THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN
March 29 - April 9, 1865
What was to become the final campaign for Richmond began when the Federal Army of
the Potomac crossed the James River in June 1864. Under Lieutenant General U.S.
Grant's command, Federal troops applied constant pressure to the Confederate lines
around Richmond and Petersburg, and by Autumn, three of the four railroads into
Petersburg had been cut. The South Side Railroad remained as the only means of rail
transportation into Confederate lines, and once severed, the Army of Northern Virginia
would have no other choice but to evacuate the capitol.
However, Lee's concern stretched beyond the Confederate capitol to Federal actions
elsewhere in the south. By February of 1865, two federal armies, one under Major
General William T. Sherman and the other under Major General John M. Schofield, were
moving through the Carolinas. If not stopped, they could sever Virginia from the rest of
the south, and if they joined Grant at Petersburg, Lee's men would face four armies
instead of two. Realizing the danger, Lee wrote the Confederate Secretary of War on
February 8, 1865: "You must not be surprised if calamity befalls us."
By the time he wrote this letter, Lee knew he would have to leave the Petersburg lines,
the only question was when. Muddy roads and the poor condition of the horses forced
the Confederates to remain in the trenches throughout March.
Once again, Ulysses S. Grant seized the initiative. On March 29, Major General Philip H.
Sheridan's cavalry and the V Corps began moving southwest toward the Confederate
right flank and the South Side Railroad. On the 1st of April, 21,000 Federal troops
smashed the 11,000 man Confederate force under Major General George Pickett at an
important road junction known locally as Five Forks. Grant followed up this victory
with an all- out offensive against Confederate lines on April 2nd.
With his supply lines cut, Lee had no choice but to order Richmond and Petersburg
evacuated on the night of April 2-3. Moving by previously determined routes,
Confederate columns left the trenches that they had occupied for ten months. Their
immediate objective was Amelia Court House where forces from Richmond and
Petersburg would concentrate and receive rations sent from Richmond.
Once his army was reassembled, Lee planned to march down the line of the Richmond
and Danville Railroad with the hope of meeting General Joseph E. Johnston's Army of
Tennessee coming from North Carolina. Together, the two armies could establish a
defensive line near the Roanoke River, and assume the offensive against Sherman.
The march from Richmond and Petersburg started well enough. Many of the
Confederates, including Lee, seemed exhilarated at being in the field once again, but
after the first day's march signs of weariness and hunger began to appear.
When Lee reached Amelia Court House on April 4, he found, to his dismay, that the
rations for his men had not arrived. Although a rapid march was crucial, the hungry
men of the Army of Northern Virginia needed supplies. While awaiting the arrival of
troops from Richmond, delay by flood condition, Lee decided to halt the march and send
wagons into the countryside to gather provisions. Local farmers, though, had little to
give and the wagons returned practically empty. The major result of this effort was a
lost day of marching. This delay allowed the pursuing Federals time to catch up, proved
to be the turning point of the campaign.
Leaving Amelia Court House on April 5, the columns of Lee's army had travelled only a
few miles before they found Union cavalry and infantry squarely across their line of
retreat at Jetersville. Rather than attack the entrenched federal position, Lee changed
his plan. He would march his army west, around the Federals, and attempt to supply his
troops at Farmville along the route of the South Side railroad.
The retreat of the Army of Northern Virginia was under constant Federal pressure.
Union cavalry attacked the Confederate wagon train at Paineville destroying a large
number of wagons. Tired from lack of sleep (Lee had ordered night marches to regain
the day he lost) and hungry, the men began falling out of the column, or broke ranks
searching for food. Mules and horses collapsed under their loads.
As the retreating columns became more ragged, gaps developed in the line of march. At
Sailor's Creek (a few miles east of Farmville), Union cavalry exploited such a gap to
block two Confederate corps under Lt. Generals Richard Anderson and Richard Ewell
until the Union VI Corps arrived to crush them. Watching the debacle from a nearby hill, Lee exclaimed, "My God! Has the army been dissolved?"
Nearly 8,000 men and 8
generals were lost in one stroke, either killed, captured, or wounded. The remnants of
the Army of Northern Virginia arrived in Farmville on April 7 where rations awaited
them, but the Union forces followed so quickly that the Confederate cavalry had to
make a stand in the streets of the town to allow their fellow troops to escape.
Blocked once again by Grant's army, Lee once more swung west hoping that he could be
supplied farther down the rail line and then turn south. Just north of Farmville, Lee
turned west onto the Richmond-Lynchburg Stage Road. The Union II and VI Corps
followed. Unbeknownst to Lee, however, the Federal cavalry and the V, XXIV, and XXV
Corps were moving along shorter roads south of the Appomattox River to cut him off.
While in Farmville on April 7, Grant sent a letter to Lee asking for the surrender of his
army. Lee, in the vicinity of Cumberland Church, received the letter and read it. He
then handed it to one of his most trusted corps commanders -- Lt. General James
Longstreet. Longstreet tersely replied, "Not yet."
As Lee continued his march westward he knew the desperate situation his army faced.
If he could reach Appomattox Station before the Federal troops he could receive rations
sent from Lynchburg and then make his way to Danville via Campbell Court House
(Rustburg) and Pittsylvania County. If not, he would have no choice but to surrender.
On the afternoon of April 8, the Confederate columns halted a mile northeast of
Appomattox Court House. That night, artillery fire could be heard from Appomattox
Station, and the red glow from Union campfires foretold that the end was near. Federal
cavalry and the Army of the James -- marching on shorter roads -- had blocked the way
south and west.
Lee consulted with his generals and determined that one more attempt should be made
to reach the railroad and escape. At dawn on April 9, General John B. Gordon's Corps
attacked the Union cavalry blocking the stage road, but after an initial success, Gordon
sent word to Lee around 8:30 a.m. "...that my command has been fought to a frazzle, and
unless Longstreet can unite in the movement, or prevent these forces from coming upon
my rear, I cannot go forward."
Receiving the message, Lee replied, "There is nothing left for me to do but to go and
see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths."
joe_williams@nps.gov