Introduction

When one attempts to recover California’s history, reality is often overlooked for the spectacular.  It is often perceived that the historic role of the military in California encompassed only the grandeur visions and accomplishments of Spain; this has far too often been the sole subject of research.  However, it also comprises the mundane, everyday realities of frontier life.  This essay attempts to shed light on the typical soldier.  A general characterization of the men as well as military enlistment, organization, and training processes are provided.

The Character of California Soldiers and Procedures for their Enlistment, Organization, and Training

            Emerging from a variety of traditions, California soldiers resembled other troops and military establishments across the globe; the recruitment and organization of these men expressed further similarities (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  From town to town, a comandante, secretary, and payroll officer would set up a recruiting table and banner.  Incentives included regular payroll, free board and clothing, land, pension, and future financial prospects in plundering.  Furthermore, Spanish and European enlistment had, for centuries, offered monetary bonuses after sign-up.  It was likely that this continued in California but is questionable due to lack of evidence.  Williams stresses that the potential for economic gain was a primary reason for military enlistment; by these means, many men hoped to eradicate debts.

Table 1.0: Military Salaries in California, 1791-1800^[1]

Most men were from poor and unprivileged background.  For example, the soldiers and settlers that were recruited from Northern Mexico had comprised the humblest social positions (Johnson 1985: 6).  Coming to California, they risked their meager livelihood for something more.  In fact, a great proportion of San Jose’s early population originated from the impoverished presidio town of Sinaloa, Mexico.  Furthermore, literacy was very low among the military personnel of the presidios, with the exception of the few, elite upperclassmen (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Notably, the military of the northern frontier had a higher literacy rate (though still low and constantly fluctuating) than the Spanish regulars (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  William James and George McMurry provide an example and explanation for this.  At the Pueblo de San Jose de Guadalupe, soldiers and children were obligated to learn to read; a commitment of three years was required (James 1933).   

Despite the initial financial prospects of enlistees, soldiers soon realized the promising enlistment incentives were misleading; even a regular cash payroll could not be expected (Moorhead 1975: 201).  Moorhead articulates that a soldier’s indebtedness was not relieved through military enlistment; rather, indebtedness continued and grew despite employment.  Consequentially, this lowered morale among California’s soldiers.  “Pay was intended not only to cover normal living expenses, but also food, clothing, weapons and ammunition, and even horses. …Most of their pay was in the form of credit at the presidial store for goods,” (Perissinotto 1998: 22).  Financially, there was little change.

Military recruitment was essential for the vitality of the mission system and numbers had to be substantial.  Despite deceptive recruitment, most men remained enlisted regardless of payroll.  “That men continued to volunteer for military service for such illusory compensation was due in all probability to the sober fact that civilian jobs were scarce and even less renumerative, that soldiering was better than starving,” (Moorhead 1975: 201).  In fact, before 1810, enlistment of at least one son per Californio family was relatively common (Williams 2001, [3], 1).  This should not imply, however, that recruits were abundant.  “During most of the presidio era, recruits were scarce on the frontier,” (Williams, 2001: [3], 1).  Williams argues that, when terms ended, reenlistment was pressed.  Retirement could even be delayed if a shortage of men occurred.  Within Europe, the Spanish began to conscript their forces in 1792.  “The early nineteenth century witnessed the creation of standing armies of unprecedented size in Europe,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  However, conscription was not adopted in the New World until 1821 under the Mexican Republic.  For California, there would be repercussions to conscription; political pressures would support the enlistment of untrained men and unqualified leaders.

Within California, recruits ranged in age from fifteen to forty; terms lasted for approximately ten to twelve years (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Thereafter, soldiers could enlist for additional five year terms.  Catalonian volunteers could enlist for six year terms.  Ledgers were well-kept and detailed.  Williams states that records included a man’s name, parents’ names, birthplace, religion, and his physical measurements and distinctive features.  In addition, date of enlistment, terms of service, and the names and positions of those who witnessed the enlistment were documented.  High illiteracy required recruiters to orally reiterate conditions of service; men typically signed ledgers with a mark rather than signature (typically a cross).

There were other limits and preventions to enlistment; these included physical requisites.  “The potential recruit had to be at least five feet, two inches tall, have no noticeable facial defects or extreme racial coloration, be a Roman Catholic, be willing to enlist for ten years, and sign a statement that he understood the meaning of the military code,” (Faulk 1988: 41).  Good health was necessary; captains monitored soldiers for signs of weakness.  The Regulations of 1772 outlined in detail the physical and behavioral requirements a soldier was subject to.  Obedience and a sense of duty were stressed.

Characteristically, presidio forces of the Southwest “were neither elite troops nor raw recruits, but hard-bitten, home-grown vaqueros who were at ease in the saddle, inured to the harsh and lonely terrain in which they served, and accustomed to the cruel and unconventional tactics of Indian warfare,” (Moorhead 1975: 178).  The same can be assumed for a majority of the men enlisted in California.  Don Miguel Costansó once wrote, “It is not too much to say that they are the best horsemen in the world and among the best soldiers in the service of the king,” (Johnston Denis 1927: 68-69).  Naturally, however, there were some exceptions. (Abuses of soldiers are noted in the latter half of this essay).  Certainly, the pioneering men of California were distinctive in kind; given the circumstances, they were what the expansionist crown needed for missionization in the New World.

The soldiers of frontier California were not homogeneous when it came to race (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Alta California was the product of the Spanish empire’s progressive expansion through Latin America, northern New Spain, Baja California, and southwest North America; recruits represented mixed racial identities.  Furthermore, many of those who were of “pure” Iberian descent were themselves mixed peoples: for centuries, invasions and networking caused a blending of peoples in Spain.  In Alta California, biological and cultural diversity was expressed through ranks of Criollos, Peninsulares, Mestizos, and Mulattos.  Syncretism, despite the hierarchal system and social divisions, occurred among these peoples; this can be assessed through colonial military studies.

Racial diversity and hierarchal patterns caused some tension.  The non-Iberians of Baja California were often abused and received only half pay (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  However, the Regulation of 1772 ended discriminating salary practices; in California, “although institutionalized preferences for noblemen remained, all soldiers were paid the same, irrespective of the pureness of their blood,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  The designation of “soldado distinguido” was given to those who demonstrated European lineage; benefits included exemption from menial labor.  As the enlistment requisites demonstrate, extreme racial coloration concerned the recruiters.  Ideally, the Spanish elite did not want to enlist non-whites; “laws of the Hapsburg era had required that the garrisons only include Peninsulares and Criollos,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  This was not practical or feasible.  Integration occurred despite some ideological concern; tensions “about enlisting darker castes as soldiers seem to have been insignificant after 1821,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).     

            Like the racist desire to employ only white men as soldiers, officers were theoretically only supposed to be noblemen.  This was similarly impractical.  “Because of the constant shortage of qualified [noble] men, an individual that had the skill and ambition could find opportunities that were far less common in Central New Spain or Europe,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  A system of promotions and the advent of military apprenticeship allowed lower-rank men and families to assume more powerful social positions.  Such social mobility allowed the creation of a pseudo-nobility (deemed the “nobility of the sword”); high positions could be achieved with merit.  Despite the advent of military apprenticeship, military academies were not present in the New World until 1805.

  Militia men, mission neophytes, and non-Christian neophyte allies were other forces that served military purposes in California (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Williams emphasizes the importance of these forces, stating that they were essential to the defense of the region and mission system.  Temporal service was the extent of their use; no regular training, uniform, or salary was afforded these men.  “The informal militia was called out in the face of both native and European threats,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  “All the male settlers who owned property and were not a part of the regular army, and who were able bodied, were expected to serve in the informal militia,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Retired men also served.  After 1800, some permanent militia units emerged; the Chumash of the La Purisima and Santa Bárbara missions were among the recruits.   

Military organization on the northern frontier was much simpler than that of Spanish or Mexican armies (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Essentially, forces were divided into compañias and escoltas (squads).  Williams states that companies were composed of officers and heavy cavalry lancers.  Historically, the troops are designated as the leather jacket soldiers, or “soladados de cuera,” due to their distinct uniform.  The cuera “or heavily quilted, sleeveless jacket or coat, [was] covered with several thicknesses of deerskin to turn the arrows of the Indians,” (Johnston Denis 1927: 68).  According to Johnston Denis, further protection included an adarga, or shield; two thickness of rawhide were used in making the adarga. 

“They were mounted, and man and horse were still further protected, not only from arrows, but, in riding through chaparral, by the armas, an apron of leather, fastened to the pommel, falling in front of the horse as low as the stirrups and draped over the legs and thighs of the rider,” (Johnston Denis 1927: 68).

“The leather jacket soldiers had evolved out of earlier mounted formations that were distinct to Northern New Spain,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  From 1769 to 1774, the men comprised one company, the Presidio de las Californias.  Headquarters were moved to Monterrey in 1770; the company was separated into three in 1774.  The presidios at Loreto, San Diego, and Monterrey were established. 

            The presence of artillery men were an exception to the mounted cavalry.  “Although cannons were present from the earliest phases of the Spanish occupation of Alta California, troops specialized in the use of artillery were not sent to the region until the end of the 18th century,” (Williams, 2001: [3], 1).  From 1796 to 1821, these men served in detachment units derived from the artillery corps in New Spain.  Numbers were few however; they further declined with the lack of replacements.  Fortunately, only two men were required to man a cannon.  The militia artillery company (after 1806) and veterans (after the establishment of the Mexican Republic) helped manage gun batteries along the coast of California.

              Dragoons, mounted soldiers who typically demounted and fought on foot, were present in California.  “The Dragoons of Spain…and Mazatlan Provincial Dragoons…were deployed at company strength levels in Alta California.  Each of these formations were part of larger cavalry regiments (rather than independent corps),” (Williams, 2001: [3], 1).  Williams asserts, however, that leather jacket soldiers never assumed light cavalry roles, similar to the dragoons.  In fact, the late 1700s witnessed a decline in the use of dragoons; they were converted to medium cavalry.

            “Only one line infantry unit served in Spanish Alta California,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  According to Williams, this was an independent company, the San Blas Infantry Company, and it defended the Naval Department at San Blas’ headquarters.  Borne in 1788, the company served in Monterey and San Francisco from 1818 to 1821.

Infantry duties were also conducted by regular, formal militia companies near the end of the eighteenth century (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Less frequently, these troops would mount or use cannons.  Like the informal militia described above, these men were used for temporal service.  They were expected to be ready and at-hand when needed and were deemed necessary to the defense of the region.  Unlike the informal militia, these troops had distinct organization; uniforms were supplied.  Although military status was below that of regulars, formal militia troops were rewarded with privileges and earned some degree of social prestige.  “The first, and only, units of this type to be organized was the Provincial Artillery Company of Alta California,” (Williams, 2001: [3], 1).

Native informal and formal militia were no less significant than that of the Spanish.  In fact, “the conquest of the Americas could not have been attempted without the participation of Indian peoples,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Alta California was founded on behalf of neophyte militia efforts and, likewise, neophytes had much to do with occupying and preserving this region under the crown.  The informal native militias were equipped with bows and arrows; training was limited to simple tactical formations.  Training the natives against Europeans did not occur until approximately 1819 when formal systems were established.  “During the final phases of the presidio era, the new mission militia units continued to provide a combination of scouts, horse-archers, bow-armed infantry, and lancers,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  The new strength of native troops caused some concern and mistrust among the Spanish colonizers.  Therefore the neophyte’s ability to bear firearms was eventually banned, although many continued their use.   

            Within the New World, high military command was assumed by the Visitor General Galvez from 1768-1771, by the viceroy from 1771-1774 and 1792-1821, and by the commandant general from 1774-1792.  Due to the infrequency of communication, the king relayed to these individuals the future plans for colonization.

The estado mayor, or administration of high command, was very basic in California.  “In general the provincial military staff represented a highly abbreviated version of what would be found in a regular Spanish regiment,” (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Regionally, the governor served as the capitán general.  Governors reported to viceroys from 1769-1774 and in the years after 1792; from 1774-1792, governors would report to the officer in command of the Interior Provinces.

Lieutenants (tenientes) or captains (capitánes) commanded individual presidios in California (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Captains of higher rank could also be comandantes, or port commanders.  If this was the case, they were also usually be chief of supplies.  Lieutenants fell below the office of captain.  The development of apprenticeship, described earlier, produced cadets, the lowest rank of commissioned officer.

Among the non-commissioned officers, or enlisted men, the sergeant was highest ranking (Williams 2001: [3], 1).  Sergeants were expected to read and write, as they often served in remote locations distant from the presidio.  “The sargentos were also given the primary responsibility for disciplining and training the troops,” (Williams: [3], 1).  Below these officers were the corporals, or cabos; they were the lowest ranking non-commissioned officers.  Soldados distinguidos (mentioned above), soldados liciencados (those distinguished in service), and soldados were the three types of soldiers within the military.  Soldados could become drummers or armorers if they possessed the specialized skills.

Superior horse riding was an ingrained and useful skill, distinguishing the soldados.  Frontier children were exposed to horses all their lives, and they were infatuated with the vaqueros’ riding abilities (Williams 2001: [3], 2).  Equestrian sports were common.  Furthermore, the hardiness of the troops was not questioned.  Nevertheless, their combat potential was disputed: the men could not properly use equipment, and they had no educational background in military tactics.  In fact, Prior to the Regulation of 1772 and the Ordinances of 1768, there was no formal training of military troops (Williams 2001: [3], 2).  Adequate training was limited to units with exceptional, knowable commanders.  A standardized system, derived from the Prussians, was not adopted until reforms were made in the late eighteenth century.

            Inspections, drills, and exercises, became routine after the new regulations.  “The quality of troop training seems to have peeked throughout the frontier under the administration of Teodoro de Croix (1776-1782),” (Williams 2001: [3], 2).  In addition to the Prussian-based system, aspects of French training were incorporated after 1803.  After 1821, training standards began to decline.

            “Nearly all basic training and drill would take place on the plaza de armas, which also served as the parade ground and town square,” (Williams 2001: [3], 2).  Timing was exercised to keep troops organized and moving simultaneously.  The drummer was an essential part of this; musical signals were learned.  Basic formations for the infantry and cavalry included columns and files (lines).  In the infantry, 21 formations were taught.  Men were organized into one of four ranks; each rank would perform a specific action to complete a formation.  “Squares, battle lines, and massed circles,” (Williams 2001: [3], 2) were the result.  “The soldiers were also trained to…march, retreat, disperse, halt, fire, cease fire, skirmish, pursue, charge, and attack,” (Williams: 2001 [3], 2).  Entire companies could pivot.  Regarding the cavalry, there were 30 formations.  Cavalry squadrons also divided men into four ranks.  “The troopers were expected to move in column, wheel right, wheel left (with pivots at the right, at the left and in the center), form battle lines (in one, two, three or four ranks), attack, charge, halt and fall-back,” (Williams 2001: [3], 2).  Gallops, trots, and dismounting were also practiced.   

            The large stallion was the horse of choice; these animals had to be tamed and arduously trained (Williams 2001: [3], 2).  Wild horses, accustomed to the calm of nature and startled easily, were slowly introduced to battle through a series of simulations.  Men trained their horses to hold formations and to charge.

The Atrocities

It is a well known fact that in Spanish-controlled California, the relationship that existed between the secular (military) and religious (missionary) powers was strained to say the least.  Fortunately, documents have preserved the history of this rocky relationship; the complaints of the Padres have been recorded.  This has allowed anthropologists to evaluate the behavior of the mission soldiers.  The atrocities committed included “chronic alcoholism,  direct violation of orders, larceny, the breaking of major aspects of church law (such as living in concubinage or marrying without permission), cattle rustling, desertion, mutiny, assault, and murder,” (Williams 2001: [3], 6).  “By far the most significant [and] serious crimes committed by troops stationed in Alta California involved sexual activities,” (Williams 2001: [3], 6).  Among these, rape was prevalent.

            In one letter entitled “Father Luis Jayme Criticizes the Behavior of Spanish Soldiers, 1772,” Father Jayme discusses the difficulties that he and other Padres are having in Christianizing the Indians.  These difficulties can be attributed to the contradictory behavior of the Spanish soldiers.  He states, “As for the example to be set by the soldiers, no doubt some of them are good exemplars and deserve to be treated accordingly, but very many of them deserve to be hanged on account of the continuous outrages which they are committing in seizing and raping the women,” (Chan 1997: 59).  He further explains that, when he rides out to the Indian villages with the other Padres, the natives flee into the woods, presuming military atrocities.  As reported by Antonia I. Castaneda, “the soldiers, adept as they are at lassoing cows and mules, would lasso Indian women—who then became prey for their unbridled lust.”  Risking starvation, the natives attempt to avoid any further degradation of their women.  Father Junipero Serra confirms that similar sexual attacks existed at every presidio establishment: “[atrocities began] shortly after the founding of the presidio and mission at Monterey in June 1770…and continued throughout the length of California,” (Castaneda 1997: 76).

            Amerindian women were not the sole victims of military crimes, however.  Several Indian men who tried to defend the women were shot to death,” (Castaneda 1997: 75).  In addition to physical violence, the Spanish soldiers would also wantonly ruin and/or steal the crops of the native villages (Chan 1997: 59).

            The founding of the Mission San Gabriel offers evidence of native resistance to Spaniards expeditions as well as retaliation caused by the abuses of soldiers.  In 1771, “Somera and Cambon with a guard of ten soldiers and a supply-train of mules under four muleteers and four soldiers…left San Diego to establish their new mission,” (Bancroft, 179).  The River San Miguel, later known as the River San Gabriel, was the chosen as a site, but hostile native demonstrations ensued to halt this progress.  A painting of the virgin was exposed, however; peace was maintained.  Due to the vast number of natives, forces at the mission were reinforced with two men.  Although natives were very productive and assisted in the construction and establishment of the mission, violent incidences soon occurred.  “There is little doubt that their sudden hostility arose from outrages by the soldiers on the native women,” (Bancroft, 181).  A crowd of resurgent natives attacked two horseback soldiers.  The chief of the natives was killed with a musket ball; the “savages” fled the destructive weaponry.  “The soldiers, cutting off the fallen warrior’s head, set it on a pole before the presidio gates,” (Bancroft, 181).  Forces were again reinforced with six men. 

In the end, the worst atrocities committed by the Spanish soldiers were obviously those of rape and murder; the significance of these crimes should not be diminished.  Some have blamed these actions on the institutions, stating, “sexual violence functioned as an institutionalized mechanism for ensuring subordination and compliance.  It was one instrument of sociopolitical terrorism and control—first of women and then of the group under conquest,” (Castaneda 1997: 82).  The Black Legend was manifest among the actions of the California military.  This concept “systematically overlooked and belittled Spanish achievements.  It held that…Spain was motivated strictly by ‘Glory, God, and Gold,” the implication being that something peculiar to the Spanish national character allowed bigotry, pride, and hypocrisy to color its approach in the New World,” (Hanlon 1994: 38).  However, as noted, there were exceptions; anthropologists must also remember what Father Jayme pointed out, “some of them [Spanish soldiers] are exemplars,” (Chan 1997: 59).  The White Legend also existed.

The military abuses that occurred in California should not be considered from a black and white perspective.  Rather, reality was very gray.  As in all societies and groups, men were both good and bad; men of the Spanish military were no exception to this.  We must consider the soldiers as human beings, each with very personal qualities.  Stereotypes and generalizations cannot pervade our perspective.

Conclusions

            During Spanish colonial expansion in the New World, there were two types of settlements originally planned; these included missions and presidios.  Missions were devoted to the task of evangelizing the native peoples.  The presidios, rather, were established for the protection and perpetuation of the mission system; in turn, this preserved California as part of the Spanish realm.  Thus, research of the colonial California military has one prominent, underlying theme: presidio and military presence were necessary for the success of the mission system.  Under religious and military institutions, California became a microcosm of Spain.  Consequentially, traditions of the Old World were remade in the New; social stratification and ethnocentrism were incorporated.  Soldiers, retaining these traditions, abused neophytes.  However, other soldiers had no role in the degradation and oppression of indigenous peoples.

            Research in this essay is confined to a general characterization of the men of California’s military and sheds light on the enlistment, organization, and training processes.  Furthermore, examples are provided that describe the abusive and non-abusive qualities of the soldiers.  Jack S. Williams was a major contributor; volume 3 of his work has been heavily incorporated into this report (it is cross-referenced with other available sources).  Williams is one among the few who have investigated the military institutions of the region in a holistic manner.  His work, though only in draft form, presents the collective study of the Ibero-American forces.  Retrieving information from previous authors’ research, primary documents, archaeology, experimental archaeology, and comparative data, Williams offers a well-rounded and unique approach to studying California’s military from 1769-1835.  His studies encompass the formal and informal aspects of the military system.  Future research should expand upon William’s military studies, including his chapters on equipment, tactics, retirement, and the navy (among others).  Further cross-referencing is needed.