Craters of the Moon Administrative History

Chapter 6:
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Resource Management At Craters Of The Moon:
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT - THE DEVELOPING PROGRAM

As with other phases of the monument's management, wildlife management was largely an unorganized enterprise until the 1950s. [178] While hunting is prohibited at Craters of the Moon, deer poaching has occurred with frequent regularity and has occupied administrative time and energy since the monument's establishment. A central contributing factor has been the northern boundary which follows a grid rather than a topographical pattern along the hydrographic divide. The boundary's "unnatural" location often confuses hunters outside the monument who accidentally cross into and kill an animal on Park Service land. For those less respectful, the vagaries of the boundary provide a good excuse. [179] Besides the boundary problem is the attraction of the well-sized deer themselves. Compounding the problem further is the herd's seasonal migration to the monument's northern unit (with its relatively lush vegetation and water) where it finds sanctuary during the fall hunting season as pressure on outside lands increases. Although early managers displayed concern for other species, sporadically inventorying animals within the monument boundaries as funding and staffing allowed, they concentrated primarily on preserving the deer herd--patrolling the boundary of the northern unit to inform hunters of Park Service regulations. In doing so, they mostly offered visual deterrence.

A Program in Disrepair

During the war years, even this minimal level of wildlife management decreased. In the fall of 1945, both the director of Region Four and the Washington office believed that the monument's attention to wildlife resources was falling short of Service policy. Regional Director O.A. Tomlinson was unsatisfied with Custodian Guy E. McCarty's October wildlife report, which stated that in 1945 "work in the field of wildlife at this area...consisted of patrol during hunting season, and putting out salt for the deer." [180] Tomlinson objected to the cursory nature of the McCarty's program, as did NPS Acting Director Hillory Tolson. Salting for deer also raised substantial concern. Not only did it run contrary to Service policy, it also introduced abnormalities, concentrating animals in specific areas and resulting in landscape disturbance due to salting and overgrazing. Tolson recommended that McCarty desist from salting, and Tomlinson admonished the custodian for not putting more effort into his duties. [181]

While the directors may have been correct in their assertions regarding Service wildlife policy, the war years had left the monument's administration threadbare. McCarty was the lone permanent employee assisted only by fluctuating seasonal staff who were usually terminated by fall hunting season. Moreover, the war era and gas rationing increased local pressure on the monument's herd. Until restrictions were lifted after the World War II, hunters were unable to range far from home. [182] While the custodian's single-sentence report of October 1945 suggested apathetic management, his wildlife reports did include a significant roster of fauna.

Law Enforcement, Cooperation, and Research

Typifying wildlife problems at the monument, McCarty discovered in November 1946 that many "hunters were receiving information, from around Twin Falls and vicinity, [sic] that the area north of the highway was open to hunting. This required continuous patrol to head them off before they got started." [183] Working in cooperation with the state game warden and county sheriff, the custodian helped arrest two hunters, who were fined in Arco approximately one hundred dollars. [184] It appears that this event represented the first reported law enforcement action at the monument involving wildlife. More importantly, perhaps, is that it signifies roots of cooperation between local and state law enforcement agencies and monument personnel in controlling illegal hunting.

It is known, for example, that Custodian McCarty participated in area law enforcement as a substitute Butte County Sheriff in September 1946, [185] and it is likely that he operated in the capacity of Idaho Deputy Sheriff and Game Conservation Officer, as authorized by a May 26, 1943 memorandum from the Department of the Interior. [186] His successor, Superintendent Aubrey Houston, did become deputized under that directive in October 1951, launching a long-term trend of active and cooperative law enforcement toward poaching. [187]

The policy of seeking law enforcement credentials and cooperation to combat poaching lacked in application what it gained in principle. The monument's small staff was simply unable to keep pace with increasing threats. During the early 1950s, local population grew with the installation of the Atomic Energy Commission's facility in the Lost River Valley, which in turn expanded hunting pressures on wildlife (primarily mule deer) near and in the monument. While day and night patrols in 1951, for example, netted some illegal hunters, others went undetected or unprosecuted. Reflecting on the 1951 season, Superintendent Houston cited the standard pre-Mission 66 analysis of the monument's administration: "Lack of adequate personnel made it possible for poachers to kill four deer during the last hunting season." Other outside pressures tended to exacerbate management problems as well. The classification change from "special hunt" to "open country" in the adjacent Lost River Range, for example, caused the herd to incur greater stress as hunting blanketed the region for the extent of the season rather than being limited to specific places and periods. But no matter the season, closed or open, Houston concluded, poaching remains a problem, "and frequent patrols are needed to meet this threat." [188]

Even the addition of the monument's first permanent ranger (in spring of 1952), frequent patrols and roadblocks in the hill country near the northern unit did not appreciably end violations by the late 1950s. This led to another cooperative effort: Park Service officials and Idaho Fish and Game Department officers marked the boundary of the northern unit together, posting hunting closure signs on September 29, 1959. [189] The 1960s saw more of the same--night patrols tried to deter spotlighting, and boundary surveys of the Little Cottonwood drainage distinguished Bureau of Land Management lands from those of the Park Service. But more policy changes were required.

Turning to the law, in a February 1964 report, Superintendent Daniel Davis signaled the need for better state and federal law enforcement regulations in protection of the monument's wildlife, especially the deer herd. To that end, Davis contacted the Idaho State Fish and Game Commission "in hopes of getting state hunting regulations pertinent to Craters of the Moon changed to more closely coincide with federal regulations." The loophole at the time stemmed from the fact that while the monument was classed a "`closed area' for hunting it is not a state offense to carry a loaded gun or shoot on the monument as long as a game animal is not killed." As an example, coyotes or mountain lions "could legally be killed as far as the state is concerned." Enforcement was also exacerbated by the monument's distance from the nearest federal magistrate, located several hours from Craters of the Moon, and consuming precious time for a small staff to seek a conviction. [190]

Although the outcome of Davis' attempts to upgrade the monument's wildlife management program is not known, a significant policy highlight took place the following year. In the summer of 1965, Superintendent Roger Contor drafted the Long Range Wildlife Management Plan for Craters of the Moon National Monument. Approved August 16, 1965, the document stated that previous management activities "have been negligible." Rather than highlight legal deficiencies as had his predecessors, Contor instead stressed research as the primary management tool. Objectives of the plan were oriented towards all wildlife in order "to maintain and, where practical, re-establish representative populations of native wildlife and plant communities in a healthy ecological environment which provides each species a reasonable opportunity to perpetuate itself." [191] Expressing the philosophy of "original conditions," as called for in the Leopold Report, the management program would attempt to better understand wildlife, such as deer, through research, and base management directions on relevant and contemporary wildlife studies. In addition, it was determined that the monument's small size was not conducive to harboring predatory animals year round; controls in the grazing country outside the monument thinned the number of predators to the extent that predator management was largely unnecessary. [192]

While the focus was on all of the monument's animals, once more the popular deer herd drew the most attention. Vegetation and population studies were needed to determine range carrying capacity and composition, as well as the growth rate of the herd, which appeared to be on the increase since the area's establishment. Visual observations suggested that vegetation was suffering impacts from deer browsing--a concern on record since the mid-1950s. [193] And only after proper investigation, then, could resource managers determine appropriate controls. Were reduction required, for instance, Contor decided that public hunting, ironically, would prove beneficial. If necessary, monument and state wildlife personnel could even haze the deer out of the boundaries during hunting season for several days. [194]

Superintendent Contor's recommendations and attempts to initiate wildlife research met with success after his departure. [195] Between April 1967 and January 1968, the first mule deer study was conducted by Brent Ritchie, a seasonal ranger and graduate student in wildlife biology, who carried out his research on his own time. Ritchie's research focused on the population, migratory characteristics, and life cycles of the herd. Ritchie also established permanent range transects to monitor forage growth and use. At most, the study led to a more informed observational management program, from which, it was hoped, more substantial management programs could emerge for "herd and range use controls." [196]

Evidently this type of research satisfied management concerns at the time about the herd's life history and interaction with the surrounding environment. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, population and range issues were all but absent from issues surrounding the herd, and illegal hunting still constituted the greatest threat. For Superintendent Paul Fritz, the best program for mitigating hunting impacts reflected standard policy practiced by the first monument managers--patrol. But to this he added a higher level of public contact, informing both the hunters and the community at large of Park Service regulations and the monument's mission. [197] Good public relations alone, however, failed to curtail violations to a satisfactory level. As stated in the monument's 1972 annual report, enforcement required more legal punch. "A bail-bond system would help mete out justice and could serve as a deterrent to further poaching." [198] The state passed a bail-bond system two years later, and monument personnel welcomed the new measure. [199]

New measure or not, when Robert Hentges assumed the superintendency at the monument in 1974, he and his staff pursued a stricter protection program. Like other managers before him, Hentges upscaled patrols, and completed a northern unit boundary marking program in 1977. [200]

Although he reported early success from this program, Hentges also noted that illegal hunting continued to be influenced by forces beyond the monument's immediate jurisdiction. Hentges remarked that poaching correlated with Idaho's fluctuating hunting regulations. A general opening date for the hunting season, as was the case in the late 1970s, for example, caused less pressure on the monument's deer herd because hunters were dispersed throughout the state--all at one time. Separate openings, on the other hand, staggered the hunting season, and, as Hentges recalled, attracted more hunters to the monument who were looking to bag an "extra" deer before hunting one legally elsewhere. [201]

To counter poaching, Hentges broke with traditional policies and went one step further. His roadblocking and spiking program presents the best example of his quest for wildlife protection. Accessibility constituted a great threat to the herd. When Hentges arrived, poachers were driving onto the north unit on the old road bed of Goodale's Cutoff. To combat illegal entrance from the west, the superintendent stacked rocks and posted more warning signs. Even so, Hentges recalled, determined hunters detoured around them. He executed his most extreme deterrent near the eastern entrance. He ran a cable gate up the hillside closing access to the road. Here, too, he spread signs out along the ridgeline and unused two-track roads warning trespassers of unlawful entrance. It was along these old roads that Hentges buried long, metal spikes mounted in boards. Instead of a hunter, though, the spikes trapped a rancher, who, without heeding orders to contact a ranger first, attempted to retrieve his cattle from within the northern unit. The act took place at night; the violator lost all four tires, confronted the superintendent with the spikes the next day, and took his case to the sheriff. While Hentges believed he was right, he removed the remaining spikes at the sheriff's request--to avoid public controversy and respect the state's jurisdiction at the monument. But, as Hentges recalled, "word got around, and I never saw another track in the park around our gates." While this might have been an overstatement, the incident indeed proved to be an effective "rumor" for reducing the number of poachers operating out of vehicles, leaving rangers more time to pursue those hunters who entered on horseback or foot. [202]

In the late 1970s, additional personnel also aided in the resource management program and in protection of the mule deer herd. When Chief Ranger Neil King joined the staff at Craters of the Moon in 1978, he replaced a ranger who had not been very effective. [203] King helped establish regular patrols and a formal program of hunter contacts--giving hunters printed handouts of monument regulations outside the boundary. But more significantly, King used his law enforcement knowledge and experience (reflecting the systemwide trend to commission law enforcement rangers) to work with local and state agencies to rectify the poaching issue.

In the meantime, other steps taken to improve herd management involved more research. It was one thing to concentrate on poaching, but while the herd "provided meat and trophies for those outside the boundaries," it had high significance for the monument visitor, according to Hentges. The herd's north to south migrations through the monument provided excitement "for the park visitor who drives the loop drive road in the early morning light....This herd is a major resource at the park and needs to be studied more thoroughly in order to be managed properly in the future." [204]

To this end, the National Park Service and the Cooperative Park Studies Unit at the University of Idaho funded a three-year study in May 1980 to investigate the life cycles and characteristics of the herd. The study, conducted by wildlife biologist Brad Griffith, helped answer questions about the herd's population; Griffith determined that hunting provided a major population control (contrary to past beliefs that dispersal was the reason) as did natural mortality, and to a lesser extent highway accidents. In addition, findings confirmed the north-south migratory pattern, and also proved that the herd dispersed over the monument's entire vegetated range. Finally, Griffith countered previous conclusions that the herd damaged its forage supply. [205]

In terms of management, Griffith recommended ten guidelines for monitoring the herd's population and habitat. Included in these were methods to acquire estimates on herd population size, productivity, and winter survival of fawns. Hentges, while pleased with the report overall, expressed some embarrassment over the recommendations. The monument was unable to review the document prior to publication and had concerns with some of its conclusions; this caused managers, in some instances, to apparently contradict their own policies during consultations with state and federal cooperating agencies familiar with the report.

Hentges called attention to two recommendations in particular that posed problems. The first was the suggestion to develop and implement a prescription burning program for the northern unit, a debatable idea. Other factors besides the deer herd, such as public opinion, planning, and Park Service policy, were involved in this type of policy and further study would be necessary. The second recommendation concerned reduction in road kills during heavy visitation in August and September. Deer were attracted to the visitor center lawns and sprinkling system across the highway from the northern unit, and the report advised that both be removed and be replaced with native vegetation. On this point, Hentges stated that "Visitor use patterns, grounds, maintenance," to name a few things "all must be considered [first]. To phase out the entire lawn system is not acceptable to park management." [206]

Moreover, the study helped implement two standard operating procedures in the monument's resource management program. Beginning in 1983, population and vegetation monitoring were incorporated into the herd's management. [207] The study also provided the basis for entering into a long-term cooperative agreement with the Idaho Department of Fish and Game. The agreement had been a goal of the research program because the monument is but one agency managing the herd, [208] which migrates through Craters of the Moon. Approved on September 14, 1984, the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Idaho Department Fish and Game and the National Park Service provided for management of the mule deer herd "in recognition of the need for cooperation in the preservation, use and management of wildlife within the Craters of the Moon National Monument and upon adjacent and State lands." [209]

The memorandum crowned a four-year effort, brought about mostly by Chief Ranger Neil King in 1979, who believed that law enforcement was one of the best methods for protecting the herd. Because of the monument's proprietary jurisdiction, the National Park Service possesses only regulatory authority at the monument, whereas the state "has the legal obligation and authority to enforce criminal law in the park." [210] State authority was requisite to properly manage the herd, and impossible without a written agreement. Generally, the agreement allowed monument rangers to enforce state laws and formalized the practice of deputizing rangers as conservation officers. Thus, not only could rangers enforce state regulations inside the monument, but they could also assist state officials outside the area's boundaries. No longer were rangers helpless to stop activities occurring just outside monument borders. Now they were able to issue citations and successfully prosecute cases. The program under the agreement, related Superintendent Hentges, will place the park

in a position to effectively meet our management objects of...maintaining solid data on the deer population that will be accepted by the other cooperating resource management agencies...provide maximum protection for the deer herd while maintaining good relations with hunters along the monument boundaries...more effectively control poaching/illegal killing of deer and...prosecute poachers in the most efficient and cost effective manner. [211]

And for the Department of Fish and Game, the agreement permitted the agency to better fulfill its legal obligations at the monument, while at the same time concentrate its efforts elsewhere. [212] Lasting for a period of five years, the document was reaffirmed on October 26, 1989.

In a historical context, the 1984 memorandum represents a significant wildlife management landmark. While the effort to formalize the cooperation between agencies lasted four years, the process transpired over a longer period of time. Monument officials since at least the 1940s collaborated with state game wardens to protect the monument's wildlife. The agreement also helped to institute active law enforcement, patrols, monitoring, and interagency cooperation as the basis for mule deer management.

In 1987, Superintendent Robert Scott announced successes in herd management. For example, cooperation among the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Idaho Fish and Game, and the monument resulted in the arrest and conviction of individuals involved in three separate poaching operations outside the area's boundaries. More significantly, perhaps for the first time, no known poaching occurred within the monument. [213] Even so, several citations are issued each season, in or near the monument, for illegal hunting. To date, no real changes are foreseen in managing the herd. [214]