sent out to punish the raiders, fought an indecisive battle with the Comanche, Kiowa and Apache at the mouth of the Little Arkansas.¹¹

At the close of the Civil War the Southern Plains tribes "were more insolent and desperatethan at its beginning, and, they still made a formidable barrier to the settlement of their country."¹² The Comanche and Kiowa continually violated the peace treaty made in 1865. On August 5, 1867 Gov. Throckmorton reported that since the Civil War's close 162 persons had been killed, 43 taken prisoner and 24 wounded on the Texas frontier.¹³

In the autumn of 1867 the Peace Commission was on the Plains in an effort to work out a peaceful solution to Indian difficulties there. In October 1867, the Commission met representatives of the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache and Comanche at Medicine Lodge Creek in one of the last old fashioned Indian gatherings in which these tribes participated. The Indians desired to be left alone to live their own lives without being forced on reservations or to live in houses. The Commission desired to settle the Indians on reservations to make way for white expansion. At the meeting a compromise was reached. The treaty negotiated provided for the cession by the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache of all their claims in the southwestern plains, to be placed on a reservation in southwestern Indian Territory of 5,548 square miles. They were to be allowed the privilege of hunting over all their old territory south of the Arkansas and white settlements were to be forbidden in the region for 3 years.¹⁴

At this same treaty, the Cheyenne and Arapaho relinquished all their land claims to be given a reservation on the northern border of the Indian Territory on lands obtained by the government from the Cherokee.¹⁵

Nominally the problem of the "wild tribes" of the Southern Plains should have been settled by the treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek. But it was not. The Comanche, Kiowa and Apache, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, gathered at the place selected for reservation, only to find it in the territory of the Wichita. The excited Indians demanded food and presents. With no reserve of their own the Comanche then reverted to their old practice of raiding the Texas frontier, stealing cattle and horses, and murdering settlers. Finally in October 1868, the Army, fearing an alliance of these Indians with the hostile Cheyenne, Arapaho and Sioux of the north in a general Plains war, sent troops to bring these Indians onto their reservations. Most of them were "brought in" under escort by General Hazen.¹⁶

Custer with a force of 700 cavalry was sent out to find and punish the laggards. After a difficult march through a blizzard, they came upon Black Kettle's Southern Cheyenne Village on the Washita November 27, Custer attacked. The Indian village contained less than a third the number of men in Custer's force. The Indians were armed with archaic bow and arrow or ancient muskets. Custer's men used Spencer repeaters. The result

was a veritable massacre. One hundred and three Indian men were killed in addition to women and children. Fifty-three women and children were captured -- many of whom had been wounded. Custer had one man killed, 20 missing whom he never tried to find. The Indians' tipis were burned, their 875 horses shot.¹⁷ This quick, decisive action broke the spirit of the Southern Cheyenne. In this first extensive winter campaign on the Plains, the troops had shown the Indians that there was no longer security even in the dead of winter. In 1869, they accepted a new reservation on the North Canadian in lieu of the one given them in 1867 which they did not want, and settled down to the life of reservation Indians.¹⁸

General Sheridan established Fort Sill in December 1868, as military headquarters near the Kiowa, Comanche and Kiowa-Apache Reservation. It became the center for future operations against these Indians. In mid-1869, less than two-fifths of the Comanche were not on the reservation, and there were probably several hundred Kiowa also running "wild."¹⁹ As long as game remained plentiful and Indians could secure arms and ammunition from the traders, it seemed that the southern Plains tribes could not be kept on reservations without the force of arms.²⁰

Bison Extermination helps settle the Southern Plains Problem.

The solution of the Indian problem on the Plains is closely bound up with the extermination of the buffalo, the animal that was the staff of life of the "wild tribes." So long as buffalo could be hunted by the Indians in sufficient quantity to keep them alive the "wild" tribes could not be tied down on reservations. For decades the number of the buffalo had been dwindling. But it was the wholesale invasion of the Southern Plains by white, commercial hide hunters after the construction of the Kansas Pacific Railroad that exterminated the southern herd. (The buffalo of the plains had been divided into a northern and a southern herd by the construction of the Union Pacific Railroad in the late 1860's). As early as 1867, when the western end of the Kansas Pacific had reached the heart of the buffalo country, the railroad found it necessary to employ William F. Cody, "Buffalo Bill," to hunt buffalo for them in the hostile Indian country.²¹

With the completion of that railroad large numbers of professional white buffalo hunters entered the southern Plains, and "the chief industry of that entire country, for four or five years, was killing buffalo."²² In 1873 Dodge City had a population of perhaps four thousand, two-thirds of whom were buffalo hunters. In small parties the hunters spread out over the prairie and began their destruction of the southern herd.²³

The government made no attempt to stop this slaughter of the Indians' game. Indirectly it was encouraged because it was realized that the destruction of the buffalo made the "wild" tribes easier to control -- more helpless, more dependent on the government for subsistence. In 1875 Kansas and Colorado passed drastic hunting laws regulating hide hunting. But it was then too late. What was left of the southern herd had been driven into Texas and the hunters followed them south.²⁴ When Texas considered a bill for the protection of the buffalo in 1875, General Sheridan, in command of the military department of the southwest, appeared before the joint Assembly and told them "that it was a sentimental mistake to legislate in the interest of the buffalo and that instead of stopping the hunters they should give them an unanimous vote of thanks and present each a bronze medal having a representation of a dead buffalo on one side and a discouraged Indian on the other -- for the hide hunters were doing more to settle the Indian question than the entire Army had done in thirty years, by destroying the Indian's commissary. 'Let them kill, skin and sell until the buffalo is exterminated, as it is the only way to bring about a lasting peace and allow civilization to advance,' he exclaimed. His speech had the desired effect and nothing was done to protect the buffalo."²⁵

The Comanche and Cheyenne regarded the Arkansas River as the boundary line south of which white hunters should not go. Accordingly when hunters began to enter the forbidden ground in the fall of 1873 and established a trading post at Adobe Walls in the Texas panhandle in the spring of 1874, these tribes determined to drive them out. On June 27, their attack on Adobe Walls was ineffective. But the Comanche and Cheyenne continued their war on the hunters and ranchers. In 1874, to September 9, 190 hunters or settlers were killed by the Indians. Probably one-half the Comanche, Kiowa and Cheyenne were hostile at this time. In the summer United States troops converged from all sides to punish the hostiles. From August on into the cold winter the war raged. Few Indians were killed, but as cold weather came on want of supplies and able horses forced the hostile bands into the agencies to surrender unconditionally. Some bands, through fear, stayed away until spring or summer of 1875. By August 5, all but 50 Comanche were on reservations.²⁶

For most of these Indians the year 1875 marked the sharp transition from opponents of expansion to subdued reservation Indians. It marked "the end of their influence as a frontier factor of significance."²⁷

In 1876 a band of 170 Comanche warriors under Black Horse, unhappy over conditions on the reservations, headed for the Staked Plains, and began to make raids on the hide hunters in February 1877. These hunters united in a campaign, culminating in the Battle of Pocket Canyon, March 10, in which the Indians were badly beaten. Later they surrendered to Capt. P. L. Lee, of the 10th Cavalry near Lake Quemado. This was the last time the Comanche fought the whites. They never went on the warpath again.²⁸

"What was doubtless the last real Indian fight on Texas soil" was fought in January 1881, between Texas Rangers and Apache, in the Devil Mountains of the El Paso region. The Indians had previously stolen horses from the village of San Jose, killed 15 Mexicans who followed them, and 35 more from the town of Carrajal were trapped and massacred. The Rangers under Lieut. Baylor, followed, attacked the Apache camp, and defeated them.²⁹

Thus ended the Indian resistance to the advance of whites into Texas and the Southern Plains. Although here as elsewhere, the Indians were finally subdued, they did retard for several decades the white settlement of the Southern Plains.

The Wars of the Northern Plains.

Prior to 1854, the Indians of the Plains dwelling along the Oregon Trail had refrained from open warfare on the whites, although for more than a decade these tribes had been getting more and more excited as they watched the growing number of emigrants passing through their country, killing off the buffalo and driving the herds farther from the Platte Valley. The establishment of military posts on the Trail in 1849, and the Treaty of 1851 had had a restraining effect.

Fort Laramie had become the "military capital of the frontier" on the central Plains in 1849. It was to remain so for a period of 41 years. Its strategic positions among the Teton Dakota and Cheyenne, on the overland trail near the western edge of the Plains made it a logical place for councils and treaties, an important halting place for emigrants, a refuge for fugitives from Indian attacks in the years to come. From Fort Laramie "went forth in all directions, armed expeditions against the savage marauders, and to it sometimes elated with victory and sometimes dejected with defeat, they returned."³⁰

For the troops garrisoned at Fort Laramie, numbering among them men who had fought in the Mexican War and others young, eager to distinguish themselves in action, life at the fort was considered very dull. Much time was spent in gambling.³¹ With the Indian pledged to peace with the emigrants by the treaty of 1851 there seemed little hope of interesting action.

Then, in August 1854, reports came to Fort Laramie that an Indian had killed the cow of a Mormon emigrant a few miles east of the fort. Young Lieut. Grattan, a confirmed Indian hater, was sent with an interpreter, sergeant, corporal and 27 men to secure the surrender of the guilty Indian. At the camp of Miniconjou and Brule Sioux, the drunken interpreter must have offended the Indians. All the whites save one (who later died of wounds) were murdered. The redskins mutilated the bodies of the dead soldiers.³² Thus, the

simple matter of a dispute over a cow caused the first clash of Teton Dakota and United States troops. Pent up Indian emotions were at last loosed -- and the period of Indian Wars on the northern and central Plains had begun.

The Sioux did not regard the Grattan Massacre as a signal for a general uprising. As a whole they remained quiet and peaceful. However, a few bands committed depredations in the Fort Laramie region in succeeding months -- a murderous attack on the Salt Lake mail, the stealing of horses and mules from trading posts emigrants, etc. These troubles were exaggerated and Gen. Harney was sent with three regiments to put an end to what was erroneously termed a "Sioux War." Hearing of this most of the Indians were inclined to peace by the summer of 1855.³³

The Brule of Little Thunder's band, who had been involved in the Grattan Massacre and later hostilities, had been warned to remain south of the Platte or be considered hostile. But Harney, moving up the Platte with dragoons and infantry, reached Ash Hollow, September 2, 1855, to find that the Brule were encamped on Blue Water Creek, 6 miles north of the Platte. He attacked, killed 86 Indians (including women) captured about 70 women and children, while losing only 5 of his force. In this virtual massacre the Indians were armed with bow and arrows and poor flintlocks; Harney's men with rifles.³⁴ This ended the so-called "War". Next year Harney made a treaty with the Teton at Fort Pierre on the Missouri. This fort had been acquired by the Army the year before (1855). The treaty which provided for Indian respect for white right-of-way on the Oregon Trail and a trail between Fort Pierre and Fort Laramie, was never ratified.

The Teton Dakota remained relatively peaceful from 1856 to 1864. But the Cheyenne, meanwhile, became hostile. A misunderstanding over a white man's horse taken by Indians caused the first clash between Cheyenne and United States troops toward the end of August 1856. Ten Northern Cheyenne were killed near Grand Island (Nebraska). The Cheyenne retaliated by committing depredations on mail and emigrant parties. By late fall 18 whites had been killed. Agent Twiss in council with the Cheyenne arranged a cessation of hostilities.³⁵

But the Army was not so easily satisfied, and demanded that the Cheyenne be punished for their depredations of 1856. In the next year, after return of spring, two forces of cavalry were sent out from Fort Leavenworth. One went up the Arkansas, the other up the North Platte. The Cheyenne neatly slipped between them. On July 29, Col. Sumner's cavalry met some 300 Cheyenne, charged them with sabres, routed them, with little loss to either side. Two days later he destroyed an abandoned Cheyenne camp. At Bent's Fort in mid-August he destroyed or gave to friendly Indians the annuity goods meant for the Cheyenne, then returned eastward. The 1857 Campaign against the Cheyenne had been a failure. Sumner had "chastised a few

Indians, embittered many more and overawed none."³⁶ Although armed only with the primitive bow and arrow and a few old-fashioned flintlock smoothbores obtained from traders the Cheyenne had held their own.³⁷

From 1858 to 1864 the Cheyenne remained at peace with the whites, while they engaged in their traditional intertribal wars with their Indian enemies.³⁸

Meanwhile the Teton Dakota went into action along the overland trail, the scene of much new activity on the part of the whites. In April 1860 the pony express was inaugurated over this route, and continued in operation as a fast mail route for 18 months. Meanwhile the Butterfield overland mail route was moved north to follow this way, and the first transcontinental telegraph was erected. Nevertheless, "no Indian disturbances of consequence developed on the route during 1861."³⁹

A clever device was employed to get the Indians to respect the telegraph and not destroy it. "This was done after the line was opened to Fort Laramie by stationing several of their most intelligent chiefs at Fort Laramie and others at Fort Kearny, the two posts being 300 miles apart, and having them talk to each other over the wire and note the time sent and received. Then we had them mount their fleetest horses and ride as fast as they could until they met at Old Jule's ranch, at the mouth of the Lodge Pole, this being about half way between Kearney and Laramie. Of course this was astonishing and mysterious to the Indians. Thereafter you could often see Indians with their heads against the telegraph poles, listening to the peculiar sound the wind makes as it runs along the wires and through the insulators. They thought, and said, it was 'Big Medicine' talking."⁴⁰

Teton Dakota raids on the stage stations from Fort Bridger to the North Platte, burning stations, driving off stock, attacking stages and killing a number of men, in the spring of 1862, were halted when troops were sent into the region in early summer. Nevertheless, as a precautionary measure, the mail line was moved from the South Pass-Fort Laramie route to one farther south -- via the South Platte, Laramie Plains and Fort Bridger, in July. In the following winter the Fort Laramie region was peaceful.⁴¹

The discovery of gold in Colorado in 1858 brought between 100,000 and 150,000 miners rushing to the Pikes Peak region in 1859. Denver and other towns sprang up. Whites and Cherokee Indian miners overran the region in search of the precious metal. Only about 40,000 remained, after the first excitement failed to bring wealth to all. The rest, discouraged, returned eastward through the Indian country frightening game and exciting the Indians.⁴²

The land invaded by the miners had been guaranteed to the Cheyenne and Arapaho by the treaty of 1851. But in 1861 these tribes had been driven south to the Arkansas and argued into the Fort Wise Treaty by which they relinquished their claims to the valuable mining area in Colorado and in return were given annuities and a more restricted reservation. For more than three years they put up with white encroachment but steadfastly refused to go on the reservation. Then in April 1864, their depredations against the whites caused the Army to send a force under Major Downing to harry the Indians. Frequent attacks were made on the Cheyenne, often with little reason. Most destructive was Downing's attack on a village near Cedar Canyon of the South Platte while the men were away -- 26 Indians were killed, 30 wounded.⁴³ In June an Indian raid on a ranch 30 miles east of Denver, in which the rancher, his wife and two children were scalped and murdered, threw the growing town of Denver in panic. Indian raids continued into July. In August the worst outbreak of summer occurred on the South Platte. For a month the Indians completely closed the South Platte road. Mail to Denver from the east was sent by way of Panama and San Francisco. The frontier on the Plains was in panic as far east as Omaha. There occurred what was then known as "the stampede" of Nebraska and Kansas settlers seeking safety in the more settled communities east of the Missouri.⁴⁴ Gov. Evans of Colorado issued a proclamation declaring "Any man who kills a hostile Indian is a patriot." Not until the latter part of September was the Platte road opened and mail service resumed.

At the urging of William Bent, influential trader, the Cheyenne began to seek peace in late August. But Major General S. R. Curtis telegraphed from Fort Leavenworth September 28: "I want no peace till the Indians suffer more."

The suffering came like a thunder bolt. On November 29, 1864, the Southern Cheyenne village of Black Kettle was encamped on Sand Creek (north of Fort Lyon, Colorado), in the belief that they had made peace and would not be disturbed, when, at dawn, Col. Chivington with a force of 900 to 1,000 Colorado cavalry attacked the village. It is impossible to determine the exact number of casualties. Chivington at first reported 500 Indians killed, but George Bent's figure of over 150 is probably nearer the truth. Included among the murdered were many women and children.⁴⁵

The Sand Creek Massacre proved a boomerang to the whites. Instead of forcing peace it brought war, more desperate, and bloody than before, and fugitive survivors from Sand Creek made their way to a Cheyenne camp on the Smoky Hill. Enraged by their unjust attack they held a council and sent pipe bearers to the Northern Arapaho and the Sioux on Solomon River, relating their sufferings and inviting them to join in a war to exterminate the white man from the Plains. These tribes "inhaled bitterness from the Cheyenne pipe" and joined in a powerful triple alliance -- Cheyenne-Sioux-Arapaho.⁴⁶

Now there were some 1,000 warriors in the united force. Together they planned the attack which was to initiate the "bloody year" on the Plains, 1865. First they decided to attack Julesburg, prominent junction point and supply depot on the South Platte. They attempted to lead out the soldiers from nearby Fort Rankin to an ambush, and did succeed in killing 14. Then they sacked Julesburg and carried away loads of flour, sugar and other supplies. Later in the month they completely wrecked about 75 miles of road, burning ranches, capturing wagon trains and destroying telegraph lines. In early February Julesburg was again attacked, sacked and burned. Then the Indians moved north, attacked Mud Springs station without success, and continued on northward toward Powder River. The troops wisely decided not to follow. The Indians spent the rest of the winter in the general region of the Powder and Tongue Rivers, living rich on the spoils of their raids.⁴⁷

Meanwhile the Army was planning a vigorous campaign to carry the war into the Indian stronghold. While the Powder River Expedition was delayed for lack of provisions, the allied hostile force descended onto the Platte and began attacks on the emigrant and telegraph line in May. With about 3,000 warriors they moved toward the Platte Bridge in July. The 120 whites ably defended this little station, until Lieut. Collins with 25 men sent out to escort an approaching wagon train, was killed with four of his men on the north side of the bridge. Later the wagon train was attacked and all men killed. The total loss in the series of engagements near the Platte Bridge was 26. After another series of raids on the overland trail toward Fort Laramie, resulting in the killing of a number of whites (12 in one raid on August 4) the Indians again withdrew to Powder River.⁴⁸

The Powder River Campaign finally got under way in July. Three large expeditions, numbering in all several thousand men (including Pawnee, Winnebago and Omaha Indian allies) were sent into the Powder River country to converge upon the allied hostiles in their hideaway. Although a few skirmishes were fought, and one small victory was gained against the Arapaho in late August, the campaign as a whole was a costly failure. The troops returned in the fall, fortunate to have escaped starvation and annihilation. The Indians remained unpunished.⁴⁹

The situation in 1866 was desperate. Gen. Dodge wrote, "The government must understand that it will have to meet the problem of Indian warfare or abandon the western country. There are 25,000 Indians on the plains, north and south. We need more troops, not less, for there are 5,000 teams that are trying to cross the plains each month, and it is my understanding that I am to protect this travel at all hazards."⁵⁰

There had been a treaty of peace at Fort Sully in 1865, but its terms were generally misunderstood by the Indians. At this time the Lower Brule, first of the Teton groups to do so agreed to go on a reservation.

Meanwhile more trouble was brewing. Gold had been discovered in Montana in 1862, and the government wished to establish a road from the Oregon Trail northward across Wyoming to the new mining district. This was the most direct and practicable route for prospectors. Yet it ran through the heart of the rich hunting grounds of the Teton Dakota. At Fort Laramie in June 1866 the Oglala chief, Red Cloud refused to sign a treaty agreed to by a large part of the Teton led by Spotted Tail, by a considerable number of Cheyenne and some Arapaho, permitting the government to establish the Bozeman Trail to Montana. He knew that the route was through the best hunting grounds of the Sioux -- "the last large game reserve of the northern plains."⁵¹

Red Cloud's action was understood by both Indians and whites. They knew that the beginning of construction of posts along this route would mean a declaration of war. Yet the Army followed out General Carrington's resolve that the road would be built, and sent men northward to begin the construction of Fort Phil Kearny and Fort C. F. Smith along the new route. Red Cloud saw that protests were in vain. He must resort to force.

Just before midnight on Christmas night Portugee John Philips, after a long and difficult winter's ride, reached Fort Laramie with the news that Capt. Fetterman with a force of 80 men, while escorting a wood train near Fort Phil Kearny, had been led into ambush by Red Cloud's warriors, and the entire command massacred, December 21, 1866. Perhaps it had been grim, poetic justice. Fetterman had previously boasted that with eighty men he could ride the whole Sioux nation down. Fate had given him eighty-one!⁵² The affair was a lesson to the soldiers. Thereafter there was generally less recklessness on their part, and more respect for the Indians' fighting qualities.

The Red Cloud War was now definitely on. Yet until August of 1867 there was no important engagement.⁵³ Meanwhile the infantry was equipped with improved breach-loading Springfields. Then on August 2, Red Cloud with a huge, mounted force attacked an escort of Fort Phil Kearny woodcutters. The defenders, Captain Powell and 31 men, took cover behind wagon-boxes removed from 14 wagons, arranged as a fort in the form of a rough circle, connected and strengthened with baled tents, blankets, sacks of grain, clothing, etc. Though outnumbered "a hundred to one," the whites, time after time repulsed the Indian charge, firing from loopholes cut in the wagon boxes. Neihardt has well described this dramatic action:

The breach-fed Springfields poured a steady stream
That withered men and horses roaring in!
And gut-shot ponies screamed above the din;
And many a wounded warrior, under-trod
But silent, wallowed on the bloody sod -
Man piled on man and horses on the men!⁵⁴

The defenders held out until relief came and the Indians withdrew. Red Cloud asserted later that he lost 1,500 warriors in this battle.⁵⁵ The whites had lost but 8. It was probably the most disastrous battle for the Indians in the history of their wars with the whites. They referred to it afterward as "the bad medicine fight with the whites."⁵⁶

In the autumn of 1867 the Peace Commission sought to negotiate with the hostiles, but Red Cloud refused to come in to talk things over until the forts had been evacuated. Finally November 6, 1868 Red Cloud came in to Fort Laramie.

Meanwhile the whites had made another stirring stand against great odds. In the summer of 1868 Indians had raided the Saline and Solomon Valleys in Kansas, killing a number of people, stealing horses, and taking two women captive. Gen. Sheridan called for volunteers to attack the hostiles in western Kansas. From the large number, 50 experienced frontier fighters were selected, and led by Col. Forsythe. About September 10, they set out after the Indians, scarcely realizing the number of the foe. While encamped on an island in the middle of the dry bed of the Arickaree (in extreme eastern Colorado) the Indians attacked -- Cheyenne, Teton Dakota, Arapaho, under Roman Nose. For nine days the frontiersmen fought off the Indians, until relief came. It has been estimated that the Indians lost between 700 and 800 in this "Beecher Island Fight."⁵⁷

The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 stands out as perhaps the most important treaty of the northern Plains. In it Red Cloud won his point. The government capitulated, and the Bozeman Trail, and forts along it were abandoned. At the same time Red Cloud, greatest warrior-diplomat of the Sioux, determined to give up the war on the whites to become a peaceful reservation Indian. By the treaty the Great Sioux Reservation was established in western South Dakota, and the old Sioux territory west of it was reserved to them for hunting. At the same treaty the Crow, "friendly Indians," ceded their lands in return for a reservation in southern Montana. And the Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho groups agreed to go on reservations either with their southern brethren or with the Sioux.

Montana residents were angry at the decision of the government to give in to Red Cloud on the matter of the Bozeman Trail. Years later one of Montana's pioneers wrote: "With characteristic pusillanimity the government ordered all the forts abandoned and the road closed to travel."⁵⁸

But for the frontier peoples of Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado the peaceful conclusion of the "Red Cloud War" and pacification of the Cheyenne was a blessing. It ended four years of nightmare for the pioneers during which there had been numerous attacks on the frontier... "Men and

boys were shot and women and horses taken captive. Devastation, death and fear reigned on the prairies."⁵⁹ It was such raids as these that formed the less well known but more common kind of Indian dangers on the Plains.⁶⁰ It was these small raids of a few Indians on frontier ranches, farms, wagon parties, mail and stage coaches that brought more death and destruction than the more imposing battles of large forces during the period of the Plains Indian Wars. The Army could do little to quiet the panic of citizens on the Plains in the period 1865-68. Gen. Sherman wrote in 1867: "Were I or the department commanders to send guards to every point where they are clamored for, we would need alone on the plains a hundred thousand men, mostly of cavalry."⁶¹ Only two months before Red Cloud came to Fort Laramie the Council Bluffs Bugle called again for the revival of the old, reliable scalp bounty as the solution to the problem: "Offer a reward of \$500 for each Indian's scalp brought in and in less than six months we will have an end to the Indian war and will have peace with the red devils on a permanent basis."⁶²

Peace with the Sioux, Arapaho and Cheyenne in November 1868 did more than relieve the anxiety of the settlers and travelers on the Plains, it made possible the peaceful completion of the first transcontinental railroad.

Indians and the Union Pacific.

The factor of controlling the hostile Indians had been one of the five pressing needs for the construction of a transcontinental railroad in the fifties.⁶³ One of the important explorations to ascertain the best route for the railroad had been marred by the massacre of Capt. Gunnison, in charge of the explorations for the Central Route, and seven of his men, by hostile Paiute near Sevier Lake, Utah, October 26, 1853.⁶⁴ When an able engineer was needed to complete the construction of the major part of the Union Pacific line in 1866, Grenville M. Dodge, who had had experience as a surveyor over the Rockies (from which the Indians named him "Long Eye") and as an Indian fighter, was appointed May 6. He was the one man who could organize the construction crews, fight the Indians and still build the road.⁶⁵ Dodge wrote that "Our Indian troubles commenced in 1864 and lasted until the tracks joined at Promontory"⁶⁶ (May 10, 1869). Even the choice of route was determined in part by the Indian menace. The route from Fort Laramie westward was 400 miles shorter than any other, but Dodge knew this country was dearer to the Indians than any other section. Hence he decided (in 1865) to run the railroad farther south and leave this region to the powerful Indian tribes. The route actually followed -- through the Laramie Hills -- was discovered by Dodge in the fall of 1865 as the result of a conflict between his party and hostile Crow. The Indians were put to rout and fled westward by the Lone Tree Pass. Dodge noted the value of the pass at the time and used it for the railroad later on.⁶⁷

Ahead of construction into the Indian Country went the surveyors to lay out the route. Each survey party consisted of 18 to 22 men, all armed. "When operating in a hostile Indian country they were regularly drilled, though after the civil war this was unnecessary, as most of them had been in the Army. Each party entering a country occupied by hostile Indians was generally furnished with a military escort of from ten to a company under a competent officer. The duty of this escort was to protect prominent hills commanding the territory in which the work was to be done, so as to head off sudden attacks by the Indians. Notwithstanding this protection, the parties were often attacked, their chief or some of their men killed or wounded, and their stock run off."⁶⁸ In May 1867, L. L. Hills, assistant chief in location work from Cheyenne westward over the Laramie Plains, was killed by Sioux six miles west of Cheyenne. Late in July of that year Percy T. Browne, assistant engineer, was killed in an attack on his survey party by some 300 Sioux in the Red Desert (Wyoming).⁶⁹

The construction crews were also armed and organized for defense. Dodge wrote: "We lost most of our men and stock while building from Fort Kearney to Bitter Creek. At that time every mile of road had to be surveyed, graded, tied, and bridged under military protection. The order to every surveying corps, grading, bridging and tie outfit was never to run when attacked. All were required to be armed, and I do not know that the order was disobeyed in a single instance, nor did I ever hear that the Indians had driven a party permanently from its work."⁷⁰ Hardy Irishmen with Civil War experience made up the greater part of the construction crews. Indians did not care to mix it in fight with the robust graders, being content to run off their stock. Favorite points of Indian attack were "end o' track," construction and supply trains.⁷¹

The Union Pacific reached Plum Creek, 200 miles west of Omaha when the Indians made their first attack on the builders in August 1866. They swept down on a freight train, captured both train and crew. Dodge, **ten miles to the west, came to the rescue** in his private car, with twenty well armed men. The fight was not for long, and the captured train and crew were recovered. This was the beginning of 20 months of bitter warfare with the Indians along the line of the U. P.⁷² Late in May 1867, after a scrape with Indians at the end of track, Dodge remarked to the government commissioners: "We've got to clean the damn Indians out or give up building the Union Pacific Railroad. The government may take its choice." This remark brought three additional companies of cavalry to be stationed along the line to keep the Sioux and Cheyenne away from the railroad.⁷³ In the summer of this year Dodge was urged to stop construction for six months until the Army was able to furnish a stronger military force for protection. Dodge wrote east: "If we stop now we may never get started again. I'll push this road on to Salt Lake in another year or surrender my own scalp to the Indians."⁷⁴

Dodge didn't finish in a year, but his scalp remained intact. The Peace Commission with its Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, providing reservations for the Southern Plains tribes far to the south of the line; its Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, putting the Sioux on a great reservation miles to the northward; and its treaties with the Ute, Bannock and Shoshoni of the Rockies placing these tribes on reservations removed from the railroad line, opened the way for the advance of construction toward the west.

The Central Pacific, working eastward from the West Coast, was not hampered by hostile Indians, largely because the Indians through which it built were "Diggers" and Shoshoni who had already learned to keep the peace as the result of murderous attacks of emigrants and miners. A peace treaty with the Paiute and Shoshoni aided. The Indians were pleased by the permission granted them to ride on the freight cars whenever they so desired.⁷⁵

The completion of the railroad gave the government an effective means for quick movement of troops into the Indian Country. Gen. Sherman wrote Dodge in 1867: "I regard this road as the solution of Indian affairs and of the Mormon question and I will give you all the help I can."⁷⁶ Again, "Sherman was right." There was no general Indian War after 1869. And the construction of additional railroads aided in the control of local disturbances. "The resistance of the tribes would generally have ceased by 1870, even without the new peace policy. Every mile of western railroad lessened the Indians' capacity for resistance by increasing the government's ability to repress it. The Union Pacific, Northern Pacific, Atlantic and Pacific, Texas Pacific, and Southern Pacific, to say nothing of a multitude of private roads like the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, the Denver and Rio Grande, the Achison, Topeka and Santa Fe, and the Missouri, Kansas and Texas, were the real forces which brought peace to the plains."⁷⁷

Another force for peace was the extermination of the buffalo, in itself hastened by the construction of the railroads for the rapid transportation of hunters, equipment, and the hides, meat, tongues, and bones of the buffalo. For decades the buffalo range on the northern plains had been shrinking. By 1810 the buffalo was practically extinct east of the 97th meridian.⁷⁸ Each year its range contracted. By 1868, game had become so scarce that it was necessary for the government to issue rations to the reservation tribes "until the Indians were able to support themselves." Such provision was made in the Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Sioux, whose rations cost the government about \$1,250,000 a year.⁷⁹

The proud Teton Dakota and their former allies now became "beggars at the Great White Father's trough

Forgot the bow and waited to be swilled."⁸⁰

To maintain the peace that had been in existence since the end of the Red Cloud War, Gen. Sheridan on June 29, 1869 issued an order declaring that all Indians on reservations were to be under control of their agents but "outside the well-defined limits of their reservations they are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the military authority and as a rule will be considered hostile." This order, though in direct violation of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, held in force until December 1876.⁸¹

The Sioux remained at peace until mid-1873. Gen. Auger was able to report in 1872 that "not a white man was killed in the department of the Platte."⁸² But a faction of the Sioux influenced by Sitting Bull, who kept hatred for the whites alive after 1868, was dissatisfied with reservation life. In 1872, while most of the Sioux were staying close to the agencies, these malcontents, about 450 lodges of them, were in the Montana country. In early August these hostiles, with reinforcements from other bands, attacked surveyors of the Northern Pacific near Tongue River. Troops held off the attacks, for several days.⁸³

But a more important intrusion was to concern the Sioux in 1874. By the Fort Laramie Treaty the Black Hills, "the Sioux Olympus," had been set "apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians." Now, in response to Sheridan's desire to investigate the advisability of establishing a large military post near the base of the Black Hills, Gen. Custer was to lead a reconnoitering force of 1,000 men into the heart of this region. While in Custer Park in the Hills, gold was discovered, and Custer sent Reynolds post haste to Fort Laramie, riding by night and hiding out by day, with the news. From there the news of the gold discovery was telegraphed east and blazoned on the front page of nearly every paper in the land.⁸⁴

This was the signal for a headlong rush of prospectors to the Hills. In vain the Army attempted to hold back the rush and expel miners illegally entering the reservation. Large numbers of Indians on the reservation left to join Sitting Bull's band of hostiles. On December 6, 1875, the Indian Commissioner informed all Sioux and Northern Cheyenne agents that Sheridan's order of 1869 would be invoked against all Indians not on reservations by January 31, 1876. This order did not reach the agents in their snowed-in reservation until December 20th. Runners were sent out to warn the off-reservation Indians. But the severity of the weather probably made it impossible to reach all those groups. Those who were reached and "came in" were disarmed. On February 1, the Indian Office surrendered control of all Sioux and Cheyenne off the reservation to the War Department. There is no record that Sitting Bull, Gall or Crazy Horse ever received the warnings.⁸⁵

From this situation developed what has been called "the greatest of all the Indian wars,"⁸⁶ the Sioux War of 1876. The number of hostiles off the reservation in February is estimated at about 3,000, or less.^{86a} On March 1, General Crook, with a large, well-equipped force, moved north from Fort Fetterman to punish the hostiles. On March 17, he succeeded in taking the village of Crazy Horse, one of the most able of the Sioux leaders, and burning it. But the Indians had fled to timber. With reckless courage the Indians forced the superior body of troops to retreat, then cut off and stole their cattle. Crook returned to Fort Fetterman. The first expedition against the hostiles was an utter failure.

Then, in early summer a campaign was inaugurated consisting of three covering expeditions under Crook (from the south), Gibbon (eastward from Montana) and Terry (up the Missouri from Fort Abraham Lincoln). With Crook went some 164 Shoshoni, and additional Crow Indian allies.⁸⁷ On June 21, Crook again met Crazy Horse. All day the forces, about equal in number, fought near the banks of the Rosebud. When the Sioux withdrew Crook could not follow, but moved southward for more supplies and to care for the wounded.

This left matters up to Terry, and his dashing, courageous, subordinate, Custer. Together they planned their attack on the Indian camp in the vicinity of the Little Big Horn (Montana). But Custer, desirous of achieving a spectacular victory on his own, ignored orders. The result -- the total annihilation of his force of 208 men by the combined Sioux-Cheyenne-Arapaho under the able "generals," Crazy Horse and Gall. Reno's command also lost 57 killed, bringing the total to 265, in this best known and most disputed Indian battle in American history. The news of Custer's tragic end was flashed to the east, causing the greatest wave of popular sympathy and mourning since the death of Lincoln eleven years before.⁸⁸

With the hostiles still unpunished, the war dragged on. General Miles was sent into the Indian country to constantly harrass the Indians. Winter brought the Indians no peace. In December Crazy Horse's large force was defeated by troops employing cannon with deadly effect. By February 1877, the hostiles were tired of war, and the large bodies began to break up. Late that month groups began to come into the agencies and military posts to be disarmed and fed. By spring more than 2,000 had given themselves up. Crazy Horse himself came in early in May. "Most of the Indians were back on the reservations by early summer, but General Sheridan did not consider the war over until September 1877."⁸⁹ Only Sitting Bull's band, which had escaped into Canada, remained away from the reservations. In 1881 he returned with his followers to the United States and gave himself up to the Army at Fort Buford.

Most of the Northern Cheyenne were sent south to the Indian Country to join the southern Cheyenne in 1877. Both the climate and conditions there were disagreeable to them, and next year a group of about 300 (only 60 fighting men) under Dull Knife and Little Wolf, struck out for their former home in the north. Troops were sent after them, as they left a trail of blood on their way northward across Kansas. After crossing the Platte the two leaders divided their force. Dull Knife and his band of about 150 were captured in October. About half the number were killed when attempting to make a break to avoid return to the Indian Territory in January 1879. Little Wolf's band was not captured until March. They were permitted to remain in the north.⁹⁰ Finally, in 1884 the Northern Cheyenne were given a reservation at the head of Rosebud River, Montana.

The Northern Arapaho were given the reluctant consent of Washakie, chief of their old enemies the Shoshoni, to be allowed to winter on the Wind River Reservation 1877-78. In the fall of 1877 a military escort took them to that Reservation. They have remained there ever since.⁹¹ Until 1882 these Northern Arapaho continued to make raids on the emigrants, miners and settlers of the Sweetwater Valley, Wyoming.⁹²

And what of the Sioux? Gradually their domain continued to diminish. In the heat of the Black Hills troubles in 1876, the government had taken their hunting rights in Wyoming west of the reservation from them, and cattlemen began to take over the rich grazing land north of the Platte, hitherto forbidden them. At the same time the beloved Black Hills were ceded. Finally, in 1889, another cession was made and the Great Sioux Reservation was broken up into five smaller ones. These five reservations, with minor boundary changes, exist today.

By 1889 the Teton Dakota had been living on reservations for more than a decade at peace with the whites. But they were, for the most part, making exceedingly slow progress in following the "white man's way." Many of them still looked back longingly toward the old days when buffalo ran and the Indians were free to roam and live their own lives. In addition many of the Teton were dissatisfied with the cession of 1889, and further disturbed by partial crop failures in 1889 and 1890 by the great mortality from grippe, measles and whooping cough, and by the reduced rations, and government failure to provide education, etc.⁹³

Accordingly when the Teton heard of the new doctrine expounded by the Paiyotso Indian, Wovoka, which was sweeping the Plains in 1889, they sent a delegation to Nevada to learn more of his ideas. These men returned to the Teton reservations to encourage the practice of Wovoka's "Ghost Dance" and its accompanying beliefs among the Sioux. It was believed that by dancing and observing the formalized ritual associated with the Ghost Dance, the whites could be made to disappear and the Indians would be restored to their old way of life, reunited with their

departed friends in a country filled with buffalo. The buffalo had been exterminated from the northern Plains since 1883. Four short years of systematic hunting by white professional hunters had resulted in the almost complete destruction of the northern herd, just as the southern herd had been wiped out in the preceding decade. The Sioux had made their last buffalo hunt in November 1883.⁹⁴

Unlike the Comanche and their allies in the south, the Sioux and their neighbors of the northern Plains had offered no armed resistance to the white buffalo hunters in their country. The excitement of the Ghost Dance, with its promise of the return of happy days, was particularly appealing to the disgruntled minority on the Teton Dakota reservations. Groups of hostiles began to slip off the reservations to practice the rites of the Ghost Dance in the Bad Lands. In December 1890, Sitting Bull, still the leader of the malcontents, was arrested by the Indian police on Standing Rock Reservation. An attempt on the part of some of his followers to rescue him resulted in a fight in which Sitting Bull himself and several others were killed. This action brought panic to the Sioux, and heightened the fear of the whites that an Indian outbreak of sizeable proportions was imminent. "Troops were brought from the whole trans-Mississippi region, and the concentration ultimately included nearly half the infantry and cavalry of the whole Army and part of the artillery."⁹⁵ The craze had been at its height on Pine Ridge Reservation. Yet quiet was being restored with the aid of friendly Indians and influential whites, when on December 29, Colonel Forsythe attempted to disarm a band of Indians under Big Foot. Misunderstanding led to a fight. The Army let fire its Hotchkiss guns on the Indian camp. In a few minutes 200 Indian men, women and children, and sixty soldiers were dead or wounded on the ground. The tipis had been torn down by the shells and were burning over the helpless wounded. In panic the small number of survivors fled for the shelter of the ravine. Maddened soldiers pursued, Hotchkiss guns fired into the ravine. The pursuit was a massacre, in which women and children suffered along with the warriors. At the conclusion of the fight nearly every warrior was dead or dying on the snow-covered ground.

This was the battle of Wounded Knee, the last pitched battle between Indians and whites within the limits of the United States. In this fight the Seventh Cavalry had its long delayed revenge for the Custer Massacre. The short struggle had brought out the worst that was in them. In January the stragglers were rounded up and disarmed.⁹⁶

The so-called "Sioux outbreak" of 1890 was the swan song of Plains Indian culture -- the last attempt of the Indians to regain and hold on to their traditional way of life. It failed, and with its failure the old existence with all that it meant was doomed.

Now, almost four centuries to the year after Columbus' discovery of the New World, its aboriginal peoples had been finally pacified.

The pacification of the Plains Indians and their settlement on limited reservation areas opened the Great Plains to white settlement. Other factors, of course, contributed to the rapid advance of settlement in the Plains in the late years of the nineteenth century. Yet the rapid growth in population following 1870, and the resulting organization of states was only possible after the menace from "wild Indians" had been materially lessened. The older settled areas, Kansas and Nebraska (both admitted to statehood in the 1860's) advanced rapidly in population. From 1860 to 1870 Kansas more than tripled its population. In the next decade it was nearly tripled again. Nebraska rose from less than 29,000 to nearly 123,000 between 1860 and 1870, and to 452,402 in 1880, and over a million in 1890. Since 1880 Kansas' growth has been less rapid, as has Nebraska's since 1890. Colorado gained only four thousand in population during the trying decade of Cheyenne and Sioux wars 1860-1870. In the next two decades that state (admitted in 1876) obtained a population ten times that of 1870. After 1890 its growth was less rapid. Wyoming, numbering little over 9,000 in 1870, continued to grow rapidly until 1900. In the first decade after the Sioux Wars (1860-1890) its population more than tripled. In 1890 Wyoming became a state. Dakota Territory had less than 5,000 population in 1860, a little over 14,000 in 1870. In the succeeding decades which witnessed the Black Hills Gold Rush and the end of the Sioux Wars, Dakota's population increased to more than nine times the 1870 figure. In 1890 North and South Dakota were admitted to the Union. By that year South Dakota population had begun to slacken its rapid growth, but North Dakota continued to grow apace until after 1910.

Thus, in little more than a decade after the last serious Indian Wars on the Plains (1870's) the vast, grass covered, open country of the Great Plains was transformed from an Indian wilderness into an organized abode of white skinned Americans.

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DEATH IN THE FAR WEST:

The Subjugation of the other Western tribes, 1854-1886.

"Set them to raising corn instead of scalps."

-- General George Crook.

While the Plains Indian Wars were in progress in the heart of the continent there was also strife in other parts of the West. Although the troubles of the period in the Plains have captured the imagination of popular writers and historians alike to the extent that the Plains warfare has become to the average man the warfare of the western frontier during the latter half of the nineteenth century, we must recognize that elsewhere -- in the Southwest, the Northwest, and in Minnesota hostile Indians also presented an effective barrier to the advance of white settlement and the establishment of peaceful existence in the West after 1854.

The Eastern Dakota Subdued.

For more than a decade after the Eastern Dakota cession of 1851, these Indians continued to trouble the settlers of Minnesota and adjacent portions of Iowa and Nebraska. These Indians witnessed the "Suland" which they had evacuated by that treaty gobbled up by land-hungry whites even before the treaty had been legalized by ratification. They saw their annuities swallowed up by the traders, and a portion of their reserve along the Minnesota River denied them. Still part of these Indians, known as the "farmer" faction, saw the futility of opposition, and settled down to the difficult task of becoming peaceful agriculturalists. The remainder, termed the "blanket" faction, were averse to settling down, and hostile to the advancing whites. In small bands they roamed the country and made raids on the settlements. In 1857, a band under Inkpaduta, which had not taken part in the treaty of 1851, and, on seeking to share in the annuities was refused, attacked the little settlement at Spirit Lake in March, massacring 32 men, women and children. The great majority of the Eastern Dakota were not in sympathy with this act, but they were all denied their annuities until the murderers were punished.¹

The continued overrunning of Indian lands by whites, and seduction of Indian women, coupled with the failure of the government, engrossed in Civil War, to give the Eastern Dakota their promised annuities, resulted in "one of the bloodiest massacres in frontier history" in 1862.²

In a fracas in Meeker County, Minnesota, on August 7, Indians had killed five white men. Many "farmer" Sioux, recognizing that white punishment would fall on the innocent as well as the guilty as it had in 1857, joined the "blanket" faction in a terrible raid on the farmers, largely Germans, over an area of 200 miles. In a few days 644 settlers were murdered and others carried into captivity. Fort Ridgely was attacked, but successfully defended with the aid of cannon. The Governor of Minnesota at once appealed to the United States, saying that "half the population of the State are fugitives."³ Settlers of adjacent portions of Iowa and Nebraska were also alarmed.

Quickly an Army under Henry H. Sibley was sent to punish the murderers. He reached Fort Ridgely August 28. The Sioux won a victory at Birch Coulee, but Sibley beat them at Wood Lake, and many of the Indians began to sue for peace. The 269 white captives were returned. Sibley rounded up 1,500 of the enemy and imprisoned them at Fort Snelling, and Mankato. Later nearly 400 of the Indians were tried for murder, rape and arson. President Lincoln pardoned all but 38, who were hanged on a single scaffold at Mankato on December 28. Later Little Crow, the Santee Chief and leader of the outbreak, was killed by deer hunters, while picking berries to keep himself alive while in hiding.⁴

A large number of the hostiles had not been taken by Sibley in 1862. They had fled westward over the prairies. It was necessary for Sibley and Sully to conduct two extensive campaigns into the present North Dakota to punish them. The first, in 1863, was indecisive. The second, in 1864, resulted in two bad defeats for the Eastern Dakota aided by a small number of Teton.⁵

This ended the hostility of the Eastern Dakota. In 1863 they were removed from Minnesota to reservations provided for them in Dakota Territory. They remain to this day, on reservations in North and South Dakota. Between 1854 and 1866, the various Chippewa bands, who had held the northern half of Minnesota ceded all their large holding to go on scattered small reservations. The last of the states in the first tier of states west of the Mississippi had finally solved its Indian land problem.

In the Northwest.

Washington Territory had been formed in 1853 from the northern portion of the Oregon Territory. At that time not a single Indian land cession had been made in this region. The next year saw great activity in treating with the Indians of the Northwest for their lands. Then treaties were made in 1854-1855. By the summer of 1855 by far the greater

portion of Indian land claims between the Cascades and the Pacific in Oregon, as well as in the middle of that state, had been ceded to the government.⁶ Yet by 1860 more than 12,600 of the 31,000 Indians in Washington Territory, and 3,700 of the 7,000 Oregon Indians were still not embraced by treaties.⁷

The progress of treaty making in the Northwest had been impeded by a succession of distressing Indian Wars. In 1855 and 1856 the Rogue River Indians were fighting for their lives against the rough miners and settlers of southern Oregon. Finally in June 1856 the hostiles surrendered and were placed on the Coast Reservation.⁸ In the same years the Yakima War was waged in Washington.⁹ In 1857 and 1858 campaigns were conducted against the hostile Indians of northeastern Washington who opposed settlements and wagon roads in their country. As result the power of the Palouse, Spokane, Coeur d'Alene and Yakima was broken. But it was felt necessary to close the region between the Bitter Root and Cascades to settlers.¹⁰ By January 1859 peace reigned once more in Oregon, and Washington.¹¹

The 1860's witnessed the cession of the greater part of the Indian lands remaining in central and eastern Oregon. But Indians retained large sections of eastern Washington until the early 1870's.

There were three major Indian disturbances in the Northwest following this period: "The Modoc War of 1872-73; the Nez Perce War of 1877; and The Bannock War of 1878." All involved reservation Indians, but created temporary unrest in the settlements of the region.

The Modoc War resulted from the refusal of a small number of the tribe to move onto a new reservation. The Army was called out when settlers feared a massacre at the hands of the stubborn Indians. When an attempt was made to arrest Capt. Jack, leader of the rebels, for a previous murder, shots were exchanged (November 29, 1872). The Modoc then retreated into the Lava Beds. Here, in "the land of the burnt-out fires," Capt. Jack assembled a fighting force of but 50 Indians. An Army sent after them was defeated in January. A peace commission sent into the Lava Beds March 10, to treat with the hostiles was fired on. Gen. Canby and Rev. Thomas were killed. Another Army force succeeded only in losing a large number of men at the hands of the hidden Modoc sharpshooters. Finally the Modoc, quarreling among themselves, and short of supplies, left the Lava Beds. In mid-May part of their number deserted and shortly surrendered. On June 1, Capt. Jack finally surrendered and the war was over. Capt. Jack and three other Modoc leaders were hanged; two more sent to Alcatraz for life. Considering the number of hostiles, the Modoc War was the most costly in our history. "It lasted four and a half months and it cost something like \$500,000, to say nothing of the lives of eight officers, thirty-nine privates, sixteen

volunteers, two Indian scouts, and eighteen settlers... With the help of the artillery, five warriors were killed, two of them were examining an unexploded shell. The Lost River area for which Captain Jack had begged contained about 2,000 acres and had a value not exceeding \$20,000."¹²

The Nez Perce War of 1877 has attracted widespread interest not so much because of its real importance in frontier history as because of the audacity and masterful tactics of its leader, Chief Joseph. Like the Modoc War it developed from the refusal of a portion of a tribe to remove to a reservation assigned to them by the government. Chief Joseph and his followers wished to remain in the Wallowa country of northeastern Oregon. The government decided they must remove to the Lapwai Reservation. Chief Joseph desired a peaceful settlement of the problem, but the impetuous action of a few of his young men in killing a number of settlers to revenge the recent murder of an Indian, forced him to fight. Whites had already crowded into the country he desired, and troops were on hand to protect them. After three pitched battles with American troops between June 17 and July 12, in which both sides suffered heavy losses, the Nez Perce decided to save themselves by escaping into Canada. There followed one of the most masterful retreats in history. Over the Lo Lo Trail, which Gen. Sherman called "one of the worst trails for man and beast on this continent,"¹³ Joseph led his force from northwestern Idaho across nearly 2,000 miles of mountains, over blind winding passes, in deep canyons. His fighting force never reached 300 and he was always encumbered by twice as many women and children as he had warriors. At the peak of the pursuit he faced or dodged 2,000 infantry and cavalry backed with Gatling guns and howitzers. For two and a half months he marched and fought -- from Idaho into Montana, southeast through the Yellowstone Park and back into Montana, thence northward, striking for the Canadian boundary. Toward the end of September the hardy band rested in the Bear Paw Mountains of northcentral Montana, possibly thinking themselves safe in Canada. Here General Miles surprised them in a bloody battle only to be driven back. After five days of siege Chief Joseph came in to surrender stating: "Our chiefs are all killed..the old men are all dead..It is cold and we have no blankets. The little children are freezing to death. My people..have no blankets, no food..I want to have time to look for my children and see how many of them I can find. Maybe I shall find them among the dead. Hear me, my chiefs; I am tired, my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now stands I will fight no more forever." Thus ended the Nez Perce War. Joseph had lost 151 killed and 85 wounded, not counting the missing. The soldiers lost 126 killed and 140 wounded. At the surrender Joseph's force numbered but 87 warriors, 40 of them wounded, 184 women and 47 children.¹⁴ General Sherman termed it "one of the most extraordinary Indian wars of which there is any record. The Indians throughout displayed a courage and skill that elicited universal praise, they abstained from scalping, let captive women go free, did not commit indiscriminate murder of peaceful families, which is usual, and fought with

almost scientific skill, using advance and rear guards, skirmish lines, and field fortifications."¹⁵ After the surrender the hostiles were removed to Fort Leavenworth, then to Indian Territory. Finally some were permitted to return to their homeland. But Joseph remained a peaceful and respected captive.

Some historians call the Nez Perce War the "last important Indian war in the Northwest." Others point to the Bannock War of the following year as "the last major uprising of hostile Indians in the Pacific Northwest."¹⁶ This war involved some 1,500 to 2,000 hostile Indians including in addition to Bannock, some hundred of Paiute, Snakes, Shoshoni, and Umatilla. It started in southern Idaho and followed into Oregon to the Columbia River.¹⁷ It began as a campaign of robbery, pillage and murder, especially near Fort Hall. As the hostiles moved northward, recruiting renegades from other tribes as they went, the settlers of Eastern Oregon became panic stricken, abandoned their flocks and herds, and ran to safety in the more densely populated areas. Federal troops under General O. O. Howard pursued the Indians and successfully localized their depredations, but not until heavy property damage had been inflicted. "The war lasted less than a month. In the destruction of property, however, it was the most serious which Eastern Oregon had experienced."¹⁸

Peace with the Indians of the Northwest had been bought at an expensive price, after 37 years of intermittent warfare following the first migration of American settlers to Oregon in 1841. F. F. Victor has estimated that the number of whites known to have been killed or wounded in the territory north of California and west of the Rockies in the period 1828-1878 at 1,896. The greater proportion of those who suffered were men in the prime of life -- travelers, prospectors, miners, ranchers, traders, freighters, volunteer settlers, and soldiers.¹⁹

In the Indian Wars of the Northwest between 1865-1878, a total of 248 soldiers and citizens and 795 Indians were killed. The total cost of these wars has been estimated at approximately \$3,396,781.21.²⁰ But no figures can adequately portray the anxiety, fear and suffering, both mental and physical, of the settlers living in this sparsely inhabited region at the time.

Relations with the Ute and Shoshoni.

Had the tribes of the Rockies been as hostile to emigrants during the period of the overland migrations to Oregon, Utah and California as had the Plains Indians the whole story of these movements would have been different. In the Eastern Shoshoni the emigrants found a friendly people, who, following the tradition of Sacagawea, Lewis and Clark's invaluable Shoshoni guide and interpreter, aided the emigrants

on many occasions, never attacked them. They helped emigrants to recover lost stock, assisted them in crossing treacherous fords, and rendered aid of other kinds on numerous occasions. Largely responsible for this friendly attitude was the influence of their able chief Washakie. Another factor was their traditional hatred of the hostile Sioux, Cheyenne and Arapaho.²¹

At Fort Bridger in July 1868 these Shoshoni negotiated a treaty with the government ceded the greater portion of their land and accepting a large reservation in western Wyoming -- Wind River, approximately, 2,774,400 square miles -- almost as large as the State of Connecticut. These Indians wanted a reservation, and the one given them, was located where they most desired it. In contrast with other tribes, the fate of the Shoshoni was a happy one. By later cessions (1872, 1896 and 1904) their reservation was reduced to less than one-fifth its original size.²²

Relations with the Ute and Paiute were less friendly. From 1854 to 1857 there was peace with the Indians in Utah. But in 1857 occurred what has been termed "the most infamous outrage in Utah history" -- the Mountain Meadows Massacre. In September of that year a party of about 140 men, women and children from Arkansas en route to California was attacked by Mormons, in combination with Indians, while passing through southern Utah, and 120 men, women and children were murdered. The entire nation was incensed at this outrage. It encouraged the aversion of the rest of the nation toward the Mormons.²³

Not until 1861 was an Indian land cession negotiated in Utah. Between 1861 and 1868 the various Ute divisions were placed on reservations.

The high handed action of agent N. C. Meeker in attempting to move one of the Ute reservations against the will of the Indians, to make way for miners who were invading the Ute country, led to the so-called Meeker Massacre in 1879. In September, Meeker was assaulted after a quarrel with a petty chief, and called for military aid from Fort Fred Steele; whereupon the excited Indians procured ammunition from neighboring traders and attacked the Agency, killing Meeker and seven employees, burning and rifling the buildings. The troops sent to Meeker's aid were ambushed in Red Canyon, and 13 soldiers killed. After reinforcements arrived, Chief Ouray, a staunch friend of the whites, was able to bring about a peace.²⁴ Thus ended the open hostility of the Ute.

Desert Death in the Southwest.

In no other section of the country was Indian hostility to the white advance as persistent as in the Southwest. The Apache wars were perennial. Until the year 1886 the Apache, cruel, aggressive haters of the whites, threw fear into the hearts of the stoutest settlers in New Mexico Territory. Prior to 1863 the Navaho also warred on Mexican and American ranchers.

Unlike the Plains warriors, the Apache used their ponies only for transportation, and fought habitually on foot. Operations against them were hampered for many years by the ease with which they could flee, when pursued, across the international boundary into Mexico.²⁵ In the arid, mountainous Southwest the problem of sending an armed force after a foe that moved for hundreds of miles with tremendous rapidity, was like chasing a will-o-the-wisp. Even when caught, and forced to treat for peace, there was no assurance that the Indians would not again go on the warpath whenever time seemed appropriate. The wars with the Apache and Navaho were interspersed with futile treaties, and "peaces" that often lasted but a few months.

The Jicarilla War of 1854, followed the punishment of a party of Jicarilla Apache for stealing cattle near Fort Union. The Apache retaliated by killing 22 and wounding 23 of a party of 60 soldiers in a surprise attack. All "through the fall and winter of 1854 and the spring of 1855 the Jicarilla and Mescalero Apache remained openly hostile; the friendship of the Ute was questionable, and efforts had to be made to keep the Navaho and Gila Apache peaceful." In the summer of '55, peace was made with the Mescalero and Mimbrenos Apache, the Navaho, the Capote Ute, and in September with the Jicarilla Apache and Mohuache Ute. Though none of these treaties were ratified, a precarious peace was maintained in New Mexico until 1858.²⁶

The Navaho War grew out of the murder of a slave boy serving Major Brooks by a Navaho on July 12, 1858. The war developed into a series of predatory raids by the Indians and retaliations by white troops. A peace treaty on Christmas Day 1858, was soon broken. The Navaho were not finally subdued until Col. Canby conducted a vigorous campaign against them in the winter of 1860-1861. Peace was restored by treaty February 15, 1861.²⁷ But peace was not for long. The withdrawal of troops from the Southwest after the opening of the Civil War made raiding again profitable to the Navaho. Finally Col. Kit Carson invaded their territory in 1863, killed so many of their sheep as to leave them without means of support, rounded them up and took the greater part of the tribe as prisoners to Fort Sumner at the Bosque Redondo on the Rio Pecos. For four years the Navaho remained in exile at Bosque Redondo. Then in 1867, their plea for return to their old territory was granted. Their days of warfare against the whites were ended. Given a new supply of sheep, the Navaho began to prosper as a pastoral people. They have advanced rapidly since their freedom was regained.

The first reservation in New Mexico Territory was established in 1860 for the Gila, Mimbres, Mogollen and Chilicayia bands of Apache.²⁸ By the early '70's the other Apache groups had become nominally at least, "reservation Indians." But it was one thing to place the restless Apache on reservations; and quite another thing to keep them there. Until 1886, hostile Apache bands in large or small numbers continued to slip away from the reservations and engage in their age old pastime of raiding in New Mexico, Arizona, or across the boundary in Mexico.

One factor that kept the Apache hostile was their persistent ill-treatment by the whites. Both the Mimbreno leader, Mangas Coloradas, and the Chiricahua chief, Cochise, the two most formidable leaders of Apache raiding parties in the 1850's and 1860's, were incited to revenge by humiliating treatment at the hands of white men. "Thousands of lives and an inestimable amount of property were destroyed" by the Apache led by these two inveterate haters of the white man.²⁹ During the Civil War the Federal General Carlton instituted an extermination policy against the Apache: "The men are to be slain whenever and wherever they can be found. The women and children may be taken prisoners, but, of course, they are not to be killed."³⁰ In 1871 the Mexican government "still paid bounty for Apache scalps, no matter where procured."³¹ Under such conditions there could be little possibility of peace in the Southwest.

An undignified whipping by miners of the Pinos Altos gold mines in 1851 turned Mangas Coloradas, previously friendly to Americans, against the whites. For years thereafter (until his death in 1862 or 1863) his band of loyal followers was the scourge of the white settlements of New Mexico Territory. Until late in 1860 Cochise had been friendly to the Americans. His capture and ill-treatment by soldiers, who had ignored his flag of truce and denial of having taken a white child, turned him against the whites. "For almost 12 years -- 1861 to 1872 -- Cochise and his warriors ravaged a wide area of country extending from the Gila River far into Old Mexico, and eastward in New Mexico as far as the Mimbres River. He held impregnable strongholds far back and up amid the canyons and pinnacles of the rugged Dragoon and Chiricahua Mountains, and from these lurking places he would dispatch far and wide small bands of his picked warriors to plunder wagon trains, stampede cattle and horses, and murder unprotected settlers."³²

In the autumn of 1871 the "Prescott Miner" published a list of Apache murders and atrocities between March 1864 and the fall of 1871. It showed: 301 pioneers murdered; two of whom were known to have been burned alive; 53 were wounded and crippled for life and 5 carried into captivity. Yet all this time United States troops had been busy trying to forestall such atrocities, and punishing the Apache after they had been committed.³³

Earlier that year citizens had attempted to take matters into their own hands -- with devastating effect. There had been a raid on the settlement at San Xavier, and one of the Indian raiders who had been killed was believed to have been from Camp Grant reservation. On the basis of this supposed identification, a party of 6 Americans, 43 Mexicans and 92 Papago Indians made a surprise attack on Camp Grant at dawn on April 30. One hundred and twenty-eight men, women and children of the Camp Grant Apache were murdered with guns and clubs. President Grant ordered a civil trial for those who had perpetrated the massacre. The men were tried and acquitted. So high was the feeling against the Apache in Arizona at that time that newspapers and citizens alike generally commended the murderers for their action.³⁴

In July 1871 the government decided to try a policy of conciliation with the Apache. The attempts of Vincent Colyer to get Cochise to go on the Tularosa Reservation failed. With this failure, General Crook (who had taken command in Arizona in July) announced the policy of "proceeding to punish the incorrigibly hostile," in September 1872. Crook's vigorous campaign against the Tonto Apache in the Tonto Basin (1872-73) was successful. The Tonto Apache surrendered and never again went on the warpath. The Apache-Mohave surrendered in April 1873.

Two years later General Crook was transferred to the Department of the Platte to wrestle with the problem of subduing the hostile Sioux. The Apache were still the major problem. In April 1879, the able military leader, Victorio, refused to go on the San Carlos Reservation, and began a remarkable series of raids on both sides of the international boundary, in which, with but 250 or 300 fighting men, he struck terror into the hearts of the inhabitants of New Mexico, Arizona and Chihuahua. In a single raid he murdered 70 settlers. Fully 200 citizens of New Mexico and as many more in Mexico were killed. On both sides of the border large bodies of troops were sent after him. Yet almost miraculously he succeeded in evading them. But in the series of conflicts he suffered severe losses. Finally in October 1880, Victorio and a portion of his men were surrounded and attacked by Mexican troops at Tres Castillos. Victorio and many others were killed in the struggle.

Old Mana stepped into the place of leadership of the hostiles after Victorio's death. In July of 1881, with not over 40 warriors, he raided into the United States, fought 8 battles winning all, killed some 30 to 50 persons, eluded large forces of soldiers, and fled to Mexico. Meanwhile other Apache bands were striking terror to the Arizona settlements.

In 1882 hostile Apache groups continued their destructive raids on both sides of the international border. Prior to July 29, both Mexican and American troops were handicapped in their pursuit of the Apache by the fact that each was forbidden to cross the border into the territory of the other nation. Under such conditions Apache bands found the international boundary a useful weapon of defense. They had but to cross it to escape their pursuers. But on July 29, a treaty between the United States and Mexico was negotiated permitting soldiers of either country to cross the border of the other in pursuit of hostile Indians. This was most helpful in the final solution of the Apache problem. General Crook's return to the Southwest in September 1882 was also important.

Crook combined a policy of relentless warfare against the hostile bands with one of settling those pacified on Reservations under his direct control, that they might learn agriculture and the arts of peace. He said that he "set them to raising corn instead of scalps."³⁵ In 1884 over 4,000 tons of grain, vegetables and fruits were harvested by the Apache.

A government attempt to prohibit tiswin drinking (the native intoxicant) on San Carlos Reservation, resulted in a group of warriors under Geronimo leaving the reservation in May 1885, and fleeing into Mexico, from whence they conducted raids into New Mexico and Arizona. The number of the hostiles was small, yet it managed to keep the whole border region in a state of fear and excitement for nearly a year. Crook pursued the hostiles into Mexico and Mexican troops cooperated in an extensive man hunt on Mexican soil. By the following March the Apache had tired of war and asked for a parley. Crook and Geronimo discussed terms of surrender in Canyon de los Embudos, Sonora, March 27, 1886. But before the final surrender was consummated, Geronimo changed his mind, and with his immediate band, fled. Washington refused to accept Crook's terms for dealing with the hostiles. Crook, therefore, resigned, April 1.

Next day Gen. Nelson A. Miles was assigned to succeed Crook. With 5,000 soldiers and 500 Indian scouts the deserts were combed for Geronimo. On September 4, 1886, Geronimo and his band surrendered. These hostiles with numerous friendly Apache, believed to be potential trouble-makers, were transported to Fort Marion, Florida.

At last the Apache Wars of the Southwest were ended, and the region was to have a real and lasting peace for the first time in history. For forty years after the American occupation of New Mexico hostile Indians had proved an effective barrier to the development of the Southwest. American and Mexican settlers in the region during this period had lived in a veritable no-mans-land in constant fear, never knowing when a well-aimed Apache bullet might put a sudden end to their precarious existence.³⁶

Between 1860 and 1870, while Cochise and his warriors were on the warpath, the population of New Mexico and Arizona had remained almost stationary. In the succeeding decade, during which many of the Apache bands were pacified and placed on reservations, the population of this region grew rapidly. Yet the most rapid growth of population in these states did not take place until the decade 1900-1910, when Arizona's population nearly doubled, and New Mexico's more than doubled.

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THE FATE OF THE "VANISHING AMERICAN:"

Indian Affairs since 1890.

"For nearly 300 years white Americans, in our zeal to carve out a nation made to order, have dealt with the Indians on the erroneous, yet tragic, assumption that the Indians were a dying race -- to be liquidated. We took away their best lands; broke treaties, promises; tossed them the most worthless scraps of a continent that had once been wholly theirs. But we did not liquidate their spirit."

- Annual Report of Secretary of Interior, 1938.

In the year 1890 the Census Bureau issued a statement to the effect that a frontier of settlement was no longer traceable in the United States. The end of the frontier meant the end of the pioneer phase of America history.


The year 1890 also marked the last futile effort of the Indians to regain the independent existence they had known before the white man appeared on this continent to begin the relentless process of taking away the Indians' land, breaking their spirits, and cooping them up on limited reservation areas surrounded by white settlements. This effort ended with the tragedy of Wounded Knee. The fate of the Indian seemed to be sealed. He was to be a dependent ward of the government. His home was to be henceforth the government operated reservation. Yet "the protection that it afforded saved the Indian from virtual extermination. Had no reservations been established, the Indian would have faced the necessity of withstanding the westward march of millions -- an obvious impossibility -- or of being killed or assimilated by them. Indian reservations, like animal reservations, serve to preserve a race -- a species of humanity."¹ How then, has time dealt with the pacified, reservation Indian?

The Indian at the close of the Great Period of National Expansion.

Before Europeans began to settle on land within the area of the present United States Indians were the sole owners and occupants of its 3,026,789 square miles. By 1890, Indian holdings had been reduced to 162,993 square miles -- approximately one-nineteenth of the original area.² Indian land was embraced in a system of reservations, of varying sizes, scattered over the greater portion of the country, but largely west of the Mississippi.







THE BREAK-UP OF INDIAN TERRITORY 1888-1901

The Indian population, estimated at between 700,000 and 849,000 at the beginning of the historic period, had decreased, largely by disease and warfare, to but 248,253 in 1890.³

In 1890 the government was making an effort to remake the Indian after the white mans pattern -- to get him to wear citizen's clothing, to live in houses, to embrace Christianity, to till his land or to raise sheep or cattle upon it.

The opening of Oklahoma -- Last Indian Frontier Broken-Down.

In 1889 the Indian Territory comprised the last, large, contiguous, cultivatable area inhabited solely by a number of tribes of Indians. But even this last remnant of the old Indian Country could not escape the covetousness of land-hungry white men. For some years prior to this date there had been growing agitation for the opening to white settlement of portions of Indian Territory which it was felt were not required by the Indians of that region for their subsistence. Since 1879 there had even been some illegal invasion of the Territory by whites. Finally in 1889 the government agreed to open a portion of the Territory -- the Oklahoma District an area entirely surrounded by Indian lands, to settlement. On April 22, 1889, this section was officially opened. There was a wild land rush, and in a day the greater portion of the desirable land in the area was claimed by whites. In a series of similar rushes between 1891 and 1901 the surplus lands of a number of tribes were thrown open to settlement. After August 6, 1901 there remained but 4 reservations in the old Indian Territory which had not been assigned to counties and given administration under territorial laws -- the Kansas, Ponca, Oto and Missouri, and Osage.⁴ In 1890 the western part of the Old Indian Territory became the organized Territory of Oklahoma. The eastern portion retained the name "Indian Territory" until 1907, when the two were combined to form the State of Oklahoma. The creation of this state "marked the total abandonment of Monroe's policy on an Indian Country" adopted more than three-quarters of a century before.⁵

The Rebirth of the Vanishing American.

Figures on Indian population are notoriously unreliable, yet the best available ones indicate that the downward trend continued during the decade 1890-1900. In 1900 Indian population reached 237,196. Then, sometime between 1900 and 1910, the population began to increase. The census of 1910 showed a gain of nearly 29,000 over the figure at the turn of the century. By 1930 the Indians numbered 332,397.⁶ The better control of disease and betterment of living conditions generally have been an important factor in the numerical "comeback" of the Indians. Today, instead of being "the vanishing American," "Indians are increasing at twice the rate of the population as a whole."⁷

The Indians' Land.

The matter of land has continued to be a major factor in the Indian problem. The Allotment Act of 1887, intended as a means to alleviate the Indians condition, by giving him sufficient land on which to make a living, proved another boomerang. Almost before its application began important changes were made in the Act. It was decided to allot land to each member of the tribe instead of on a family basis. Indians could not profitably use a farm for each member. The temptation to lease unused land (often the choice land) to whites became great. After a decade of leasing amendments to the Dawes Act, leasing was thrown wide open. Any Indian land might be leased.⁸ Gradually the Indians' land slipped away from them. "Of the 130,000,000 acres held in trust by the government in 1887 when the General Allotment Act was passed, some 49,000,000 of the poorest acres remained in 1933."⁹ Through a series of sweeping reforms the present administration of the Indian Office has increased the Indians' acreage. At the close of the fiscal year 1938 the Indian land area had been increased to approximately 51,540,307 acres, 67 per cent of which was tribally owned.¹⁰ The Indians have remained, for the most part, close to the soil. In 1938, "at least 9 out of 10 Indians remain on or near the land."¹¹

The Indian's Political Status.

Prior to 1924 about two-thirds of the Indians had become citizens under the General Allotment Act or under various special acts. In 1924 an act of Congress declared all noncitizen Indians born in the United States to be citizens. This did not necessarily give them the right to vote. Voting right is based on state laws -- which in the Southwest, where Indians predominate, has been so ordered that Indians on non-taxable reservation property cannot vote.¹²

The Indian Problem is still with us.

Today, 450 years after Columbus' discovery of the New World, there is still a live "Indian Problem" in this country, and there are still a variety of solutions proposed. The present administration has had the difficult task of attempting to bring health and happiness to a race that has suffered from centuries of abuse at the hands of the white man. It is a task that cannot be performed over night. But the aims in view are both an encouragement and a challenge: "So productively to use the moneys appropriated by the Congress for Indians, as to enable them, on good, adequate lands of their own, to earn decent livelihoods and lead self-respecting, organized lives in harmony with their own aims and ideals, as an integral part of American life. Under such a policy, the ideal end result will be the ultimate disappearance of any need for Government aid or supervision."¹³

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
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INDIAN CESSIONS 1750-1890



- LANDS CEDED BY INDIANS, 1750-1783.
- 1784 - 1810
- 1811 - 1830
- 1831 - 1850
- 1851 - 1870
- 1871 - 1890

LANDS ACQUIRED BY THE COLONISTS BEFORE 1750, LANDS ACQUIRED LATER BY THE UNITED STATES IN LOUISIANA AND TEXAS WITHOUT INDIAN CESSION, OR INDIAN RESERVATIONS NOT CEDED.

A. M. CHASE, JR.

THE INDIAN BARRIER AND THE FRONTIER PROCESS:

Some General Conclusions.

"The Only good Indian is a dead one."

- General Phillip Sheridan.

"No Indian ever loved the white man."

- Sitting Bull.

From either side we choose to view it, the story of the Indian Frontier in the United States (1763-1890), is a dramatic one. From the point of view of the white man, it is a stirring epic, in which a hardy, aggressive people finally wrest the control of a rich continent from a stubborn, hard-fighting foe. From the Indian viewpoint, it is a bitter tragedy, in which a proud and home-loving people, wedded to a stone age, relinquish bit by bit their hold on the continent to a numerically stronger and culturally more advanced opponent. The story as a whole is one of inevitable struggle between two vastly different civilizations, prolonged over a period of many years.

The Basic Struggle -- Conflict over Use of Land.

North America was a red man's continent before the European "Age of Discovery." When white explorers approached and moved through the land of the red man they generally excited curiosity and interest rather than hostility. When fur traders went among the Indians they usually found the red man friendly and happy to offer the traders pelts of wild animals which they valued lightly for useful tools and utensils, weapons, liquor or trinkets which the Indians valued highly. "But the coming of the settlers meant the end of the Indian's world."¹

White settlers -- whether miners, cattle, or sheep men, or farmers, not only killed off the wild game on which the Indians counted for subsistence but they took from the red man the very land on which they had had their homes, hunted, fished and raised their crops. There were three types of white men the Indians soon learned to fear -- the surveyor with his compass and chain, the settler with his axe and rifle, and the miner with his pan and gun. It was the advance of these men onto Indian land that caused nearly all of the Indian wars of the period of national expansion.

In the wars between nations of white men for the possession of North America prior to the Mexican War, the majority of the strong Indian tribes sided with the people who promised them protection against the further advance of white settlers into their country. Therefore, they sided with the French against the English, and later with the English and Spanish against the Americans. It was the Indians' sad lot to stake their all on the losing side in each instance.

Two factors were of particular importance in determining the final outcome of the struggle that took place on the Indian Frontier:

First, the extreme aggressiveness of the American frontiersmen, who, despite actual or threatened Indian hostility, and despite the feeble efforts of their own government to hold them back, continually pushed forward onto the Indians' land. They were driven by a seemingly insatiable hunger for land that had to be appeased at almost any cost. They found moral justification for their seizure of Indian lands in their interpretation of Christian teachings, saying as did Senator Benton, that the white race had a superior right to the land because they "used it according to the intentions of the Creator."² Governor Harrison of Indiana Territory voiced the sentiments of the typical white frontiersman when he said: "Is one of the fairest portions of the globe to remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few wretched savages, when it seems destined by the Creator to give support to a large population and to be a seat of civilization, of science and of true religion?" The eager pioneers knew the answer to this one, and did their part to speed the realization of this "Manifest Destiny."³ At the same time they dispossessed the Indians and gained themselves homes with an untroubled conscience.

Second, the consistent inability of the beleaguered Indians to unite their forces in an effective defense of their homeland. A united Indian front, if it had been achieved during the colonial period, might have successfully driven the whites out of the country and at least forestalled the white conquest of North America for a long period of years. But among the Indians there were old, tribal feuds dating back to pre-Columbian times. No Indian leader ever emerged who was influential enough to dissolve these old hatreds of one group of red men for another. Throughout the period of national expansion there were "hostile" Indian groups who struggled to hold back the white advance, and there were "friendly" Indian groups (generally those who had previously suffered at the hands of the "hostiles" and would rejoice at their defeat) who frequently rendered valuable assistance to the whites in the conquest of the continent.

The Insecurity of Life on the Indian Frontier.

On the Indian Frontier, throughout the period of expansion, white settlers dwelt in absolute or relative isolation in close proximity to the Indian tribes. During the colonial period they lived almost without military protection. In later years such protection was generally inadequate. Thus, alone in the wilderness, they faced the dual problems of making a living and being constantly on their guard against hostile redskins. Eternal vigilance was the price of life on the frontier -- not just now and then, but 24 hours a day, every day of the year. The mental strain of such an existence was terrific. Crèvecoeur described the tense atmosphere of the Indian frontier as he observed it first hand in the late 18th century -- how the ever present fear of Indian attack prevented the settlers from exerting all their strength in the fields, engulfed the greater part of their conversations, lessened their appetites at meals, disturbed their sleep, and gave them many prolonged periods of watchful waiting, gun in hand, on the occasion of false-alarms when the dreaded Indian attack never came.⁴ Writing of the frontier on the Plains of many decades later Everett Dick indicates this same fear pervading the lives of the settlers: "Above and beyond the actual losses suffered from savage attacks was the terrible strain on the pioneers who lived in daily dread of an Indian. Women, having heard of recent savage attacks with kidnappings, rape and murder, lived in awful fear of what might come to them any day. With husband gone for a three-day trip to the mill or town the strongest heart quailed."⁵

In the slang of the border of circa Revolutionary times the word "nerve" was used to indicate a high and praiseworthy degree of courage, without its modern implication of unblushing effrontery.⁶ It took such "nerve" for whites to live on the Indian Frontier. The frontier was no place for cowards, either male or female.

Life under such conditions necessitated the development of certain protective techniques by the whites of the Indian Frontier. In the pattern of life on the Indian Frontier of the eastern woodlands the strong, palisaded fort played an important part. The primitive white settlements in the wilderness were almost invariably located at no great distance from such a fort to which settlers might gather for protection when an Indian alarm was spread. In later years the military posts of the trans-Mississippi west served the same purpose for soldiers, traders and settlers of nearby sections. The isolated settler on the Plains or in the Southwest living at a distance from a fort was in daily dread of losing life or property at the hands of raiding Indians.

Throughout the period of the Indian Frontier the white man of the border generally lived close to his trusty firearm. His rifle or pistol was his life insurance policy. He did not dare be without it. White men of the border devoted much time and thought to the care of their firearms. They developed deadly aim. At the outset of the Revolution John Adams marvelled at the skill of the frontiersmen with the then little known weapon among the Colonists of the Coast, the rifle. He wrote his wife: "They are the most accurate marksmen in the world."⁷ At about the same time Richard Henry Lee remarked of the Virginia frontiersmen: "There is not one of these Men who wish a distance less than 200 yards or a larger object than an Orange --- Every shot is fatal."⁸ Nor can we forget that it was frontier conditions that were largely responsible for the early development of perhaps the two most typical varieties of American firearm -- the Kentucky rifle, and the six-shooter. Both were excellently adapted to Indian fighting under the peculiar conditions of their times.

The Savagery of Warfare on the Indian Frontier.

There is nothing more savage than race warfare. And the Indian Wars of the period of expansion not infrequently degenerated to the level of race wars. On either side the innocent suffered with the guilty once the fighting began. To settlers, even to soldiers, all Indians looked alike. To Indians, believing among themselves in the tribe's responsibility for the crimes of its individual members, one outrage by white men was an act that must be revenged on the next white encountered.

Under such conditions each side on the Indian frontier looked upon the other with a combination of fear and hatred. Often the problem of survival seemed to narrow down to one of brutal killing or being brutally killed. Under such conditions men did not hesitate to question the intentions of persons of the other race. Color of skin alone became the distinguishing mark of the hated enemy.


It was this psychology that led to the adaptation of two patterns of warfare that were savage in the extreme. Only under conditions where discrimination is reduced to its simplest form could such techniques be employed. These were:

(1) The Scalp Bounty. The payment of money for the scalp of a member of the opposing force was a practice which developed out of the boiling cauldron of hate that marked Indian-white warfare in the present United

States. First invoked by Gov. Kieft of New Netherland in the Colonial Indian Wars of the 17th century, the scalp bounty was an important factor in the Indian Wars of American colonists and citizens of the United States down to the War of 1812. More than a half century later Mexico was still offering scalp bounties in an effort to put an end to the bloody Apache Wars. North of the border, in the trans-Mississippi West there were calls for a revival of the deadly scalp bounty at times when Indian raids became unusually severe. Desperation and the scalp bounty seemed to travel hand in hand.

(2) The Massacre. The complete annihilation of the enemy without discrimination as to age or sex was a typical technique of warfare on the Indian Frontier from the time of the Jamestown Massacre in 1622 to the fiasco at Wounded Knee in 1890. In all sections of the country there are sites where occurred such bloody struggles. Sometimes it was groups of whites who were "rubbed out," as the Indians of the Plains picturesquely termed it. Sometimes it was groups of Indians who were massacred with equal barbarity by so-called civilized white men.

These two techniques -- the Scalp Bounty and the Massacre -- were outgrowths of the race struggle that was waged on the Indian Frontier down to 1890. In such a struggle each individual was considered to be a "fighting man." The pioneer woman had to take it along with her mate. And the records of the frontier are filled with incidents where these brave women took active parts in the actual fighting. Armed with a rifle at the stockade, or with her favorite weapon, the axe, at the cabin door the rugged frontier woman was no mean fighting force -- as many an Indian learned to his misfortune. There are also a limited number of examples in the literature to show that Indian women also could drive home the tomahawk or pull the bow in the struggle against the whites when occasion required. The conflict on the Indian frontier, like modern warfare, was not a clash of armies alone. It was, in truth, a death struggle between two civilizations.





①

TREATY MADE IN WHICH
(1) FRIENDSHIP DECLARED
(2) INDIANS CEDED LANDS AND
IN RETURN RECEIVED ANNUITIES
AND PRESENTS. (3) A BOUNDARY
LINE BETWEEN SETTLEMENT AND
INDIAN LAND DETERMINED

②

A
PERIOD OF
PEACE LASTING
AT MOST A FEW
YEARS - ACTUALLY
ONLY SUSPENDED
HOSTILITY

The
CYCLE
OF
INDIAN-
WHITE
RELATIONS ON THE
FRONTIER

⑥

INDIANS
OVERPOWERED BY
WHITE SOLDIERS,
SUED FOR
PEACE, AND
PREPARATIONS
MADE FOR
ANOTHER TREATY AND
LAND CESSION

③

WHITE PIONEERS
CROSSED THE
BOUNDARY LINE
AND SETTLED
ON UNCEDED
INDIAN
LANDS

⑤

WHITE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST
THE HOSTILE INDIANS
ORGANIZED.
REGULAR TROOPS
AND/OR VOLUNTEERS
SENT AGAINST
INDIANS

④

INDIAN PROTESTS,
MASSACRES OF SETTLERS,
WHITE RETALIATIONS,
OFTEN PANIC AMONG FRONTIER
SETTLEMENTS, AND
CONTRACTION OF
SETTLED AREAS

The reign of terror that gripped London during the days immediately preceding the recent Munich conference, is a modern example of the psychological atmosphere of the Indian Frontier during the expansion period. Yet unlike the Londoners, both Indians and whites on the frontier found little real solace in treaties.

How the Indian Frontier Was Pushed Back.

In general it is possible to determine the nature of the movement of the Indian Frontier during the period of national expansion. In a series of recurring cycles of typical events the Indian Frontier moved westward from the Atlantic Coast until the Indians had all been confined on reservations and had given up the futile struggle against the white man.

A typical cycle consists of:

(1) A treaty is made between whites and Indians. In the treaty friendship between the races is declared. The Indians are usually given presents and/or annuities; and the whites are given title to a portion of land previously claimed by Indians. A new boundary line is marked off. The Indian treaty was usually a one sided affair. For the whites it afforded "what a strong power usually seeks in a treaty with a weaker neighbor: a legal basis for future penetration."⁹ George Washington, with typical truthfulness, termed the Indian Treaty "a sop to quiet them."¹⁰ For the naive Indian, unaccustomed to thinking in terms of legal rights to land, the treaty was often a source of misunderstanding. Such misunderstanding was a not infrequent cause of later friction. As one Creek Indian is said to have remarked to Sevier, "Powder and lead, stroud and Kaskaskia, me know, but paper me don't know."¹¹ Yet for nearly 250 years, from the purchase of Manhattan Island by the Dutch until the abandonment of the treaty technique by the United States in 1871, the Indian Treaty remained the typical peaceful method of dealing with the Indian tribes in important matters involving land use or acquisition.

(2) A brief period of peace follows the treaty. For a time the terms of the treaty serve to satisfy both whites and Indians. Whites are basied with the settlement of the newly acquired land -- consolidating their gains. Indians are temporarily secure in the belief that white penetration has been checked by the boundary line provided in the treaty. For a period which may last but a few weeks or may extend over several years, depending on local conditions, there is peace on the Indian Frontier. But it is not lasting peace. Rather it is suspended hostility lasting only until

(3) White men cross the boundary established by the treaty and settle on unceded Indian land. The filling up of the land acquired by the treaty with white settlers leads the restless squatter element and

the land-hungry for whom there is no more good available land on the white man's side of the Indian boundary, to cross the line and take up illegal claims on unceded Indian land. These people not only took the Indian land but also frequently ill-treated the Indians themselves, whom they regarded as an inferior race without land rights that the white man was bound by law or nature to respect. Although the central government itself recognized the validity of the Indian title, it was usually powerless to check the invasion of these lands by its own people on the frontier. The ineffective Proclamation of 1763, and the unsuccessful attempt of the Army to prevent the penetration of the Black Hills by gold seekers in 1875, are but two of many examples of the government's inability to check the illegal movement of white frontiersmen onto the Indians' land.


(4) Unlawful trespass by whites leads to Indian resort to force to protect their homeland. Indian protests and threats were usually of little avail against the stream of settlers overrunning their land. The only effective weapon against the invaders was the use of force. Most commonly Indian resistance took the form of guerilla warfare -- the swift attack of small bodies of redskins on isolated parties of whites -- either settlers or travellers. Losses from such raids were usually not great, but a few such raids at widely distributed points, and the threat of more raids to come at unpredictable times and localities served to produce a general state of alarm among the isolated settlements of whites on the Indian Frontier. Not infrequently this brought

(5) Panic among the white inhabitants of the Indian Frontier. Fear of the bloody results of attacks on the part of the thoroughly excited Indians often led to the wholesale and hurried abandonment of the frontier by whites to seek the safety of the more densely populated, older communities. Panic among the frontier settlers was common at this point in the cycle -- whether the frontier happened to be in the east, midwest, or far west. There were picturesque terms for such panic at different times. The rapid abandonment of the Wyoming Valley in the Revolution was called "the Great Runaway." The hurried eastward run of settlers in Kansas and Nebraska at the time of the Cheyenne War of 1864 was termed "the Stampede." The phenomenon was much the same in all sections -- it everywhere meant the temporary set-back of the whites.

(6) Then follows an organized white campaign against the hostiles with a force composed of regular soldiers and/or militia. After the initial excitement and panic had passed, the next step was the hurried organization of an adequate armed force of whites to penetrate the Indian country and punish the Indians. In some instances a single well commanded expedition accomplished the purpose. Indian villages were burned, crops and/or supplies destroyed, leaders killed or captured. Often a single pitched battle was all that was required to reduce the Indians to submission. But in some sections long and costly series of campaigns were required to humble the redskins. In any event, the final result was

(7) The Indians overpowered, sue for peace. Unable to further withstand the organized attack of a superior force of whites the Indians sued





SOME IMPORTANT
INDIAN MASSACRES
 ON THE FRONTIER
 1622-1890

for peace. But now the whites had the upper hand, and could exact concessions of additional lands as the price of peace. To give formal and legal status to the terms of the peace

(8) Another treaty is made. In it more land is ceded, more presents distributed to the Indians, a new boundary and a new peace is established.

After this fashion did the Indian Frontier fall back before the white advance during the period of expansion. This typical cycle was repeated time and again until the whites had gained control of the entire area of our country.

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3. Idem. p. 79.
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10. DUNBAR, SEYMOUR
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KEY TO MAP OPPOSITE

- (1). Jamestown, Virginia. 1622.
- (2). Pequot Fort, Connecticut. 1637.
- (3). Stamford, Connecticut. 1647.
- (4). Narragansett, Rhode Island. 1675.
- (5). Turner's Falls, Massachusetts. 1676.
- (6). Watick, Massachusetts. 1676.
- (7). Pueblo Revolt, New Mexico. 1680.
- (8). Roanoke River, North Carolina. 1711.
- (9). Fort Rosalie, Mississippi. 1729.
- (10). Wyoming Valley, Pennsylvania. 1778.
- (11). Cherry Valley, New York. 1778.
- (12). Gnadenhütten, Ohio. 1782.
- (13). Fort Dearborn, Illinois. 1812.
- (14). Frenchtown, Michigan. 1813.
- (15). Fort Mims, Alabama. 1813.
- (16). Horseshoe Bend, Alabama. 1814.
- (17). Santa Rita, New Mexico. 1837.
- (18). Near Withlacoochee River, Florida. 1835.
- (19). Taos, New Mexico. 1847.
- (20). Waiilatpu Mission, Oregon. 1847.
- (21). Near Sevier Lake, Utah. 1853.
- (22). Near Fort Laramie, Wyoming. 1854.
- (23). Blue Water Creek, Nebraska. 1855.

- (24). Spirit Lake, Iowa. 1857.
- (25). Mountain Meadows, Utah. 1857.
- (26). Minnesota Massacre. 1862.
- (27). Sand Creek, Colorado. 1864.
- (28). Near Fort Phil Kearny, Wyoming. 1866.
- (29). Washita River, Oklahoma. 1868.
- (30). Camp Grant, Arizona. 1871.
- (31). Little Big Horn, Montana. 1876.
- (32). Ute Agency, Colorado. 1879.
- (33). Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota. 1890.

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