Cerro Grande Fire

Conducting a prescribed fire involves planning and implementation, and RM-18 is used as technical guidance (USDI National Park Service 1998b).  The general steps to conduct a prescribed fire are:

• The park resources management plan identifies the need for wildland and prescribed fire and sets forth objectives.

• Fire management plan is written and approved with environmental compliance. 

• Specific prescribed fire plans, which are subordinate to the fire management plan, are prepared for selected areas, and environmental compliance is confirmed for the site.  The plan is reviewed by peers within the park.  Other interested parties should be included in the review process, although that is not required.

• The prescribed fire plan is approved by the agency administrator.

• The burn site is prepared to keep the fire within the perimeters.

• Environmental and regional factors, such as weather, fuels, other fires, resource availability, etc., are tracked.

• Coordinate notification and implementation with other agencies and interested parties.

• Execute the fire and monitor behavior and effects.

• Prepare evaluation documentation.

Following are details about the preparation of the Upper Frijoles Units 1 and 5 prescribed fire plan written by Bandelier staff.  Implementation describes the chronological account of the fire events from May 4 to 8 for ignition of the prescribed fire, fire behavior and weather changes, implementation of the suppression efforts, and efforts made to protect life and property.  There are appendices relevant to this section.  Appendix 5 shows the staff position organization charts for Bandelier National Monument's park managers and resources management division.  Appendix 6 is a validation of prescription parameters used for the Upper Frijoles Prescribed Fire.  Appendix 7 is a summary of weather information for the Cerro Grande Prescribed Fire.  Appendix 8 is a discussion of the events leading to the escape of the Upper Frijoles Units 1 and 5 Prescribed Fire.

Planning

The Prescribed Fire Plan for the Upper Frijoles Creek drainage was originally signed and approved on April 19, 2000 (USDI National Park Service 2000b).  On May 4, an amendment to the plan was signed and approved, which excluded private property on the Baca Ranch from the project area.

The Upper Frijoles Units 1 and 5 are in the northwest corner of Bandelier (Figure 2).  They encompass 1,000 acres in the headwaters of Frijoles Creek above U.S. Highway 4 to the park boundary at the Cerro Grande summit.  The vegetation in the area consists mostly of ponderosa pine-mixed conifer with some mixed conifer areas and montaine grasslands at the higher elevations (Figure 4).  Included in the 1,000 acres is approximately 32 acres of the Baca Ranch.

The area within Unit 1 was burned in 1993.  The fire was not as successful as planned, as much of the area within the burn unit was inherently moist and did not burn very well.  Dead fuel loadings, from averaged plot information from the 1993 fire and the current prescribed fire were:

The primary purpose of the project was to reduce hazard fuels in the burn unit, while allowing fire to be restored as a keystone natural process.  With the exceptions of the grasslands, dry conditions were needed to accomplish fire objectives.  The prescribed fire was to be accomplished in three phases.  The first phase was to burn the upper part of the area that contained the grasslands.  The second phase was to burn the timbered areas along the burn perimeter and drier aspects (usually south facing slopes) within the project area.  This phase would occur shortly after or concurrently with the first phase.  The third phase was to be delayed until extremely dry conditions develop that would allow for burning of the wetter areas.  The third phase would most likely happen several weeks or even months after the initial burning.

Following is a summary of events that became the Cerro Grande Prescribed Fire.  Figures 5A through 5E show the initial ignition location and subsequent spread areas, while Figures 5F through 5I show the fire progression during days 1 through 4.

Thursday, May 4

The burn boss prepared the amendment to the prescribed fire plan, excluding the 32 acres of private land from the project.  The park superintendent approved this amendment at 1300 hours.

The burn boss notified Santa Fe Zone Dispatch (Zone Dispatch) in the morning of the intent to implement the fire plan.  The dispatcher expressed concerns about Bandelier conducting a prescribed fire when the Forest Service had already suspended prescribed fire activities on national forest lands and wildland fires were currently burning.

The burn boss and fire program assistant made notifications to the various agencies and individuals on the Bandelier prescribed fire notification list.

At 1830 hours, the holding boss notified Zone Dispatch of the prescribed fire.  The burn boss conducted the prescribed fire briefing.

At 1900 hours, the holding boss called the National Weather Service confirming the winds in the spot weather forecast.

At 1920 hours, the test fire was ignited near the summit of Cerro Grande.  Twenty fire personnel were on the scene.  At approximately 2000 hours, the test fire was successfully completed, and the fire behavior was within expected parameters; the decision was made to continue the prescribed fire by the burn boss.  They began the blackline by burning down the northeast edge of the fire from the test fire area.  Progress was slow using the ignition pattern outlined in the plan.  They changed the ignition pattern to speed up the progress and the burn boss made a decision to stop suppressing the fire on the interior side of the ignition lines.

At about 2200 hours, ignition was completed on the northeast edge of the fire area. 

The burn boss began walking back to the test fire area. Upon reaching it, the burn boss discovered the fire had burned through the blackline on the northeast and was burning southwest into the canyon faster than anticipated.

At 2200 hours, two additional firefighters arrived on the east side of the fire.

At 2300 hours, the ignition crew of three and a holding crew of 12 arrived back at the test fire area to suppress the fire burning outside the test fire.

At approximately 2315 hours, ignition began down the northwest edge of the unit.

Friday, May 5

At approximately 0100 hours, the crews reached the upper saddle and spent the next 1-1/2 hours bringing the fire back from the knob into the saddle, securing the line at 0230 hours.

Between 0100 and 0130 hours, the burn boss sent part of the Black Mesa crew down the mountain to get some sleep.  At 0230 hours, five NPS personnel, the burn boss, the fire observer, and the remainder of the Black Mesa 10-person crew hiked down to the vehicles to get some sleep.  The burn boss then left the fire, going to the office in the NPS housing area to order contingency resources. 

At 0300, the burn boss called Zone Dispatch to order a Type 3 helicopter and a 20-person hand crew; he was told to call back in the morning.  He also called the crew of Bandelier Engine 91 and asked them to come on duty at 0530 hours and go to the fire.

At 0600 hours, the burn boss and the fire observer began to determine the status of the ordered resources and contact key park staff regarding the fire situation.  The holding boss updated the burn boss on the fire.  The interior fire had backed below where the blacklining operations had stopped.

At approximately 0730, the burn boss reached Zone Dispatch, having tried since 0630 hours, to request a Type 1 20-person hand crew and a Type 3 helicopter.  The dispatcher responded that he would need to check with others before filling this order.  The dispatcher then called the park FMO and explained that the prescribed fire needed to be converted to a wildland fire so the requested resources could be obtained.  The park FMO and the Zone Dispatcher reached agreement whereby resources would be ordered for a wildland fire currently burning on the national forest, but would be diverted to the prescribed fire.

At 1000 hours, the fire observer, the burn boss, and the holding boss discussed a change in command of the prescribed fire, as the burn boss needed sleep. The decision was made that the fire observer would now become the burn boss.  Shortly thereafter, the holding crew on the northeast side reported fire slopover outside the line and they were having difficulty containing it.  They requested water drops and additional firefighters.

At 1030 hours, the Type 3 helicopter (H312) arrived, dropping off two personnel on the northeast side of the fire and departed to the helibase to pick up the bucket and begin water drops.

At 1100 hours, the Type 1 hand crew arrived at the fire.  Five people went up the west line and 13 people went up the east line to the northeast side of the fire to assist in containing the slopover. 

At 1255 hours, an air tanker was requested for the slopover on the northeast side and arrived an hour later.  At this point, the burn boss made the decision to convert the prescribed fire to a wildland fire, which then became the Cerro Grande fire.  The burn boss took over the fire as the Incident Commander (IC) and additional resources were ordered.  Efforts then focused on suppressing the fire.

At approximately 1630 hours, a spot fire was detected one-quarter mile east of the main fire in Water Canyon, which the Type 1 hand crew contained.  Another Type 1 hand crew arrived at the fire and started walking in.

At 2115 hours, the Wildland Fire Situation Analysis (WFSA) was completed by the IC, the park Fire Management Officer, and the Chief of Resources Management and approved by the Superintendent.

At 2255 hours, Zone Dispatch requested the current fire weather observations to send to the National Weather Service (NWS).   During the nighttime hours, crews began burning out the east handline (the part of a natural or constructed fire barrier that is scraped or dug to mineral soil) and improved the west saw line.

At 2355 hours, the NWS issued a spot weather forecast, calling for a fire weather watch on Saturday, May 6. 

Saturday, May 6

At 0230 hours, the hand crew began its blacklining operations along the east and west sides of the fire to stay ahead of the fire as it backed down the hill.

At 0728 hours, the hand crew requested an air tactical group supervisor, after a second spot fire was observed outside the fire area to the east, which was successfully contained.

During the daytime hours, the crew held the lines on the east and west sides of the fire, down to State Road 4.

At 1425 hours, the park Superintendent and key fire staff met with the interagency cooperators (Los Alamos National Laboratory. U.S. Forest Service and Los Alamos County) to discuss the suppression strategy and tactics selected in the WFSA.

At 1846 hours, the crews continued firing operations to secure the handline along the east side of the fire.  Progression was slow. 

Sunday, May 7

At approximately 0800 hours, air attack reported a spot fire on the park/forest boundary.  By 1110, the spot was fully contained.

All burning operations along State Route 4 were halted at 1000 hours due to down slope wind conditions.

At 1150 hours, winds increased from the west and a spot fire occurred across State Route 4 into Frijoles Canyon. 

At 1230 hours, the spot fire was growing rapidly and a Type 1 Incident Management Team and two Type 1 crews, two Type 2 crews, and one Type 3 helicopter were requested.

At 1240 hours, a decision was made by the IC to evacuate Graduation Flats and American Springs.

At approximately 1300 hours, interagency road closures and evacuation procedures were initiated.  The Santa Fe National Forest Supervisor and Forest FMO were notified of these actions.

At 1450 hours, spot fires were reported along the eastside of the fire, increasing in intensity with the potential to threaten Los Alamos National Laboratory.

At 1700 hours, the spot fires in Frijoles Canyon were contained by the two Type 1 hand crews.

By 1700 hours, a spot fire to the east of the fire had grown to approximately 100 acres with additional spotting up to one-quarter mile ahead of the main fire. 

At 1845 hours, a decision was made to burn out sections along State Route 501 and Forest Road 1 (Camp May Road) to protect the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the town of Los Alamos.

At 2100 hours, an interagency meeting was held to develop a unified command delegation of authority and a revision of the WFSA.

Monday May 8

Figures

National Park Service Cerro Grande Fire Website