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The calamitous San Francisco
1906 earthquake struck at 5:12 a.m. on Wednesday,
April 18. That morning, as aftershocks jarred and fires spread,
an increasingly unnerved population started to panic. Hundreds massed
at the Ferry Building in an attempt to escape the city. The tense
disarray and lack of order stirred the growing crowds. A young man
recalled, "On down the street we came across groups of men about
whiskey and beer kegs drinking from cans, hollering, screaming,
cursing in the most terrible manner." Another noted: "Throughout
the whole day constant trouble had been experienced owing to a large
number of drunks along the waterfront. The uncontrolled crowds rushed
from saloon to saloon, looting the stocks and becoming intoxicated
early in the day." Mobs raided saloons and refused to assist in
the fire fighting efforts. As ensuing confusion accelerated, the
Mayor's office received report after report of disorder and chaos.
San Francisco Mayor Eugene Schmitz quickly issued a bold proclamation
to the city: "The Federal Troops, the members of the Regular Police
Force and all Special Police Officers have been authorized by me
to KILL any and all persons found engaged in Looting or in the Commission
of Any Other Crime." Within two hours of the initial earthquake,
Army troops were posted along Market Street, two men to a block,
and Presidio troops marched into the city. To the traumatized residents
of San Francisco, seeing soldiers in the streets posed both a comforting
assurance and a troubling prospect. Schmitz's infamous edict authorized
the U.S. Army to maintain order and protect property in the streets
of an American city. However, the Mayor was not in a position of
legal authority to order forces to shoot down citizens on command.
The presence of military within the city enforced and undermined
the city government's authority, but neither Schmitz nor General
Funston advocated martial law.

Soldiers rest by their gear in downtown
San Francisco.
Credit: Bob Bowen Collection
In the confusion following the initial shock and subsequent aftershocks
and fires, army troops maintained law and order, closed the saloons,
and evacuated residents. They also investigated accounts of looting.
By the second day, law enforcement included Army and Navy forces,
as well as police forces, the California National Guard and various
volunteer groups. Without an organized center of control, the various
enforcers were each following and issuing different orders.
General Order No. 12, issued three days after the earthquake, divided
the city into six military districts each under control of the five
law enforcement divisions. The General Order further stated that
all divisions were to conduct themselves in "temperate action in
dealing with the unfortunate people who are suffering from the awful
catastrophe that has befallen them." This warning was the response
to citizen's reports of incidents regarding military misconduct.
Citizens had complained of rash or unnecessary evacuations. One
such occasion occurred along Polk Street where soldiers evacuated
inhabitants "with bayonets fixed" several hours before the fire
threatened the area. "There was abundant time to save many valuable
articles which were by this time lost. I did not understand at the
time, nor have I since been able to understand," recalled a resident.
Witnesses reported the looting of homes by the soldiers before dynamiting.
The California National Guard was the subject of headlines such
as "Blame the Militia for Much Looting." In one instance, the 20th
Infantry Regiment arrested National Guardsmen for looting while
members of the 11th Infantry were arrested as they "tapped a barrel."
Troops did carry out Schmitz's order to shoot and kill looters -
even presumed looters. The reports of citizens shot as a result
of the Mayor's Proclamation vary greatly, and range from one dozen
up to one hundred. Brigadier General
Funston, however, denied involvement of any regular Army troops
and his immediate supervisor, Major
General Greely, attributed these occurrences to other military
units.
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Brigadier
General Funston
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Major
General Greely
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Credit: Museum of the City
of San Francisco
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The police were given authority to "conscript manpower" for digging
latrine ditches and organizing bread lines. But residents charged
that Presidio soldiers forced them to clear streets or bury the
dead, and that private automobiles were seized by the troops. The
military, though, denied that they commandeered civilian "forced
labor." A Navy midshipman recalls a detachment of Marines from Fort
Mason assisting in "rounding up and impressing men to assist the
fire fighters." Funston responded and issued a directive to city
military district commanders. Whether it impressed civilian labor
or not, the Army was equally disappointed in citizen contributions.
Their reports note: "We received very little help from the real
citizens, most of whom were engaged elsewhere looking after their
own particular interests."
Aware of controversy over earlier actions by Funston to mobilize
troops, conflicting reports about the behavior of the troops, and
the inherent contentiousness of the army's role in the city, Greely
advocated a withdrawal. In a request for army responsibilities to
be transferred to local civil authorities and the Red Cross, Greely
stated: "The spirit of American institutions is obviously adverse
to the quartering of troops in times of peace in large cities."
He was also very aware that while the soldiers had been reasonably
well behaved, on July 1st the city's saloons were to reopen, inviting
potential conflict for both military and civilians. On July 2nd,
the U. S. Army troops pulled out of the city of San Francisco.
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