Chapter XIII The Defenses of San Juan It is appropriate at this stage to examine in detail the defenses which faced the invading English force, as it was these defenses which played the major part in rendering the attack unsuccessful. From the earliest days of her conquest and colonization of the New World, Spain had been required to undertake defensive construction in order to defend and retain her new territories and after the attack on Puerto Rico in 1625 by the Dutch under Captain Boudewijn Hendricksz, an ongoing program was begun to improve the fortifications of San Juan and the surrounding area. This initiative was eventually to show significant results, including the completion of the city walls and a connecting wall between the forts of El Morro and San Cristobal on the north coast of the island. The first half of the eighteenth century was for Puerto Rico one of relative tranquility, partly as a result of the peace between the mother country and her rival, France, and a reluctance by the other Great Powers to take an interest in the island. It is probably for this reason that between the period 1701 to 1740, Spain seems to have largely forgotten the island and very little defensive maintenance or improvement took place. As a result, by mid century, the defenses had fallen into a poor state of repair and were much in need of maintenance and revision. By 1759, it had become apparent to Spain that unless she took action to defend her Caribbean territories, she was in danger of losing them to the British, as was to prove the case when Havana fell in 1762. By the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, Charles III of Spain had initiated a series of reforms which would eventually culminate in the impressive defensive array which was to prove insurmountable to the British at the close of the century. By 1764, it was Puerto Rico's turn to benefit from the new initiative, following repeated petitions from the Island's Governor regarding the unsatisfactory state of affairs. In response to a Royal Decree of September 26, Field Marshall Alejandro O'Reilly was commissioned to make his way to the island to compile a comprehensive report on the defenses and conditions prevailing at San Juan and the area in general. He eventually arrived at the island on April 8, 1765 aboard the frigate "El Aguila".(1) It was the visit of O'Reilly which gave the impetus for the eventual defensive improvements. He complied diligently with his orders to provide a comprehensive report to Spain, spending a full two months inspecting the area in the company of the Governor and considering the opinions and questions of the local officials. Once the investigation was completed, O'Reilly compiled a detailed General Program of Military Reform which included the state of the El Morro castle and that of San Cristobal with it's adjacent coastal defenses, together with the northern and western ramparts of the walled city. He also enclosed "a Plan and a project of Fortifications for the better understanding of this study..."(2) These he forwarded to the Minister for the Indies, stating "I feel it necessary to inform Your Excellency of the state in which I found the citadel and of that which I find necessary to ensure its protection". He continued "Honored Sir, For many reasons I wish to give you the results of my investigations, and it appears to me that it will be of infinite service to the King to have an exact and detailed report of the state of our colonies in America."(3) The worth of this valuable information was quickly appreciated, and Charles III declared San Juan a "Defense of the First Order" on September 25, 1765. The Royal Decree stated that "San Juan in Puerto Rico shall be a city of the first order of support for the island, bulwark of the Antilles, safeguard of the Gulf of Mexico, depository, point of acclimatization, port of call and naval station of the navigating fleets, favorable to foster and secure the commerce that will improve industry, agriculture and art, the foundation of true wealth."(4) The Minister for the Indies gave his approval and it was decided that Lieut. Col. Thomas O'Daly, Chief Engineer and Second in Command should be nominated to supervise the works. He was to be assisted by three engineers, Don Pablo Castello, Lt. Col. Don Pedro Carrasco and Juan Francisco Mestre, together with two architects, Diego Ramos and Antonio Sein.(5) What appeared to O'Reilly and O'Daly as a major requirement was the necessity to extend considerably the exterior works to delay the advance of an enemy. O'Reilly's main observation was that the fortifications were "passive", and to make them "active" it was necessary to design certain types of defense which would keep the enemy at a distance. Finally, on January 1, 1766, the work began on the citadel of San Juan, under the direction of Chief Military Engineer O'Daly. Employed on the construction works were officers and soldiers of the Toledo Regiment,(6) workers, outcasts, prisoners and slaves. (See Appendix XIX) A description of the city plan stated that "On the western side of the City of San Juan was the Castle of San Felipe del Morro, situated on a promontory at the entrance of the bay for the purpose of preventing the entrance of enemy ships into the harbor. At the other side of the bay, the Fort of El Cañuelo (San Juan de la Cruz) was placed to provide crossfire in case of attack and at the same time to protect the passage between Palo Seco and the Isla de Cabras. On the eastern side of the city lay the Castle of San Cristobal with its exterior works, fulfilling the objective of defending the city from enemy attacks launched from the shore line, and also from naval attacks. A sophisticated system of exterior emplacements completed the design of this defensive masterpiece, which consisted of the Ravelin of San Carlos with its defensive ditch, the battery of Santa Teresa, and the small fort of the Abanico, all these works encompassing three lines of retreat. The works were interdependent and incorporated the tactical concepts of active defense which prevailed at the time, with deep defensive positions and good distribution of fire."(7) The Trinidad battery, the ravelin del Principe, the bastion of Santiago and the provisional battery of San Francisco de Paula extended from the Castle of San Cristobal to the south of the bay. These exterior works were complemented by those built along the shoreline, extending towards the eastern coastal inlet. In that direction were also situated the battery of Escambrón, and the small fort of San Gerónimo. The purpose of these emplacements was to impede the entrance from the sea to the inlet of Boquerón which connected the Condado lagoon and the San Antonio Channel with the eastern side of the Bay of San Juan. The other strongpoint on the eastern shoreline was the San Antonio bridge, which provided the only access from the small island on which San Juan was situated to the remainder of the of the country. The city of San Juan itself was surrounded by a sophisticated system of walls. On the southern side which faced the bay and the Puntilla area, joining the walls of the bastions of Santiago and San Pedro, there were the fortified moles of San Jose, Concepción and the San Justo gate. On the western side, there were the bulwarks of Santa Catalina and San Agustin, (between which was the Gate of San Juan), Santa Elena and San Fernando. Along the length of the north coast between the Castle of San Felipe del Morro and San Cristobal extended the bastions of San Antonio, Santa Rosa, Santa Domingo, Las Animas, Santo Tomas and San Sebastián, with the two gates of Santa Rosa, next to the cemetery and La Perla, in the vicinity of the old outer fort and the slaughter house. O'Reilly's plans and projects had been designed specifically in preparation for the war with England which seemed inevitable at the time. His recommendations and plans would be the basis for all the successive studies and works which would be undertaken in San Juan under the supervision of the military engineers Thomas O'Daly, Juan Francisco Mestre and Felipe Ramirez. Their accomplishments would be relied upon to defend the city if necessary by Governors and CaptainsGeneral Don Jose Dufresne and Don Miguel Antonio de Ustariz between the years 1765 and 1791. According to the scholar Dr. Juan Manuel Zapatero, in his monumental work, "The war in the caribbean in the xviii century", a plan was presented of the general fortifications drawn up by Field Marshall O'Reilly, from which we quote: "Northwest Sector, principal entrance to the San Juan Bay. Castle of San Felipe del Morro: Reinforce the works with two batteries, one on the shoreline and the other to the sea. Improvement and addition to the Castle of San Juan de la Cruz or to the Cañuelo, which is constructed on the islet which blocks the passage to the West, opposite the Morro. A new battery of nine cannon would be placed on the Isla de Cabras to the back of the Cañuelo, their fire directed toward the left flank of the Morro. These would provide a crossfire to prevent any enemy incursions into the bay. Northern Sector, extending between the Morro Castle in the West and San Cristobal in the east: A sheltered route would be extended from the Castle of San Cristobal via the heights of San Sebastián, Santa Barbara and Santa Domingo, connecting with the battery at la Perla. Reinforcing batteries would be installed at the heights of San Sebastián and Santa Barbara. Western Sector, between the Morro Castle and the Royal Fort: The old ramparts would be reinforced by new refuges. Southern Sector, between the Royal Fort and the Santiago bastion: O'Reilly considered this portion very adequate because it comprised a system of ramparts well placed and preserved; these were San José, San Justo, Concepción and the Mole of San Pedro. Eastern Section, shoreline between the Santiago bastion and the Castle of San Cristobal: Two raveling were to be erected to protect the eastern walls and the Santiago Gate. Castle of San Felipe del Morro: Decommission the Carmen or lower battery. Widen the Santa Barbara or middle battery with parapets of 18 feet on the Northern front and Bay. The powder store, the Granados battery and the artillerymens' barracks would disappear, providing a protected space for the well. Raise a wall in such a manner that it would be level with the natural terrain and the embankment, so as to provide a secure vault, leaving the ruined barracks, the house of Castellano and the chapel to be demolished. The wall would extend to a height of 30 feet, excluding it's parapet. The internal sides of the two principal bulwarks, Austria and Ochoa, easily discernible in O'Reilly's plan of 1765 and in another anonymous plan of 1742, would be occupied by two vaults, leaving the flanks in the form that O'Reilly had envisaged and which had been drawn up by O'Daly. By 1775, the works along the shoreline presented an imposing picture. Miyares González described them as follows in his memoirs of the same year: "The shoreline of this citadel is totally completed, of which the northern part ascends about one hundred feet above sea level and descends to form a beach at the bay. It's fortification consists of a semibastion called the Northern, a level work, and another by the name of Santiago. In front of the ramparts formed by these three bastions have been constructed two ravelins. The one between the Northern and the level is called San Carlos and the other, el Príncipe. Between these two revelins one finds an arsenal called la Trinidad, because it includes three batteries which follow the irregularity of the terrain. All of these works are protected by a covered way with it's accompanying crossbeams and fences. In the rampart between the level bastion and Santiago is the gate of the same name, solely for leaving the city by carriage. All of the principal walls on this shoreline were built above the old foundations, but the ravelins and the other exterior works have been constructed from the ground. In the level bastion there are some works which together with the northern balustrade are called the Castle of San Cristobal, behind which there is a big parade ground with three vaults which could accomodate a batallion."(8) These observations are confirmed by the chronicles of Abbad y Lasierra who in the year 1776 wrote in the History of Puerto Rico: "the most impressive and grandiose thing in this city, are the fortification works which defend it".(9) In that year, the principal defenses of the city were the castles of el Morro and San Cristobal and according to the description, "These fortifications enclose the City on the eastern side, occupying the width of the islet, from the bay to the sea, directing its fire everywhere, although its principal objective is to protect the land area.."(10) "...Its construction follows the terrain which is uneven, forming a downward slope from the northern shoreline to the bay. At the top of the hill is the ramp through which one enters the castle courtyard, in which a batallion can be assembled. It has two large bombproof barracks with other offices and auxiliary rooms, on top of which there is the Caballero, which can hold from 22 to 24 cannon whose fire can dominate the City and the surrounding land and sea. Below the Caballero there is the parade ground. Its batteries point towards the open sea, the land and the drawbridge of the interior moat. After this there are three large ravelins; that of San Carlos occuping the top of the hill, the Principe on the slope, and the main one in which the drawbrige of the second moat is located and exits onto an open field and the countryside. All these works are surmounted by heavy artillery. These fortifications and their moats have openings in the rock in various parts and are bombproof, as are the barracks and wells. If the ramparts are viewed from the "mined" fields, three emplacements of batteries may been seen, one above the other, that direct their fire in all directions". ...Abbad y Lasierra.(11) The term "mined" here refers to the practice of digging tunnels and filling them with explosives beneath strategic approaches. These explosives could then be detonated beneath an advancing enemy. The observations continue: "From this castle to San Felipe del Morro, which is located in the extreme western side of the City, there is no wall on the northern side, only six batteries placed near the seashore at regular intervals, this defense being considered sufficient owing to the inaccessibility of the coast due to the dangerous reefs which run alongside it.(12) The Morro Castle forms an obtuse angle with three lines of batteries towards the sea, one above the other, which can direct their crossfire to defend the entrance to the port. On the city side it has a wall flanked by two guarded emplacements of heavy artillery, which dominate all the intermediate ground towards the City. That part which faces the northern shore can cross it's fire with that of the Caballero of San Cristobal. Its barracks, wells, stores, chapel, and auxiliary rooms are all bombproof. A tunnel goes down to a battery that is just above the waterline at the center of the entrance to the port, through which it is possible to send out troops, receive provisions and communicate with the Cañuelo Castle. "The Cañuelo castle is situated on an outcrop in the middle of the port channel. It is square and well fortified, and it's location prevents ships from forcing entry into the port since it can create a crossfire with the guns of El Morro. However, if the enemy could take the Isla de Cabras, which is low lying, of short extension and without defense, they could bombard the Castle of El Cañuelo from Palo Seco point. From the City to the bridge in which the islet ends there is a powder store with it's guard house. At the end of the islet, where the open sea connects with the bay, is the Castle of San Jeronimo, which is a little fort for defending the passage of small boats, these being the only ones which may pass through the shallows of the Boqueron, a passage between the bay and the open sea. Nearby is a bridge of two carriageways which crosses the inlet. It's supports are of cut stone faced with lime, over which there are wooden cross beams which give safe passage and may be easily cut when necessary. At the entrance of the bridge there is a strongpoint for defense, and at the opposite side is a stone water fountain, the only one which may be found in the island (of San Juan).(13) A further description reads "...The island is long and narrow. Entrenchments cut entirely across it rather more than half way up the hill and the town, which is situated on the summit, is fortified apparently by the strongest forts, presenting embrazures for at least two hundred pieces of artillery. The system of fortification is chiefly perpendicular as there is no situation where the works can be flanked except from a neck of land to the Eastward, but on which the nearest spot to the town that could be fired upon is at least 1,500 yards distant... The entrance into the harbour is defended by the Morro Castle and a strong insulated work (El Cañuelo) to the southward of the channel, independent of the other 12 guns of the place, so that it would be extremely dangerous to attempt anything with shipping, as the wind blowing constantly from the northeast makes it a lee shore, and in case of damage the ship must immediately run aground..."(14) According to the historian Pedro Tomás de Córdova: "...in the year 1795 the military expenditures reached the sums of 356,813 ps. 20mrs. In fortification works 64.145ps. 1 real, 30mrs. were spent, and in the artillery 13,879 ps. 14 mrs. The citadel had 253 cannon, 20 mortars, 3 pedreros and 4 howitzers..."(15) "Prior to the attack, on the fort of San Antonio and in front of the Rodeo, a battery of six pieces was constructed. To the left of the waterway, another battery of four pieces was built in order to defend the point of the Condado. A parapet was also constructed along this line and at its end was placed a battery of five pieces which defend the waterway between San Gerónimo and San Antonio. In case San Antonio should be taken along with the heights of Condado and Rodeo, this battery connected by another road to San Gerónimo. The castle of San Gerónimo was repaired and two embrasures were added facing the sea, with a further two at San Antonio. Also, another battery of three pieces was constructed which communicates with that at Escambrón. A straight channel was cut through Miraflores to enable it to face fire from the bay and in its center a battery of six pieces were placed, with another of four cannon nearby whose fire would be directed towards the Rodeo...."(16) In 1796, 65,760 ps. 5 rs. 7mrs. were spent on fortifications and on the artillery, 14, 836 ps. 1 real 5 mrs. The review of the militia gave the numbers of 1871 infantry men and 300 horses.(17) Brigadier Don Ramón de Castro had assumed the position of Governor of the island on March 21, 1795 and would remain in office until November 12, 1804. De Castro's military experience and the preventive measures he took in advance of the invasion may have been decisive factors in his eventual victory. Tomas de Cordova has left us with a detailed account of these precautions, which are interesting as they give an example of the type of defensive activity which must have taken place on most of the Caribbean islands during the many wars of the century. He states: "...The news that Brigadier Castro had received of the hostilities taking place between the British and the Spanish in the autumn of 1796) and the intentions of the former to attack Spanish possessions in America, had made him assume an attitude of vigilance and a determination to complete military preparations for the city."(18) These measures were as follows: - As the battery of San Francisco de Paula was considered to be one of the most important defensive works, he hastened it's completion by allocating the largest possible workforce that could be spared without delaying the the work on the San Gerónimo fort. He also made great efforts to ensure that these two strongpoints were equipped with their respective artillery. He also: - Ordered all batteries, the land front, the outerworks, gates and stockades of the San Cristobal Fortress checked and repaired, to ensure their full readiness. - Advised all towns on the island that they should have their cattle rounded up at the first warning. - Held cannon, mortar and howitzer drills, which included giving instruction to officers and men from the militias. - Ordered increased vigilance from San Cristobal and all along the coast, to forwarn of any threat from the sea. - Recalled all men on temporary leave. - Ordered the regular garrison increased by three companies of militia. - Inspected the points most vulnerable to attack between the city and the mouth of the Cangejos River. - Prohibited ships from sailing from any port on the island.(l9) When Governor de Castro heard in March of the fall of Trinidad the previous month, he correctly surmised that Puerto Rico would be next on Britain's agenda and he immediately: - sent lieutenants to train all able-bodied men in areas where there was no militia. - ordered a precise account of provisions to be stockpiled, and prepared warehouses. - Had all cattle taken to enclosures in the interior of the island, with a view to supplying the city. - Had the Cañuelo Fortress inspected and repaired. - Commissioned two city councillors or "Regidores" to requisition sufficient rice for the Royal Storehouses. - Cancelled the discharge papers of soldiers who had completed their tour of duty. - Gave orders to the Urban Militias. - Ordered the E1 Morro fortress to repel any suspicious ship. - Sent an Engineer to prepare the town of Aguadilla's defenses. - Transferred most of the powder from the magazines at Miraflores and San Gerónimo into the main fortress. - Began the outfitting of two pontoons and four Barges with two 16 pounder cannon each, and twelve launches with 3,4 and 6 caliber cannon, for defending the port and it's channels. Frigate Captain D.Francisco de Paula Castro was instructed to oversee this. - Prepared the battery at the end of the moat. - Sent word to Caracas, Santa Domingo and Havana warning of the real danger of attack and requesting help. - Had stone-throwing mortars outfitted and set up workshops for preparing explosives and war rockets. - Ordered 440 militia who were being drilled in various districts to be incorporated into the "fixed" militia. - Expedited the outfitting of patrol boats. - Commissioned local leaders, "jueces territoriales" to have the citizens plant all the produce that would be necessary in case of an attack. - Requested loans from corporations and private citizens pending the arrival of the "situado", the funds from Spain. The response from the local citizenry is exemplified as in de Cordoba's report. "...Doña Juana de Lara had constructed at her own expense two batteries of four pieces each on the islet of Punta Las Marias.."(20) In April, as the threat of attack became more imminent, de Castro further reinforced his preparations and: - Ordered Batallion cannon ready for use as necessary. - Accepted the offer of the leader of the French community on the island, a Monsieur Paris, to join the defensive effort along with his countrymen. - Ordered eight companies of militia to active duty to join the eight companies already in the citadel. Also to add 200 men from the militias into artillery service. - All citizens of San Juan were enlisted into the urban militias. - As enemy privateers were constantly engaging in forays along the coast, he was appointed General Commander of the Northern Militia and Colonel of the "Fixed" Militia regiment to enable him to limit as far as possible the threat to the people posed by these privateers.(21) The Governor, along with his Chief Engineers, also spent several days personally inspecting the bay area, the entrance to the port, the Boca-Vieja channel, the accesses and outlets of the Martin Peña San Antonio channels, the possible landing sites on the three Cangrejos beaches, Punta Salinas, and the entrance to the Martin Peña lagoon, where an embankment was constructed. He also inspected the posts, fortresses and castles of the city, the outerworks and those locations most vulnerable to attack.(22) These most comprehensive preparations were a sound tribute to the knowledge and military experience of Governor De Castro and as the chronicler de Cordoba puts it, "It may be stated categorically that this Commander proceeded with the utmost prudence, not neglecting the slightest detail and preparing things as well as he could to save the country and ensure the triumph of Your Majesty's arms".(23) These, then, were the defenses and preparations which faced the British invaders and according to the historian Salvador Brau,"...for the English fleet, the major obstacle was without any doubt the recently finished fortifications and the artillery emplacements with 415 guns and 10,000 quintals of powder", together with "the resistance offered by the garrison and those newly recruited."(24) In the next chapter we will follow the course of the attack and see how these defenses stood up to the test of fire. 1 Ricardo Torres Reyes. El Mariscal O'Reilly y Las Defensas de San Juan, 1765-1777. Historia, Vol. IV. Centro de Investigaciones Históricas, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1954. 2 Ibid. 3 AlejandroTapia y Rivera. Memoria de D. Alexandro O'Reilly Sobre la Isla de Puerto Rico, año 1765. Biblioteca Histórica de Puerto Rico, Ed. Instituto de Literatura, San Juan, 1945. 4 Torres Reyes, op cit. 4 5 Ibid. 6 From 1765 onwards the "veterans" Battallion had been transformed into the "fixed regiment of Puerto Rico" and was later even further reformed. In 1787, spanish soldiers were incorporated into the naples regiment but during the following year, this practice ceased. María Cadilla Martínez. Rememorando el Pasado Heróico, Puerto Rico 1946. 7 Edward Hoyt. A History of the Harbor Defenses of San Juan, P.R. Under Spain, 1509-1898. Puerto Rico Coast Artillery Command, 1943. 8 Fernando Miyares González. Noticias particulares de la Isla y Plaza de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1954. 9 Fray Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra. Historia Geográfica, Civil y Natural de la Isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico. Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, 1979. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Charles Stewart. Report of British Spy at San Juan, Puerto Rico. Enclosed with a Letter from Governor Burt of Antigua to Lord Germain. 15 Pedro Tomás de Córdoba. Memorias Geográficas, Históricas, Económicas y Estadísticas de la Isla de Puerto Rico, Tomo III, Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, San Juan de Puerto Rico, 1968. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Salvador Brau. Historia de Puerto Rico. Nueva York, 1914.   Frequently Asked Questions | Ask the Historian | Available Documents   Back To Top