Cerro Grande Fire

Conclusions

On May 4, 2000, Bandelier National Monument fire management personnel ignited a prescribed burn, Upper Frijoles 1&5, which has become known as the Cerro Grande Prescribed Fire, near the summit of Cerro Grande. This prescribed fire was based upon a flawed plan and required fire management policies were not followed. This fire progressed without problems until on May 5 at approximately 1300 hours when slopover and spotting resulted in the burn boss declaring it a wildfire. The wildfire was managed by a Type 3 Incident Management team and staffed by local firefighters until May 7. Around noon, stronger than forecasted gusts of wind of up to 50 miles per hour caused the fire activity to increase dramatically. The winds continued to intensify, the fire developed numerous spotfires, and triggered a crown fire. This in turn resulted in extreme fire intensity which fire crews could not attack. A Type I Incident Management Team was ordered and upon arrival, after assessing the condition of the fire and the current management personnel, assumed command.

Based upon a review by the Investigation Team's fire behavior specialists, it is possible that if sufficient contingency resources had been at the burn site on May 5, these resources may have been able to contain the "slop-over" without the need to convert the prescribed burn to a wildfire. If that had occurred the prescribed fire would have progressed to the forest fuels where it is probable that the fire would have slowed or stopped completely. Thus, the fuels would not have been preheated and dried out and no ignition source would have existed to initiate the crown fire that resulted on May 7.

Conclusions of the investigation are as follows:

• The Board of Review needs to consider accountability as described in the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review to determine appropriate actions to address the overall findings of this report (USDA Forest Service and USDI 1995, page 30).
  
• This incident critically demonstrates the need to continue to provide for firefighter and public safety, and must be given the highest management considerations when managing wildland fire as outlined in the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review (USDA Forest Service and USDI 1995, page 20).
  
• All agencies must ensure that all administrators are actively involved and committed to the fire management activities. Agency administrators must set the example and establish that wildland and prescribed fire management are critical and of highest importance.
  
• Agencies must follow all policies set forth in the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review if we are to expect to continue using fire as a critically important management tool to restore natural conditions, maintain forest health, provide wildlife habitat, reduce hazardous fuel buildup, protect watersheds, and improve range condition.
  
• Agencies must ensure that leaders and managers at all levels set the example in working closely together in planning and implementing fire management activities. Agencies also must ensure that a component of their fire management program includes proactive communication and coordination with local communities and cooperators. The consequences of not doing so are totally unacceptable.
  
• The Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy was adopted by the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture on December 18, 1995. Federal agencies have not fully completed manuals, guidelines, and procedures to fully implement policy along interagency lines. Federal agencies must jointly complete standardization of manuals and procedures to assure consistency of plans and operations to promote cooperation and integrate fire activities across agency boundaries and provide leadership for cooperation with state and local fire management organizations.

National Park Service Cerro Grande Fire Website