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The U.S. Army's relief efforts
during the 1906 earthquake and fire not
only answered the needs of the immediate tragedy but also left a
legacy for future domestic emergencies. Based on the army's experience
in the 1906 disaster, clear and formal policies were developed regarding
civil relief and the Army's relationship with the Red Cross was
formally defined.
As U.S. Army troops marched into the city of San Francisco to assist
in fire fighting and law
enforcement efforts, Depot Quartermaster Major Carroll A. Devol
sent a telegram to the War Department informing authorities of the
earthquake and requesting relief aid. The quartermaster general
sent out 46 telegrams to army headquarters across the nation. Almost
immediately, trains loaded with military supplies began heading
toward San Francisco. As the army clothed, fed and housed the refugees,
the distinctions between military and civil functions blurred.
On the afternoon of the earthquake, Mayor Schmitz called together
prominent citizens to establish the Citizen's Committee of Fifty.
This group of men met twice a day during the emergency to address
specific relief issues. Schmitz soon authorized the order of labor
and supplies for public use. This proxy city government quickly
realized it was overwhelmed and ill prepared to feed, clothe, house
and monitor a refugee population of over 250,000.
Quartermaster Major Devol noted in his report that the massive
distribution at the Presidio was "without any authority, but when
reported was promptly approved by the Secretary of War." Devol was
placed in charge of transportation, receipt and distribution of
both military and civil supplies. In the first three days the four
supply depots of the Presidio issued 3,000 tents, 12,000 shelter
halves, 13,000 ponchos, 58,000 pairs of shoes and 24,000 regulation
blue shirts. The commissary storehouses at the Presidio, Fort Mason
and Fort Miley were undamaged and open during the relief efforts.
The Presidio bakery began baking large quantities of bread. On the
fifth day alone, a day of torrential rains, the army issued 20,000
blankets and 13,000 ponchos. According to army reports, over 30,000
refugees were dependent on the army for food and shelter - 16,000
at the Presidio alone. Eventually, the Army's Department of the
Pacific distributed 15,000 tents in San Francisco.
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Winding
lines of refugees at Fort Mason.
Photo credit: National Park Service, Golden
Gate NRA Archives (GOGA 2316)
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On the fourth day, as the last of the fires were being extinguished,
the mayor met with leaders of the various law enforcement agencies
including General Frederick Funston,
in command while the division commander, General
Aldophus Greely, was on a Washington visit. The city was divided
into six districts, each under a different municipal or military
control. These six districts were the basis for the creation of
the seven relief divisions created three weeks later.
Food donations began arriving in San Francisco almost immediately.
However, prohibitions against fires forbade people from cooking.
By April 23rd, less than one week after the earthquake, the Citizen's
Relief Committee was overcome by the food distribution efforts and
the mayor asked the army to take over. General Greely, back in San
Francisco, initially refused Mayor Schmitz's request to manage food
distribution. It was only after prodding by members of the Committee
of Fifty that Greely agreed to set up the nine food depots on April
26th. Each civilian was fed the equivalent of three-quarters of
an Army enlisted man's rations. On April 30th more than 300,000
people were fed at these commissary food stations. The Army commissary
later assisted in organizing and opening relief restaurants.
Supplies and donations (both military and civil) began coming to
San Francisco from all over the country, even arriving before the
fires ended. Train boxcars filled with donations carried signs such
as "For the California Sufferers, From Denver, Colorado, More to
Follow." The Southern Pacific Railroad reported 1,800 carloads of
relief supplies that came into the city in a single month. Responsibility
for the receipt and fair distribution fell to Quartermaster Devol.
General Greely met with Mayor Schmitz to define the Army's role
in the recovery. Greely asserted that the army would not supervise
in maintaining order - only assist civil authorities. According
to army regulations, the military was to protect Federal property
only. Greely worked with Schmitz under the vague state of civil-military
law that existed but Greely remained sensitive to the army's role
and authority in a civil disaster. Early on, he advocated a return
to civil authorities in matters of relief and law enforcement. On
April 29th, General Orders No. 18 outlined the role of the Army
in the relief efforts. Army officers were appointed to work with
the Mayor's committee and the Red Cross. Mrs. Eda
Funston, the wife of General Funston, worked with the head of
the fledgling Red Cross, Dr. Edward T. Devine, in setting up a releif
distribution system.

The lines for food were stagering.
Credit: Bob Bowen Collection
The Army's food and clothing distribution responsibilities led
to a system of relief strategies shaped by U.S. Army regulations.
The city's seven relief areas were under command of Regular Army
officers, called military chairmen, who were eventually paired with
Red Cross workers, called civilian chairmen. Greely, in an effort
to lessen army authority, worked with the Red Cross and reached
an agreement whereby the Army would pass out civilian-donated clothing
to the victims. Two clothing depots were set up in city schools
where Red Cross agents received and sorted the donations.
A refugee wishing to request supplies would approach an army designee
to obtain a necessary requisition. This example of a typical note,
written on "In the Field" stationary of the First Infantry Regiment
was signed by Capt. J. Duffy and addressed to Mrs. A.M. Curtis,
a Red Cross agent. Captain Duffy wrote that Mrs. Deveago "was burned
out in the recent calamity and lost all her effects. She wishes
two blankets. Anything you can do for her will be appreciated."
In addition to distributing food and clothing, the Army ran 21
official refugee camps. These camps, organized and maintained in
military fashion, were among the safest and cleanest of the earthquake
refugee shelters. However, thousands remained outside the official
camps, and it fell to the Army to enforce standards in even the
smallest of huddled groups. Tent camps sprung up all over the city,
formed by groups of people simply surviving together or run by a
variety of organizations. These were a cause for concern, primarily
because of sanitation issues; an outbreak of typhoid was a genuine
fear.
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Refugee camp on the Presidio.
Photo credit: National Park Service,
Golden Gate NRA Archives (GOGA 1766)
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Sanitation was of such concern to the army, that in General
Funston's General Orders No. 12, which divided the city into
military districts, he noted: "Our greatest concern in the future
may be expected from unavoidable sanitary conditions, and every
person is cautioned that to violate in the slightest degree the
instructions of the sanitary officers would be a crime that could
have no adequate punishment."
While an Army medical officer was assigned to each of the official
camps, enforcement of sanitation standards in the unofficial encampments
fell under the jurisdiction of the Army's Lieutenant-Colonel G.A.
Torney (Chief Surgeon of the Army's Department of California and
commanding officer of the Army General Hospital at the Presidio).
Two days after the earthquake, Funston issued General Orders No.
37 giving Torney authority in military and civilian sanitation matters.
Torney became the Chief Sanitary Inspector in charge of all sanitary
work and the key individual for enforcement of sanitary rules in
both the official and stray camps throughout the city. (Torney was
later appointed Surgeon General of the United States.)
When the city was divided into seven districts, each headquarters
had a committee-appointed physician who reported directly to Torney.
Also responsible for the official camps, Torney enforced the rules
and regulations with an iron hand, expelling those refugees who
did not maintain standards.
Torney's district inspectors combed the city, investigating sanitation
concerns such as garbage, cisterns, and latrines. Their reports
paint a poignant picture of the homeless refugees attempting to
cope with their plight and the military trying to prevent disease.
One of Torney's inspectors, Officer Charles Clark, M.D., of the
Third District, reported on April 22nd: "(On) Gavin Street there
are two children with sore throats which appear suspicious of diphtheria.
There are about 100 families here with no shelter and no bedding
whatsoever." Clark noted a variety of informal camps; including
a camp at the foot of Hyde Street "composed of about 45 people"
and one at Stewart and Folsom held about 60 people. Clark reported
finding a garbage pile near a camp: "With the aid of a guard who
could speak Spanish I was able to instruct the people camping in
the park and at the top of the hill to clean up their garbage piles
and rubbish." At another, Clark found "About 500 people. No bedding
or tentage observable."
On the same day Clark was making his inspections, the front-page
headline of the San Jose Sunday Mercury and Herald incorrectly declared:
"Plague Is Now Threatening the Homeless." The newspaper noted "Typhoid
fever, as a result of unsanitary conditions, has made its appearance.
Four cases are now receiving medical attention. Smallpox and scarlet
fever, too, are reported. General Funston has caused to be posted
throughout the city notices of sanitary regulation." Perhaps Funston's
sanitary precautions inspired the newspaper's erroneous story. Nevertheless,
through Torney and the Army's sanitation efforts, there were no
reported epidemics or outbreaks of disease.
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