One of the relatively few fatalities caused directly by the earthquake was that of San Francisco Chief Fire Engineer, Dennis L. Sullivan. The serious injuries he suffered as a result of a falling chimney at Fire Station #3 led to his death several days later at the Presidio's U.S. Army General Hospital. Fire Chief Sullivan had previously anticipated the potential threat of a devastating fire due to the tinderbox-dry wood construction of many buildings within San Francisco. As such, he had just installed a state-of-the-art wet cell alarm system. Unfortunately the wet cells and the fire-bell alarm system were knocked out by the 5:12 a.m. shock.

The earthquake caused water and gas mains to twist and break. The leaking gas caused fires that quickly spread throughout the city. At 6:30 a.m. the San Francisco Fire Department sent a messenger to the Presidio requesting an artillery division armed with explosives to assist with the relief effort, as the "earthquake had broken the water mains." At 10 a.m. infantry troops from Angel Island and artillery troops from Fort Miley arrived in San Francisco to guard the U.S. Mint. The artillery troops unsuccessfully attempted to control the fires by dynamiting strategic buildings. By noon, the financial district was ablaze. By evening the firestorm had incinerated city center. The fires burned over three days, destroying nearly five square miles (over 500 city blocks) of homes, businesses, and warehouses. The 2000-degree heat of the fires literally incinerated all in its path. So intense were the flames that they could be felt vibrating "like the passing of several streetcars."

Captain Le Vert Coleman, of the Presidio Artillery Corps reported, "During the first day of the fire, and until the evening of the second day, the city authorities withheld their permission to blow up buildings except those in immediate contact with those already ablaze." Such caution hampered Coleman's progress, "Although we were able to check the fire at a certain point, it outflanked my party time and again, and our work had to be begun over."

Wednesday night, General Funston met with the Citizen's Committee; the Mayor's appointed relief and recovery organization. With a situation map at hand, he outlined his plan to stop the fires through the use of dynamite. The strategy was not infallible and the risks were great. Members of the San Francisco Fire Department had never used dynamite before. The dynamiting that had occurred up until that point was carried out by military demolition squads of artillerymen. However, the dynamite was often ignited too close to the advancing fire and the explosions showered burning embers causing new infernos. But in viewing the firestorm's fury and with few other options, the Committee agreed to the explosive demolitions. City officials permitted the buildings to be destroyed.

Funston initiated the civilian evacuations within the firebreak. "Police and regiments of soldiers, along with volunteers, were sent into the doomed areas to warn citizens to flee. In one district, a sentry, making a megaphone of his hands, shouted up and down the area, 'This street is going to be dynamited; if you want anything in the grocery store, go to it!'" Citizens complained of rash or unnecessary evacuations; along Polk Street soldiers evacuated inhabitants "with bayonets fixed" several hours before the fire threatened the area. One resident recalled,"There was abundant time to save many valuable articles which were by this time lost. I did not understand at the time, nor have I since been able to understand." An army report noted "much difficulty was experienced in clearing these buildings of panic-stricken citizens."

Captain Coleman described the complicated and hazardous work of the dynamiting party: "The charges often had to be laid in buildings already on fire; the dynamite had to be carried by hand through showers of sparks; the wires constantly shortened by repeated explosions, could be replaced only by climbing poles in the burning district and cutting down street wires." Coleman noted the dangers to his troops: "In order to stop the fire in time, buildings had to be blown up from such a short distance, and with such short lead wire that the part was struck by falling debris."

It is not surprising that the first Army causality, Lt. Charles C. Pulis, commanding officer of the 24th Company of Light Artillery, was involved with the dynamiting operations. He was fatally wounded by a charge of dynamite on Thursday, April 19th. "The fuse was imperfect and did not ignite as soon as he expected," reported the Army. "When he reentered the building, the dynamite exploded."

By Thursday evening, the army was preparing to create the firebreak by stopping the fire at an east west division of the city along an avenue of affluent mansions. "Every pound of dynamite was hauled up to the fireline," reported an army newspaper. Funston and his officers, as well as the Mayor and members of the Citizen's Committee silently watched the demolitions as three blocks of expensive houses fell every twenty minutes. Later that evening Captain Coleman received permission to use his judgment in continued demolition. The fire had crossed the wide expanse of Van Ness at certain points and Coleman's team proceeded; "in this work whole blocks were blown up."

The remains of the Phelan Building were dynamited on Friday. Credit: Bob Bowen Collection

On Friday, the winds blew the fire northward and threatened Fort Mason itself. Army troops helped pump bay water to the few fire engines outside the firestorm. Its southward progression to the Mission District was fought by fire department members and volunteers.

On Saturday, the fire simply stopped in the center of a block filled with wooden frame houses. Two days later explosions again echoed in the destroyed city as the weakened remains of structures were felled by military blasts. "The walls, some of them seven stories high, being in a tottering condition, the civilian riggers would not tackle them," reported Captain Coleman. "Fresh winds, and on one occasion an earthquake shock threw bricks and debris about the party, and one five story wall fell while the charge was being placed and before it could be fired."

Coleman was absolute in his assessment of the dynamite demolitions, "The fire would unquestionably have destroyed the unburnt portion of the city." The spread of the fire occurred "where authority was not granted to clear a bare space sufficiently broad to arrest the course of the flames." Not all agree, as debate continues today regarding the damage caused or prevented by the dynamiting efforts.

Resources

Cole, Tom. A Short History of San Francisco, (San Francisco: Don't Call It Frisco Press, 1980).

Coleman, Le Vert (Letter from). Captain Artillery Corps to The Adjutant, Presidio of San Francisco 2 May 1906, http://www.sfmusuem.org

Dillion, Richard. "San Francisco's Occupying Army, 1906" San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle 14 April 1985.

Halsey, Jr., Col. Milton B. Point Paper U.S. Army Activities in the 1906 Earthquake and Fire, Presidio Ranger files.

Hansen, Gladys and Emmet Condon. Denial of Disaster, (San Francisco: Cameron and Company, 1989).

"Lieutenant Charles C. Pulis Fatally Wounded as Army Fights Raging Fires with Dynamite," Presidial Weekly Clarion, (Presidio of San Francisco) 27 April 1906, 1.

Thomas, Gordon and Max Morgan Witts. The San Francisco Earthquake, (New York: Stein and Day, 1971).

Thompson, Erwin N. Defender of the Gate: The Presidio of San Francisco, A History from 1846 to 1995, (Golden Gate National Recreation Area, California, National Park Service, 1995).