After halting at Burr's Mill late on the afternoon of January 16, 1781, Colonel Tarleton dispatched patrols and spies to observe the movements of Morgan and his people. The 17th Light Dragoons were directed to follow the foe till dark, while spies were to question people known for their Whig sympathies as to what they might know about Morgan's intentions.

It was after dark before Tarleton received his first reports. A patrol had watched the Americans as they "struck into byways," leading toward Thicketty Creek. Not long thereafter, a party of Loyalists brought in an American Colonel of Militia who had strayed from his unit. Tarleton questioned the Colonel. The information gained, along with other reports collected by his men, satisfied Tarleton that his proper course of action would be to hang "upon General Morgan's rear, to impede the junction of reinforcements, said to be approaching, and likewise to prevent his passing Broad river without the knowledge of the light troops. . . ."

About midnight, Tarleton was awakened to receive a report that a "corps of mountaineers" were on the march from Green River to join Morgan. This added to the urgency of the situation—the Americans would have to be watched closely, if he were to capitalize on any mistakes Morgan might make. [1]

Tarleton was so eager to fulfill his boast to destroy Morgan's corps or push it back against Kings Mountain, where Lord Cornwallis could finish it off, that he allowed his men little rest on the night of the 16th. At 3 a.m. on January 17, 1781, Tarleton called in his pickets, and the British took up the march. [2] The redcoats followed the route taken by the Americans the preceding evening, as they had pulled back to the Cowpens. Since he would travel light and fast, Tarleton left his baggage and wagons behind. The troops, detailed from each unit of the corps to guard the train, were to follow the main column at daybreak.

As the column moved out in the darkness, three companies of light infantry, supported by the Legion infantry, took the advance. The 7th Fusiliers, the Royal Artillerists with their two 3-pounders, and the 1st Battalion 71st (Fraser's Highlanders) constituted the main column; the cavalry and mounted infantry brought up the rear. Progress was slowed by the configuration of the terrain. Numerous creeks and ravines had to be crossed in the darkness. In addition, the men guarding the flanks had to move cautiously, because this was ambush country. Before dawn, Thicketty Creek was crossed. Tarleton now called a brief halt to let an advance guard of cavalry take the lead. An American patrol led by Captain Inman was encountered, pursued, and two of its members captured. The prisoners, when questioned, told the British that Morgan was camped five miles away. Where upon, Tarleton ordered Captain Ogilvie of the Legion to the front with two companies of dragoons. The chase was not continued much farther before Captain Ogilvie sent word that the Rebels had halted and were forming for battle. [3]

Tarleton now called for and closely questioned his guides. These people, who were familiar with the area, explained that

the woods were open and free from swamps; that the part of Broad River, just above the place where King's creek joined the stream, was about six miles distant from the enemy's left flank, and that the river, by making a curve to the westward, ran parallel to their rear. [4]

Subsequently, Tarleton reported:

America does not produce many more suitable [fields for battle] to the nature of the troops under. . . [my] command. The situation of the enemy was desperate in case of misfortune; an open country, and a river in their rear, must have thrown them entirely in the power of a superior cavalry; whilst the light troops, in case of a repulse, had the expectation of a neighboring force to protect them from destruction. [5]

Tarleton accordingly was delighted with the situation. He believed he had Morgan just where he wanted him—with a rain-swollen river to his rear. In case of a repulse, Tarleton could look to Cornwallis and Leslie for assistance. He would attack immediately. Orders were given for the Legion dragoons to drive in the militia patrols covering Morgan's front, so the British could reconnoiter Morgan's position. Pressing forward on the Mill Gap Road, the Legionaries forced Captains Inman's and Price's scouts to pull back. Tarleton was now able to ascertain that the Americans had posted their troops in two lines—the front line, he estimated, to consist of about 1,000 militia and the second of 500 Continentals. After having studied the American position, Tarleton had his officers see that their men shucked their gear, except their arms and ammunition. The Light Infantry Battalion was filed to the left till its front equalled that of Pickens' militia posted east of the road. [6] The green-uniformed infantry of the British Legion filed into position on the left of the Light Infantry Battalion. [7] A 3-pounder, called a "grasshopper", was positioned between these two units.

Covered by the fire of the 3-pounder, these commands closed to within 300 yards of Morgan's skirmish line. Next, the 7th Fusiliers were advanced and formed on the left of the Legion infantry, while the other 3-pounder was emplaced along the right of the 7th Fusiliers. [8] A captain, each with 50 dragoons, was posted to the right and left of the infantry battle line. Besides guarding Tarleton's flanks, the dragoons would threaten those of the Americans. The 1st Battalion, 71st Infantry (Fraser's Highlanders) was ordered to form 150 yards to the rear and echeloned to the left of the 7th Fusiliers. The kilted Highlanders, along with 200 green-uniformed horsemen of the British Legion, were to constitute Tarleton's reserve. [9]

Tarleton, his fighting blood aroused, was so eager to close with the foe that he ordered the attacks before his officers could complete their dispositions. Major Newmarsh of the 7th Fusiliers was still posting his officers. The 1st Battalion, 71st Infantry and the cavalry had not disentangled themselves from "the brushwood with which... [Thicketty] Creek abounds" at the time they were directed to form and await orders. [10]

Astride his horse, behind Howard's Continentals, Morgan caught sight of green-jacketed dragoons riding among the trees at the far end of the slope, 400 yards in front of his skirmishers. They were followed by infantrymen in red and white. It was about 7 a.m., and the day was clear and cold. As the British gathered at the edge of the open woods, Tarleton sent a detachment of dragoons to scatter Morgan's skirmishers. Cunningham's Georgians and McDowell's North Carolinians obeyed their orders. As they retired on Pickens' line, they kept up a desultory but effective fire which unhorsed 15 of the British. [11] One section of the skirmishers merged with Pickens' militia, while the remainder circled and reformed in rear of Howard's Continentals. [12]

After the dragoons had been recalled, it was intended that McDowell's and Cunningham's people should resume their positions in front of Pickens' battle line. Before they could do so, Tarleton's artillery roared into action, under cover of which his right wing took up the advance. [13]

As drums rolled and fifes shrilled, the British "raised a prodigious yell and came running as if they intended to eat us up," Morgan recalled. "It was the most beautiful line I ever saw, commented Thomas Young of Jolly's cavalry:

When they shouted, I heard Morgan say, "They gave us the British halloo, boys. Give them the Indian halloo, by God!" and he galloped along the lines, cheering his men and telling them not to fire until he could see the whites of their eyes. Every officer was crying "Don't fire!" for it was a hard matter to keep us from it. [14]

Some of the recruits of the 7th Fusiliers lost their nerve and halted and opened fire. Their officers moved in, and after a few of the men had been knocked sprawling with the flat of a saber, they came to their senses. They then moved out "in as good a line as troops could move at open files." [15]

Covered by the fire of their artillery, the British drove to within 150 yards of Pickens' battle line, when the militia, at Pickens' command, let loose a deadly volley. A number of red coats and green-coated legionaries were cut down, including several of the "epaulet men." The militia reloaded and fired again, staggering Tarleton's battle line. Being veterans, the British did not panic easily. They quickly dressed their ranks and pressed on, their bayonets at the ready. The militia, in accordance with Morgan's orders, now filed off toward the left end of Howard's line. [16]

Tarleton, seeing the militia take to their heels, sensed that victory was at hand. He ordered Captain Ogilvie, who commanded the 50 dragoons on the right, to charge the retreating Americans. By the time the hard-riding men of the 17th Light Dragoons thundered forward, the troops constituting Pickens' right had not passed from in front of Howard's line. Assailed by the dragoons they panicked, and instead of halting at Howard's line, they sought safety by fleeing toward the crest where Washington's cavalry was posted. [17]

Some of Pickens' militia ran fast enough to get to their horses and vanish. One of the militia officers was Lieutenant Hughes:

a man of great personal strength and of remarkable fleetness on foot. As [Hughes'] men, with others, broke. . . and fled before Tarleton's cavalry. . .with his drawn sword he would out-run his men and passing them, face about, and command them to stand, striking right and left to enforce obedience to orders; often repeating with a loud voice: "You damned cowards, halt and fight! If you don't stop and fight, you'll all be killed!" But most of them were for a while too demoralized to realize the situation or obey the commands of their officers. As they would scamper off, Hughes would renewedly pursue, and once more gaining their front, would repeat his tactics to bring them to their duty. At length the company was induced to make a stand, on the brow of a slope, some distance from the battle line, behind a clump of young pines that partially concealed and protected them from Tarleton's cavalry. [18]

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Morgan saw the British horsesoldiers thunder forward, and he determined to commit his reserve—Colonel Washington's cavalry. As Ogilvie's dragoons rode among the Americans, Washington's horsemen struck them with such force that the British fled. Though Washington pursued them, Collins reported they were as hard to catch as a "drove of wild Choctaw steers." [19]

Meanwhile, Morgan had galloped to the end of Howard's line to rally the militia. While brandishing his sword and shouting encouragement to the last units to leave the field, he saw that many of the irregulars were heading for the area where their horses were tethered. Riding after them, he bellowed, "Form, form, my brave fellows...Old Morgan was never beaten." Assisted by Pickens, Morgan halted most of the militia, and the two officers began to re-form them behind Howard's main line of resistance. [20]

The British, believing that victory was in their grasp, let go a wild shout and advanced up the gentle slope against Howard's position. As soon as the militia had passed across their front to the left, Howard's men opened fire. A desperate fight ensued. For the better part of the next fifteen minutes, neither side gained an inch. Tarleton determined to commit his reserve. The 1st Battalion, 71st (Fraser's Highlanders) was to assail Howard's Continentals, while the cavalry threatened Morgan's right. The reserve at this time was about a mile away. Major Archibald McArthur of the Highlanders was told to pass the 7th Fusiliers before halting his men and having them blaze away. He was cautioned not to entangle his right with the left of the 7th. The cavalry of the British Legion, reinforced by the 50 dragoons posted to the left of the artillery, was to incline to the left, and to form a line, which would envelop the Americans' right. [21]

The Highlanders came forward on the double with their bagpipes skirling. The arrival of the Highlanders enabled the British to extend their left so that it overlapped Howard's right. Morgan at the same time saw that the British horse was getting ready to charge his endangered flank. Responding to this emergency with his characteristic alacrity, Morgan sent Colonel Brannon with instructions for Colonel Washington to regroup his troopers and to assail the foe before they could carry out their mission. [22]

After having taken this action, Morgan rode to the point of danger, where he found Colonel Howard badly shaken by the turn of events. Seeing that his right had been outflanked by the Highlanders, Howard decided that the best way to cope with this danger was by changing the front of his right flank company, Wallace's Virginians. Howard ordered Wallace's company to face about in line, then wheel to its left to form a right angle with the rest of the battle line, and thus be better able to oppose the advance of the Highlanders. This order was misunderstood, however. In executing it, the Virginia militia, after coming to the right about, marched forward and toward the rear, instead of wheeling to the right. Other officers along the line seeing this, and supposing that orders had been given for a retreat, faced their men about and moved rearward.

Morgan was understandably distressed by this development. Calling to Howard, he inquired, "Why are your men retreating?"

Howard replied, "I am trying to save my right flank."

"Are you beaten?"

"Do men who march like that look as though they are beaten?" Howard asked.

Morgan saw that the men were marching to the rear, as if they were on parade. His confidence restored, Morgan told Howard to remain with his men until they reached "the rising ground near Washington's horse." He then rode ahead to select the "proper place for us to halt and face about." [23]

This was the climax of the battle and the crucial decision. If Morgan had panicked or not gone along quickly with Howard, the Cowpens would have had a different ending. As it was, the misunderstood order called for a lightning-like decision, an almost intuitive reaction. Daniel Morgan met the crisis superbly.

Tarleton's soldiers had seen the Continentals and Virginia militia start to retreat and assumed that victory was at hand. Shouting louder than ever in their eagerness to be in on the kill, the British dashed up the slope, breaking ranks. Colonel Washington, returning from his pursuit of Ogilvie and his dragoons, was to be right of the onrushing British, and he saw the confusion which had swept their ranks. "They are coming on like a mob; give them a fire and I will charge them," he messaged to Morgan. [24]

Howard's people had now reached the swale separating the knolls, and they had started up the hillock on which the cavalry had been posted at the beginning of the fight. Turning quickly on the retiring Continentals and Virginians, Morgan roared, "Face about, boys! give them one good fire, and the victory is ours!" He then galloped along the entire line. [25]

At this moment, the foe, confident of victory, was sweeping forward in an impetuous and disorderly fashion. As if on parade, the Continentals and Virginians faced about, and sent a volley crashing into the redcoats' ranks at a range of between 30 and 40 yards. Stunned by this unexpected and terrible fire, the British recoiled. Before they could recover from the shock, Colonel Howard called for a charge, and the grim Americans were upon them bayonets flashing. Tarleton, in the meantime, had called for his cavalry to charge. Just as the British horse was sweeping toward the foe, a volley crashed into their flank from an unexpected direction, and sent them reeling back in the wildest confusion. The dragoons of the Legion, ill disciplined at best, and spoiled by the easy successes Tarleton's dash had gained for them, were not the men to face a surprise attack.

Moments before, the British might have escaped by flight. But by this time Colonels Washington and Pickens were ready to strike. Washington's cavalry swept down upon Tarleton's right, while Morgan and Pickens hurled the re-formed militia at his left. [36]

The result was a double envelopment, perfectly timed. The British, Tarleton admitted, were thrown into a panic. Tarleton sent orders for his cavalry to rally and form about 400 yards to the right of the foe, while he endeavored to re-form the infantry to protect the two 3-pounders. The cavalry of the Legion, however, refused to listen to the pleas of their officers, while Tarleton's effort to collect the infantry was ineffectual. Neither promises nor threats could gain their attention. Many of the men of the 7th Fusiliers threw down their arms, and fell to the ground. Morgan watched as the Legion infantry and Light Infantry dropped their arms and accouterments and took to their "heels for security—helter-skelter." But they were quickly overtaken by the volunteer cavalry, and with the exception of a few, surrendered, about 200 yards from the point of disaster. As the Americans swept forward, the cry "Tarleton's Quarter" was raised. But a useless slaughter was avoided, as Morgan, Howard, and the other officers shouted for their men to spare their prisoners. [27]

As the Continentals forged ahead, Colonel Howard spotted the artillery a short distance to his front and called Captain Nathanial Ewing to take it. Captain Thomas Anderson of Delaware, hearing the order, also rushed for the same piece. Anderson won the race by placing "the end of his spontoon forward into the ground, made a long leap which brought him upon the gun and gave him the honor of the prize." [28] The other 3-pounder was captured by a detachment of Continentals led by Captain Robert H. Kirkwood. [29] Tarleton had watched in frustration as the Americans closed in on the handful of blue-coated Royal Artillerists. He sought to rally 250 dragoons of his Legion for a counterattack, for he felt that by a furious onset, he might yet win the day, as the Americans were badly disorganized by their sweeping success. He was unsuccessful, however. About 250 dragoons forsook their leader and rode off, bearing down any officer that opposed their flight. [30]

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On the Americans' right, the battalion of the 71st had been able to hold Pickens' militia at bay. Deserted by their cavalry and fiercely assailed in front and on the flank by the militia, the Highlanders slowly pulled back. Just when it seemed as if they might escape, Colonel Howard, his Continentals freed by the quick surrender of the 7th Fusiliers. threw his right wing against them.

This movement threw their ranks into confusion. The militia rushed forward and engaged the Highlanders in hand-to-hand combat. Into the Scottish masses charged Colonel James Jackson at the head of his Georgians. He snatched at the regimental flag but missed. Howard promised quarter, and Major McArthur surrendered his sword to Colonel Pickens. [31]

Fourteen officers and 40 men of the 17th Light Dragoon rallied on Tarleton. As he led a charge in a futile effort to save the Highlanders, Tarleton was intercepted by Washington's cavalry. Tarleton's horse was shot from under him. Dr. Robert Jackson, Assistant Surgeon of the 71st, rode up and offered his horse to the Colonel. Tarleton refused, but Jackson insisted, exclaiming, "Your safety is of the highest importance to the army!" As Tarleton swung into the saddle, Jackson affixed a handkerchief to the end of his cane and walked toward the Americans. When challenged, he answered, "I am assistant surgeon of the Seventy-First. Many of the men are wounded and in your hands. I therefore come to offer my services to attend them." [32]

Colonel Washington was satisfied that Tarleton would be with the dragoons, as they were the only organized British force still on the field. Burning with desire to capture him, Washington ordered a pursuit. The Americans soon overtook the retreating foe, but in his eagerness to come to grips with the British, Washington had outdistanced most of his column. As Washington pounded into view, Tarleton and two of his officers wheeled their horses about. Undaunted, Washington struck at the first that approached him, the officer on Tarleton's right. Washington's sword crashed against the Britisher's and snapped off near the hilt. The English officer stood up in his stirrups to deal Washington a mortal blow. Just at this moment, a lad named Collins rode up and shot the Britisher in the shoulder. The uplifted arm fell. Tarleton's other companion moved to close with Washington, but he was routed by Sergeant-Major Perry. Tarleton pushed forward and made a thrust at Washington, which he parried with what remained of his sword. Tarleton, seeing that additional Americans were at hand, wheeled his horse around and rejoined his retreating dragoons. As he galloped off, he took a parting shot at Washington, whose horse received the ball. [33]

The detachment from each corps under Lieutenant Fraser of the 71st that was guarding the train received early news of the defeat from several Loyalists. He ordered the excess baggage destroyed, had the men climb into the wagons, and led them to Cornwallis' encampment. While on his forced march neither he nor any of his men saw any Americans or Colonel Tarleton's column. Fraser's command was the only infantry to escape the debacle. [34]

A body of Tories, who were attached to Tarleton's command and had been employed as guides and spies, moved in to plunder the abandoned wagons. Tarleton and his people came upon the Tories, and in their haste failed to ascertain their identity. Calling for a charge, Tarleton scattered the Tories, killing and wounding a number, before pushing on toward Broad River. Before reaching the Broad with the survivors of the disaster, Tarleton learned that Cornwallis had not advanced beyond Turkey Creek. He accordingly turned his column to the southeast toward Hamilton's Ford, where he could open direct communications with his superior. [35] About 200 horsesoldiers of the Legion, who had fled the field, reported to Tarleton on the 18th at Hamilton's Ford. [36]

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A second party of dragoons, in addition to those with Tarleton, returned to the British lines, reporting in at Cornwallis' encampment on the evening of the 17th. From these people, His Lordship first learned of the defeat of his young protégé. [37]

Washington and his troopers, in a futile effort to bag Tarleton, pressed on about 20 miles. Unfortunately for the Patriots' cause, they followed almost from the start the wrong road. They took a road leading to the Pacolet instead of that taken by the British toward the Broad. Although every effort was made, after the discovery of the error, to recover the lost time, the fugitives had too much of a headstart. On his return to the Cowpens, after abandoning the chase, Washington and his people swept through the countryside and rounded up about 100 stragglers from Tarleton's shattered corps. [38]

The battle had commenced about 7 a.m. and had continued for nearly an hour. Morgan listed his losses as: 1-2 killed and 61 wounded. This loss was chiefly sustained by the Continentals and Virginians, and particularly by the flank companies posted on the right of Howard's line. Tarleton lost 110 killed including one major, 13 captains, 14 lieutenants, and nine ensigns; 830 prisoners were counted, including 200 wounded. Tarleton had lost nine-tenths of his force; a fourth of Cornwallis' field army, a blow from which the latter never recovered. [39]

Among the trophies of victory were two stands of colors, two 3-pounders, 800 muskets, 35 wagons with the baggage of the 7th Fusiliers, 60 Negro slaves, 100 cavalry horses, one traveling forge, a large quantity of ammunition, and "all the enemy's music." [40]

At Cowpens on January 17, 1781, the Patriot forces had gained a smashing victory. Under a resolution of Congress passed March 9 the thanks of the United States were given to General Morgan, and the officers and men under his command, "for their fortitude and good conduct, displayed in the action at the Cowpens." The resolution further provided that a gold medal be presented to General Morgan, silver medals to Lieutenant Colonels Washington and Howard, and a sword to Colonel Pickens. [41]

News of the victory was welcomed by Patriots throughout the country. General Washington wrote the President of Congress on February 17 that he hoped this success would "check the offensive operations of the enemy until General Greene shall have collected a much more respectable force than he had under his command by the last accounts from him." The battle again proved the value, if employed properly, of the militia. [42]

Colonel Tarleton blamed his defeat on several factors: (a) the bravery and good conduct of the Americans; (b) the loose manner of forming which had always been practiced by the King's troops in America; and (c) to the sudden onset which panicked his troops. The "extreme extension of the files" by the British, he continued, was responsible for the disaster. Previously, this had been nullified by the "multiplicity of lines with which the British generally fought." If infantry who are formed "very open, and only two deep," he wrote, "meet opposition, they can have no stability: But when they experience an unexpected shock, confusion will ensue, and flight, with out immediate support, must be the inevitable consequence." [43]

One of Tarleton's subordinates, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie countered:

if his [Tarleton's] files were too extended, why did he not contract them? For he says...that "the disposition was planned with coolness, and executed without embarrassment." Any other mode of attack, or disposition, therefore, which he might have planned, would doubtless have been executed with equal promptitude. [44]

Moreover, Mackenzie continued, Tarleton had been badly outgeneraled by Morgan. Because of his hurry to launch an attack, the advance had been taken up while the 7th Fusiliers was still forming and before the reserve had moved into its assigned position. Thus, the British infantry was in no condition to press its advance when the Continentals recoiled, as it had been exhausted by forced marches. Up till this moment, not less than two thirds of their officers had fallen. Morgan soon discovered that the Legion cavalry was holding back. He ordered Colonel Washington to cover Howard's people and to check the pursuit. Washington's dragoons carried out their mission, and Howard's infantry as soon as it had faced about launched a savage counterattack on the British. Mackenzie continued:

In disorder from the pursuit, unsupported by the cavalry, deprived of the assistance of the cannon, which in defiance of the utmost exertions of those who had them in charge, were now left behind, the advance of the British fell back, and communicated a panick [sic] to others, which soon became general: a total rout ensued. [45]

Lord Cornwallis was understandably distressed. As a result of his experience at Camden, it seemed impossible that "an inferior force, two-thirds militia should gain such a decisive advantage over his favorite hero." [46]

Tarleton, in commenting on the disasters at Kings Mountain and Cowpens in his Campaigns, wrote that the defeat of Ferguson was a catastrophe which put an end to the first expedition into North Carolina, and the battle of Cowpens overshadowed the commencement of the second invasion. The battle of Cowpens greatly heartened the Patriots and cast a pall of gloom over the British army and their Tory sympathizers. It was a prelude to Yorktown. [47]