

"They Get Nothing But Caresses"
Resentment of the Osage in the Late Eighteenth-Century
Mississippi Valley
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After 1800, the fortunes of both Spaniards and Native Americans in the North American West changed dramatically. Spain evacuated the vast Louisiana Territory in 1803. After Mexican independence, the United States acquired Texas, New Mexico, and California. More tragically, Anglo-Americans pushed Native Americans off of their homelands and into Indian Territory or onto reservations that were a tiny percentage of the size of their original lands.

We tend to think of the United States in the nineteenth century as a juggernaut, but what if Europeans and Indians in the trans-Mississippi west had banded together? Could they have changed history? Could St. Louis be part of Mexico now? Or the Spanish-speaking or French-speaking "Republic of Louisiana"? Or an Osage or pan-Indian nation, bordered on the east by the United States and the south by Mexico, with its own representation at the United Nations? Those possibilities sound far-fetched in twenty-first-century St. Louis, but there were Spaniards and Indians in the late eighteenth century who conceived of collaborating against the United States.

It is not simply in hindsight that we see the Louisiana Purchase as a crucial step in the expansion of the United States. Spain had assisted the American rebels during their Revolution, but by the end of the war, officials in Spanish North America already had reason to worry about the new republic with which they were sharing the continent. In 1783, the Treaty of Paris ended the American Revolution. Spain was not invited. As part of the treaty, the British surrendered what would become the states of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama to the United States. The United States Congress quickly began surveying these lands and selling them off. But it was Spain's troops that during the war had seized much of this region from the British. With good reason, Spanish officials worried about, as the Spanish governor of Louisiana, the barón de Carondelet, put it, the "unmeasured ambition of a new and vigorous people, hostile to all subjection, advancing and multiplying . . . with a prodigious rapidity." The Spanish predicted that this expansionist people's next goal was Louisiana.-1- Likewise, Louisiana's native peoples heard rumors of a people who trampled Indian land rights. In the 1780s, Iroquois, Shawnee,

Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw visitors from the east told tales of an "ambitious" "plague of locusts" that was streaming across the Appalachians.-2-

If the Indians and Europeans of Louisiana had banded together, they could have assembled ten thousand men to defend against the expanding United States, and more if they had recruited Indians and Frenchmen in the contested regions east of the Mississippi. So why didn't they? The peoples west of the Mississippi failed to defend against Anglo-American expansion because of their historical relationships in the region. They were not a united front, but rather a barely-co-existing collection of peoples who did not necessarily trust one another any more than they trusted the United States.

Most of the people in Louisiana had in fact attempted a joint military action against one of the other groups in this region-another expansionist people, the Osage Indians. In the early 1790s, Spanish administrators, French hunters and traders, Quapaws, Caddos, Shawnees, and Chickasaws had tried to fight the Osage together but had failed because of each group's refusal to subordinate its own interests to the war effort. A decade later, the proposed coalition against the United States faced the same organizational difficulties. To make matters worse, by then many people were frustrated with each other at the prior lack of unity against the Osage.

The Osage had dominated their neighbors south of the Missouri River for almost a century. When French traders had arrived with guns and ammunition in the late seventeenth century, the Osage had become the best-armed tribe in Louisiana. Osage hunters then began to expand their hunting lands in search of items that they could trade to the French-deer, buffalo, horses, and captives to sell as slaves.-3- The Osage expanded southwest onto the Arkansas River at the expense of Caddoan and Wichita peoples with inferior access to arms.-4- And the Osage plundered and occasionally killed French traders who attempted to ascend the Missouri, Arkansas, and Red Rivers to trade arms to their enemies. Louisiana became part of the Spanish empire in 1763, but the situation on the ground did not change much. Most traders and even many officials in the Spanish hierarchy in Louisiana were Frenchmen. And the Osage continued their expansion.

Osage expansion made them many enemies. French traders feared for their lives every time they went upriver. The Caddo and the Wichita peoples had lost their homelands and were continuing to suffer Osage attacks. On the lower Arkansas River, the Quapaw Indians often clashed with the Osage. Shawnees, Chickasaws, and other peoples from east of the Mississippi wanted to hunt and even settle in Louisiana as game diminished and settlers increased in the east, but Osage attacks made Louisiana a dangerous place. Finally, the Spanish officials who had to hear all of their neighbors' complaints about Osage violence would very much have liked to establish control over that troublesome people. These groups all wanted to bring down the Osage, but their conflicting interests prevented them from forming an effective anti-Osage coalition.

To begin with, the Indians insisted that traders had to stop providing the Osage with weapons. Otherwise, they said, war against the heavily-armed Osage would be suicide. The Indians said to the Spanish: first enforce trade sanctions, then we will fight. The Spanish government agreed to ban trade with the Osage, but French traders and merchants, who made tremendous profits from the Osage trade, protested. Influential St. Louis merchants lobbied hard to reinstate trade.-5- Local Spanish officials generally agreed, since they made money from licensing traders, and when the Osage trade was forbidden, their traders did not buy licenses.

The Spanish government was able to crack down some on official trade, but illicit trade continued unabated on the Missouri and especially the Arkansas Rivers. An Osage woman testified that ten barges of goods had arrived at the Osage villages in the summer of 1792, during an Osage trade ban.-6- Trade with the Osage was simply too valuable. During the 1790s the Arkansas Post trade with the Osage alone was worth four times the local settlers' entire agricultural output.-7- Osage trade was similarly important to St. Louis, where the lieutenant governor called their trade the best at the post.-8- A colony dependent on the fur trade was not likely to stop trading with its most profitable partner.

Even if the Spanish could have stopped all traders from willingly supplying the Osage, some still would have done so against their will. When official trade slowed, the Osage increased their raids on traders supplying other Indian nations. To reach the Caddos or the Pawnees or the Missouri Indians, traders had to travel past Osage lands. If these traders were abiding by trade sanctions and not delivering to the Osage towns, an Osage party was likely to stop them and strip them of all their goods. And the Osage had another source of European goods, British traders from Canada, who eagerly traded behind the back of their Spanish enemy.-9-

Spain's Indian allies were disgusted at the ineffective embargo. A Chickasaw man named Thomas conveyed the frustration of many Osage enemies when he reminded the Spanish that they "had closed all the roads and had forbidden the white men to carry goods into their villages" so that they could strike the Osage without fear. Yet, Thomas charged, the Osage were "well clad in new blankets" and well-supplied with new guns because goods were pouring into their villages. Thomas explained that St. Louis traders "take guns, powder, and ball to the Osages and buy from them all this booty which they steal from the Spaniards and red men on the rivers and . . . they kill all the whites of Natchitoches and Arkansas and all the red men of this region who cannot hunt without being killed or plundered by the Osages." "Ah, my father," Thomas continued, "if the great chief of New Orleans had all those who carry goods to the Osages killed, there would be no one to carry [them] and . . . we could plan to attack their village."-10-

When the Spanish reprimanded their allies for not fighting the Osage, Thomas and others in turn blamed the Spanish for allowing traders to give an enemy the trade

goods that only allies deserved. Indians would fight the Osage, Thomas said, if Europeans would stop giving them weapons. According to a Miami Chief named Pacanne, Europeans were only following their own interests and love of money.-11- But with fewer than a thousand troops spread over all of Louisiana -about one soldier for every 200 square miles-Spanish officials could do little to enforce the embargo.-12-

Spain's weakness in Louisiana also offended its Indian allies directly. When the Spanish first arrived in Louisiana, they had described to the Indians the wealth and power of their empire. As a result, the Indians expected Spanish troops to fight alongside them against the Osage and Spanish supplies for the war, including guns, ammunition, and food for the expeditions. But the Spanish did not have troops to spare and could not afford the supplies necessary to guarantee their allies' participation. One can imagine the growing reluctance among warriors when Lieutenant Governor Zenon Trudeau informed them: "war having been declared at [your] solicitation," they could "expect nothing of us" except munitions "indispensably necessary . . . for each expedition."-13-

To the Spanish, it was perfectly reasonable to supply only guns, powder, and bullets, and only when a large party was going to engage the Osage. After all, the Indian enemies of the Osage were the ones calling for their destruction. But to the Chickasaw, the Caddo, and their allies, if the Spanish wanted them to fight a war without Spanish troops, against enemies armed with European weapons, they had better supply rations and give them enough arms so that they could not only win the battle but also defend themselves against the inevitable Osage reprisals.

Unsurprisingly, when Trudeau attempted to organize an attack on the Osage returning from their summer hunt in 1793, only one hundred warriors gathered in St. Louis. Most nations sent their regrets. Some from the east explained that the Americans would march against them if they left home. Others claimed that they could not leave their wives and children alone because other tribes with which they were at war "might easily attack and destroy [our] families" in the warriors' absence.-14-

It would have been difficult to organize such a large and diverse population under any circumstances, but the fact that the organizing was a complete failure reveals that Spain's allies were not eager to begin an Osage war if the Spanish did not back them up completely. When their Spanish agent instructed the Shawnees to prepare themselves for an expedition against the Osages," and to "set a time and a meeting place with all the nations of the lower part of the river and of Mexico," the Shawnee leaders replied that they were eager to fight, but "that it was not up to them to fix a time, but to their father to set it for his children."-15- Spain's Native American allies believed the Spanish role in their alliance was to organize and supply their multi-party Osage war. If the Spanish did not fulfill their role, their friends would not do it for them. Without full support from the Spanish,

Louisiana's native peoples would not engage the dangerous Osage in an all-out war. They might occasionally skirmish, to defend themselves or to support their own interests, but no more.

If local French settlers had fought with them, the Indians might have been more willing to endanger their own lives, but French Louisianans were reluctant to plunge into an Osage war, even though they regularly suffered from Osage attacks. The residents of Ste. Geneviève reflected this reluctance in the face of a powerful enemy. The Osage had continually pillaged the town and its hunters. In a joint letter to the governor in 1790, residents had complained that the Osage "take our Horses, kill our Cattle, plunder the French and Indian Hunters," and generally made life in Ste. Geneviève dangerous and unprofitable. The residents demanded that the governor punish these "Bandits."-16- But once war began, they were not so sure. As Trudeau explained, "fear makes them want peace." They were afraid even to work in their fields for fear of Osage reprisals, and they did not volunteer to fight the Osage.-17-

For their part, the Osage gave the Spanish a way out of the trap of disobedient traders, dissatisfied Indians, and fearful settlers. Every time the Spanish tried to cut off trade or organize an expedition, the Osage sent a delegation to St. Louis or the Arkansas Post to explain and apologize for offenses and promise they would not happen again. Osage chiefs portrayed their people as a steadfast Spanish ally. They blamed the violent raids on a few restless young Osage men, who did not represent the Osage chiefs or their people generally. After the Spanish declared an Osage trade embargo in 1792, an Osage chief traveled to St. Louis to apologize for raids. The chief blamed "young men" in the Arkansas hunting grounds, telling Lieutenant Governor Trudeau that he would have more control over these "bad" warriors if trade resumed.

This Osage pressure, compounded by the constant lobbying from St. Louis merchants, and his personal financial losses, was more than Trudeau could take. He decided that, since illegal trade was continuing anyway, he would reinstate official Osage trade. To make up for giving in, Trudeau vacuously warned that this would be the "last time" he would show the Osage leniency.-18- The Spanish, of course, were in no position to ignore Osage overtures. Trudeau advised the governor to accept Osage friendship and overlook Osage misdemeanors because they could not win an Osage war.

On another occasion the Arkansas Commandant sent an interpreter up the Arkansas River to tell the Osage of a decision to end trade. On hearing of the decision, Osage representatives traveled to the Arkansas Post where they surrendered the Spanish symbols of recognition—a medal, flag, and commission—belonging to Brucaiguais, the man they said was guilty of the attacks. They explained that he was dying and therefore could not come himself. But they offered several "chiefs," they said, as hostages in his place. The Arkansas

Commandant approved this peace measure and provided the representatives with abundant provisions for their return journey. The next morning he awoke to find that the Osage representatives had left, taking with them the provisions, as well as all of the "hostages." The supposedly "dying" Brucaiguais lived many more years.-19- On other occasions, the Osage brought hostages to answer for past offenses or as insurance against new ones, but these hostages were not the "chiefs" Osage representatives claimed them to be. At times they were not even Osage.-20-

Spanish officers did not like being duped, and they tended to doubt the chiefs when they attributed all Osage violence to a few unruly young men. Still, accepting this explanation-that most Osage opposed the violence-had the advantage of disguising the Spanish inability to organize an Osage war.

In 1794, the Osage, the Spanish government, and two influential St. Louis merchants reached a compromise. Auguste and Pierre Chouteau offered to build a fort near the Osage villages. They told Governor Carondelet that the purpose of this fort-shrewdly named Fort Carondelet -- was to "subject" the Osage. But the Osage saw the Chouteaus' building more as their tribe's own personal trading post than as a military fort. Having a few Spanish troops near their villages was a small price to pay to have traders on their doorstep. The Osage not only got a more convenient, safer, and steadier source of European goods, they also saw having their own trading post as a sign that they were Spain's most important Indian ally.-21- And because the fort was near their permanent towns on the Osage River, it did not limit their control over their hunting lands to the south. The Osage knew their own power in Louisiana and Spain's lack thereof. They simply did not take the Spanish seriously as enemies. While the Spanish thought they were "subjecting" the Osage, the Osage thought they had won a major concession from the Spanish.

Louisiana's other native peoples were enraged at this development (and even more angry when the Osage rubbed it in by bragging about it).-22- Chief Pacanne complained that the fort was designed to "sustain them in their rogueries." He accused the Spanish of using a double standard for the Osage and other Indians: We, if one of us steals a horse, or any other thing, are treated as thieves and as bad savages. In the same manner if anyone of us becomes intoxicated, and tries to commit any extravagance, one hears immediately: 'They are dogs; they must be killed. Results have proved it.' They spare us in nothing, and treat us with harshness. It is quite the contrary for the Osages where they steal, pillage, and kill. They get nothing but caresses, and are supplied with everything.-23-

First, the Spanish had failed to organize the war; now they were giving the Osage special favors. Other Indians would remember this betrayal as threats from the east increased.

But the Spanish were caught in a catch-22. They did not have the forces or budget to enforce trade sanctions and provide troops and expensive supplies. Without trade sanctions, troops, and supplies, Indians would not fight the Osage. Without Indian warriors, the Spanish had to compromise with the Osage. But compromise with the Osage made their Indian allies even more angry.

When fears of United States expansion grew in the mid-1790s, Louisiana was ill-prepared to respond. In November of 1794, Governor Carondelet proposed defending Louisiana and driving Anglo-Americans out of the contested areas east of the Mississippi with the help of the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, Quapaws, and the Osage. The governor surmised that, being "fearful of the usurpations of the Americans," these Indian nations would "be disposed to make the most destructive war on them." -24-

But a European-Indian coalition that included the Osage was hardly feasible after years of trying to make war on them. The Osage had long traded with the British, and they correctly believed that they could profit from traders from the United States. And the Osage in the late 1790s had little reason to suspect that the United States would prove a less malleable force than the Spanish. The Osage had dominated Louisiana by protecting their lands with violence, providing irresistible trade opportunities, and negotiating to win the Spanish over. Even though they heard rumors of large numbers of settlers devouring eastern lands, their domination in Louisiana was too great to give them much worry. With little affinity for the Europeans and Indians who had aspired to make war on them and little fear of the United States, the Osage were not likely to join the Spanish coalition.

A coalition without the Osage might have been powerful enough to defend against the United States, but their failure to organize against the Osage had left a bitter taste in the mouths of everyone involved. When the Spanish began to look for allies against the United States in the mid-1790s, the nations they tried to recruit used the Spanish inability to organize retribution on the Osage in their explanations of why they felt no obligation to risk their lives for the Spanish.

The Shawnees living on the St. Francis River (between St. Louis and Arkansas Post) sent a messenger named Ne-tom-si-ca to chastise the Spanish for their hypocrisy. He reminded the Spanish that the Osage "war has been avoided by delays, or by other pretexts." It seemed to him that the Spanish had no need of the Shawnees against the Osage, but now they summoned them "in their necessity." Ne-tom-si-ca pointedly asked how the Shawnees could leave their homes to fight for the Spanish, not knowing "where to place [our] families in order that they may be

sheltered from the courses of the Osages and from those of the American enemy."-
25- Now the Shawnees had two powerful enemies, and they needed to take care of their own defense, thank you very much.

In their response to the same call for assistance, the Miamis charged that the Spanish had lied when they promised to ban Osage trade. They were doubly appalled when they discovered that the Spanish were at that very moment sending a new shipment of artillery to the Osage towns.-26- Having failed to overcome their differences in order to fight the Osage, other Indians and Europeans could neither organize themselves to defend Louisiana nor recruit the powerful Osage to that effort.

Even Spain was not a completely dependable ally, due to events far from Louisiana. On October 1, 1800, Napoleon persuaded Spanish King Carlos IV to exchange Louisiana for lands north of Tuscany. The threat from the United States figured into the king's decision. He hoped that France would build up Louisiana's military defense and thus provide a strong buffer between the United States and New Spain.

Perhaps if Louisiana's local Spanish officials and Indian peoples had constructed their own strong defense, the king would not have given in to Napoleon. But even under tight budgetary restrictions, Louisiana was a drain on Spanish coffers, and the appealing thought of the French taking over these expenses made more palatable the fact that Napoleon was probably going to get whatever he wanted from Spain.

Maybe French officials could have succeeded where Spanish ones had failed. Maybe they could have sent the troops and supplies that Spain could not afford and used them to organize French and Indian Louisianans to defend their land together. But war with Britain and a rebellion in Santo Domingo drew Napoleon's attention away, and he cut his losses in Louisiana.-27-

Was an anti-United States coalition in Louisiana possible? Could we be standing in The Republic of Hispano-India now? Probably not. For this kind of coordinated action, Louisiana and the peoples in it would have had to be entirely different from what they were.

There was not stable alliance in Louisiana, either between Europeans and Indians or within those broad groups. French Louisianans were not particularly loyal subjects of the Spanish crown, and Caddos did not necessarily get along with Pawnees or Miamis, much less the Osage. Louisiana was at best a tenuous stalemate, where it was in no group's interest to go to war against any other group. This was not a steady foundation on which to build a force to fend off the United States.

Footnotes

-1- François Luis Hector, barón de Carondelet, Military Report on Louisiana and West Florida, 24 November 1794, *Louisiana under the Rule of Spain, France, and the United States, 1785-1807: Social, Economic, and Political Conditions of the Territory represented in the Louisiana Purchase as portrayed in hitherto unpublished contemporary accounts by Dr. Paul Alliot and various Spanish, French, English, and American Officials*, ed. and trans. James Alexander Robertson (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1911), 1: 297; Spanish Ambassador to Paris to Francisco de Saavedra, 12 June 1798, qtd. in *Minister Alvarez to Captain-General of Cuba, 26 June 1798, Louisiana under the Rule of Spain, France, and the United States*, 1: 349.

-2- Francisco Cruzat to Esteban Miró, 23 August 1784, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794*, ed. and trans. Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946-1949), 2: 117.

-3- Cecile Elkins Carter, *Caddo Indians: Where We Come From* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 170. The Spanish outlawed the slave trade but continued the other trade. Alejandro O'Reilly, Proclamation, 7 December 1769, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 1: 125-126.

-4- Willard H. Rollings, *The Osage: An Ethnohistorical Study of Hegemony on the Prairie-Plains* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992), 6; Carter, *Caddo Indians*, 170.

-5- See, for example, Merchants of St. Louis to the Barón de Carondelet, 22 June 1793, *Before Lewis and Clark: Documents Illustrating the History of the Missouri, 1785-1804*, ed. and trans. Abraham Phineas Nasatir (St. Louis: St. Louis Historical Documents Foundation, 1952), 1: 181-4. Periodic complaints confirm that illegal trade continued on the Arkansas regardless of trade embargoes. See, for example, St. Louis Merchants' Petition, 15 October 1793, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 3: 195-198. Lieutenant Governor Zenon Trudeau reported 16,000 pesos of trade with the Osage, out of a total St. Louis trade of 30,799 pesos; Zenon Trudeau, trade report, entry for 1794, *Before Lewis and Clark*, 2: 530. When the St. Louis merchants allotted trading posts, the Osage got sixteen traders and an estimated 96,000 livres of trade goods, more than all other tribes combined. Zenon Trudeau, minutes of merchants' meeting, 3 May 1794, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 3: 278-279.

-6- Zenon Trudeau, trade report, entry for 1793, *Before Lewis and Clark*, 2: 530; Log of La Fleche, 9 February 1793, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 3: 119; Zenon Trudeau to the Barón de Carondelet, 10 April 1793, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, 3: 148.

- 7- Morris S. Arnold, *Colonial Arkansas, 1686-1804: A Social and Cultural History* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1991), 62. The average agricultural output of wheat, corn, and tobacco was \$4,120. The Osage fur trade averaged \$18,750. Morris Arnold and Dorothy Jones Core, eds., *Arkansas Colonials, 1686-1804: A Collection of French and Spanish Records Listing Early Europeans in the Arkansas* (Dewitt, Ark.: Grand Prairie Historical Society, 1986), 47-91; John B. Treat to Henry Dearborn, 27 March 1806, Letter Book of the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-1810, National Archives Record Group 75 (M142).
- 8- Manuel Perez to Esteban Miró, 23 August 1790, Before Lewis and Clark, 1: 134-135.
- 9- Manuel Perez to Esteban Miró, 5 October 1791, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 2: 416; Manuel Perez to Esteban Miró, 8 November 1791, Before Lewis and Clark, 1: 150; Merchants of St. Louis to the Barón de Carondelet, 22 June 1793, Before Lewis and Clark, 1: 182; the Marqués de Casa Calvo to Ramón de Lopez y Angulo, 8 May 1801, *The Spanish Régime in Missouri: A Collection of Papers and Documents Relating to Upper Louisiana Principally within the Present Limits of Missouri During the Dominion of Spain, from the Archives of the Indies at Seville*, ed. Louis Houck (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1909; rpt. New York: Arno Press, 1971), 2: 309-10.
- 10- Log of La Fleche, 9 February 1793, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 3: 119.
- 11- Louis Lorimier's Journal, 22 August 1794, Spanish Régime, 2: 94.
- 12- Francisco Cruzat, "Report of the Indian Tribes Who Receive Presents at St. Louis," 15 November 1777, Spanish Régime, 1: 144; Victor Collot, "State of the Indian Nations," 1796, Before Lewis and Clark, 2: 384; Stanley Faye, "The Arkansas Post of Louisiana: Spanish Domination," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* 27 (1944): 637.
- 13- Zenon Trudeau to the Barón de Carondelet, 28 September 1793, Before Lewis and Clark, 1: 197.
- 14- Zenon Trudeau to the Barón de Carondelet, 28 September 1793, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 3: 206-207.
- 15- Louis Lorimier to the Barón de Carondelet, 17 September 1793, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 3: 204-205.
- 16- St. Geneviève Inhabitants to Esteban Miró, 9 April 1790, legajo 7, folio 338, Papeles de Cuba. Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain.

-17- Zenon Trudeau to the Barón de Carondelet, 28 September 1793, Before Lewis and Clark, 1: 199. Also see Carl J. Ekberg, *Colonial Ste. Genevieve: An Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier* (Gerald, Mo.: Patrice Press, 1985).

-18- Zenon Trudeau to the Barón de Carondelet, 25 July 1792, Before Lewis and Clark, 1: 156-7.

-19- Esteban Miró to the Marquis de Sonora, 1 February 1781, Spanish Régime, 1: 256-7. However "dying" Brucaiguais was in 1781, he was still alive five years later. Jacobo Du Breuil to Miró, 18 March 1785, leg.107, fol. 560, Papeles de Cuba; Miró to Du Breuil, 28 April 1785, leg.107, fol. 567, Papeles de Cuba.

-20- Terry P. Wilson, "Claremore, the Osage, and the Intrusion of Other Indians, 1800-1824," *Indian Leaders: Oklahoma's First Statesmen*, ed. H. Glenn Jordan and Thomas M. Holm (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Historical Society, 1979), 142.

-21- Zenon Trudeau to the Barón de Carondelet, 18 April 1795, Before Lewis and Clark, 1: 320.

-22- Zenon Trudeau to the Barón de Carondelet, 18 April 1795, Before Lewis and Clark, 1: 320.

-23- Louis Lorimier's Journal, 26 August 1794, Spanish Régime, 2: 95.

-24- The Barón de Carondelet, Military Report on Louisiana and West Florida, 24 November 1794, *Louisiana under the Rule of Spain, France, and the United States*, 1: 300, 303, 309.

-25- Louis Lorimier, journal, 13 February 1794, Spanish Régime, 2: 73.

-26- Louis Lorimier, journal, 26 August 1794, Spanish Régime, 2: 95-96.

-27- Marc Villiers du Terrage, *The Last Years of French Louisiana*, trans. Hosea Phillips, ed. Carl A. Brasseaux and Glenn R. Conrad (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1982), 434-437.