On January 22, 23, and February 20 key staff from Gettysburg National Military Park and the Gettysburg NMP Advisory Commission met with a peer review panel of historians convened by the GNMP Advisory Commission. The different dates were necessary to accommodate the schedules of various historians on the panel. The historians serving on the panel were Ed Bearss, Dr. Charles Fennell, Dr. Gary Gallagher, General Hal Nelson, Dr. Harry Pfanz, Dr. Richard Rollins, and Mark Snell.

Gettysburg NMP is currently working on a General Management Plan that will guide management of the park for the next fifteen to twenty years. A critical element of that plan is the park’s effort to:

• document and map the change that has occurred on the battlefield from 1863 to present
• document and map what remains of the 1863 battlefield landscape, and
• determine the significance of landscape and topographic features associated with the battle.

The park staff has currently mapped and assembled documentation on the landscape for four crucial time periods in the battlefield’s history. They are:

• 1863 - The battlefield as it appeared at the time of the battle, based upon mapping completed by the U.S. Army and John Bachelder after the battle, reports, letters, etc., of citizens and soldiers, and photographs.
• 1895 - The battlefield at the end of the administration of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, and the beginning of the administration of the U.S. War Department.
• 1927 - The end of the era of battlefield administration by veterans. 1927 marks the death of Supt. Emmor B. Cope.
• 1993 - The most recent aerial mapping of the battlefield.

The development of this process required an extensive research and analysis process on the part of the park staff. In every intellectual undertaking of this magnitude there is always the lingering doubt as to the completeness of research, objectivity of analysis and soundness of conclusions no matter how impeccable the credentials of the worker.

The issue of doubt was raised during public comment at the November meeting of the GNMP Advisory Commission concerning the park staff’s assessment of battle related action on the proposed site of the new Visitor Center/Museum Complex.

The Advisory Commission Executive Committee decided to commission a peer review of the park staff’s conclusions relative to the military use and action upon the proposed Visitor Center site in an effort to facilitate satisfaction of any speculation and/or doubt in the public’s mind. Since the Park’s conclusions were based on the process of documentation of the battlefield landscape, it was a logical move to extend the Peer Review to include this process, its attendant documentation, and conclusions.

Peer Review Briefing

Park historians made presentations on each of the periods listed above to the peer review panel and explained the most significant findings from their research on each time period. The park Geographic Information Specialist briefed the panel on the process of mapping each of these era’s and how GIS can be used to effectively, and accurately illustrate the changes that have occurred to the 1863 landscape since the battle.

As a basis for understanding the significance of landscape features on the battlefield GNMP elected to use a methodology employed by the U.S. Army to evaluate terrain. The acronym for this methodology is K.O.C.O.A. The letters stand for the following:

• K = Key terrain. This is terrain that must be held or taken to achieve victory. For example, Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill is key terrain. The Peach Orchard, although tactically important, is not.
• O = Observation. This could apply to a signal station, an artillery battery, etc. It is terrain that permits observation of enemy movements or avenues of approach.
• C = Cover and concealment. Terrain that provides troops protection from enemy observation or fire.
• O = Obstacles. Natural or man-made features that stand in the way of seizing key terrain. This could be dense woods, a rail fence, a stream, rugged terrain, etc.
• A = Avenues of approach. Terrain by which the enemy may be approached. This might be the Chambersburg Pike, or simply ground over which troops could advance with minimal exposure to enemy fire or minimal disruption to appropriate attack formations.

Following a briefing on KOCOA, park staff explained how all of the above work is being used in General Management Plan alternatives and in evaluation of the proposed site for the new Visitor Center and Museum.

In addition to their discussion of the methodology and information presented during the peer review session, each historian was asked to submit in writing a brief report that addressed four questions:

• Evaluate the methodology, sources and process used to understand the extent of landscape change and the significance of features to the outcome of the battle.
• Suggest improvement to the methodology, sources and process
• Advise if the process the NPS has developed is a sufficient basis for General Management Plan level decisions.
• Advise if there is evidence of battle action or battle activity that we have missed in our evaluation of the LeVan and Fantasyland tracts.

Peer Review Conclusions

The following are the salient points each historian made to the questions asked of them. Responses are presented in the order the questions are listed above:

• "KOCOA, in conjunction with the four historic base maps, provides park management and the public with invaluable tools for informed decision making rather than conjecture. If park management and the public had been privy to this type of data, I believe that the 1961 decision to locate the Cyclorama Center adjacent to the High Water Mark and in 1989 to proceed with that part of the land exchange involving the east railroad cut would not have occurred. "
• "I enthusiastically endorse the methodology, process, and sources used by park staff in preparation of the four historic base maps and KOCOA. " Mr. Bearss recommended as far as KOCOA was concerned that attention be given to artillery concentration/groupings and their fields of fire. The Union artillery grouping assembled along the high ground running southeast from Cemetery Hill to the Baltimore Pike on July 2 was cited as an example.
• "It is my view that NPS has developed a satisfactory data bank for General Management Plan decision".
• "The briefing and familiarity with the battlefield gained during the last 32 years, and documentation presented satisfied me that the Levan Tract would be a proper location for the Cyclorama and Visitor Centers than their current locations. The Levan tract, if developed with care, is far less intrusive on the core area of the battlefield. Excepting the artillery positions on artillery ridge [the ridge from Cemetery Hill to Baltimore Pike] and Kinzie’s Knoll [see note below], troops movements east and west across the Levan Tract were not of overriding significance to the battle; the trade-off of development of the Levan tract as a center for visitor facilities to facilitate their relocation from north of Cemetery Ridge and Ziegler’s Grove and the restoration of those key sites to their appearance circa 1863 is vital to an understanding and appreciation of what happened when this hallowed landscape turned red in July 1863."

Mr. Bearss added that if the Levan tract is developed the NPS must insist on:

• It should be noted that although several historians identify Kinzie’s Knoll, there is in fact, no such feature identified by battle veterans. This is merely a name recently applied to a slight ridge the cuts across present day Hunt Avenue in a nominally northwest-southeast direction that was occupied by the Union artillery batteries of Lieutenant David H. Kinzie and Lieutenant Sylvanus T. Rugg, on part of July 2 and July 3. The position of both of these batteries is marked by War Department tablets erected in the 1880’s along the ridge occupied by the guns on the above stated days.

Dr. Charles Fennell:

• Observed that the methodology "is as impressive as it is unprecedented." However, Dr. Fennell noted that "not all battle action occurred on key terrain and not all key terrain hosted battle action." He also wrote that "if we only preserve the battle that was and not the battle that might have been, we are creating a sterile, unfeeling shrine which will have little, if any, meaning to future generations."
• Dr. Fennell did not offer suggestions to the methodology, sources and process, and did not comment upon whether the process developed is a sufficient basis for GMP level decisions, apart from his comments cited above.
• Dr. Fennell, like other historians, identified the positions of Kinzie’s and Rugg’s batteries as important for preservation. He continued; "Having established the position of Kinzie and Rugg on part of the ground proposed for the new visitor center-museum complex, it is recommended that this site be interpreted rather than developed. The rest of the tract is of less significance as a battle position and could provide for the new complex if tactfully done." Dr. Fennell expressed concern about development of privately owned property, outside of the park boundary along the Baltimore Pike, and recommended that the ground along the pike "from Cemetery Hill to Rock Creek should be preserved and returned to its 1863 appearance."

• "I am impressed with the methodology employed by the NPS staff in seeking to understand and map changes in the battlefield’s landscape and in relating features of the landscape to the progress and outcome of the battle. The series of maps locating fences (and by extension and outcome of fields), woods, orchards, roads, railroads, streets, and streams in the benchmark years 1863, 1895, 1927, and 1993/1997 cannot be praised too highly."

"The maps depicting zones of battle action on each of the three days of combat, together with the map that combines the data from those three to offer a composite picture of areas of combat on all three days, convey as much information at a glance as can be gleaned from a great deal of reading in primary and secondary materials. The map depicting KOCOA elements also is very useful, allowing even the uninitiated in military affairs and concerns to grasp why certain points and areas on the battlefield were more important than others."

• "I cannot offer any suggestions for improvements of the methodology, sources, or process. I can only reiterate that I believe the NPS staff involved in this project pursued their goals of mapping landscape changes and relating terrain to the battle’s outcome in an exemplary fashion."
• "Having said that [the above point], it will come as no surprise that I believe the NPS developed a process that provides a more than sufficient basis on which to base decisions at the General Management Plan level."
• "I believe the NPS has reached entirely sound conclusions regarding the extent of action on this ground. The historic records clearly indicate that there was minor artillery activity directed toward Culp’s Hill from a small ridge near the proposed site for the new visitor center. That action involved a pair of batteries—neither of which suffered any casualties in the action. Union infantry also moved across the ground on July 2 and may have suffered four casualties (that the casualties were suffered on these parcels of ground cannot be determined with assurance). None of the three maps depicting zones of fighting shows even tertiary action on these parcels, and I firmly agree that they should not do so. There simply was not significant action of any kind on either the LeVan or Fantasyland tract."

Gen. Hal Nelson:

• Gen. Nelson approved of the methodology being employed by the park, observing the work completed, "highlights the importance of past management decisions that have literally shaped the landscape, providing a helpful resource for the ongoing discussion of preservation and restoration options." He , felt that, "the KOCOA interpretive method combined with traditional troop location/movement gives an excellent framework to determine significance of landscape features." He also commented that the source material is being used appropriately, and that the methodology allowed for continuous improvement as new sources are consulted or discovered.
• Gen. Nelson suggested that the park should, "begin intensive research on the 1863 base map for those locations where significant features seem to merit detailed work. . . Projecting the battle action overlays on the 1863 base maps as well as the 1993 base maps would highlight areas where this research is needed." Although he stated, "the underlying process of analysis does not require improvement, he offered the following recommendations for improvement 1) the park should maintain a list of "puzzles" and "gaps," that future research might offer answers to 2) the park should make contact with the U.S. Army War College as a source for discussion of our efforts to apply KOCOA to a historical battlefield 3) the mapping completed should be made available for examination in public meetings and presentations.
• "I believe the process demonstrated on January 23 provides appropriate historical input for General Management Plan decisions. Many people who are providing ‘overwatch’ on the GMP would benefit from having access to the process and its products. Many of us know too little about the ways in which terrain has been modified since 1863, and I think all parties to the discussions would make more meaningful contributions if they were better informed."
• "I know of no evidence of battle action or battle activity that NPS historians have missed in the evaluation of the LeVan and Fantasyland tracts." Gen. Nelson further stated that he believed the War Department markers to Kinzie’s and Rugg’s batteries accurately mark the ridge upon which the batteries were positioned.

• "It seems to me that the methodology, sources, and process to understand the battlefield terrain are quite adequate. As I ponder what I think that I heard and saw in the course of the presentation, I am inclined to wonder if there might be overkill in the use of the Army’s KOCOA process. Yet, if so, this would be erring on the side of caution, and I would yield to the planners judgment on this."
• Dr. Pfanz had no improvements to the methodology, sources, and process, to suggest. He noted that written materials on the battle should be carefully examined, particularly for information on crops and fences, as many fences were destroyed during the battle and crops changed.
• "I believe that the final product will be an adequate basis for decisions. Whether or not the necessary decisions will be made on the basis of the plan is another matter that must be closely monitored. It seems to me also that there should be a provision for changes in the plan based on any new and better information that might be uncovered from time to time. I presume there is a mechanism for this."
• "I don’t recall many references to the use of the Fantasyland and LeVan tracts during the battle. However, it is apparent that they were busy places during the battle. The eastern portion of the LeVan tract, as is known, had an integral part in the battle on Culp’s Hill. Two batteries, Kinzie’s and Rugg’s, occupied the swell of ground on or near where they are marked and from there they covered the open swale toward Spangler’s Spring and on the morning of 3 July shelled the Confederate forces on the lower crest of Culp’s Hill. During the battle the batteries were supported by Union infantry regiments posted along the east side of the tract and along the

• "Gettysburg National Military Park is now engaged in a project that is long overdue, and holds great promise for the future of the park. Upon completion, it will establish an objective, factual basis for future important decisions shaping the management of the Park. This is major step towards achieving a comprehensive plan for the park’s long term management. "

• Dr. Rollins did not comment upon this question.
• Dr. Rollins’ only comment upon this question was; "For the record, Kinzie’s Knoll was an important artillery site on July 2^nd and 3^rd, and must not be compromised in any way."

Mark Snell

• "Using the terrain-evaluation process known in the military as KOCOA, the ranger-historians at GNMP have done a superb job of analyzing the significant terrain features of the battlefield and assessing their impact upon military operations that occurred in 1863. The base maps will be especially useful in the interpretive process."
• Mr. Snell offered five suggestions for improvements:

1. He thought the base maps and any accompanying narrative should differentiate between "key terrain" and "decisive terrain." As an example he noted that both Little Round Top and Big Round Top are key terrain features, but the outcome of the July 2 battle on the Union left was determined on Little Round Top, due to the fields of fire on its western slope.
2. He recommended a base map be drawn that includes view-sheds of the battlefield - that observation should be interpreted not only in the military sense, but also in the preservation sense.
3. "Areas that were used for logistical purposes (hospitals, ordnance parks, main supply routes, headquarters, etc.) should be included on the KOCOA map or on a separate map, even if these areas are not within the park boundary."
4. "A larger area map should include areas such as Hunterstown and Brinkershoff’s Ridge."

He recommends that the completed mapping be sent to the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, since it is more concerned with tactical and operational warfare, to allow its experts to evaluate it.

• "Yes, if the suggestions made by the Peer Review Panel are incorporated. In addition it would be prudent to incorporate a separate study in which all of GNMP’s previous land restoration/preservation efforts are detailed, such as the removal of the non-historic rail lines running through the park, the demolition of non-historic buildings, and the replanting of historic vegetation patters, to name a few."
• Mr. Snell did not indicate any battle action or battle activity overlooked by NPS historians.

Report Summary

• The peer review panel endorsed the validity of the methodology design, the use of relevant source material and the output of comparative base maps reflecting the terrain features present from 1863 to the present. The panel further endorsed the applicability of KOCOA when used with the base maps to identify critical terrain features affecting the outcome of the battle.
• The panel recommended the maps be amended with the addition of artillery positions and fields of fire so as to be on the same level of importance as infantry action. This will give an expanded view of battle action and key terrain.
• The panel recommended the continued refinement and use of the process to include at a minimum the continuation of the peer review process as a means of testing conclusions and providing outside input.
• The panel endorsed the process as a valid and sufficient basis for General Management Plan (GMP) level decisions.
• The panel agreed with the park historians’ assessment of battle related activity experienced on the Levan property during July 1-3, 1863.
• The panel further agreed that the probable site of Kinzie’s Battery K, 5^th U.S. Artillery, during its action against Confederate infantry positions on Culp’s Hill during the morning of July 3, was on the ridge running essentially perpendicular to Hunt Avenue, where a battery tablet to it and Lieutenant Rugg’s Battery F, 4^th U.S. Artillery, are located. This, the panel agrees, was the only battle action that took place on the tract during the battle.
• The panel unanimously agrees that it is imperative that the site of Kinzie’s and Rugg’s batteries remain undisturbed by construction and be interpreted within the Baltimore Pike artillery line.

1999 General Management Plan History

Park Planning

National Park Service
Gettysburg National Military Park
97 Taneytown Road
Gettysburg, PA 17325