# The Battle of the Aleutians...

A GRAPHIC HISTORY \* 1942-1943

# THE BATTLE OF THE ALEUTIANS

In honor and memory of the men of the North Pacific Theater who died so that a continent might be free

\* \* \*

A chain of unsinkable aircraft carriers now stretches across the North Pacific — from the shores of Alaska to the threshold of Japan. This small book is a partial record of the men who fought for these Aleutian bases, and the men who built them into impregnable fortresses that history will remember as the Northern Highway to Victory.

PRODUCED BY THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION, FIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS, ADAK, ALASKA

OCTOBER, 1943

MAJOR HENRY W. HALL, Infantry Intelligence Officer

Illustrations, maps and layout . SGT. HARRY FLETCHER

Reproduction by detachment 29th Engineers stationed with Headquarters Western Defense Command 1944



# The Northern Highway to Victory

Major General Eugene M. Landrum commanded the ground force that occupied Adak. Later, he led the American troops to victory on Attu. Before leaving the Aleutians for a new assignment, General Landrum made the following summary of the campaign:

"Contrary to popular opinion, the Aleutian campaign had its inception prior to the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor. In successive steps our ground forces occupied and secured bases on which were constructed airfields, docks, warehouses and other facilities.

"The navy has played an indispensible part in the prosecution of the campaign. Time was a vital factor—and the sea, weather and terrain conditions existing in this theater presented difficulties that must be experienced to be understood.

"In spite of these difficulties, the existence of the first Aleutian bases enabled us to meet the abortive Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor with bombers and fighters.

"The construction of the key base at Adak was then pushed rapidly. This enabled bomber attacks on Kiska to have fighter protection. The next move took us to Amchitka, within relatively few flying minutes of Kiska.

"The campaign thus far having provided for effective air attack on the enemy, was then brought to a successful conclusion by a combined operation which secured for our troops the valuable forward and flanking position on Attu.

"The capture of this island so threatened the ability of the enemy to sustain himself in the Aleutians that he withdrew his forces from all American territory in this theater.

"This campaign is not over and will not be over until the Japanese people are forced to unconditional surrender.

"The campaign so far has driven the Japanese out of our territory and has furnished us with a chain of bases that adds immeasurably to the security of Alaska, the west coasts of Canada and the United States, and gives to our forces the initiative in the North Pacific area. We can rest assured that these advantages will be retained and exploited to the discomfort of our enemies.

"The campaign has further proven that the American soldier can soundly whip the Japanese, and that the Japanese, when placed under unfavorable conditions, will evacuate strong positions."

The Aleutian Islands are the tops of submerged mountain peaks—a 1,000 mile westward extension of the high volcanic ranges of the Alaska Peninsula. Some of these submerged peaks rise more than four

miles from the ocean bed; there are few places where the ocean is deeper than here. Once upon a time, long ago, this now-sunken range may have been a land bridge from A in to America over which America's prehistoric inhabitants slowly made their way can to this new land. A now we have made of these islands a road over which we may swiftly make our way to Ann. If the Eleventh Air Force with many strong bases on the Aleutians—is now the northern arm of a gigantic many armed air force prince closing on the Japanese Empire; the Seventh Air Force in the Hawarian Islands, the Thirteenth Air Force in the Solomon Islands, the Fifth Air Force in New Guinea, the Tenth Air Force in India the Fourteenth Air Force in China. Elements of the Eleventh Air Force base afready strock at the strong Japanese military and naval installations on Paramushiru and Shimu hu. On July 10, 1913, and again on July 18th, August 11th and (only a few days before this account was written) on september 11th. B-24 and B-25 planes made bombing runs, dropping about 115,000 pounds of bombe on these Japanese targets. The story of the Alcutians in this war is not yet him bed.


## CHRONOLOGY OF THE ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN


December 7, 1941	Hostilities begin in the Pacific
June 3, 1942	Japanese attack Dutch Harbor
August 30, 1942	American forces occupy Adak
September 14, 1942	Planes from Adak bomb Kiska
September 20, 1942 .	American forces occupy Atka
January 12, 1943 Am	erican forces occupy Amchitka

February 21, 1943 Planes from Amchika bomb Kida May 11, 1943 American forces haid on Atta May 29, 1943 Lust Inputtick crushed on Atta May 30, 1943 Occupation of Atta completed July 10, 1943 First raid on Paramushira August 15, 1943 Allied forces occupy Kiska

# ENEMY ATTACK ... Dutch Harbor bombed

When, on December 7, 1941 the Japanese first attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor we had, on all our Alaskan islands, only two small army posts and naval bases. One was on Kodiak Island. The other was at Dutch Harbor on Unalaska. In all wide-spread Alaska we had but six small army posts. \* In June, 1942, the Japanese struck at Dutch Harbor. But this time they did not catch us napping. Two secret airfields had been hastily installed just east and west of Dutch Harbor. One was at Cold Bay, near the tip of the Alaska Peninsula. The other was on Umnak Island. The Blair Packing Co. and Saxton & Co., supposed to be canners of fish, were the disguises these secret airfields wore. \* On June 2. 1942, two Japanese aircraft carriers were reported less than 400 miles south of Kiska. They were moving eastward. Bad weather fought against us there. Air reconnaissance was almost impossible. Patrol planes would find the Japanese, only to lose them again in fog and storm before bombers could be brought to the spot. Bad weather always played a part in Aleutian warfare. \* On June 3, and again on June 4, bombers and fighters based on these carriers attacked Dutch Harbor. Bad weather fought against American and Japanese alike. All available planes of the Eleventh Air Force had been rushed to our two secret airfields. They went up to meet the Japs, who had thought our nearest airfield was on distant Kodiak. Many of the Japanese planes failed to return to their carriers. Bad weather had a lot to do with that. But that same bad weather made it impossible for our planes to destroy the Japanese carriers or their convoying warships. \* The enemy task force withdrew from Dutch Harbor, and occupied Kiska, some 700 miles to the west. \* War had come to the Aleutians—to a chain of islands where modern armies had never fought before. Modern armies had never fought before on any field that was like the Aleutians. We could borrow no knowledge from the past. We would have to learn as we went along, how to live and fight and win in this new land, the least known part of our America.





# COUNTER-ATTACK . . . the Move on Amchitka


Our Airfield on Adak was a little more than 200 miles from the Japanese on Kiska, and nearly twice that distance from Attu. Planes left Adak to strike at the Japanese every day that the weather let them. But there was another island on which planes could be based only seventy miles from Kiska. This was Amchitka, one of the flattest of the Aleutians. \* Scouting parties on Amchitka hid while Japanese reconnaissance planes circled overhead. In December our scouts reported that Japanese patrols had dug test holes on Amchitka, hunting for suitable airfield sites. Another race for an Aleutian island was on. \* On January 12, 1943, U. S. forces landed on Amchitka. They came ashore as they had come ashore at Adak—wading through icy surf. They came ashore from jam-packed freighters and transports and




barges that had sailed and been towed through long days and nights of fog and storm. \*Again bad weather had no favorites. It kept the Japanese planes home at their bases, and played havoc with our shipping. Not until twelve days later were our Amchitka forces attacked from the air. And they made good use of those twelve days. \*It was the story of Adak over again. Men toiling without rest in winter rain and wind, in the bitter cold surf of Constantine Harbor, through black Aleutian mud, over hard rock and heavy tundra. Unloading, carrying ashore, storing, protecting arms, ammunition, food, equipment, fuel even to the smallest kindling. For here in the Aleutians the soldier's needs are many and the country can supply

WILD WIND IN THE ALEUTIANS

Massacre Bay, 3,000 or 4,000 yards inland, and the valleys leading to Chichagof Harbor. \* The beaches of Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay were strongly defended against frontal attacks, but no protection was given to the area immediately north of Holtz Bay, and some of our forces landed there unopposed. In general, the enemy used the same tactics he had used—and is still using—in the Southwest Pacific. Though he lacked foliage and tropical growth, he prepared excellent camouflaged positions, and dotted the terrain with fox holes, two-man caves and light machine gun and mortar positions. \* Enemy rifle fire was generally inaccurate, and the sniping, though annoying, was never a serious hindrance to our progress. But, in the early stages of the fight, small groups of Japanese with light machine guns and the so-called "knee mortar" often had our troops hugging the ground, unable to advance. \* The constant use of "small group" tactics forced us to search thoroughly every square foot of area to our rear as well as on our flanks. Japanese would lie motionless for hours at a time. Their rifles and machine guns gave out no flash, no smoke, to betray their positions. \* The enemy on repeated occasions counter-attacked against superior numbers in daylight, though it has been said that the Japanese attack only at night. \* The much-discussed fanatically reckless fighting spirit was shown by the small number of prisoners we took, by their killing their wounded rather than letting them fall into our hands, and by such desperate kill-or-be-killed assaults as that of May 29th, in which every Japanese who could walk took part, some armed only with bayonets tied on the end of sticks. \* A last attempt to aid the Attu garrison by a formation of sixteen Japanese bombers was blocked by Eleventh Air Force fighters. Only four of the enemy planes escaped destruction. They fled in the fog. \* The annihilation of the Japanese at Chichagof Harbor was completed on Memorial Day, May 30, 1943. \* An observer at Attu said, "American troops do their best fighting when they can close with the enemy and see what they are shooting at." \* On July 10th U. S. planes took off from Attu-to bomb Paramushiru.





## ATTACK . . . the Battle of Attu

The Japanese had occupied Attu in June, 1942. In mid-September a Jap infantry battalion moved from Attu to Kiska. Our air reconnaissance first reported this movement on September 22nd. It is probable that the Japanese either evacuated Attu completely or withdrew most of their forces at that time. 


In late October a reoccupation force from Japan reached Attu. Beach defenses were immediately constructed in both arms of Holtz Bay and the Japanese garrison was reinforced from time to time until March 1943. By then there were about 2,200 men in the garrison. 

The most important mission of the Japanese garrison on Attu—aside from defense of the island—was the construction of an airfield at the East Arm of Holtz Bay. Thanks to Adak and Amchitka, our mastery of the air kept them from



accomplishing that mission. Attu is about forty miles long, twenty wide, and its highest peak rises more than 3,000 feet above the sea. On May 11, 1943, after being delayed four days by bad weather, U. S. forces landed on the island. From the very beginning the Japanese were on the defensive, and made the most of the terrain for that purpose. The occupied portion of Attu was divided by the Japanese into two main defense sectors, (1) the Holtz Bay sector, and (2) the Chichagof sector, which included Massacre Bay and Sarana Bay. Although they must have expected a landing at Massacre Bay, the Japanese had not organized beach defenses in that area. Instead they chose to defend the high ground at the northern end of

him with literally nothing. No one who has not seen it can have any conception of the tremendous quantity of supplies and equipment that must be moved from ship to shore. And, once ashore, all this vast mountain of material had to be transported by hand. Vehicles were of little use in those allimportant early days of the occupation. \* And these men did what they had come to do. They built their airfield. From January 24th on, Japanese planes scouted and bombed Amchitka whenever weather permitted. But by February 18th a new fighter strip was ready for Warhawks and Lightnings. The Japanese bombers came over no more. \* The occupation of Amchitka, like the occupation of Adak five months before, let us still further increase the pressure on the Japanese at Attu and Kiska. Within two months our reconnaissance and bombing missions had forced the enemy to give up attempts to bring reinforcements and supplies to Attu and Kiska by surface vessels. \* Aerial photographs taken on January 19th had revealed the beginnings of an enemy fighter strip south of Salmon Lagoon, on Kiska. This strip—and another strip begun at about the same time an Attu—were the targets for constant attacks throughout the spring. As a result of these constant attacks, and of our success in keeping supply ships from bringing adequate machinery to the islands, the Japanese failed to finish either airfield. \* With the occupation of Amchitka, the stage was set for a new phase in the Aleutian campaign. We had been racing the Japanese for island bases. Now we were next door to the Japaneseheld base of Kiska. Attu, the only other base the Japanese held in the Aleutians, was nearly two hundred miles farther away. Either island would have to be taken by force. And Kiska was the more important of the two, as well as the more accessible. \* It was decided to by-pass Kiska and take Attu first. For this there were two reasons: (1) The Japanese were expecting us to attack Kiska, and (2) with Attu in our hands we would have the Japs on Kiska-not surrounded, for with the weather as violent as it is in the Aleutians no island can ever be kept surrounded—but pinched between our bases.




## RETREAT...Flight from Kiska


WITH ATTU in our hands the Japanese occupation of Kiska was doomed. And the Japanese knew it as well as we did. ★ Kiska was first occupied on June 5, 1942, by a special landing party of 500 Japanese marines. At the same time some twenty Japanese ships, including four transports, moved into Kiska Harbor. ★ In September the Kiska garrison was reinforced by about 2,000 additional personnel, and, at about this time, was placed under the command of Rear Admiral Akiyama. Shortly afterwards an infantry battalion was moved to Kiska from Attu. In December 1942 and January 1943 additional anti-aircraft units, engineers and infantry arrived at Kiska, and in the spring of 1943 the tactical command was transferred from the Imperial Navy to Lt. General Higuchi, commanding general of the

Northern Army. ★ Japanese fighter and reconnaissance plane replenishments, boxed and crated, came to the island on the decks of small plane transports carrying seven to nine planes each trip. ★ By air combat and by strafing planes on the ground, the Eleventh Air Force whittled the Japanese air strength down as fast as new planes could be brought in. At no time during the enemy occupation of Kiska did he have more than fourteen effective planes on hand. ★ March and April 1943 saw increasingly severe bombing attacks on Kiska. On March 26th, a light U. S. naval force engaged a heavier enemy fleet and foiled an effort to run supply ships into Attu or Kiska. This was probably the last known Japanese attempt to supply either



island by large surface vessels. Enemy submarine activity in the waters around Kiska increased in late spring and early summer but was unsuccessful. A number of them were sunk by our naval forces. \* Bad weather and our concentration on Attu gave Kiska some rest in May. But after Attu fell we went to work on Kiska in earnest. Throughout June and July the intensity of our attack increased almost daily. \*During the first six months of 1943 the Eleventh Air Force dropped more than 3,000,000 pounds of bombs on the enemy installations. After the fall of Attu this deadly power was concentrated on Kiska. Nearly 900,000 pounds of bombs were dropped on that island in July. \* Demolition, general purpose, incendiary and parachute fragmentation bombs were released from high level, medium level. deck level and dive approaches. Fuzes ranged from instantaneous to long delay. Liberators, Mitchells, Dauntless dive bombers, Lightnings and Warhawks swooped over Kiska in coordinated and determined attacks. Kiska Island was to be made untenable. \* The first indication of a possible Japanese attempt at evacuation came on July 10th, when a navy PBY spotted four small cargo vessels between Kiska and Japan. Mitchells and Liberators sank one, left one sinking, and damaged the other two. \* In aerial photographs taken over Kiska from June 22nd on, other evidence of what might be preparations for evacuation were seen. This evidence included the destruction of some barracks, the removal of some guns, and unusual activity among barges in Kiska Harbor. On July 28th the Kiska radio went off the air. Later aerial photos showed trucks parked in the same position day after day. Naval shelling of Japanese installations drew no answering fire, and Eleventh Air Force units had only small-arms fire to contend with. \* Presumably the main body of Japanese troops had finished its evacuation of Kiska during the night of July 28th, going by barge to waiting surface ships or submarines. \* At daylight of August 15, 1943, U. S. and Canadian troops occupied Kiska. Even those enemy detachments responsible for the small-arms fire reported by planes over the island after July 28th had cleared out.





THE LOYAL COURAGE, vigorous energy and determined fortitude of our armed forces in Alaska—on land, in the air and on the water—have turned back the tide of Japanese invasion, ejected the enemy from our shores and made a fortress of our last frontier. But this is only the beginning. We have opened the road to Tokyo; the shortest, most direct and most devastating to our enemies. May we soon travel that road to victory."

M3Buellierfr.

### HEADQUARTERS, U. S. TROOPS OFFICE OF THE ENGINEER ALCHITEA, ALASKA.

Address: APO 986 c/o Postmaster, Seattle, Wash.

12 September, 1945.

Subject:

Commandation.

To:

Capt. Clifford F. McGinnis, C.E., Engineer's Office, Amchitka, Alaska.

- l. On the eve of my departure from this station to Alaska Department Headquarters, it is my desire to tell you of my appreciation of your loyal and efficient services to the Engineer since your arrival on this Island in January, 1945. When I appointed you my Operations Officer, you took over duties of three officers who were transferred to other Theatres of Operation not in Alaska.
- 2. You also were my Assistant Contract and Purchasing Officer in carrying to successful conclusion construction contracts for approximately \$2,000,000.00 of hangar and power and heating construction, and housing incidental thereto. As Operations Officer you had under your supervision and direction, the reconstruction of White Dock and Mirloff Dock, involving heavy gile driving and timbering. Extensive quarrying involving hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of rock for breakwater and road construction and in the maintenance of the 125 miles of roads.
- 3. Of special rention, I wish to corrend your handling of the operation of the hot mix asphalt plant incident to the resurfacing of several million square yards of runways, taxiways and hardstands, which, in this cold, wet climate, was an engineering task requiring the highest degree of skill and ability.
- 4. The work program under your direction involved over 700 Enlisted men from the 177th Engr. Const. Bn., and Detachment Engineers, Alaska Department, as well as approximately 400 Civilian Employees of the War Department and as many employees of the Contractor.
- 5. In the Utilities operations, the consolidation of the electrical distribution and generation system from 58 generation stations, to six central plants, was a major operation. The placing in operation of water pumping and purification stations, and about 15 miles of water mains was a big job in itself
- 6. In addition to the above, your work as Safety Officer and Assistant Fire Marshall, along with other work, make you one of the hardest working officers I've ever known, but your duties required the sixteen hours a day you put in on them, in order to do the efficient job you have done, and it is with great pleasure I extend to you my best wishes for the future, in assuming the position as Engineer, as my successor, and know you will continue doing a great job.

Soren Nelson Lt. Col. C.E.

#### HEADQUARTERS U S TROOPS

APO 986 U.S.Army

27 December 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO: Captain Clifford F. McGinnis, 0318501, CE.

- 1. Orders have been issued which will soon take you home for separation from the service after serving at this station since December 1944.
- 2. During your tour of duty at this Post you have been Commanding Officer, Detachment Engineers, in which position you have been the immediate supervisor of 260 military personnel and an equal number of civilians. As such, it was your responsibility to employ, direct and supervise engineer personnel in the performance of their assigned duties. You performed those duties in a highly satisfactory and creditable manner. For the past three months, you have performed the functions of Post Engineer. This position carried a much higher rank than you hold and it was my intention of recommending you for promotion, but your desires to return to civilian life prevented such action on my part. In this capacity you acted as advisor to the Post Commander and prepared plans for the future use of installations on this Island. Your competency in your professional work and cooperative spirit made work with you a pleasure.
- 3. You have contributed greatly to the success of this installation and it is with regret that I see you leave. I hope that your civilian career will be as productive of good work as your military life has been.

FRANK H. BARNHART
Colonel, Cavalry
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS U.S. TROOPS Amchitka Alaska

## CLEARANCE

Date 20 Dec 45

Clifford F. M. ginnis, Capt. (Signature of Officer) CE.

C	(Neme) (Rank) (ASI) (Organization)
	1. The above named officer is not indebted to any Government Agencies on this Post except as noted below:
	Agoney Officer in Charge
	Officers' Hoss. Kush Tuffin, Capt. C.a.C.
	Unit Supply Officer. Crafted The house Isolace
	Post Special Service Officer FRIEND Cold FD.
	N. V. L. The age
	Company Co mander. Custo Appell 15ths Of
	2. Clearance will be obtained from the following supply agencies by Com-
	pay or Unit Commanders only, except where an officer is acting in a Supervisory capacity or as Custodian, he will clear his Memorandum Receipt Account with the
	Quartermaster Property Section: / Cubut W. Wall a military
	Quartermaster Property. Transis & Cooky 2 nd ft, Vice
	Signal Property Julet h. mellon 1 the leg C
	Chemical Warfare Property
	Post Engineer. Judenih Caherne 1 Ht Ce
	3. I cortify that the above is a true statement of my accounts upon relief from duty at this station.
	4. I further certify that I have settled all my personal debts and obligations both military and civilian, incurred thile in Alaska.



The "David Branch" arrives at Amehitka Dec 23, 1945 to load a cargo of excess property for ? The States. Boywass ballast.



## CERTIFICATE OF RETIREMENT

FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO ALL WHO SHALL SEE THESE PRESENTS, GREETING: THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CLIFFORD F MC GINNIS 168 03 0519

HAVING SERVED FAITHFULLY AND HONORABLY,
WAS RETIRED FROM THE
UNITED STATES ARMY

ON THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF APRIL
ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-TWO

WASHINGTON, D. C.



Cane Lowers

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

philadeless to the