

26-67 CRO

## REPORT OF ACCIDENT OTHER THAN MOTOR VEHICLE

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY <b>National Park Service</b>			ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN—	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF LOCAL REPORTING ORGANIZATION <b>Grand Teton National Park, Moose, Wyoming</b>			GOVERNMENT OPERATION	CONTRACTOR OPERATION
TIME AND PLACE OF ACCIDENT	DATE OF ACCIDENT <b>8/21/67</b>	TIME <b>4 PM</b>	EXACT LOCATION OF ACCIDENT <b>East end of second ledge on the North Face of the Grand Teton</b>	
PERSON OR PERSONS INJURED	NAMES		ADDRESSES	
	<b>(b) (6)</b>		<b>(b) (6)</b>	
	NATURE AND EXTENT OF INJURIES <b>(b) (6)</b>			
PROPERTY DAMAGED	NAME OF OWNER		ADDRESS OF OWNER	
	DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION OF PROPERTY			
	NATURE AND EXTENT OF DAMAGE			
FULL DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT <i>(Use Reverse Side, If Necessary)</i>	<p>According to <b>(b) (6)</b> <sup>(b) (6)</sup> was leading a pitch about 20' above <b>(b) (6)</b> belayer when some large falling rocks struck <b>(b) (6)</b>, <b>(b) (6)</b> and knocking <b>(b) (6)</b> over. <b>(b) (6)</b> landed back on the belay ledge where <b>(b) (6)</b> was standing. The party was able to attract the attention of another climbing party descending Mt. Owen but this party heard only the cries for help and did not understand the nature of injuries. The returning party notified the Rangers at Jenny Lake at 1:00 AM on August 22, 1967 that they had heard the cries for help. At 3:00 AM lights were seen on the North Face and at 7:15 AM the party was</p>			
WITNESSES	<b>IMPORTANT.</b> —Be particular to secure the names and addresses of witnesses, bystanders, or persons in the immediate vicinity who may have seen the accident or heard any statement made by the person injured.			
	NAMES		ADDRESSES	
	<b>(b) (6)</b>		<b>(b) (6)</b>	
DATE OF THIS REPORT <b>8/26/67</b>	TITLE OR POSITION <b>Park Ranger</b>		SIGNATURE OF PERSON EXECUTING THIS FORM <b>Rick Reese</b> <i>Rick Reese</i>	

spotted by telescope. The party was observed until 9:00 AM, by then it was definite that one member of the party was injured and unable to move. At this time, it was decided to alert the rescue team to get ready to go. While the rescue team was making plans for the evacuation, Yellowstone was contacted in regards of the use of a helicopter. The service of a helicopter was secured and it was to arrive about 1:00 PM. The rescue team consisting of L. R. Sinclair (leader), R. L. Reese, R. H. Tingey, M. Ermarth, W. McKeel, H. Woodham, I. L. Mortenson, T. Wilson, D. Stevenson, L. Scott, R. H. Black, and H. Scott was shuttled to the "Lower Saddle." At this point the rescue team was divided into two groups. The technical team included Sinclair, Reese, Tingey, Wilson and Ermarth who were to work on the North Face and the remaining team members would transport supplies and equipment from the "Lower Saddle" and standby in reserve at the "Lower Saddle" if needed. At the "Upper Saddle" the technical team met Ranger R. W. Irvine and Leigh Ortenberger.

The rescue team reached the scene of the accident at 4:00 PM and found that

(b) (6) (b) (6)

. Due to the length and steepness of the route to the "Upper Saddle" it was decided the best evacuation route was down the North Face to the Teton Glacier for a helicopter evacuation. By the time all of the necessary equipment was transported to the accident scene and (b) (6) was made ready to evacuate and the lowering devices rigged up it was too dark to work. At this time the rescue team felt some pain killer would be required for (b) (6) before (b) (6) could be moved very far. Plans for an air drop from the helicopter at day light on the morning of the 23rd were made.

The air drop was made successfully and a reconnoiter of the entire North Face and Teton Glacier was made to see if there was a possibility of making a landing as high on the evacuation route as possible. After the reconnoiter, the helicopter landed at the "Lower Saddle" to evacuate (b) (6) who had been assisted back to the "Lower Saddle" during the night by the rescue team, also the standby team was transported to the valley floor from the "Lower Saddle."

The evacuation of (b) (6), for the most part, was directly down the North Face toward the Glacier. The progress was quite slow and continually hampered by rock fall and the location of adequate belay and lowering points for 200 to 300 foot drops. The evacuation continued throughout the 23rd and 24th.

On the evening of the 23rd, two additional men were transported to Teton Glacier with rations and sleeping bags for the rescue team. The two men were to set up an evacuation route down the Glacier in order to speed up the operation once the Glacier was reached. On the morning of the 24th two more men were transported to the Glacier to relieve the main rescue team once the Glacier was reached. While the four men on the Glacier were waiting for the rescue team to get to the Glacier they were able to fashion a spot near the top of the Glacier for the helicopter to land thus eliminating a long snow and ice evacuation to the lower end of the Glacier.

The progress of the rescue team was somewhat slower on the 24th than before due to their fatigued condition. The rescue team was able to get (b) (6) to the helicopter at 4:20 PM and (b) (6) was taken directly to St. John's Hospital in Jackson by helicopter.

The entire rescue team was then brought down from the Glacier by helicopter by 7:30 PM .

The rescue team worked nearly all night on the 22nd getting equipment and supplies to the scene of the accident, setting up for the lowering process and getting (b) (6) over to the "Lower Saddle." On the night of the 23rd the rescue team worked until after 11:00 PM getting the litter to a secure ledge where it would not slip and then later getting themselves secured for some rest.

Expenditures: Overtime Costs, 554 man-hours \$2,208.04  
Regular time, 206 man-hours \$590.00  
Contributed time, 60 man-hours  
Helicopter Costs: approximately \$1,375.00  
Equipment and Supplies: \$225.00

August 25, 1967

For years, members of the Grand Teton Rescue Team have mentioned the fearful possibility of a rescue on the North Face of the Grand Teton as the ultimate test of their skills -- and with an occasional doubt about the outcome. August 22 thru 24, 1967 brought us the opportunity to compare our imaginings with hard reality. I personally have never been so tried by a mountain. It was as if the mountain added little difficulties at crucial moments to see if we would crack.

Start from the moment we decided we had a rescue on our hands. In our discussions about the possibility of an accident on the North Face, we had concluded that if the accident occurred at the top of the "Second Ledge" or above, we would make the evacuation by raising techniques. If on the "First Ledge" or below, we would lower (b) (6) was in between these two zones, on the lower part of the "Second Ledge", so we took gear to make either raising or lowering possible, but had to sacrifice some items of equipment we would have included had we known exactly what we were going to do. This also meant carrying less food, an important factor on the third day. That day, I, for example ate 1/2 a candy bar until we got down to within 300' of the glacier. Then I had a can of fruit, to give me strength to get down the last three rappels. No one else had any more than that.

The principle features of the rescue were as follows:

1. (b) (6) had to be lowered 1,620 vertical feet, every inch by technical rescue techniques. We were unable to gain even 10' toward the valley by carrying him without first setting up a complicated anchoring apparatus.
2. We were there not because some inexperienced climber had done something stupid, but because a good climber had been caught by something against which there is no defense. A rock came off the mountain and hit the ledge as (b) (6) happened to be passing. The only difference between (b) (6) situation and ours was that when (b) (6) had been in a heavy rockfall region, (b) (6) could try to hurry past. If we happened to be in a similar region, we had to stay for hours, cowering under protuberances every time we heard the menacing whirr of an airborne projectile. Of course, the lower we got on the face, the more rock there was above us to come. On the second night, I was hit twice by rocks as I attempted to sleep. On the morning of the third day, in one two hour period I calculated that about 200 pounds of rock landed within 30' of me. The analogy to being shelled on a battlefield is close. By the time we got to the last pitch we were jumpy from "rock-shock" that when the helicopter motor started suddenly, we leaped involuntarily into defensive positions, sure that the largest and last rockfall was upon us.
3. Although all of us in the Rescue Team had climbed the North Face before, none of us had been in the region down which we had to go. We really did not know if we could get down until we actually did. One particularly

awesome section (the pitch onto the Grandstand) and was exactly 300' long. If it had been 15' longer, Mr. Ortenburger who judged that it might go, and tried it, would have had to climb back up 300' of rope, and we would probably have bivouacked yet another night, dangerously weakened by hunger.

4. Because of the food situation, because of long intervals without water, and because of the cold sleepless bivouacs, we found ourselves lapsing into carelessness. We had to watch each other, alert for moments of temporary dopiness, our energies waxing and waning at different intervals.

5. Finally, and related to the previous point, we had to guard against despair. As we went down, the problems became increasingly difficult, the rockfall increasingly frequent while we were weakening. As a defense against this, we had support and encouragement from the valley and our faith in the abilities and characters of the other members of the team. This, and a lot of luck, finally proved to be decisive.

Pete Sinclair

(b) (6)

EVACUATION  
TRIP LOG

TUESDAY, AUGUST 22ND:

- 9:10 A.M. Pete Sinclair advised Chief Ranger's Office by phone that an injured party was reported on the 2nd Ledge of the Grand Teton. Rick Reese and Pete Sinclair will leave in approximately one hour to start evacuation. It will be a two day operation. They will be followed by Mike Ermarth, Ted Wilson and Ralph Tingey. Another party is also overdue on Teewinot.
- 10:15 A.M. Arranged with Yellowstone for use of helicopter. Copter presently located near Bozeman, will fly to Jackson to refuel and pick up observer. ETA for pick up of crews at Lupine Meadows will be in approximately two hours.
- 10:30 A.M. Set up evacuation crews and arranged for assembly at Lupine Meadows. Men to participate: Sinclair, Reese, Tingey, Ermarth, McKeel, Woodham, Mortenson, Wilson, Stevenson, Larry Scott, Black, Hugh Scott. All men advised to gear up and meet at Jenny Lake Ranger Station not later than 12:30 P.M. to begin recon about 1:00 P.M.
- 10:30 A.M. Lowell White called from Yellowstone and advised he could get a bigger helicopter from Cody in an hour. This helicopter can carry three passengers but will cost more. Checked with Chief Ranger and he said OK if the pilot had the necessary experience to operate at elevations approximating 13,000 feet. White said pilot had handled rescue last week at 12,500 feet and was sure he could handle this. White said the helicopter would be at the Jackson Airport about 11 P.M. and would like to have somebody meet it.
- 10:35 A.M. Chief Ranger transported McLaren to Airport to meet helicopter.
- 11:40 A.M. McLaren reports copter has not arrived yet; will call back when it reports at Airport or will call at noon if it hasn't arrived so we can make check.
- 12:15 P.M. Called White in Yellowstone to confirm arrival time of helicopter. Copter left Cody 11 A.M., ETA 12:30 P.M. Dan Hawkins pilot of three place Hiller, supercharged. Rent \$160.00 per hour.
- 12:55 P.M. McLaren called reporting chopper arrived Airport. Clearance from Shoshone needed to hold over tomorrow. No standby time if two hours flying time involved. Decision to be made prior to completion of today's operation.
- 1:05 P.M. Pete Sinclair and Rick Reese took off in chopper from Airport to Lupine Meadows.
- 2:12 P.M. Pete Sinclair radioed to GRO after being unable to contact R-10. Wants Ralph to check with the pilot when he comes up and see what he thinks of possibility of landing at Grandstand tomorrow.
- 2:15 P.M. Call from Mac advising he had contacted Lowell White regarding use of chopper tomorrow. Advised White would be calling GRO shortly and I was to pass word onto Doug.

2:26 P.M. Lowell White called GRO and advised it was ok to keep chopper on standby through tomorrow afternoon. Forgot to get standby costs.

2:30 P.M. Called Shoshone National Forest. Standby pay is two hours flying time; if used in excess of two hours tomorrow we will pay full rate for all actual flying time.

2:35 P.M. Advised Chief Ranger by radio of above. Unable to contact R-10.

2:45 P.M. Doug McLaren advised by phone of same. Said chopper was on next to the last trip and he would advise pilot of same when he got down.

3:10 P.M. Pilot can't land on Grandstand per Ralph Tingey. Pete Sinclair advises (b) (6) Larry Scott and Ralph Tingey going to Upper Saddle with litter; will wait there until they hear from Pete; will probably have to raise litter; rest of party will stay at Lower Saddle, pending further instructions.

3:30 P.M. Doug McLaren back to office. Advised names of party:  
 (b) (6);  
 phone (b) (6); (b) (6);  
 (b) (6), phone  
 (b) (6)

Lowell White called and advised Douglas that Yellowstone needs chopper tomorrow morning. Wants us to send Cody chopper back and said they would send their (Yellowstone's) chopper back tomorrow for rest of evacuation. Lowell White's home phone is (b) (6). Doug contacted Anvil Motel and cancelled reservation for chopper pilot.

3:57 P.M. Pete Sinclair to R-13; no contact; called GRO. Pete needs all the ropes he can get and wanted to know how many ropes Ralph and Larry had with them; word received they had one and there were four more at the Lower Saddle; Pete advised boys at Lower Saddle to start up with the rest of the ropes and the lug-all. No more people needed up there as no more than two additional people could make the traverse. Pete said he would be in contact with them later regarding bivouac arrangements for the night.

4:10 P.M. Higgins called by radio and confirmed chopper off the ground and headed back for Yellowstone.

5:00 P.M. Sinclair to R-1; will have to lower injured party as they can go down as easy as they can go up. Lower Saddle party to carry up 600' cable, but wait 30 minutes until they know for sure whether they can pack (b) (6) out on their back.

5:30 P.M. Transmission from Lower Saddle as to whether Pete wanted rest of group to start for Upper Saddle. Pete said they were having problems getting enough rope in the right place. Rick had just got to injured person and they would know more what the situation was in about 10 minutes.

5:45 P.M. Pete needs 600' cable and lowering block as they will definitely have to go down. One man go back to Upper Saddle to get Ralph's party and are putting in fixed ropes. Irv's party can do as they please about staying either at Upper or Lower Saddle. Ralph to take stokes with him.

7:10 P.M. Pete to Ralph regarding his progress with litter. Irv almost to Upper Saddle with cable. Need some kind of (b) (6)

7:45 P.M. Chopper from West Yellowstone to start in 1/2 hour for early delivery of medicine due in Teton 9:30 P.M.  
8:05 P.M. Rescue party bringing (b) (6) out tonight. Arrangements made to pick up medication at St. Johns at about 9:00 P.M. tonight.  
8:25 P.M. Contact Region to report above incident.  
9:30 P.M. Helicopter arrived from West Yellowstone. McClain to hospital to pick up (b) (6).  
9:30 P.M. (b) (6), Symmetry Spire victim arrived at St. Johns Hospital in Jackson.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23RD:

6:00 A.M. Helicopter took off with Doug to make medicine, rope and hardware drop.  
7:00 A.M. Drop completed. Brought (b) (6) out from Lower Saddle. Drop satisfactory to ledge. ETA at Glacier - 2 P.M. or later.  
11:45 A.M. Rescue party has reached first ledge. No time of arrival at snowfield estimated yet. Crews from Lower Saddle being flown out.  
1:30 P.M. All of first crew down from mountain.  
4:30 P.M. Rescue party has about 300 feet to go to reach upper ledge of Glacier. Part of party has to rappel the 300 feet drop above. Expected time to pick up about dark. Morehead and McKeel to fly to Glacier to assist across Glacier with victim in order to have him out before dark.  
5:45 P.M. Two smokejumpers out; return to Yellowstone with them. Helicopter to Lupine Meadows; Morehead and McKeel to Lupine Meadows and on to Glacier to assist on traverse of same.  
6:45 P.M. It appears about 10 P.M. before they get to the Glacier.  
9:00 P.M. Helicopter back to Airport to secure for night. Crew working in vicinity of platforms securing for night. Plan for early start in A.M.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 24TH:

6:30 A.M. Chopper to Lupine Meadows to take Mortenson and Black to Glacier to assist with moving victim across Glacier once they hit bottom of last ledge. ETA at heliport about 10 A.M.  
11:45 A.M. R-1 to 700R requesting report of progress. CRO unable to give information. R-13 picked up and advised new ETA of between 3 P.M. and 5 P.M.; just leaving snowfield above Glacier.  
12:30 P.M. S-1 to R-13 and R-20; with helicopter pilot and said he was going to leave the valley and land on Glacier and await party. Morehead advised weather calm; little wind on Glacier and asked if chopper pilot could land at spot they had checked out further up on Glacier. Said this would save an hour or so in climbing time and would eliminate bad part of climb. Said he would have two men mark the spot for pilot.  
12:57 P.M. Chopper landed on above spot. R-20 to S-1 and R-1. This would save bunch of time (1-1½ hours) and estimated arrival of victim at chopper landing in at least two hours.  
3:10 P.M. R-20 to Ted Wilson. Victim a few feet from Snowfield (Glacier)  
4:23 P.M. R-20 to R-1 giving ETA at Jackson Hospital with injured person in about 35 minutes.



4:33 P.M. Helicopter leaving with victim; would like to have somebody meet pilot at Airport and get fellows some candy bars or something and take back with him. Chopper will be gassing up after delivering to St. John's hospital.

4:35 P.M. McClain to Airport to meet pilot.

5:30 P.M. Pete reported on (b) (6) Yesterday - (b) (6)  
(b) (6)

6:00 P.M. Helicopter in to evacuate first part of rescue crew.

6:02 P.M. Lowell White notified of progress and requested information on critical need for Bob Schellinger's return to West Yellowstone tonight. Apparently critical need has passed and pilot's option on return tonight or tomorrow. Mechanic at West Yellowstone will repairs for copter.

7:25 P.M. All crew members and equipment moved from Glacier to Lupine Meadows and mission successfully completed.

7:30 P.M. Bob Schellinger, helicopter pilot, depart for Jackson Airport to refuel and proceed to West Yellowstone.

Congratulations to all who participated in the rescue for unfailing loyalty and devotion to duty. The technical rescue team and the mountain support team are especially commended for the successful conclusion of the most technically difficult rescue ever undertaken within the Park.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 25TH:

9:00 A.M. Both Regionand Washington notified of successful conclusion of evacuation.

10:00 A.M. Checked with St. Johns Hospital on condition of (b) (6). Apparently is doing well. Much of (b) (6) and (b) (6)(b) (6). It is early to determine (b) (6), but (b) (6) condition is listed as good.

GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
MOOSE, WYOMING 83012

INCIDENT REPORT

Report received from: Jenny Lake Date: 8/22/67 Time: 9:05 A.M.  
(Area - Person Reporting)  
By: McClain

Incident: Grand Teton climbing accident

Where: Second Ledge North Face

Date and Time: 8/21/67 - 4:00 P.M.

<u>Name and Address of Persons Involved</u>	<u>Employee</u>	<u>Visitor</u>
<u>(b) (6)</u>		<u>X</u>
<u>(b) (6)</u>		<u>X</u>

General Statement:

(b) (6) (b) (6) in  
fall on North Face of Grand Teton yesterday. Notified by party hearing  
distress calls on Mount Owen at 9:05 A.M. today. Chopper used in taking  
rescue team to Lower Saddle by 3:00 P.M. (12 man party). 3:15 P.M. advance  
party reached scene going down. Expect to make pickup by helicopter in snow-  
field early tomorrow.

Other Action: (Kin notified, witness's statements obtained, photographs  
made, etc.) kin not notified; reported in Puerto Rico

Press Notified 3:30 P.M., 8/23/67



UNITED STATES  
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
P. O. Box 67  
MOOSE, WYOMING 83012

IN REPLY REFER TO:

August 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS

Chief Ranger C. W. McClain stated that late Monday afternoon, 8/21, a climbing accident occurred on the second ledge of the North Face of the Grand Teton.

Another climbing party working on Mount Owen to the North of the Teton heard rock falling and cries for help at about 4 P.M. Sunday afternoon. This party returned to the Jenny Lake area about 3:00 A.M. Tuesday morning, 8/22 and reported the incident to Rangers there.

A helicopter from Cody, Wyoming operated at Dan Hawkins arrived about noon and ferried a 13 man rescue team to the Lower Saddle.

The advance party reached the accident scene at about 4:00 P.M. and advised that (b) (6) had sustained (b) (6) companion, (b) (6) was unhurt.

Evacuation from the North Face has never been encountered since the Park was established and is probably the most difficult rescue ever attempted.

Rescue parties advise the only feasible evacuation route is to lower the victim to the Teton Glacier where an attempt will be made to use a helicopter to complete the evacuation.

At 6:00 A.M., today, August 23, a helicopter was used in making a drop of medications and equipment to the rescue party which was successful.

(b) (6) who was brought over the top and into the Lower Saddle late last night was picked up by the helicopter during the early morning flight.

With the difficult aspects of this evacuation, it is not expected that the evacuation will be completed until late this afternoon. Weather forecasts indicate strong winds today which may further complicate the rescue.

END

(b) (6)

story of the accident  
(b) (6) was climbing ahead of (b) (6)  
and (b) (6) heard some rock fall and saw  
(b) (6) fall, (b) (6) was in belay and expected  
to stop (b) (6) fall when (b) (6) saw that  
the rope was cut in several places  
and (b) (6) fell about 70 feet. The  
accident occurred at 4:00 PM.

(b) (6)

F. J. Freeway Jumper -

(b) (6)

Morning

"Crack" mechanic at West

Bob Schellinger

(b) (6)

Last Name First Name Initial Age Height Weight

(b) (6)

5'4"

120

Home Address: (b) (6) Street City State Phone Number

Local Address: JENNY LAKE, SITE # 80 Car Make RAMBLER License (b) (6)

Type of experience and where obtained ROCK CLIMBING - ROCKIES, etc. No. of Years 1

Leadership Qualifications

No. of Teton Climbs 0 Climbing or Mountain Club U.I.C. OF ILL. CLIMBING CLUB

I have received a copy of, and agree to abide by the climbing regulations.

(b) (6)

Climbers Signature

Registered by Ralph Tingey

Date 6-30-67



GRTE-5  
3/30/67

GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK - CLIMBING REGISTRAR

Card No. 194

(b) (6)

Last Name First Name Initial Age Height Weight (b) (6)

5'10" 165

Home Address: (b) (6)  
Street City State Phone Number

Local Address: Car Make Ford License (b) (6)

Type of experience and where obtained France (Chamonix, Mass, Desormes), Italy (Orsento) etc No. Years 6

Leadership Qualifications 5.8

No. of Teton Climbs 1 Climbing or Mountain Club C.A.F. Club Alpin Français

I have received a copy of, and agree to abide by the climbing regulations.

(b) (6)

Climber's Signature

Registered by Ralph Tingey

Date June 30